The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether respondent committed the offense alleged in the administrative complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Adele "Nikki" Leon, holds Florida teaching certificate number 413436, covering the area of emotional disturbances and special learning disabilities. Such certificate is valid through June 30, 1996. At all times material hereto, respondent was employed by the Dade County Public Schools, Palmetto Adult Education Center, as a part-time teacher, and was assigned to teach Adult Basic Education for the Elderly (ABE) at Snapper Creek Nursing Home. Pertinent to this case, respondent's assignment during September and October 1992, included the teaching of an ABE class at Snapper Creek Nursing Home each Tuesday from 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. According to respondent's attendance reports for that period, twenty-five residents were enrolled in the class. On September 15, 1992, Ivette Morgan, assistant principal of Palmetto Adult Education Center, at the request of Edward Gehret, principal of Palmetto Adult Education Center, visited Snapper Creek Nursing Home to evaluate the adult education program. During the course of that visit, as well as visits on September 22, September 29, and October 20, 1992, Dr. Morgan had an opportunity to observe respondent's Tuesday class. On those occasions, Dr. Morgan noted only four to six residents in the classroom. 4/ Dr. Morgan reported her observations regarding class attendance to Dr. Gehret who, at the time, had been involved with enrollment and attendance review for, inter alia, Snapper Creek Nursing Home. Based on that review, Dr. Gehret observed that respondent had routinely marked all twenty-five residents in her class as "present," which did not square with Dr. Morgan's observations. On October 22, 1992, Dr. Gehret met with respondent to review the discrepancies he perceived in her attendance report procedures. At that time, it was the School Board's policy to mark residents "present" for an ABE class if they appeared at any time during the class period, no matter how briefly; but if they never appeared, to mark them as "absent." 5/ Respondent advised Dr. Gehret that she was of a different perception, and understood that nursing home residents enrolled in an ABE class were not to be marked as "absent" but, rather as "present," whether attending or not, so long as they were still in the facility. Notwithstanding, following the meeting, respondent agreed to conform her attendance procedure to the policy Dr. Gehret outlined. Regarding the discrepancies in respondent's attendance reports, when measured against the School Board's policy, the proof demonstrates that for the attendance reporting periods of September 14-27, September 28-October 11, and October 12-25, 1992, respondent completed and signed the attendance report for her Tuesday class on which she marked as "present" nursing home residents Helen Ambler and Gertrude Monge. Ms. Ambler and Ms. Monge were not, however "present" during such periods since they had died September 2, 1992, and June 15, 1992, respectively. The proof further demonstrated that for the same reporting periods, respondent had marked as "present" nursing home residents Agaton Bolanio, Nazario Lopez, and Martin Ruiz. Mr. Bolanio, Mr. Lopez and Mr. Ruiz were not, however, "present" during such periods since they had been discharged from the nursing home on June 19, 1992, July 20, 1992, and May 14, 1992, respectively. Finally, based on Dr. Morgan's observations of respondent's Tuesday class on September 15, September 22, September 29, and October 20, 1992, wherein she observed no more than four to six residents in attendance, it is reasonable to conclude that a significant number of residents who were marked as "present," other than the residents heretofore mentioned, were likewise not "present" on those dates. Which residents and why they were not present was not, however, established of record. 6/ Regarding the ABE program and the preparation of enrollment and attendance reports at Snapper Creek Nursing Home, the proof demonstrates that the ABE program was under the direction of the nursing home activities director who, without the participation of the instructors, prepared the enrollment for each class. 7/ Accordingly, respondent would not necessarily have known the residents assigned to her class, and reasonably assumed that the list of residents she received from the activities director contained current residents of the nursing home. Likewise, respondent relied on the activities director to advise her when residents died, were discharged or were otherwise no longer able or interested in attending before removing them from the roll; however, such information was rarely provided by the activities director. Finally, absent advice to the contrary from the activities director, respondent did not consider a resident's failure to attend on a given day an absence, as in the traditional classroom setting, and routinely marked them "present." Such practice in the ABE program was reflective of the voluntary nature of the program, as opposed to compulsory attendence in the traditional school setting, and the unavailability of information, except from the activities director, as to the reason a resident did not attend. Notably, residents frequently did not attend because, inter alia, nurses aides failed to bring them to class or they were too ill to attend, as opposed to not wanting to attend the course any longer. That such was the procedure at Snapper Creek Nursing Home, and perhaps other adult education centers in Dade County, finds other support in the record apart from respondent's testimony. For example, another instructor, Evelyn Foster, during the times in question, carried Francies Lambrou as "present" on her attendance record until July 27, 1992, although she was discharged July 2, 1992; and carried Maria Diaz, Carmen Morela, and Lorenzo Legundo as "present" until at least October 9, 1992, although Ms. Diaz and Ms. Morela were discharged September 5, 1992, and Mr. Segundo was discharged September 24, 1992. Moreover, Dr. Morgan found it necessary, at sometime between September 15 and October 26, 1992, to give the activities director specific instructions on how attendance was to be recorded, and Dr. Gehret found it necessary to conduct a "rollbook workshop" at Snapper Creek Nursing Home for all instructors, as well as agreeing to urge the nurses aides to bring the residents who desired to attend to class. [Petitioner's exhibit 1, pages 17 and 21, and respondent's exhibit 12.] Finally, there is of record a memorandum of July 8, 1993, almost one year after the events at issue in this case, from Connie Gilbert, District Director, Division of Adult Education, Dade County Schools, to all adult education center principals, which suggests continued confusion in attendance procedures for off- campus classes and that the practice at Snapper Creek Nursing Home was not an isolated occurance. That memorandum provided, in part, as follows: SUBJECT: ATTENDANCE PROCEDURES Off-campus visitations have revealed problems and confusion about attendance procedures. Please inform all teachers of the following procedures: Students must be present in a teacher's class and participate in the class activities in order for the teacher to mark this student present in that class. * * * Please make sure that off-campus teachers understand that students present "someplace in the facility" can not be considered present in a particular class. Students must be physically present in a class in order to be marked present in that class. Given the proof, it must be concluded that respondent's failure to record attendance in accordance with school board policy was, more likely than not, a consequence of a misunderstanding of, or ignorance of, that policy. In this regard, it is observed that no state policy for recording ABE attendance was established of record, and no proof that any policy established by the school board had been reduced to writing or imparted to respondent, or any other adult education instructor, prior to the events giving rise to the issues in this case. Accordingly, it follows that there was no compelling proof that respondent, by completing the attendance reports in the manner she did, had any intent to deceive the school board.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered dismissing the administrative compliant. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of May 1995. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May 1995.
The Issue The parties have stipulated that Petitioner is a "prevailing small business party" as defined in Section 57.111, F.S., and that the attorney fees requested are reasonable, up to the $15,000.00 statutory limit. The issue remaining for resolution is whether the expungement proceeding had a "reasonable basis in law and fact at the time it was initiated by [the] state agency", as provided in Section 57.111, F.S.
Findings Of Fact The following findings are adduced from the record, consisting of the transcript and exhibits in cases number 89-4151C/89-6087C, from the stipulations of the parties, and from the final order of the agency adopting the recommended order of Hearing Officer, K.N. Ayers, dated March 20, 1990. Petitioners are sole proprietors of Forest Haven, an unincorporated adult congregate living facility (ACLF) licensed by the State of Florida pursuant to Chapter 400, Part II, F.S., and located at 8207 Forest City Road, Orlando, Florida. Petitioners and Forest Haven have their principal office in Orlando, Florida and are domiciled in Orlando, Florida. They have less than 25 full-time employees and a net worth of less than $2 million. On March 17, 1989, a Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) survey team visited Forest Haven to conduct an annual survey of the facility. The survey team was comprised of 10 persons, enlarged due to a training exercise. Several of the team members were registered nurses; several members were Office of Licensure and Certification supervisors. During the course of the visit and observations of the residents, members of the team determined that eight residents required a higher level of care than could be provided at the ACLF. As found in the recommended order adopted by the agency, the basis for this determination was, As to T.M., age 81, the need for a restraining vest, and the existence of bruises and gashes on the face and head; As to H.L., age 89, the presence of a foley catheter, total disorientation, low weight and poor skin turgor (brittle skin); As to F.W., age 72, the presence of a foley catheter, observation of fresh blood in the catheter bag, and low body weight; As to M.B., age 81, incontinence and nonambulatory status; As to R.T., age 84, a foley catheter and contraction of both legs; As to L.O., age 94, edema of lower extremities, contracture of both knees, low body weight, skin tear on left buttocks, and possible bed sore on right buttocks; As to P.B., age 88, incontinence, low body weight, and inability to transfer from wheelchair to bed without assistance; and As to F.H., age 89, one-half inch bed sore on coccyx, pitting edema of legs, incontinence and somewhat confused state. An adult protective services investigator was summoned, as well as law enforcement personnel, and the above residents were removed from the facility on an emergency basis and were placed in a nursing home. They were evaluated at the nursing home the following day by Carolyn Lyons, a Registered Nurse Specialist with HRS, who found that intermediate or skilled nursing home services were required. A ninth resident, C.K., was evaluated by a medical review team nurse and an adult protective services worker at the ACLF on March 20, 1989, and was removed from the facility and placed in a nursing home the same day. C.K., age 89, was found to be confused, incontinent, with bruises, a swollen foot, non- ambulatory, and with a red rash on the trunk of her body. HRS obtained orders from the Circuit Court to provide protective services for seven of the above-mentioned residents. Of the remaining two, one was competent to consent to the nursing home placement and another was returned to his own home by relatives. On March 22, 1989, HRS Protective Services worker, Annette Hair, classified the report in her investigation as "confirmed" medical neglect by S.G. and J.G. of the eight residents who had been removed from the ACLF. She relied on her own observations of the individuals, on the medical assessments performed by the survey team nurses at the ACLF, and the subsequent assessment of Carolyn Lyons, the HRS staff person responsible for making an evaluation of the level of care required for medicaid nursing home placement. The narrative "investigative conclusion" of Ms. Hair's report provides, in pertinent part: * * * Based on the facts obtained during the course of this investigation this case is being classified as CONFIRMED. In accordance with F.S. Section 415.102(4) it is clearly estab- lished that [S. and J.G.] were the caregivers of the eight alleged victims of this report as they had been entrusted with the care of said individuals. The allegation of neglect is verified for each of the eight alleged victims in that [S. and J.G.] failed to provide the care and service necessary to maintain the physical and mental health of an aged person that a prudent person would deem essential for the well-being of an aged person (F.S. Section 415.102(13)). Specifically each of the eight alleged victims has a medical condition which required twenty-four hour skilled nursing care and supervision which the caregivers, [S. and J.G.] failed to provide for said individuals. Five of the eight alleged victims, [H.L., L.O., T.M., F.H. and P.B.] had Scabies (a highly contagious disease caused by parasitic mites that burrow under the skin. This disease is associated with unsanitary conditions and causes a painful itch). [S. and J.G.] failed to provide the supervision necessary to detect this disease and in so doing jeopardized the health and well-being of the other residents in the facility. [H.L.] in addition to having Scabies, was semi-comatose, had bed sores on her buttocks and pelvic area and had a foley catheter. [T.M.] had open lacerations on her face, was extremely mentally confused and was known to wander and fall which required her to be physically restrained. [L.O.] had two open skin areas and Edema. [M.B.] has an excoriated area on her buttocks, Edema of the feet, and her right knee was swollen. [R.T.] had a cough of unknown origin, contraction of both legs, and an in-dwelling catheter. [F.W.] had an in-dwelling catheter which was draining bloody urine and appeared malnourished. [P.B.] appeared malnourished and was incontinent of both bowels and bladder, was extremely confused, and had an open draining wound. [F.H.] had bed sores, and Pitting Edema in addition to Scabies. [S. and J.G.], in addition to being negligent for failing to provide the care and services necessary to maintain the physical and mental health of the alleged victims, were in direct violation of F.S. Section 400.426(1) as they did not perform their responsibility of determining the appropriateness of residence of said individuals in their facility. (Petitioner's exhibit 2, in cases number 89-4151C/89-6087C) On April 4, 1989, HRS Protective Services worker, Kathleen C. Schirhman, classified the report in her investigation as "confirmed" medical neglect by S.G. and J.G. She relied on her own assessment of the resident, and on the medical assessments by Nurse Lyons, and by medical staff at the receiving nursing home, including a physician, Dr. Parsons. The narrative "investigative conclusion" of Ms. Schirhman's report provides: Based upon the facts obtained during the course of this investigation, both alle- gations of medical neglect and other neglect were determined to be verified, and the case is being classified as CONFIRMED. [J.G. and S.G.] assumed the responsibility of care for [C.K.] and, therefore, became her caregivers. They did not provide the care and services necessary to maintain the physical and mental health of [C.K.] that a prudent person would deem essential for her well-being. She required medical services and nursing supervision in a skilled nursing facility. Pursuant to F.S. 400.426 "the owner or Admini- strator of a facility is responsible for determining the appropriateness of admission of an individual to the facility and for deter- mining the continued appropriateness of resi- dence of an individual in the facility." The assessment by the CARES nurse determined that [C.K.] was being medically neglected, because she required 24 hour nursing care, which she was not receiving. She had Scabies, for which she was not being treated. The CARES nurse believed that the alleged victim was at risk and requiring immediate nursing home placement. Allegation of "other neglect" was added to the original report. [C.K.] was being neglected, because she was a total transfer patient, who required restraints, which were not used and cannot be used in an ACLF. Furthermore, the potential for harm to her was great: She was blind, confused, and unable to self-preserve. (Petitioner's exhibit number 1 in cases number 89-4151C/89-6087C) S.G. and J.G. requested expungement of the reports but the request was denied on July 10, 1989. Thereafter, through counsel, they made a timely request for a formal evidentiary hearing. The hearing was conducted on February 14 and 15, 1990, by DOAH Hearing Officer, K.N. Ayers. Depositions of David J. Parsons, M.D. and Gideon Lewis, M.D. were filed after the hearing, by leave of the Hearing Officer. In his recommended order issued on March 20, 1990, Hearing Officer Ayers found that the HRS investigators did not contact the physicians who had signed the admissions forms when each of the residents at issue had been admitted to the ACLF. Nor did the HRS staff obtain records from the home health agency which, at the treating physicians' direction, was providing, or had provided, home health care to most of the residents at Forest Haven. Skin lesions (decubitus) and scabies were found to be frequently present in nursing home and ACLF residents. Edema and underweight conditions are also common in these residents. Dr. Lewis, the treating physician for most of the residents at Forest Haven, had ordered the vest restraint for T.M.'s protection. He had also written to HRS about a year prior to the survey, recommending that efforts be made to relocate H.L. to a skilled nursing facility. The recommended order found that no evidence of exploitation or neglect, other than medical neglect, was presented at the hearing. The order also found that evidence of medical neglect by S.G. and J.G. was not presented, but rather, "[t]o the contrary, the evidence was unrebutted that Respondents [Petitioners in this proceeding] promptly reported to the resident's physician all changes in the resident's physical condition." The agency's final order was filed on May 29, 1990, adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law recommended by Hearing Officer Ayers, and granting J.G. and S.G.'s requests for expungement. The Final Order addressed the department's exceptions to the recommended order, as follows: RULING ON EXCEPTIONS FILED BY THE DEPARTMENT The dispositive issue is whether retention of a resident (or residents) in an ACLF whose medical condition is more serious than the established criteria for residence in an ACLF (see Section 10A-5.0181, Florida Administra- tive Code for the criteria) constitutes per se neglect under Chapter 415. Inappropriate retention of a resident may constitute grounds for disciplinary sanctions under the licensure rules, but it does not automatically consti- tute abuse under Chapter 415. See State vs. E. N. G., Case Number 89-3306C (HRS 2/13/90). The evidence of medical neglect was based on the inappropriate retention of certain resi- dents. The Hearing Officer's finding that these residents were not medically neglected is based on competent, substantial evidence; therefore, the department is obligated to accept this finding. Johnson vs. Department of Professional Regulation, 456 So2d 939 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), B. B. vs. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 542 So2d 1362 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1989). In pursuing expungement, Petitioners incurred fees, costs and interest in the total amount of $22,772.49. The amount of interest included in that total is $1,000.91. As stipulated, the fees, up to the $15,000.00 statutory maximum, are reasonable.
Findings Of Fact At the outset, it should be noted that the record in this proceeding is much less remarkable for its content than for what it fails to contain. The dispute between Petitioner and Respondent appears to revolve around Petitioner's objections to Respondent's disallowance of certain claimed items of operational costs and expense in the operation of Petitioner's nursing home. Respondent's disallowance was apparently based upon an audit of Petitioner's books, none of which were introduced into evidence, conducted by a private accounting firm, no representative of which was called to testify at the final hearing, which accounting firm submitted to Respondent a report, which was neither offered nor received into evidence. The only "pleading" on file in this cause is a letter dated March 20, 1978, from the office of Petitioner's certified public accountant, which letter is not signed by any individual, but simply bears the imprimatur of that firm. This letter details certain "specific areas of disagreement" and requests a formal administrative hearing thereon. Nowhere in this letter are the specific reasons for disagreement detailed. Respondent chose not to file any pleadings in response to the aforementioned letter. Because of the lack of detail in the "pleadings", the Hearing Officer, by Order dated April 25, 1979, required counsel for Petitioner and Respondent to meet together no later than fifteen days prior to the date of final hearing in this cause, which at that time had been set for July 10, 1979, to prepare a prehearing stipulation. The Order required the prehearing stipulation to be filed no later than ten (10) days prior to the date set for final hearing, and further required that the prehearing stipulation contain: a concise statement of the nature of the controversy; a brief, general statement of each party's position; a list of all exhibits, which shall be prenumbered, to be offered at the hearing, noting any objections thereto, and the grounds for each objection; a list of the names and addresses of all witnesses intended to be called at the hearing by each party. Expert witnesses shall be so designated. a concise statement of those facts which are admitted and will require no proof at hearing, together with any reservations directed to such admission; a concise statement of those issues of law on which there is agreement; a concise statement of those issues of fact which remain to be litigated; a concise statement of those issues of law which remain for determination by the Hearing Officer; a concise statement of any disagreement as to the application of the rules of evidence; a list of all motions or other matters which require action by the Hearing Officer; the signature of counsel for all parties. At the time of convening the final hearing in this proceeding on July 10, 1979, counsel for Petitioner and Respondent had failed to confer and prepare the prehearing stipulation required by the Hearing Officer's Order of April 25, 1979. As a result, the Hearing Officer agreed to proceed with the taking of testimony, subject to counsel for Petitioner and Respondent complying with the requirements of the prehearing order within seven (7) days from conclusion of the final hearing. On July 19, 1979, counsel for Petitioner and Respondent filed a Joint Stipulation, in two parts, which contained, in part, the following pertinent information: The nature of the controversy concerns itself with the claim of the [Petitioner] for the year ending March 31, 1976, as more fully set forth in the "adjustments to Statement of Cost of Operations" audit by Elmer Fox, Westheimer & Co., dated June 17, 1977, with particular reference to the following items: (1) Excess depreciation claimed on building through providers' use of original cost before adjustment for reduced basis from forgiveness of indebtedness ($ 6,912) (2) Excess depreciation erroneously calculated ($ 6,619) (3) The return on equity erroneously calculated ($30,873) (4) Owner/Administrator compensation ($ 5,287) In the prehearing stipulation, counsel for Petitioner and Respondent also agreed that a total of $13,513, covering insurance expense, housekeeping services and expenses for unallocatable income should be allowable to Petitioner for operational expenses. In addition, the following facts were stipulated to by counsel for Petitioner and Respondent: 3. (a) Petitioner, Sweeting Nursing Home is a facility located in Broward County, Florida, accepting Medicaid Nursing Home patients. Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, is a department of the State of Florida charged by law with administrating [sic] the Medicaid program which includes auditing all nursing homes accepting Medicaid patients. At the request of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Elmer fox, Westheimer, & Co., an accounting firm in Broward County, did a fiscal year end audit of Sweeting Nursing Home for the period of March 31, 1975 to March 31, 1976. The audit report dated June 17, 1977, was forwarded to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services with certain recommended disallowances which included the following items: Depreciation $13,531.00 Return on Equity 30,873.00 Owner's compensation disallowance 5,287.00 After reviewing the Fox, Westheimer audit, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services' Audit, Evaluation and Review Unit initially notified the Sweeting Nursing Home that it had been overpaid the sum of $97,324.00, which sum was later reduced by stipulations between the parties. The nursing home requested certain adjustments and a reduction of the amount of overpayment. However, the Department disallowed the adjustments requested by letter addressed to Irving Lambert [sic] dated March 13, 1978, and Sweeting Nursing Home requested an Administrative Hearing. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services approved the FYE Audit Report, with disallowances, and takes the position that Sweeting Nursing Home is not entitled to the adjustments claimed by the nursing home in the areas enumerated in Paragraph (a). No exhibits to be offered. * * * Both parties admit that the audit was made by Elmer Fox, Westheimer, and Co. Both parties agree that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services had a legal right to audit Sweeting Nursing Home for Medicaid purposes. Further, that Fox, Westheimer, & Co., performed the audit in a manner perscribed [sic] by law. There are two issues of fact which remain to be litigated: Depreciation - "Did the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services' validly disallow the Nursing Home's class depreciation on certain equipment, i.e., was the method used by Sweeting in depreciating certain equipment acceptable and consistent with the Medicaid HIM Manual?" "Was the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services correct in disallowing the owner's compensation claimed by Sweeting Nursing Home?" The principal issue of law involved herein is the determination of "What is historical cost?" Historical cost touches on both item (1) of Paragraph (a), Depreciation and item (2) of Paragraph (a), Return on Equity. "May a Nursing Home, for Medicaid purposes, use an amount as historical costs of a facility, when such amount, subsequent to the original purchase, was reduced substantially by a forgiveness of an indebtedness agreement?" The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services takes the position that the historical cost was $817,654.00 minus the $276,577.00 forgiveness of the indebtedness or actual historical cost of $541,077.00 Despite the above-mentioned provisions of the prehearing stipulation that no exhibits were to be offered, counsel for Petitioner in another section of the prehearing stipulation, which, as previously noted, was filed seven (7) days after the conclusion of the final hearing, indicated that: Petitioner relies upon as its principal exhibit the Medicare Provider Manual, HIM-15, together with all reports submitted to the Florida Department of Helath [sic] and Rehabilitative Services heretofore and objects to the introduction of the Elmer Fox audit dated June 17, 1977, since no testimony was presented with respect to said audit. Petitioner's objection in the prehearing stipulation to the introduction of the audit report was, in fact, moot, since the report was not offered into evidence at the final hearing by counsel for Respondent. In addition, neither counsel for Petitioner nor counsel for Respondent requested that the Hearing Officer take official notice of, nor did they attempt to introduce into evidence, either the Medicare Provider Manual, HIM-15; any rules or regulations of the State of Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services; any applicable depreciation guidelines adopted by the American Hospital Association; or any depreciation guidelines promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service. In fact, no documents of any kind were offered for inclusion in the record in this proceeding by either Petitioner or Respondent. As indicated in the prehearing stipulation, there are four areas of disagreement between Petitioner and Respondent: the amount claimed as depreciation on Petitioner's building; the amount of depreciation claimed on certain items of equipment; the amount claimed as return on equity; and owner/administrator compensation. Although the record reflects that Petitioner used an original cost figure of $817,654.00 in calculating depreciation on its building, and that Respondent's auditors apparently used $541,077.00, there are no facts of record to substantiate the use of either amount. These same figures were apparently also used in calculating Petitioner's "return on equity", again with no factual justification for their use. Likewise, there is no competent evidence to demonstrate the manner in which Petitioner calculated depreciation on its equipment, or even the specific items of equipment on which such depreciation is claimed. Finally, although the record demonstrates that Petitioner's owner/administrator was paid $10,000 as salary for the fiscal year in question, and that he spent 25 percent to 30 percent of his time involved in the administrative functioning of the facility, there are no facts in this record on which to base a determination of the reasonableness of that salary or the owner's entitlement thereto. There is, in short, neither any competent evidence in this record concerning the methodology employed by Petitioner in computing the allowances to which it deems itself entitled, nor any reliable explanation of Respondent's rationale for disallowing those claims. To further complicate matters, the failure of both Petitioner and Respondent to introduce into evidence, or to request official notice of applicable governmental rules, regulations and guidelines against which to measure their respective claims, renders any meaningful resolution of their dispute impossible on this record.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Health Quest Corporation should be granted a certificate of need for a 120-bed nursing home in Palatka, Florida. Whether, after comparative review, Petitioner, Health Quest Corporation should be granted a Certificate of Need for a 120-bed nursing home in Palatka, Florida rather than Respondent, Florida Convalescent Centers, Inc., being granted Certificates of Need for a 60-bed nursing home in Lake City, Florida and a 60-bed addition to its existing facility in Ocala, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found:
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order granting certificate of need number 4944 to Florida Convalescent Centers for construction of a 60-bed nursing home in Columbia County, Florida and a certificate of need number 4948 to Florida Convalescent Centers for the addition of 60 beds to its existing facility in Marion County, Florida, and denying Health Quest Corporation's certificate of need number 4949 for construction of a 120-bed nursing home in either Marion County or Putnam County, Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 87-3503 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the * in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Health Quest Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-4(1); 5(38,44); 7-9(70); 10(71); 11(68,70); 14-15(102); 18-19(10); 20(11); 21(11,12); 74-75(90); 77(112); 78(72); 80(74); 82(72); 87(72-73)and; 94(47). Proposed findings of fact 6, 12, 13, 23 and 25 are unnecessary. Proposed findings of fact 26 and 95 are rejected as being argument and as relating to legal conclusions. 4. Proposed findings of fact 16, 17, 29-36, 38-42, 76, 79, 81 and 88-93 are rejected as not being relevant or material. Proposed finding of fact 22 is rejected for the reasons set forth in findings of fact 13 - 20 and as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Proposed finding of fact 24 is rejected for the reasons set forth in findings of fact 23 - 34 and as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. The first sentence of proposed finding of fact 27 is rejected for the reasons set forth in finding of fact 102. The balance of proposed finding of fact 27 and proposed finding of fact 28 are adopted in substance in finding of fact 102. Proposed findings of fact 37, 43-73 and 83-86 are rejected as being a restatement of testimony or argument going to the credibility of witnesses rather than a finding of fact that is material or relevant to the issue. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, FCC 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1); 2(6); 3(8); 4(7); 5(4); 7-13(35-40); 14(45); 18-21(41-44); 24(45); 27-28(21-22); 29- 39(10-20); 41(50); 42-44(4); 45-47(46-48); 49-50(48-49); 51(2); 52-53(49-51); 55-57(54-59); 60-61(67); 62(50,52,53); 63(65-66); 64-69(61,62,66); 70-74(63-66); 77(83); 78-80 (71,77,78); 82-88(73-76,68,79); 90(80); 92-93(81-82); 95(85); 101(91); 104-107(90,95,96); 109(94); 110- 112(90,100); 113-114(74); 116-120(74,88,86,85,77); 124- 126(112); 133-139(91,92,93,98,99,94,100); 145(30); 157- 159(77,40,80); 162-165(105); 166(108) and 169- 175(106,107,110,110,111,110,110). 2. Proposed findings of fact 6, 15, 16, 22, 23, 25, 40, 54, 58, 59, 75, 76, 89, 91, 94, 96-100 102, 108, 115, 121, 122, 140, 152, 153, 155, 156, 160, 161, 167 and 168 are unnecessary. 3. Proposed findings of fact 17, 26, 48, 81, 103, 123, 129-132, 141-144, 148 and 151 are rejected as not being material or relevant. 4. Proposed findings of facts 127, 128, 146, 147, 149, 150 and 154 are rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, HRS 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-7(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13, 17); 8(17,18); 9(17, 18, 19); 10-21(23-34); 22(36, 37); 23(46); 24(48,50,52):25-26(48, 50); 27(51, 52) and 28(53). COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Huss, Esquire 1017-C Thomasville Road Tallahassee, FL 32303 E. Lee Elzie, Jr., Esquire 804 First Florida Bank Building Post Office Box 82 Tallahassee, FL 32303 Robert P. Daniti, Esquire Post Office Box 14348 Tallahassee, FL 32317 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Sam Power, Clerk Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Venice Hospital, a general acute care hospital offering 342 medical/surgical beds and 30 bed's for general psychiatric care, services a population of approximately 110,000 people in Southern Sarasota and Northern Charlotte Counties. Approximately 80% of its patients are covered by Medicare. This figure being higher than average, puts it somewhere in the top 5% of Medicare providers in Florida. The hospital's services are concentrated on geriatric patients and it is developing several programs devoted to that type of patient. It has recently received approval for nursing home development and operates a home health agency. Missing from the geriatric spectrum of services is the hospital based skilled nursing facility, (SNF), which is the subject of this action. Sarasota County currently has four med/surg hospitals, including Petitioner which is the only hospital in the Venice area. Petitioner has a licensed psychiatric unit which operates under separate rules and which is licensed separately but within the hospital cycle. The patients which are treated in that unit are of a different demographic make up than those treated in the med/surg beds and the staff which treats them is different. Petitioner completed a study of the potential need for SNF beds in the hospital which led to the conclusion being drawn by it that this service should be established. Mr. Bebee's review of the applicable rules and statutes indicated to him that the hospital could elect to designate a special care unit within the hospital without even having to go through Certificate of Need, (CON), review. A letter was submitted by the hospital to the Department on February 8, 1990, asking for an exemption from CON review for that project. Because no response to that letter was forthcoming, and because the hospital review cycle was fast coming up, on February 22, 1990, Mr. Bebee submitted a LOI to the Department seeking to convert 42 med/surg beds to a hospital based SNF facility at a cost of $310,000.00. After the LOI was sent, on February 26, 1990, Ms. Gordon-Girvin, on behalf of the Department, responded by letter to Bebee's inquiry letter, indicating the CON review process was a necessary part of the process for Petitioner's facility, but that the LOI and application should be filed in the next nursing home batching cycle by April 30, 1990. Shortly thereafter, by letter dated March 13, 1990, Ms. Gordon-Girvin rejected the LOI which Petitioner had submitted in the hospital cycle since, according to the Department, it was properly "reviewable under the nursing home review cycle rather than the hospital review cycle." Notwithstanding that rejection, and understanding the Department's position as to which cycle was appropriate, on March 26, 1990, Petitioner submitted its CON application for this project, modified to seek only 36 beds. By undated letter, the envelope for which was postmarked April 16, 1990, Ms. Gordon-Girvin declined to accept that application for the same reason she had rejected the LOI. Petitioner has since filed a CON application for the same project in the current nursing home cycle, on a nursing home application form. It did this to keep its options open but considers that action as being without prejudice to the application at issue. Though numerical bed need is not in issue in this proceeding, a brief discussion of general need is pertinent to an understanding of why Petitioner has applied for approval of this project. Petitioner is of the opinion that SNF beds within the hospital setting will provide better care for the patients than could be provided in a nursing home. Many of the patients in issue are receiving intravenous applications of medicines; taking antibiotics; require orthopedic therapy; or are in respiratory distress calling for ventilator or other pulmonary procedures. These patients need a continuing level of nursing care on a 24 hour basis but no longer qualify for a hospital continued length of stay. Petitioner currently has and is taking care of such patients in the facility, but would like to do so in a more organized, systematic manner which could be accomplished in a hospital based SNF. In addition, reimbursement rules dictate that patients no longer needing full hospital care but who remain in the hospital, become, in part, a cost to the hospital because no meaningful reimbursement is received for thatlevel of care. They would qualify for Medicare reimbursement, however, if the unit were designated and certified as a SNF. Medicaid does not recognize these beds as reimbursable because they are in a hospital. Certification for the hospital based SNF would be through the Health Care Financing Administration, (HCFA), and the Medicare program. To secure this certification, the hospital based unit would have to be a distinct part of the facility and not merely consist of beds scattered throughout the facility. Once certified, the unit is not referred to as a nursing home by HCFA or Medicare, but is classified as a hospital based unit. Because Petitioner sees this as a hospital project - a service that the hospital would be providing under its license, it chose to file for the approval in the hospital cycle rather than in the nursing home cycle. Bebee is familiar with the certification process for both hospitals and nursing homes. The latter is a lengthier process and is substantially different from that used for hospitals. In his opinion, it does not give the hospital based applicant the opportunity to properly justify the approval of a hospital based SNF since it deals more with the requirements of a community based facility. The nursing home form is highly structured whereas the hospital form makes it easier to identify and supply the appropriate supporting information for the project applied for. Further, Bebee does not consider the hospital based SNF bed in the same context as a community nursing home bed. The type of patient is not the same nor are the resources required to treat that patient. Petitioner has purchased a CON to construct a 120 bed community nursing home within the Venice area which will have some SNF beds in it. Nonetheless, because of the basic difference between the services, it still plans to pursue the hospital based SNF. A Florida Hospital Association study concluded that SNF in hospitals are different and there is a lack of this type of service in the hospitals throughout the state. This study, dated May, 1989, at Page 5 reads: Conversion of hospital beds to nursing home beds could improve the financial viability of hospitals, reduce purchasers' and consumers' health costs, and improve access to care for patients requiring higher levels of nursing care, [if they are needed and meet quality care requirements]. Bebee also points out that if this project is considered in the nursing home cycle rather than in the hospital cycle, it would result in a hospital competing with nursing homes which are seeking a different type of bed - community versus SNF. Current community nursing home bed need is set at 0. Petitioner's nursing home cycle application was filed under the "not normal circumstances" provision, but there may still be substantial contest. This type of litigation, he believes, adds unreasonably and unnecessarily costs and is a resultant financial burden to the hospital. Mr. Balzano, a health care consultant and Petitioner's other expert, confirmed and amplified the substance of Mr. Bebee's thesis. He compared hospital based SNFs with those in community nursing homes and found notable differences aside from the statutes and rules governing each. Petitioner's current beds are controlled under Chapter 395, Florida Statutes, and Rule 10D- 28, F.A.C. If some were converted to SNF beds under the pending application, they would still fall under the purview of that statute and rule. On the other hand, community nursing home SNF beds would be controlled by the provisions of Chapter 400, Florida Statutes, and Rule 10D-29, F.A.C. There is a substantial difference between them. Other differences are: Patients in hospital based SNF beds generally have greater nursing requirements than those in SNF beds in community nursing homes. Staffing in hospital based SNF is generally higher than in free standing nursing homes. The average stay is shorter in a hospital based SNF. Patients are not there for continuing care but for restorative care. The size of a hospital based SNF unit is generally smaller than that in a free standing unit. Costs are usually greater in a hospital based SNF unit reflecting the greater needs of the patient. Therefore, reimbursement is generally higher. Health services in the different systems are different and a comparative review would be difficult. The questions in the different application forms reflect a different approach and in the nursing home application, relate to residential type care. This is not the case in the hospital form. Costs relating to the use of an existing facility would be cheaper for the hospital based unit when compared with building a new nursing home facility. However, the costs of hospital construction are usually higher than nursing home construction though the quality of construction is generally better. The operating costs for the more complex services provided in a hospital based unit are higher and Petitioner would have trouble competing if reimbursement were based on the classification as a nursing home. Higher staffing levels and higher staffing costs in a hospital based facility would act in disfavor of that facility. The state generally looks with greater favor on projects for Medicaid patients. Hospital based units are not oriented toward that group and would, therefore, not be given the same consideration, as would be a nursing home which catered to Medicaid patients. The type of patient, (residential vs. subacute) has an impact. The hospital based unit provides treatment to the more acutely ill patient. SNF patients who need that higher degree of care would get it better at a hospital based facility which has greater resources to meet patient needs. Mr. Balzano feels it is unfair to compare the two types of properties. The differences in the programs would have an impact on the issue of need when comparative review is done. A SNF in the hospital setting is different but would be compared, if the nursing home cycle were used, against the total pool of community nursing home beds even though the patients are different and their need for services are different. Need methodology looks at historical utilization. Hospital based SNF patients turn over more frequently than do community nursing home patients and the occupancy level is not as high in the hospital based setting. This would bring the average occupancy rate in an area down and could affect the need for community beds across the board. It is also noted that hospital based SNF beds would not be appropriate to house community nursing home patients who could not be accommodated in a nursing home, and vice-versa. SNF patients could normally not be appropriately treated in a community nursing home because of their greater needs. If compared in a batched review, however, they would be considered together without that distinction being made. Since all other hospital services are reviewed under the provisions of Chapter 395 parameters as hospitals, Balzano sees it as inconsistent to review hospital based SNF beds under the nursing home criteria. He can find no statutory or rule provision requiring this. The Department has drafted a proposed rule on the subject but that proposal is presently under challenge. Further, Medicare considers hospital based SNF beds and community nursing home based SNF beds as different entities with the hospital based beds earning a higher reimbursement ceiling due to the increased services and the different type of patient. According to Mr. Balzano, in Florida, hospital based SNF beds account for 1/2 of 1% of all hospital beds. Nationwide the figure is 4%. Balzano feels this is because in Florida there is no criteria to judge need against and therefore these beds are compared to all nursing home beds. He considers this wrong, especially in a state where there is such a high percentage of elderly patients. It is, in his opinion, poor health planning, and when compared against other nursing homes, the hospital based SNF unit will always be at a disadvantage. The testimony of Ms. Sharon Gordon-Girvin, Director of the Department's Office of Community Health Services and Facilities, reveals the Department's rationale in its rejection of the Petitioner's LOI for the instant project and the subsequent return of its application. The application was rejected because there was no underlying LOI for the project. The LOI was initially rejected as having been filed in an inappropriate cycle, (hospital). The Department's policy, calling for applications for all extended care or hospital based skilled nursing facility beds to be filed in a nursing home batching cycle has been in place for an extended period going back before 1984. The Department looks at extended care beds and SNF beds as somewhat equivalent but different. The designation of extended care facility beds initially used by HCFA, (Medicare), in hospital situations is no longer applicable. Now, Medicare recognizes SNF beds in hospitals, but does not distinguish them from other types of hospital based beds. The service is considered the same and the patients must meet identical admissions criteria. The reasons relied upon by the Department, from a health planning standpoint, for reviewing applications for hospital based SNF beds in the nursing home cycle are: Medicare conditions of service and admission criteria are the same, and The State nursing home formula rule projects a need for all nursing home beds, (SNF and ICF) , and does not differentiate between type. Providers compete for the beds, not where they will be used or under what conditions. The mere need for special treatment such as ventilators or intravenous antibiotics is not controlling. If the patient does not need the acute care provided to hospital acute care patients, since a "subacute" status is no longer recognized by the state, it is the Department's position that that patient should be in intermediate care status. This position is incorporated in the Departments proposed rule which is currently under challenge. It had been elucidated, however, in both the 1988 and 1990 editions of HRSM 235-1, relating to Certificates of Need, where at section 9-5 in both editions the text reads: 9-5 Skilled Nursing Unite in Hospitals. Beds in skilled nursing units located in hospitals will be counted in the nursing home bed inventory, even though they retain their licensure as general medical surgical beds. In addition, the Florida State Health Plan for 1989 and for each year since 1984, has counted hospital based SNF beds in the nursing home bed inventory. The parties stipulated to that point. Ms. Gordon-Girvin admits that it is sometimes difficult for an applicant to apply for hospital based SNF beds on a nursing home application for, but claims that is as it should be. She asserts that the patients are the same, (disputed), and since, she claims, a hospital cannot provide the same services that a full service nursing home could provide, the applicants should be differentiated on the basis of services rather than patient category to justify the additional cost inherent in the hospital based setting. In short, she believes the current situation is appropriate since it requires the applicant, a hospital, to look more carefully at the terms and conditions of the services to be provided. In so far as this results in health care cost savings, her position is accepted. She also contends that the Florida Hospital Association study relied upon by Petitioner to support its position that hospital based SNF bed applications for distinct units cannot compete fairly against nursing homes in a comparative CON review, is not pertinent here considering it was prepared to examine an excess of hospital bed inventory and possible alternative uses as income sources. Regardless of the purpose of the study, absent a showing that it is unreasonably slanted or biased, its conclusions have not been successfully rebutted. Ms. Gordon-Girvin also contends that the low percentage of hospital based SNF beds as compared to total hospital beds is a positive result of the state's efforts to reduce costly services in favor of less costly alternatives. The Department has the exclusive charter to determine which services are to be reviewed and how the review is to be conducted. Even if the proposed rule formalizing the procedure questioned here is stricken, the policy currently being utilized by the Department would still be valid and appropriate. Psychiatric, substance abuse, and rehabilitation beds in hospital inventories are considered distinct from acute care beds, but are still classified as hospital beds because there are no reasonable alternatives for treatment of those conditions. With regard to those patients using hospital based SNF beds, however, the Department claims there is an alternative, the community nursing home based SNF beds. In further support of the Department's position, Amy M. Jones, the Department's Assistant Secretary for Health Care Facilities and an expert in facility licensing and certification in Florida, pointed our that the Department treats hospital based SNF beds and community nursing home SNF beds the same because: conditions of participation are the same and the Department wants to look at and compare similar activities in the same cycle, and pertinent statutes and rules both provide for comparison of similar beds and similar services. Section 395.003(4), Florida Statutes, defines the various types of hospital beds as psychiatric, rehabilitative, and general medical/surgical acute care beds regardless of how they are used. The HCFA Conditions of Participation call for certification of SNF beds as either a distinct part of another facility or as a free standing facility. The agency regulations, as outlined in The Federal Register for February 2, 1989, outlines the requirement that SNF beds in a hospital be surveyed just as are community nursing home SNF beds. Taken as a whole, it would appear that both federal and state regulatory agencies look at SNF beds, regardless of where located, as an integral part of a nursing home operation as opposed to a hospital operation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department affirming its rejection of the Petitioner's Letter of Intent and CON application for the conversion of medical/surgical beds to SNF beds filed in the hospital batching cycle. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of August, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASES NOS. 90-2738 & 90-3575 The following constituted my specific rulings pursuant to S 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: Not a proper Finding of Fact. Accepted and incorporated herein as it relates to Petitioner's filing of the LOI and the CON application. The balance is background information and is not a proper Finding of Fact. 3.-6. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a proper Finding of Fact but a statement of party position. Accepted and incorporated herein except for first sentence. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. &13. Accepted and incorporated herein. 14.&15. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. 18.-21. Accepted. Not a Finding of Fact but merely a restatement of the testimony. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. &26. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. &29. Not a Finding of Fact but argument and a restatement of testimony. Not a Finding of Fact but argument. Not a Finding of Fact but a comment on the evidence. Accepted. Recitation of the witnesses testimony is accurate, but the conclusion drawn does not necessarily follow. Frequency of use does not necesarily determine the finality of the policy. Not a Finding of Fact but a comment on the evidence. Accepted as a presentation of the contents of the document. Accepted. Accepted as represented. 38.-40. Accepted and incorporated herein. 41. Accepted as a restatement of testimony. 42.&43. Accepted. Accepted. &46. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1.&2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. Accepted. 4.-6. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard A. Patterson, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2727 Mahan Drive - Suite 103 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Jeffery A. Boone, Esquire Post Office Box 1596 Venice, Florida 34284 Linda K. HarSris General Counsel DHRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power Agency Clerk DHRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner, Melvin Alston, is entitled to insurance coverage under the State of Florida Health Plan for services received at Miracle Hill Nursing Home.
Findings Of Fact Doris Alston, widow of Melvin Alston, is requesting payment for services rendered to Melvin Alston at Miracle Hill Nursing Home. Melvin Alston died on December 31, 1985. Melvin Alston, as a retired state employee, became eligible for coverage under the State Health Plan on July 1, 1985. He was a professor and dean at Florida A&M University from 1946 until 1969, when he retired. Thereafter he became a professor at Southern Illinois University, from which he retired in 1976. Alston was admitted to Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center (TMRMC) in September, 1984, and was transferred to the extended care unit on September 20, 1984, because there were no available nursing home beds. On October 31, 1984, a bed became available at Goodwood Manor, a skilled nursing home facility, and Alston was admitted to Goodwood Manor from the TMRMC extended care unit. Alston remained at Goodwood Manor until August 22, 1985, when Mrs. Alston removed him and placed him at Miracle Hill Nursing Home. While at Goodwood Manor, Alston was receiving essentially custodial care. He had a routine diet and simply needed assistance with his activities of daily living, such as bathing and feeding. He was able to take his medications as they were given to him and he could leave the nursing home on a pass basis. While at Goodwood, Alston's medical orders were reviewed monthly and he was not seen daily by a physician. Alston received the same level of care at Miracle Hill Nursing Home. In skilled nursing facilities, the range of services needed and provided goes from skilled through intermediate levels to custodial. Skilled care includes such services as injections or intravenous medications on a daily basis which must be administered by a nurse. Dr. C. E. Richardson became Alston's physician at Miracle Hill Nursing Home. In the course of his deposition, Dr. Richardson testified that Alston received medical level care at Miracle Hill. However, Dr. Richardson stated several times that he did not know the level of care given to Alston under the definitions of the care levels available. He acknowledged that the levels of care ranged from skilled to custodial. Dr. Richardson also did not know the terms of the benefit document for the State Health Plan. Dr. Richardson only provided the medical care, which was the same no matter what level of nursing care he needed or received. According to Dr. Richardson, Alston was on a fairly routine diet, could engage in activities as tolerated, and could go out on a pass at will. One of Dr. Richardson's orders dated 11/27/85 shows that Dr. Richardson did not order a skilled level of care, but instead checked the level of care to be intermediate. Alston did not receive or need skilled nursing care at Miracle Hill. It is more appropriate to classify the level of care as custodial, as that term is defined in the State Health Plan Benefit Document. Alston's primary insurer was Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois, based on coverage he had from his employment there. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois denied the claim for services at Miracle Hill because the services were custodial and were not covered by that plan. It also denied the claim because Miracle Hill's services did not fit its criteria for skilled nursing care. William Seaton is a State Benefits Analyst with the Department of Administration and his duties include assisting people who have a problem with the settlement of a claim with Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Florida, which administers the State Health Plan. After the claim was denied by Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois, Mr. Seaton assisted Mrs. Alston by filing a claim under the State Health Plan. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Florida concluded that no benefits were payable for facility charges at a nursing home and that an extended care or skilled nursing facilities would have limited coverage; however, because Alston was not transferred to Miracle Hill directly from an acute care hospital, no coverage existed. The pertinent provisions of the benefit document of the State Health Plan are as follows: I.G. "Custodial Care" means care which does not require skilled nursing care or rehabilitative services and is designed solely to assist the insured with the activities of daily living, such as: help in walking, getting in and out of bed, bathing, dressing, eating, and taking medications. * * * I.N. "Hospital", means a licensed institution engaged in providing medical care and treatment to a patient as a result of illness or accident on an inpatient/outpatient basis . . . and which fully meets all the tests set forth in ., 2., and 3. below: . . . In no event, however, shall such term include . . . an institution or part thereof which is used principally as a nursing home or rest for care and treatment of the aged. * * * I.AH. "Skilled Nursing Care" means care which is furnished . . . to achieve the medically desired result and to insure the insured's safety. Skilled nursing care may be the rendering of direct care, when the ability to provide the service requires specialized (professional) training; or observation and assessment of the insured's medical needs; or supervision of a medical treatment plan involving multiple services where specialized health care knowledge must be applied in order to attain the desired medical results. * * * I.AI. "Skilled Nursing Facility" means a licensed institution, or a distinct part of a hospital, primarily engaged in providing to inpatients: skilled nursing care . . . or rehabilitation services . . . and other medically necessary related health services. Such care or services shall not include: the type of care which is considered custodial . . . . * * * II.E. Covered Skilled Nursing Facility Services. On or after August 1, 1984, when an insured is transferred from a hospital to a skilled nursing facility, the Plan will pay 80% of the charge for skilled nursing care . . . subject to the following: The insured must have been hospital confined for three consecutive days prior to the day of discharge before being transferred to a skilled nursing facility; Transfer to a skilled nursing facility is because the insured requires skilled care for a condition . . . which was treated in the hospital; The insured must be admitted to the skilled nursing facility immediately following discharge from the hospital; A physician must certify the need for skilled nursing care . . . and the insured must receive such care or services on a daily basis; . . . 6. Payment of services and supplies is limited to sixty (60) days of confinement per calendar year. * * * VII. No payment shall be made under the Plan for the following: * * * L. Services and supplies provided by . . . a skilled nursing facility or an institution or part thereof which is used principally as a nursing home or rest facility for care and treatment of the aged. * * * N. any services in connection with custodial care . . . .
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order denying the request for benefits for services rendered to Melvin Alston at Miracle Hill Nursing Home. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 1988. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 87-4674 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Melvin Alston 1 . Proposed findings of fact 1-3 and 5 are rejected as being subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Additionally, proposed findings of fact 3 and 5 contain argument which is rejected. 2. Proposed finding of fact 4 is irrelevant to the resolution of this matter. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Department of Administration Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1); 4(2); 5(2); 6(11); 8(11); 9(12); 10(3 & 4); 11(5); 12(4); 14(5); 15(7); 19- 21(8 & 9) 23(13); and 24(13). Proposed findings of fact 2, 3, and 16 are unnecessary. Proposed findings of fact 7, 13, 18, 26, and 27 are rejected as being irrelevant. Proposed findings of fact 17 and 22 are subordinate to the facts actually found in the Recommended Order. 2. Proposed finding of fact 25 is unsupported by the competent, substantial evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: James C. Mahorner Attorney-at-Law P. O. Box 682 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Andrea Bateman Attorney-at-Law Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Adis Villa, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the duly promulgated rules of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services by designating and continuing to designate the same person as the Assistant Administrator and the Director of Nursing of the Bonifay Nursing Home, Inc., after having been cited for such deficiency and allowed sufficient time to correct the deficiency.
Findings Of Fact An Administrative Complaint was filed by Petitioner Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services on October 27, 1980 notifying Respondent Bonifay Nursing Home, Inc., a skilled nursing care home, that Petitioner intended to impose a civil penalty of $100 for violating duly promulgated rules by designating the same person to act as Assistant Administrator and Director of Nursing of the nursing home. At the formal administrative hearing the Administrator admitted that he served more than one health facility, that at all times pertinent to the hearing the acting Assistant Nursing Home Administrator was also designated as the Director of Nursing, and that she was the only registered nurse on duty. It was admitted that no change had been made after the inspector for the Petitioner Department had called attention to this alleged violation until after the time period allowed for correcting this situation had expired and after the Petitioner had informed Respondent it intended to impose a $100 civil penalty. In mitigation Respondent presented testimony and adduced evidence showing that as the owner and operator of the nursing home he had made an effort to employ registered nurses at the home and that on the date of hearing the nursing home was in compliance with the statutes, rules and regulations. It was evident to the Hearing Officer that the nursing home serves a need in the community and that the residents appreciate the service. Petitioner Department submitted proposed findings of fact, memorandum of law and a proposed recommended order, which were considered in the writing of this order. Respondent submitted a memorandum. To the extent the proposed findings of fact have not been adopted in or are inconsistent with factual findings in this order, they have been specifically rejected as being irrelevant or not having been supported by the evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that a final order be entered by the Petitioner assessing an administrative fine not to exceed $50. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: John L. Pearce, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 200-A Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. J. E. Speed, Administrator Bonifay Nursing Home 108 Wagner Road Bonifay, Florida 32425 David H. Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
