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CIGNA HEALTHCARE OF FLORIDA, INC. (FLR-96.4678 AND FLR-96.5702) vs. DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, 87-005525BID (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-005525BID Latest Update: Apr. 19, 1988

Findings Of Fact On July 31, 1987, DOA mailed a Request for Proposal, (RFP), to various Health Maintenance Organizations, (HMOs), soliciting proposals for the providing of HMO services in the Orlando service area. Petitioner, Cigna, and the various Intervenors herein, submitted proposals which were opened by DOA on August 28, 1987, with a contemplated date of award of September 14, 1987 and an effective date of contract on January 1, 1988. Section 2 of the RFP defined the general purposes of the procurement as being to meet benefit objectives of DOA and to provide high quality benefits and services to state employees. Specifically, the objectives of the RFP were: A proactive approach to cost containment, including an emphasis on aggressive claims management, utilization review, and superior statistical reporting. Quality medical care which encourages health promotion, disease prevention, early diagnosis and treatment. Stability in the financial structure of offered health plans. Professional, high quality service in all administrative areas including claims processing, enrollment, membership services, grievances, and communications. Competitive premium rates which take into account the demographics and, if appropriate, the claims experience of state employees. Other stated objectives included: Have each county or contiguous group of counties be considered one service area. Award no more than two contracts per service area; however, the awards will be based on the HMO's ability to respond to the needs of employees and on accessibility by employees. Have reciprocal agreements between locations, if an HMO has multiple service areas. Enter into a two year, non-experience rates contract. A provision will be included tying renewal action at each of the two renewals to the consumer price index, (CPI), for medical care services. In order to be considered as a "qualified" proposer, an organization had to be licensed by the Department of Insurance pursuant to Part II, Chapter 641, Florida Statutes. Section IX of the RFP listed five major criteria for evaluation of the proposals. They were: Premium Cost Extensiveness of service area - by county and/or contiguous counties. Plan Benefits as follows: Covered services Limitations and exclusions Co-payments, deductibles, and coinsurance features Range of providers including specialists and numbers of hospitals D. Out of service area coverage F. Grievance procedures Accessibility as follows: Reciprocal agreements Provider locations Number of primary care physicians and specialists, in relation to membership Completeness of proposals The first four of the above objectives were called for by the Legislative action providing for these procurements to be effective January 1, 1988. The fifth, completeness of proposals, was not identified by the Legislature but was added by DOA. The Department reviewed and evaluated all the proposals submitted by Petitioner and the various Intervenors. Each proposer was evaluated by three individual evaluators. Two separate sets of evaluations were performed; the second coming upon the direction of the Secretary who, after the first evaluation and recommendation of award, concluded the standards for evaluation had been too subjective and directed a second evaluation utilizing more objective standards. During this second evaluation process, after the actual evaluations had been done but before the recommendation was forwarded to the Secretary, several computer treatments of the raw scores were accomplished by Mr. Nye because of additional unidentified factors brought to his attention. The final computer run identified that Central Florida Physicians, not a party to this action, received the highest point total followed by Health Options, Pru-Care, and Petitioner, Cigna. Mr. Nye, who had designed and supervised the evaluation process, recommended to the Secretary that Central Florida Physicians, Health Options, and Pru-Care receive the award even though the guidelines called for only two recommendees. Central Florida Physicians was recognized to be in financial difficulties though it received the highest rating, and in order to provide two viable candidates in the event that provider should be disqualified, Health Options and Pru-Care were added. Central Florida Physicians was, in fact, subsequently disqualified due to financial insolvency. This left Health Options and Pru-Care as the two providers with the highest evaluations and the Secretary made the award to them. At the final count, Health Options received a point total of 64.635; Pru-Care, 57.415; and Cigna, 56.83, or a difference of .585 between Pru-Care and Cigna. According to Mr. Black, an administrator with the Department of Insurance and responsible for the licensing of HMOs and other health care facilities, as of January 12, 1988, Pru- Care was not licensed in Volusia or Lake Counties and department records show that Pru-Care has never been or requested to be licensed in those counties. Mr. Beckerink, the Director of Planning for Cigna of Florida, who oversaw Cigna's proposal for the Orlando area and who reviewed DOA's evaluation of the various proposals submitted, carefully examined the evaluation forms for both Cigna and Pru- Care and concentrated on scores relating to costs, benefits, accessibility, service area, and completeness. He noted that Pru-Care received 10 points for proposing service in Orange, Seminole, Osceola, Lake, and Volusia Counties though it is not licensed in the latter two, whereas Cigna received only 4 points for Orange and Seminole Counties. Cigna is licensed in all five counties and has hospitals and physicians in Seminole, Osceola, and Orange Counties. He contends Pru-Care received credit by the evaluators for five counties when it is licensed only in three, an unearned award of 4 points, and Cigna was awarded credit for only two counties when it is licensed in five, an improper denial of 6 points. According to Mr. Nye, the award to Pru-Care was based on its representation it would provide service in five counties. The Department of Insurance could not tell him, at the time, in which counties Pru-Care was licensed. As a result, he took the proposal, which indicated the five counties, at face value. Credit was given only for full counties to be served and Cigna's proposal indicated it would deliver service to two full counties and to only portions of three counties. The evidence indicates that Pru-Care's facilities are primarily in Orange and Seminole Counties with some service offered in the extreme northern portion of Osceola County, too far away for those individuals living in the southern portion of that county reasonably to take advantage of it. Mr. Nye indicates that driving time, which would be the problem here, is not a consideration in assessing accessibility, but merely a factor in quality of service. The department is not concerned with whether it is convenient for the employee to get to the service but merely whether the service will be offered to anyone residing in the county. For this reason, Pru-Care was awarded credit for Osceola county since it proposed to enroll any eligible employee living in the county whether service was convenient to that party or not, whereas Cigna, which limited it's enrollment in certain counties to those personnel living in only a part of the county, was not given any credit for those partially served counties. Mr. Nye admits that had he known Pru-Care was not fully licensed, he would have deferred to legal counsel, but would most likely not award points if a provider is not licensed in a county for which it proposes service. Mr. Breckerink identified additional areas in the evaluation wherein he believes errors were made, the correction of which would result in an adjustment of the award of points. For example, in evaluating plan benefits, the evaluator gave Pru- Care 20 points when only 10 points are available for award without a demonstration of additional services. For emergency room availability, Cigna was awarded 5 points when it should have received 10. In the area of co- payments, Cigna was awarded points and should have received 23. Concerning range of providers, Cigna's proposal lists seven hospitals yet the evaluation form only reflects six, resulting in a shortage of 10 points. As to turnaround time, Cigna indicated it would accomplish payment in 60 days whereas Pru-Care indicated it would in "an average" of two weeks. As a result, Mr. Breckerink, who points out Cigna's actual time is 30 days and it therefore should have been given 30 points, contends there is no opportunity for a valid comparison here since Pru-Care's answer is not responsive to the RFP's call for" an "expected" time. His point is well taken. With regard to accessibility, Mr. Breckerink states that Cigna got only 20 points for its two allowed counties but should have received 30 points since it has hospitals in three counties in the service area. DOA's rationale on this point is identical to that on the issue of full counties served. He also alleges that Cigna was shortchanged by at least 2 points on the number of counties in which specialty providers are represented and by at least 1 point on the number of providers. Mr. Nye admits Pru-Care should have received 5 points instead of 10 for benefits. This would reduce its' raw score in this area from 258 to 253 points. Nye contends, however, that the points awarded Pru-Care for its' turnaround time were correct. He does not consider the question to be a bad one since it was asked equally of all providers and each responded as it saw fit realizing that its response might become a part of a contractual obligation. This reasoning is specious at best and does not address the real question of the fairness and appropriateness of the question asked. Further, Mr. Nye also admitted that under certain circumstances, if Pru-Care were to lose credit for those two counties in which it was not shown to be licensed, the change could result in a difference sufficient to reverse the relative standings of Pru-Care and Cigna. Mr. Breckerink alleges, and Mr. Nye admits that multiple computer runs were made utilizing the raw scores developed by the evaluators before the recommendation as to award was forwarded to the Secretary. On the first run for the second evaluation, Cigna was in second place with a point total of 71.1 and Pru-Care was third with 65.86 points. On the second run, which Nye contends was done to make the computer run consistent with what had been said at the pre-bid conference and in the RFP, Cigna dropped from second place to third with 58. 2 points and Pru-Care went from third to fourth with 57.195 points. In the third run, which ultimately formed the basis for the award, the positions of Cigna and Pru-Care reversed with Cigna dropping to 56.83 points and Pru-Care rising to 57.415. Central Florida Physicians remained in first and Health Options in second. When Central Florida Physicians dropped out due to insolvency, Health Options became number one and the other two each went up one place in the standings without changing relative positions. According to Mr. Breckerink when the mistakes were identified and changes made in the raw scores, Cigna got a total of 23 more points but Pru-Care still got 16 more points than it should have. He contends that if the mistakes were accurately corrected, if Cigna were to get all the points it should and Pru- Care lose all it should not legitimately have, Cigna would come out higher in the overall ranking than Pru-Care. However, he admits there are factors involved about which he does not know which may affect the standings. What is clear is that while Mr. Breckerink could not clearly follow the evaluation procedure, neither can others charged with evaluating it. What is more, notwithstanding the direction given in the objectives of the procurement that only two providers be awarded contracts, the department continuously has been unable to abide by this guideline. In its September 11, 1987 recommendation after the first evaluation sequence, Mr. Nye recommended, for the Orlando service area, awards to Central Florida Physicians, Cigna, and Pru-Care for a part of the service area and an additional award to Health Options and Florida Health Care for other counties in the service area. When the Secretary directed the objective second evaluation, no change was made to the number of providers to be recommended (two), but again, on October 6, 1987, Mr. Nye recommended three providers, Central Florida Physicians, Health Options, and Cigna. No evidence was presented as to why this recommendation was not implemented, but it is seen that on October 26, 1987, Mr. Nye submitted his third set of recommendations to the Secretary, this time recommending only Central Florida Physicians, and Health Options. Being still unable to finalize the process, on October 30, 1987, Mr. Nye submitted his fourth set of recommendations to the Secretary recommending, for the most part, three providers, but specifically recommending Pru-Care for award in Lake and Volusia Counties, where it was arguably not even licensed. No justification or explanation for this vacillation was forthcoming from the Department and the exercise appears to have been clearly capricious.

Recommendation In view of the foregoing, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration issue a Final Order rejecting all proposals submitted for the Orlando service area and readvertise for new proposals if deemed appropriate. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of April, 1988 at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-5525BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. By Petitioner Cigna: 1 - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence not a Finding of Fact. Second sentence accepted except for conclusion as to legal license status of Pru-Care. Rejected as a restatement of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. First three sentences rejected as restatements of testimony. Balance accepted with the assumption that "those counties" indicates Lake and Volusia counties. First and second sentences rejected as restatements of testimony. Third sentence accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. First and second sentences rejected as restatements of testimony. Third sentence accepted as a possibility and, not a fact. First sentence accepted and incorporated herein. Second sentence rejected. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted except for use of word "awarded" in last sentence. Award is a function of the Secretary. A better word would be "recommended". Accepted. Reject Accepted. Rejected. Accepted except for word "significantly". First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as not being a proper Finding of Fact. For Respondent, DHRS: 1 - 14. Accepted and incorporated as appropriate. 15 - 16. Accepted. 17 - 19. Accepted. First, second, and fourth sentences accepted. Third sentence rejected as not supported by the evidence. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted except for the last three sub-paragraphs which are not supported by the evidence. Absent. 25 - 26. Accepted except for last sub-paragraph which is rejected as a conclusion. 27. Absent. 28 - 29. Accepted. 30. Accepted. 31 - 37. Absent. 38. Accepted. For Intervenor, Pru-Care: 1 & 2. 3. Rejected as a restatement of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Accepted. 4 - 5. Accepted. 6 - 7. Rejected as not being a Finding of Fact. 8 - 10. Accepted. 11. Accepted. 12. Rejected as not being a Finding of Fact. 13 - 14. Accepted. 15. Rejected as not being a Finding of Fact except for 16 - 17. last sentence which is accepted. Accepted. 18. Accepted. For Intervenor, Health Options: 1 - 3. Accepted and incorporated herein. 4 - 10. Accepted and incorporated herein. 11. Accepted except for the seventh sentence which is rejected. 12 - 13. Accepted. 14. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. 15 - 16. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: David Yon, Esquire 315 South Calhoun Street Suite 800 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32399 John Buchanan, Esquire 118 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jann Johnson, Esquire Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 J. Stanley Chapman, Esquire Ervin, Varn, Jacobs, Odom, & Kitchen Post Office Drawer 1170 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Larry Carnes, Esquire 515 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

Florida Laws (4) 110.123120.57287.012287.057
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UNIVERSITY HOME FOUNDATION, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 77-001590 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-001590 Latest Update: Jan. 13, 1978

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: From 1968 to the present time, petitioner University Home Foundation, Inc. has owned and operated the Convalescent Center of Gainesville, a 119-bed skilled care nursing home. In early 1977, petitioner submitted an application for a certificate of need to construct and operate a new 120-bed skilled care nursing home in Gainesville, Florida. Due to the bed need projection of the 1976 Florida State Plan for Construction of Hospitals and Related Medical Facilities, petitioner submitted a revised application for an 83-bed skilled care facility. It is petitioner's intention, should a certificate of need be issued, to downgrade the present Convalescent Center of Gainesville to an intermediate care nursing facility and to build the new facility as an 83-bed skilled facility. Petitioner's revised and completed application was acknowledged by respondent effective June 3, 1977. In the latter part of October, 1976, the respondent denied an application for a certificate of need for a 91-bed nursing home in Gainesville, Florida, proposed by Hill-Guthrie Associates. This adverse determination by respondent resulted in an administrative hearing. On June 8, 1977, the Hearing Officer entered an order finding that the procedural deficiencies surrounding the timeliness of the review process on the Hill-Guthrie application should be construed as an approval of the proposal to construct the 91-bed nursing home. On July 28, 1977, respondent issued a certificate of need to Hill-Guthrie Associates. The 1975 Florida State Plan projected a bed need for Alachua County of 91. The 1976 Plan projected a need for 83 long term care beds for the year 1981. The 1977 Plan, which was not accepted by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare until July 19, 1977, calls for a long term bed need of 106 by the year 1982. These plans do not distinguish between skilled and intermediate care bed needs. Due to federal regulations, the projected need figures do not include patients under 65 years of age. Testimony at the hearing indicated that between 10 and 14 percent of patients in nursing homes are under The figures in the State Plans are derived by subtracting from the projected number of beds needed for the area's population the number of beds presently existing in the area. In this instance, Alachua County presently has three existing nursing homes with a capacity of 332 beds. The projected number of beds needed in the 1976 and 1977 Plans (83 and 106, respectively) do not take into consideration the 91 bed proposal of Hill-Guthrie Associates, for which a certificate of need was issued on July 28, 1977. If the Hill-Guthrie home is completed, Alachua County would be overbedded by eight beds under the 1976 Plan and underbedded by fifteen beds under the 1977 Plan. On June 23, 1977, the North Central Florida Health Planning Council, Inc. (HPC), which serves a sixteen county area, held a public hearing to receive comments on the petitioner's revised proposal for an 83-bed skilled care nursing home. Among the items discussed at the hearing were the effects of the Hill- Guthrie decision and the correctness of the figures contained in the State Plan. (Exhibit No. 2) The Staff of the HPC prepared a report on petitioner's application and recommended that a certificate of need be denied. The Staff Report considered the twelve criteria suggested by respondent and found that the proposal was not in conformity with plans, standards and criteria; that there are less costly alternatives to the proposed project; that the proposal would not promote cost containment; and that there was no documented need for the project. More specifically, the Staff found that the Hill-Guthrie approval for 91 beds would exceed by eight the 83 beds needed in Alachua County under the 1976 State Plan. Since Hill-Guthrie proposed construction at a cost of $11,407.00 per bed and petitioner's proposed cost was $13,614.00 per bed, the Staff determined that it would be less costly to utilize existing facilities and to construct the Hill- Guthrie Nursing Home than to build a more expensive facility that would create an overbedded situation. (Exhibit D) The HPC Project Review Committee held its hearing on July 14, 1977, and petitioner's president, Mr. Paul Allen, presented his comments in response to the Staff Report. He contested the population and bed need projections contained in the State Plan, and the Hill-Guthrie decision was discussed. The Committee voted to follow the Staff's recommendation to deny the petitioner a certificate of need. (Exhibits No. 3 and D) The HPC's Executive Committee meeting was held on July 25, 1977. Mr. Allen spoke to the committee, disagreeing with the figures contained in the State Plan and requesting the committee to vote only on his application and disregard the Hill-Guthrie proposal since a certificate of need to Hill-Guthrie had not yet been issued. Thereafter, the HPC voted to recommend to respondent denial of petitioner's application for a certificate of need for the same reasons set forth in the Staff Report. (Exhibits No. 4 and D) By letter dated August 23, 1977, respondent's administrator, Art Forehand, notified petitioner that its project proposal was not in conformity with established standards, plans and criteria. The 1976 State Plan was specifically referenced, but respondent stated that it also considered petitioner's proposal in accordance with the recently adopted 1977 State Plan (Exhibit No. 1) At the hearing, Mr. Forehand testified that his decision was based upon nonconformity with the State Plan without a detailed showing that a need existed irrespective of said Plan. The issuance of a certificate of need to Hill-Guthrie played a large role in Forehand's decision.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that the determination of the respondent Office of Community Medical Facilities to deny petitioner's application for a certificate of need to construct and operate an 83-bed skilled care nursing home in Alachua County be upheld and affirmed. Respectfully submitted and entered this 13th day of January, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Art Forehand Administrator Office of Community Medical Facilities 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Selig I. Goldin, Esquire Post Office Box 1251 Gainesville, Florida 32602 James Mahorner, Esquire 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301

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POLK COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 77-000144 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-000144 Latest Update: Apr. 05, 1977

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner desires to construct a 180-bed nursing home facility. The proposed facility was originally conceived by the Winter Haven Hospital. The hospital was seeking to construct the facility adjacent to its present location. The hospital planned to utilize Federal Economic Development Agency funds to finance the construction. Under Federal regulations, Economic Development Agency funds are not available to a private hospital, but are available to local governmental units. The Petitioner agreed to seek the certificate of need, to apply for Economic Development Agency funds, and to construct the facility. After construction it is the Petitioner's plan to contract with the Winter Haven Hospital to operate the facility. Petitioner's request for certificate of need was forwarded to the South Central Florida Health Systems Council, Inc., and to the Respondent. The Health Systems Council, by a seven to six vote, recommended to the Respondent against the issuance of a certificate of need. The Council's written recommendation to the Respondent was never forwarded to the Petitioner, or to the Winter Haven Hospital. The Respondent denied the request for issuance of certificate of need by letter dated December 30, 1976. The Respondent's denial was based upon a mechanical application of the Florida State Plan for Construction of Hospitals and Related Medical Facilities. The sole basis for the denial was that in accordance with population figures set out in the State Plan, and in accordance with the application of a Federally required formula to the population figures, there is no need for the additional nursing home beds proposed by the Petitioner. No independent determination was made by the Respondent as to actual needs for nursing home facilities that might exist in Polk County. In the Florida State Plan for Construction of Hospitals and Related Medical Facilities, it was determined that 252 additional long-term care beds were needed in Polk County. At the time that the plan was promulgated, Kennedy Center, a new nursing home facility located in Lakeland, Florida, was not actively under construction. Since the plan was adopted, active construction of the Kennedy Center has commenced. At the time of the hearing 120 beds had been opened and made available at the Kennedy Center, and an additional 120 beds were being constructed. When the Kennedy Center is considered, there remains a need of only 12 additional long-term care beds in Polk County. Obviously the Petitioner's proposed 180-bed facility would greatly exceed the need envisioned in the State Plan. Petitioner offered evidence in the form of a publication of the Bureau of Economic and Business Research at the College of Business Administration, University of Florida, which indicates that the population of Polk County is somewhat higher than that set out in the State Plan (Petitioner's Exhibit 3). If these population figures, rather than those set out in the State Plan were utilized, there would remain a need for 252 long-term care beds in Polk County, even after construction of the Kennedy Center (Petitioner's Exhibit 5). There is no means of determining from the evidence whether the population figures submitted by the Petitioner are more or less accurate than those set out in the State Plan. Petitioner offered evidence that it has had difficulty placing certain classes of patients in nursing home facilities. This difficulty in fact prompted the Petitioner to seek a certificate of need for a new nursing home facility. Petitioner takes the responsibility for placing indigent persons in need of nursing home care. The State Medicade Program contributes the bulk of the cost of the care. Three categories of nursing home care are identified for Medicade purposes. These are "skill care", "intermediate I" and "intermediate II" patients. Skill care patients are the most infirm, and intermediate II care patients are the least infirm. The Medicade program allots more money for skill care patients than it does for intermediate care patients. Because of this private nursing home facilities often reject intermediate care patients in favor of skill care patients. The Petitioner has accordingly experienced difficulty in placing indigent intermediate care patients. The Petitioner has had to place 86 patients in nursing home facilities outside of Polk County. The opening of the Kennedy Center will alleviate most of the placement difficulties that the Petitioner has experienced. Approximately 100 beds at the Kennedy Center will be available for "intermediate II" patients. In addition, the operator of the "Grovemont Home" in Winter Haven, Florida, appeared at the hearing and stated that his facility would accept Medicade intermediate care patients, and that they are not running at full capacity. The Petitioner had not previously been placing Medicade patients in the Grovemont Home.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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BOBBY JONES | B. J. vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 97-004496 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Quincy, Florida Sep. 29, 1997 Number: 97-004496 Latest Update: Jun. 05, 1998

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust should be granted.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This case involves a request by Petitioner, Bobby Jones, for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust. If the request is approved, Petitioner would be allowed to return to work as a unit treatment rehabilitation specialist in a unit for developmentally disabled adults at Florida State Hospital (FSH). Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of approving or denying such requests. In a preliminary decision entered on an unknown date, a DCFS committee denied the request. Petitioner is now barred from doing such work because of a disqualifying offense which occurred on June 4, 1989. On that date, Petitioner was arrested for the offense of "battery- domestic," a misdemeanor under Section 784.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1987). According to Petitioner, the victim in the incident was his former wife. Thus, the offense constituted domestic violence as it subsequently became defined in 1994 by Section 741.28, Florida Statutes. Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the charge of "battery" on August 10, 1989. He was fined $75.00, and he was placed on probation for a period of "up to 9 months." In addition, the court retained jurisdiction "to [o]rder rest[itution]," and Petitioner was required to complete a mental health counseling program. Petitioner successfully completed all terms of his probation, including the counseling course which lasted around "six to nine months." In October 1989, Petitioner began working at FSH as a human services worker in a unit for developmentally disabled adults. Eventually, he attained the position of unit treatment rehabilitation specialist, a position involving supervision of developmentally disabled adults. Due to a change in the law, in 1996, he was required to undergo a background screening. That screening uncovered his 1989 offense, and on July 14, 1997, he was disqualified from working in a position of special trust with developmentally disabled adults. Petitioner was then offered a temporary assignment effective July 24, 1997, without any "direct care duties." Most recently, however, he has been employed at a Wal-Mart store in Tallahassee, Florida. Because of his desire to return to his former position, he has applied for an exemption from disqualification. Since the disqualifying incident in 1989, Petitioner worked continuously at FSH for almost eight years. Since leaving FSH, he has been steadily employed by Wal-Mart. Petitioner was described by a former supervisor at FSH as being "dependable," "very good" with residents, and someone who got along well with other staff. Three former co-workers echoed these comments. A present co-worker at Wal-Mart also described Petitioner as friendly, helpful, and courteous with customers. Except for the fact that a former wife was the victim, the circumstances surrounding the incident for which the exemption is sought are not of record, and the "harm [if any] caused to the victim" is unknown. Despite the glowing comments of other workers, the adverse testimony of a former supervisor at FSH must be taken into account. In December 1995, she found Petitioner engaged in a verbal confrontation with another worker. She then directed that Petitioner report to her office. On the way to the office, he told her that the other employee was "going to make [Petitioner] put a board on his ass." At the ensuing meeting, Petitioner became extremely upset and told the supervisor that he wished she were dead, that she would get killed in a traffic accident on the way home, and that he would "spit on her grave." Petitioner subsequently received a written reprimand for using "Threatening and/or Abusive Language" towards his supervisor. In another incident that occurred on May 22, 1997, Petitioner was observed by the supervisor "horseplaying with another employee" in the dining room. When told by the supervisor that such conduct was inappropriate for the workplace, Petitioner stated in a loud, hostile manner, in the presence of both co-workers and clients, that he "would choke the motherfucker out." For this conduct, he received another written reprimand for "Threatening and/or Abusive Language," and he was suspended from work for three days. According to the same supervisor, Petitioner has an "explosive" temper, and she would not want him returning to her unit. Given this testimony, it is found that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he will not present a danger if continued employment is allowed. Besides the disqualifying offense, Petitioner has a long string of misdemeanor convictions beginning in 1979 and continuing through 1992. The specific crimes are described in Respondent's Exhibits 1-7 and 9-31 received in evidence. Petitioner himself acknowledged that he has been convicted of passing worthless bank checks approximately thirty times. Most recently, he was convicted for the offense of disorderly conduct in November 1992. In addition, he was convicted for the offense of simple battery on a former wife in October 1990. These convictions, by themselves, are not disqualifying offenses, and many are so old as to be arguably remote and irrelevant. They do, however, establish a continuing pattern of misconduct, especially since Petitioner has at least eight convictions for various misdemeanors since the disqualifying offense in 1989. Given these circumstances, it is found that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence of rehabilitation since the disqualifying event. This being so, his request for an exemption should be denied.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification for employment in a position of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Pete Peterson, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Ben R. Patterson, Esquire Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-4289 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 252A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949

Florida Laws (6) 120.569435.03435.04435.07741.28784.03
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FREDERICK MANN vs BOARD OF DENTISTRY, 91-007865F (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Dec. 05, 1991 Number: 91-007865F Latest Update: Apr. 10, 1992

Findings Of Fact The Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Dentistry, filed an Administrative Complaint in DPR Case Number 00-52375 against the Petitioner's license to practice dentistry on May 13, 1986. The Petitioner did not dispute the facts alleged in the Administrative Complaint and the Board of Dentistry held an informal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, on September 13, 1986. On October 2, 1986, the Board of Dentistry issued a Final Order suspending the Petitioner from the remunerative practice of dentistry for a period of ten (10) years and advised the Petitioner of his right to appeal the Board's Final Order. The Petitioner did not appeal the October 2, 1986 Final Order of the Board of Dentistry. On or about May 1, 1987, and/or May 2, 1987, the Board of Dentistry met to consider correspondence from the Petitioner seeking a determination of compliance with the Board's October 2, 1986 Final Order for his proposal to do volunteer community service dental work at "St. Catherine Laboure Manor" in Jacksonville, Florida. The Board of Dentistry requested further clarification from the Petitioner and took no further action with respect to the Petitioner's request. On June 10, 1987, the Board of Dentistry met to consider the Petitioner's request to allow him to provide volunteer community service dental work under indirect supervision, and on June 26, 1987, the Board of Dentistry issued an Order Denying the Modification. The Petitioner did not appeal the June 26, 1987, Order of the Board of Dentistry. On or about March 9, 1988, the Petitioner submitted his second request to the Board of Dentistry for modification of its October 2, 1986 Final Order. The Petitioner identified the following reasons as why the Board of Dentistry should grant his request: My obligation to the people of the State of Florida was fully satisfied on September 28, 1987 (enc.). My civil rights were restored on February 25, 1988 (enc.). The fine imposed by the Board of Professional Regulation ($2000.00) has been paid in full. Since July 1987 I have been treating patients in St. Catherine Laboure' Manor under the direct supervision of Owen Boales D.D.S., as required by order of the Board (enc.). I am currently 64 years of age and need gainful employment. My wife and I are currently surviving primary on her earnings as an employee of the Florida Community College at Jacksonville. My mentally disabled son was admitted to The Northeast Florida State Hospital approximately one month after my arrest. His condition would be benefited by whatever personal attention and care my wife and I may be able to provide. The ten year suspension order now in effect is tantamount to lifetime punishment. This long suspension does not benefit the public but severely obstructs rehabilitative effort. It minimizes the opportunities for professional public service and prevents professional employment. It reduces the available options to demonstrate reliability and observable conformity to the profession's ethical standards. It will continue to impede all my effort to becoming a self sustaining productive and worthy member of society. On April 23, 1988, the Board of Dentistry met to consider the Petitioner's second request for modification of the Board's October 2, 1986 Final Order. After discussion and consideration of the evidence and arguments of the Petitioner, the Board of Dentistry on July 13, 1988, issued an Order Denying Modification of Final Order. The Petitioner did not appeal the Board's July 13, 1988 Order denying his second request. On or about June 5, 1990, the Petitioner through his attorney submitted his third request to the Board of Dentistry for a modification of the October 2, 1986 Final Order. The Petitioner's third Motion for Modification of Final Order submitted to the Board on or about June 5, 1990, did not contain information or circumstances that were substantially different from those known to the Board at the time the Final Order of October 2, 1986, was entered, at the time the first order was entered denying the modification request, or that were known to the Board when it had previously heard and denied Petitioner's second request in 1988. On July 28, 1990, the Board of Dentistry met to consider the Petitioner's third request for modification of the October 2, 1986 Final Order. After discussion of the parties and upon the advice of legal counsel, the Board of Dentistry on August 13, 1990, issued an Order Denying Modification of Final Order. The Petitioner timely sought an appeal of the Board's August 13, 1990 Order in the First District Court of Appeal, Case Number 90-2369. On September 4, 1991, the First District Court of Appeal issued its opinion where they found the August 13, 1990 Final Order to be ambiguous, vacated the August 13th Final Order, and remanded the case back to the Board of Dentistry for further proceedings. On October 8, 1991, the First District Court of Appeal issued its Mandate to the Board of Dentistry to hold further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. On or about October 15, 1991, the Petitioner submitted an Amended Motion for Modification alleging for the first time that "there had been material changes in circumstances since his suspension was entered and/or since the previous rulings as to his suspension." On November 8, 1991, the Board of Dentistry met to consider the Petitioner's third request for modification of the Board's October 2, 1986 Final Order, the Amended Motion for Modification of Final Order, and the Opinion and Mandate of the First District Court of Appeal. After discussion and consideration of the Petitioner's requests for modification, the Opinion and Mandate of the First District Court of Appeal, and the evidence presented, on December 12, 1991, the Board of Dentistry issued a Final Order on Remand granting the Petitioner's Amended Motion for Modification of the Board's October 2, 1986 Final Order. The Petitioner is a sole proprietor of a professional practice of dentistry. His principal office and domicile are located in Jacksonville, Florida. He has fewer than twenty-five (25) full-time employees, and his net worth, at the time of filing, was less than two million ($2,000,000) dollars. The Petitioner incurred appellate attorney's fees in the amount of $8,990.00 and costs in the amount of $323.92. The Respondent did not dispute the reasonableness of the fees and costs in this case.

USC (1) 28 U.S.C 2412 Florida Laws (5) 120.52120.57120.68466.02857.111
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AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION vs CENTRAL FLORIDA REGIONAL HOSPITAL, 06-005335MPI (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Dec. 29, 2006 Number: 06-005335MPI Latest Update: Aug. 03, 2007

The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner overpaid Medicaid reimbursements to Respondent for inpatient hospital services due to the lack of medical necessity for such services and, if so, the amount of the overpayment.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is a 226-bed community hospital in Sanford. It is an acute-care hospital with an emergency department. At all material times, Respondent has been an authorized Medicaid provider. For inpatient services, Respondent receives, under Medicaid, an all-inclusive per diem rate for all goods and services provided during a 24-hour period, less any third-party payments. Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation of the Medicaid program in Florida. Petitioner is required to perform Medicaid audits of providers and to recover any overpayments. Pursuant to this authority, Petitioner conducted an audit of Respondent for the period from January 1, 2001, through March 31, 2002. Pursuant to its procedures, Petitioner duly informed Respondent of the audit, obtained from Respondent relevant medical and hospital records, issued a Provisional Agency Audit Report on January 24, 2006, obtained additional information from Respondent pertinent to the provisional findings, and issued a Final Agency Audit Report on October 19, 2006, which claimed a total overpayment of $286,357.54 based on Medicaid payments made to Respondent on behalf of 35 different recipients. (The report indicates two separate denials for each of four recipients, so 39 total transactions are listed.) The dispute in this case concerns the medical necessity of the inpatient hospitalization of each recipient. The Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Handbook) states that the purpose of the Medicaid program is "to provide medically necessary inpatient and outpatient services to recipients in the hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. This case involves paid claims for inpatient, not outpatient, services. The Handbook defines inpatient services as those services "rendered to recipients who are admitted to a hospital and are expected to stay at least 24 hours and occupy a bed, even though a bed is not actually utilized because the recipient is discharged or transferred to another hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. The Handbook provides that the day of admission is covered, but the day of discharge is not covered, unless it is also the day of admission. Handbook, page 2-22. The Handbook defines "grace days" as non-medically necessary days following the day of formal discharge when the recipient continues to occupy a hospital bed until an outside facility or residence can be found. These days are not reimbursable by Medicaid except for children under 21 years of age on "Department of Children and Families hold . . .." Medicaid will pay up to 48 hours of inpatient stay beyond the formal discharge day for these children while an alternative placement is located. The Handbook incorporates the limitation of medical necessity as follows: Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary, do not duplicate another provider's service, and are: individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; not experimental or investigational; reflective of the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or service medically necessary or a covered service. Note: See Appendix D, Glossary, in the Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, for the definition of medically necessary. Handbook, pages 2-1 to 2-2. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, defines "medically necessary" as follows: Means that the medical or allied care, goods, or services furnished or ordered must: Meet the following conditions: Be necessary to protect life, to prevent significant illness or significant disability, or to alleviate severe pain; Be individualized, specific, and consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; Be consistent with generally accepted professional medical standards as determined by the Medicaid program, and not experimental or investigational; Be reflective of the level of service that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available; statewide; and Be furnished in a manner that is not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. "Medically necessary" or "medical necessity" for inpatient hospital services requires that those services furnished in a hospital on an inpatient basis could not, consistent with the provisions of appropriate medical care, be effectively furnished more economically on an outpatient basis or in an inpatient facility of a different type. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or services medically necessary or a medical necessity or a covered service. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, page D-10. E. A. was admitted on January 6, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. A.'s acute exacerbation of chronic bronchitis from January 6-8. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining ten days of E. A.'s hospitalization. (All calculations of duration of hospitalizations omit the day of discharge, pursuant to the above-cited provision from the Handbook. In this case, for instance, E. A. was discharged on January 19.) E. A., a 60-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and a history of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), emphysema, and hypertension. He had been unable to eat for the preceding four days due to respiratory distress. At the time of his admission, E. A. had been living for a short while with his sister, who was suffering from cancer. His relevant history included a shotgun wound to the left lung 30 years earlier. Respondent states in its proposed recommended order that E. A.'s chest X-rays showed acute infiltrate demonstrating pneumonia, although the discharge summary reveals that chest X-rays fail to reveal this condition, but acknowledged that sputum grain stains revealed a polymicrobial infection. More to the point, the X-ray reports dated January 6 and 8 note: "no focal infiltrate." However, the discharge summary described E. A.'s prognosis as poor because he was in "end-stage lung disease." In the emergency department, after treatment with bronchodilators, E. A.'s oxygen saturation rate was only 87 percent--not 94-100 percent, as mistakenly stated by Petitioner's expert, Dr. Ellen Silkes, an otolaryngologist whose practice is largely limited to outpatients. This low rate of oxygen saturation evidences hypoxia. E. A.'s arterial blood gases bore a pH of 7.28, evidencing, on the facts of this case respiratory acidosis, which results from excessive retained carbon dioxide due to poor lung function. E. A. was started on Albuterol and Atrovent by nebulizer at four-hour intervals, as well as a corticosteroid intravenously every six hours to relieve the swelling in the lungs. He received oxygen by nasal cannula. On January 10, the physician's notes state that E. A. still suffered from "severe COPD" secondary to smoking with bronchospasms. According to the notes, the first day that E. A. showed any improvement was January 12. On January 14 and 16, E. A. was still retaining excessive carbon dioxide and remained hypoxic, but showed some improvement by January 16 in terms of arterial blood gases. The physician's note for January 17 states that E. A. could be discharged as soon as arrangements for home health care were completed. E. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 6-17. His hospitalization after January 17 was not medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied January 9-16, given that the day of discharge is excluded. Thus, for E. A., Petitioner should have denied two days, not all ten days. A. A. was admitted on June 19, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat A. A.'s gastrointestinal bleeding from June 19-20. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 12 days of A. A.'s hospitalization. (Some of Petitioner's calculations are incorrect. For instance, in this case, Petitioner does not deny July 2-5, even though, undoubtedly, its position as to the lack of medical necessity as to the earlier dates would mandate the same position as to the later dates. This recommended order does not disturb Petitioner's implicit acceptance of the medical necessity of any dates, even when it appears to be in error.) A. A., a 51-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain, diarrhea, and black tarry stools. His recent history included bloody vomit and a diagnosis, a few months earlier, of a pulmonary embolism. A. A. had discontinued taking Coumadin, a blood thinner, due to nosebleeds. A. A. had been diagnosed with AIDS in 1998 and had lost 30 pounds in one month. At admission, A. A.'s hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were critically low at 5.1 and 15.5, respectively, and remained critically low the following day when, after A. A. received transfusions of two units of packed red blood cells, his hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were only 6.8 and 20.0, respectively. Dr. Silkes denied the hospitalization after June 20 because an upper gastrointestinal endoscopy revealed, on June 19, no acute bleeding, and a bleeding scan the following day was negative. However, according to the physician's notes, A. A. was continuing to experience diarrhea on June 20, even though he was starting to feel better. The course of treatment of A. A. was complicated by his recent history of pulmonary embolism and his inability to report an accurate history. By June 21, A. A.'s severe anemia had been corrected, but he was diagnosed with candida, an opportunistic fungal infection common in AIDS patients. This diagnosis would explain the vomiting of blood. Generally, the treatment dilemma posed by A. A. was that efforts to increase his clotting time to stop the bleeding raised the risk of pulmonary embolism. The physicians debated whether to install a Greenfield filter to stop the passage of a blood clot. The filter is introduced under X-ray control through the femoral vein into the inferior vena cava, where it is anchored, so that it allows the passage of blood, but not the passage of a blood clot. But the Greenfield filter is contraindicated in the presence of A. A.'s fever of 101 degrees and elevated white blood counts. Physicians introduced Coumadin to minimize the risk of clots, but A. A.'s low platelet count required the discontinuation of Coumadin on June 30. A. A.'s International Normalization Ratio (INR) was 4.2, which is well above the range of 2.0-3.0 and thus indicative of the fact that A. A.'s blood was taking too long to clot. The standard of care in 2001 precluded safe outpatient management of a complicated patient such as A. A., given his twin risks of pulmonary embolism and bleeding, either of which could result in his death. A. A.'s Coumadin could not safely have been adjusted on an outpatient basis. The physicians restarted the Coumadin on June 24 and doubled its dosage the following day. As they were working on adjusting the blood thinner, though, A. A. continued to suffer nightly fevers of 103 degrees, and the physicians needed to monitor him closely for the next week for this reason too. On June 28, A. A. reported that he was feeling better, but the physicians needed to monitor him for a recent reduction in his Coumadin dosage. A. A. was reported as "alert and comfortable" on July 2. A. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from June 19 through at least July 2. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization. T. B. was admitted on May 15, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat T. B.'s esophageal cancer and tuberculosis from May 15-17 and The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the ten days that Dr. Silkes denied of the remaining 14 days of T. B.'s hospitalization. (It is unclear why Petitioner denied only ten days when Dr. Silkes denied May 18-20 and May 22-June 1--a total of 14 days, or 13 days exclusive of the day of discharge. But, as noted above, in cases such as this, the recommended order will consider only whether up to ten days within this period are allowable as medically necessary.) T. B., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with difficulty swallowing. He had visited a physician in February 2001 with the same complaint, and the physician had recommended an upper gastrointestinal series. Due to financial constraints, T. B. did not undergo this procedure until late April, when he was found to have a high-grade obstruction consistent with a tumor. T. B.'s recent history included the loss of 25 pounds. An endoscopy with biopsy performed on May 16 revealed a high-grade carcinoma of the esophagus. The physician planned to commence preoperative chemotherapy and radiation therapy to shrink the lesion, but, based on sputum collected on May 18, it was discovered that T. B. had mycobacterium tuberculosis. Physicians had suspected the tuberculosis from the time of admission when they placed T. B. in a negative airflow isolation room. Treatment of the tuberculosis necessarily preceded the preoperative chemotherapy recommended for T. B.'s carcinoma. The sputum sample revealed rare acid-fast bacilli, for which the standard of care in 2001 typically required two to three weeks of treatment before isolation precautions could be discontinued. T. B. remained in isolation at least through May 31. In addition, T. B. suffered significant pain from the carcinoma. By May 23, he was on patient-controlled analgesia in the form of a morphine pump, which is not available outside of an acute-care hospital. T. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from May 15 through at least June 1. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization that it denied. R. B. was admitted on December 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat R. B.'s respiratory failure from December 3, 2001, to January 2, 2002, and January 8, 2002. Based on Petitioner's prehearing stipulation, the dispute concerns only seven days' hospitalization. R. B., a 59-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with acute respiratory distress and respiratory failure. She was immediately intubated. Her family insisted upon aggressive treatment of, among other things, her bilateral pneumonia caused by a virulent staph infection. R. B. required a tracheotomy on December 20 due to the difficulty in weaning her from the ventilator. She required the placement of a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube on January 1. The discharge summary describes R. B. as "very frail and fragile" and her hospitalization as "very prolonged and complicated." On December 23, when R. B. was finally weaned from the ventilator, her family agreed to a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) code for her. The dispute arises from an incident on January 3 when R. B. fell when trying to get out of bed. Her mental status deteriorated, probably due to malignant disease. Physicians ruled out sepsis in the bloodstream, but X-rays revealed multiple nodules in the lung and liver. On January 8, a CT- guided lung biopsy of one of the nodules confirmed malignant disease. Two days later, the physician stated that a consultation with hospice was indicated. Upon the agreement of the family, R. B. was discharged to her home under hospice care on January 12. Dr. Silkes is substantially correct in her opinion. The diagnostic work after January 2 only supported the poor prognosis that had become obvious to R. B.'s family ten days earlier and certainly was not palliative in nature. R. B.'s hospitalization after January 2, 2002, was not medically necessary--except for January 8, which Dr. Silkes initially conceded, and an additional two days, which Petitioner conceded in its prehearing stipulation. Petitioner properly denied seven days of this hospitalization. J. B. was admitted on January 5, 2002. Petitioner does not contest a 23-hour observation on January 5, but this would generate a reimbursement considerably smaller than that sought by Respondent for inpatient services for that day, so Petitioner has essentially denied the entire hospitalization, which consists of 16 days. J. B., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and atrial fibrillation with fast ventricular rate. He had been diabetic for 25 years. He had been laid off from construction work in August 2001, and had arthritic knees which prevented his return to work. Since losing his job, J. B. had been feeling poorly and had lost 20 pounds. J. B.'s pulse at the time of his arrival was 165, and it dropped to 105 within his first six hours at the hospital. J. B.'s relevant history included congestive heart failure, edema of the extremities, and nocturnal dyspnea. A chest X-ray on the day of admission revealed a dense mass in the left lobe. Physicians started a calcium channel blocker to regulate J. B.'s rapid heart beat and a diuretic to eliminate his excess fluids and swelling. J. B. was feeling much better by January 7, as the physicians had controlled his rapid heart beat. On that day, J. B. underwent a stress test, which was negative. However, a CT scan performed on January 8 and reported the following day revealed a left hilum mass that proved to be advanced carcinoma. The physicians decided that J. B. needed a bronchoscopy to biopsy the lung mass and a thoracentesis, in which a needle is inserted between the ribs to extract fluid for the purpose of determining the fluid's source. However, J. B.'s atrial fibrillation complicated their plans. On January 8, J. B. remained in atrial fibrillation, and the physicians were considering starting him on Coumadin because patients with atrial fibrillation are at high risk of clotting due to the poor expulsion of blood into the ventricle. Introduction of this blood-thinning agent before other invasive procedures requires first that the physicians stabilize the patient. This dilemma delayed the introduction of the blood- thinning agent and prevented treating J. B. as an outpatient. Once stabilized on Coumadin, J. B. underwent the two diagnostic procedures on January 11. They revealed that he was suffering from stage IV squamous cell carcinoma, according to a physician's report dictated on January 14 and transcribed the following day. The physician ordered additional CT scans to determine the extent of the metastatic disease before deciding on a course of treatment. A whole body bone scan was performed on January 15 and was essentially negative. However, the carcinoma had metastasized to the left hilum and, by report dated January 15, a physician noted that J. B. would not benefit from surgery, chemotherapy, or radiation, although palliative radiation could offer him some relief. An IV port for chemotherapy (not radiation) was placed on January 16--not January 6, as noted by Dr. Silkes in her report. Coumadin had been discontinued in advance of the procedure and resumed on the day of the procedure, but required adjustment for the next several days, as J. B.'s INR was too low, indicative of excessive clotting. Although the administration of the chemotherapy through the IV port could have been done on an outpatient basis, J. B. was comfortable at all times after January 15, and with no effective treatment possible, his hospitalization remained medically necessary until the physicians were able to adjust his Coumadin so that his INR reached the normal range. J. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 5 through January 22, on which date he was discharged. Petitioner improperly denied the 16 days of inpatient services. N. C. was admitted on February 8, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. C.'s intracranial hemorrhage from February 8-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 21 days of N. C.'s hospitalization. N. C., a 40-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with a complaint of passing out and no significant medical history. N. C. was a single mother of a developmentally disabled child. Her father resided in a nursing home and suffered from dementia, so her siblings were her decisionmakers concerning care. At admission, N. C. was already in a vegetative state, suffering from a massive intracranial hemorrhage. Her blood pressure was 213/107. She was immediately intubated and given Mannitol to reduce intracranial pressure and Dilantin to prevent seizures. On February 8, a neurologist evaluated N. C. and found her a poor candidate for surgery to evacuate the intracranial hematoma due to the likelihood of extensive consequent neurological deficits. The neurologist discussed the possibilities and the "extremely poor" prognosis with the siblings, who decided not to pursue surgery and instead allow N. C. to be "managed medically." The physicians asked the siblings to consider a DNR code for N. C. N. C. made no meaningful progress in the following days. Respondent was unable to contact her siblings until February 19, and they asked for two days within which to make the decision whether to place N. C. on a DNR code. On February 22, they decided to place N. C. on a DNR code and withdraw the ventilator. Three days later, the physician discussed with the siblings the possibility of placement in a nursing home. Three days after this discussion, the siblings agreed on inpatient hospice care for N. C. On March 4, IV fluids and medications and the nasogastric feeding tube were withdrawn, and N. C. was transferred to a nursing home under hospice care. N. C.'s hospitalization was medically necessary through February 22 because a nursing home cannot accept a patient on a ventilator, N. C.'s course following the stroke could reasonably be observed for a couple of weeks to determine if improvement--however unlikely--might take place, and the siblings reasonably required this long to make this difficult decision. From February 23 through discharge, the inpatient services provided N. C. were no longer medically necessary, so Petitioner properly denied nine days of the 21 days that it denied for this recipient. N. Ch. was admitted on May 23, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. Ch.'s cellulitus and osteomyelitis from May 23 to June 24. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 46 days of N. Ch.'s hospitalization. N. Ch., a 38-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with wounds to both legs and loss of feeling in both feet and a history of fractures to both tibias 20 years ago followed by osteomyelitis four years ago. Despite considerable hospital treatment to both legs, consisting of antibiotics, hyperbaric oxygen, debridement, and skin grafts, drainage of the wounds persisted. Four grainy wounds on both legs penetrated to the bone, and N. Ch. had suffered some bony damage from the persistence of these infected wounds. A physician performed a surgical debridement of the wounds on May 26, and a vacuum- assisted closure device was applied to the wound on the following day. This device produces negative air pressure to stimulate a chemical change in the tissues to enhance the migration of new blood vessels and granulation tissue over the area of the wound. The pump was changed often. On June 22, N. Ch. underwent a second debridement and a pump was reapplied to the wounds on June 24. The issue in this case involves the use of hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an inpatient basis. On June 7, a physician reasonably recommended 20, 90-minute hyperbaric oxygen treatments. The treatments, which accelerate wound healing, began the next day. Dr. Silkes correctly finds no medical necessity after N. Ch. became stable after the second debridement. Although he later suffered some fever, apparently from his reaction to an antibiotic, and gastroesophagael reflux, as well as some adverse reactions to IV and peripherally inserted central catheter lines, N. Ch. could have been managed as an outpatient after June 24. Nothing suggests that the vacuum-`assisted closure device requires hospitalization, and hyperbaric oxygen treatment clearly does not require hospitalization. Respondent contends that inpatient services remained medically necessary after June 24 because Medicaid would not pay for hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an outpatient basis. Medical necessity is driven by medical, not legal, considerations. If the sole reason for hospitalization is to obtain a medically necessary good or service that Respondent has restricted to the inpatient setting, then the provider community improperly circumvents Petitioner's restriction. If there is no other reason to continue to hospitalize a recipient, such as N. Ch., the decision to do so in order to obtain for him a concededly medically necessary service--that does not otherwise require hospitalization--is unwarranted. Petitioner properly denied the 46 days of inpatient services for N. Ch. after June 24. J. C. was admitted on February 24, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. C.'s coronary artery disease and lymphoma on February 24 and March 3-8. In its proposed recommended order, Respondent does not contest Petitioner's denial of the "last two days," which apparently are March 9-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining six days of hospitalization from February 25 through March 2. J. C., a 61-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with worsening chest pain over the past two weeks and a history of coronary artery disease. She also had an undiagnosed mass on her neck. She had previously failed outpatient treatment and was admitted to the hospital. Two weeks earlier, J. C. was to have had an outpatient biopsy of the neck mass, but the anesthesiologist declined to administer anesthesia until her unstable angina was addressed. J. C. went to her primary care physician, who referred her to a cardiologist, but, prior to seeing him, J. C. went to the emergency department. On February 25, the physician's notes indicate that J. C. was stable and without chest pain. The cardiologist performed a cardiac catheterization on February 26 and found 100 percent blockage of the left anterior descending artery, 80 percent blockage of the proximal circumflex, and other narrowings that were not amenable to angioplasty and stenting, so he recommended coronary artery bypass grafting. Heart surgery could not proceed until physicians learned the nature of the neck mass. A biopsy was performed on February 28, which revealed B-cell malignant lymphoma. The oncologist preferred to commence chemotherapy after the bypass operation, so this was performed on March 3. J. C. was extubated on March 4, but developed acute respiratory distress on March 5 and required a transfusion the following day. However, Dr. Silkes is correct in finding the hospitalization from February 25 through March 2 medically unnecessary. The procedures performed during this period could have been done on an outpatient basis. The record does not support Respondent's argument that her unstable angina required inpatient management. Petitioner properly denied these six days of inpatient services. R. LaB. was admitted on April 2, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last day of inpatient service on April 12. This is the first case considered in this recommended order handled by Dr. Alan Yesner, an internist whose practice is more evenly divided between inpatients and outpatients than is Dr. Silkes' practice. R. LaB., a 47-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain of two days' duration and a history of COPD, hypertension, and diabetes. She was rushed to abdominal surgery to reduce an incarcerated hernia. The surgery was long. R. LaB. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation. Dr. Yesner is correct in opining that R. LaB.'s hospitalization after April 11 was not medical necessary. She was stable and on appropriate medication, so Petitioner properly denied one day of inpatient service for R. LaB. J. L. was admitted on June 12, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the seven days of inpatient services. J. L., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with complaints of a gradual increase of abdominal girth and was found to have blood in his stool. Lab work indicated an elevated INR, elevated bilirubin, and bacteria in his urine. The physician concluded that J. L. suffered from primary biliary cirrhosis, for which he had been treated since at least 1998. J. L. admitted that he had become noncompliant with his medication after a divorce. A CT scan revealed a probable stone obstructing the right ureter, causing urine to back up and flood the right kidney. A successful laser lithotripsy was performed on June 17 with the complete fragmentation of the stone and the installation of a stent, which would facilitate drainage, to be removed a few days later. J. L. tolerated the procedure well, and on the next day he reported feeling better without any pain in his flank. Dr. Yesner notes the "late schedule" of the lithotripsy, but Respondent did not have a lithotripter in 2001 and had to schedule it for use at the hospital. The hospitalization was medically necessary through June 17 due to the pain, advanced kidney disease, and potential kidney problems presented by the blockage, prior to its surgical fragmentation. Petitioner should have denied two days, not seven days. C. M. was admitted on April 2, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of admission for 23-hour observation only on April 2 for end-stage sarcoidosis, pneumonia, and gastrointestinal bleeding. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 31 days of C. M.'s hospitalization, which concluded with her death. C. M., a 55-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and weakness. She is a Jehovah's Witness, so she declines blood transfusions on religious grounds. By April 4, C. M.'s blood gases, although not within normal ranges, were out of critical ranges. C. M. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation on April 16. Her hemoglobin gradually dropped after this, but treatment was limited to iron and vitamins due to the refusal of the patient to accept a blood transfusion. This treatment was unsuccessful. The family supported C. M.'s decision not to accept a blood transfusion, but insisted on full, aggressive treatment, including CPR. C. M. went into cardiac arrest on May 3 and CPR failed to revive her. Dr. Silkes states that Respondent should have arranged for hospice care during the first day of hospitalization. C. M. was not then on a ventilator, so a hospice would not have objected to taking C. M. on that ground, but her respiration was critically impaired for the first three days of her hospitalization and her prognosis was not such as to render hospital care medically unnecessary. It was medically necessary to stabilize C. M.'s respiration during these first three days, but her hemoglobin issues could have been addressed by home health care for the next 11 days. The medical necessity of inpatient services resumes, though, after C. M.'s respiratory failure of April 16 and continues to the end of her hospitalization. The first three days of inpatient services were medically necessary, the next 11 days of inpatient services were not medically necessary, and the last 17 days of inpatient services were medically necessary, so Petitioner should have denied 11 days, not 31 days. M. M. was admitted on March 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat acute asthmatic bronchitis with a history of coronary artery bypass graft, asthma, sarcoidosis of the lung, and diabetes from March 3-12, which Petitioner later extended to March 13. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days of M. M.'s hospitalization, which Respondent's expert frankly conceded was difficult to justify. As Dr. Yesner noted, M. M. was stabilized on oral medication by March 11, and he allowed a couple of additional days to monitor her. M. M. experienced hypoglycemia on March 16, but this is a condition that, according to Dr. Yesner, is not unusual with the Prednisone that M. M. was taking, and hypoglycemia is typically managed on an outpatient basis. Petitioner properly denied the last three days of M. M.'s hospitalization. J. P. S. was admitted on January 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. P. S.'s obstruction of the common bile duct. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last three days of his hospitalization. J. P. S., a 54-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe jaundice and a history of diabetes, congestive heart failure, and triple coronary artery bypass graft performed in 1997, although he displayed no significant cardiac abnormalities during this hospitalization. During the initial examination, J. P. S. went into respiratory arrest and required intubation. The gastroenterologist found J. P. S. ready for discharge, from a gastroenterological perspective, on January 13. but J. P. S. immediately developed COPD symptoms, including shortness of breath and edema. According to the physician notes, J. P. S. was sufficiently stable for discharge on January 15, but a note for the next day says to hold the discharge pending cardiac evaluation. Respondent discharged J. P. S. three days later, after physicians could monitor the level of Digoxin to ensure that J. P. S. was safe for discharge. P. S.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied the last three days of inpatient services. J. P. was admitted on December 8, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of services to treat J. P.'s fever from December 8-12. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 14 days of J. P.'s hospitalization. J. P., a 27-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with high-grade fevers and severe headaches and a history of AIDS. Dr. Silkes approved the treatment of the fever until it ended on December 12. The fever was likely caused by J. P.'s toxoplasmosis of the central nervous system. This is an opportunistic condition not unusual in immunocompromised patients. Candida fungal infection likely caused J. P.'s complaints of pain on swallowing, as this too is an opportunistic condition. Additionally, a blood culture revealed a staph infection. Through December 18, J. P. was continuing to experience fevers of up to 101 degrees. At the same time, it was necessary to address the toxoplasmosis before it extended to other organs. This required the sequential administration of IV antibiotics and careful, continual monitoring of the patient for his clinical response to treatment. On December 20, J. P. underwent a bone marrow biopsy to rule out the extension of toxoplasmosis in the bone marrow or the presence of tuberculosis. This test was negative, which was a precondition for discharge. The pathology report was "received" on December 21, but not "printed" until December 27. However, J. P. did not complete his IV administration of Doxycycline until December 23, when the medical necessity for his inpatient services ended. Petitioner should have denied three days, not 14 days. W. P. was admitted on June 18, 2001. Dr. Silkes would allow only a 23-hour observation on the day of admission for the treatment of lung cancer and tuberculosis. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of 13 days of his hospitalization from June 18 through July 1 (even though he was not discharged until July 13). W. P., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe coughing up of blood and a recent loss of 40 pounds. A chest X-ray at admission revealed a large mass in the upper left lobe of the lungs. Lab work suggestive of anemia correlated with a malignancy as its source. Sputum to test for acid fast bacillus was taken, and a consult was immediately arranged with a pulmonary specialist to consider a bronchoscopy and to take a biopsy. A CT scan of the chest on June 18 revealed abnormal soft tissue density filling the right upper lobe, two tumors, and numerous nodes. The bronchoscopy on June 19 revealed 80 percent obstruction of the right main bronchus secondary to an endobronchial lesion and 100 percent obstruction of the right upper lobe. A biopsy of the right mainstem bronchus revealed a squamous cell carcinoma. A physician noted in his consultation report that W. P. was to complete his metastatic survey on the day of the report--June 22--after which they would discuss palliative treatment. The report states that the patient understands that he will unlikely live more than six months. Subsequently, acid fast bacillus, which had originally not been detected, was found, so W. P. was placed in isolation on June 26. He had been experiencing elevated white blood counts and fevers. He was placed on antituberculosis treatment, which, as noted above, typically takes two or three weeks until the patient can be removed from isolation. July 10 was W. P.'s first day without fever. On this date, Respondent sent his records to the Health Department to facilitate a transfer to a tuberculosis hospital. He was discharged on July 13. W. P.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner should not have denied any of the 13 days that it denied. M. Pr. was admitted on December 18, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. Pr.'s coronary artery disease from December 18-27. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. Pr.'s hospitalization. M. Pr., a 58-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a recent cardiovascular accident while out of state. A cardiac catheterization revealed severe triple vessel coronary artery disease. On December 19, M. Pr. underwent a four-vessel bypass. Post-operatively, however, M. Pr. fell while on the commode. The dispute in this case arises due to the unavailability of rehabilitation facilities that would take M. Pr. after his fall. He was suitable for discharge on December 28, but no facility could be found to receive him. These are "grace days," as noted in the Handbook and are available, on a limited basis, for persons under 21 years of age, but, by negative implication, are unavailable for adults. Thus, medical necessity dictated that Respondent discharge M. Pr. on December 27, so the inpatient services are not reimbursable after December 28, given that the day of discharge is not allowable. Dr. Silkes' determination was correct in this case. Petitioner properly denied seven days' inpatient services for M. Pr. A. R. was admitted on December 30, 2001. Petitioner has denied the entire 14 days of A. R.'s hospitalization, although Dr. Silkes approved one day's inpatient services, on the day of admission, for the treatment of ovarian cancer. A. R., a 63-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with vomiting on the day of admission, progressive abdominal distension, anorexia, weight loss over the past month, and a 15-year history of bronchial asthma. A CT scan of A. R.'s thorax at the time of admission revealed a large collection of fluid in the abdominal cavity. At this time, a physician removed 4.5 liters of fluid from the cavity, and A. R., not surprisingly, began to feel much better. A report on January 3--delayed probably due to the holidays-- indicated the presence of scattered malignant cells in the withdrawn fluid compatible with carcinoma. Metastatic ovarian cancer was subsequently confirmed. A. R.'s case was complicated by the withdrawal of this large volume of fluids, which required continual monitoring of her electrolytes, and the sudden exacerbation of her dementia on January 2, which would impede outpatient services, as well as the initiation of chemotherapy. The dementia, which had been progressive for the past six months, was likely a reaction to the carcinoma. By January 11, a physician recommended hospice placement given A. R.'s incurable tumor. A. R.'s daughter agreed on this day to hospice placement. This is the day that medical necessity for inpatient services ended. Petitioners should have denied three days, not 14 days. The remaining days were medically necessary. E. S. was admitted on May 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. S.'s pancreatitis and multisystem failure from May 4-23. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 24 days of her hospitalization, which ended with her death. E. S., a 64-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with nausea and abdominal pain and a history of hypertension and abuse of alcohol and tobacco. She was found to have elevated pancreatic enzymes. On May 8, E. S. underwent a laparoscopic removal of her gallbladder, which she tolerated well, but soon afterwards suffered respiratory failure. E. S. was then placed on a ventilator. Problems with malnourishment and then kidney failure precluded a successful weaning her off the ventilator. On May 23, the family agreed to a DNR code. May 23 marks the last day that Dr. Silkes found that E. S.'s hospitalization was medically necessary. Care after this date was entirely supportive and not medically necessary; however, no hospice or skilled nursing facility would take E. S. because she could not be weaned off the ventilator. The unavailability of an alternative, less costly setting does not automatically render the inpatient care of a recipient medically necessary. The circumstances dictate whether inpatient services to such a patient are medically necessary. Here, it is impossible to find that services after May 23 were medically necessary. Dr. Silkes was correct in her opinion. Petitioner properly denied all 24 days of inpatient services for E. S. D. S. was admitted on March 24, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat D. S.'s osteomyelitis of the right foot from March 24-25 and March 30-April 10. (Originally, Dr. Silkes allowed only March 24-25 and March 30-April 6, but, on February 7, 2007, she revised her opinion to allow the additional four days to April 10.) In its prehearing statement, Petitioner conceded that only three of the original ten denied days remained at issue, as it was agreeing that an additional seven days were medically necessary. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days, although it is not clear what three days Petitioner is contesting. D. S., a 57-year-old female, presented at the emergency department with a "hole in the right foot" and a history of diabetes. She dropped a can of juice on her foot on January 1, and the foot had become progressively infected since that time. On the day of admission, she underwent surgery for the removal of fourth and fifth metatarsal bones and toes of the right foot. She did not heal properly and required followup surgery on April 7 to trim some of the necrotic flap, as the physicians considered the possibility of a below-knee amputation. On April 13, the surgeon probed the wound, found no hidden pockets, and discharged D. S. Regardless what three days that Petitioner continues to find were not medically necessary, the entire hospitalization was medically necessary. J. W. was admitted on August 20, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. W.'s multiple organ failure from August 20 to September 14. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining two days of J. W.'s hospitalization, at which time he died. J. W., a 48-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a two or three-day history of progressive congestive heart failure with pulmonary edema, atypical chest pain, and increasing abdominal girth. His history included nonischemic cardiomyopathy with minimal coronary artery disease, chronic alcohol abuse, pulmonary hypertension, chronic atrial fibrillation requiring anticoagulation therapy, hepatitis B and C, chronic renal insufficiency, and chronic congestive heart failure with multiple hospitalizations. On admission, his INR was 6.6, indicative of very slow clotting. Despite the care of numerous consultants, J. W. suffered increased respiratory failure on September 5, at which time he was intubated. He received a Greenfield filter on September 7 to prevent further pulmonary clots. Starting September 10, and continuing everyday thereafter, J. W. required dialysis due to renal failure. J. W. was on total parenteral feeding as of September 14. The family, whose availability had been a problem, agreed to a DNR code on September 17. Respondent claims in its proposed recommended order that a DNR code is a precondition to hospice care, but no competent evidence establishes this fact. Dr. Silkes and Petitioner properly denied the last two days because they were not medically necessary. M. W. was admitted on June 10, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. W.'s ventricular fibrillation and complications from June 10- The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W., a 31-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with cardiopulmonary arrest after his wife found him slumped on the sofa, seizing. On arrival, he was found to be in ventricular fibrillation, and he was intubated. Physicians restored a normal rhythm, but M. W. suffered a seizure in the emergency department, so he was given large doses of Dilantin. M. W. had suffered brain damage from cerebral anoxia. M. W. was extubated on June 13, and his breathing remained stable. He remained in normal sinus rhythm. M. W. began to receive Librium on June 13 to sedate him. The cardiologist proposed a cardiac catheterization, but M. W. refused. An EKG on June 15 found a conduction defect in M. W.'s heart that was suggestive of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. The cardiologist then determined, on June 16, that M. W. required an electrophysiology study to rule out Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. In 2001, Respondent lacked the equipment to perform this study, for which M. W. remained too confused to participate on June 18 anyhow. Physicians continued to monitor M. W.'s cardiac rhythm, and, when a bed opened at Florida Hospital, Orlando, which had the necessary equipment, Respondent promptly transferred M. W. on June 22. During the transfer, the cardiac monitor continued to check M. W.'s rhythm due to the risk of another cardiac incident until the underlying cardiac abnormality was assessed and treated. Petitioner improperly denied the final seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W. had suffered a serious cardiac event. Physicians had not yet ruled out all possible reasons for the event and needed to address a promising possibility of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome, so M. W. remained at risk for another event. He was confused from the brain damage. All of these factors militate in favor of finding that the remaining seven days of inpatient services were medically necessary. E. A. $1666.62 R. B. $5703.18 N. C. $7332.66 N. Ch. $38,332.26 J. C. $4888.44 R. LaB. $833.31 J. L. $1666.62 C. M. $9166.41 M. M. $2499.93 The total overpayment is $104,309.97, which breaks down as follows: J. P. $2444.22 M. Pr. $5703.18 A. R. $2444.22 E. S. $19,999.44 J. S. $1629.48

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding overpayments totaling $104,309.97 during the audit period and requiring that Respondent repay this amount, imposing an administrative fine of $1000, requiring Respondent to prepare a corrective action plan, and reserving jurisdiction to remand the case to the Division of Administrative Hearing for a determination of Petitioner's entitlement to statutory costs, if any. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig H. Smith, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Dr. Andrew C. Agwunobi, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32304-0551 William Blocker, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Daniel Lake, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tracy Cooper, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57409.913409.9207.28
# 8
PHYSICIANS MEDICAL CENTERS-JAX, INC. vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 10-003202 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Jun. 14, 2010 Number: 10-003202 Latest Update: Jan. 19, 2012

Conclusions Having reviewed the four Notices of Intent to Deny Application issued May 13-18, 2010, attached hereto and incorporated herein (Ex. 1, 2, 3, and 4), and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration (“Agency”) has entered into a Settlement Agreement (Ex. 5) with the other party to these proceedings, and being otherwise well-advised in the premises, finds and concludes as follows: ORDERED: 1. The attached Settlement Agreement is approved and adopted as part of this Final Order, and the parties are directed to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The Petitioner shall remit to the Agency, within thirty (30) days of the entry of a Final Order adopting this agreement, an administrative fee in the sum of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000.00) to resolve the Agency's allegations of unlicensed activity, in the interest of expediently resolving these matters and in recognition of the expense and uncertainty of litigation. 3. Checks should be made payable to the “Agency for Health Care Administration.” The check, along with a reference to this case number, should be sent directly to: Filed January 10, 2012 1:47 PM Division of Administrative Hearings Agency for Health Care Administration Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit 2727 Mahan Drive, MS# 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 4. Unpaid amounts pursuant to this Order will be subject to statutory interest and may be collected by all methods legally available. 5. Any requests for an administrative hearing are withdrawn. The parties shall bear their own costs and attorney’s fees. This matter is closed. DONE and ORDERED this [0 day of ~ Bettie: ; 20/2, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. — Ds we { izabeth Dudek, retary fey ir wacked 0. th€are Administration A PARTY WHO JS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY, ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW OF PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: Lance P. Cohen, Esquire Warren J. Bird, Asst. General Counsel Cohen & Thurston, P.A. Office of the General Counsel 1723 Blanding Boulevard, Suite # 102 Agency for Health Care Administration Jacksonville, Florida 32310 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg #3, MS #3 (U. S. Mail) Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Jan Mills Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg #3, MS #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Roger Bell Health Care Clinic Unit Manager Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS #53 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Agency for Health Care Administration Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit 2727 Mahan Drive, MS# 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Suzanne F. Hood Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (U.S. Mail) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this Final Order was served on the oa above-named person(s) and entities by U.S. Mail, or the method designated, on this the 10 day of aaa » 2012" Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 412-3630 Certified Article Number , ?bbO 390) Y5778 8971 SEMDERS RECORD i", Certified Article Number (?160 3901 9846 7935 1337 SENDERS RECORD One Nofice $1149/1° CHARLIE CRIST FIORDAAGENCY FOR HEATH CARE ADMINS TRATION Better Health Care for ail Floridians THOMAS W. ARNOLD GOVERNOR SECRETARY May 12, 2010 Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc File Number: 8428 1680 Dunn Ave Case #: 2010004935 Ste 39 Jacksonville, FL 32218 F INTENT TO DENY APP TION It Is the decision of this Agency that the application for certificate of exemption from health care clinic licensure for Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc, located at 1680 DUNN AVE, STE 39, JACKSONVILLE, FL, 32218, be DENIED. The specific basis for this determination is based on the fact that: Requested information was not complete or timely received by the Agency pursuant to Section 408.806(3)(b), Florida Statutes. You were notified by correspondence dated April 9, 2010 to provide further Information addressing identified apparent errors or omissions within twenty-one days (21) from the receipt of the Agency's correspondence. Our records indicate you received this correspondence by certified mail on April 15, 2010. The outstanding issues remaining are: A copy of the closing documents, stock or similar certificates signed and dated by both the buyer and seller is required, In addition, the Agency received information that the facility does not meet exemption requirements as it is not wholly owned by a Florida licensed health care practitioner, pursuant to Section 400.9905(4)(g). EXPLANATION OF RIGH Pursuant to Section 120.569, F.S., you have the right to request an administrative hearing. In order to obtain a formal proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings under Section 120.57(1), F.S., your request for an administrative hearing must conform to the requirements in Section 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C), and must state the material facts you dispute. SEE ATTACHED ELECTION AND EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS FORMS. ce: Agency Clerk, Mail Stop 3 ; Legal Intake Unit, Mall Stop 3. EXHIBIT 14 Visit AHCA online at http://ahca.myflorida.com 2727 Mahan Drive,MS-53 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 " Certified Article Number , 7260 3901 9648 57748 8995 SENDERS RECORD FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION CHARLIE CRIST THOMAS W. ARNOLD GOVERNOR Better Health Care for all Floridians SECRETARY May 12, 2010 Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc File Number: 8430 9826 San Jose Blvd Case #: 2010004881 Jacksonville, FL 32257 .. : NOTICE OF INTENT TO DENY APPLICATION It is the decision of this Agency that the application for certificate of exemption from health care clinic licensure for Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc, located at 9826 San Jose Bivd, Jacksonville, FL, 32257, be DENIED. The specific basis for this determination is based on the fact that: Requested information was not complete or timely received by the Agency pursuant to Section 408.806(3)(b), Florida Statutes. You were notified by correspondence dated March 27, 2010 to provide further information addressing identified apparent errors or omissions within twenty- one days (21) from the receipt of the Agency's correspondence. Our records indicate you received this correspondence by certified mail on April 8, 2010, The outstanding issues remaining are: Subpart 1.B, Name-of.Applicant: The name of the applicant must be the corporation or legal entity as it is registered with. the Division of Corporations, it must also match-the FEIN indicated in section 1.C. This subpart was submitted as a response to the omissions, but the. applicant's name indicated does not match the FEIN# listed in section 1.C. of the application. : As this facility did a change of ownership, provide a copy of the closing documents signed and dated by both the buyer (new owner) and seller (previous owner). Acceptable documentation may include any one of the following: Copy of final sale/transfer documents showing date of final transfer and signatures of buyer(s) and seller(s), or a signed, written statement from an attorney, on letterhead, that confirms sale/transfer completion and provides the date of final action. : In addition, the Agency received information that the facility does not meet exemption requirements as it is not wholly owned by a Florida licensed health care practitioner, pursuant to Section 400.9905(4)(g). TION OF HT! Pursuant to Section 120.569, F.S., you have the right to request an administrative hearing, In order to obtain a formal proceeding before -the Division of Administrative Hearings under Section 120,57(1), F.S., your request for an administrative hearing-must conform to the - requirements in Section 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C), and must state the material facts you dispute. ; : : Visit AHCA online at http://ahca.myflorida,com 2727 Mahan Drive,MS-53 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 EXHIBIT 2 Physicians Medical Centers -. . Inc Page 2 : May 12, 2010 SEE ATTACHED ELECTION AND EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS FORMS. ce: Agency Clerk, Mail Stop 3 Legal Intake Unit, Mail Stop 3 Te thictee-Va thet [9 Number fd60 3901 9848 7495 a2, SENDERS RECORD FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION CHARLIE CRIST THOMAS W. ARNOLD GOVERNOR Better Health Care for all Floridians SECRETARY May 13, 2010 Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc File #8427 5960 Beach Blvd : Case #2010004956 Ste3 ; Jacksonville, FL 32207 NOTICE OF INTENT TQ DENY APPLICATION It is the decision of this Agency that the application for certificate of exemption from health care clinic licensure for Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc, located at 5960 Beach Bivd., Ste 3, Jacksonville, FL, 32207, be DENIED. The specific basis for this determination is based on the fact that: Requested information was not complete or timely received by the Agency pursuant to Section 408.806(3)(b), Florida Statutes. You were notified by correspondence dated April 7, 2010 to provide further information addressing identified apparent errors or omissions within twenty- one days (21) from the receipt of the Agency's correspondence. Our records indicate you received this correspondence by certified mail on Apri! 9, 2010. The outstanding issues remaining are: As this facility did a change of ownership, provide a copy of the closing documents signed and dated by both the buyer (new owner) and seller (previous owner). Acceptable documentation may include any one of the following: Copy of final sale/transfer documents showing date of final transfer and signatures of buyer(s) and seller(s), or a signed, written statement from an attorney, on letterhéad, that confirms sale/transfer completion and provides the date of final action. ; In addition, the Agency received information that the facility does not meet exemption requirements as it is not wholly owned by a Florida licensed health care practitioner, pursuant to Section 400.9905(4)(g). EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS Pursuant to Section 120.569, F.S., you have the right to request an administrative hearing. In order to obtain a formal proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings under Section 120.57(1), F.S., your request for an administrative hearing must conform to the requirements in Section 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C), and must state the material facts you dispute. EXHIBIT 3 Visit AHCA online at http://ahca.myflorida.com 2727 Mahan Drive,MS-53 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Page 2 May 13, 2010 SEE ATTACHED ELECTION AND EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS FORMS. Health Cae Clinic Unit ce: Agency Clerk, Mail Stop 3 Legal Intake Unit, Mail Stop 3 RTE ecm 3901 94a 7935 yy74 SENDERS RECORD FLORIDA AGENCY TOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION oe ERNGS Better Health Care for all Floridians THOMAS W. ARNOLD May 18, 2010 CERTIFIED MAIL / RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED File Number: 8429 Physicians Medical Centers - Jax, Inc 2020 Kingsley Ave Case #: 2010005135 Suite A Orange Park, FL 32073 NOTICE OF INTENT TO DENY APPLICATION It is the decision of this Agency that the application for certificate of exemption from health care clinic licensure for Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc, located at 2020 Kingsley Avenue, Suite A, Orange Park, Florida, 32073 be DENIED. The specific basis for this determination is based on the fact that: Requested information was not complete or timely received by the Agency pursuant to Section 408.806(3)(b), Florida Statutes, You were notified by correspondence dated April 9, 2010 to provide further information addressing identified apparent errors or omissions within twenty-one days (21) from the receipt of the Agency’s correspondence, Our records indicate you received this correspondence by certified mail on April 12, 2010, The outstanding issues remaining are: Evidence of Ownership — Information received by the Agency states that Victoria Critzer is the owner of Physicians Medical Centers-Jax Inc. Provide the following documentation as evidence of ownership: * A copy of the final closing documents such as a bill of sale or stock purchase agreement. signed and dated by both the buyer and seller including the effective date sale or transfer. The closing documents should contain the signature of Gordon Garver DC, previous owner of Physicians Medical Center-Jax Inc and Joseph Thomas MD, new owner of Physicians Medical Center-Jax Inc. ¢ A copy of the cancelled and reissued stock certificates transferring shared to Joseph Thomas MD. ¢ Acopy of the lease agreement that includes the name(s) of the owner(s). e Acopy of the business tax receipt that includes the name of the corporation and owner. In addition, the Agency received information indicating that the facility does not meet exemption requirements as it is not wholly owned by a Florida licensed health care practitioner, pursuant to Section 400.9905(4)(g). EXHIBIT 2727 Mahan Drive,MS-53 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Visit AHCA online at http://ahca.myflorida.com . Physicians Medical Centers - Ja... .nc Page 2 May 18, 2010 EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS Pursuant to Section 120,569, F.S., you have the right to request an administrative hearing. In order to obtain a formal proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings under Section 120.57(1), F.S. your request for an administrative hearing must conform to the requirements in Section 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C), and must state the material facts you dispute. ey SEE ATTACHED ELECTION AND EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS FORMS, For questions regarding this notice, please contact Ruby Schmigel, Health Services & Facilities Consultant with the Health Care Clinic Unit at (850) 412-4413. oger Bgl, Mandger Health Care Clinic Unit ce: Agency Clerk, Mail Stop 3 Legal Intake Unit, Mail Stop 3 STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS PHYSICIANS MEDICAL CENTERS-JAX, INC., Petitioner, DOAH Case Nos. 10-3202, 10-3203, 10-3204 and 10-3205 vs. AHCA CASE Nos.: 2010004881, 2010004956 AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE 2010004935 and 2010005135, ADMINISTRATION, Respondent. / SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT Respondent, State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration (hereinafter the “Agency”), through its undersigned representatives, and Petitioner, Physicians Medical Centers- Jax, Inc. (hereinafter “Petitioner”), pursuant to Section 120.57(4), Florida Statutes, each individually, a “party,” collectively as “parties,” hereby enter into this Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) and agree as follows: WHEREAS, the Petitioner applied for four certificates of exemption from licensure pursuant to Section 400.9935(6), Florida Statutes and Chapter 59A-33, Florida Administrative Code; and WHEREAS, Victoria Critzer has applied for four initial health care clinic licenses, expressly intending to purchase the interest of Dr. Joseph Thomas in Petitioner upon issuance by the Agency of those licenses; and WHEREAS, the Agency has jurisdiction of the license and exemption applications described in the foregoing paragraphs, by virtue of being the regulatory and licensing authority over the said licenses and exemptions; and EXHIBIT 5 WHEREAS, the Agency served the Petitioner with four Notices of Intent to Deny Application on or about May 13, 2010, notifying the Petitioner of the Agency’s intent to deny the certificates of exemption for the reasons stated thereon, in Agency cases numbered 2010004881, 2010004956, 2010004935 and 2010005135; and WHEREAS, Petitioner timely requested a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, and in response to said request the matters were forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), and were designated as cases numbered 10-3202, 10-3203, 10-3204 and 10-3205 in that tribunal; and subsequently the parties agreed to, and did abate those cases in DOAH, for the purpose of discussing settlement; and WHEREAS, the Agency alleges, and Petitioner denies, that during the period of processing of the aforementioned applications, Petitioner operated one or more unlicensed health care clinics in violation of Florida law as to which no formal administrative, civil or criminal action has thus far been brought; and WHEREAS, the parties have agreed that a fair, efficient, and cost effective resolution of this dispute would avoid the expenditure of substantial sums to litigate the dispute; and WHEREAS, the parties stipulate to the adequacy of consideration exchanged; and WHEREAS, the parties have negotiated in good faith and agreed that the best interest of all the parties will be served by a settlement of these proceedings; and NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and recitals herein, the parties intending to be legally bound, agree as follows: 1. All recitals are true and correct and are expressly incorporated herein. 2. Both parties agree that the “whereas” clauses incorporated herein are binding findings of the parties. 3. Joseph Thomas, M.D. hereby acknowledges, affirms and certifies that, at the time this agreement is executed by him, he is the sole owner of the Florida corporation Physicians Medical Center-Jax, Inc. 4, Victoria Critzer hereby acknowledges, affirms and certifies that, at the time this agreement is executed by her, she is the sole owner of the Florida corporation Physicians Medical Center, Inc. 5. Upon full execution of this Agreement, Petitioner agrees to waive any and all proceedings and appeals to which it may be entitled including, but not limited to, an informal proceeding under Subsection 120.57(2), a formal proceeding under Subsection 120.57(1), appeals under Section 120.68, Florida Statutes; and declaratory and all writs of relief in any court or quasi-court (DOAH) of competent jurisdiction; and further agrees to waive compliance with the form of the Final Order (findings of fact and conclusions of law) to which it may be entitled. Provided, however, that no Agreement herein, shall be deemed a waiver by either party of its right to judicial enforcement of this Agreement. 6. Upon full execution of this Agreement, the parties agree to the following: a. Petitioner's four (4) applications for exemption from licensure are hereby withdrawn, and Petitioner expressly waives its right to challenge or appeal, or both, in DOAH or elsewhere, the denial by the Agency of the exemptions. b. The Agency will resume processing the four initial licensure applications submitted by Victoria Critzer as intended future 100% owner of Physicians Medical Centers-Jax, Inc., now pending, and if the applications are complete and the applicant qualified under applicable law, the Agency will issue the licenses upon full payment by Petitioner of an agreed upon sum, as set forth below, to resolve the Agency's claim of unlicensed activity against Physicians Medical Center, Inc. Ms. Critzer agrees to use reasonable diligence to timely remedy any omissions from the applications cited by the Agency, to make the facilities available as required by law for all inspections required in connection with the licensure of the facilities, and to otherwise comply with all requirements of the application process, and all statutes and administrative rules thereunto appertaining, including background screening as may be applicable. c. The Agency agrees to use all reasonable diligence to process the initial license applications, and to issue the initial licenses as expeditiously as reasonably possible, provided that Ms. Critzer timely complies with all reasonable requests for additional information to which the Agency is entitled as a component of the application and licensure process, and provided that Victoria Critzer, and the applications she presented, are qualified for the licenses under all applicable statutes and administrative rules. d. Victoria Critzer will maintain the health care clinic license #HCC6732 currently held by Physicians Medical Center Inc. (PMC), for purposes of billing health care services provided solely at the licensed location, 9826 San Jose Boulevard, Suite B, Jacksonville, Florida. Whereas, Ms. Critzer, through counsel, has advised the Agency of a change of address for the license from 9826 San Jose Boulevard, to 9826 San Jose Boulevard, Suite B, PMC will submit a change of address application to the Agency together with the appropriate fee, within 10 days of execution of this agreement, and prior to resumption by the Agency of processing of the subject licensure applications. The license will be maintained 7. under a different federal employer identification number from any other licenses issued to Victoria Critzer or any entity in which she has a controlling interest. A separate health care clinic license must be obtained for any other location at which any health care services will be provided and third-party reimbursement sought for on behalf of Physicians Medical Centers Inc. e. Physicians Medical Centers, Inc. agrees to pay the sum of thirty thousand and no/100s dollars ($30,000.00) to the Agency, to resolve the Agency's allegations of unlicensed activity, in the interest of expediently resolving these matters and in recognition of the expense and uncertainty of litigation. The sum will be paid in lump sum at the time that the initial licenses referenced in paragraph b., above, are issued, or within 30 days following rendition of a Final Order by the Agency that incorporates this Agreement, whichever occurs first. f. Nothing in this Agreement shall prohibit the Agency from denying Petitioner’s application for licensure based upon any statutory and/or regulatory provision, including, but not limited to, the failure of Petitioner to satisfactorily complete a survey reflecting compliance with all statutory and rule provisions as required by law. By executing this Agreement, the Petitioner neither admits nor denies the allegations raised in the Notices of Intent to Deny referenced herein. 8. Upon full execution of this Agreement, the Agency shall enter a Final Order adopting and incorporating this Agreement in its entirety, and closing the above-styled case(s). The cases resident in DOAH, referenced above as DOAH cases numbered 10-3202, 10-3203, 10- 3204 and 10-3205, are currently closed by Order entered in that tribunal on October 7, 2010. The parties hereby further agree that those cases shall remain closed permanently, and each party hereby waives its right to seek to have any of those cases re-opened. 9. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney’s fees. 10. This Agreement shall become effective on the date upon which it is fully executed by all the parties. 11. The Petitioner for itself and for its related or resulting organizations, its successors or transferees, attorneys, heirs, and executors or administrators, does hereby discharge the Agency and its agents, representatives, and attorneys of all claims, demands, actions, causes of action, suits, damages, losses, and expenses, of any and every nature whatsoever, arising out of or in any way related to this matter and the Agency’s actions, including, but not limited to, any claims that were or may be asserted in any federal or state court or administrative forum, including any claims arising out of this Agreement, by or on behalf of the Petitioner or related or resulting organizations. 12. This Agreement is binding upon all parties herein and those identified as a party, or a beneficiary, of the provisions of this Agreement, and each signatory acknowledges same and the adequacy of consideration therefor. 13. In the event that Petitioner is or was a Medicaid provider, this settlement does not prevent the Agency from seeking Medicaid overpayments or from imposing any sanctions pursuant to Rule 59G-9.070, Florida Administrative Code. This Agreement does not prohibit the Agency from taking action regarding Petitioner’s Medicaid provider status, conditions, requirements or contract. 14. The undersigned have read and understand this Agreement and have authority to bind their respective principals to it. Both parties have been represented by counsel in the negotiation and execution of this Agreement. The Petitioner fully understands that counsel for the Agency represents solely the Agency and Agency counsel has not provided legal advice to or influenced the Petitioner in its decision to enter into this Agreement. 15. This Agreement contains the entire understandings and Agreements of the parties. 16. | This Agreement supersedes any prior oral or written Agreements between the parties. This Agreement may not be amended except in writing. Any attempted assignment of this Agreement shall be void. 17. Venue for any action brought to interpret, challenge or enforce the terms of this Agreement or the Final Order entered pursuant hereto shall lie solely in the Circuit Court in Leon County, Florida. 18. ‘Ifa court of competent jurisdiction finds any part of this Agreement to be void, voidable, or unenforceable, then the remainder of the contract shall remain in full force and effect. 19. All parties agree that a facsimile signature suffices fe 20. The following representatives and beneficiaries hereby ae duly S. to enter into this Agreement. Molly McKéns eputy Secretary {_ panes P. Céhen, Esquire Health Quality ance Cohen & Thurston, P.A. Agency for Health Care Administration 1723 Blanding Boulevard, Suite 102 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg #3 Jacksonville, Florida 32310 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Counsel to Petitioner DATED: (frolir DATED: 1-1 U~ aye William R. Roberts Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 DATED: /7 [(3l 4 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 DATED: Uf (5) WH Physicians Medical Centers-Jax, Inc. 9826 San Jose Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32257 patep: _})-14~!/ ~~ x. 1 _f- Victoria Critzer as president, sole director and 100% Owner Physicians Medical Center, Inc. 9826-B San Jose Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32257 DATED: _|1- (4-//

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