The Issue Whether the Petitioner should be treated as having abandoned his employment with the Respondent?
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was a Career Service employee with the Respondent. The Petitioner received a copy of an Employee Handbook upon his employment with the Respondent. The Handbook informed the Petitioner of the rules governing absences from work, including the rule providing that an employee will be treated as having abandoned his position if absent for 3 days without authorized leave. The Petitioner was employed as an Investigator in the Child Support Enforcement Office of the Respondent in Inverness, Florida. The Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Shirley Barker. In June, 1986, the Petitioner suffered a seizure. The Petitioner subsequently underwent surgery for the removal of a brain tumor in June, 1986. The Petitioner returned to work following his surgery on approximately September 15, 1986. Ms. Barker determined that the Petitioner's performance was not up to standard and discussed the need for additional leave with the Petitioner. The Petitioner's physician agreed that it would be beneficial for the Petitioner to have additional time to recover from his surgery and recommended an additional six months leave of absence. The Petitioner signed a Report of Personnel Action indicating that he was going to take leave without pay. The Petitioner's leave was effective October 13, 1986, "for a period of 6 months with return pending medical reevaluation." This leave of absence ended on April 13, 1987. During the Petitioner's 6 months leave of absence he was given a monthly medical evaluation by his physician. In December, 1986, the Petitioner met with Ms. Barker and told her that he planned on returning to his position with the Respondent when his physician approved his return. The Petitioner did not, however, tell Ms. Barker when he would return or request an extension of his 6 months leave of absence. In March, 1987, the Petitioner met with Barbara Jordan, a supervisor in the Child Support Enforcement Office of the Respondent. This was the Petitioner's only meeting during 1987 with any employee of the Respondent. During this meeting the Petitioner did not indicate when he would return to work or request an extension of his 6 months leave of absence. By letter dated April 16, 1987, Herbert R. Hildreth, Sr., Human Services Program Manager, and Ms. Barker's supervisor, informed the Petitioner that his 6 months leave of absence had expired. The Petitioner was also informed that he should advise the Respondent by April 26, 1987, of his intentions concerning his employment with the Respondent. Mr. Hildreth's letter of April 16, 1987, was received by the Respondent on April 21, 1987. The Petitioner did not respond to Mr. Hildreth's letter of April 16, 1987, prior to April 26, 1987. By letter dated April 30, 1987, Judith Mesot, Deputy District Administrator of the Respondent, informed the Petitioner that the Respondent considered the Petitioner to have abandoned his Career Service position with the Respondent because the Petitioner had been on unauthorized leave since April 10, 1987. By letter dated May 27, 1987, the Petitioner informed the Respondent that his physician had informed him during a May 20, 1987, appointment that he could return to work on a part-time basis. At no time between October 13, 1986, and April 13, 1987, did the Petitioner inform the Respondent when he intended to return to work or request an extension of his 6 months leave of absence. The first time that the Petitioner informed the Respondent that he was ready to return to work was in his May 27, 1987, letter.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued concluding that the Petitioner, John Blackford, has abandoned his position with the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. DONE AND ORDERED this 15th day of January, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2617 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1. 2 2. 3 and 4 To the extent that these proposed facts were proved by the evidence, see finding of fact number 3. 5 and 6 4. 7 5. 8 Hereby accepted. 9 and 10 6. 11 7. 12 Although the Petitioner testified that he met with Ms. Barker within one day after his monthly examina- tions, the weight of the evidence failed to support this testimony. See 8. Even if the Petitioner had met with Ms. Barker as often as the Petitioner indicated, the Petitioner still did not return to work or obtain approval of his absence after April 13, 1987. 13 and 14 To the extent that these proposed facts were proved by the evidence and are relevant, see finding of fact number 9. Most of these proposed findings of fact are not relevant, however. 15 10 and 12. 16 13. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 1. 2 6. 3 10 and 11. 4 Hereby accepted. 5 11. 6 12. 7 13. COPIES FURNISHED: Don Royston, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services District III Building H 1000 Northeast 16th Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32609 John Blackford 3199 East Quail Court Inverness, Florida 32652 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Agustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Respondent is charged under Section 464.018(1)(c), Florida Statutes, of being convicted, regardless of adjudication, of a crime which directly relates to the practice of nursing or the ability to practice nursing, and under Section 464.018(1)(d) 5, of being found guilty, regardless of adjudication, of a violation of Chapter 784, Florida Statutes, relating to assault, battery, and culpable negligence.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is, and at all times material hereto has been, a licensed registered nurse in the state of Florida, having been issued license number RN 1931082. She has been licensed in one or more states as a nurse for 25 years. She has been a critical care nurse and worked emergency rooms and ambulances. She has never before been the subject of Florida license discipline. On March 15, 1995, Respondent was charged with the crime of vehicular homicide, a second degree felony, pursuant to Section 782.071, Florida Statutes (1993). (See Exhibit R-5 showing the statutory year.) That statute provided in pertinent part, 782.071 Vehicular homicide. -- "Vehicular homicide" is the killing of a human being by the operation of a motor vehicle by another in a reckless manner likely to cause death of, or great bodily harm to, another. Vehicular homicide is a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. Any person who commits vehicular homicide and willfully fails to stop or comply with the requirements of s. 316.027(1) is guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 774.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 Respondent pled "not guilty" to the charge of vehicular homicide. On May 30, 1996, Respondent was tried and found guilty by a jury of vehicular homicide, in the Circuit Court in and for Manatee County, Florida under Case No. 94-3739F. A charge against Respondent of leaving the scene of the accident was dropped at trial. On June 27, 1996, Respondent was sentenced to six-and- one-half years of imprisonment followed by eight years of probation. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the Respondent's conviction, but her sentence was recalculated in connection with the applicable sentencing guidelines. There have been no other appellate decisions regarding Respondent's conviction. Respondent was due for work release shortly after formal hearing. The Respondent testified that she considered it her obligation as a nurse to stop and render assistance if she knew she hit someone with a motor vehicle; however, Respondent maintained that she did not know that she had hit anyone. The Agency presented no testimony, expert or otherwise, to relate Respondent's second degree felony conviction of vehicular homicide to the practice of nursing or the ability to practice nursing.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Nursing enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of both counts of the Administrative Complaint and dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 1998.
The Issue Whether Respondent Employer committed an unlawful employment practice by discrimination on the basis of age and/or retaliation1/ against Petitioner, in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Deanna L. Eftoda, was born on August 26, 1949. Respondent, HealthSouth Rehabilitation Hospital of Tallahassee (HealthSouth), is a healthcare facility providing both in-patient and out-patient rehabilitation services in Tallahassee, Florida. As such, it employs personnel designated as "exempt" and "non-exempt," pursuant to the federal Fair Labor Standards Act. Generally speaking, "exempt" employees are salaried employees, in managerial posts, who do not receive over-time pay by the hour, and "non-exempt" employees are regular, non- managerial employees, who are paid a set amount per hour up to 40 hours per week and time and a-half per hour for every hour above 40 hours that they work in the same 40-hour week. There are some exceptions to this federal compensation scheme which are immaterial to this case. At all times material, a “Nursing House Supervisor” or “RN House Supervisor” were interchangeable job titles. Petitioner was initially hired by Respondent on January 26, 2004, as an "RN-Baylor Nurse." The RN-Baylor position was a non-exempt position, and in that position, Petitioner's hourly pay rate was $28.00. Petitioner's hourly rate of $28.00, was very high for an RN-Baylor Nurse, but Petitioner's credentials are exceptional. Within days of her hire, Petitioner was asked whether she would take an RN House Supervisor position. Petitioner accepted the RN House Supervisor position, and a corrected personnel action form reflecting this change was prepared on January 30, 2004. Petitioner signed an acknowledgement of her acceptance of the House Supervisor position on February 22, 2004. Every House Supervisor employed by Respondent during Petitioner's period of employment was an exempt employee. The RN House Supervisor position that Petitioner accepted was an exempt position. Nursing House Supervisors traditionally worked the evening and night shifts, when there was no member of the hospital administration on duty. Without a member of the hospital administration on duty, the Nursing House Supervisor was the highest ranking management employee at the facility. While Petitioner was employed with Respondent as an RN/Nursing House Supervisor, Respondent simultaneously employed “Charge Nurses.” The duties of a Charge Nurse were similar to the duties of a Nursing House Supervisor. However, unlike Nursing House Supervisors, Charge Nurses traditionally worked the day shift, during which higher-ranking members of the facility’s administration were simultaneously on duty. In 2004, Respondent also employed a Charge Nurse on the weekend day shift(s) when at least one administrator was present for several hours. (This anomaly seems to be at least one element which confused Petitioner and led to this case.) Even so, unlike RN House Supervisors, all Charge Nurses were classified by Respondent Employer as filling non-exempt positions. Every Charge Nurse employed by Respondent during Petitioner's employment was classified as a non-exempt employee, eligible to earn time-and-a-half for overtime. Petitioner’s salary was not increased when she accepted the RN House Supervisor position, because her base salary (calculated at $28.00 per hour) was commensurate with the salary of other RN House Supervisors already being paid as managerial employees at straight salary. On the other hand, because Petitioner worked as an RN/Nursing House Supervisor on a “Baylor,” or weekend, shift, Respondent paid Petitioner a special compensation for being scheduled to work every weekend, with no weekends “off.” This special compensation took the form of Respondent’s paying Petitioner as if she had worked 36 hours per week, even though she was only scheduled for 32 actual hours of work per week. Petitioner believes that she worked a minimum of four additional hours per week, because it was her practice to come on shift an hour early and leave an hour late to set up and wind down the area and staff under her supervision as Nursing House Supervisor. She “guessed” there were some weeks when, between this practice and meetings she was required to attend, she worked 32 hours above the usual 40 hours per week. Her “best guess” was that she was working “two (additional) hours per eight-hour shift,” plus attending meetings which were not held during her shift(s), beyond her scheduled 32 hours, but Petitioner never worked straight eight-hour shifts. (See Findings of Fact 12-15, and 25.) A Nursing House Supervisor working the Baylor shift, or an RN-Baylor Nurse, normally worked two twelve-hour shifts on the weekend and one eight-hour shift during the week. When Petitioner was hired by Respondent in January 2004, she was completing a second doctoral degree. In order to accommodate Petitioner's work on her dissertation, Respondent had offered Petitioner an irregular shift pattern consisting of two sixteen- hour shifts on the weekends. Petitioner had accepted this scheduling accommodation. As RN House Supervisor, Petitioner was required to attend occasional mandatory meetings for Nursing Supervisors and other nursing staff. These meetings were held during the week, and usually, but not always, between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. This meeting time was more convenient for employees regularly working the weekday shift immediately before 5:00 p.m. or coming on shift immediately after 6:00 p.m., than for staff on other shifts, but no age or retaliation component existed with regard to Petitioner or anyone else on other shifts. Petitioner also was required once or twice to attend several hours of computer classes in a single day and other training, but so was everyone else on staff. Because the meetings were not on the weekends during the hours Petitioner would normally work, Petitioner’s attendance at the mandatory weekday meetings upset Petitioner's personal plans for study, research, and writing her doctoral dissertation, but there is no evidence she was singled out for this inconvenience. Petitioner claimed herein that she was entitled to be paid overtime for coming to "work" for meetings and classes. Because her Nursing House Supervisor position was an exempt position, Petitioner was not paid overtime for attending these mandatory meetings and classes, but no other exempt employees were paid overtime for attending these meetings and classes outside of their normal working hours, either. Respondent's policy does provide that if a Nursing House Supervisor works an additional shift as a "floor nurse," separate and apart from his/her regularly scheduled shifts as a House Supervisor, then that Nursing House Supervisor can be granted additional pay for that additional shift during which he/she works as a floor nurse, even though the House Supervisor position is that of an exempt employee. In order to be granted this additional pay, the Nursing House Supervisor must fill out an "Additional Pay for Exempt Employees" request form and submit the form to management for prior approval. The mandatory weekly meetings that Petitioner was required to attend as a part of her Nursing House Supervisor duties did not qualify as a full additional shift, for any employee. Petitioner received a memorandum dated April 12, 2004, explaining this. In fact, When Petitioner filled out the correct form for work as a floor nurse, she was paid at the $27.50 per hour rate for a floor nurse. She was not paid when she filled out such a form for mandatory staff meetings, classes, and training sessions. Petitioner represented that throughout her employment by Respondent, she repetitively and persistently inquired about how her pay was being calculated and why the Employer did not calculate it the way she thought it should. She also claims to have repeatedly requested a different calculation of her pay and leave accruals on the basis of her beliefs and desires, but at the time she made no formal claim or discrimination complaint related to these inquiries and requests. In her testimony, even Petitioner described what she was doing as “negotiating” her salary. Throughout her employment by Respondent, Petitioner was cited by management for performance problems, including but not limited to difficulty in dealing with staff; poor management style; poor judgment in dealing with her supervisors and subordinates; creating confusion and chaos for staff on her scheduled shift by her confrontational manner; failing to properly address performance concerns with staff on her scheduled shift; and failure to take responsibility for her own actions. Giving Petitioner the benefit of the doubt, some of her friction with management and staff may have arisen because of her complaining that evaluators did not observe her for an entire shift; because she mis-read management’s instructions on how to code her timesheets as a requirement to falsify them; because she perceived that Respondent’s staffing levels occasionally fell below matrix, and she then created turmoil by calling in extra staff, whereas her superiors did not share her interpretation of the matrix requirements or the staffing events themselves; because she blamed the preceding shift for cleanliness issues; because she perceived herself undervalued for her extensive nursing experience; because she perceived herself personally opposed and ridiculed by a nurse of lesser or equal rank (Mandar); and because she did not believe that her superiors backed her up sufficiently and/or did not afford her the appropriate discretion in her interactions with subordinates. Petitioner objected to Respondent’s chain of command, which had her reporting to Ms. Roberts, Nurse Manager. Petitioner felt she should report directly to the Director of Nursing, her “two-up” supervisor. However, none of these disputes rose to the level of a protected activity under Chapter 760.10(7), Florida Statutes (see Finding of Fact 35), or related to Petitioner's age in any way. From Respondent's perspective, its administration received a myriad of complaints from Petitioner's supervisors, peers, and subordinates, regarding Petitioner's management style and performance. Some of Respondent's employees threatened to quit if they were forced to continue to work under Petitioner's supervision. Petitioner testified that in July 2004, she had polled her subordinates and asked them to indicate that they had “no problems” with her management style. Then she presented the list of subordinates to her superiors. This could have legitimately been viewed by Respondent’s management as Petitioner’s insubordination to them and/or intimidation of the polled subordinates by Petitioner. Respondent’s Nurse Manager and Petitioner’s direct supervisor, Barbara Roberts, felt that she was being required to spend an inordinate amount of her time dealing with Petitioner's problems. As a result of these problems, Petitioner was placed on probation on September 10, 2004. Petitioner challenged this probation, and a review was conducted by Respondent's management. Despite the fact that the complaints concerning Petitioner's management style and performance came from various sources, Petitioner complained that Ms. Roberts was unfairly disciplining and harassing her. Respondent's management concluded that the attention Petitioner had received from Ms. Roberts was not improperly motivated, but was a result of personality conflicts between Petitioner and other employees. Some of the allegations against Petitioner were substantiated, but investigation into an allegation that Petitioner had coerced or threatened employees into working, only produced limited supporting documentation. In the absence of additional documentation, Lynn Streetman, Hospital Administrator, concluded that probation was not the correct level of discipline for Petitioner. (P-22) Ms. Streetman recommended that Petitioner's supervisor, Ms. Roberts, chalk the problems up to differences in management style and downgrade Petitioner’s probation citation to a "written warning." On September 30, 2004, the probation citation was replaced with a written warning citation. Also on September 30, 2004, six months after Petitioner’s initial hire and approximately five and a-half months after she accepted the exempt Nursing House Supervisor position, Ms. Roberts sent Petitioner a memorandum informing her that it was no longer operationally feasible to continue the irregular pattern of two sixteen-hour shifts on the weekend (R- 3).2/ Respondent's reason for this change was that for four hours of each day that Petitioner was scheduled to work, there was an overlapping period when two supervisors were on duty, and this duplication of supervisory personnel resulted in an unnecessary expense for Respondent. Ms. Roberts' memorandum informed Petitioner that it was operationally necessary for Petitioner to begin working the traditional Baylor-RN's two twelve-hour weekend shifts and one eight-hour shift during the week, beginning with the October 16-17, 2004, weekend. This managerial decision obviously inconvenienced Petitioner for purposes of completing her doctoral dissertation, and she contends the decision was “retaliatory.” However, the change had been in discussion with management before September 30, 2004. Immediately after her probation was down-graded to a written warning, Petitioner asked for a weekend off, which was granted. Because she took a weekend off at that time, Petitioner had one less weekend to use later in December 2004. (See Finding of Fact 36.) Approximately October 17-18, 2004, when her new shift arrangement was beginning, Petitioner's supervisors again sought to put her on probation, due to a series of complaints by staff similar to the previous ones. Ms. Roberts and other superiors believed Petitioner distorted common conversations and created chaos on her shift by misinterpreting in her conversations with her subordinates the instructions her superiors had given her. In accord with its policy, Respondent launched a second investigation into Petitioner's alleged misconduct. On December 11, 2004, prior to conclusion of the second investigation, Petitioner sent an e-mail to Ms. Roberts and to Respondent's Human Resources Director, Jackie Chaires, requesting that her status be changed from full-time Nursing House Supervisor to "PRN," or "as needed," status. Petitioner's e-mail stated, I believe I have 'too many irons in the fire.' With my dissertation and numerous meetings outside my 32 hours, I find myself run down. To remedy this situation I am willing to wait until January 17, 2005 for this transition to begin. Please advise as to the salary changes. Petitioner believed that by giving four weeks’ notice before the date she wanted to “go PRN” she would be entitled to a payout of “personal time off” (PTO). However, due to subsequent events, she was not entitled to an "in cash" payout of PTO. (See Findings of Fact 59-60.) Respondent's policy provided that at any time an employee moved to a new position, he/she was placed on a 90-day mandatory probation to assess his/her performance in that new position. Because Petitioner was to be placed on a mandatory 90-day probation at the time that her status changed to PRN, there was no need to also place Petitioner on probation due to the conclusions of the second investigation into her alleged misconduct. However, Ms. Streetman instructed Ms. Chaires and Ms. Roberts to meet with Petitioner to go over the various performance problems that Petitioner was experiencing, and to inform Petitioner that continued poor performance in these areas during her PRN probationary period could result in disciplinary action up to, and including, termination. This meeting took place on December 15, 2004, and led to a rebuttal by Petitioner on December 29, 2004. (See Finding of Fact 34.) Petitioner previously considered moving to PRN status during February 2004. Petitioner also claimed that in March or April 2004, she had requested to be moved back to an RN-Baylor Nurse position, and that Ann McElreath, Director of Patient Care Services/Director of Nursing, told her that she could not make such a move without suffering a 45-percent decrease in compensation. Ms. McElreath testified that she did not remember any such request from Petitioner, and that she never told Petitioner that Petitioner would suffer a 45 percent decrease in pay if she moved back to a Baylor-RN position. Ms. McElreath further testified that she would have no reason to make such a statement to Petitioner, because she was not involved in any way in setting salaries. In light of the differential between part-time and full-time pay schedules, as discussed hereafter (see Findings of Fact 38 and 58), and the complexity of Respondent Employer’s other pay categories, coupled with the complexity of Baylor status, one can see how Petitioner misunderstood her situation, but her testimony evidences a clear misunderstanding of how Respondent calculated salaries, as well as a misunderstanding of the effect of designating exempt and non-exempt positions. On December 29, 2004, Petitioner sent a memorandum to Ms. Roberts, Ms. Chaires, Ms. Streetman, and Ms. McElreath, requesting to rescind her request to move to PRN status and requesting to finish another six months as House Nursing Supervisor; complaining about “harassment” by Ms. Roberts due to Ms. Roberts’ telephone calls reminding Petitioner to attend meetings and Ms. Roberts’ “insulting” Petitioner’s professional abilities by not seeing/taking Petitioner’s side of many issues with staff. Petitioner requested to begin “dispute resolution.” At no point in this memorandum did Petitioner mention anything about alleged discrimination on the basis of age. At no point during any investigation, nor at any other time, did Petitioner allege that she was being discriminated against based on her age. She did allege harassment by her immediate supervisor, Ms. Roberts, but this was in the nature of challenging Respondent’s basic chain-of-command decisions; Ms. Roberts' not permitting her sufficient discretion; and Petitioner’s belief that only Petitioner could interpret Center for Disease Control (CDC) requirements regarding cleanliness and restrictions on the employment of coughing personnel and Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) staffing requirements with regard to scheduling additional staff and instructing staff concerning these issues. Yet, Petitioner has never posed any complaint directly alleging violations of any federal or state regulation besides her “exempt” versus overtime issues, which she raised for the first time, herein. Petitioner wanted to take off December 31, 2004, and January 1, 2005 (New Year’s Eve and New Year’s Day), and she had been authorized in advance to do so. However, that authorization was rescinded when management discovered that she had already used the three weekend leaves to which she was entitled and that there might be staffing problems for the weekend period requested. (See Findings of Fact 26 and 54-57.) Petitioner had already made arrangements for her personal activities, and badgered management by e-mail to give her one or the other day off. Management ultimately let her have one of the days off, despite its “only three weekends” policy. Due to Petitioner’s on-going performance problems; management’s continuing concerns about her ability to effectively function as Nursing House Supervisor raised in the second misconduct investigation; and the patient safety concerns raised by her admission that she felt she had too many demands on her time, Respondent's management declined to allow Petitioner to rescind her request to move to PRN status. On January 5, 2005, Ms. Chaires told Petitioner, and on January 10, 2005, Ms. Chaires sent Petitioner a formal acknowledgement, of Respondent's acceptance of Petitioner's request to move to PRN status, effective January 17, 2005. On January 12, 2005, Ms. Chaires sent Petitioner an e- mail communication outlining the Respondent Employer’s pay rates for PRN status/service. Because Petitioner would be moving from a full-time House Nursing Supervisor position to a part-time PRN position, Ms. Chaires informed Petitioner that there would be a reduction in her salary from $28.00 per hour to $21.00 per hour. Ms. Chaires testified that it was customary for an employee moving from a full-time House Supervisor position to a PRN position to experience a reduction in pay. Petitioner claimed she was discriminated against because she received no merit increase at the end of 2004. She believes the lack of merit increase constituted retaliation for her obtaining the rescission of probation on September 30, 2004. Actually, Respondent’s employees undergo performance evaluations approximately every October. According to Respondent's policy, if an employee is on probation at any time during the third- quarter (July, August, September) of the calendar year, that employee is not eligible for a merit increase in connection with that year's October performance review. Respondent considered Petitioner ineligible for a merit raise at the end of 2004, because she had been on probation in September 2004; because there was a second investigation into Petitioner's performance and alleged misconduct that continued at least until December 15, 2004; and because Petitioner had requested to change her status to PRN. Because Petitioner’s probation was rescinded on the last day of September 2004, she technically was not barred from a merit increase due to being on probation in the third quarter, but she continued to be in the turmoil of some sort of disciplinary investigation until at least December 15, 2004. Respondent may have not followed the letter of its policy, but it maintained that policy’s spirit and purpose in not rewarding with a merit increase an employee who was subject to discipline at any moment. Petitioner also has not demonstrated that she was eligible for a merit increase based on meeting or exceeding performance standards. There is no credible evidence that the lack of an evaluation, the contents of an evaluation, or the lack of a 2004 merit increase in pay for Petitioner, constituted discrimination against her on the basis of her age or in retaliation for any protected activity. On January 14, 2005, a Friday, Petitioner had a friend phone Ms. Roberts on her behalf. The friend informed Ms. Roberts that Petitioner had undergone surgery that same day and would not be able to work as scheduled on the upcoming weekend. When Ms. Roberts inquired as to what kind of surgery Petitioner had undergone, the speaker would not give that information to Ms. Roberts. Ms. Roberts informed the caller that Petitioner should call Respondent to discuss her expected recovery time and her availability to return to work. Petitioner, who testified that she had listened to the foregoing conversation, described Ms. Roberts as “rude,” and the phone call may, indeed, have been acrimonious, in that the caller insisted on Petitioner’s right to medical privacy and Ms. Roberts wanted some detailed explanation why Petitioner was unable to report for work and why Petitioner was giving such short notice for her weekend shift(s), if she had not been in an accident and if she had elected the surgery in advance. At hearing, Petitioner’s explanation for her inability to work her last House Supervisor shift(s) covering January 14, 15, and 16, 2005, was that she had elected minor surgery with the intent to return to work her regular shift, but the procedure had turned out to be more debilitating than she had expected, so she could not return to work as scheduled. Also by date of January 14, 2005, Petitioner submitted an application for PRN employment with a different health care provider, Interim Healthcare. This date was a little more than a month after Petitioner had requested PRN status with Respondent; a little more than two weeks after Petitioner had sought to rescind that request; and two days after Respondent had declined in writing Petitioner's PRN rescission request. It was three days prior to Petitioner's scheduled move to PRN status with Respondent on January 17, 2005, pursuant to her accepted request. There was nothing to prohibit Petitioner from signing-up for PRN work with multiple health care providers. Because Petitioner did not show up for her last three scheduled shifts (two days) as Nursing House Supervisor, Respondent's policy required Petitioner to provide a doctor's note releasing her to return to work before Respondent would place her on PRN duty. Petitioner never provided Respondent with a doctor's note releasing her to return to work. Petitioner's testimony, that Ms. Chaires had told Petitioner on some previous occasion that as an "exempt" employee Petitioner did not need a doctor’s note for her absences, is not credible upon the record as a whole. It also is immaterial whether Petitioner's absence for her last three shifts/two days equate with "three consecutive days' absence," per Respondent’s policy on doctors’ notes, because more than three days passed without any word from Petitioner in response to Ms. Robert’s January 14, 2005, instructions by telephone. Respondent’s witnesses maintain that after January 14, 2005, Petitioner never initiated contact with Respondent in any way to discuss her availability for work, and that Ms. Streetman first phoned Petitioner in March 2005, to determine whether she was returning to work as a PRN. Petitioner claims that Respondent did not call her for any PRN work until May 2005, and therefore, in effect, Respondent constructively terminated Petitioner’s employment. There also is some divergence in testimony whether or not Respondent mailed Petitioner a package of materials with instructions that she must complete and return those materials before Respondent would call her for PRN duty, in March or at any other time. However, there is no dispute that during May 2005, Ms. Streetman, as acting interim Human Resources Director for Respondent, had telephone contact with Petitioner to coordinate Petitioner’s return to work as a PRN nurse. During this conversation, Petitioner informed Ms. Streetman that she would not return to work for Respondent as a PRN nurse under any circumstances. Petitioner stated that she would only work for Respondent if: Petitioner were returned to the position of full-time House Supervisor; Petitioner would only work a 16-hour shift on the weekends; and Ms. Streetman would set up a meeting with herself, Petitioner, Ms. Roberts, and a corporate representative of Respondent to discuss the resolution of various issues Petitioner wanted addressed. These issues were much as set out previously. (See Findings of Fact 17-19 and 35-39.) Age does not seem to have been one of Petitioner’s issues. Petitioner also indicated that she had not received the PRN packet of information that Respondent maintains it had sent her. Ms. Streetman immediately forwarded a copy of the PRN package to Petitioner. Although Petitioner provided a copy of a current CPR card to Respondent in May of 2005, she did not provide a doctor's note releasing her to return to work, her executed PRN paperwork acknowledging her duties and responsibilities as a PRN nurse, or an executed acknowledgement of Respondent's HIPPA policies and procedures, all of which Respondent required before putting Petitioner on its PRN status/phone list. On or about May 24, 2005, Ms. Streetman once again contacted Petitioner and informed her that she was unable to bring Petitioner back to work under the conditions that Petitioner had previously outlined, but Respondent was willing for Petitioner to work as a PRN nurse. Once again, Petitioner informed Ms. Streetman that she would not return to work as a PRN nurse under any circumstances. Accordingly, at that time, Ms. Streetman terminated Petitioner. During her employment with Respondent as a Nursing House Supervisor, Petitioner accrued PTO, in accordance with her position and length of service. As a Nursing House Supervisor, Petitioner should have accrued PTO at the rate of 7.69 hours of accrued PTO per two week pay period, which corresponds to the PTO accrual schedule for staff employees. However, due to a clerical error by Ms. Chaires, Petitioner actually had been allowed to accrue PTO at a rate of 9.54 hours of accrued PTO per two-week pay period, which corresponds to the PTO accrual schedule for department head employees, even though as Nursing House Supervisor, Petitioner was not a department head. Respondent's policy in 2004, permitted all Baylor, or weekend, employees of Respondent to expend PTO hours on no more than three weekends per year. Because Petitioner worked a Baylor, or weekend, schedule as Nursing House Supervisor, Petitioner was limited to using PTO for three weekends per year. Petitioner signed off on, and acknowledged, this three weekend limitation. Although this policy limited the weekend days on which Petitioner was entitled to use her accrued PTO, Petitioner was entitled to use her accrued PTO for any weekday shifts for which she was scheduled after September 30, 2004, when Ms. Roberts informed her that it was operationally necessary for her to work at least one eight-hour shift during each week. During 2004, Petitioner used 171 hours and 15 minutes of PTO, and all three of her allotted weekends off as a Baylor employee of Respondent. (See Findings of Fact 26 and 36.) Later in 2005, Respondent re-examined its PTO leave policy. In order to compete for staff with other local health care providers, Respondent changed the number of allowed weekend PTO days for its Baylor employees from three to four weekends. However, this increase in the number of weekend leaves permitted for Baylor employees did not affect Petitioner, because her request to move from full-time Nursing House Supervisor to PRN nurse had been granted, effective January 17, 2005, and the new leave policy was not retroactive. A PRN nurse occupies a part-time position. As a PRN nurse, Petitioner was not eligible to accrue or use PTO. On January 22, 2005, Petitioner’s PTO balance was 4.37 hours, meaning Petitioner had 4.37 hours of PTO available for use. The dollar value of Petitioner’s remaining PTO hours amounted to $83.09. According to Respondent's policy, an employee was eligible for a cash payout for his/her unused PTO hours upon voluntary resignation (including a voluntary employment status change) and/or involuntary lay-off if: (1) the employee had successfully completed his/her 90-day probationary period; (2) the employee provided Respondent with proper notice; and (3) the employee worked a minimum of four hours on his or her final scheduled day of work. Whether Petitioner successfully completed her probationary period as a Nursing House Supervisor is not at issue in this case. Sufficient notice of status change is not at issue in this case. (See Findings of Fact 29- 30.) Petitioner did not receive a cash payout for her 4.37 unused PTO hours on January 17, 2005, when she moved from a full-time Nursing House Supervisor position to a PRN nurse position, because she did not work the required four hours on her final scheduled day of work as a Nursing House Supervisor. Petitioner missed her final three scheduled shifts as a Nursing House Supervisor in January of 2004, and she did not work on the day that her employment with Respondent was terminated. whether one counts the status change date of January 17, 2004 or the final termination date in May 2005. (See Findings of Fact 45 and 52.) Therefore, Petitioner was not eligible for a PTO payout under Respondent Employer’s policy at the time her status changed to PRN nurse, January 17, 2005. Between January 14, 2005, and November 2005, Petitioner did not apply for any type of work so as to mitigate potential damages. After January 14, 2005, she had PRN status with Interim Healthcare, but she did not accept work from Interim until November 2005. During that period, she only attended classes and lived on her student loans. Petitioner had previously acquired at least a J.D. (law degree), two nursing degrees, and possibly another doctorate. With these credentials, she was certainly not “unemployable” during the interim of January-November 2005. Petitioner never complained to Ms. Roberts, her direct supervisor, that Petitioner believed that she was being discriminated against on the basis of her age. In 2004, Petitioner would have been 55, and Ms. Roberts would have been 51 years of age. Ms. Roberts never treated Petitioner any differently than any other Nursing House Supervisor. Ms. Roberts was not actively aware of Petitioner's age at any time during her employment. Petitioner never complained to Ms. McElreath, then- Director of Nursing and Petitioner's “two-up” supervisor, that Petitioner believed she was being discriminated against on the basis of her age. Ms. McElreath would have been 50 to Petitioner's 55 years of age at all times material. Petitioner never complained to Ms. Chaires, Director of Human Resources, that Petitioner believed she was being discriminated against on the basis of her age. No decision that Ms. Chaires made concerning Petitioner was motivated by Petitioner's age. Petitioner never complained to Ms. Streetman, Respondent's administrator, that Petitioner believed she was being discriminated against on the basis of her age. Ms. Streetman would have been 49 years of age, at all times material. No decision that Ms. Streetman made concerning Petitioner was motivated by Petitioner's age.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief and Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 2006.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of willful absence from duty, in violation of Section 1012.67, Florida Statutes; willful neglect of duty, in violation of Sections 447.209, 1012.22(1)(f), and 1012.40, Florida Statutes; gross insubordination, in violation of Sections 447.209, 1012.22(1)(f), and 1012.40, Florida Statutes; and incompetence, in violation of Sections 447.209, 1012.22(1)(f), and 1012.40, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact During the 2001-02 school year, Petitioner employed Respondent as a part-time cafeteria worker at Ludlam Elementary School. Except for the manager, all food workers at the school are part-time employees. The absence of any of these workers, especially without notice on the morning of the nonappearance, places a considerable burden on the other cafeteria workers and jeopardizes the provision of what may be the first meal of the day for many students. By January 24, 2002, Respondent had been absent 16 days, including the four consecutive days preceding Christmas vacation, four of five days in mid-January, and January 22-24, 2002. Responding to this problem, the school principal sent Respondent a memorandum dated January 24 and ordering her to notify the principal of when Respondent intended to return to work and use leave procedures in the future. On the same date, the principal sent another memorandum to Respondent ordering her to communicate directly to the principal when Respondent intended to be absent and document future absences with medical excuses. Respondent signed this memorandum, indicating receipt. On Sunday, January 27, 2002, Respondent telephoned the principal and told her that Respondent would be returning to work the following day. The next day, when Respondent appeared at work, the principal talked to her about Respondent's professional responsibilities and offered to refer her to the Employee Assistance Program for help with a problem with alcohol that Respondent said that she had. Respondent declined the offer and said she would follow the principal's orders. The next day, Respondent arrived to work late. The following day, Respondent did not report to work or call in to notify the school of her absence. The two succeeding days, Respondent did not report to work, but she called the principal to say that she was in the hospital. However, on the last day of the week, Respondent did not report to work and did not call in. On February 11, 2002, the principal conducted a conference-for-the-record (CFR) with Respondent. Respondent said that she had been a recovering alcoholic for 15 years and had been encountering problems with alcohol since October. The principal again offered a referral to the Employee Assistance Program, but Respondent said that she was already in counseling. The principal warned Respondent that further noncompliance with her order would be gross insubordination. On February 19 and 20, 2002, Respondent was again absent and again failed to notify anyone at school of her absence. On the next day, the principal sent another warning memorandum to Respondent. On February 26 and March 11, 2002, Respondent again missed work and again failed to call anyone at the school. Respondent never provided medical documentation for these absences. Also, on March 5 and 8, 2002, Respondent was tardy without calling in to say that she would be late. On March 11, Respondent also failed to attend an appointment that the principal had scheduled for her with the Employee Assistance Program. Respondent told the principal that she would reschedule the appointment, but later failed to appear at this appointment. On September 20, 2002, the district office conducted a CFR. Out of 18 workdays in the new 2002-03 school year, Respondent had already missed four. For the prior school year, Respondent had been absent 47 times and late 11 times. Of the 47 absences, Respondent never called the principal 23 times and never even called the school 11 times. Respondent at first claimed that she had only been absence once that school year, but later admitted to four absences. She then explained that two of the absences were due to a job interview and an accident at the train station. On January 16, 2003, Petitioner advised Respondent that it had suspended her and initiated dismissal proceedings for the reasons set forth above. Petitioner has proved that Respondent is guilty of willful absence from duty without leave by repeated absences without leave and without notification on the day of the absence; willful neglect of duty by repeated absences, repeated failures to advise the school of absences, and repeated failures to provide medical documentation for absences; gross insubordination for the repeated disregard of the principal's order to call in before absences and document absences; and incompetence for the failure to perform her job duties adequately.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order dismissing Respondent from employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of March, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Merrett R. Stierheim Interim Superintendent Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, No. 912 Miami, Florida 33132-1394 Daniel J. Woodring, General Counsel Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street 1244 Turlington Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Denise Wallace Legal Department The School Board of Miami-Dade County 1452 Northeast Second Avenue, Suite 400 Miami, Florida 33132 Carleen Braddy 1884 Northwest 53rd Street Miami, Florida 33142
Findings Of Fact On April 18, 1988, Respondent, Jack Schenkel, was employed as one of fifteen fire fighter/emergency medical technicians, (EMT), with the Tarpon Springs Fire Department. He was scheduled to work on C shift which was to start at 7 am and extend for 24 hours until 7 am, April 19, 1988. In accordance with normal procedure, he then would have been off for 48 hours before his next shift. At approximately 1:30 am on April 18, Lt. Dennis L. Jennings, B shift supervisor, was on duty at the main fire station, when he received a phone call from the Respondent who indicated he had had a serious quarrel with his girl friend. Respondent indicated she was drunk and had "trashed" his house and he needed to stay at home to insure his possessions were not ruined. Respondent's actual request was for a personal day off, and when Mr. Jennings indicated there was no such thing for City employees, Respondent asked for a vacation day. It is and has been, for as long as Respondent has worked with TSFD, Department policy that vacation pay can only be authorized by personnel above the grade of Lieutenant, and while the actual paper request may, at times, be signed after the fact, the authorization must be received prior to departure so that the Department has time to rearrange schedules to accommodate the absence. When Mr. Jennings advised Respondent of this, though evidence indicates he was aware of it, Respondent indicated he had had no sleep and as a result, Mr. Jennings suggested that Respondent take a day of sick leave. However, Mr. Jennings also reminded Respondent that in accordance with an order issued in writing by the Fire Chief in 1979 to the effect that requests for sick leave must be called in between 6 and 6:30 am of the day in question, prior to the start of the duty day, he would have to call in during the prescribed time to arrange for his sick leave. Though a Lieutenant can take the information, he does not have the authority to approve the leave. As a matter of fact, however, bona fide sick leave, called in in conjunction with the Chief's order, at an appropriate time, is never disapproved. Respondent did not call in between 6 and 6:30 am on April 18 to request sick leave as he had been instructed to do by Lt. Jennings. Mr. Lopes, also a fire fighter, who was scheduled to work on the same shift, arrived at approximately 6:50 that morning. When he spoke to Lt. Jennings to ask where he would be assigned, Jennings advised him that Respondent had not come in and Lopes would fill his slot. Jennings told Lopes what Respondent had told him concerning the house and like matters. At that point, Lopes advised Mr. Jennings that Respondent did not own the house where he was living nor was he the prime tenant. To verify this, Jennings telephoned Respondent at home at approximately 7:05 am. When Respondent answered the phone and Jennings asked why he had not reported for duty, Respondent indicated that he intended to take a sick day. Jennings reminded him that he had not called in properly and told him that if he took the time off, there would be repercussions. According to Jennings, Respondent did not seem concerned about that possibility, replying something like, "Oh well, whatever." Lt. Jennings logged this call in and reported the situation to his relief, Lt. Parker, the incoming shift lieutenant. He also discussed the matter the following morning with Assistant Chief Carr and at Carr's request, submitted a written statement of what had happened. According to the City regulations, sick leave, such as was requested by Respondent here, can be used for situations where the employee himself is sick or disabled; where the employee has an appointment with a physician or dentist; where the employee in under medical quarantine; and as a result of a death in the immediate family of the employee, in which case, only four days leave are authorized. Girl friends are not included within the definition of "immediate family." In the opinion of Mr. Carr, sick leave is not authorized for circumstances such as were described by Respondent in his reasons for not coming in. Under the terms of the City regulation, taking a sick day for a reason not within the above-described categories, constitutes grounds for discipline. When Respondent came to work on April 21, 1988, Chief Carr called him in and asked for an explanation of why Respondent had failed to report for duty on April 18. In response, Respondent told him the same story he had related to Lt. Jennings. In the course of their conversation, Carr advised Respondent that he, Respondent, knew from prior incidents that sick leave was not appropriate under these circumstances. Respondent replied that his girl friend was sick and he was concerned about her safety, and showed Carr a copy of the police report regarding the incident on April 18 which reflected that she was highly intoxicated. Carr advised Respondent that the circumstances did not justify or authorize sick leave, and that action would be taken to terminate him from employment. With that, Respondent left. After Respondent departed, Chief Carr reviewed his personnel records in detail and saw the number of sick days Respondent had taken since he began work with the Department, as well as his prior disciplinary record. Respondent's personnel record shows that in the years he has been an employee of the City, he has taken 44 sick days accounting for 1,056 hours of sick leave. He then prepared a memorandum outlining it which he forwarded to the City personnel director who concluded that termination was appropriate. Respondent's personnel records reflect the following actions: Memorandum 7/82 from Respondent's shift leader indicating he arrived 2 hours 9 minutes late for work. When questioned, he related his alarm did not go off due to a possible power failure. Memorandum 8/19/82 from Respondent's supervisor reflecting he was again late for work by 1 hour 45 minutes. On 2/7/83, Respondent called in for sick leave at 6:40 am, 10 minutes after the close of the call-in window. Respondent was given a written reprimand. On 3/23/83 Respondent reported for work at 7:11 am without calling in. He indicated he had a flat tire. He was ordered to take a one day suspension without pay. On 5/2/83 Respondent was found asleep on duty with earphones on his head, a violation of rule 5, Section 4, Civil Service Rules and Regulations of the City of Tarpon Springs. For this offense, Respondent was given a warning. On October 27, 1983, Respondent was warned and counseled regarding the prior discrepancies in his job performance including the incident involving his sleeping on duty and his 17 incidents of sick leave within a relatively short period. On October 7, 1985, Respondent was again counseled on his excessive use of sick days which then amounted to 26 despite a counseling on the matter in December, 1984 and in October, 1983. On February 7, 1986, Respondent was disciplined for calling in at 6:48 am, on February 4, 1986, outside the window for sick leave call in. He was given a written warning and a one day suspension without pay. On August 7, 1987, Respondent called in sick at 6:17 am which was within the parameters of the Chief's order. As is the Department's policy, however, the Lieutenant on duty called back several minutes later to check on the employee, and found that Respondent was not sick. In fact, he had left to go to the store to pick up a part for the truck on which he was working. Since this constituted an abuse of sick leave, he was given a three shift suspension without pay. On January 28, 1988, Respondent was counseled for poor report writing and advised to take greater care in doing so. Even after two warnings to this effect, his reports were still incorrect and incomplete and he was given a written warning. Chief Carr is of the opinion that Respondent's improperly using sick days, and his failure to call in to request sick leave on time, demonstrates a disregard for the City's leave program and regulations. After the incident on April 18, Chief Carr had a report prepared analyzing Respondent's sick leave from the beginning of his employment with the Department in 1982. This report showed a pattern wherein Respondent would work one shift, do overtime and exchange days with other fire fighters so he could work two days in a row, and thereafter take several sick days in a row. It was apparent from this analysis that Respondent was manipulating the sick leave process for his own benefit and the testimony of Ms. Evans that he was moonlighting with Medic-One, an ambulance company in Pinellas County, on some of the days he had called in sick, tends to support this conclusion. Under the terms of the Personnel Rules of the City of Tarpon Springs, a fire fighter earns 15 days sick leave per year, which, if not used, can be carried over to succeeding years. Chief Carr has not had a sick leave analysis prepared on any other employee within the Department even though, to his understanding, there are others who have taken off an equivalent number of sick leave days. To the best of his understanding, however, the other employees utilized their sick leave in an appropriate manner. Respondent has been employed by the Department since May, 1982 as a paramedic. He admits the incident on April 18. He went to bed at approximately 10 pm on the evening of April 17, 1988 because he had to go to work the next morning. He was awakened around midnight by his girl friend who was hitting him, throwing things around, and screaming. She was very intoxicated. Respondent tried to avoid her and called the police who tried to quiet them both down. After the police left at about 12:30 am, Respondent went to sleep on the couch. At approximately 1:30 am she started fighting with him again and to avoid any further dispute, he took some of his things, left the apartment and made the first call to Lt. Jennings. In that conversation, according to Respondent, he advised Jennings he was tired and upset and needed the day off but to his recollection, did not request any specific type of time off. At the time in issue, Respondent admits to having both sick leave and vacation time adequate for the following day accrued. According to Respondent, Jennings did not say Respondent could not have the time off nor did he say how it would be recorded. He also did not tell him to call back or to do anything else in order to secure approval for his time off. However, in light of the fact that Respondent had obviously been aware of the requirement to call in for sick leave within a certain time window, and in light of the uncontroverted evidence that he failed to do so, whether Jennings advised him to call in or not is irrelevant. After talking to Lt. Jennings, Respondent intended to spend the night on his boat. However, he was too upset and was unable to sleep and he merely sat on the boat until just before dawn when he went back to his apartment. He did not sleep at all that night. Jennings called at about 6:30 am. During the conversation, Jennings talked to him about whose apartment it was and Respondent, tired and upset, told Jennings that since he'd already given him the time off, he could categorize it any way he wanted. Respondent had to find a place to stay and put his things in storage and he was quite tired. He did not feel he could go to work, and since Jennings did not direct him to come to work, he did not do so that day. Respondent reported to work the next shift he was scheduled for and was called in for an interview during which he was advised he was being terminated for abuse of sick leave. He attempted to tell the Chief he had not requested sick leave and explain what had happened, but Carr advised him he was nonetheless going to recommend Respondent be fired. Respondent does not dispute his prior disciplinary record but denies ever having called in on sick leave when he was not really sick in order to work someplace else. The testimony of Ms. Evans outlining several days on which Respondent worked for Medic-One when he appears to have called in on sick leave shows otherwise. Respondent would not object to a use of vacation time for the absence on April 18, 1988. It appears from the evidence that had Respondent not had so extensive a history of prior disciplinary actions, his absence here may well have been charged to vacation leave to protect him. Vacation time, when properly authorized, can be used for any purpose whatever. However, it must be properly approved in advance by someone higher than a Lieutenant. Chief Carr admits that had Respondent called and spoken to him that night, he might have been given vacation leave. However, in this case, no consideration was given to allowing Respondent to take vacation time for this absence because of his prior record. In making his decision to terminate the Respondent, Chief Carr considered not only the Respondent's disciplinary record, but also his commendations. Nonetheless, the good in Respondent's file did not justify overlooking the bad and his judgement in this case is not unreasonable.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Jack Schenkel, be discharged from employment with the Fire Department of the City of Tarpon Springs. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of October, 3988, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. For the Petitioner: 1 - 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3 - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. 7. Accepted. 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. 9 - 10. Accepted and incorporated herein. 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. 12. Accepted. 13. Accepted and incorporated herein. Irrelevant. Accepted. 16 - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. 20 - 21. Accepted and incorporated herein. 22. Accepted. 23 - 36. Accepted and incorporated herein in substance but not in detail. 37. Accepted. 38 - 39. Accepted and incorporated herein in substance. 40 - 42. Accepted and incorporated herein. For the Respondent: 1 - 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3 - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. 6 - 10. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: NICHOLAS J. SARGENT, ESQUIRE SARGENT, REPKA, AND COVERT, P.A. 2963 GULF-TO-BAY BLVD., SUITE 320 CLEARWATER, FLORIDA 34619 ROBERT F. MCKEE, ESQUIRE 1724 EAST 7TH AVENUE TAMPA, FLORIDA 33605
Findings Of Fact On July 8, 1986, Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, sent Petitioner, Shirley Johnson, a letter to confirm her separation from employment as a Human Services Worker II in Pierce Cottage, Unit II, Facility IV, at the Gulf Coast Center in Ft. Myers. At the time, Johnson was a permanent employee of HRS. Her job at Pierce Cottage was to help care for 29 severely profoundly mentally retarded persons. On or about May 6, 1986, HRS' Gulf Coast Center instituted new policies for applying for authorization for leave from work. /1 No longer would Petitioner and fellow employees be required to notify their immediate supervisor, Twila Bevins, of their absence or tardiness. Instead, the employees are responsible only to notify the group shift supervisor on duty at Pierce Cottage. The employee only advises the group shift supervisor of the employee's intent to apply for authorization for leave and the amount and time the leave would be taken. The group shift supervisor does not approve leave. Authorization for leave must be obtained directly from the immediate supervisor, Twila Bevins, by explaining the reasons for the leave request which would entitle the employee to authorization for leave. Application for authorization for leave can be made either before or after the group shift supervisor is notified. However, no leave can be authorized for an employee who did not personally give notification of anticipated absence unless the employee is incapacitated. Petitioner is a mother of six. She also cares for her father, who has heart disease, and for her mother, who is overweight and has limited mobility. After a separation she has been reconciled with her husband, who, after being out of work, is now employed and contributes to the support of the family. On July 2, 1986, Petitioner and her immediate supervisor agreed that Petitioner would have July 3 and 4 off, but would work from 6:30 A.M. to 2:30 P.M. on July 5. Petitioner also was scheduled to work on July 6, 7 and 8, 1986. During the early morning hours of Saturday, July 5, between approximately 1:00 A.M. and 4:30 A.M., Petitioner's father had a heart attack and Petitioner and her husband went with him to the hospital and stayed there while he was being cared for. When they returned home at approximately 4:30 A.M., they were told by Petitioner's mother that Petitioner's brother was in jail in Ocala and that she was very concerned about her son. At her mother's request, Petitioner and her husband agreed to drive to Ocala to bail her brother out of jail. When they arrived in Ocala, Petitioner's husband, who was driving when they arrived in Ocala, was arrested for driving with a license under suspension and was himself put in jail. Petitioner herself then had to drive back to Ft. Myers to get money to bail her husband out of jail, drive back to Ocala to bail him out, and drive her husband back to Ft. Myers, a drive of a total of approximately 600 miles. Petitioner did not work and did not call in to work on Saturday, July 5. She was absent without authorized leave. On Sunday, July 6, 1986, Petitioner called into work at 6:30 A.M. to explain to the shift supervisor why she had been absent the previous day, and to notify him that she would not be in until approximately 10:00 A.M. However, tired from her ordeal the previous day and developing a severe headache, Petitioner did not work on Sunday, July 6. She called in later in the morning and spoke to one of the women working in Pierce Cottage but did not speak to the group shift supervisor. She was again absent without authorized leave. On the following morning, Monday, July 7, 1986, Petitioner called in at 6:25 A.M. to tell the group shift supervisor she would be late getting in to work. However, her headache got worse, and the pain traveled down to her neck and down one side of her body. The pain was so severe that she was crying uncontrollably. Although she still told her husband that she wanted to go to work to avoid any disciplinary problems, he talked her into letting him telephone Pierce Cottage to say that she would not be able to work on July 7. At approximately 6:45 A.M., her husband telephoned the group shift supervisor and told him that Petitioner would not be at work at all that day because of her physical condition. On Tuesday, July 8, 1986, Petitioner still was in approximately the same physical condition. At approximately 7:00 A.M., her husband telephoned the group shift supervisor at Pierce Cottage, reported her physical condition, and reported that Petitioner would not be in to work on July 8. Petitioner's husband also reported that Petitioner would probably have to see a doctor that day. Petitioner did indeed go to the Lee County Health Department on July 8, 1986, to be seen for her physical condition. Petitioner went to the Lee County Health Department because she and her husband could not afford to pay a private doctor. When Petitioner arrived at the Health Department at approximately 2:00 P.M., there was no doctor available to see her. She left at approximately 3:00 P.M. with a note confirming the she had been at the Health Department between 2:00 and 3:00 P.M., and that she needed a follow-up appointment. Although Petitioner still was suffering from a severe headache on Wednesday, July 9, 1986, she went to work, turning in her note from the Health Department. However, upon arriving, she was advised of HRS' July 8 letter confirming her separation from her employment. After reciting the grounds upon which HRS had taken the position that Petitioner should be deemed to have abandoned her position, the letter stated: "In the event it was not your intention to resign from employment, you are instructed to immediately contact me and provide a reasonable and acceptable explanation for your unauthorized absence from your employment." Petitioner was absent without authorized leave on July 5 and 6, 1986. Petitioner was not incapacitated from telephoning her group shift supervisor on July 7 and July 8, 1986. However, under the circumstances, it was reasonable for her to have her husband telephone for her. She did not intend to abandon her position. As of July 2, 1986, Petitioner had 27 hours of annual leave and 8 hours of compensatory time in her accumulative leave records and available for use July 5 - 8, 1986. She also would earn an additional 5 hours of annual leave and 4 hours of sick leave by July 10, 1986. This would have been enough to cover her absences and permit her to be paid during her absences if authorized and approved.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact' and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order granting the petition in this case and ruling that the circumstances of this case do not constitute an abandonment of Petitioner's position. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of November, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 1986.
The Issue Whether respondent discriminated against petitioner on account of her race in not promoting her to executive director, denying her a salary increase, threatening her with a demotion and/or placing her on medical leave?
Findings Of Fact At the time and place noticed for hearing, petitioner failed to appear and nobody appeared on her behalf.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, recommended that the FCHR enter an order denying the petition for relief. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Margaret Jones, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Anita I. Parker 7740 Southside Blvd., #501 Jacksonville, FL 32256 Glenn R. Padgett, Esquire Kinsey Vincent & Pyle P.O. Box 3096 Daytona Beach, FL 32018-0096
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Celeste H. Tiemsanguan (Petitioner) abandoned her career service position with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Respondent).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a clerk specialist with Respondent from October, 1988 until the end of December, 1988, and during such employment was a member of the career service system. The last day on which Petitioner worked was December 21, 1988. Petitioner brought a note to the home of her supervisor at 7:30 a.m. on December 22, 1988, stating that, "Effective this date I request six months maternity leave, with the Doctor's excuse to follow . . . ." Petitioner never provided a doctor's statement certifying her pregnancy, with specific beginning and ending dates for maternity leave, as required by the Respondent's Procedure No. 60-5 which governs leave without pay. By letter dated December 22, 1988, the Respondent attempted to notify the Petitioner that she needed to submit a doctor's statement prior to her leave being approved. This letter was sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, to Petitioner's last known address. However, it was returned to the Respondent as undeliverable. Petitioner did not report to work and made no further contacts with Respondent after December 22, 1988. She never provided a doctor's certification. On December 29, 1988, Petitioner was deemed to have abandoned her position, and notice of her abandonment was mailed to her on that date by certified mail, return receipt requested. Again, this letter could not be delivered. It became known to the Respondent on January 3, 1989, that Petitioner was in jail, and personal service of this notice of abandonment was accomplished by Betty Maddux, her immediate supervisor, on that date. Petitioner refused to sign acknowledging receipt of this letter. Petitioner did not properly request approval of maternity leave because she never provided a medical certification. She abandoned her position because she never received approval from Respondent for maternity, or any other type of leave. Therefore, between December 22 and December 29, 1988, Petitioner was absent without approved leave for three consecutive work days. Notice of the final hearing was sent to Petitioner at her last known address of record, and was not returned as undelivered. In fact, the Petitioner ordered subpoenas from the Division of Administrative Hearings on July 13, 1989. The final hearing had previously been continued one time at the request of the Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order concluding that Petitioner has abandoned her position with Respondent in the career service system. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of September, 1989 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara McPherson, Esquire District Legal Counsel 701 94th Street North St. Petersburg, FL 33702 Celeste H. Tiemsanguan 628 88th Avenue North, #2 St. Petersburg, FL 33702 John Miller, Esquire General Counsel 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Gregory Coler, Secretary 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Larry Scott, Esquire 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel 435 Carlton Bldg. Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 A. J. McMullian, III Interim Secretary Dept. of Administration 435 Carlton Bldg. Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Judith A. French (French), was employed full time by Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Department), as a switchboard operator in Riveria Beach, Florida. On three consecutive workdays, to wit: July 7- 9, 1986, French was absent from her employment without authorized leave. By certified letter dated July 10, 1986, the Department advised French that her absence from work since July 7, 1986, was unauthorized and that, pursuant to Rule 22A-7.10(2), Florida Administrative Code, she was deemed to have abandoned her position and resigned from the Career Service. The letter further advised French of her right to petition the Department of Administration for a review of the facts, and whether they constitute abandonment. French timely petitioned the Department of Administration for review. On August 13, 1986, the Department of Administration accepted French's petition and requested the assignment of a Hearing Officer from the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the final hearing. At hearing, French asserted that her absence was occasioned by a sudden and severe illness she contracted over the fourth of July weekend, which illness she averred rendered her totally incapacitated and unable to contact her employer the week of July 7, 1986. French offered no proof, however, of the cause or nature of her illness but merely testified that she was incapacitated, subject to profuse vomiting, and admitted to a hospital on July 14, 1906, where she was treated for a lack of potassium. While unable to do so personally, French contended that efforts were made on her behalf to advise the Department of her illness. According to Lester Smith (Smith), French's live-in-boyfriend and co-worker at the Department's Riviera Beach office, he made on attempt to call French's supervisor at noon, July 7, 1986, but no one answered the Department's telephone. Smith asserted that his efforts to contact the Department on July 1986, were frustrated by an epileptic seizure he suffered that morning, and the fact that he had to use a pay phone since their phone was out-of-order. Smith did not contend that he was incapacitated by his seizure of July 7, 1986, and offered no further excuse for his failure to notify the Department that he and French would be absent that day. On July 8, 1986, according to French and Smith, their friend Mr. Dudick offered to call the Department concerning their absence, and subsequently advised them that he had been unable to reach their supervisor but had left word with the Department that French and Smith were ill and their telephone out-of- order. Mr. Dudick did not testify at hearing, and there is no record of any such call having been received by the Department. On July 9, 1986, no effort was made to notify the Department that French would be absent from work. The proof established that French's absence from her employment on July 7-9, 1986, was not authorized, and that the Department was not notified that she would be absent due to illness. Consequently, on no less than three consecutive business days her employer was left without the benefit of her services or the notice needed to secure a replacement to perform her duties. While French may have been ill, she offered no proof that would excuse her failure to promptly notify her employer of her incapacity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration enter a final order finding that Petitioner, Judith A. French, abandoned her position and resigned from the Career Service. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1986 APPENDIX The Department's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows Addressed in paragraph 1. Addressed in paragraph 1. Addressed in paragraph 1. Addressed in paragraphs 2-7. COPIES FURNISHED: Judith A. French 2815 Broadway, Apartment #1 West Palm Beach, Florida 33407 K. Stuart Goldberg, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 111 Georgia Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 William Page, Jr., Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steven W. Huss, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
