Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the governmental agency responsible for issuing licenses to practice real estate and for regulating licensees on behalf of the state. Respondent is a licensed real estate sales person under license number 0466167. Respondent's real estate license was invalid during the dates at issue in this proceeding. The license expired on September 30, 1993, and was activated on February 1, 1994. The last license issued to Respondent was issued as a voluntary inactive sales person at 171C Springwood Boulevard, Longwood, Florida. On October 28, 1993, Mr. Frank Canty, terminated Respondent from employment at Frank G. Canty Realty ("Canty"). Mr. Canty notified Respondent of the termination by telephone on or about the same day and immediately filed the form required to notify the Florida Real Estate Commission (the "Commission") of Respondent's change in status. 2/ Mr. Robert Sirianni and Respondent are long time friends. Mr. Sirianni is the broker and owner for Bay Hill Realty, Inc ("Bay Hill"). Mr. Sirianni hired Respondent as a real estate sales person for Bay Hill on November 22, 1993. Mr. Sirianni signed the completed form required to notify the Commission that Respondent had placed his license with Bay Hill. Mr. Sirianni gave the completed form to Respondent to hand deliver to the Commission. However, Respondent failed to deliver the form to the Commission. On November 22, 1993, Respondent showed a condominium to prospective buyers. Respondent represented that he was an employee of Canty. Respondent delivered a written offer of $36,000 to Watson Realty Corporation ("Watson"), the listing office. Respondent used his Canty business card in the transaction. A representative of Watson contacted Mr. Canty to discuss some problems in the transaction. Mr. Canty informed the representative that Respondent was terminated from Canty on October 28, 1993. Watson caused a new contract to be executed between the buyers and sellers showing Watson Realty as the listing and selling office. The transaction closed on the new contract. On December 13, 1993, Mr. Sirianni faxed a memorandum to Watson claiming the sales commission purportedly earned by Respondent. Mr. Sirianni withdrew the demand after learning of the facts and circumstances surrounding the matter.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order: finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(b), 475.25(1)(e), and 475.42(1)(b); authorizing the issuance of a written reprimand; placing Respondent on probation for one year; and imposing a fine of $1,000 to be paid in accordance with this Recommended Order. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of May, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May 1995.
Findings Of Fact In September of 1976, Mr. and Mrs. Robert B. Kenney went to 8521 Madonna Place in Sarasota, Florida, in response to a newspaper advertisement. There they found respondent, who showed them through the house at that address, saying she was a friend of the owners who were offering it for sale. Respondent told the Kenneys that she was a registered real estate salesperson employed by Marjorie McCrory Real Estate, and gave them her card. But she said there would be no commission on any sale, because the owners were her friends and had helped her with babysitting. On October 2, 1976, the Kenneys entered into a written agreement with Mr. and Mrs. Robert C. Tritschler, owners of the house respondent had shown them. By this con tract, which was received in evidence as petitioner's exhibit No. 3, the Kenneys agreed to buy the house in the event that they were able to sell their mobile home within thirty days' time and in the event that they were able to obtain financing for 80 percent of the agreed purchase price. The Kenneys were unable to obtain such financing and were also unable to sell their mobile home within thirty days of the signing of the contract. On October 5, 1976, the Kenneys drew a check to respondent's order in the amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), on which was written "Earnest Money-Escrow." The check was delivered to respondent. On October 6 1976, respondent endorsed the check arid deposited it in a savings account. Afterwards, she showed the Kenneys her newly acquired pass book, on which was written "Sherry Gayer, Escrow Account for Robert L. Kenney." After the Kenneys' efforts to meet the conditions of the contract proved unavailing, they demanded the return of the money they had given respondent. Her refusal resulted in litigation which was settled when the Kenneys agreed to accept five hundred dollars ($500.00), plus the interest that had accrued on the entire one thousand dollars ($1 000.00) while it had been on deposit in respondent`s account. The other five hundred dollars ($500.00) went to the Tritschlers, in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner suspend respondent's license for sixty (60) days. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 904/488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Joseph A. Doherty, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Ms. Sherry L. Gayer 2116-59th Street Sarasota, Florida 33580
The Issue Whether the Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed by the Petitioner and, if so, whether Respondent's real estate license should be suspended, revoked, or otherwise disciplined.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165, Florida Statutes; Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes; and the rules adopted pursuant thereto. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Jared A. White T/A Jerry White Realty was a licensed real estate broker, having been issued license number 0187087 pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent was as a broker with an address of 231 Skiff Pt. 7, Clearwater, Florida 34630. TITLE TO THE PROPERTY The matters at issue began with Respondent's retention as a real estate broker to bid at a foreclosure auction for a beachfront house and lot at 235 Howard Drive in Belleair Beach, Pinellas County, Florida. Respondent was hired to submit the bid on behalf of Dr. Moshe Kedan and/or his wife, Ella Kedan. Prior to the auction on August 17, 1995, Respondent had no contact with the Kedans. Kathy MacKinnon of Viewpoint International Realty in Clearwater was Respondent’s point of contact with the Kedans. It was Ms. MacKinnon who obtained Respondent's services to bid on behalf of the Kedans, and Ms. MacKinnon who negotiated with Dr. Kedan as to the financial arrangements for both the bid and any ensuing commissions for Respondent. Neither Ms. MacKinnon nor Dr. Kedan was called as a witness in this case. Respondent attended the foreclosure auction and tendered the winning bid on the property. Respondent bid in his own name. Respondent testified that he had bid at several similar sales in the past, and his practice was to bid in the name of the person who would hold title to the property. Respondent did not follow his usual practice here because Ms. MacKinnon failed to instruct him as to whether the property would be titled in the name of Dr. Kedan, Mrs. Kedan, or one of their corporations. Ms. MacKinnon told Respondent she would know on August 18 how the property was to be titled. Respondent's testimony regarding the initial titling of the property is supported by a handwritten note faxed by Ms. MacKinnon to Dr. Kedan on August 17, shortly after the auction. Ms. MacKinnon's note provides instructions regarding payment of the purchase price, indicating that the money must be submitted to the Clerk of the Court no later than 10:30 a.m. on the morning of August 18. The note specifically asks, "Also, whose name do you want the house in?" Respondent testified that on August 18, he went to Atlanta on business, with the understanding that Ms. MacKinnon would handle the payments to the Clerk of the Court and the titling of the property on that date. This testimony is consistent with the handwritten note in which Ms. MacKinnon indicates that she will take the Kedans' checks to the court. The record evidence shows that the payments were made to the Clerk of the Court and that title insurance on the property was timely issued. However, the title and the title insurance policy listed Respondent as owner of the property. Respondent was unaware the property had been titled in his name until he received the certificate of title in the mail, approximately two weeks after the auction. Upon receiving the incorrect certificate of title, he went to the title company and signed a quitclaim deed, effective August 17, 1995, in favor of Ella Kedan. Respondent testified that he had learned from Ms. MacKinnon that the property would be titled in Ella Kedan’s name at sometime during the two-week period after the auction. The quitclaim deed was not notarized until October 9, 1995, and was not recorded until October 10, 1995. However, the face of the deed states that it was made on August 17, 1995. It is plain that the signature line of the notary statement on the quitclaim deed has been altered from August 17, 1995 to October 9, 1995. Respondent had no knowledge of how the quitclaim deed came to be altered. Respondent also had no clear recollection as to why he dated the quitclaim deed August 17, 1995, in light of his testimony that he signed it approximately two weeks after that date. A reasonable inference is that Respondent so dated the quitclaim deed to clarify that Mrs. Kedan's ownership of the property commenced on August 17, the date on which Respondent submitted the winning bid. Respondent also had no knowledge of why the title company failed to record the quitclaim deed at the time he signed it. He testified that on or about October 9, 1995, he checked the Pinellas County computer tax records and discovered that he was still the owner of record. At that time, he returned to the title company to make sure the quitclaim deed was recorded the next day. Petitioner offered no testimonial evidence regarding the events surrounding the titling of the property. Respondent's uncontradicted testimony is credible, consistent with the documentary evidence, and thus credited as an accurate and truthful statement of the events in question. THE CONTRACT FOR REPAIRS Shortly after the auction, Respondent began discussing with Dr. Kedan the possibility of Respondent’s performing repairs on the just-purchased property. Because Dr. Kedan did not testify in this proceeding, findings as to the substance of the negotiations between Respondent and Dr. Kedan must be based on the testimony of Respondent, to the extent that testimony is credible and consistent with the documentary evidence. Respondent testified that Ms. MacKinnon approached him after the auction and asked him if he would be interested in fixing up the house for the Kedans. Respondent testified that he was agreeable to contracting for the work because his carpenter was between jobs and could use the money. Respondent thus met with Dr. Kedan at the doctor’s office to discuss the repairs. Dr. Kedan explained to Respondent that his ultimate plan was to demolish the existing house on the property and to build a more elaborate residence. Dr. Kedan wanted to rent out the house for five years before tearing it down, and wanted Respondent to affect such repairs as would make the house rentable for that five-year period. Respondent testified that Dr. Kedan expressly told him he did not want to spend a lot of money on the repairs. Respondent quoted Dr. Kedan a price of $20,000.00, which was the price it would take to pay for the repairs, with no profit built in for Respondent. Respondent testified that he sought no profit on this job. He had made a substantial commission on the purchase of the property, and anticipated doing business with Dr. Kedan in the future, and thus agreed to perform this particular job more or less as a “favor” to Dr. Kedan. After this meeting with Dr. Kedan, Respondent walked through the house with Irene Eastwood, the Kedans’ property manager. Ms. Eastwood testified that she and Respondent went from room to room, and she made notes on what should be done, with Respondent either concurring or disagreeing. Ms. Eastwood typed the notes into the form of a contract and presented it to Respondent the next day. On September 21, 1995, Respondent signed the contract as drafted by Ms. Eastwood. There was conflicting testimony as to whether Respondent represented himself as a licensed contractor in the negotiations preceding the contract. Respondent testified that he never told Dr. Kedan that he was a contractor, and that he affirmatively told Ms. Eastwood that he was not a contractor. Ms. Eastwood testified that she assumed Respondent was a licensed contractor because Dr. Kedan would not have hired a nonlicensed person to perform the contracted work. She denied that Respondent ever told her that he was not a licensed contractor. The weight of the evidence supports Respondent to the extent it is accepted that Respondent never expressly represented himself as a licensed contractor to either Dr. Kedan or Ms. Eastwood. However, the weight of the evidence does not support Respondent’s claim that he expressly told either Dr. Kedan or Ms. Eastwood that he was not a licensed contractor. Respondent’s subcontractors commenced work immediately upon the signing of the contract. Ms. Eastwood was in charge of working with Respondent to remodel the house, and she visited the site every day, often two or three times. She only saw Respondent on the site once during the last week of September, and not at all during the month of October. She did observe painters and a maintenance man regularly at work on the property during this period. Respondent concurred that he was seldom on the property, but testified that this was pursuant to his agreement with Dr. Kedan that he would generally oversee the work on the property. Respondent testified that he was on the property as often as he felt necessary to perform his oversight duties. Ms. Eastwood testified as to her general dissatisfaction with the quality of the work that was being performed on the property and the qualifications of those performing the work. She conveyed those concerns to the Kedans. Respondent testified that he did not initially obtain any permits to perform the work on the house, believing that permits would not be necessary for the job. On or about October 11, 1995, officials from the City of Belleair Beach shut down Respondent’s job on the Kedans’ property for lack of a construction permit. Respondent made inquiries with the City as to how to obtain the needed permit. City officials told Respondent that a permit could be granted to either a licensed contractor, or to the owner of the property if such property is not for sale or lease. Respondent checked the City’s records and discovered that, despite the fact that he had signed a quitclaim deed on August 17, he was still shown as the owner of the property. Respondent then proceeded to sign a permit application as the homeowner, and obtained a construction permit on October 11, 1995. Respondent testified that because the City’s records showed him as the record owner of the property, he committed no fraud in obtaining a construction permit as the homeowner. This testimony cannot be credited. Whatever the City’s records showed on October 11, 1995, Respondent well knew he was not the true owner of this property. Respondent cannot be credited both with having taken good faith steps to correct the mistaken titling of the property and with later obtaining in good faith a construction permit as the record owner of the property. Respondent testified that in obtaining the construction permit under false pretenses, his main concern was to keep the job going and to finish it in a timely fashion. He testified that there was no financial advantage to him in having the property in his name: he was making no profit on the job, and actually lost money because he had to pay for another title policy in the name of the Kedans. While there may have been no immediate financial advantage to Respondent, he was clearly motivated by the prospect of future profits in projects with Dr. Kedan. The City’s closing down this project jeopardized Respondent’s anticipated continuing relationship with Dr. Kedan, and Respondent took the improper step of obtaining a construction permit as the property owner to maintain that relationship. The Kedans ultimately dismissed Respondent from the job. A claim of lien was filed against the property by the painter hired by Respondent, and the cabinet maker sent the Kedans a lawyer’s letter threatening to file a claim of lien. Mrs. Kedan testified that she paid off both the painter and the cabinetmaker in full. Ms. Eastwood estimated that the Kedans ultimately had to pay an additional $20,000 to $50,000 to complete the repairs to the house, some of which included correctional actions for the improper repairs performed by Respondent’s workers. ALLEGED PRIOR DISCIPLINE Respondent has been the subject of a prior disciplinary proceeding by the Florida Real Estate Commission. In that prior proceeding, the Division of Real Estate's Administrative Complaint alleged that Respondent was guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(b) and (1)(k), Florida Statutes. On September 25, 1995, Respondent and the Division of Real Estate entered into a Stipulation disposing of the Administrative Complaint. Under the terms of the Stipulation, Respondent agreed to pay a fine of $1,000, and be subject to one year of probation, during which he would complete 30 hours of post-license education for brokers. The Stipulation expressly stated that Respondent neither admitted nor denied the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint. The Florida Real Estate Commission entered a Final Order approving the Stipulation on November 14, 1995. Respondent's broker license was suspended by the Florida Real Estate Commission on January 24, 1996. The cause for this suspension was Respondent's failure timely to pay the $1,000 fine imposed by the Stipulation. Respondent paid the fine on February 19, 1996, and late renewed his license on April 24, 1997. In the instant proceeding, Respondent testified that by entering into the Stipulation, he had no intention of pleading guilty to any of the allegations, and that he would never have entered into the Stipulation had he known it would be construed in any way as a guilty plea.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing Counts One and Three of the administrative complaint, and finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count Two of the administrative complaint, and suspending Respondent’s real estate license for a period of three years and fining Respondent a sum of $1,000. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Geoffrey T. Kirk, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, N-308 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 John Bozmoski, Jr., Esquire 600 Bypass Drive, Suite 215 Clearwater, Florida 34624-5075 Jared White White Realty 231 Skiff Point, Suite Seven Clearwater, Florida 34630 Henry M. Solares Division Director 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
The Issue Whether Weston Professional Title Group, Inc. (Respondent) committed the violations alleged in Counts I, II, III, V, VI, and VII of the Amended Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times, Petitioner has been the entity of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility to regulate title insurance agencies. At all times relevant to this proceeding Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as a title insurance agent in the State of Florida. As of the formal hearing, Respondent had ceased its operations due to the lack of business. Petitioner's investigation of Respondent was initiated by a complaint from a man named Robert Anderson. Mr. Anderson represented to Petitioner that he discovered that his name and address had been used as the buyer of the two residences discussed above. Respondent was the title and settlement agent for both transactions. The Collonade Drive transaction settled on November 14, 2006, with disbursement of the funds on November 16, 2006. The Vignon Place transaction settled and the funds were disbursed on December 15, 2006. Mr. Anderson reported to Petitioner his belief that his identity had been stolen by a person named Pamela Higgins. Mr. Anderson reported to Petitioner that he had not participated in either transaction, and asserted that he did not sign any of the documents that purport to contain his signature as the buyer. Respondent was required to comply with the provisions of RESPA in completing the HUD-1 for the Collonade Drive closing and the Vignon Place closing. RESPA required that disbursements at closing be consistent with the HUD-1 as approved by the parties to the transaction and by the lender. COLLONADE DRIVE CLOSING On September 15, 2006, Robert Anderson (or someone impersonating Mr. Anderson) signed a "Contract for Sale and Purchase" (Collonade contract), agreeing to buy the Collonade Drive property from Mark Mariani and Kathy Mariani, for the purchase price of $1,375,000.00. The Collonade contract reflected that a deposit had been made to "FLORIDA TITLE & ESC." in the amount of $5,000 with an additional deposit of $5,000 to be made within ten days. Two loans with separate mortgages constituted the financing for the purchase of the Collonade Drive property. The first mortgage was $962,500.00. The second mortgage, as reflected on the HUD-1 Settlement Statement with the disbursement date of November 14, 2006, was $263,430.08.3/ First Magnus Financial Corporation, an Arizona corporation, was the lender for both loans. Agents of America Mortgage Corp. served as the mortgage broker for the transaction. Juan Carlos Rodriguez, an employee of Agents of America Mortgages, signed Mr. Anderson's loan application as the "interviewer." The following was a special clause of the Collonade contract: "BUYER AGREES TO PAY FOR TITLE INSUANCE [sic] FEE ONLY (LINE 1108 OF SELLERS' SETTLEMENT STATEMENT), ONLY [SIC] IF SELLERS AGREE TO USE BUYER'S TITLE COMPANY OF CHOICE. BUYER IS A LICENSED FLORIDA REAL ESTATE AGENT." Petitioner established that Robert Anderson was not a licensed Florida real estate agent. The Collonade contract represented that there were no real estate brokers representing either party. On or about November 1, 2006, Respondent received a "Request for Title Commitment" from Claudit Casanova, a mortgage broker with Agents of America Mortgage Corp., for the Collonade Drive transaction. This was a revised request. The first request had been sent to Respondent on or about October 3, 2006. A copy of the Collonade contract had been forwarded to Respondent with the first request. In connection with the Collonade Drive transaction, Respondent prepared two HUD-1s,4/ each of which was approved by the parties and the lender.5/ The first HUD-1 had an anticipated closing date of November 14, 2006. That HUD-1 was revised in response to the lender's instruction to move the disbursement date from November 14, 2006, to November 16, 2006. The revision of the HUD-1 slightly reduced the amount of cash the buyer needed to close as a result of interest beginning to run on the loans as of November 16 instead of November 14. This was a mail-away closing, in that a packet of the documents the buyer was to sign was sent to someone named Laurie Martin at a title agency in Glendale, Arizona. Ms. Marrero testified she mailed the packet pursuant to instructions without specifying who gave her those instructions. The packet of documents was returned to Respondent, with signatures purporting to be Mr. Anderson's. Laurie Martin appears to have served as the notary public when the documents were signed. The transaction closed pursuant to the revised HUD-1 with the disbursement date of November 16, 2006, which, as approved by the parties and the lender, reflected that the sellers were to receive $477,884.93 upon closing. Upon closing, Respondent drafted a check in the amount of $477,884.93 made payable to the sellers. The sellers voided the check and based on instructions from the sellers, Ms. Marrero redistributed the sellers' proceeds by wire transfer as follows: $116,112.85 to sellers; $170,250.00 to Pamela Higgins; and $191,508.08 to Unlimited Advertising USA. Fourteen dollars were spent on wire transfer charges. The actual disbursement of the seller's proceeds was inconsistent with the HUD-1 and unknown to the buyer and the lender. Respondent violated the provisions of RESPA by disbursing the proceeds of the sale in a manner that was inconsistent with the HUD-1. $195,000 DEPOSIT The Collonade contract reflected that a $5,000 deposit had been made to "Fla. Title & Esc." required for the buyer to pay an additional deposit of $5,000 within ten days. There was no evidence establishing any relationship between Respondent and "Fla. Title & Esc." Both HUD-1s for the Collonade Drive transaction reflected that the buyer had provided to the sellers a deposit in the amount of $195,000. These HUD-1s, reflecting that the sellers were holding a deposit in the amount of $195,000, were approved by the parties and the lender. Ms. Marrero testified that she was instructed to include the $195,000 deposit on the HUD-1s without specifying who gave her those instructions. Ms. Marrero did not attempt to verify that the $195,000 deposit was actually being held by the sellers. FRAUD Petitioner alleged that the Collonade Drive transaction was fraudulent. Mr. Wenger's testimony, based in part on reports of mortgage fraud prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, supported that allegation. Other evidence supporting that allegation included the following facts The first mortgage quickly went into foreclosure; A mailing address given for Robert Anderson did not (as of April 19, 2011) exist. The address of Unlimited Advertising USA was also the address of Claudia Rodriguez, a former Florida title agent whose license had been suspended by Petitioner for failing to disburse in accordance with HUD statements and disbursing on uncollected funds; The address of Unlimited Advertising USA was also the address of Juan Carlos Rodriguez (the person who supposedly took the credit application from Robert Anderson); The address of Unlimited Advertising USA was also the address of Agents of America Mortgage Corporation (the mortgage broker for the Collonade closing. Juan Carlos Rodriguez supposedly notarized the document authorizing disbursement of part of the sellers' proceeds to Pamela Higgins. Mr. Anderson's purported signatures on different documents are inconsistent. The address for Mr. Anderson as it appears on the HUD- 1 Settlement Statements is 14233 W. Jenan Drive, Surprise, Arizona. Prior to the closing Ms. Marrero sent by Federal Express a copy of the unexecuted closing documents to "Pam Higgins c/o Robert S. Anderson" 12211 N. 85th Street, Scottsdale, Arizona. Following the closing, Ms. Marrero sent a copy of the closing documents by Federal Express to Robert S. Anderson, at the address 12211 N. 85th Street, Scottsdale, Arizona. Ms. Marrero testified that she acted on instructions in sending the two packages, without identifying who gave her those instructions. There was no evidence that anyone employed by Respondent knew anyone connected to this transaction prior to being asked to provide a title commitment. There was insufficient evidence to establish that Respondent had anything to do with the buy-sell agreement between the buyer and the sellers or the efforts by Mr. Anderson (or the person or persons impersonating Mr. Anderson) to obtain financing for the purchase. While there was significant evidence that the Colonnade Closing was a fraudulent transaction, there was insufficient evidence to establish that Respondent was complicit in that fraud. VIGNON COURT CLOSING On a date prior to November 6, 2006, Maribel and Timothy Graves signed a "Contract for Sale and Purchase" offering to sell their Vignon Court residence to Robert Anderson for the purchase price of $1,975,000.00. Mr. and Mrs. Graves were represented by counsel during this transaction. The copy of the contract admitted into evidence had not been signed by Mr. Anderson and did not bear a legible date. The contract provided an acceptance date of November 6, 2006. The fully executed contract was not admitted into evidence. On October 4, 2006, Claudit Casanova of Agents of America Mortgage requested Respondent to provide a title commitment for the Vignon Court transaction. In that request, the sales price was stated as being $1,975,000; the loan amount was $1,481,250 and the mortgagee was American Brokers Conduit. Preferred Properties, Int., Inc., was listed as being the real estate broker for the transaction. Respondent prepared a HUD-1 for the Vignon Court transaction that reflected a closing and disbursement date of December 15, 2006. DEPOSIT The unexecuted (by the buyer) and undated copy Purchase Agreement required a deposit of $100,000 at the time of acceptance with an additional $50,000 being due within ten days thereafter. There was no evidence as to the terms of the completely executed Purchase Agreement. Line 201 of the HUD-1 reflected a deposit of $250,000 paid on behalf of the buyer. Respondent did not verify that deposit had been made. The HUD-1 specified that the deposit was being held by the sellers. The buyer, sellers, and lender approved the HUD-1, which reflected the existence of a deposit of $250,000, prior to closing. GASPARE VALENTINO On December 6, 2006, Mr. and Mrs. Graves entered into a "Joint Venture and Property Resale Agreement" (Resale Agreement) pertaining to the sale of the Vignon Court residence with Gaspare Valentino. On February 5, 2002, Gaspare Rino Valentino was issued a license by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation of the type "Real Estate Broker or Sales" and of the rank "Sales Associate." That license was valid at the times relevant to this proceeding. Paragraph 2 of the Resale Agreement provides as follows: (2) SALE EFFORTS: CONTRACT PROCEEDS. Valentino agrees to use reasonable efforts to obtain a third party purchaser (a "Purchaser") for the Property. Valentino is not required to advertise the Property or list the Property for sale, but shall have such right to do so. Valentino does not guaranty [sic] the procurement of a Purchaser. The parties agree that the intention is for Valentino to secure a Purchaser who will pay a purchase price sufficient in order to (i) satisfy the existing debt upon the Property, (ii) pay ordinary and reasonable closing costs of the transaction, (iii) generate a net proceeds [illegible] to Owner not less than ONE HUNDERED THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($100,000); and (iv) generate such further sums beyond the foregoing in order to pay Valentino a fee for services rendered as set forth in this Agreement. In accordance with such understanding, Owner agrees to enter into and fully execute a Contract for Purchase and Sale with a Purchaser procured by Valentino which is consistent with the terms set forth in this Agreement, including without limitation, a designated sales price which enables Owner to receive at closing a net proceeds sum equal to ONE HUNDERED THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($100,000) (the "Owner's Sale Proceeds") after payment of the Property Sale Expenses, hereinafter defined as set forth in Paragraph 3. Owner agrees that any net sales proceeds in excess of the Owner's Sale Proceeds shall be payable to Valentino (the "Excess Proceeds Fee), as Valentino's fee for the efforts of Valentino as set forth herein. Paragraph 3 (i) of the Resale Agreement reiterates that after the payment of the "Property Sale Expenses" as follows: Owner shall receive the Owner Sale Proceeds consisting of exactly ONE HUNDERED THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($100,000) from the net sales proceeds . . . Paragraph 3 (ii) of the Resale Agreement reiterates that after the payment of the "Property Sale Expenses" and the "Owner Sale Proceeds": Valentino shall receive the Excess Proceeds Fees, constituting all remaining net sales proceeds in excess of the Owner Sale Proceeds, as a fee for services rendered by Valentino pursuant to this Agreement. Paragraph 7 of the Resale Agreement is as follows: 7. Licensed Agent: Valentino represents and discloses that Valentino is a licensed real estate agent in the State of Florida. Notwithstanding such, Valentino is individually entering into this Agreement using his own resources to assist Owner in the improvement and sale of the Property, and as such is a principal in this transaction earning the Excess Proceeds Fee. The parties acknowledge that Valentino is an investor in this transaction and as such at closing is entitled to and shall receive the Excess Proceeds Fee as set forth in Section [Paragraph] 3(ii) of this Agreement. Under RESPA, Section 700 of a HUD-1 is appropriately used for reporting the payments for commissions to real estate salesmen and/or brokers as part of the "Settlement Charges." Such payments can also be reported under Section 1300 ("Additional Settlement Charges"), if the payments are appropriately labeled. Respondent reflected the payment of $527,656.92 as "Payoff" to Gaspare Valentino at line 1307 of Section 1300." Prior to closing the buyer, sellers, and lender had approved the HUD-1 for the Vignon Court transaction. The lender was aware of the Resale Agreement. Mr. Marrero is an attorney licensed to practice law in Florida. Mr. Marrero construed the payments to Mr. Valentino to be other than a real estate commission. Although it is clear that Petitioner considers that payment to Mr. Valentino to be a real estate commission, the terms of the Resale Agreement entitled Mr. Marrero to treat that payment as being to an investor. Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent erroneously stated the payment to Mr. Valentino on the HUD-1. SURETY BOND As a condition of licensure, a title agency is required to provide to Petitioner a $35,000 security deposit or a $35,000 surety bond. In connection with its application for licensure on August 29, 2002, Respondent filed the required surety bond with Petitioner. The bond was issued by Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland with bond number 133046577. On July 14, 2004, Petitioner received from Respondent a surety bond issued by Western Surety Company in the amount of $35,000, effective as of August 29, 2004. The bond number was 69728435. On May 28, 2010, Petitioner received a letter from his surety dated May 24, 2010, which advised that bond number 69728435 would be voided or cancelled as of August 29, 2010. That letter of cancellation showed a copy being furnished to Respondent at the address "1820 North. Corporate Lakes Boulevard, Suite 105, Weston, Florida 33326." On June 11, 2010, Petitioner advised Respondent by letter sent to "1820 North Corporate Lakes Boulevard, Suite. 105, Weston, Florida 33326" that it had received the cancellation letter. The letter stated, in part, as follows: If we do not receive a replacement bond within 30 days of the dated letter, we will forward your file to the appropriate division for disciplinary action. If you do not plan to continue transacting business and wish to terminate your license, you must submit a request to us immediately. Prior to May 24, 2010, Respondent moved its offices from 1802 North Corporate Lakes Boulevard, Suite 105, Weston, Florida, to Suite 304 of the same building. Mr. Marrero testified that he had no recollection of receiving the letters cancelling the surety bond or the letter from Petitioner dated June 11, 2010. Respondent was without a surety bond between August 29, 2010, and November 18, 2010. Petitioner did not establish that Respondent's failure to maintain it surety bond during that period was willful within the meaning of section 626.8437(9). No prior disciplinary action has been brought against Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating the provisions of subsections 626.8473(2) and (4) as alleged in Count I of the Amended AC; and guilty of failing to maintain a surety bond as required by section 626.8418(2) in violation of section 626.8437(1), as alleged in Count III of the Amended AC. It is further recommended that the final order find Respondent not guilty of all other violations alleged in the Amended AC. For the violations found as to Count I, it is recommended that Respondent's licensure be suspended for a period of six months. For the violations found in Count III, it is recommended that Respondent's licensure be suspended for a period of three months. It is further recommended that the periods of suspension run concurrently. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 2012
The Issue At issue herein is whether respondents' real estate licenses should be disciplined for-the alleged violations set forth in the administrative complaint. Based upon all of the evidence, the following facts are determined:
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Juan Rios, was a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0155126 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate. Respondent, Victoria R. Rios, is a licensed real estate broker-salesman having been issued license number 0331183 by petitioner. The Rios are husband and wife and presently reside at 855 80th Street, #1, Miami Beach, Florida. On December 13, 1982, Juan Rios obtained a six-month multiple listing agreement to sell a house located in Hacienda Estates at 11451 S.W. 33rd Lane, Miami, Florida. The agreement was executed by Rios "As Realtor" and by the property owner, Mercedes Garcia. At Mercedes' request, the Rios placed an initial sales price of $145,000 on the home. On December 15, a similar agreement was executed by Rios and Garcia on condominium unit 9B, Laguna Club Condominium, 10710 N. W. 7th Street, Miami, Florida. That property was also owned by Garcia. Although the agreement introduced into evidence does not contain Rios' signature, at final hearing Juan Rios acknowledged that he had executed such an agreement. The listing agreements provided that if the properties were leased during the term of the agreements, the listing realtor would receive a brokerage fee of 10% for such leasing. The agreement also provided that the realtors were not responsible for vandalism, theft or damage of any nature to the property. Garcia is a native and resident of Venezuela, where she owns a radio station. The two properties in question were previously owned by her father. When the father died, apparently sometime in 1982, Mercedes inherited the house and condominium. The Rios were friends of the father, and agreed to list and manage the properties as a favor to the deceased. Mercedes left the country after the agreements were signed, and has apparently not returned. Although she is the complainant who initiated this matter, she did not appear at final hearing. The house at 11451 S. W. 33rd Lane had been vandalized prior to the listing agreement being signed. According to documents introduced into evidence, the property has also been the subject of subsequent vandalisms, the nature and extent of which are unknown. A tenant was eventually procured by Mercedes' aunt in February, 1983 at a monthly rate of $800. The tenant, a Mrs. Ramirez, paid some $4,800 in rents and deposits before she was killed at the home in June, 1983. The Rios spent some $2,644.36 of the $4,800 on repairs to the vandalism and for general maintenance. They also retained a 10% commission for their services, or $480. That left $1,675.64 owed to Mercedes. No lease was apparently ever signed by Ramirez, or at least none was given to the Rios by the relative who procured the tenant. The home was eventually sold to Mercedes' aunt for $85,000.1 None of the rental monies were placed in the Rios' trust account. The condominium unit was rented in June, 1983. The tenant, Oscar Ruiz, had answered an advertisement run by the Rios in a local newspaper. Although Ruiz executed a lease to rent the unit at a monthly rate of $500, the Rios did not have a copy of same, and claimed none was kept in their records. According to the Rios, Ruiz continued to rent the unit through April, 1984, or for eleven months. Total monies collected by the Rios from Ruiz, including a $500 security deposit, were $6,000, of which $3,364.86 was spent for maintenance, utilities, two mortgage payments, and a $500 payment to the owner (Mercedes). An additional $40.33 was spent on a plumbing bill, and $600 was retained as a commission by the Rios. This left $2,724.53 owed to Mercedes. None of the rental monies were placed in the Rios' trust account. In the spring of 1984, Mercedes retained the services of an attorney in Miami to seek her monies due from the Rios. Up to then, she had received no income or accounting on the two properties. The attorney wrote the Rios on several occasions beginning in April 1984, asking for a copy of the lease on the condominium unit, the security deposit, an accounting of the funds, and all other documents relating to the two, properties. He received his first reply from the Rios on May 3, 1984 who advised him that they had attempted to reach Mercedes by telephone on numerous occasions but that she would never return their calls. They explained that rental proceeds had been used to repair vandalism damage and structural defects. When the attorney did not receive the satisfaction that he desired, he filed a civil action against the Rios on October 10, 1984. On October 26, 1984 the Rios sent Mercedes a letter containing an accounting on the two properties reflecting that she was owed $4,400.17 by the Rios. To pay this, they sent a $140 "official check," and a promissory note for the balance to be paid off in 40 monthly installments at 10% interest. They explained that their real estate business had closed, and due to financial problems, they were unable to pay off the monies due any sooner. They also asked that she instruct her attorney to drop the suit. Mercedes rejected this offer and has continued to pursue the civil action. It is still pending in Dade County Circuit Court. At final hearing, the Rios characterized their involvement with Mercedes as a "professional mistake," and one undertaken out of friendship for Mercedes' father. They acknowledged they did not use a trust account on the transactions and that they had used the $4,400 in rental money due Mercedes for their own use. They considered the excess rent proceeds to be compensation for other "services" performed by them on behalf of Mercedes. However, there is no evidence of any such agreement between the parties reflecting that understanding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is Recommended that Juan and Victoria Rios be found guilty as charged in Counts II and III, and be found guilty of culpable negligence and breach of trust in Count I. It is further recommended that Juan Rios' license be suspended for one year and that Victoria Rios' license be suspended for three months. DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of January, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 1986
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the respondents, Dorothea L. Prisament and Warricks Real Estate , Inc., should be disciplined on charges filed in a six-count Administrative Complaint, three counts for each respondent, and alleging that the respondents: (1) were culpably negligent in allowing their escrow account to have a negative balance, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1989); (2) failed to maintain trust funds in a properly maintained escrow account, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes (1989); and (3) failed to maintain a proper office sign, in violation of F.A.C. Rule 21V-10.024 and Sections 475.25(1)(e) and 475.22, Florida Statutes (1989).
Findings Of Fact Dorothea L. Prisament and Warricks Real Estate, Inc., are now, and were at all times material hereto, licensed as real estate brokers in the State of Florida. Dorothea L. Prisament was the active real estate broker for the corporate broker, Warricks Real Estate. On or about August 16, 1989, investigator Marjorie G. May conducted an office inspection and audit of the escrow accounts of the respondents. Ms. May also reviewed the outer office of the respondents. The entrance sign did not have the name of Dorothea L. Prisament on it; however, the sign did have Warricks Real Estate correctly identified and identified as a licensed real estate broker. Ms. May advised Ms. Prisament of the fact that Ms. Prisament's name needed to be on the sign and identified as a real estate broker. Ms. Prisament had a new sign made which fully complies with the statutes and rules. There was no evidence introduced at hearing to show that the escrow account of the respondents had a shortage in any amount; directly to the contrary, both the Department of Professional Regulation investigator and Ms. Prisament agreed that there was no shortage in the account.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and in light of the fact both that the respondents' violation was a very minor and technical one which was immediately corrected and that the respondents had to undergo the costs of defense of this case and suffer the mental duress of defending this case, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing Counts I through IV of the Administrative Complaint and reprimanding the respondents for a minor and technical violation under Counts V and VI. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Janine A. Bamping, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire One Urban Centre, Suite 750 4830 West Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33609 Darlene F. Keller Director, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729
The Issue The issue to be resolved herein concerns whether the Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees in this proceeding. Embodied in that general issue are questions concerning whether the Petitioners are the prevailing parties; whether they meet the definition of "small business" parties, including the net worth amounts, enumerated in Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, as well as whether the disciplinary proceeding against both Petitioners was "substantially justified". See Section 57.111(3)(e) , Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with licensing and regulating the practices of real estate salesmen and brokers by the various provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Included within those duties is the duty to investigate conduct by realtors allegedly in violation of Chapter 475 and related rules and to prosecute administrative penal proceedings for which probable cause is found as a result of such investigations. At times pertinent hereto, both Ms. Maxwell and Ms. Cosyns, (then Pauline Sealey) were licensed realtors working as independent contractors for Mariner Properties, Inc. and V.I.P. Realty Inc. The complete file of the underlying proceeding DOAH Case No. 86-0140, was stipulated into evidence. That file included the Administrative Complaint filed against these Respondents and the Recommended and Final Order, which Final Order adopted the Recommended Order. The findings of fact in that Recommended Order are incorporated by reference and adopted herein. During the Petitioner's case, counsel for Petitioner voluntarily reduced the attorney's fees bills for both Petitioners such that Ms. Maxwell's bill is the total amount of $2,695.50 and Ms. Cosyns' bill is $17,200, rather than the original amounts submitted in the affidavit. Respondent acknowledged in its proposed Final Order that the fees and costs submitted by the Respondent were thus reasonable. The testimony the Petitioners presented through depositions, transcripts of which were admitted into evidence into this proceeding, was unrefuted. That testimony demonstrates that both Ms. Cosyns and Ms. Maxwell were prevailing parties in the administrative proceeding referenced herein brought by the Respondent, Department of Professional Regulation. They were individually named as Respondents in the Administrative Complaint whereby their professional licenses were subjected to possible suspension or revocation for alleged wrong doing on their part. There is no dispute that they were exonerated in that proceeding and are thus prevailing parties within the meaning of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. The Petitioners are also "small business parties". In that connection, they both were independently licensed Real Estate professionals during times pertinent to the underlying proceeding and were acting in the capacity of independent contractors for all the activities with which the administrative complaint was concerned. Each established that her net worth is below the limit provided by Section 57.111 as an element of the definition of "small business party". The reasonableness of the fees having been established in the manner found-above and the Petitioners having established that they meet the definitional requirements of prevailing small business parties, there remains to be determined the issue of whether the proceedings against the two Petitioners were "substantially justified", that is, whether the proceeding had a "reasonable basis in law and fact at the time it was initiated by a State agency." See Section 57.111(3)(e), Florida Statutes. The facts concerning each Petitioner's case regarding the three counts of the Administrative Complaint relating to them are as found in the Recommended Order incorporated by reference herein. Respondent Maxwell was charged in the complaint with having worked in conjunction with an office manager, Mr. Hurbanis of V.I.P. Realty, in conspiring with him to submit a fraudulent real estate sales contract to a lending institution for purposes of financing. This allegedly involved submitting a contract to the lending institution with an inflated purchase price in order to secure one hundred percent financing, the scheme being more particularly described in that portion of the findings of fact in the Recommended Order related to Jean Maxwell. In fact, Ms. Maxwell did not work in the realty office as charged in the Administrative Complaint, but rather was employed by Mariner Properties, which may have been a related company. The contract in question, although alleged to be fraudulent was, in fact, a bona fide contract which was a legitimate part of the Real Estate transaction submitted to the bank for financing purposes, about which the bank was kept fully advised. All details of the transaction were disclosed to the lender. Maxwell was specifically charged with concealing the true contract from the lender in order to enhance the percentage of the purchase price that the bank would finance, done by allegedly inflating the purchase price in a second contract submitted to the bank. It was established in the disciplinary proceeding that no such concealment ever took place. In fact, Ms. Maxwell was purchasing a lot from her own employer, Mariner Properties. Two contracts were indeed prepared for the purchase of Lot 69, a single family lot on Sanibel Island. In fact, however, the difference of $42,875 and $49,500 in the stated purchase price, as depicted on the two contracts, was the result of continuing negotiations between Ms. Maxwell and the seller, who was also her employer. The difference in the two prices depicted on the contracts was the result of, in effect, a set-off to the benefit of Ms. Maxwell, representing certain employee discounts and real estate commission due from the employer and seller to Ms. Maxwell, the purchaser. As Petitioners' composite Exhibit 5 reflects, the lender involved, North First Bank of Ft. Myers, Florida, was fully apprised of all the details concerning this transaction at the time it was entered into and the loan commitment extended and closed. Mr. Allan Barnes, the Assistant Vice President of North First Bank revealed, in the letter contained in this exhibit in evidence, that there was no concealment or misrepresentation of the facts to his institution by Ms. Maxwell. This letter is dated April 18, 1984. The other related letter in that exhibit, of May 2, 1984 from attorney Oertel to attorney Frederick H. Wilson of the Respondent agency, thus constitutes notice to the agency well before the complaint was filed, that no concealment or misrepresentation to the lender involved had occurred and the charges were requested to be dismissed. In spite of the fact that the agency was on notice of this turn of events well before the filing of the Administrative Complaint, it proceeded to file the complaint and to prosecute it all the way up to the date of hearing, requiring Ms. Maxwell's attorney to attend the hearing to defend her interests. At the hearing, counsel for the Department acknowledged that there was no basis for prosecuting Ms. Maxwell and voluntarily dismissed the complaint as to her. The Respondent's witness, Investigator Harris, in his deposition taken September 11, 1984, acknowledged that he did not discuss any details concerning the investigation, with attorney Frederick Wilson, who prepared the complaint, nor did he confer with him by telephone or correspondence before the filing of the complaint. Therefore, the complaint was prepared solely on the basis of the investigative report. The investigative report came into evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 1. It reveals that Mr. A. J. Davis the president of Mariner Group and Mariner Properties, who was Jean Maxwell's employer and the owner of the lot in question, signed one contract and his Executive Vice President signed the other. In spite of this, the investigative report does not reveal that the investigator conferred with either Ms. Maxwell, or the sellers concerning this transaction. He conducted a general interview of A.J. Davis concerning the alleged "problem" in his office of "double contracting," but asked him no questions and received no comment about the Jean Maxwell transaction whatever. Nor did the investigator confer with Mr. Allen Barnes or any other representative of North First Bank. If the investigation had been more complete and thorough, he would have learned from Mr. Barnes, if from no one else, that the bank had knowledge of both contracts and all details of the transaction underlying them and there had been no concealment or misrepresentation of the facts regarding the transaction by Ms. Maxwell. This information was learned by attorney Oertel as early as April 18, 1984 by Mr. Barnes' letter, referenced above, and it was communicated to the agency by Mr. Oertel on May 2, 1984. Nevertheless, the complaint was filed and prosecuted through to hearing. Therefore, the prosecution and filing of the Administrative Complaint were clearly not substantially justified. If the Department had properly investigated the matter it would have discovered the true nature of the transaction as being a completely bona fide real estate arrangement. Former Respondent, Pauline Sealy Cosyns was charged with two counts, III and V, in the Administrative Complaint at issue. One count alleged, in essence, that Ms. Sealey had engaged in a similar fraudulent contract situation regarding the sale of her residence to a Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Floyd. The evidence in that proceedings revealed no concealment of any sales contract occurred whatever with regard to the lending institution or anyone else. The facts as revealed at hearing showed Ms. Cosyns and the Floyds, through continuing negotiations after the original sales contract was entered into, amended that contract and executed a second one, in order to allow Ms. Cosyns to take back a second mortgage from the Floyds. This was necessary because Mr. Floyd, an author, was short of the necessary down payment pursuant to the terms of the original contract, because his annual royalty payment from his publishers had not been received as the time approached for closing. The second contract was executed to allow for a second mortgage in favor of the seller, Ms. Cosyns, in order to make up the amount owed by the Floyds on the purchase price agreed upon, above the first mortgage amount. The testimony and evidence in the disciplinary proceeding revealed unequivocally that the lending institution, Amerifirst Mortgage Company, was fully apprised of the situation and of the reason for the two contractual agreements. The $24,000 second mortgage in question is even depicted on the closing statement issued by that bank. There was simply no concealment and no effort to conceal any facts concerning this transaction from the lender or from anyone else. The investigation conducted was deficient because the investigator failed to discuss this transaction with the lender or with the purchasers. He discussed the matter with Ms. Sealy-Cosyns and his own deposition testimony reveals, as does his investigative report, that he did not feel that he got a complete account of the transaction from her. She testified in her deposition, taken prior to the instant proceeding, that she indeed did not disclose all facts of the transaction to him because she was concerned that he was attempting to apprehend her in some "legal impropriety". Therefore, she was reluctant to be entirely candid. The fact remains, however, that had he conducted a complete investigation by conferring with the lender and the purchasers, he would have known immediately, long before the Administrative Complaint was filed and the matter prosecuted, that there was absolutely no basis for any probable cause finding that wrong-doing had occurred in terms of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Thus, the facts concerning the prosecution as to Count III against Pauline Sealy-Cosyns, as more particularly delineated in the findings of fact in the previous Recommended Order, reveal not only that Ms. Cosyns was totally exonerated in the referenced proceeding, but that there was no substantial basis for prosecuting her as to this count at all. Concerning Count V against Ms. Cosyns, it was established through the evidence at the hearing in the disciplinary case that she was merely the listing agent and did not have any part to play in the drafting of the contract nor the presenting of it to the lender. Because there was no evidence adduced to show that she had any complicity or direct involvement in any fraudulent conduct with regard to the transaction involved in Count V of the Administrative Complaint at issue she was exonerated as to that count as well. It is noteworthy here that a statement was made by counsel for the agency, appearing at pages 20 and 21 of the transcript of the proceeding involving the Administrative Complaint, which indicates that the agency, based upon its review of certain documents regarding Counts III and V, before hearing, felt that indeed there might not be a disputed issue of material fact as to Mrs. Cosyns. The agency, although acknowledging that a review of the documents caused it to have reason to believe that it was unnecessary to proceed further against Ms. Cosyns nevertheless did not voluntarily dismiss those counts and proceeded through hearing. Be that as it may, the investigation revealed that Ms. Cosyns acknowledged that she knew that there were two contractual documents involved, but the investigation also revealed that Ms. Cosyns was only the listing agent. The selling agent was Mr. Parks. The investigation revealed through interviews with Ms. Cosyns, Mr. Parks and Mr. Hurbanis, the office Manager of V.I.P. Realty, that Ms. Cosyns, as listing agent, was merely present when the offer from the buyers was communicated to the office manager, Mr. Hurbanis, and ultimately to the sellers, the Cottrells. There was no reason for the investigator to believe that Ms. Cosyns had anything to do with the drafting of the contracts nor with the communication of them to the lending institution involved. That was done by either Mr. Parks or Mr. Hurbanis or by the buyers. The investigation (as revealed in the investigative report) does not show who communicated the contract in question to the lender. The investigation was simply incomplete. If the investigator had conferred with the buyers, the sellers and especially the lender, he could have ascertained-whether the lender was aware of all the facts concerning this transaction and whether there was any reason to believe that Ms. Cosyns had anything to do with the arrangement and the details of the transaction. It was ultimately established, by unrefuted evidence at hearing, that indeed Ms. Cosyns did not have anything to do with the transaction, nor the manner in which it was disclosed to the lender. The fact that she was aware that two contracts had been prepared did not give a reasonable basis for the investigator to conclude that she had engaged in any wrong-doing. The report of his interviews with Ms. Cosyns, Mr. Hurbanis and Mr. Parks, as well as Donna Ross, does not indicate that he had a reasonable basis to conclude that Ms. Cosyns had engaged in any fraudulent conduct with regard to the transaction, including the conveyance of a bogus contract to the lending institution involved, nor for that matter, that Mr. Hurbanis or Mr. Parks engaged in such conduct. In order to ascertain a reasonable basis for concluding whether Ms. Cosyns was involved in any wrongful conduct, he would have had to obtain more information than he did from these people or confer with the lender, the buyer or the seller, or all of these approaches, before he could have a reasonable basis to recommend to the prosecuting agency that an Administrative Complaint be filed against her concerning this transaction. In fact, he did not do so, but the Administrative Complaint was filed and prosecuted through hearing anyway, causing her to incur the above-referenced attorney's fees. It thus has not been demonstrated that there was any substantial basis for the filing and prosecution of Count V of the Administrative Complaint against Ms. Cosyn. Thus she is entitled to the attorneys fees referenced above with regard to the prosecution of the Administrative Complaint in question.
The Issue Whether Respondent's Florida real estate license should be revoked or otherwise disciplined for violations of Sections 475.25(1)(b), 475.25(1)(e), and 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, is the state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to enforce the provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. At all material times, Respondent, Lee Scott Marose, was a licensed real estate salesperson in the State of Florida, having been issued license No. 0584225, pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. From December 10, 1993 to June 6, 1994, Respondent was employed as a real estate salesperson with Tam-Bay Realty, Inc., in Hillsborough County, Florida. On or about February 1, 1994, Respondent solicited and obtained a residential lease between Richard Akers, Sr. (Owner), and R. Dugan Fry (Tenant) for property located at 1731 Staysail Drive, Valrico, Florida. The lease provided for rental payments of $850.00 per month. On or about May 1, 1994, in accordance with the lease, the Tenant sent Respondent a check in the amount of $850.00 payable to Tam-Bay Realty. Respondent did not deliver the May 1, 1994 check to Tam-Bay Realty, but instead caused the Tenant to issue another check dated May 9, 1994, in the amount of $850.00 payable to Respondent. Respondent received the May 9, 1994 check, cashed the check, and diverted the funds to his own use. Due to Respondent's actions, Tam-Bay Realty refunded the money to the Owner, and dismissed Respondent from its employment. During the investigation of this matter by Petitioner, Respondent admitted to Petitioner's investigator the conversion of the rental check, but explained that his actions were an attempt to shorten the "turn-around" time on the rental check, and that he had been unable to replace the funds because money had been stolen from his personal checking account.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent be found in violation of the above-cited statutory provisions, and that Respondent's Florida real estate license be revoked. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 8th day of September, 1995. RICHARD HIXSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 1995. APPENDIX As to Petitioner's proposed findings: 1.-9. Accepted and incorporated. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson,, Esquire Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lee Scott Marose 18950 U.S. Highway 144, #133 Mount Dora, Florida 32757 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds real estate broker license no. 0186475, and was so licensed at all times relevant to this proceeding. However, he did not act in his licensed capacity in any of the transactions discussed herein. Respondent was involved in a corporate business venture with Donald M. and Darlene Pifalo. He believed the Pifalos had improperly diverted funds from the corporation and filed suit accordingly. In December, 1980, while this suit was pending, Respondent filed a notice of lis pendens against various properties owned by the Pifalos. This action encumbered property in which the Pifalos' equity greatly exceeded Respondent's alleged loss in the business venture. There was no evidence that the Pifalos were planning to leave the jurisdiction or would be unable to make any court ordered restitution. Further, the encumbered property was not at issue in this litigation. Finally, Respondent filed the notice of lis pendens on his own volition and not on the advice of counsel. The notice was subsequently dismissed.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Subsections 475.25(1)(a) and 475.42(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1979), and fining Respondent $500. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of April, 1982 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April, 1982.
The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether Respondent violated Section 475.25(1)(b) Florida Statutes, 1/ by committing the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the governmental agency responsible for issuing licenses to practice real estate and for regulating licensees on behalf of the state. Respondent is a licensed real estate broker under license number 0478560. The last license issued to Respondent was issued as a broker t/a Concord Financial Realty Co. ("CFR"), 495 E. Semoran Boulevard #115, Casselberry, Florida 32708. Respondent is the sole owner of CFR. CFR carries on regular business activities that include apartment rentals and sales of real estate. On January 31, 1992, Respondent and Mr. Charles Wallman, Respondent's husband, owned all of the stock of C.L. Wallman Associates, Inc ("CWA"). 2/ Respondent's husband owned Concord Financial Services, Inc. ("CFS"). CFS was formed to sell insurance and securities. Respondent and her husband operated CFR, CWA, and CFS out of shared office space. Respondent performed bookkeeping and secretarial duties for CWA and CFS. In January, 1992, Respondent's husband (the "seller") verbally agreed ("agreed") to sell 35 percent of the stock of CFS to Mr. John Topercer (the "purchaser") for $35,000. The seller and purchaser agreed to operate the company as "partners." The sale proceeds were to be invested in the company in which the seller and purchaser were to be partners. The purchaser paid the $35,000 purchase price in five installments from January 31, 1992, through March 12, 1992. During that time, the seller agreed to sell an additional 14 percent of the stock of CFS for an additional $13,000. The purchaser paid the additional $13,000 in three installments from April 14, 1992, through May 13, 1992. In May, 1992, the purchaser and seller agreed to another stock acquisition for $20,000. The seller would merge CFS, CWA, and CFR into a new company to be known as Concord Financial Centre ("CFC"). All of the business activities carried out by the separate companies would be consolidated into CFC. The purchaser would receive 49 percent of the stock of CFC in exchange for his 49 percent stock ownership in CFS. The seller and purchaser would operate CFC as "partners" in the same manner as originally contemplated for CFS. The sale proceeds were to be invested in the company in which the seller and purchaser were to be partners. The purchaser paid $20,000 in five installments from June 2 through June 22, 1992, and tendered his stock in CFS. However, the purchaser never received any stock in CFC. CFC was never formed. The seller never tendered any stock in CFC to the purchaser. The seller used some of the sale proceeds to operate CFS. However, approximately $30,000 of the sale proceeds were misappropriated and used by Respondent and her husband for personal purposes including a down payment on a house and a car. On January 6, 1993, the purchaser filed a civil complaint against Respondent and her husband alleging fraud, recision, and mismanagement of corporate funds. On August 8, 1994, the purchaser received judgment against Respondent and her husband in the amount of $30,000. Respondent and her husband have not satisfied the judgment. Neither has paid any money toward the judgment, and the purchaser has been unable to satisfy the judgment. Respondent knew of the negotiations and business transactions between her husband and Mr. Topercer. Respondent performed the duties of bookkeeper and documented all of the payments made by Mr. Topercer. Respondent was present during some of the discussions between her husband and Mr. Topercer. Respondent agreed to the merger of CFR into CFC. Respondent participated in the misappropriation of the purchase proceeds for her own personal use. When considered in their totality, the acts committed by Respondent constitute fraud and dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Those acts were repeated and continued for more than six months. The amount misappropriated by Respondent is significant. During the three and a half years since June, 1992, Respondent has made no attempt at restitution.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b) and revoking Respondent's real estate license. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January 1996.
