Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this final order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Sections 120.68 and 766.311, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing the original of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the appropriate District Court of Appeal. See Section 766.311, Florida Statutes, and Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association v. Carreras, 598 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner was discriminated against based upon his race when he was disciplined for absenting his post contrary to Chapter 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Willie B. Smith, is an African-American male. He is now and was at the time of the incidents involved in his complaint employed by the Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services, at Florida State Hospital as a guard in the forensic (prison) unit. The Petitioner is part of a bargaining unit that is represented by the Florida Police Benevolent Association. On November 15, 2001, at approximately 1:05 a.m., the Petitioner contacted his Shift Supervisor, Jimmie Williams, an African-American male, and requested to leave his assigned post in Tower B and go to Unit 3 at the hospital and pick up food from a fish fry. Williams approved the Petitioner’s leaving his post to get the food and to return to his post after getting the food. At 2:35 a.m., Williams was contacted on the radio by the Control Room Officer, Johnny Smith, who indicated that the Petitioner wanted to talk to him on the telephone. Williams provided Johnny Smith a telephone number at which the Petitioner could reach him, and the Petitioner called Williams a short time later. The Petitioner informed Williams that he had spilled diesel fuel on his uniform and asked permission to take the remainder of the shift off. Williams asked the Petitioner where he was, surprised that the Petitioner was some place other than at his post. The Petitioner refused to identify where he was, and Williams denied his request for leave. Realizing that the Petitioner was not at his post, Williams proceeded to Tower B and manned that post until the Petitioner arrived there at 3:04 a.m. When he arrived at Tower B, Williams asked the Petitioner where he had been, and the Petitioner stated he had been at the Florida State Hospital gas station. Williams had checked the Florida State Hospital gas station looking for the Petitioner and was aware that the Petitioner had not been there. At this point, angry words were exchanged and the Petitioner admitted that he had not been at the gas station. Williams wrote up an incident report that initiated a formal investigation into the Petitioner's having absented himself from his post while on duty without proper authorization. The Petitioner was advised of the investigation, and he requested that the PBA represent him in the investigation pursuant to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. At the Petitioner's specific request, Steve Mears, from the Tallahassee Office of the PBA, represented the Petitioner in this matter. During the course of a break in a meeting held with regard to the investigation, the Petitioner mentioned to Mears voluntarily changing duty stations, and Mears raised this request with representatives of the Respondent, including William T. Parker, now Chief of Security. As a result, the Petitioner was re-assigned from the forensic unit to the central forensic unit because this was the only place where there was a vacancy. His shift and days off remained the same, which did not constitute a transfer under the terms of the contract. Such a re-assignment was not subject to being grieved under the terms of the bargaining agreement. See testimony of Parker and Mears. The Petitioner's days off changed from the first and third weeks of the month to the second and fourth weeks of the month, but the days of the week remained the same. Although the evidence supports a finding that this move was voluntary, it is not material because, under terms of the bargaining agreement, such a re-assignment was not subject to a grievance. The investigation established sufficient cause for the Respondent to issue an official letter of reprimand to the Petitioner for absenting his post without permission. Pursuant to internal policy, the Petitioner's new supervisor, Roger Howell, who had had nothing to do with the incident upon which the reprimand was based, issued the letter. See testimony of Howell and Bryant. The Respondent introduced the Employee's Handbook, dated Mary 29, 2001, which the Petitioner had received. The book contains the Standards for Disciplinary Action, which include absences without authorized leave. This provision provides that for the first occurrence of Absence Without Authorized Leave, the section under which the Petitioner was disciplined, the violator can be given a range of punishments from a written reprimand to dismissal. See testimony of Bryant. Evidence was received that these penalties have been imposed upon employees of the Respondent without regard to race or gender. See testimony of Williams. At the hearing, the Petitioner expressed his concern that his reprimand had been signed by someone who had no knowledge of the incident, and stated that he felt he had permission to leave his post. He also introduced a doctor's excuse (Petitioner's Exhibit 2); however, the date of the doctor's visit did not relate to the date of the incident. The supervisor who signed the letter of reprimand and the personnel specialist who prepared the letter testified that it was policy for an employee's supervisor to sign the reprimand, even if he or she personally did not have knowledge of the events. Mr. Williams testified regarding his authorization to the Petitioner to leave his post to get food. He was very credible. He expected the Petitioner, in accordance with regular procedure, to leave his post, get his food, and return to the post immediately, being absent from the Tower for approximately 30 minutes. This was the normal process for getting food during a shift. The Petitioner was gone for two hours, and gone for over an hour without Williams being aware that Tower B was not covered. There was significant evidence introduced that none of the actions complained of by the Petitioner were motivated by racial animus. The disciplinary action taken by the Petitioner was at the lower end of penalties that could have been imposed. The complainant, Williams, was also an African-American. The PBA representative, whom the Petitioner specifically requested over the regular one at the hospital, testified regarding the events leading up to the Petitioner's re-assignment. The Petitioner sought a change of assignment and voluntarily accepted the change. See the testimony of Mears and Parker. There was no evidence adduced to show pretext.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief filed by the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Anita L. Davis, Qualified Representative 708 Brag Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32305 Jacqueline H. Smith, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 1000 Chattahoochee, Florida 32324-1000 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Human Relations Commission 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Human Relations Commission 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Dentistry, filed an Administrative Complaint in DPR Case Number 00-52375 against the Petitioner's license to practice dentistry on May 13, 1986. The Petitioner did not dispute the facts alleged in the Administrative Complaint and the Board of Dentistry held an informal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, on September 13, 1986. On October 2, 1986, the Board of Dentistry issued a Final Order suspending the Petitioner from the remunerative practice of dentistry for a period of ten (10) years and advised the Petitioner of his right to appeal the Board's Final Order. The Petitioner did not appeal the October 2, 1986 Final Order of the Board of Dentistry. On or about May 1, 1987, and/or May 2, 1987, the Board of Dentistry met to consider correspondence from the Petitioner seeking a determination of compliance with the Board's October 2, 1986 Final Order for his proposal to do volunteer community service dental work at "St. Catherine Laboure Manor" in Jacksonville, Florida. The Board of Dentistry requested further clarification from the Petitioner and took no further action with respect to the Petitioner's request. On June 10, 1987, the Board of Dentistry met to consider the Petitioner's request to allow him to provide volunteer community service dental work under indirect supervision, and on June 26, 1987, the Board of Dentistry issued an Order Denying the Modification. The Petitioner did not appeal the June 26, 1987, Order of the Board of Dentistry. On or about March 9, 1988, the Petitioner submitted his second request to the Board of Dentistry for modification of its October 2, 1986 Final Order. The Petitioner identified the following reasons as why the Board of Dentistry should grant his request: My obligation to the people of the State of Florida was fully satisfied on September 28, 1987 (enc.). My civil rights were restored on February 25, 1988 (enc.). The fine imposed by the Board of Professional Regulation ($2000.00) has been paid in full. Since July 1987 I have been treating patients in St. Catherine Laboure' Manor under the direct supervision of Owen Boales D.D.S., as required by order of the Board (enc.). I am currently 64 years of age and need gainful employment. My wife and I are currently surviving primary on her earnings as an employee of the Florida Community College at Jacksonville. My mentally disabled son was admitted to The Northeast Florida State Hospital approximately one month after my arrest. His condition would be benefited by whatever personal attention and care my wife and I may be able to provide. The ten year suspension order now in effect is tantamount to lifetime punishment. This long suspension does not benefit the public but severely obstructs rehabilitative effort. It minimizes the opportunities for professional public service and prevents professional employment. It reduces the available options to demonstrate reliability and observable conformity to the profession's ethical standards. It will continue to impede all my effort to becoming a self sustaining productive and worthy member of society. On April 23, 1988, the Board of Dentistry met to consider the Petitioner's second request for modification of the Board's October 2, 1986 Final Order. After discussion and consideration of the evidence and arguments of the Petitioner, the Board of Dentistry on July 13, 1988, issued an Order Denying Modification of Final Order. The Petitioner did not appeal the Board's July 13, 1988 Order denying his second request. On or about June 5, 1990, the Petitioner through his attorney submitted his third request to the Board of Dentistry for a modification of the October 2, 1986 Final Order. The Petitioner's third Motion for Modification of Final Order submitted to the Board on or about June 5, 1990, did not contain information or circumstances that were substantially different from those known to the Board at the time the Final Order of October 2, 1986, was entered, at the time the first order was entered denying the modification request, or that were known to the Board when it had previously heard and denied Petitioner's second request in 1988. On July 28, 1990, the Board of Dentistry met to consider the Petitioner's third request for modification of the October 2, 1986 Final Order. After discussion of the parties and upon the advice of legal counsel, the Board of Dentistry on August 13, 1990, issued an Order Denying Modification of Final Order. The Petitioner timely sought an appeal of the Board's August 13, 1990 Order in the First District Court of Appeal, Case Number 90-2369. On September 4, 1991, the First District Court of Appeal issued its opinion where they found the August 13, 1990 Final Order to be ambiguous, vacated the August 13th Final Order, and remanded the case back to the Board of Dentistry for further proceedings. On October 8, 1991, the First District Court of Appeal issued its Mandate to the Board of Dentistry to hold further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. On or about October 15, 1991, the Petitioner submitted an Amended Motion for Modification alleging for the first time that "there had been material changes in circumstances since his suspension was entered and/or since the previous rulings as to his suspension." On November 8, 1991, the Board of Dentistry met to consider the Petitioner's third request for modification of the Board's October 2, 1986 Final Order, the Amended Motion for Modification of Final Order, and the Opinion and Mandate of the First District Court of Appeal. After discussion and consideration of the Petitioner's requests for modification, the Opinion and Mandate of the First District Court of Appeal, and the evidence presented, on December 12, 1991, the Board of Dentistry issued a Final Order on Remand granting the Petitioner's Amended Motion for Modification of the Board's October 2, 1986 Final Order. The Petitioner is a sole proprietor of a professional practice of dentistry. His principal office and domicile are located in Jacksonville, Florida. He has fewer than twenty-five (25) full-time employees, and his net worth, at the time of filing, was less than two million ($2,000,000) dollars. The Petitioner incurred appellate attorney's fees in the amount of $8,990.00 and costs in the amount of $323.92. The Respondent did not dispute the reasonableness of the fees and costs in this case.
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner overpaid Medicaid reimbursements to Respondent for inpatient hospital services due to the lack of medical necessity for such services and, if so, the amount of the overpayment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a 226-bed community hospital in Sanford. It is an acute-care hospital with an emergency department. At all material times, Respondent has been an authorized Medicaid provider. For inpatient services, Respondent receives, under Medicaid, an all-inclusive per diem rate for all goods and services provided during a 24-hour period, less any third-party payments. Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation of the Medicaid program in Florida. Petitioner is required to perform Medicaid audits of providers and to recover any overpayments. Pursuant to this authority, Petitioner conducted an audit of Respondent for the period from January 1, 2001, through March 31, 2002. Pursuant to its procedures, Petitioner duly informed Respondent of the audit, obtained from Respondent relevant medical and hospital records, issued a Provisional Agency Audit Report on January 24, 2006, obtained additional information from Respondent pertinent to the provisional findings, and issued a Final Agency Audit Report on October 19, 2006, which claimed a total overpayment of $286,357.54 based on Medicaid payments made to Respondent on behalf of 35 different recipients. (The report indicates two separate denials for each of four recipients, so 39 total transactions are listed.) The dispute in this case concerns the medical necessity of the inpatient hospitalization of each recipient. The Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Handbook) states that the purpose of the Medicaid program is "to provide medically necessary inpatient and outpatient services to recipients in the hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. This case involves paid claims for inpatient, not outpatient, services. The Handbook defines inpatient services as those services "rendered to recipients who are admitted to a hospital and are expected to stay at least 24 hours and occupy a bed, even though a bed is not actually utilized because the recipient is discharged or transferred to another hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. The Handbook provides that the day of admission is covered, but the day of discharge is not covered, unless it is also the day of admission. Handbook, page 2-22. The Handbook defines "grace days" as non-medically necessary days following the day of formal discharge when the recipient continues to occupy a hospital bed until an outside facility or residence can be found. These days are not reimbursable by Medicaid except for children under 21 years of age on "Department of Children and Families hold . . .." Medicaid will pay up to 48 hours of inpatient stay beyond the formal discharge day for these children while an alternative placement is located. The Handbook incorporates the limitation of medical necessity as follows: Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary, do not duplicate another provider's service, and are: individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; not experimental or investigational; reflective of the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or service medically necessary or a covered service. Note: See Appendix D, Glossary, in the Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, for the definition of medically necessary. Handbook, pages 2-1 to 2-2. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, defines "medically necessary" as follows: Means that the medical or allied care, goods, or services furnished or ordered must: Meet the following conditions: Be necessary to protect life, to prevent significant illness or significant disability, or to alleviate severe pain; Be individualized, specific, and consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; Be consistent with generally accepted professional medical standards as determined by the Medicaid program, and not experimental or investigational; Be reflective of the level of service that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available; statewide; and Be furnished in a manner that is not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. "Medically necessary" or "medical necessity" for inpatient hospital services requires that those services furnished in a hospital on an inpatient basis could not, consistent with the provisions of appropriate medical care, be effectively furnished more economically on an outpatient basis or in an inpatient facility of a different type. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or services medically necessary or a medical necessity or a covered service. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, page D-10. E. A. was admitted on January 6, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. A.'s acute exacerbation of chronic bronchitis from January 6-8. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining ten days of E. A.'s hospitalization. (All calculations of duration of hospitalizations omit the day of discharge, pursuant to the above-cited provision from the Handbook. In this case, for instance, E. A. was discharged on January 19.) E. A., a 60-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and a history of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), emphysema, and hypertension. He had been unable to eat for the preceding four days due to respiratory distress. At the time of his admission, E. A. had been living for a short while with his sister, who was suffering from cancer. His relevant history included a shotgun wound to the left lung 30 years earlier. Respondent states in its proposed recommended order that E. A.'s chest X-rays showed acute infiltrate demonstrating pneumonia, although the discharge summary reveals that chest X-rays fail to reveal this condition, but acknowledged that sputum grain stains revealed a polymicrobial infection. More to the point, the X-ray reports dated January 6 and 8 note: "no focal infiltrate." However, the discharge summary described E. A.'s prognosis as poor because he was in "end-stage lung disease." In the emergency department, after treatment with bronchodilators, E. A.'s oxygen saturation rate was only 87 percent--not 94-100 percent, as mistakenly stated by Petitioner's expert, Dr. Ellen Silkes, an otolaryngologist whose practice is largely limited to outpatients. This low rate of oxygen saturation evidences hypoxia. E. A.'s arterial blood gases bore a pH of 7.28, evidencing, on the facts of this case respiratory acidosis, which results from excessive retained carbon dioxide due to poor lung function. E. A. was started on Albuterol and Atrovent by nebulizer at four-hour intervals, as well as a corticosteroid intravenously every six hours to relieve the swelling in the lungs. He received oxygen by nasal cannula. On January 10, the physician's notes state that E. A. still suffered from "severe COPD" secondary to smoking with bronchospasms. According to the notes, the first day that E. A. showed any improvement was January 12. On January 14 and 16, E. A. was still retaining excessive carbon dioxide and remained hypoxic, but showed some improvement by January 16 in terms of arterial blood gases. The physician's note for January 17 states that E. A. could be discharged as soon as arrangements for home health care were completed. E. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 6-17. His hospitalization after January 17 was not medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied January 9-16, given that the day of discharge is excluded. Thus, for E. A., Petitioner should have denied two days, not all ten days. A. A. was admitted on June 19, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat A. A.'s gastrointestinal bleeding from June 19-20. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 12 days of A. A.'s hospitalization. (Some of Petitioner's calculations are incorrect. For instance, in this case, Petitioner does not deny July 2-5, even though, undoubtedly, its position as to the lack of medical necessity as to the earlier dates would mandate the same position as to the later dates. This recommended order does not disturb Petitioner's implicit acceptance of the medical necessity of any dates, even when it appears to be in error.) A. A., a 51-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain, diarrhea, and black tarry stools. His recent history included bloody vomit and a diagnosis, a few months earlier, of a pulmonary embolism. A. A. had discontinued taking Coumadin, a blood thinner, due to nosebleeds. A. A. had been diagnosed with AIDS in 1998 and had lost 30 pounds in one month. At admission, A. A.'s hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were critically low at 5.1 and 15.5, respectively, and remained critically low the following day when, after A. A. received transfusions of two units of packed red blood cells, his hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were only 6.8 and 20.0, respectively. Dr. Silkes denied the hospitalization after June 20 because an upper gastrointestinal endoscopy revealed, on June 19, no acute bleeding, and a bleeding scan the following day was negative. However, according to the physician's notes, A. A. was continuing to experience diarrhea on June 20, even though he was starting to feel better. The course of treatment of A. A. was complicated by his recent history of pulmonary embolism and his inability to report an accurate history. By June 21, A. A.'s severe anemia had been corrected, but he was diagnosed with candida, an opportunistic fungal infection common in AIDS patients. This diagnosis would explain the vomiting of blood. Generally, the treatment dilemma posed by A. A. was that efforts to increase his clotting time to stop the bleeding raised the risk of pulmonary embolism. The physicians debated whether to install a Greenfield filter to stop the passage of a blood clot. The filter is introduced under X-ray control through the femoral vein into the inferior vena cava, where it is anchored, so that it allows the passage of blood, but not the passage of a blood clot. But the Greenfield filter is contraindicated in the presence of A. A.'s fever of 101 degrees and elevated white blood counts. Physicians introduced Coumadin to minimize the risk of clots, but A. A.'s low platelet count required the discontinuation of Coumadin on June 30. A. A.'s International Normalization Ratio (INR) was 4.2, which is well above the range of 2.0-3.0 and thus indicative of the fact that A. A.'s blood was taking too long to clot. The standard of care in 2001 precluded safe outpatient management of a complicated patient such as A. A., given his twin risks of pulmonary embolism and bleeding, either of which could result in his death. A. A.'s Coumadin could not safely have been adjusted on an outpatient basis. The physicians restarted the Coumadin on June 24 and doubled its dosage the following day. As they were working on adjusting the blood thinner, though, A. A. continued to suffer nightly fevers of 103 degrees, and the physicians needed to monitor him closely for the next week for this reason too. On June 28, A. A. reported that he was feeling better, but the physicians needed to monitor him for a recent reduction in his Coumadin dosage. A. A. was reported as "alert and comfortable" on July 2. A. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from June 19 through at least July 2. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization. T. B. was admitted on May 15, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat T. B.'s esophageal cancer and tuberculosis from May 15-17 and The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the ten days that Dr. Silkes denied of the remaining 14 days of T. B.'s hospitalization. (It is unclear why Petitioner denied only ten days when Dr. Silkes denied May 18-20 and May 22-June 1--a total of 14 days, or 13 days exclusive of the day of discharge. But, as noted above, in cases such as this, the recommended order will consider only whether up to ten days within this period are allowable as medically necessary.) T. B., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with difficulty swallowing. He had visited a physician in February 2001 with the same complaint, and the physician had recommended an upper gastrointestinal series. Due to financial constraints, T. B. did not undergo this procedure until late April, when he was found to have a high-grade obstruction consistent with a tumor. T. B.'s recent history included the loss of 25 pounds. An endoscopy with biopsy performed on May 16 revealed a high-grade carcinoma of the esophagus. The physician planned to commence preoperative chemotherapy and radiation therapy to shrink the lesion, but, based on sputum collected on May 18, it was discovered that T. B. had mycobacterium tuberculosis. Physicians had suspected the tuberculosis from the time of admission when they placed T. B. in a negative airflow isolation room. Treatment of the tuberculosis necessarily preceded the preoperative chemotherapy recommended for T. B.'s carcinoma. The sputum sample revealed rare acid-fast bacilli, for which the standard of care in 2001 typically required two to three weeks of treatment before isolation precautions could be discontinued. T. B. remained in isolation at least through May 31. In addition, T. B. suffered significant pain from the carcinoma. By May 23, he was on patient-controlled analgesia in the form of a morphine pump, which is not available outside of an acute-care hospital. T. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from May 15 through at least June 1. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization that it denied. R. B. was admitted on December 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat R. B.'s respiratory failure from December 3, 2001, to January 2, 2002, and January 8, 2002. Based on Petitioner's prehearing stipulation, the dispute concerns only seven days' hospitalization. R. B., a 59-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with acute respiratory distress and respiratory failure. She was immediately intubated. Her family insisted upon aggressive treatment of, among other things, her bilateral pneumonia caused by a virulent staph infection. R. B. required a tracheotomy on December 20 due to the difficulty in weaning her from the ventilator. She required the placement of a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube on January 1. The discharge summary describes R. B. as "very frail and fragile" and her hospitalization as "very prolonged and complicated." On December 23, when R. B. was finally weaned from the ventilator, her family agreed to a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) code for her. The dispute arises from an incident on January 3 when R. B. fell when trying to get out of bed. Her mental status deteriorated, probably due to malignant disease. Physicians ruled out sepsis in the bloodstream, but X-rays revealed multiple nodules in the lung and liver. On January 8, a CT- guided lung biopsy of one of the nodules confirmed malignant disease. Two days later, the physician stated that a consultation with hospice was indicated. Upon the agreement of the family, R. B. was discharged to her home under hospice care on January 12. Dr. Silkes is substantially correct in her opinion. The diagnostic work after January 2 only supported the poor prognosis that had become obvious to R. B.'s family ten days earlier and certainly was not palliative in nature. R. B.'s hospitalization after January 2, 2002, was not medically necessary--except for January 8, which Dr. Silkes initially conceded, and an additional two days, which Petitioner conceded in its prehearing stipulation. Petitioner properly denied seven days of this hospitalization. J. B. was admitted on January 5, 2002. Petitioner does not contest a 23-hour observation on January 5, but this would generate a reimbursement considerably smaller than that sought by Respondent for inpatient services for that day, so Petitioner has essentially denied the entire hospitalization, which consists of 16 days. J. B., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and atrial fibrillation with fast ventricular rate. He had been diabetic for 25 years. He had been laid off from construction work in August 2001, and had arthritic knees which prevented his return to work. Since losing his job, J. B. had been feeling poorly and had lost 20 pounds. J. B.'s pulse at the time of his arrival was 165, and it dropped to 105 within his first six hours at the hospital. J. B.'s relevant history included congestive heart failure, edema of the extremities, and nocturnal dyspnea. A chest X-ray on the day of admission revealed a dense mass in the left lobe. Physicians started a calcium channel blocker to regulate J. B.'s rapid heart beat and a diuretic to eliminate his excess fluids and swelling. J. B. was feeling much better by January 7, as the physicians had controlled his rapid heart beat. On that day, J. B. underwent a stress test, which was negative. However, a CT scan performed on January 8 and reported the following day revealed a left hilum mass that proved to be advanced carcinoma. The physicians decided that J. B. needed a bronchoscopy to biopsy the lung mass and a thoracentesis, in which a needle is inserted between the ribs to extract fluid for the purpose of determining the fluid's source. However, J. B.'s atrial fibrillation complicated their plans. On January 8, J. B. remained in atrial fibrillation, and the physicians were considering starting him on Coumadin because patients with atrial fibrillation are at high risk of clotting due to the poor expulsion of blood into the ventricle. Introduction of this blood-thinning agent before other invasive procedures requires first that the physicians stabilize the patient. This dilemma delayed the introduction of the blood- thinning agent and prevented treating J. B. as an outpatient. Once stabilized on Coumadin, J. B. underwent the two diagnostic procedures on January 11. They revealed that he was suffering from stage IV squamous cell carcinoma, according to a physician's report dictated on January 14 and transcribed the following day. The physician ordered additional CT scans to determine the extent of the metastatic disease before deciding on a course of treatment. A whole body bone scan was performed on January 15 and was essentially negative. However, the carcinoma had metastasized to the left hilum and, by report dated January 15, a physician noted that J. B. would not benefit from surgery, chemotherapy, or radiation, although palliative radiation could offer him some relief. An IV port for chemotherapy (not radiation) was placed on January 16--not January 6, as noted by Dr. Silkes in her report. Coumadin had been discontinued in advance of the procedure and resumed on the day of the procedure, but required adjustment for the next several days, as J. B.'s INR was too low, indicative of excessive clotting. Although the administration of the chemotherapy through the IV port could have been done on an outpatient basis, J. B. was comfortable at all times after January 15, and with no effective treatment possible, his hospitalization remained medically necessary until the physicians were able to adjust his Coumadin so that his INR reached the normal range. J. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 5 through January 22, on which date he was discharged. Petitioner improperly denied the 16 days of inpatient services. N. C. was admitted on February 8, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. C.'s intracranial hemorrhage from February 8-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 21 days of N. C.'s hospitalization. N. C., a 40-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with a complaint of passing out and no significant medical history. N. C. was a single mother of a developmentally disabled child. Her father resided in a nursing home and suffered from dementia, so her siblings were her decisionmakers concerning care. At admission, N. C. was already in a vegetative state, suffering from a massive intracranial hemorrhage. Her blood pressure was 213/107. She was immediately intubated and given Mannitol to reduce intracranial pressure and Dilantin to prevent seizures. On February 8, a neurologist evaluated N. C. and found her a poor candidate for surgery to evacuate the intracranial hematoma due to the likelihood of extensive consequent neurological deficits. The neurologist discussed the possibilities and the "extremely poor" prognosis with the siblings, who decided not to pursue surgery and instead allow N. C. to be "managed medically." The physicians asked the siblings to consider a DNR code for N. C. N. C. made no meaningful progress in the following days. Respondent was unable to contact her siblings until February 19, and they asked for two days within which to make the decision whether to place N. C. on a DNR code. On February 22, they decided to place N. C. on a DNR code and withdraw the ventilator. Three days later, the physician discussed with the siblings the possibility of placement in a nursing home. Three days after this discussion, the siblings agreed on inpatient hospice care for N. C. On March 4, IV fluids and medications and the nasogastric feeding tube were withdrawn, and N. C. was transferred to a nursing home under hospice care. N. C.'s hospitalization was medically necessary through February 22 because a nursing home cannot accept a patient on a ventilator, N. C.'s course following the stroke could reasonably be observed for a couple of weeks to determine if improvement--however unlikely--might take place, and the siblings reasonably required this long to make this difficult decision. From February 23 through discharge, the inpatient services provided N. C. were no longer medically necessary, so Petitioner properly denied nine days of the 21 days that it denied for this recipient. N. Ch. was admitted on May 23, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. Ch.'s cellulitus and osteomyelitis from May 23 to June 24. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 46 days of N. Ch.'s hospitalization. N. Ch., a 38-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with wounds to both legs and loss of feeling in both feet and a history of fractures to both tibias 20 years ago followed by osteomyelitis four years ago. Despite considerable hospital treatment to both legs, consisting of antibiotics, hyperbaric oxygen, debridement, and skin grafts, drainage of the wounds persisted. Four grainy wounds on both legs penetrated to the bone, and N. Ch. had suffered some bony damage from the persistence of these infected wounds. A physician performed a surgical debridement of the wounds on May 26, and a vacuum- assisted closure device was applied to the wound on the following day. This device produces negative air pressure to stimulate a chemical change in the tissues to enhance the migration of new blood vessels and granulation tissue over the area of the wound. The pump was changed often. On June 22, N. Ch. underwent a second debridement and a pump was reapplied to the wounds on June 24. The issue in this case involves the use of hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an inpatient basis. On June 7, a physician reasonably recommended 20, 90-minute hyperbaric oxygen treatments. The treatments, which accelerate wound healing, began the next day. Dr. Silkes correctly finds no medical necessity after N. Ch. became stable after the second debridement. Although he later suffered some fever, apparently from his reaction to an antibiotic, and gastroesophagael reflux, as well as some adverse reactions to IV and peripherally inserted central catheter lines, N. Ch. could have been managed as an outpatient after June 24. Nothing suggests that the vacuum-`assisted closure device requires hospitalization, and hyperbaric oxygen treatment clearly does not require hospitalization. Respondent contends that inpatient services remained medically necessary after June 24 because Medicaid would not pay for hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an outpatient basis. Medical necessity is driven by medical, not legal, considerations. If the sole reason for hospitalization is to obtain a medically necessary good or service that Respondent has restricted to the inpatient setting, then the provider community improperly circumvents Petitioner's restriction. If there is no other reason to continue to hospitalize a recipient, such as N. Ch., the decision to do so in order to obtain for him a concededly medically necessary service--that does not otherwise require hospitalization--is unwarranted. Petitioner properly denied the 46 days of inpatient services for N. Ch. after June 24. J. C. was admitted on February 24, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. C.'s coronary artery disease and lymphoma on February 24 and March 3-8. In its proposed recommended order, Respondent does not contest Petitioner's denial of the "last two days," which apparently are March 9-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining six days of hospitalization from February 25 through March 2. J. C., a 61-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with worsening chest pain over the past two weeks and a history of coronary artery disease. She also had an undiagnosed mass on her neck. She had previously failed outpatient treatment and was admitted to the hospital. Two weeks earlier, J. C. was to have had an outpatient biopsy of the neck mass, but the anesthesiologist declined to administer anesthesia until her unstable angina was addressed. J. C. went to her primary care physician, who referred her to a cardiologist, but, prior to seeing him, J. C. went to the emergency department. On February 25, the physician's notes indicate that J. C. was stable and without chest pain. The cardiologist performed a cardiac catheterization on February 26 and found 100 percent blockage of the left anterior descending artery, 80 percent blockage of the proximal circumflex, and other narrowings that were not amenable to angioplasty and stenting, so he recommended coronary artery bypass grafting. Heart surgery could not proceed until physicians learned the nature of the neck mass. A biopsy was performed on February 28, which revealed B-cell malignant lymphoma. The oncologist preferred to commence chemotherapy after the bypass operation, so this was performed on March 3. J. C. was extubated on March 4, but developed acute respiratory distress on March 5 and required a transfusion the following day. However, Dr. Silkes is correct in finding the hospitalization from February 25 through March 2 medically unnecessary. The procedures performed during this period could have been done on an outpatient basis. The record does not support Respondent's argument that her unstable angina required inpatient management. Petitioner properly denied these six days of inpatient services. R. LaB. was admitted on April 2, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last day of inpatient service on April 12. This is the first case considered in this recommended order handled by Dr. Alan Yesner, an internist whose practice is more evenly divided between inpatients and outpatients than is Dr. Silkes' practice. R. LaB., a 47-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain of two days' duration and a history of COPD, hypertension, and diabetes. She was rushed to abdominal surgery to reduce an incarcerated hernia. The surgery was long. R. LaB. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation. Dr. Yesner is correct in opining that R. LaB.'s hospitalization after April 11 was not medical necessary. She was stable and on appropriate medication, so Petitioner properly denied one day of inpatient service for R. LaB. J. L. was admitted on June 12, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the seven days of inpatient services. J. L., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with complaints of a gradual increase of abdominal girth and was found to have blood in his stool. Lab work indicated an elevated INR, elevated bilirubin, and bacteria in his urine. The physician concluded that J. L. suffered from primary biliary cirrhosis, for which he had been treated since at least 1998. J. L. admitted that he had become noncompliant with his medication after a divorce. A CT scan revealed a probable stone obstructing the right ureter, causing urine to back up and flood the right kidney. A successful laser lithotripsy was performed on June 17 with the complete fragmentation of the stone and the installation of a stent, which would facilitate drainage, to be removed a few days later. J. L. tolerated the procedure well, and on the next day he reported feeling better without any pain in his flank. Dr. Yesner notes the "late schedule" of the lithotripsy, but Respondent did not have a lithotripter in 2001 and had to schedule it for use at the hospital. The hospitalization was medically necessary through June 17 due to the pain, advanced kidney disease, and potential kidney problems presented by the blockage, prior to its surgical fragmentation. Petitioner should have denied two days, not seven days. C. M. was admitted on April 2, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of admission for 23-hour observation only on April 2 for end-stage sarcoidosis, pneumonia, and gastrointestinal bleeding. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 31 days of C. M.'s hospitalization, which concluded with her death. C. M., a 55-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and weakness. She is a Jehovah's Witness, so she declines blood transfusions on religious grounds. By April 4, C. M.'s blood gases, although not within normal ranges, were out of critical ranges. C. M. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation on April 16. Her hemoglobin gradually dropped after this, but treatment was limited to iron and vitamins due to the refusal of the patient to accept a blood transfusion. This treatment was unsuccessful. The family supported C. M.'s decision not to accept a blood transfusion, but insisted on full, aggressive treatment, including CPR. C. M. went into cardiac arrest on May 3 and CPR failed to revive her. Dr. Silkes states that Respondent should have arranged for hospice care during the first day of hospitalization. C. M. was not then on a ventilator, so a hospice would not have objected to taking C. M. on that ground, but her respiration was critically impaired for the first three days of her hospitalization and her prognosis was not such as to render hospital care medically unnecessary. It was medically necessary to stabilize C. M.'s respiration during these first three days, but her hemoglobin issues could have been addressed by home health care for the next 11 days. The medical necessity of inpatient services resumes, though, after C. M.'s respiratory failure of April 16 and continues to the end of her hospitalization. The first three days of inpatient services were medically necessary, the next 11 days of inpatient services were not medically necessary, and the last 17 days of inpatient services were medically necessary, so Petitioner should have denied 11 days, not 31 days. M. M. was admitted on March 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat acute asthmatic bronchitis with a history of coronary artery bypass graft, asthma, sarcoidosis of the lung, and diabetes from March 3-12, which Petitioner later extended to March 13. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days of M. M.'s hospitalization, which Respondent's expert frankly conceded was difficult to justify. As Dr. Yesner noted, M. M. was stabilized on oral medication by March 11, and he allowed a couple of additional days to monitor her. M. M. experienced hypoglycemia on March 16, but this is a condition that, according to Dr. Yesner, is not unusual with the Prednisone that M. M. was taking, and hypoglycemia is typically managed on an outpatient basis. Petitioner properly denied the last three days of M. M.'s hospitalization. J. P. S. was admitted on January 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. P. S.'s obstruction of the common bile duct. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last three days of his hospitalization. J. P. S., a 54-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe jaundice and a history of diabetes, congestive heart failure, and triple coronary artery bypass graft performed in 1997, although he displayed no significant cardiac abnormalities during this hospitalization. During the initial examination, J. P. S. went into respiratory arrest and required intubation. The gastroenterologist found J. P. S. ready for discharge, from a gastroenterological perspective, on January 13. but J. P. S. immediately developed COPD symptoms, including shortness of breath and edema. According to the physician notes, J. P. S. was sufficiently stable for discharge on January 15, but a note for the next day says to hold the discharge pending cardiac evaluation. Respondent discharged J. P. S. three days later, after physicians could monitor the level of Digoxin to ensure that J. P. S. was safe for discharge. P. S.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied the last three days of inpatient services. J. P. was admitted on December 8, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of services to treat J. P.'s fever from December 8-12. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 14 days of J. P.'s hospitalization. J. P., a 27-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with high-grade fevers and severe headaches and a history of AIDS. Dr. Silkes approved the treatment of the fever until it ended on December 12. The fever was likely caused by J. P.'s toxoplasmosis of the central nervous system. This is an opportunistic condition not unusual in immunocompromised patients. Candida fungal infection likely caused J. P.'s complaints of pain on swallowing, as this too is an opportunistic condition. Additionally, a blood culture revealed a staph infection. Through December 18, J. P. was continuing to experience fevers of up to 101 degrees. At the same time, it was necessary to address the toxoplasmosis before it extended to other organs. This required the sequential administration of IV antibiotics and careful, continual monitoring of the patient for his clinical response to treatment. On December 20, J. P. underwent a bone marrow biopsy to rule out the extension of toxoplasmosis in the bone marrow or the presence of tuberculosis. This test was negative, which was a precondition for discharge. The pathology report was "received" on December 21, but not "printed" until December 27. However, J. P. did not complete his IV administration of Doxycycline until December 23, when the medical necessity for his inpatient services ended. Petitioner should have denied three days, not 14 days. W. P. was admitted on June 18, 2001. Dr. Silkes would allow only a 23-hour observation on the day of admission for the treatment of lung cancer and tuberculosis. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of 13 days of his hospitalization from June 18 through July 1 (even though he was not discharged until July 13). W. P., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe coughing up of blood and a recent loss of 40 pounds. A chest X-ray at admission revealed a large mass in the upper left lobe of the lungs. Lab work suggestive of anemia correlated with a malignancy as its source. Sputum to test for acid fast bacillus was taken, and a consult was immediately arranged with a pulmonary specialist to consider a bronchoscopy and to take a biopsy. A CT scan of the chest on June 18 revealed abnormal soft tissue density filling the right upper lobe, two tumors, and numerous nodes. The bronchoscopy on June 19 revealed 80 percent obstruction of the right main bronchus secondary to an endobronchial lesion and 100 percent obstruction of the right upper lobe. A biopsy of the right mainstem bronchus revealed a squamous cell carcinoma. A physician noted in his consultation report that W. P. was to complete his metastatic survey on the day of the report--June 22--after which they would discuss palliative treatment. The report states that the patient understands that he will unlikely live more than six months. Subsequently, acid fast bacillus, which had originally not been detected, was found, so W. P. was placed in isolation on June 26. He had been experiencing elevated white blood counts and fevers. He was placed on antituberculosis treatment, which, as noted above, typically takes two or three weeks until the patient can be removed from isolation. July 10 was W. P.'s first day without fever. On this date, Respondent sent his records to the Health Department to facilitate a transfer to a tuberculosis hospital. He was discharged on July 13. W. P.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner should not have denied any of the 13 days that it denied. M. Pr. was admitted on December 18, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. Pr.'s coronary artery disease from December 18-27. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. Pr.'s hospitalization. M. Pr., a 58-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a recent cardiovascular accident while out of state. A cardiac catheterization revealed severe triple vessel coronary artery disease. On December 19, M. Pr. underwent a four-vessel bypass. Post-operatively, however, M. Pr. fell while on the commode. The dispute in this case arises due to the unavailability of rehabilitation facilities that would take M. Pr. after his fall. He was suitable for discharge on December 28, but no facility could be found to receive him. These are "grace days," as noted in the Handbook and are available, on a limited basis, for persons under 21 years of age, but, by negative implication, are unavailable for adults. Thus, medical necessity dictated that Respondent discharge M. Pr. on December 27, so the inpatient services are not reimbursable after December 28, given that the day of discharge is not allowable. Dr. Silkes' determination was correct in this case. Petitioner properly denied seven days' inpatient services for M. Pr. A. R. was admitted on December 30, 2001. Petitioner has denied the entire 14 days of A. R.'s hospitalization, although Dr. Silkes approved one day's inpatient services, on the day of admission, for the treatment of ovarian cancer. A. R., a 63-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with vomiting on the day of admission, progressive abdominal distension, anorexia, weight loss over the past month, and a 15-year history of bronchial asthma. A CT scan of A. R.'s thorax at the time of admission revealed a large collection of fluid in the abdominal cavity. At this time, a physician removed 4.5 liters of fluid from the cavity, and A. R., not surprisingly, began to feel much better. A report on January 3--delayed probably due to the holidays-- indicated the presence of scattered malignant cells in the withdrawn fluid compatible with carcinoma. Metastatic ovarian cancer was subsequently confirmed. A. R.'s case was complicated by the withdrawal of this large volume of fluids, which required continual monitoring of her electrolytes, and the sudden exacerbation of her dementia on January 2, which would impede outpatient services, as well as the initiation of chemotherapy. The dementia, which had been progressive for the past six months, was likely a reaction to the carcinoma. By January 11, a physician recommended hospice placement given A. R.'s incurable tumor. A. R.'s daughter agreed on this day to hospice placement. This is the day that medical necessity for inpatient services ended. Petitioners should have denied three days, not 14 days. The remaining days were medically necessary. E. S. was admitted on May 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. S.'s pancreatitis and multisystem failure from May 4-23. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 24 days of her hospitalization, which ended with her death. E. S., a 64-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with nausea and abdominal pain and a history of hypertension and abuse of alcohol and tobacco. She was found to have elevated pancreatic enzymes. On May 8, E. S. underwent a laparoscopic removal of her gallbladder, which she tolerated well, but soon afterwards suffered respiratory failure. E. S. was then placed on a ventilator. Problems with malnourishment and then kidney failure precluded a successful weaning her off the ventilator. On May 23, the family agreed to a DNR code. May 23 marks the last day that Dr. Silkes found that E. S.'s hospitalization was medically necessary. Care after this date was entirely supportive and not medically necessary; however, no hospice or skilled nursing facility would take E. S. because she could not be weaned off the ventilator. The unavailability of an alternative, less costly setting does not automatically render the inpatient care of a recipient medically necessary. The circumstances dictate whether inpatient services to such a patient are medically necessary. Here, it is impossible to find that services after May 23 were medically necessary. Dr. Silkes was correct in her opinion. Petitioner properly denied all 24 days of inpatient services for E. S. D. S. was admitted on March 24, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat D. S.'s osteomyelitis of the right foot from March 24-25 and March 30-April 10. (Originally, Dr. Silkes allowed only March 24-25 and March 30-April 6, but, on February 7, 2007, she revised her opinion to allow the additional four days to April 10.) In its prehearing statement, Petitioner conceded that only three of the original ten denied days remained at issue, as it was agreeing that an additional seven days were medically necessary. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days, although it is not clear what three days Petitioner is contesting. D. S., a 57-year-old female, presented at the emergency department with a "hole in the right foot" and a history of diabetes. She dropped a can of juice on her foot on January 1, and the foot had become progressively infected since that time. On the day of admission, she underwent surgery for the removal of fourth and fifth metatarsal bones and toes of the right foot. She did not heal properly and required followup surgery on April 7 to trim some of the necrotic flap, as the physicians considered the possibility of a below-knee amputation. On April 13, the surgeon probed the wound, found no hidden pockets, and discharged D. S. Regardless what three days that Petitioner continues to find were not medically necessary, the entire hospitalization was medically necessary. J. W. was admitted on August 20, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. W.'s multiple organ failure from August 20 to September 14. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining two days of J. W.'s hospitalization, at which time he died. J. W., a 48-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a two or three-day history of progressive congestive heart failure with pulmonary edema, atypical chest pain, and increasing abdominal girth. His history included nonischemic cardiomyopathy with minimal coronary artery disease, chronic alcohol abuse, pulmonary hypertension, chronic atrial fibrillation requiring anticoagulation therapy, hepatitis B and C, chronic renal insufficiency, and chronic congestive heart failure with multiple hospitalizations. On admission, his INR was 6.6, indicative of very slow clotting. Despite the care of numerous consultants, J. W. suffered increased respiratory failure on September 5, at which time he was intubated. He received a Greenfield filter on September 7 to prevent further pulmonary clots. Starting September 10, and continuing everyday thereafter, J. W. required dialysis due to renal failure. J. W. was on total parenteral feeding as of September 14. The family, whose availability had been a problem, agreed to a DNR code on September 17. Respondent claims in its proposed recommended order that a DNR code is a precondition to hospice care, but no competent evidence establishes this fact. Dr. Silkes and Petitioner properly denied the last two days because they were not medically necessary. M. W. was admitted on June 10, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. W.'s ventricular fibrillation and complications from June 10- The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W., a 31-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with cardiopulmonary arrest after his wife found him slumped on the sofa, seizing. On arrival, he was found to be in ventricular fibrillation, and he was intubated. Physicians restored a normal rhythm, but M. W. suffered a seizure in the emergency department, so he was given large doses of Dilantin. M. W. had suffered brain damage from cerebral anoxia. M. W. was extubated on June 13, and his breathing remained stable. He remained in normal sinus rhythm. M. W. began to receive Librium on June 13 to sedate him. The cardiologist proposed a cardiac catheterization, but M. W. refused. An EKG on June 15 found a conduction defect in M. W.'s heart that was suggestive of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. The cardiologist then determined, on June 16, that M. W. required an electrophysiology study to rule out Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. In 2001, Respondent lacked the equipment to perform this study, for which M. W. remained too confused to participate on June 18 anyhow. Physicians continued to monitor M. W.'s cardiac rhythm, and, when a bed opened at Florida Hospital, Orlando, which had the necessary equipment, Respondent promptly transferred M. W. on June 22. During the transfer, the cardiac monitor continued to check M. W.'s rhythm due to the risk of another cardiac incident until the underlying cardiac abnormality was assessed and treated. Petitioner improperly denied the final seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W. had suffered a serious cardiac event. Physicians had not yet ruled out all possible reasons for the event and needed to address a promising possibility of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome, so M. W. remained at risk for another event. He was confused from the brain damage. All of these factors militate in favor of finding that the remaining seven days of inpatient services were medically necessary. E. A. $1666.62 R. B. $5703.18 N. C. $7332.66 N. Ch. $38,332.26 J. C. $4888.44 R. LaB. $833.31 J. L. $1666.62 C. M. $9166.41 M. M. $2499.93 The total overpayment is $104,309.97, which breaks down as follows: J. P. $2444.22 M. Pr. $5703.18 A. R. $2444.22 E. S. $19,999.44 J. S. $1629.48
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding overpayments totaling $104,309.97 during the audit period and requiring that Respondent repay this amount, imposing an administrative fine of $1000, requiring Respondent to prepare a corrective action plan, and reserving jurisdiction to remand the case to the Division of Administrative Hearing for a determination of Petitioner's entitlement to statutory costs, if any. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig H. Smith, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Dr. Andrew C. Agwunobi, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32304-0551 William Blocker, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Daniel Lake, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tracy Cooper, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
Conclusions Having reviewed the four Notices of Intent to Deny Application issued May 13-18, 2010, attached hereto and incorporated herein (Ex. 1, 2, 3, and 4), and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration (“Agency”) has entered into a Settlement Agreement (Ex. 5) with the other party to these proceedings, and being otherwise well-advised in the premises, finds and concludes as follows: ORDERED: 1. The attached Settlement Agreement is approved and adopted as part of this Final Order, and the parties are directed to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The Petitioner shall remit to the Agency, within thirty (30) days of the entry of a Final Order adopting this agreement, an administrative fee in the sum of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000.00) to resolve the Agency's allegations of unlicensed activity, in the interest of expediently resolving these matters and in recognition of the expense and uncertainty of litigation. 3. Checks should be made payable to the “Agency for Health Care Administration.” The check, along with a reference to this case number, should be sent directly to: Filed January 10, 2012 1:47 PM Division of Administrative Hearings Agency for Health Care Administration Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit 2727 Mahan Drive, MS# 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 4. Unpaid amounts pursuant to this Order will be subject to statutory interest and may be collected by all methods legally available. 5. Any requests for an administrative hearing are withdrawn. The parties shall bear their own costs and attorney’s fees. This matter is closed. DONE and ORDERED this [0 day of ~ Bettie: ; 20/2, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. — Ds we { izabeth Dudek, retary fey ir wacked 0. th€are Administration A PARTY WHO JS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY, ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW OF PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: Lance P. Cohen, Esquire Warren J. Bird, Asst. General Counsel Cohen & Thurston, P.A. Office of the General Counsel 1723 Blanding Boulevard, Suite # 102 Agency for Health Care Administration Jacksonville, Florida 32310 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg #3, MS #3 (U. S. Mail) Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Jan Mills Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg #3, MS #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Roger Bell Health Care Clinic Unit Manager Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS #53 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Agency for Health Care Administration Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit 2727 Mahan Drive, MS# 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Suzanne F. Hood Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (U.S. Mail) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this Final Order was served on the oa above-named person(s) and entities by U.S. Mail, or the method designated, on this the 10 day of aaa » 2012" Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 412-3630 Certified Article Number , ?bbO 390) Y5778 8971 SEMDERS RECORD i", Certified Article Number (?160 3901 9846 7935 1337 SENDERS RECORD One Nofice $1149/1° CHARLIE CRIST FIORDAAGENCY FOR HEATH CARE ADMINS TRATION Better Health Care for ail Floridians THOMAS W. ARNOLD GOVERNOR SECRETARY May 12, 2010 Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc File Number: 8428 1680 Dunn Ave Case #: 2010004935 Ste 39 Jacksonville, FL 32218 F INTENT TO DENY APP TION It Is the decision of this Agency that the application for certificate of exemption from health care clinic licensure for Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc, located at 1680 DUNN AVE, STE 39, JACKSONVILLE, FL, 32218, be DENIED. The specific basis for this determination is based on the fact that: Requested information was not complete or timely received by the Agency pursuant to Section 408.806(3)(b), Florida Statutes. You were notified by correspondence dated April 9, 2010 to provide further Information addressing identified apparent errors or omissions within twenty-one days (21) from the receipt of the Agency's correspondence. Our records indicate you received this correspondence by certified mail on April 15, 2010. The outstanding issues remaining are: A copy of the closing documents, stock or similar certificates signed and dated by both the buyer and seller is required, In addition, the Agency received information that the facility does not meet exemption requirements as it is not wholly owned by a Florida licensed health care practitioner, pursuant to Section 400.9905(4)(g). EXPLANATION OF RIGH Pursuant to Section 120.569, F.S., you have the right to request an administrative hearing. In order to obtain a formal proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings under Section 120.57(1), F.S., your request for an administrative hearing must conform to the requirements in Section 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C), and must state the material facts you dispute. SEE ATTACHED ELECTION AND EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS FORMS. ce: Agency Clerk, Mail Stop 3 ; Legal Intake Unit, Mall Stop 3. EXHIBIT 14 Visit AHCA online at http://ahca.myflorida.com 2727 Mahan Drive,MS-53 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 " Certified Article Number , 7260 3901 9648 57748 8995 SENDERS RECORD FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION CHARLIE CRIST THOMAS W. ARNOLD GOVERNOR Better Health Care for all Floridians SECRETARY May 12, 2010 Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc File Number: 8430 9826 San Jose Blvd Case #: 2010004881 Jacksonville, FL 32257 .. : NOTICE OF INTENT TO DENY APPLICATION It is the decision of this Agency that the application for certificate of exemption from health care clinic licensure for Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc, located at 9826 San Jose Bivd, Jacksonville, FL, 32257, be DENIED. The specific basis for this determination is based on the fact that: Requested information was not complete or timely received by the Agency pursuant to Section 408.806(3)(b), Florida Statutes. You were notified by correspondence dated March 27, 2010 to provide further information addressing identified apparent errors or omissions within twenty- one days (21) from the receipt of the Agency's correspondence. Our records indicate you received this correspondence by certified mail on April 8, 2010, The outstanding issues remaining are: Subpart 1.B, Name-of.Applicant: The name of the applicant must be the corporation or legal entity as it is registered with. the Division of Corporations, it must also match-the FEIN indicated in section 1.C. This subpart was submitted as a response to the omissions, but the. applicant's name indicated does not match the FEIN# listed in section 1.C. of the application. : As this facility did a change of ownership, provide a copy of the closing documents signed and dated by both the buyer (new owner) and seller (previous owner). Acceptable documentation may include any one of the following: Copy of final sale/transfer documents showing date of final transfer and signatures of buyer(s) and seller(s), or a signed, written statement from an attorney, on letterhead, that confirms sale/transfer completion and provides the date of final action. : In addition, the Agency received information that the facility does not meet exemption requirements as it is not wholly owned by a Florida licensed health care practitioner, pursuant to Section 400.9905(4)(g). TION OF HT! Pursuant to Section 120.569, F.S., you have the right to request an administrative hearing, In order to obtain a formal proceeding before -the Division of Administrative Hearings under Section 120,57(1), F.S., your request for an administrative hearing-must conform to the - requirements in Section 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C), and must state the material facts you dispute. ; : : Visit AHCA online at http://ahca.myflorida,com 2727 Mahan Drive,MS-53 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 EXHIBIT 2 Physicians Medical Centers -. . Inc Page 2 : May 12, 2010 SEE ATTACHED ELECTION AND EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS FORMS. ce: Agency Clerk, Mail Stop 3 Legal Intake Unit, Mail Stop 3 Te thictee-Va thet [9 Number fd60 3901 9848 7495 a2, SENDERS RECORD FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION CHARLIE CRIST THOMAS W. ARNOLD GOVERNOR Better Health Care for all Floridians SECRETARY May 13, 2010 Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc File #8427 5960 Beach Blvd : Case #2010004956 Ste3 ; Jacksonville, FL 32207 NOTICE OF INTENT TQ DENY APPLICATION It is the decision of this Agency that the application for certificate of exemption from health care clinic licensure for Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc, located at 5960 Beach Bivd., Ste 3, Jacksonville, FL, 32207, be DENIED. The specific basis for this determination is based on the fact that: Requested information was not complete or timely received by the Agency pursuant to Section 408.806(3)(b), Florida Statutes. You were notified by correspondence dated April 7, 2010 to provide further information addressing identified apparent errors or omissions within twenty- one days (21) from the receipt of the Agency's correspondence. Our records indicate you received this correspondence by certified mail on Apri! 9, 2010. The outstanding issues remaining are: As this facility did a change of ownership, provide a copy of the closing documents signed and dated by both the buyer (new owner) and seller (previous owner). Acceptable documentation may include any one of the following: Copy of final sale/transfer documents showing date of final transfer and signatures of buyer(s) and seller(s), or a signed, written statement from an attorney, on letterhéad, that confirms sale/transfer completion and provides the date of final action. ; In addition, the Agency received information that the facility does not meet exemption requirements as it is not wholly owned by a Florida licensed health care practitioner, pursuant to Section 400.9905(4)(g). EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS Pursuant to Section 120.569, F.S., you have the right to request an administrative hearing. In order to obtain a formal proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings under Section 120.57(1), F.S., your request for an administrative hearing must conform to the requirements in Section 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C), and must state the material facts you dispute. EXHIBIT 3 Visit AHCA online at http://ahca.myflorida.com 2727 Mahan Drive,MS-53 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Page 2 May 13, 2010 SEE ATTACHED ELECTION AND EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS FORMS. Health Cae Clinic Unit ce: Agency Clerk, Mail Stop 3 Legal Intake Unit, Mail Stop 3 RTE ecm 3901 94a 7935 yy74 SENDERS RECORD FLORIDA AGENCY TOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION oe ERNGS Better Health Care for all Floridians THOMAS W. ARNOLD May 18, 2010 CERTIFIED MAIL / RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED File Number: 8429 Physicians Medical Centers - Jax, Inc 2020 Kingsley Ave Case #: 2010005135 Suite A Orange Park, FL 32073 NOTICE OF INTENT TO DENY APPLICATION It is the decision of this Agency that the application for certificate of exemption from health care clinic licensure for Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc, located at 2020 Kingsley Avenue, Suite A, Orange Park, Florida, 32073 be DENIED. The specific basis for this determination is based on the fact that: Requested information was not complete or timely received by the Agency pursuant to Section 408.806(3)(b), Florida Statutes, You were notified by correspondence dated April 9, 2010 to provide further information addressing identified apparent errors or omissions within twenty-one days (21) from the receipt of the Agency’s correspondence, Our records indicate you received this correspondence by certified mail on April 12, 2010, The outstanding issues remaining are: Evidence of Ownership — Information received by the Agency states that Victoria Critzer is the owner of Physicians Medical Centers-Jax Inc. Provide the following documentation as evidence of ownership: * A copy of the final closing documents such as a bill of sale or stock purchase agreement. signed and dated by both the buyer and seller including the effective date sale or transfer. The closing documents should contain the signature of Gordon Garver DC, previous owner of Physicians Medical Center-Jax Inc and Joseph Thomas MD, new owner of Physicians Medical Center-Jax Inc. ¢ A copy of the cancelled and reissued stock certificates transferring shared to Joseph Thomas MD. ¢ Acopy of the lease agreement that includes the name(s) of the owner(s). e Acopy of the business tax receipt that includes the name of the corporation and owner. In addition, the Agency received information indicating that the facility does not meet exemption requirements as it is not wholly owned by a Florida licensed health care practitioner, pursuant to Section 400.9905(4)(g). EXHIBIT 2727 Mahan Drive,MS-53 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Visit AHCA online at http://ahca.myflorida.com . Physicians Medical Centers - Ja... .nc Page 2 May 18, 2010 EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS Pursuant to Section 120,569, F.S., you have the right to request an administrative hearing. In order to obtain a formal proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings under Section 120.57(1), F.S. your request for an administrative hearing must conform to the requirements in Section 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C), and must state the material facts you dispute. ey SEE ATTACHED ELECTION AND EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS FORMS, For questions regarding this notice, please contact Ruby Schmigel, Health Services & Facilities Consultant with the Health Care Clinic Unit at (850) 412-4413. oger Bgl, Mandger Health Care Clinic Unit ce: Agency Clerk, Mail Stop 3 Legal Intake Unit, Mail Stop 3 STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS PHYSICIANS MEDICAL CENTERS-JAX, INC., Petitioner, DOAH Case Nos. 10-3202, 10-3203, 10-3204 and 10-3205 vs. AHCA CASE Nos.: 2010004881, 2010004956 AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE 2010004935 and 2010005135, ADMINISTRATION, Respondent. / SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT Respondent, State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration (hereinafter the “Agency”), through its undersigned representatives, and Petitioner, Physicians Medical Centers- Jax, Inc. (hereinafter “Petitioner”), pursuant to Section 120.57(4), Florida Statutes, each individually, a “party,” collectively as “parties,” hereby enter into this Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) and agree as follows: WHEREAS, the Petitioner applied for four certificates of exemption from licensure pursuant to Section 400.9935(6), Florida Statutes and Chapter 59A-33, Florida Administrative Code; and WHEREAS, Victoria Critzer has applied for four initial health care clinic licenses, expressly intending to purchase the interest of Dr. Joseph Thomas in Petitioner upon issuance by the Agency of those licenses; and WHEREAS, the Agency has jurisdiction of the license and exemption applications described in the foregoing paragraphs, by virtue of being the regulatory and licensing authority over the said licenses and exemptions; and EXHIBIT 5 WHEREAS, the Agency served the Petitioner with four Notices of Intent to Deny Application on or about May 13, 2010, notifying the Petitioner of the Agency’s intent to deny the certificates of exemption for the reasons stated thereon, in Agency cases numbered 2010004881, 2010004956, 2010004935 and 2010005135; and WHEREAS, Petitioner timely requested a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, and in response to said request the matters were forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), and were designated as cases numbered 10-3202, 10-3203, 10-3204 and 10-3205 in that tribunal; and subsequently the parties agreed to, and did abate those cases in DOAH, for the purpose of discussing settlement; and WHEREAS, the Agency alleges, and Petitioner denies, that during the period of processing of the aforementioned applications, Petitioner operated one or more unlicensed health care clinics in violation of Florida law as to which no formal administrative, civil or criminal action has thus far been brought; and WHEREAS, the parties have agreed that a fair, efficient, and cost effective resolution of this dispute would avoid the expenditure of substantial sums to litigate the dispute; and WHEREAS, the parties stipulate to the adequacy of consideration exchanged; and WHEREAS, the parties have negotiated in good faith and agreed that the best interest of all the parties will be served by a settlement of these proceedings; and NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and recitals herein, the parties intending to be legally bound, agree as follows: 1. All recitals are true and correct and are expressly incorporated herein. 2. Both parties agree that the “whereas” clauses incorporated herein are binding findings of the parties. 3. Joseph Thomas, M.D. hereby acknowledges, affirms and certifies that, at the time this agreement is executed by him, he is the sole owner of the Florida corporation Physicians Medical Center-Jax, Inc. 4, Victoria Critzer hereby acknowledges, affirms and certifies that, at the time this agreement is executed by her, she is the sole owner of the Florida corporation Physicians Medical Center, Inc. 5. Upon full execution of this Agreement, Petitioner agrees to waive any and all proceedings and appeals to which it may be entitled including, but not limited to, an informal proceeding under Subsection 120.57(2), a formal proceeding under Subsection 120.57(1), appeals under Section 120.68, Florida Statutes; and declaratory and all writs of relief in any court or quasi-court (DOAH) of competent jurisdiction; and further agrees to waive compliance with the form of the Final Order (findings of fact and conclusions of law) to which it may be entitled. Provided, however, that no Agreement herein, shall be deemed a waiver by either party of its right to judicial enforcement of this Agreement. 6. Upon full execution of this Agreement, the parties agree to the following: a. Petitioner's four (4) applications for exemption from licensure are hereby withdrawn, and Petitioner expressly waives its right to challenge or appeal, or both, in DOAH or elsewhere, the denial by the Agency of the exemptions. b. The Agency will resume processing the four initial licensure applications submitted by Victoria Critzer as intended future 100% owner of Physicians Medical Centers-Jax, Inc., now pending, and if the applications are complete and the applicant qualified under applicable law, the Agency will issue the licenses upon full payment by Petitioner of an agreed upon sum, as set forth below, to resolve the Agency's claim of unlicensed activity against Physicians Medical Center, Inc. Ms. Critzer agrees to use reasonable diligence to timely remedy any omissions from the applications cited by the Agency, to make the facilities available as required by law for all inspections required in connection with the licensure of the facilities, and to otherwise comply with all requirements of the application process, and all statutes and administrative rules thereunto appertaining, including background screening as may be applicable. c. The Agency agrees to use all reasonable diligence to process the initial license applications, and to issue the initial licenses as expeditiously as reasonably possible, provided that Ms. Critzer timely complies with all reasonable requests for additional information to which the Agency is entitled as a component of the application and licensure process, and provided that Victoria Critzer, and the applications she presented, are qualified for the licenses under all applicable statutes and administrative rules. d. Victoria Critzer will maintain the health care clinic license #HCC6732 currently held by Physicians Medical Center Inc. (PMC), for purposes of billing health care services provided solely at the licensed location, 9826 San Jose Boulevard, Suite B, Jacksonville, Florida. Whereas, Ms. Critzer, through counsel, has advised the Agency of a change of address for the license from 9826 San Jose Boulevard, to 9826 San Jose Boulevard, Suite B, PMC will submit a change of address application to the Agency together with the appropriate fee, within 10 days of execution of this agreement, and prior to resumption by the Agency of processing of the subject licensure applications. The license will be maintained 7. under a different federal employer identification number from any other licenses issued to Victoria Critzer or any entity in which she has a controlling interest. A separate health care clinic license must be obtained for any other location at which any health care services will be provided and third-party reimbursement sought for on behalf of Physicians Medical Centers Inc. e. Physicians Medical Centers, Inc. agrees to pay the sum of thirty thousand and no/100s dollars ($30,000.00) to the Agency, to resolve the Agency's allegations of unlicensed activity, in the interest of expediently resolving these matters and in recognition of the expense and uncertainty of litigation. The sum will be paid in lump sum at the time that the initial licenses referenced in paragraph b., above, are issued, or within 30 days following rendition of a Final Order by the Agency that incorporates this Agreement, whichever occurs first. f. Nothing in this Agreement shall prohibit the Agency from denying Petitioner’s application for licensure based upon any statutory and/or regulatory provision, including, but not limited to, the failure of Petitioner to satisfactorily complete a survey reflecting compliance with all statutory and rule provisions as required by law. By executing this Agreement, the Petitioner neither admits nor denies the allegations raised in the Notices of Intent to Deny referenced herein. 8. Upon full execution of this Agreement, the Agency shall enter a Final Order adopting and incorporating this Agreement in its entirety, and closing the above-styled case(s). The cases resident in DOAH, referenced above as DOAH cases numbered 10-3202, 10-3203, 10- 3204 and 10-3205, are currently closed by Order entered in that tribunal on October 7, 2010. The parties hereby further agree that those cases shall remain closed permanently, and each party hereby waives its right to seek to have any of those cases re-opened. 9. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney’s fees. 10. This Agreement shall become effective on the date upon which it is fully executed by all the parties. 11. The Petitioner for itself and for its related or resulting organizations, its successors or transferees, attorneys, heirs, and executors or administrators, does hereby discharge the Agency and its agents, representatives, and attorneys of all claims, demands, actions, causes of action, suits, damages, losses, and expenses, of any and every nature whatsoever, arising out of or in any way related to this matter and the Agency’s actions, including, but not limited to, any claims that were or may be asserted in any federal or state court or administrative forum, including any claims arising out of this Agreement, by or on behalf of the Petitioner or related or resulting organizations. 12. This Agreement is binding upon all parties herein and those identified as a party, or a beneficiary, of the provisions of this Agreement, and each signatory acknowledges same and the adequacy of consideration therefor. 13. In the event that Petitioner is or was a Medicaid provider, this settlement does not prevent the Agency from seeking Medicaid overpayments or from imposing any sanctions pursuant to Rule 59G-9.070, Florida Administrative Code. This Agreement does not prohibit the Agency from taking action regarding Petitioner’s Medicaid provider status, conditions, requirements or contract. 14. The undersigned have read and understand this Agreement and have authority to bind their respective principals to it. Both parties have been represented by counsel in the negotiation and execution of this Agreement. The Petitioner fully understands that counsel for the Agency represents solely the Agency and Agency counsel has not provided legal advice to or influenced the Petitioner in its decision to enter into this Agreement. 15. This Agreement contains the entire understandings and Agreements of the parties. 16. | This Agreement supersedes any prior oral or written Agreements between the parties. This Agreement may not be amended except in writing. Any attempted assignment of this Agreement shall be void. 17. Venue for any action brought to interpret, challenge or enforce the terms of this Agreement or the Final Order entered pursuant hereto shall lie solely in the Circuit Court in Leon County, Florida. 18. ‘Ifa court of competent jurisdiction finds any part of this Agreement to be void, voidable, or unenforceable, then the remainder of the contract shall remain in full force and effect. 19. All parties agree that a facsimile signature suffices fe 20. The following representatives and beneficiaries hereby ae duly S. to enter into this Agreement. Molly McKéns eputy Secretary {_ panes P. Céhen, Esquire Health Quality ance Cohen & Thurston, P.A. Agency for Health Care Administration 1723 Blanding Boulevard, Suite 102 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg #3 Jacksonville, Florida 32310 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Counsel to Petitioner DATED: (frolir DATED: 1-1 U~ aye William R. Roberts Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 DATED: /7 [(3l 4 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 DATED: Uf (5) WH Physicians Medical Centers-Jax, Inc. 9826 San Jose Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32257 patep: _})-14~!/ ~~ x. 1 _f- Victoria Critzer as president, sole director and 100% Owner Physicians Medical Center, Inc. 9826-B San Jose Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32257 DATED: _|1- (4-//
The Issue Whether J. Glenn Brown, Jr., was an "employee" of Northwest Florida Community Hospital for purposes of the State of Florida retirement system?
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, Board of Trustees of the Northwest Florida Community Hospital (hereinafter referred to as the "Board of Trustees"), is the governing body of the Northwest Florida Community Hospital. Petitioner, Board of County Commissioners of Washington County, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "County Commissioners"), is the governing body of Washington County, Florida, and the owner of the Northwest Florida Community Hospital. The Respondent, the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (hereinafter referred to as the "Division"), is the agency charged with responsibility for administering the Florida retirement system established by Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. Operation of Northwest Florida Community Hospital Prior to February of 1988. The Northwest Florida Community Hospital (hereinafter referred to as the "Hospital"), is a small, rural acute-care hospital located in Chipley, Washington County, Florida. During the mid-1980's, the Hospital suffered from a financial crisis that threatened its continued existence. As a consequence thereof, it was concluded that the Hospital should be sold. A contract was negotiated and entered into for the sale of the Hospital to National Healthcare, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "NHI"). As a part of the contract entered into with NHI, NHI was to operate the Hospital before the contract for sale was completed. J. Glenn Brown was an employee of NHI. NHI assigned Mr. Brown to the Hospital to act as the administrator of the Hospital. As administrator of the Hospital, Mr. Brown was the top manager of the Hospital. Mr. Brown, while employed by NHI, acted as the administrator of the Hospital from September 1986, until approximately September or October of 1987. At some time prior to February 1988, the contract for sale of the Hospital to NHI was cancelled and the Board of Trustees began to operate the Hospital. The Consulting Contracts. On or about February 1, 1988 the Hospital and Mr. Brown entered into a Consulting Contract (hereinafter referred to as the "First Contract"). Petitioner's exhibit 1. Mr. Brown agreed in the First Contract to operate the Hospital. Mr. Brown operated the Hospital pursuant to the First Contract until its expiration. Although the term of the First Contract ended January 31, 1991, Mr. Brown continued to operate the Hospital. A second Consulting Contract (hereinafter referred to as the "Second Contract"), was entered into on or about May 29, 1992 between Mr. Brown and the Hospital. The Second Contract applied to the period February 1, 1992, through February 1, 1993. Mr. Brown continued to perform services for the Hospital between the end of the First Contract and the beginning of the Second Contract. The differences between the First Contract and the Second Contract (hereinafter referred to jointly as the "Consulting Contracts"), were not substantial other than the amount of the annual fee to be paid to Mr. Brown. The Treatment of Mr. Brown for Purposes of the Florida Retirement System. During the period of time that Mr. Brown operated the Hospital from February 1, 1988 until he departed in the fall of 1992, the Hospital treated Mr. Brown as an "independent contractor" and not an "employee" for purposes of the Florida retirement system. Although the Hospital could have requested a determination of Mr. Brown's status for purposes of the Florida retirement system, the Hospital was not required to do so. The Hospital, as it was authorized to do pursuant to Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, made the initial decision to treat Mr. Brown as an independent contractor. After Mr. Brown had left the Hospital, an audit of the Hospital was conducted by the management review section of the Division. As a result of the audit, the Division raised a question about the status of Mr. Brown for purposes of the Florida retirement system. As a result of the audit of the Hospital, the Division required the Hospital to submit a Florida Retirement System Employment Relationship Questionnaire form requesting a determination of Mr. Brown's status as an employee or independent contractor. The Hospital did so. See Respondent's exhibit 2. The Division reviewed the Questionnaire and determined that Mr. Brown was an "employee" for purposes of the Florida retirement system, and so notified the Hospital. The Hospital filed a request for a formal administrative hearing to contest the Division's determination that Mr. Brown was an employee. Based upon the foregoing, it is the Division that is attempting to change the status quo in this matter. But for the Division's audit and requirement that the Hospital file a Questionnaire, the Hospital's treatment of Mr. Brown as an independent contractor for purposes of the Florida retirement system would have been final. Services to be Provided by Mr. Brown Pursuant to the Consulting Contracts and Mr. Brown's Relationship with the Board of Trustees. Mr. Brown, referred to as the "consultant" in the Consulting Contracts, agreed to provide the following services: 1:1 The Hospital hereby contracts with Consultant to provide services to the Hospital to perform such services as may be necessary to properly and efficiently run the Hospital for the purpose of providing quality healthcare to the citizens of Washington County and a more productive business operation. 1:2 Consultant hereby contracts with the Hospital to perform such services as may be necessary to provide the Hospital advice, expertise and a more efficient and productive business operation. The Consulting Contracts also contained the following provision pertaining to Mr. Brown's operation of the Hospital: 2:1 Consultant agrees to devote such of his time and efforts to the performance of such services as are necessary to perform and achieve the objectives set forth in Article I above. Consultant agrees that he will not directly or indirectly render any service of a business, commercial or professional nature to any other Hospital in Northwest Florida, whether for compensation or otherwise, during the term of this Agreement without the prior written consent of the Board of Trustees of the Hospital. Consultant agrees to comply with the Hospital's policies, rules and regulations as determined from time to time by the Board of Trustees of the Hospital. It was the intent of the Hospital and Mr. Brown that he would act as an independent contractor, and not an employee, in performing the services contemplated by the Consulting Contracts. Mr. Brown was to, and did, provide his services personally. Mr. Brown did not operate through a corporation or other business entity. Between February 1988 and the Fall of 1992, Mr. Brown administered the Hospital in essentially the same manner that he had prior to 1988 while employed by NHI. The Board of Trustees established policies for the operation of the Hospital during the term of the Consulting Contracts. Mr. Brown carried out policies adopted by the Board of Trustees. Mr. Brown was involved in the formulation of policies by the Board of Trustees and he advised the Board of Trustees concerning policies it adopted. The Board of Trustees had little experience in operating the Hospital. The day- to-day operations of the Hospital had been handled by NHI prior to entering into the First Contract. Prior to NHI's operation of the Hospital, the Hospital was administered by Hospital Corporation of America (hereinafter referred to as "HCA"). HCA had operated the Hospital through an employee, Buel Sapp. The Board of Trustees, therefore, relied heavily on Mr. Brown and his expertise in developing polices and for his efficient operation of the Hospital. The manner in which Mr. Brown administered the Hospital was also largely the same as the manner in which the Hospital has been administered by the person who replaced by Mr. Brown. The new administrator has been treated as an "employee" by the Hospital. Training. Mr. Brown was a professional hospital administrator with a number of years of experience operating hospitals, including the Hospital. In light of Mr. Brown's experience, especially at the Hospital, training was not required when Mr. Brown undertook the services contemplated by the First Contract. Integration. The services to be performed pursuant to the Consulting Contacts were integral to the operation of the Hospital. Mr. Brown performed services normally performed by an "administrator" or top manager of any hospital. Manner In Which Mr. Brown Performed Services. Mr. Brown did not hire any assistants or employees to assist him in the performance of the services required by the Consulting Contracts. The Consulting Contracts did not prevent Mr. Brown from using the services of others to carry out the services to be provided. Although Mr. Brown was ultimately obligated to insure that the services contemplated by the Consulting Contracts were provided, the manner in which services required by the Consulting Contracts were to be carried out was not specified. Continuing Relationship. Mr. Brown was required, as a condition of the Hospital entering into the First Contract, to move to Washington County. Pursuant to the First Contract, Mr. Brown was obligated to perform services for the Hospital for a period of four years. The First Contract expired February 1, 1991. The Second Contract obligated Mr. Brown to perform services for the Hospital for a period of one year. The Second Contract was effective February 1, 1992. Mr. Brown continued to perform services for the Hospital between February 1, 1991 and February 1, 1992, although the First Contract had expired and the Second Contract had not yet been entered into. The evidence failed to prove why Mr. Brown continued to perform services for the Hospital between February 1, 1991, and February 1, 1992. Mr. Brown performed services for the Hospital after he left NHI for between 3 and 4 years. Mr. Brown's Working Hours. Mr. Brown's working hours were not specified in the Consulting Contracts. Mr. Brown, therefore, was not legally required to perform services during any set period of time. Mr. Brown generally performed services for the Hospital from the early morning until the early evening. Mr. Brown's hours were consistent with the hours worked by employees of the Hospital. Mr. Brown did not keep time-sheets indicating the hours he worked. Nor did Mr. Brown use, or "punch," a time-clock which employees of the Hospital used. Full-Time or Part-Time Work. Mr. Brown was not required to work any set amount of hours pursuant to the Consulting Contracts. The services expected of Mr. Brown pursuant to the Consulting Contracts reasonably contemplated that Mr. Brown would perform services full- time, only if necessary. The Consulting Contracts also provided that Mr. Brown was not required to perform services on days he attended seminars or meetings to improve his position. The Consulting Contracts also required that Mr. Brown make himself available "for all reasonable meetings, engagements, and any and all other reasonable attempts by the Hospital to promote the Hospital." Mr. Brown did not receive annual or sick leave. Mr. Brown did not work at the Hospital every day of the week. During some weeks, he only worked three or four days. Where Mr. Brown Performed Services. Although not specifically required to do so, Mr. Brown performed the services contemplated by the Consulting Contracts essentially on the premises of the Hospital. In order to effectively administer the Hospital, it was necessary that Mr. Brown be available at the Hospital. Reports from Mr. Brown to the Hospital. Mr. Brown regularly reported to the Board of Trustees and kept the Board informed of his actions. Compensation for Mr. Brown's Services. Pursuant to the First Contract, Mr. Brown was paid an annual fee of $70,555.00. The annual fee was paid biweekly in twenty-six equal installments. Payments were made on the last day of every other week. The annual fee to be paid to Mr. Brown pursuant to the First Contract was agreed upon during negotiations based upon the average salary paid to administrators of similarly sized hospitals who were serving as employees, and adding thereto the amount of withholding tax, retirement contributions and other amounts which would be paid on behalf of an "employee." Had Mr. Brown been hired as an "employee", presumably he would have only been paid an amount based upon the average salary of other employee/administrators. Pursuant to the Second Contract Mr. Brown was paid an annual fee of $98,770.00. The annual fee was paid monthly on the first day of each month and upon the submission of an invoice from Mr. Brown. The Consulting Contracts also provided the following: Consultant hereby acknowledges and agrees that he is an independent contractor individually liable for self employment and all other taxes of any nature due on the fees paid by the Hospital to Consultant. Payments of Mr. Brown's annual fee were made to him by the Hospital out of a separate account and not the Hospital's "payroll" account from which Hospital employees were paid. Payments were made at the same time that Hospital employees were paid. The Hospital also paid for group health insurance for Mr. Brown. Health insurance benefits provided to Mr. Brown were the same benefits provided to Hospital employees. The Hospital also paid for disability insurance for Mr. Brown and a life insurance policy larger than provided to Hospital employees. Mr. Brown's Expenses; Tools and Materials; Investment. Pursuant to the Consulting Contracts, the Hospital paid dues Mr. Brown was required to pay to maintain "membership in applicable organizations or associations deemed necessary for promotion of the Hospital " The Hospital paid expenses incurred by Mr. Brown to attend meetings and seminars on new federal and state health care regulations which impacted the operation of the Hospital. The Hospital paid Mr. Brown a vehicle allowance of $250.00. The Hospital also provided Mr. Brown with an office, furniture, office supplies, a secretary (who was an employee of the Hospital) and with telephone and other services necessary to operate as the administrator of the Hospital. The office provided to Mr. Brown was the office used by the Hospital administrator. Other then Mr. Brown's education, Mr. Brown did not have any substantial investment in his position with the Hospital. Capital investment necessary for Mr. Brown to carry out his duties was provided by the Hospital. Profit and Loss Potential. In light of the fact that Mr. Brown was guaranteed payment for his services and the lack of investment and expenses Mr. Brown was required to provide, there was no reasonable potential Mr. Brown would incur a loss. Mr. Brown operated as an individual. Offer of Services to the General Public. The Consulting Contracts prohibited Mr. Brown from providing his services to others in "Northwest Florida." Mr. Brown was, therefore, free to perform services elsewhere. During the term of the Consulting Contracts, Mr. Brown did perform services for other companies located outside of Florida. Article X of the Consulting Contracts provided, in pertinent part, the following: . . . . Consultant further agrees that he shall not participate, directly or indirectly, individually or as a partner, shareholder, employee, agent, consultant, officer, director or otherwise, in any other business where such participation will in any manner interfere (as reasonably determined by the Board of Trustees and Consultant) with the business of the Hospital or which ultimately, in the final opinion of the Board of Trustees, could result in the integrity of the Hospital being subject to doubt. Right to Terminate Mr. Brown and Mr. Brown's Right to Quit. Pursuant to the Consulting Contracts, the Hospital had the right to terminate Mr. Brown's services for "good cause" as determined by majority vote of the Board of Trustees and "upon sixty (60) calendar days written notice of termination to the Consultant." The Hospital was required, however, to pay Mr. Brown for four months of service. The Hospital also had the right to terminate Mr. Brown's services if he were convicted of a felony, required to take treatment for drug or alcohol abuse, engaged in activity harmful to the reputation of the Hospital or failed to comply with the terms of the Consulting Contract. Mr. Brown was authorized by the Consulting Contracts to terminate his services upon sixty days written notice. The Consulting Contracts provide that the agreement terminated upon the death of Mr. Brown. Weighted Consideration of the Facts. Several of the facts in this case indicate that Mr. Brown was an independent contractor of the Hospital and several of the facts indicate that he was an employee. Based upon a weighted consideration of the facts in this case, it is concluded that Mr. Brown operated as an independent contractor, and not an employee, for the Hospital.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order concluding that J. Glenn Brown, Jr., was not a compulsory member of the Florida retirement system pursuant to Section 121.051, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1635 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Hospital's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1. Accepted in 2 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 7-8. Accepted in 28. Accepted in 10. See 11-13 and 38-39. The First Contract expired January 31, 1991, and not January 31, 1992. Accepted in 16 and 24. Accepted in 35. Accepted in 54 and hereby accepted. The last sentence is not relevant. 9 Accepted in 26, 42-43, 52, 57 and 63. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 68. Accepted in 48. Accepted in 50. Accepted in 30-31. Accepted in 3. The Division's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 4-6. Accepted in 7. Accepted in 9 and hereby accepted. 4 Accepted in 10,53-54, 58-59 and 62. Accepted in 28. Accepted in 23. Accepted in 23 and 69. The first sentence is not relevant. 8 Accepted in 41-42, 44, 47, 52-53 and 63. See 41-43 and hereby accepted. Although Ms. Ward did testify consistent with this finding of fact, the testimony was not sufficiently detailed to conclude that Mr. Brown and Mr. Mason provided services in exactly the same manner. Accepted in 61. 12 Accepted in 11-14, 38-39 and 55. Accepted in 14, 25 and 66. Accepted in 23. Accepted in 60-61. See 73. See 53-62. The conclusion on page 10 is not supported by the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald Holley, Esquire Post Office Box 268 Chipley, Florida 32428 William S. Howell, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 187 Chipley, Florida 32428 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Division of Retirement Department of Management Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Building C Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Sylvan Strickland, Esquire Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 309 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: From 1968 to the present time, petitioner University Home Foundation, Inc. has owned and operated the Convalescent Center of Gainesville, a 119-bed skilled care nursing home. In early 1977, petitioner submitted an application for a certificate of need to construct and operate a new 120-bed skilled care nursing home in Gainesville, Florida. Due to the bed need projection of the 1976 Florida State Plan for Construction of Hospitals and Related Medical Facilities, petitioner submitted a revised application for an 83-bed skilled care facility. It is petitioner's intention, should a certificate of need be issued, to downgrade the present Convalescent Center of Gainesville to an intermediate care nursing facility and to build the new facility as an 83-bed skilled facility. Petitioner's revised and completed application was acknowledged by respondent effective June 3, 1977. In the latter part of October, 1976, the respondent denied an application for a certificate of need for a 91-bed nursing home in Gainesville, Florida, proposed by Hill-Guthrie Associates. This adverse determination by respondent resulted in an administrative hearing. On June 8, 1977, the Hearing Officer entered an order finding that the procedural deficiencies surrounding the timeliness of the review process on the Hill-Guthrie application should be construed as an approval of the proposal to construct the 91-bed nursing home. On July 28, 1977, respondent issued a certificate of need to Hill-Guthrie Associates. The 1975 Florida State Plan projected a bed need for Alachua County of 91. The 1976 Plan projected a need for 83 long term care beds for the year 1981. The 1977 Plan, which was not accepted by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare until July 19, 1977, calls for a long term bed need of 106 by the year 1982. These plans do not distinguish between skilled and intermediate care bed needs. Due to federal regulations, the projected need figures do not include patients under 65 years of age. Testimony at the hearing indicated that between 10 and 14 percent of patients in nursing homes are under The figures in the State Plans are derived by subtracting from the projected number of beds needed for the area's population the number of beds presently existing in the area. In this instance, Alachua County presently has three existing nursing homes with a capacity of 332 beds. The projected number of beds needed in the 1976 and 1977 Plans (83 and 106, respectively) do not take into consideration the 91 bed proposal of Hill-Guthrie Associates, for which a certificate of need was issued on July 28, 1977. If the Hill-Guthrie home is completed, Alachua County would be overbedded by eight beds under the 1976 Plan and underbedded by fifteen beds under the 1977 Plan. On June 23, 1977, the North Central Florida Health Planning Council, Inc. (HPC), which serves a sixteen county area, held a public hearing to receive comments on the petitioner's revised proposal for an 83-bed skilled care nursing home. Among the items discussed at the hearing were the effects of the Hill- Guthrie decision and the correctness of the figures contained in the State Plan. (Exhibit No. 2) The Staff of the HPC prepared a report on petitioner's application and recommended that a certificate of need be denied. The Staff Report considered the twelve criteria suggested by respondent and found that the proposal was not in conformity with plans, standards and criteria; that there are less costly alternatives to the proposed project; that the proposal would not promote cost containment; and that there was no documented need for the project. More specifically, the Staff found that the Hill-Guthrie approval for 91 beds would exceed by eight the 83 beds needed in Alachua County under the 1976 State Plan. Since Hill-Guthrie proposed construction at a cost of $11,407.00 per bed and petitioner's proposed cost was $13,614.00 per bed, the Staff determined that it would be less costly to utilize existing facilities and to construct the Hill- Guthrie Nursing Home than to build a more expensive facility that would create an overbedded situation. (Exhibit D) The HPC Project Review Committee held its hearing on July 14, 1977, and petitioner's president, Mr. Paul Allen, presented his comments in response to the Staff Report. He contested the population and bed need projections contained in the State Plan, and the Hill-Guthrie decision was discussed. The Committee voted to follow the Staff's recommendation to deny the petitioner a certificate of need. (Exhibits No. 3 and D) The HPC's Executive Committee meeting was held on July 25, 1977. Mr. Allen spoke to the committee, disagreeing with the figures contained in the State Plan and requesting the committee to vote only on his application and disregard the Hill-Guthrie proposal since a certificate of need to Hill-Guthrie had not yet been issued. Thereafter, the HPC voted to recommend to respondent denial of petitioner's application for a certificate of need for the same reasons set forth in the Staff Report. (Exhibits No. 4 and D) By letter dated August 23, 1977, respondent's administrator, Art Forehand, notified petitioner that its project proposal was not in conformity with established standards, plans and criteria. The 1976 State Plan was specifically referenced, but respondent stated that it also considered petitioner's proposal in accordance with the recently adopted 1977 State Plan (Exhibit No. 1) At the hearing, Mr. Forehand testified that his decision was based upon nonconformity with the State Plan without a detailed showing that a need existed irrespective of said Plan. The issuance of a certificate of need to Hill-Guthrie played a large role in Forehand's decision.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that the determination of the respondent Office of Community Medical Facilities to deny petitioner's application for a certificate of need to construct and operate an 83-bed skilled care nursing home in Alachua County be upheld and affirmed. Respectfully submitted and entered this 13th day of January, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Art Forehand Administrator Office of Community Medical Facilities 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Selig I. Goldin, Esquire Post Office Box 1251 Gainesville, Florida 32602 James Mahorner, Esquire 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact On July 30, 1981, Petitioner filed an application with the Health Systems Agency of Northeast Florida, Area III, Inc. for a Certificate of Need to construct an enclosure on the fifth floor of the south wing of Petitioner's hospital. The purpose of that enclosure was in contemplation of future available bed space at a time when need for those beds had been documented and approved by the local health system's agency. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 2) In response to a request for further information which was made by the Executive Director of the local health system's agency, Rudolph Nudo, Director of Engineering for the Petitioner, answered that inquiry in writing by correspondence dated September 24, 1981. (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3) Through the course of that correspondence Nudo indicated that the temporary use of the fifth floor would be for storage, and the fifth floor would be used in a permanent way for storage and expansion of the hospital's wellness and physical fitness programs should a determination be made in the future that additional beds are not needed in the review area of the local HSA. On November 23, 1981 the local HSA wrote to advise Herbert E. Straughn, Medical Facilities Consultant, Community Medical Facilities for Respondent, that the Northeast Florida Area III Health Systems Agency was recommending the denial of the proposed Certificate of Need. That correspondence had as an attachment the legal notices publicizing the public hearing related to the project, staff briefing memoranda and papers involved in the review process. (Respondent's Exhibits 4 through 4d) On January 27, 1982, Thomas J. Conrad, Administrator, Community Medical Facilities of the Office of Health Planning and Development, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, wrote to Charles Vadakin, President-General Manager of Petitioner, to advise Petitioner that the request for a Certificate of Need was being denied. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4) This indication of denial had as an attachment the State agency action report. (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5) On February 5, 1982, in keeping with Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, Petitioner requested a formal hearing to consider its entitlement to be granted a Certificate of Need to "shell-in" the fifth floor at its facility. On February 17, 1982, the Division of Administrative Hearings received Respondent's request that the Division conduct the formal hearing. That hearing de novo was held on April 8 and 9, 1982. The evidence presented in the course of the hearing addressed the question of whether the proposal for construction by the applicant meets the criteria established in Section 381.494(6)(c), Florida Statutes and Rule 10- 5.11, Florida Administrative Code, in particular Rule 10-5.11(1),(3),(4),(6) and (12), Florida Administrative Code. (Those other criteria set forth in Rule 10- 5.11, Florida Administrative Code, have satisfactorily been addressed by the application process or are inapplicable in terms of the subject matter of the given criteria.) Evidence presented also dealt with the subject of whether this Certificate of Need could be granted due to extenuating and mitigating circumstances which exist, notwithstanding the applicant's failure to successfully meet the criteria discussed above. Memorial Hospital of Jacksonville is an acute general care hospital with a 309 bed capacity. The hospital is located in Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida. Petitioner has been granted Certificates of Need allowing the construction of an educational floor, perinatal center on a second floor and the third and fourth floors above those. The third and fourth floors would house an additional thirty-four beds, bringing the total bed count in the hospital to 343 beds. The construction is referred to as the south wing and is depicted at a certain point in the construction through Petitioner's Exhibit 1, a photograph of the area of construction. Memorial's present request for a Certificate of Need would allow the construction of an additional floor, or fifth floor, above the, four floors that have been granted. Memorial Hospital provides critical care, to include trauma cases treated in its emergency room and open heart surgery. In addition, there is a cardiac catheterization laboratory and other general cardiac care, an intensive care unit, a perinatal (birthing) center and other hospital services. The fifth floor, if constructed, would not immediately contain additional beds and would be left with interior partition walls and would be used for storage space in the interim period prior to the grant of any further beds to the Petitioner. The construction on the south wing which had been approved has its origins in Certificates of Need which were the topic of separate applications filed in 1979 and 1980. Specifically, in November, 1979, Memorial filed separate applications for its educational floor, first floor, in the amount of $2,991,000.00 and at the same time, an application for a perinatal unit, second floor, in the amount of $4,352,000.00. The applications were granted in 1980 in the amounts requested. At a later date in 1980, Petitioner filed a separate application for three additional stories; floors three, four and five, and for 106 additional beds, all in the cost amount of $10,656,000.00. This request came about at approximately the same time as a request by St. Luke's Hospital in Jacksonville, Florida, to move its hospital operations to an area in the vicinity of Memorial Hospital. Memorial and St. Luke's, together with the local HSA, resolved the problem of the competing certificate requests by entering into a stipulation and agreement in 1981. By the terms of that agreement, Memorial limited its expansion to two floors instead of three, leaving floors three and four intact. It reduced its bed request from 106 to 34 additional new beds to be installed on one of the two additional floors, with the second additional floor receiving 34 beds from another part of the hospital which was not subject to the Certificate of Need. The second set of beds would be gained by the process of converting existing semi-private rooms to private rooms. Petitioner also agreed not to apply for additional beds until at least six months after the perinatal unit and 34 new medical/surgical beds had been opened. St. Luke's reduced its number of obstetric beds by 20 and it agreed that it would not "shell-in" space for additional beds in its proposed facility. The results of the agreement caused the abandonment by Memorial of its fifth floor request and the reduction of bed requests by 72 beds. The new terms are set out in Certificate of Need No. 1488 pertaining to floors three and four. The project costs were left as originally requested, and that monetary amount was granted. The agreement reached between the local HSA, Petitioner and St. Luke's was premised upon extenuating and mitigating circumstances, especially the possibility of the cost of protracted litigation had the parties not come to an agreement. Following the stipulation and agreement with the local HSA and St. Luke's Hospital, the Petitioner filed the present request for Certificate. The general purpose of that project has been discussed before. The rationalization on the subject of consistency of the project with the local Health Systems' plan and the local annual implementation plan was as follows: The proposed enclosure project is consistent with Health Systems' plan and annual implementation plan for 1980, in that it provides a mechanism for assuring available health care resources at the lowest possible cost consistent with quality service delivery. The proposal guarantees no additional beds will be added until approved by the Health Systems Agency and yet safeguards the most effective option of maximizing current capital investment dollars. This project will allow Memorial Hospital to continue to meet the area's acute health care needs for the next ten years. The project contemplates the expenditure of $1,200,000.00 for cost of construction of "shell-in" space. Need for the subject project was discussed in terms of a reference to "Certificate of Need #1488" which is that Certificate relating to floors three and four of the south wing. The Certificate of Need No. 1488 was based upon an application which included a study concluded in August, 1980, which set forth primary and secondary service areas, census tracts and preliminary 1980 Federal census figures for Duval County gathered by the "Research Department, Florida Publishing Company" and a document to the effect that Memorial had a firm market position, and that health care consumerism was emerging and that there was a strong consumer loyalty-to Memorial. The present application was reviewed by the local Health Agency and the Health Needs and Priorities Committee voted to recommend denial of the proposed project; its Executive Committee also recommended denial of the project. During this review cycle, concerns were expressed about the application in view of the 1981 agreement with St. Luke's and the local HSA in which Memorial agreed not to apply for additional beds for at least six months after the 34 beds which had been approved were in operation. While the present application does not violate the terms of that agreement, it does allow for a large portion of the capital expenditure, i.e., that part devoted to the construction of the "shell-in" of the floor to be achieved and thereby allows for a portion of the capital expenditure related to future beds to be approved. With St. Luke's relocation to south Jacksonville, some time in late 1984 or early 1985, and with the addition of Memorial's construction program that has been approved, 323 beds will be added to the south side area of Duval County in the next few years. In the local HSA staff's opinion, which opinion is accurate, from a community planning basis, there will not be a demonstrated community need for additional beds in the south side any sooner than 1985 and it is more likely that there would be no further bed need before 1990. The local HSA is also concerned that the project would set a precedent for future "shell-in" applications. This concern is borne out by interviews conducted through staff members of that HSA which revealed that seven hospital administrators planned major construction projects in the HSA area, and six administrators indicated that they would ask for "shell-in" space if they thought it would be approved. In specific terms, the local HSA recommended disapproval of the project and did so by written findings alluded to before. In summary, those findings indicated: The Health System's Plan did not address expansion projects which do not directly result in an increase in licensed beds or service but the primary purpose of the fifth floor would be for bed spaces. The Health System's Plan called for a regional rate of 4.3 beds per 1,000 population. Excluding Nemour's Children and St. Johns River Hospital, there were approximately 4.1 beds on the south side and beaches area of Jacksonville. When St. Luke's Hospital (289 beds) relocates to the south side and Memorial opens its 34 new beds, the rate will be approximately 5.2 beds per 1,000 population in 1985. In 1990 the estimated rate would be 5.0 beds per 1,000 population. It was HSA's staff's opinion that there will not be a need on a community planning basis to approve more beds for the south side until the 1990s. The local HSA also indicated that Memorial could be more effective in its specialization. Its recommendation in that regard was that after the current construction of four stories had been completed, Memorial could still have the capability to add additional licensed beds within its presently approved structures, even though it would mean reducing the ratio of private beds to semi-private beds. Specifically, it was recommended by the HSA that: Petitioner reconvert the 34 rooms previously used for semi-private back to semi-private --34 beds Modify the 34 private rooms on the third floor of the new building to semi-private, and --34 beds Modify the 34 private rooms on the fourth floor of the new building to semi-private. --34 beds TOTAL 102 beds These observations and findings are correct, except as they relate to modification of rooms on the third and fourth floors of the new construction. The above-stated suggestion by the local HSA related to the modification to semi-private rooms on the third and fourth floors of the south wing would not comport with the design specifications of those beds as now contemplated by Memorial, in that the private rooms contemplated on those floors did not provide sufficient space to be modified into semi-private rooms. Analysis by HRS adopted and confirmed the majority of the analysis by the local Health Planning Agency. HRS also pointed out in its analysis, and the HRS analysis is accurate, that in view of the fact of excess bed capacity in the planning area through 1985, the adding of potential beds would give Petitioner an undue advantage over facilities should the fifth floor be constructed as "shell-in" space. Furthermore, according to Respondent, construction economies to be realized by Memorial Hospital can only be recognized as legitimate, if there is a community need for the project. Based upon the analysis conducted by Respondent, the project from a community-wide standpoint, under the terms of Section 381.493, Florida Statutes, there is an excess of 238 hospital beds in Duval County through 1985, and possibly into early 1990. Respondent having in mind the bed need situation, concluded that the proposed project was not consistent with bed need standards at the time of review or in the planning future and that the community need to add "shell-in" bed space did not exist absent a recognized bed need, which would not occur before 1985. All of these comments by HRS are correct accounts. It was also concluded by Respondent that there were alternatives for converting private bedrooms to semi-private rooms, increasing capacity without major construction. This is a true understanding of the circumstances except as it relates to the third and fourth floors in the new construction. Based upon the overall analysis, the project application was denied. The conditions at Memorial Hospital are such that it would benefit from an expansion to add a fifth floor at the south wing. Those benefits pertain to the availability of storage and administrative space. The occupancy rate for patients in the hospital during the last year have averaged approximately 90 percent (Petitioner's Exhibit 16), causing both emergency and planned health care services to be delayed due to overcrowding. Federal, State and HSA guidelines call for 80 percent occupancy of nonfederal, short-term care beds, such as provided by Petitioner. There is a need for administrative office space. At the present time some administrative offices are placed in lobbies and hallways and the files for those offices are located in hallways. Intravenous solutions are stored in hallways at present. Testimony by the hospital engineer established a need of 15,000 square feet of space to accommodate storage problems more comfortably. The application seeks 17,500 square feet of space. The alternatives to the construction of the fifth floor related to future bed need and short and long-term storage space would be to forego the expansion, construct the project at a future date, or construct a new building. Construction at a later date could cost as much as an additional $7,000,000.00, constituted of approximately $813,000.00 in construction cost and $6,000,000.00 in loss of gross revenue. These costs are related to completion of the "shell-in" structure after the initial four floors had been completed and assumes loss of revenue related to beds in the third and fourth floors of the hospital, which floors would have to be closed during the construction of the fifth floor at a subsequent time. Construction costs at the present, as set forth in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, at the last sentence of the first page, is estimated to be $.31 per-patient day. There is precedent for granting the "shell-in" space as may be found in Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 8, 9, and 10, related to projects in the Florida Gulf Health Systems Agency, Inc. area of responsibility. Respectively, those projects refer to Women's Hospital in Tampa, Florida; St. Joseph's Hospital in Tampa, Florida; and L. W. Blake Memorial Hospital in Bradenton, Florida. In the situation of Women's Hospital, Respondent allowed the construction by installation of necessary structural equipment and fixtures needed to establish 34 single occupancy rooms as double occupancy rooms as a hedge against construction costs for any additional beds approved at a future date. St. Joseph's Hospital was allowed to construct two floors in which 45 beds had been requested, but only 36 beds were granted per floor, leaving additional "shell-in" space which would accommodate nine additional beds per floor, for a total of 18 beds. In the situation at Blake Memorial Hospital in Bradenton, Florida, that hospital was allowed to "shell-in" a fifth floor on condition that the structural framework would be completed and that the floor would be left in an unfinished state, that is to say, that the improvements necessary for the utilization of that fifth floor for patient rooms were not allowed to be added. In each instance in which some form of "shell-in" space was granted, the HSA area was overbeded at the time of the grant of certificate. The project is not consistent with the local health systems plan, annual implementation plan, and Florida State Health Systems Plan. (Petitioner's Exhibits 11 through 14 respectively)
Findings Of Fact In April, 1987, DOA submitted recommendations to the Florida Legislature which included proposed changes in the state employees' group insurance program. Among the recommendations was a proposal that would require the Department to competitively bid HMO contracts in the state health program on the basis of cost, service area, plan benefits, and accessibility. The stated objective of the recommendation was to: encourage HMOs in a geographic location to structure their premiums to reflect actual cost experience and to provide the lowest possible cost for the state and state employees, while at the same time changing the current concept of the state's contributions to HMOs..." At the time of the DOA legislative recommendation, existing state law provided that persons eligible to participate in the state group health insurance program had the option to elect membership in any qualified HMO engaged in providing basic health services in the HMO service area where the employee resided in lieu of participating in the state self-insurance plan. Section 110.123(3)(d), Florida Statutes, Rule 22K-1.1003(21), F.A.C. A "qualified" HMO was defined as an entity qualified under the federal Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 300e-9, or certified under Part II of Chapter 641, Florida Statutes, which had entered into a contract with the State, and had achieved a designated level of participation by state employees. Rule 22K- 1.1003(21), F.A.C. Effective October 1, 1987, Chapter 87-156, Laws of Florida (now codified as Section 110.123(3)(d), Fla. Stat.) was amended to add the following: (3) STATE GROUP INSURANCE PROGRAM. -- * * * (d) * * * 2. Effective January 1, 1988, the Department of Administration shall, by rule, contract with health maintenance organizations to participate in the state group health insurance plan through the competitive bid process based on cost, service area, plan benefits, and accessibility. Effective January 1, 1988, all employees participating in the state group health insurance plan, irrespective of whether or not the member participates in a health maintenance organization, shall be subject to the same total premium, regardless of the state or employee's share. THE REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS Dennis Nye, then the DOA Director of the Office of State Employees Insurance and administrator of the state health insurance program, was directly responsible for implementing the new legislation regarding the HMO contracts. He initially determined that procurement of HMO contractual services was governed by Section 287.057, Florida Statutes. The Request For Proposals For Health Maintenance Organization Coverage was issued on July 31, 1987, as "Bid No. 88-05." It scheduled a presubmission conference on August 12, 1987, and established the deadline for receipt of proposals of August 28, 1987, with a contemplated date of award of contract on September 14, 1987, and an effective contract date of January 1, 1988. The Department clearly set forth the general purpose of the RFP in Section II as requiring each proposal to meet the benefit objectives and to provide high quality benefits and services to state employees. More specific objectives were as follows: A proactive approach to cost containment, including an emphasis on aggressive claims management, utilization review and superior statistical reporting Quality medical care which encourages health promotion, disease prevention, early diagnosis and treatment. Stability in the financial structure of offered health plans. Professional, high quality service in all administrative areas including claims processing, enrollment, membership services, grievances, and communications. Competitive premium rates which take into account the demographics and, if appropriate, the claims experience of State employees. DOA stated other objectives to be as follows: Have each county or contiguous group of counties be considered one service area. Award no more than two contracts per service area; however, the awards will be based on the HMO's ability to respond to the needs of employees and on accessibility by employees. Have reciprocal agreements between locations, if an HMO has multiple service areas. For example, an employee covered in Miami with a covered dependent living in Gainesville, should be provided similar services. Enter into a two year, non-experience rated contract. A provision will be included tying renewal action at each of the two renewals to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Medical Care Services. This will become part of the contract. Section III of the RFP stated that to be considered as a "qualified" HMO, the proposer must be licensed by the Department of Insurance pursuant to Part II of Chapter 641, Florida Statutes. Each proposer was required to submit the following: Form PUR 7033, properly completed and signed. The completed Questionnaires Requirements Section (Please answer questions in the same order as they appear in that Section; do not reformat). The completed Cost Proposal forms (Please use the enclosed form on page 43 and 44; do not reformat). The completed Statement of Compliance on page 47. Documentation in support of the above. Section III further provided in part as follows: Proposals are to be submitted only on the forms and formats provided in this RFP. All exhibits requested must be submitted with your proposal along with answers to all questions contained in this RFP. Section IV of the RFP provided that each contract would be for a 24 month term, beginning January 1, 1988. The Department reserved the right to renew the contracts on the same terms and conditions of the initial contract for two additional one-year periods. Section VI of the RFP, concerning "Required Benefits and Services," listed the minimum benefits that must be provided, and also required that a complete list of all other intended services for each service area be provided. Section IX specified the following criteria for evacuation of the proposals: Premium Cost Extensiveness of Service Areas by County and/or contiguous Counties. Note: The State's objective is to award no more than two contracts per services (sic) area; however, the awards will be based on the HMO's ability to respond to the needs of employees and on accessibility by employees. Plan Benefits as follows: Covered services Limitations and exclusions Co-payments, deductibles and co-insurance features Range of providers including specialists and number of hospitals Out of service area coverage Grievance procedures Acessibility as follows: Reciprocal agreements Provider locations Number of primary care physicians and specialists, in relation to membership Completeness of proposals The RFP did not provide information on DOA's evaluation of the legislatively required criteria concerning the importance of price and other evaluation criteria. The Department weighed cost equal to benefits plus accessibility and determined accessibility was a part of the plan benefits. Section X was a questionnaire with forty-nine questions for the proposers to answer including questions regarding the proposer's license status, corporate structure, reserving practices, reinsurance contracts, service area, employee membership and staff, hospitals and other care facilities, participating physicians, utilization review, and other information regarding the proposer's case management, control mechanisms, statistical reporting, and the like. Each proposer was directed to submit audited financial statements for the last two fiscal years, together with financial statements for the first quarter of 1987. Section XI dealt with cost proposals and provided a form for completion as to proposed premium rates. In an undated addendum to the RFP, the Department added Question 50 to the RFP to provide information for use in a brochure which would allow state employees to compare the benefits offered by the various HMOs. In the pre-submission conference held on August 12, 1987, and attended by representatives of the HMOs, the participants were informed by Mr. Nye that the two criteria of cost and benefits would be weighted on an equal basis. He also advised that the State would enter into a two year, non-experience rated contract, subject to renewal which would tie rate increases to the Consumer Price Index for Medical Care Services. Proposers were told to quote a specific rate for the first year of the contract, and a percentage increase or decrease for each of the following three years. However, he noted that the State would evaluate cost solely on the basis of the premium for the first year. He indicated that two HMOs per service area would be awarded contracts based on the highest number of points received in the bid evaluation process, and not based upon the type of HMO, such as an individual practice association (IPA) or staff model. Then asked whether some factors would be weighted higher than others, Mr. Nye responded that benefits and cost would be weighted higher. THE PROPOSERS 15. Twelve HMOs submitted proposals to the Department for the South Florida area (Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties) in response to the RFP by the deadline, and several of those submitted more than one proposal. There was, however, no prohibition on submitting multiple proposals, and prospective bidders were told that they had that option. In this proceeding, proposals were received from Health Options, Heritage, and Humana to serve Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties, and a proposal from Gulfstream to serve Palm Beach County. Health Options is a for profit subsidiary of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, and is an individual practice association (IPA) model HMO. Health Options offers HMO services in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties. It has a total membership of 23,074 members, of which 517 are state employees and dependents. Heritage is a subsidiary of Heritage Health System, Inc., for profit Delaware Corporation, and is an IPA model HMO. Heritage offers HMO services in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties, and has a total membership of 12,500 members, including 10 state employees and dependents. Humana is a for profit subsidiary of Humana, Inc., and is a combination staff/IPA model HMO. Humana offers HMO services in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties, and has a total membership of 91,217 members, including 3,273 state employees and dependents. Gulfstream, at the time its proposal was filed, was a limited partnership whose general partner was Equicor Holding Company and whose limited partner was H.C.A. Care of Florida, Inc. The limited and general partners were wholly owned subsidiaries of Equicor, Equitable H.C.A. Corporation, which is owned by Hospital Corporation of America and the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States. On January 1, 1988, Gulfstream converted to corporate form, and is now known as Equicor Health Plan of Florida. Gulfstream offers services in Palm Beach County and has a total membership of 12,335 members, including 933 state employees and dependents. THE EVALUATION PROCESS The evaluation of the proposals submitted by HMOs throughout the state for the seven service areas was initially accomplished by employee evaluation teams made up of employees in Dennis Nye's office. He was assisted in his selection by Marie Walker, a benefits analyst in his office. Dennis Nye and Ms. Walker decided which employees could best evaluate the proposals based on the criteria established in the law, including familiarity with benefits and the request for proposal process. The employees selected for these duties had varying degrees of knowledge concerning health plan benefits, HMOs, and bid evaluations. After the initial evaluation was completed, the Department determined that inconsistent methods had been used to score the proposals and further directed Dennis Nye to continue the evaluation process based upon an objective scoring system which limited subjectivity to the maximum extent possible. As Secretary, I was concerned with the financial soundness of each bidder and instructed Dennis Nye to keep that aspect in mind when making his final recommendation. The second or "final evaluation" of the proposals was solely based on the five criteria contained in the RFP, i.e., premium cost, extensiveness of service area, plan benefits, accessibility, and completeness of proposals. In his memorandum of October 6, 1987, Mr. Nye initially recommended that contracts be awarded in the Jacksonville, Pensacola, and Gainesville Service Areas to the two HMOs in each area that had received the top rankings. 1/ However, in the South Florida Service Area, he recommended awarding four contracts based on the need to provide one staff model and one IPA model HMO in each county in the service area. It was Mr. Nye's belief that federal law required that one HMO of each type be offered in each service area, if available. I was concerned about this issue and asked DOA's General Counsel, Augustus Aikens, to review it. He informed me that the federal requirement was not applicable because a state was not included within the definition of "employer" under the applicable federal law. On the bass of this legal advice, directed Mr. Nye to review his previous recommendations as they related to the need to retain one IPA model and one staff model HMO in each service area. In his memorandum of October 26, 1987, Mr. Nye recommended that contracts be awarded to Health Options and to Heritage on the bases that they were "the lowest, best bids for (the) service area." In his memorandum of October 30, 1987, he again recommended that contracts be awarded to Health Options and Heritage. Throughout the entire bidding process, it was my desire to avoid awarding a contract to an HMO which was not in compliance with state law or the rules of the Department of Insurance. I had written to the Department of Insurance seeking its assistance to determine the ability of each bidder to comply with the state law and to meet the needs of the state employees. By letter of October 23, 1987, the Department of Insurance informed DOA that it had approved the rates of Health Options and Heritage. EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSALS Premium Costs The Department specifically designed the RFP to require each proposer to list separate costs in categories of "employee only" and "family" for active employees and retired employees under sixty-five. Required rates for Medicare recipients were to be shown separately listing rates for retirees, retiree and spouse (both on Medicare), and retiree and spouse (one with Medicare, with or without other eligible dependents). A fixed premium cost was required for calendar year 1988 and a percentage of that rate was to be shown for the successive three years. Rates for those last three years were to be "established as a percentage of the first year's premiums" with the maximum increase "limited to the increase, if any, in the overall medical portion of the Consumer Price index." (RFP, Section XI) The rates bid by each HMO were as follows: 2/ A. Heritage (low bid): Employee Only Family Dade, Broward, 66.46 166.15 and Palm Beach B. Health Options (low bid) Dade and Broward: 78.00 195.00 Palm Beach: 75.00 185.00 C. Humana, Dade: 85.02 206.01 Broward: 83.01 199.22 Palm Beach: 77.44 185.86 D. Gulfstream, Palm Beach: 78.92 197.28 (The instructions provided that the total cost of the "family plan" shall not be greater than 2.5 times the total cost of the "employee only" plan.) DOA evaluators computed a "mean" premium cost by adding the premiums for all bidders, dividing by three, and comparing each premium to the "mean," which was then given five points. A premium above the mean gave a bidder less than five points while a premium below the mean gave the bidder more than five points. The same method was used for the "employee only" plan, the "family" plan and the three Medicare retiree groups. Based on the Department's estimate that active employees constituted 90 percent and retirees 10 percent of an HMO membership, the final point calculations were: A. Heritage (low bid): Combined (Dade, Broward and Palm Beach) 9.35 B. Health Options (low bid) Dade and Broward: 7.75 Palm Beach: 9.1 Combined (Dade, Broward and Palm Beach) 8.17 C. Humana Dade: 5.72 Broward: 6.26 Palm Beach: 8.65 Combined: 6.57 D. Gulfstream Palm Beach: 6.61 The Hearing Officer evaluated the above process and found that the Department's action was reasonable even though "the cost proposals were evaluated solely on the basis of premium for 1988." He based his conclusion on: First, Nye announced at the pre-bid conference that proposals would be evaluated solely on that basis. Second, premium costs in succeeding years were limited to the lower of the cost proposed or the future and presently unknown Consumer Price index for Medical Care Services. Accordingly, no meaningful evaluation could have resulted from a consideration of premium costs for succeeding years. (R.O., page 17) Extensiveness of Service Area At the pre-submission conference, proposers were told that they should designate their service areas and that bids would be awarded on the basis of the entire service area. DOA's evaluators awarded two points for each full county and one-half point for each partial county and proposers received 2, 4, or 6 base points depending on whether their proposal was being evaluated on one, two, or three county service area. Heritage submitted one proposal, and designated its service area as Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties. Its proposal was evaluated on a composite or combined basis. Health Options submitted one proposal and designated its service area as Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties. Its proposal contained two separate premium costs: one for Dade and Broward Counties, and one for Palm Beach County. The Department evaluated Health Options' proposal as it related to the individual counties of Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach County, and on a combined basis (Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties). Humana submitted three separate proposals, which designated three separate service areas: Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties. The Department evaluated Humana's proposal for each county and on a combined basis. Gulfstream submitted one proposal, and designated its service area as Palm Beach County. The Department evaluated Gulfstream's proposal for Palm Beach County. The Hearing Officer found that the above evaluation procedure "was reasonable and a valid exercise of the agency's discretion." (R.O., page 35) ACCESSIBILITY The Department evaluated accessibility criterion on the basis of ten points each for reciprocal agreements provided statewide and national services, ten points for each county of the service area in which a hospital was located, two points for each specialty provider in each county, and one point for each provider physician and specialist. These raw scores were then evaluated further to obtain a "mean" score for each proposer as follows A. Heritage (low bid), Combined: 5.8 B. Health Options (low bid), Dade and Broward: 8.71 Palm Beach: 1.1 Combined: 9.51 C. Humana, Dade: 4.16 Broward: 3.32 Palm Beach: 1.31 Combined: 8.79 D. Gulfstream Palm Beach: 1.18 The Hearing Officer found that the above evaluation procedure "was reasonable and a valid exercise of the agency's discretion." (R.O., page 36) COMPLETENESS OF PROPOSALS The original statutory criteria contained in Chapter 87-156, Laws of Florida, included the areas of "cost, service area, plan benefits, and accessibility." To these criteria, DOA added the fifth criterion of completeness of proposals." The Hearing Officer ruled that "(t)he Department's inclusion of this criterion was reasonable." (R.O., page 22) TOTAL POINTS Total points were calculated by adding the base points to a weighted score. In deriving the weighted score, the criteria were weighted as follows: premium costs at 3.5 times, plan benefits at 2.5 times, accessibility at 1 time, extensiveness of service area at 1 time, and completeness of proposal at 1 time. In evaluating the proposals, the Department first evaluated bids solely against other bids for the same service area. For example, Gulfstream's bid was first evaluated against only those other bids that proposed to provide services in that county. In this manner, Gulfstream ranked fourth out of the five bidders in Palm Beach County, and thirteenth overall. The points and ranking assigned by the Department to the top six proposers and to Gulfstream were as follows: HMO Base Points Weights Total Points Rank Heritage (low bid): 35.34 34.15 70.5 1 Health Options Combined (low bid) 38.59 30.79 59.48 2 Av Med 38.95 24.875 63.825 3 Health Options Dade & Broward (low bid) 34.03 27.73 51.76 4 Heritage (high bid) 34.17 25.925 60.095 5 Humana Combined: 35.05 23.46 58.51 6 Gulfstream Palm Beach: 22.46 22.03 44.49 13 A review of this table shows that the weights altered the relative positions of each of the top six proposers. Mr. Nye testified that the weighting utilized did not affect the ranking of the bids of the proposers and only affected the ranking of one bidder, AV-Med. As the Hearing Officer concluded, the proof was contrary to Mr. Nye's testimony. His finding on this point is supported by competent substantial evidence and is hereby adopted. Based on the results of its evaluation the Department proposed to award the contracts to Heritage (low) and to Health Options (combined-low). HUMANA'S COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS Humana introduced expert testimony to demonstrate that, benefits and cost were weighted equally, its cost-to-benefits ratio would be comparable to or better than the successful proposers. Two analyses were presented. One actuarial expert adjusted the different benefit patterns of Heritage and Health Options up to the Human a benefit level and adjusted their price according to actuarial information filed with the Department of Insurance. The testimony sought to place the proposers on the same co-payment/benefit level to compare premium costs. The result was that Humana's premium cost was the second lowest for the South Florida Service Area. The second analysis adjusted Humana's benefit pattern down to the benefit/co-payment levels of Heritage and Health Options, and adjusted Humana's premium cost down accordingly based on Humana's filed actuarials. This testimony sought to place the proposers on the same co- payment/benefit level to compare premium costs, and Humana' premium cost was comparable to or lower than the second lowest bidder. The Hearing Officer found that the analyses by the expert witness were not persuasive in demonstrating that Humana was the second lowest proposer in this case, or that its cost/benefits were the second lowest. (R.O., page 26) For example, the fitness did not evaluate the bids based on the five criteria contained in the RFP, nor did he include in the cost/benefit analysis all of the criteria utilized by the Department to evaluate benefits. The findings of the Hearing Officer on this point are supported by competent substantial evidence and are therefore adopted. Plan Benefits The criteria for the evaluation of all proposals was set out in Section IX of the RFP as follows: Covered services; Limitations and exclusions; Co-payments, deductibles and co-insurance features; Range of providers including specialists and number of hospitals Out of service area coverage Grievance procedures Three sections in the RFP requested information which was relevant to the plan benefits. Section VI listed the required minimum benefits and requested a complete list of all other services. Each provider was directed to specify co-insurance, deductible, co-payment and other features for all benefits and services for each service area, and to list all limitations and exclusions for all benefits and services for each service area. Section X was a questionnaire which required each propose to list information concerning hospital, ambulatory care facilities services, available physician specialties, programs for health status evaluation, screening and health promotion, limitations or restrictions relative to organ transplants, range of providers and number of hospitals, availability of skilled nursing benefits, a list of the proposer's physician panel, and out-of-service area coverage. Under the Department's Scoring system, each propose received the following scores: A. Heritage 398 B. Health Options Dade & Broward 308 Palm Beach 165 C. Humana Dade 210.5 Broward 161.5 Palm Beach 184.5 D. Gulfstream Palm Beach 203 Using a similar method to calculate a "mean" score as was needed in the premium cost criteria, the base points were as follows: A. Heritage (low bid), Combined: 7.19 B. Health Options (low), Dade and Broward: 5.57 Palm Beach: 2.28 Combined: 5.91 C. Humana, Dade: 3.38 Broward: 2.92 Palm Beach: 3.34 Combined: 4.59 D. Gulfstream, Palm Beach: 3.57 Limitation to Two Successful Bidders Humana and Gulfstream argued that they should not be excluded from being awarded a contract because there was no foundation which required the limitation of the contracts to two or to any number of HMOs. The Department had considered awarding contracts to more than two proposers but rejected doing so because such action best effectuated the general objectives of the RFP, including that of promoting competitive rates. The Hearing Officer agreed with the Department and correctly found that "there was no showing that the selected HMOs could not adequately satisfy the needs of the state employees." (R.O., page 35). He concluded: "While the statute did not specify a number, it did specify that the Department contract through the competitive bid process. If the contracts are not limited in number, there is no competitive bidding process. Accordingly, it is concluded the Department acted reasonably in limiting the award to two HMOs." (R.O., page 35) Employee Evaluation Teams Yet another contention of the Petitioners was that the DOA employee evaluation teams lacked the experience and knowledge in the health care services field and should have been disqualified as not meeting the requirements of Section 287.057(16), Fla. Stat., which states as follows "A selection team of at least three employees who have experience and knowledge in the program areas and service requirements for which contractual serviced are sought shall be appointed by the agency head to aid in the selection of contractors for contracts of more than the threshold amount provided in s. 287.017 for CATEGORY FOUR." After full consideration of the above provision, the Hearing Officer agreed with the Department and found that the employees met the minimum statutory criteria (R.O., page 35) and had sufficient experience and knowledge in the area to properly evaluate the proposals (R.O., pages 13, 14). Departure From RFP At the pre-submission conference, Mr. Nye announced that cost and benefits would be weighted equally. In its final evaluation, the Department weighted cost at 3.5 and benefits at 2.5. The remaining criteria, accessibility, extensiveness of service area, and completeness of proposal , were weighted at I each. The Hearing Officer found that the Department's final evaluation failed to conform to the weighting factors announced at the pre- submission conference. 45. He further stated that: 43. The Department's failure to accord equal weight to cost and benefits was arbitrary and capricious. Such failure was a material departure from the RFP, as supplemented by the pre-bid conference, and adversely impacted the bid procurement process. ... Plan benefits and accessibility under Section 110.123(3)(d), Florida Statutes, and the RFP were distinct criteria upon which proposers formulated their responses. They were also distinct criteria when the Department told proposers that cost and benefits would be weighted equally, were distinct criteria when evaluated by the Departmen, and had a distinct impact upon the ranking of proposers. Under the circumstances, the Department's failure to accord them equal weight was arbitrary and capricious. Rather than acknowledge the disparity that existed between cost and benefits, the Department contended at hearing that accessibility was a part of benefits, and therefore cost and benefits were weighted equally. The Department's contention, and proof, was not persuasive and is rejected as not credible. (R.O., pages 24, 25) The Department finds that the above findings of fact are supported by competent, substantial evidence and adopts them in this final order. INTERVENORS' EXCEPTIONS TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Exceptions of Heritage Heritage filed six exceptions to the Recommended Order and each exception will be considered separately. Exception Number 1: Heritage argued that the Hearing Officer erred when he found that the Department's failure to accord equal weight to cost and benefits was arbitrary and capricious. While the Department agrees with the cases cited by Heritage which hold that administrative agencies have broad discretion in evaluating contracts for personal services such as health services, the Department is aware of its statutory responsibility to adhere to the bidding requirements of Section 287.057, Fla. Stat., and does not believe that it has the discretion to enter into contracts absent the competitive process. As to the testimony of Mr. Burbank, the Hearing Officer, as the trier of fact, was in the best position to assess his credibility and determine the weight to be accorded to his testimony. Koltay vs. Department of General Services, 374 So.2d 1386 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1979). The Department is unable to reject the Hearing Officer's findings in an area clearly within his responsibility. Exception Number 1 is rejected. Exception Number 2: Heritage next argues that the Hearing Officer erred in applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to the Department's actions relating to the weights given to various factors. The evidence shows that at the presubmission conference, Mr. Nye informed all proposers that the weights to be assigned to premium costs and to plan benefits would be equal. That information was clearly erroneous because, in the actual evaluations, the evaluators used a different weighting system, one that gave premium costs 40 percent greater weight than plan benefits. It is not the weights given to each category that makes the Department's actions arbitrary and capricious but its failure to adhere to and apply its announced weighting factors. On this basis, Exception Number 2 is rejected. Exception Number 3: Heritage urges that the Hearing Officer erred in concluding that the Department's failure to comply with the provisions of Section 287.012(11), Fla. Stat., was fundamental error. The above statute by its terms provides that "(r)equests for proposals shall state the relative importance of price and any other evaluation criteria." (emphasis added). According to the common usage of the term "shall", this language is mandatory (Fla. Tallow Corporation vs. Bryan, 237 So.2d 308 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); S.R. vs. State, 345 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 1977) and requires that the weight of the criteria must be included in the RFP. Therefore, Exception Number 3 is rejected. Exception Number 4: Heritage argues that the Hearing Officer erred in granting standing to Gulfstream. In Preston Carroll vs. Fla. Keys Aqueduct Authority, 400 So.2d 524 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981), an unsuccessful bidder who was third low bidder, attempted to overturn the award of the contract to the low bidder. The district court held that while a second low bidder to the award of a contract had the necessary "substantial interest" to contest the award. However, a third low bidder was unable to demonstrate that it was "substantially affected" and therefore lacked standing to protest the award of the contract to another bidder. Under the holding in this case, the Department concludes that Gulfstream did not have standing in this case since it ranked 13th in the ranking of low bidders. According, Exception Number 4 is accepted and included in the Conclusions of Law of this Order. Exception Number 5: Heritage argues that the Hearing Officer erred in concluding that Humana had standing to protest the Department's failure to state the relative importance of price and any other evaluation criteria in the RFP because Humana did not raise this point as an issue in its formal protest. If Humana did not have standing, then it was improperly permitted to protest the award of one of the contracts to Heritage. A review of Humana's protest shows that in Item 9, it argued that: "That the rejection of Humana's response to RFP #88-05, HMO coverage for State employees in Clay, Dade, Broward and Palm Beach Counties was not in accordance with all applicable rules, regulations, procedures, precedents and bid criteria." The rules of the Division of Administrative Hearings (Rule 22I-6.004(3), F.A.C.) provide for the minimum filing requirements in initial pleadings and state as follows: "(3) All petitions should contain: The name and address of each agency affected and each agency's file or identification number, if known; The name and address of the petitioner or petitioners, and an explanation of how his/her substantial interests will be affected by the agency determinations; A statement of when and how petitioner received notice of the agency decision or intent to render a decision; A statement of all disputed issues of material fact. If there are none, the petition must so indicate; A concise statement of the ultimate facts alleged, as well as the rules and statutes which entitle the petitioner to relief; A demand for relief to which the petitioner deems himself entitled; and Other information which the petitioner contends is material." (emphasis added) The requirements of this rule are directory only and not mandatory and are not designed to deny petitioners a hearing in which their "substantial interests" are affected. Section 120.57, Fla. Stat., see Seminole County Board of County Commissioners vs. Long, 422 So.2d 938, 940 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). The initial protest of Humana complied with the minimum filing requirements of Rule 22I-6.004(3), F.A.C., above, and was sufficient to place Heritage on notice of deficiencies alleged to be in the RFP. Exception Number 5 is rejected. Exception Number 6: Heritage argues that "(t)he Hearing Officer erred in concluding that the Department should invoke its right to reject all proposals." Contrary to Heritage's argument, the Department did not communicate how the criteria would be weighed in accordance with Section 287.012(11), Fla. Stat. It is not possible to cure the deficiency in the RFP by recalculating the proposals. The deficiency can be corrected by re-bidding for proposals for HMO medical services. On this basis, Exception Number 6 is rejected. HEALTH OPTIONS' EXCEPTION TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Health Options as one of the successful bidders filed an exception to the Hearing Officer's finding which stated that DOA had failed to state the relative importance of price and other criteria in the RFP. It argued that this issue was not presented by Humana or Gulfstream in the formal protests and thus could not be considered in the Recommended Order. Therefore, Health Options urged that the Department's award of the two HMO contracts was proper and should be upheld. As previously stated, Humana's protest argued that the rejection of its bid "was not in accordance with all applicable rules, regulations, procedures, precedents, and bid criteria." (Item 9 of Protest). Humana's protest complied with the minimum filing requirements of the Department of Administrative Hearings (Rule 22I-6.004(3), F.A.C.) which provide that petitions should contain: A statement of all disputed issues of material fact. If there are none, the petition must so indicate; A concise statement of the ultimate facts alleged, as well as the rules and statutes which entitle the petitioner to relief; A demand for relief to which the petitioner deems himself entitled; While Gulfstream's formal protest did not state that its protest was founded on the Department's failure to state the relative importance of price and other evaluation criteria in the RFP, all that was necessary for the Hearing Officer to rule on this issue was for one of the petitioner's to raise the issue in its initial protest. Since the issue was raised by Humana, the Exception of Health Options is rejected. DEPARTMENT'S EXCEPTIONS TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The Department also filed timely exceptions to the Recommended Order. After reviewing those exceptions, I find that to the extent they are not adopted and accepted herein, they are inappropriate findings of fact and have not been considered further in this Order.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order rejecting all proposals submitted for the South Florida service area. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 22nd day of March, 1988. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1988.
