The Issue Whether Petitioner's license as an Osteopathic Physician in the state of Florida should be revoked, suspended or otherwise disciplined under the facts and circumstances of this case.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed osteopathic physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number OS 0003822. Respondent's last known address is 1804 Nelson Street, No. 15, Ormond Beach, Florida 32074. From on or about July 17, 1985, until on or about April 28, 1987, Respondent diagnosed patient L.K. as suffering from, and rendered medical care and treatment for, juvenile fibromatosis or fibromatosis colli. Juvenile fibromatosis and fibromatosis colli are conditions characterized by the occurrence of multiple fibromas. Fribromas are benign (non- malignant) neoplasms. On or about July 17, 1985, Respondent executed a letter which was sent to the Exceptional Student Education Services section of the School Board of Volusia County (School Board) wherein Respondent represents that the patient L.K. "is being treated for a malignancy of the neck, etiology undermined." On or about August 22, 1986, Respondent executed a letter intended to allow the patient L.K. to avoid required immunization wherein Respondent represents that patient L.K. "...has a malignancy which was not identified by multiple biopsy." The representations made to the School Board in his letters of July 17, 1985, and August 22, 1986, were made in Respondent's practice of Osteopathic Medicine. Only one biopsy of the patient's neck mass was performed prior to Respondent's letter of August 22, 1986, to the School Board. This biopsy was performed during March of 1980 by Gary Horndeski, M.D. The pathology report concerning this biopsy was not received by Respondent until March 18, 1987. The patient's neck mass had not been subjected to multiple biopsy as represented by the Respondent on August 22, 1986. The Respondent's representations in the August 22, 1986 letter were deceptive, untrue, and fraudulent. The medical records of Respondent fail to document that Respondent performed multiple biopsies on the mass. Respondent has failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient, including but not limited patient histories, examination results, and test results. Respondent prescribed, dispensed or recommended BHI Regeneration, Polyzyme 022 and Vitamin C 500 mg tablets to patient L.K. On or about November 21, 1986, Respondent executed three separate forms authorizing the administration of BHI Regeneration, Polyzyme 022 and Vitamin C to patient L.K. by school personnel of Volusia County, indicating that he had ordered the administration of these substances as a "part of scheduled med program." BHI Regeneration and Polyzyme 022 are "drugs" as defined by Section 499.003(8), Florida Statutes. Respondent failed to note in patient L.K.'s medical records his prescribing, dispensing or recommendation of BHI Regeneration and Polyzyme 022. Respondent's written medical records fail to document "informed consent" to the drug therapy initiated including medically acceptable alternative procedures or treatments. The preferred course of treatment for a mass of the size and location as existing on patient L.K. would be surgical intervention. Respondent's written medical records fail to adequately document the reason for not following the preferred course of treatment (surgery), that surgery was discussed with the patient's parents, or that the parents declined surgery. Respondent's entry for March 10, 1987, in the medical record of patient L.K. indicates "recommend to get physiotherapy in lieu of surgery." Respondent's medical records fail to justify the course of treatment of the patient, including but not limited to patient histories, examination results, and test results. A reasonably prudent similar physician under similar conditions and circumstances would have referred patient L.K. to a specialist or obtained a consultation with a specialist. Respondent failed to do so. A reasonably prudent similar physician under similar conditions and circumstances would not have recommended that patient L.K. not receive standard immunizations nor would such a physician have executed a school form allowing patient L.K. to be exempted from required immunizations. A reasonably prudent similar physician would have obtained and reviewed prior biopsy report or conducted a biopsy on patient L.K. soon after undertaking the care of the patient. Respondent has failed to practice osteopathic medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably osteopathic physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. On or about April 7, 1987, the Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners issued a Subpoena Duces Tecum commanding Respondent produce for copying and inspection any and all medical records of patient L.K. On or about May 8, 1987, the aforementioned subpoena was served on Respondent to produce copies of any and all medical records of patient, L.K., on May 10, 1987, at 6501 Arlington Expressway, Jacksonville, Florida. Respondent did not file a challenge or object in any fashion to the subpoena. As a result of the Petitioner filing a petition for enforcement of the subpoena, Respondent furnished to Petitioner what was purported to be the medical records of patient L.K., and did not in any way advise Petitioner that there were certain records pertaining to L.K. that he did not consider medical records. The medical records of patient L.K. submitted by Respondent in response to the subpoena were incomplete. Respondent's license to practice osteopathic medicine in the state of Florida was disciplined by the Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners (Board) by its final order issued on April 19, 1988, wherein Respondent's license was suspended for one year; to be followed by a three year period of probation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 459.015(1)(n), (p), (y) (cc), Florida Statutes (1989), as set forth in Counts I, III, IV and V of the Second Amended Administrative Complaint, as amended, and for such violation, considering the guidelines for imposing penalties set forth in Rule 2IR-19, Florida Administrative Code, and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances allowing the Board to deviate from those guidelines set forth in Rule 2IR-19, Florida Administrative Code, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent's license to practice osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida be suspended for one year subject to the terms and conditions the Board deems appropriate for reinstatement. It is further RECOMMENDED that Count II be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 27th day of October, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1989. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-0308 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner 1-26. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1-26, respectively. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent Respondent filed a one page, two paragraph Proposed Findings of Fact and Proposed Conclusion of Law that was an argument consisting of facts and law. To the extent that there are facts contained in his argument, they are either not material or not relevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire Chief Trial Counsel 730 S. Sterling Street Suite 201 Tampa, Florida 32609 David L. Sturdivant, Sr. 1804 Nelson Street, #I15 Ormond Beach, Florida 32704 Rod Presnell Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, the following relevant facts are found: HRS District VIII includes Sarasota, DeSoto, Charlotte, Glades, Lee, Hendry and Collier Counties. There are presently no existing and operating osteopathic hospitals within District VIII. However, there are two applications now pending for new for new osteopathic facilities within the District. One is in Sarasota and one is on behalf of the intervenor Doctors' Osteopathic Medical Center, Inc., d/b/a Gulf Coast Hospital, Inc. (Gulf Coast), which seeks to build and operate a 120-bed acute care osteopathic hospital to be located in south lee County. That application has proceeded through the administrative hearing process, received a Recommended Order for approval of 120 beds, a Final Order for approval of 60 beds and is currently on appeal. The intervenor Naples Community Hospital is an existing allopathic acute care hospital located in Collier County, which is immediately south of Lee County. The intervenor Lee Memorial Hospital is an existing allopathic acute care hospital located in Lee County and has approval to construct and operate a satellite facility in south Lee County. The petitioner Family Center Hospital Osteopathic, Inc., proposes to construct and operate a 100-bed full service, osteopathic teaching hospital in southwest Lee County. A particular site has not yet been selected or acquired. If the proposed facility was established, it would be in competition with allopathic hospitals for patients and staffing. The petitioner's original application for a Certificate of Need was submitted to HRS in the summer of 1982. That application was prepared by a health planning consulting firm, no member of which testified in this proceeding. The original application was amended prior to the hearing with regard to the need for osteopathic beds in the area, the financial projections and the architectural design of the facility. Petitioner intends to retain a full-time management firm to be responsible for managing the proposed facility. No firm commitments have been made and no tentative price quotations have been received for such an arrangement. Petitioner proposes to construct a two-story 90,000 square foot building with ancillary services on the first floor and patient areas on the second floor. The patient areas include a 15-bed obstetrical until, a 10-bed pediatrics unit, an 8-bed ICU/CCU and the remaining beds would be medical- surgical beds. The architect had no knowledge of the location of the site proposed, and thus no site plan has been developed. While the average construction cost per square foot of a health care facility in Florida is approximately $115 or $120, that cost can vary depending upon site development requirements, construction materials, floor coverings, wall coverings and the like. These details have not yet been determined The fact that the proposed facility is to be teaching hospital was not taken into account in the schematic design. An accountant, who had no prior experience with projecting financial feasibility for a health care facility was retained by the petitioner to prepare a projected financial statement for the proposed facility. His opinion that the project would be financially feasible within the second year of operation was based primarily upon occupancy projections made by a health planner, the itemization and costs associated with manpower, salaries, equipment, supplies, etc., as projected in the original application and conversations with a "Mr. Becker" relating to bond financing. He compared his estimates and projections with other Certificate of Need applications in the Lee County area. The accountant was unaware of whether nor not the applications relied upon for comparison purposes had been update or revised at some subsequent time. He also received data concerning revenues of a "select group" of hospitals as published in a Hospital Cost Containment Board report for 1984, but made no determination of that Board's grouping of hospitals for comparative purposes. No independent investigation of the accuracy of the contents of the original application was performed by the accountant or anyone on his behalf. Although the accountant adjusted the manpower requirements as originally projected to conform with his perception of the occupancy projections, he was unaware of the minimum staffing requirements imposed upon hospitals by state and/or federal regulations. The witness candidly admitted that he did not consider it within his expertise to determine the manpower or equipment requirements for the proposed facility. He is unaware of whether or not the bond financing proposed for this project is available. There was no showing that petitioner had sufficient funds available to make expenditures for project development or other pre-opening expenses, estimated to be over $400,000.00. His revenue projections did not take into account the existence of other osteopathic beds in the area. By utilizing alternative methodologies which took into account both statewide and district wide statistics regarding osteopathic utilization rates, the number and distribution of osteopathic physicians, and population projections; the petitioner's health care planner concluded that there is a gross need in the year 1991 for 144 osteopathic acute care hospital beds in District VIII. Assuming that there are no other osteopathic hospitals in District VIII, the health care planner was of the opinion that there is a net need for the same number of beds in that District. She further concludes that the proposed osteopathic hospital would obtain 90% of the osteopathic patients of Lee County, 50% of the osteopathic patients in other District VIII Counties and an occupancy rate of approximately 73% for the second year of operation. She admits that if Gulf Coast is awarded a Certificate of Need for 60 beds or 120 beds and/or if the Sarasota applicant is awarded a Certificate of Need, the net bed need of 144 would be reduced accordingly and the projected market share and occupancy rates would be affected. Petitioner presented no evidence concerning its ability to adequately staff its proposed facility. Likewise, no evidence was presented as to petitioner's ability to obtain funds for capital expenditures or for the operation of the facility. The impact of the proposed project upon the cost of providing health services was not addressed by the petitioner. There is a need for research and educational facilities to train doctors of osteopathic medicine at the student, internship and residency levels. Both Manasota Osteopathic General Hospital in Sarasota and Gulf Coast Hospital in fort Myers have indicated their desires to become teaching facilities.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a Certificate of Need be DENIED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 7th day of May 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May 1986. APPENDIX The proposed joint findings of fact submitted by Doctors' Osteopathic Medical Center, Inc., d/b/a Gulf Coast Hospital, Inc., and Naples Community Hospital have been approved and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below. Paragraph 7: Rejected as unnecessary to the issues in this proceeding. Many of the proposed findings of fact contain recitations of a lack of evidence regarding certain criteria. Where these have not been included in the factual findings, they are included in the Conclusions of Law, where pertinent. COPIES FURNISHED: Claude H. Tison, Jr., Esquire MCFARLANE, FERGUSON, ALLISON & KELLY Post Office Box 1531 Tampa, Florida 33601 R. Sam Power, Esquire Office of General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John D. C. Newton, II, Esquire CARSON & LINN, P.A. Cambridge Centre 253 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 W. David Watkins, Esquire OERTEL & HOFFMAN, P.A. Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 Ivan Wood, Jr., Esquire WOOD, LUCKSINGER & ESPTEIN One Houston Center Suite 1600 Houston, Texas 77010 William Page, Jr., Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues are: (1) Whether Respondent exercised influence within a physician-patient relationship for the purpose of engaging a patient in sexual activity in violation of Subsection 459.015 (1)(l), Florida Statutes; (2) Whether Respondent engaged a patient in sexual activity outside the scope of practice or the scope of generally accepted examination and treatment of the patient in violation of Section 459.0141, Florida Statutes; and (3) If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against his license to practice as an osteopathic physician.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Department of Health, Board of Osteopathic Medicine, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of osteopathic medicine pursuant to Chapters 455 and 459, Florida Statutes. Respondent is and has been at all times material hereto a licensed osteopathic physician in the state of Florida, having been issued License No. OS-004450. Respondent has a bachelor’s degree and a master’s degree in clinical psychology and experimental psychology from Temple University, was an assistant professor of psychology at a community college before studying osteopathic medicine, and taught as an assistant professor of psychiatry in family practice at Southeastern Osteopathic Medical School. Respondent completed a residency program at Southeastern Osteopathic Hospital in North Hollywood, Florida, and also completed a three-year family practice residency program. After completing his residency programs, Respondent moved to Sarasota, Florida, and began as a family practice physician. In December 1998, Patient K.C. (K.C.) was 33 years old, married, and the mother of two children, six and two years old. Before getting married, K.C. had lived with her parents. She had attended community college for two years but did not obtain a degree. K.C. had been employed as a sales clerk and clerical staff person. On or about December 29, 1998, K.C. first presented to Respondent suffering from migraine headaches and neck pain, chronic conditions she had suffered for approximately ten years. From December 29, 1998, through or about October 1, 1999, Respondent provided osteopathic medical treatment for pain to K.C. During this period of time, Respondent treated K.C.'s migraine headaches and neck pain with heat, osteopathic manipulation, and prescription medication. Respondent also diagnosed anxiety and depression for K.C. and prescribed medication, Ativan, for this condition. Throughout the time Respondent saw K.C., he also prescribed up to six tablets per day of a sedative, Fioricet. During the time that Respondent was treating K.C., he saw K.C. once or twice a month, except for April, August, and September 1999. Respondent's records reflect that he saw K.C. four times in April, three times in August, and six times in September. There are several manipulation techniques used by Respondent in treating patients. One manipulation technique used by Respondent involves traction of the neck and movement of the patient’s head while the patient is lying down on her back. Another technique, while the patient is lying on her back, involves Respondent’s using his chest to exert pressure down on the patient’s crossed arms and body through the spine to Respondent’s hands located behind her neck and thoracic spine. Another technique has the patient roll over to the side with the leg up to the side while Respondent adjusts her pelvic bone. During this procedure, Respondent’s hand and forearm arm are placed on the buttocks to effect a pushing or pulling of the pelvic bone. The last technique Respondent provides is for the upper thoracic and lower neck area. For this, the patient places her hands on top of her head. Respondent then brings his hands around the torso from behind, placing them at the back of her neck. While the hands provide traction to the neck, Respondent pushes his chest against the spine of the patient to lift the thoracic vertebrae. It is not uncommon during this procedure for Respondent to brush his hands on the patient’s breast. Respondent’s normal office procedure is to do manipulations on patients in his treatment room with the door closed and no other persons present for 10 to 15 minutes. From December 1998 until August 12, 1999, Respondent provided adjustments to K.C. and prescribed medication and did not engage in any sexual activity or relationship with K.C. Prior to August 12, 1999, during his treatments of K.C., Respondent sometimes engaged in "random conversations." For example, during one treatment Respondent asked what kind of car she drove and when she told him, Respondent asked K.C, if her husband cared about her. Respondent told K.C. that a sports utility vehicle (SUV) was a safe vehicle, especially for someone with her condition and indicated that his wife drove an SUV. Respondent then insinuated that if K.C.'s husband cared about her, he should or would buy her an SUV. During another treatment, Respondent told K.C. that she had a good body and asked if she had been a cheerleader. During another treatment, Respondent, while engaging in conversation with K.C., made an unrelated statement about how many times per week the average married couple has sex. At another time, while treating K.C. at his office, Respondent mentioned that the sex life of people with chronic pain may be affected by their condition and asked if her sex life was so affected. Still, during another treatment, Respondent asked K.C. about her relationship with her husband, specifically inquiring as to how they related to one another. In the summer of 1999, K.C. traveled by car to Canada to visit her husband's family. For K.C., the trip to Canada was stressful and while there, she was in a lot pain. Because of the pain she was experiencing, K.C. called Respondent's office while she was still out-of-town to schedule an appointment for an adjustment upon her return to Sarasota and to request that one of her prescriptions be refilled. After K.C. returned from the trip to Canada, on the morning of August 13, 1999, she went to Respondent's office for her scheduled appointment for an adjustment. When K.C. arrived at Respondent's office, she was in a lot of pain and began to cry. K.C. told the nurse or medical assistant that she was in a lot of pain and had had a "bad trip to Canada." The nurse then escorted K.C. to an examination room. When Respondent came into to examination room, K.C. was sobbing and could hardly talk. Respondent asked K.C. to explain why she was so upset. Respondent proceeded to do an adjustment and, again, asked K.C. why she was so upset. K.C. described her feelings to Respondent, who then told K.C. that he used to counsel with patients, that he had helped a girl just like her, and that he could help her if she were willing to come back to the office and talk with him. After K.C. agreed to come back and talk to Respondent, he asked K.C. how he could reach her. In response, K.C. gave Respondent her pager number. After K.C.'s morning appointment on August 13, 1999, Respondent contacted K.C. on her pager and asked if she had made arrangements for her sons to be taken care of so that she could come back to the office to talk with him. K.C. told Respondent that she had made arrangements for her sons and agreed to return to Respondent's office that afternoon. When K.C. returned to Respondent's office on the afternoon of August 13, 1999, Beverly Carrington (Beverly), a medical assistant in Respondent's office, was vacuuming the office. At Respondent's direction, Beverly took K.C. to an examination room. Several minutes later Respondent came into the examination room and told K.C. that he had to make some calls and that he would be back in a few minutes. Respondent gave K.C. a sandwich that he said he had left over from lunch. After Respondent gave K.C. the sandwich, he left the examination room, closing the door behind him. Respondent eventually returned to the examination room and sat in a chair next to the chair in which K.C. was sitting. Respondent began asking K.C. questions about herself, similar to questions that she had been asked by counselors or psychologists. While Respondent was talking to K.C., Beverly knocked on the door of the examination room and told Respondent that she had finished vacuuming the office. Respondent indicated to Beverly that she could go home and soon thereafter, Petitioner heard Beverly leave the building.1 After Beverly left the office, Respondent continued to ask K.C. questions for the next 15 or 20 minutes. Respondent then asked K.C. to get up from her chair, face the mirror in the room, and look in the mirror. K.C. felt uncomfortable looking in the mirror, so she kept her head down. Respondent then put his hands on K.C.'s face and held her face up so that she was looking in the mirror. While doing this, Respondent asked K.C., "Don't you know you're beautiful?" Respondent placed his hands on K.C.'s shoulders and brushed his lips against her neck. Respondent began rubbing or massaging K.C.'s neck and while doing so told K.C. that she was "real tight in [her] neck" and that he would like to work on her neck again and see if he could loosen it up and help her relax. Respondent then led her to the examination table and "proceeded to rub [her] neck and then he started to take off [her] clothes." While on the examination table, Respondent helped K.C. take off her shirt, shorts, bra, and shoes and the only remaining clothing that she had on was her underwear. After her clothes were removed, K.C. presumed Respondent would cover her with a towel or give her a robe, but he did not provide K.C. with any covering. Instead, Respondent sat behind K.C., massaged her neck, and talked to her "soothingly" for about ten minutes. Respondent then took his hands and rubbed her arms and then moved his hands to her breasts, and then down to her waist and towards her panties. When Respondent moved toward K.C.'s panties, she would "tense up" and then Respondent would "start rubbing up the top part of her again." Respondent's hands again went toward her underwear and he "put his hand to go under [K.C's] underwear." K.C. was nervous about what was going on and told Respondent that she was uncomfortable. After K.C. told Respondent that she was uncomfortable, he acknowledged that she seemed uncomfortable. Respondent then handed K.C. her clothes, assisted her in sitting up on the examination table, and sat on the table while K.C. dressed herself. After talking to Respondent for about five minutes, K.C. left the doctor's office with a worse headache, feeling distraught. K.C. next saw Respondent a few days later, on a Monday or Tuesday, for an adjustment for a headache and pain. Respondent performed an adjustment on K.C. that day. During this appointment, Respondent, again, told K.C. that he wanted to help and counsel her. He told K.C. about an upcoming gun show and stated that they could talk while driving to the gun show. Later that week, Respondent paged K.C. and asked her to come to his office. In response to Respondent's request, K.C. went to Respondent's office. Once there, Respondent took K.C. to an examination room and talked to her again about the gun show. Respondent again told her that he would like for her to go to the gun show with him so that they could have time to talk. K.C. was in Respondent's office that day about ten minutes and did not receive a treatment. A few days later, on Saturday, K.C. met Respondent at his office to go the gun show. When she got there, Respondent recommended that she leave her car at the office and ride in his Toyota 4-Runner so that they could talk. Respondent stated that he and K.C. were going somewhere in Palmetto, Florida, but they actually ended up at the Manatee Civic Center. While Respondent was driving to the gun show, he told K.C. that he hoped that he was not mistaken as to the dates of the gun show. In fact, when Respondent and K.C. arrived at the Manatee Civic Center, there was no one there. Nevertheless, Respondent pulled his car into a space in the parking lot on the side of the building. Respondent left the car running and took off his seat belt as he talked to K.C. At some point, Respondent kicked his shoes off and loosened his pants and/or pulled them down, reached over toward K.C., took off her seat belt, told K.C. to get more comfortable, and adjusted her power seat in his Toyota 4-Runner to lean back more. Respondent then touched K.C.'s genitals and proceeded to get on top of her and have intercourse. While on top of her, Respondent pointed out that there were police cars in the back of the parking lot. Once Respondent pointed out the police cars, K.C. observed two or four police cars in the parking lot. Even though there were no policemen in the cars, K.C. expressed concern about the police cars to Respondent. Respondent told K.C. that she should not worry because the windows in his vehicle were tinted. Respondent and K.C. were in the parking lot about 20 minutes, although the intercourse was only three to five minutes. After the intercourse, Respondent put his clothes back on or pulled his pants up and drove back to his office. This was the first time that Respondent and K.C. had intercourse. A few days later, K.C. and Respondent engaged in sexual activity in Respondent’s vehicle during lunch while they drove to Marina Jack’s. Respondent picked up lunch at the hospital and then returned to the parking lot of his office, where K.C. met him. K.C. left her car in the parking lot and got in Respondent's Toyota 4-Runner. Respondent gave K.C. her lunch and then "fingered" her while she ate her lunch as he drove to Marina Jack's. During the period between August and October 1999, K.C. went to Respondent's house on Siesta Key. The house was in a gated community, and in order to gain entry, K.C. told the guard at the gate that she was going to Respondent's house and would give the guard her name or another name that Respondent had told her to use. At other times, K.C. would follow Respondent through the gate in her car. Some of these visits were on weekdays during Respondent's lunch break. During some of those visits, K.C. and Respondent would talk and have intercourse. K.C. and Respondent had intercourse at Respondent's house about ten times. One Saturday between August and October 1999, K.C. went to Respondent's house after he invited her to come out and talk to him and go to the beach. That day Respondent met K.C. somewhere in town and drove her to his house. When they arrived at Respondent's house, K.C. took out a bathing suit and went upstairs to change. It is unclear whether K.C. and Respondent had intercourse or engaged in any sexual activity on this day. K.C. contemporaneously reported the sexual relationship with Respondent to her husband and to a minister who had known and counseled her before she met Respondent. K.C. told her minister that the sexual activities with Respondent had occurred in Respondent's office, vehicle, and home. K.C. and Respondent had intercourse a couple of times at the home of a friend of Respondent's, Carole, that was on Tangerine Street and at the home of one of Respondent's friends, Jack Kentish. One Sunday morning in late September, K.C. went to Respondent’s office.2 While there, she went into an examination room to change clothes so that she would have attire appropriate to accompany Respondent to a gun show. About that time, K.C.'s husband showed up at Respondent's office, knocked on the office door, expressed his displeasure at the fact K.C. was there, and had a verbal confrontation with Respondent. K.C.'s husband stopped at Respondent's office after he saw his wife's car parked there. The incident described in paragraph 29, led to Respondent sending a letter dated September 28, 1999, to K.C., advising her that his professional relationship with her would terminate within 30 days. The reason for the 30 days was to allow K.C. time to find another physician. In October 2000, K.C. was admitted to Sarasota Memorial Hospital suffering from major depression, Fioricet dependence, and chronic pain. At or near the time of her admission and at this proceeding, K.C. acknowledged that she had some loss of memory surrounding the events related to the three-month period in which Respondent engaged in improper sexual conduct with her.3
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Osteopathic Medicine, enter a final order finding that Respondent violated Subsection 450.015(1)(l) and Section 459.0141, Florida Statutes, and Subsection 459.015(1)(bb), Florida Statutes (1999), now 459.015(1)(pp), Florida Statutes, and suspending his license to practice osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida for one year and imposing an administrative fine of $2,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of August, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of August, 2003.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Lawrence D. Urban was a licensed osteopathic physician in Florida having been issued license number OS 001232. From January 1983 through at least March 17, 1984, Respondent maintained offices in Clearwater and Zephyrhills. He practiced in the Clearwater office on Monday, Wednesday and Friday of each week and in the Zephyrhills office on Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday. Respondent employed Wendell Bloom to work in the Zephyrhills office as a business manager and assistant to Respondent. Bloom had no medically related license such as physician's assistant, nurse, technician, etc. As an assistant to Respondent, Bloom drew blood, performed vascular analyses, mixed IV solutions, and administered IV solutions. He worked at the Zephyrhills office Monday through Friday. Bloom had standing orders from Respondent that if a new patient came in Bloom would draw a blood sample, send it to the lab for analysis and make an appointment for the patient to see Respondent when the results of the blood analysis was received. Respondent described his practice in Zephyrhills as holistic, involving nutrition, chelation, and cancer therapy using laetril. Chelation treatment involves the intravenous injections of solutions containing EDTA (Ethylenadiaminetetracetic acid), vitamins, including B12, B complex and C, and the minerals, calcium and magnesium. On many occasions Bloom commenced IV chelation injections containing EDTA before Respondent arrived at the office and completed some of these after Respondent had left the office. On at least five (5) occasions Bloom injected patients with IV solutions containing EDTA without Respondent being present any time during the procedure. Drawing blood without a doctor present in the office constitutes the practice of medicine. Injecting IV solutions in patients constitutes the practice of medicine without a doctor present. In the Zephyrhills office Respondent referred to Bloom as Dr. Bloom in the presence of patients. No sign or disclaimer was posted in the office that Bloom had no prior medical training and was not licensed in any medically related health professional field in Florida. Respondent knew that patients might believe Bloom to be a medical doctor. In administering an IV solution to a patient there is always a danger of an allergic reaction or an anaphylactic reaction, even if a patient has previously tolerated the treatment. Respondent acknowledged that serious side affects would result to a patient receiving an IV solution containing EDTA if the patient suffered kidney failure. Bloom also operated the vascular analyzer machine in the office. As described by Bloom, by attaching clips from the machine to the fingers and toes the machine will tell you if there is any kind of clotting or obstruction any place within the cardiovascular system. Further, by putting transmission gel on the clip and holding it over an artery, transmissions from the clip with the return echo is transformed onto a chart which will denote the elasticity of the artery. This machine is not universally accepted in the medical profession. By Final Order entered August 26, 1983 (Exhibit 1) the Florida Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners found Respondent guilty of filing false reports, fee splitting, and abetting an unlicensed person to practice osteopathic medicine. He was sentenced to a reprimand, placed on probation for six (6) months and directed to report to the Board at the end of the probationary period. If, at this time, Respondent's report on the status of his practice satisfies the Board that the financial aspects of his practice is in accordance with the law, the reprimand will be withdrawn. Terms and conditions of the probation were not delineated. Respondent appeared before the Board at its March 17, 1984 meeting. After Respondent reported that the financial aspects of his practice were poor, but in conformity with the law, one of the Board members inquired if Respondent was working with any non-osteopathic physicians in his practice, which was one of the accusations for which he was reprimanded and placed on probation. At this point Respondent told the Board that he had a helper who was a "non- anything" who was drawing blood, doing vascular analyses of patients, giving IVs to patients undergoing chelation therapy and whatever Respondent told him to do. (Exhibit 2) After hearing these disturbing facts the Board voted to extend the Respondent's probation while an investigation of his practice was conducted. The charges considered at this hearing were those resulting from that investigation.
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations set forth in the Amended Administrative Complaint dated November 19, 1998, and, if so, the penalty which should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Board of Osteopathic Medicine is the entity responsible for imposing discipline on those licensed in Florida as osteopathic physicians. Section 459.015(2), Florida Statutes. The Department of Health is the state agency responsible for investigating and prosecuting disciplinary cases in which a probable cause panel of the Board of Osteopathic Medicine has found probable cause to support the filing of a formal complaint against a licensee. Section 455.621(4), Florida Statutes. Christopher Wayne, D.O., was at the times material to this proceeding, and is currently, a licensed osteopathic physician in the State of Florida, specializing in family practice and certified by the American Osteopathic Board of Family Physicians. Dr. Wayne operated at the times material to this proceeding, and currently operates, a primary care medical practice under the name of Dr. Christopher Wayne, D.O., Incorporated ("Company"). At the times material to this proceeding, the Company's office was located on the fifth floor in a building adjacent to the Mount Sinai Medical Center in Miami Beach, Florida. At the times material to this proceeding, Dr. Wayne and the physicians employed in his practice had staff privileges at several hospitals and medical centers in the Dade County area. However, at the times material to this proceeding, Dr. Wayne did not have staff privileges at Parkway Regional Medical Center ("Parkway"). At least one physician employed by the Company, Agustin Andrade, had staff privileges at Parkway. Dr. Wayne began discussions with Agustin Andrade with respect to his possible employment by the Company as a family practice physician in or around June 1995. Dr. Andrade is a medical doctor who completed a three-year residency in internal medicine and a two-year fellowship in endocrinology at the University of Miami, in Miami, Florida; he is board-certified in internal medicine and endocrinology. Dr. Andrade was also a citizen of Ecuador at the times material to this proceeding. On July 7, 1995, Dr. Andrade signed an Employment Agreement with the Company, and he began working for the Company in October 1996. The delay was attributable to Dr. Andrade's need to obtain legal residency and authority to work in this country. He obtained legal residency and authorization to work in this country in June 1996, and he obtained his green card, representing the permanent right to stay in this country, in February 1997. As part of the process for obtaining a green card, Dr. Andarde completed a HUD J-1 Visa Waiver Policy Affidavit and Agreement in which he agreed to the following conditions: I understand and agree that in consideration for a waiver, . . . I shall render primary medical services to patients, including the indigent, for a minimum of forty (40) hours per week within a USPHS designated HPSA. Such service . . . shall continue for a period of at least two (2) years. I agree to incorporate all the terms of this HUD J-1 Visa Waiver Affidavit and Agreement into any and all employment agreements I enter pursuant to paragraph 3 and to include in each such agreement a liquidated damages clause, of not less than $250,000 payable to the employer. This damages clause shall be activated by my termination of employment, initiated by me for any reason, only if my termination occurs before fulfilling the minimum two year service agreement. Soon after he began working for the Company, Dr. Andrade's professional relationship with Dr. Wayne deteriorated rapidly for a variety of reasons. After two weeks, Dr. Andrade told Dr. Wayne that he wanted a raise because he had learned that the other physician employed by the Company at the time was paid a higher salary than he was paid. Dr. Andrade also accused Dr. Wayne of forcing him to engage in what Dr. Andrade termed "illegalities," of forcing him to see too many patients at too many different hospitals, and of requiring him to see pediatric patients, which he did not feel he was qualified to treat. On January 7, 1997, Dr. Wayne and Dr. Andrade were the only physicians employed by the Company. On the evening of January 7, 1997, medical orders were given by telephone for three of Dr. Andrade's patients hospitalized at Parkway. The physician order forms indicate that the person giving the orders was Dr. Andrade. Dr. Andrade denies giving these orders, and he subsequently refused to accept responsibility for the orders by declining to sign them. At around 8:00 p.m. on January 9, 1997, Dr. Andrade went to Parkway and spoke with the nurses in Parkway's surgical intensive care unit, specifically Ann Bravi, a registered nurse who has been employed at Parkway for twenty-eight years. Dr. Andrade told Nurse Bravi that someone was impersonating him and giving telephone orders for his patients. While Dr. Andrade was standing beside her, Nurse Bravi called Dr. Andrade's answering service regarding one of his patients. The call was returned by someone who identified himself to Nurse Bravi as Dr. Andrade and who told her that there would be "[n]o orders for now." Nurse Bravi cannot recall whether she telephoned the answering service at Dr. Andrade's request or on her own initiative, nor could she recall whether she called the answering service number noted on the patient's chart or called a number that Dr. Andrade gave her. On Friday, January 10, 1997, Dr. Andrade terminated his employment with the Company, accusing Dr. Wayne of having breached the Employment Agreement by impersonating him with the staff at Parkway and by giving telephone orders on Dr. Andrade's patients at Parkway. On Monday, January 13, 1997, Dr. Andrade was distributing business cards indicating that he was practicing medicine with another physician, whose offices were located on the first floor of the building in which the Company's office was located. The Company has sued Dr. Andrade for damages resulting from breach of contract, and Dr. Andrade has sued Dr. Wayne for defamation. At the time of the final hearing, both lawsuits were pending in the Circuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida. If an osteopathic physician gives medical orders by telephone for a patient who is not his patient and who is hospitalized in a facility at which he does not have medical staff privileges, then that physician has acted in a manner inconsistent with ethics and the standard of care practiced by an osteopathic family physician. The osteopathic physician has further acted in a manner inconsistent with ethics and the standard of care practiced by an osteopathic family physician if that physician gives telephone orders using the name of another physician. The evidence presented by the Department is insufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Dr. Wayne gave telephone orders for any of Dr. Andrade's patients at the Parkway Regional Medical Center or that he identified himself as Dr. Andrade in telephone conversations with staff at the Parkway Regional Medical Center.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Osteopathic Medicine enter a final order dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint against Christopher Wayne, D.O. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 1999.
The Issue The Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners, has brought an action by Administrative Complaint against the Respondent, George Warren Frison, Jr., D.O., charging that on January 4 and 31, 1978, and February 28, 1978, the Respondent issued prescriptions for a substance commonly known as Quaalude, otherwise known as Methaqualone, and prescriptions for a substance known as Biphetamine, a material, mixture, compound or preparation which contains Amphetamines; both types of prescriptions being controlled substances within the meaning of Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. The complaint further alleges that the prescriptions were delivered to a patient, George DeBella, also known as George J. Conlon, without good faith and not in the course of the Respondent's professional practice, and, therefore, unlawfully. See Section 893.03, Florida Statutes. Finally, the Administrative Complaint alleges that these acts on the part of the Respondent are prohibited by Sections 893.05 and 893.13, Florida Statutes, and are violative of Subsections 459.14(2)(m) and (n), Florida Statutes, in that the Respondent is guilty of unprofessional conduct and has violated the laws of the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact This cause comes on for consideration based upon the Administrative Complaint filed by the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners. The Respondent in this cause is George Warren Frison, Jr., D.O., who holds license No. 1169 under regulation by the Petitioner. Dr. Frison also held license No. 1169 at all times pertinent to the Administrative Complaint. The Administrative Complaint is a six-count document, the general nature of which has been outlined in the issues statement of this Administrative Complaint. The specific contentions of the Administrative Complaint will be addressed in the course of these findings of fact. The proof offered reveals that on January 4, 1978, an officer of the Daytona Beach Police Department, one George Joseph Conlon, went to the office of the Respondent in DeBarry, Florida. At the time of this visit, Officer Conlon was operating under the assumed name of George DeBella. The purpose of Officer Conlon's visit was to ascertain if the Respondent was issuing prescriptions for drugs, not as a part of Dr. Frison's professional practice, but merely to satiate the desires of the ostensible patient and to profit from the encounter by charging the patient for the office visit. When Conlon entered the doctor's office on January 4, 1978, he was initially seen by Dr. Frison's nurse, who took the patient's blood pressure end weighed him and had the patient complete a form medical history data sheet. Conlon was then ushered in to see the doctor and he proceeded to tell Dr. Frison that he was not a "doper" and was not there for the purpose of getting Dilaudids. He explained to Dr. Frison that he had two jobs and that he was taking small black capsules to keep him going, to which Dr. Frison replied as an interrogatory, "Biphetamines?". Conlon explained that he didn't know what the substance was but that he had been paying $3.00 apiece to buy them from dealers and that arrangement was stupid and could he get some from the Respondent. Dr. Frison asked if Conlon meant a prescription and Conlon replied in the affirmative, and Frison said that he could get a prescription. Conlon in turn asked if he needed to provide other information. Frison responded by asking Conlon, "How many do you take?" Conlon indicated that he took one in the morning and one around six o'clock p.m. There was further conversation in which Conlon explained that he worked in a nursery in the daylight working hours and as a bartender from 2:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. Conlon also made remarks to the effect that he, Conlon, was not a "freak" and that he was trying to be "straight" with the doctor. Dr. Frison inquired if the small black capsules were the only thing that Conlon took and Conlon, in answering the doctor, indicated he had taken several Quaaludes, which helped to put him to sleep at night and that his frequency of using the drug was three times a week, at most. In response to the comments about Quaaludes, Dr. Frison asked Conlon if he would like a prescription for a few Quaaludes, and Conlon agreed. Frison indicated that he would give him a prescription for the Quaaludes, but not in the quantity of the Biphetamines which he was prescribing. There was further conversation about where the patient lived and in answering the Respondent's question, Conlon acknowledged that he lived in Daytona Beach, Florida. The Respondent asked why he didn't ask for a prescription in Daytona Beach and Conlon said it was because someone had mentioned Dr. Frison. There was a final series of remarks about buying drugs from other sources and paying $3.00 and that terminated the conversation. The only other examination or discussion which the doctor had with Conlon on January 4, 1978, involved the doctor taking the pulse of Officer Conlon during their conference. After this meeting between Dr. Frison and Conlon, Dr. Frison prescribed sixty Biphetamines, which is a mixture which contains Amphetamines and is a controlled substance within the meaning of Chapter 893.03, Florida Statutes, specifically a Schedule II item. Dr. Frison also prescribed thirty Quaaludes, also known as Methaqualone, which is a controlled substance within the meaning of Section 893.03, Florida Statutes, and specifically a Schedule II item. A copy of the prescriptions may be found as the Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. Officer Conlon was carrying a concealed transmitter on his person when this visit and the following visits were made to the Respondent's office, and tapes were made of the office conversations which were recorded from Conlon's transmitter. A transcript of the intelligible parts of the conversations between Conlon and the Respondent and Conlon and the Respondent's nurse, that occurred on January 4, 1978, may be found as the Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. On January 31, 1978, Conlon returned to the office of the Respondent in DeBary, Florida. Again, the nurse weighed Conlon and took his blood pressure. Dr. Frison saw the patient and asked how the patient had been progressing and inquired about the number of tablets the patient had taken. Conlon responded that he took two or three a day. Dr. Frison indicated that that number was too many. Dr. Frison also noted that it had only been twenty-seven days since the last visit. Dr. Frison then determined to issue new prescriptions, but to postdate prescriptions for Biphetamines and Quaaludes to February 3, 1978. In connection with this, he prescribed sixty Biphetamines and sixty Quaaludes. There was some discussion held about the nature of the Quaaludes and how the patient, Conlon, might become dependent on them, leading to potential addiction. Frison also indicated that addiction to Biphetamines is one of the worst addictions and that Conlon should cut down the use of them. There was a further inquiry by Dr. Frison about why the patient did not get the prescriptions in Daytona Beach, to which Conlon replied that he was nervous about that. Frison terminated the conversation by telling Conlon not to take too many of the tablets and agreeing to write the prescriptions. There was no further physical examination of the patient or other discussion of the patient's condition. A copy of the prescriptions dated February 3, 1978, may be found as the Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 3 admitted into evidence and a copy of the transcript of the conversation between Conlon and the Respondent to the extent the conversation was intelligible, may be found as the Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4 admitted into evidence. Conlon made another trip to Dr. Frison's DeBary, Florida, office on February 28, 1978. He again was weighed and had his blood pressure taken by the nurse. Conlon was seen by Dr. Frison, who checked his pulse and chest. In the course of the visit, the Respondent inquired about Conlon's health and about his job at the bar. Then Frison stated that he would give Conlon prescriptions for that date, but would not be able to give him prescriptions for Quaalude and Biphetamine in the future. He explained to Conlon the reason for termination of the practice was that he was having problems of an unspecified nature. There was some brief discussion about a skin infection which the Patient had and that ended the conversation between the Respondent and Conlon. (Frison did not treat the patient for the skin condition.) Frison prescribed sixty Biphetamines and sixty Quaaludes and copies of these prescriptions may be found as part of the Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 5 admitted into evidence. As before, the intelligible parts of the conversation, as transcribed, may be found in the copy of that transcribed conversation which is Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6 admitted into evidence. In view of the events which occurred on January 4 and 31, 1978, and February 28, 1978, involving George J. Conlon, the ostensible patient of the Respondent, the Petitioner has brought the Administrative Complaint. Counts I and II deal with the events of January 4, 1978, and the prescription for Quaalude, otherwise known as Methaqualone; and Biphetamine, a material, mixture, compound or preparation containing Amphetamines, Count I dealing with the Quaalude and Count II dealing with the Biphetamine. Counts III and IV deal with the events of January 31, 1978, and the prescription for Quaalude, otherwise known as Methaqualone; and Biphetamine, a material, mixture, compound or preparation containing Amphetamines, Count III dealing with the Quaalude and Count IV dealing with the Biphetamine. Finally, Counts V and VI deal with the events of February 28, 1978, and the prescription for Quaalude, otherwise known as Methaqualone; and Biphetamine, a material, mixture, compound or preparation containing Amphetamines, Count V dealing with the Quaalude and Count VI dealing with the Biphetamines. In each of the counts, the Respondent is accused of delivering drugs without good faith and not in the course of professional practice and thereby unlawfully distributing and dispensing a controlled substance described in Section 893.03, Florida Statutes. According to the allegations, the acts of the Respondent in those instances are prohibited by Sections 893.05 and 893.13, Florida Statutes, and such acts constitute a violation of Subsections 459.14 (2)(m) and (n), Florida Statutes, in showing that the Respondent is guilty of unprofessional conduct and has violated the laws of the State of Florida. The substantive provisions dealing with disciplinary action against the Respondent are found in Subsection 459.14(2)(m), Florida Statutes, and Subsection 459.14(2)(n), Florida Statutes. The former provision states: 459.14(2)(m) A finding of the board that the individual is guilty of immoral or unprofes- sional conduct. Unprofessional conduct shall include any departure from, or failure to conform to, the minimal standards of accept- able and prevailing osteopathic medical prac- tice, without regard to the injury of a patient, or the committing of any act contrary to hon- esty, whether the same is committed in the course of practice or not. The evidential facts shown indicate that the substance commonly known as Quaalude, otherwise known as Methaqualone, a controlled substance within the meaning of Chapter 893, Florida Statutes, and the substance known as Biphetamine, a material, mixture, compound or preparation which contains Amphetamines, a controlled substance within the meaning of Chapter 893, Florida Statutes; were not prescribed in good faith and in the course of the Respondent's professional practice, as required by Section 893.05, Florida Statutes, if the Respondent is to avoid the penalties of the provisions of Section 893.13, Florida Statutes. This lack of good faith constituted unprofessional conduct, in the sense that the Respondent was departing from and failing to conform to the minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing osteopathic medical practice, set out in Subsection 459.14(2)(m), Florida Statutes. In particular, the departure from and failure to conform to those minimal standards is evidenced by the Petitioner's act of prescribing the controlled substance for Conlon when there was no specific complaint of a physical problem. This finding is made in spite of the witnesses who testified in behalf of the Respondent, who claimed that you could prescribe medication for compassionate reasons, and notwithstanding the Respondent's false entry into the medical chart of the patient, Conlon, indicating that the patient was being treated for the condition of being overweight. The Respondent further violated the standards of his professional community by failing to take an adequate history of the patient's condition on the occasions the patient was seen; failing to make an adequate physical examination of the patient on the occasions when the patient was seen; and by not placing reasonable controls over the drugs that were prescribed for the patient, particularly in his failure to warn the patient not to drive or use heavy machinery while under the influence of the medications. The Physician's Desk Reference manual creates a necessity for these cautionary instructions referred to above, and the Respondent should have warned the patient of the medications' possible effects. The Respondent also violated medical practice by postdating the prescriptions which were issued on January 31, 1978. Finally, the Respondent violated the minimum standards of his profession by prescribing Quaaludes and Biphetamines in combination when these drugs are known to have an antagonistic effect in combination. These findings of violations pertain to each date that the patient was seen; January 4 and 31, 1978, and February 28, 1978, involving both the substances, Quaalude and Biphetamine. The other substantive grounds of a violation alleged by the Petitioner deal with Subsection 459.14(2)(n), Florida Statutes, which reads as follows: 459.14 (2)(n) Violation of any statute or law of this state or any other state or terri- tory of the United States or any foreign country, which statute or law relates to the practice of medicine. To establish this violation, it would be necessary for a court of competent jurisdiction to have found the Respondent guilty of a violation of Section 893.13, Florida Statutes. This determination cannot be made by an administrative tribunal and in view of the fact that no court of competent jurisdiction has found such a violation, the Petitioner's claim under Subsection 459.14(2)(n), Florida Statutes, has not been sustained.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners, suspend the Respondent, George Warren Frison, Jr., D.O., for a period of one (1) year for the violations established in Counts I and II; for one year for the violations established in Counts III and IV, to run concurrently with the penalty imposed for Counts I and II; and for one (1) year for the violations established in Counts V and VI, to run concurrently with the penalty imposed for Counts I and II. DONE AND ORDERED this 25th day of July, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald C. LaFace, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1838 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Edward R. Kirkland, Esquire 126 East Jefferson Street Orlando, Florida 32801
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence presented at the hearing, the following facts are found: At all times pertinent to this case, Respondent was licensed to practice osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida under license numbered 0003783. On April 1, 1981, the Florida Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners (Board), through the Department of Professional Regulation (DPR), filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent alleging several violations of Florida Statutes governing the practice of osteopathic medicine. In an effort to forestall an emergency suspension of her license as a result of these allegations, Respondent entered into a Stipulation with the Board whereby she agreed to cancel her certificate to prescribe Schedule II and III, Chapter 893, drugs; to remain enrolled in and comply with all terms of the Impaired Physicians Program; to submit blood and urine samples for drug screening upon request of DPR; and to obey all federal and state laws and regulations pertaining to the practice of osteopathic medicine. On June 10, 1982, the Board, after an informal hearing, entered an order finding that Respondent had violated the various provisions of the statutes as alleged and suspended her license for a period of six months. However, the Board considered and incorporated into its order the aforementioned Stipulation and stayed the suspension, placing Respondent on probation for three years. Sometime in January, 1983, the Secretary of DPR, being made aware of alleged violations of the terms of the probation, entered an order of emergency suspension of Respondent's license, alleging as reasons therefor: That on November 29, 1982, Respondent prescribed Demerol, a Schedule II controlled drug, for a patient, Ernestine Franklin; That on November 10, 1982, Respondent was found in an unconscious state at home. Taken to the hospital, when she regained consciousness, she was disoriented and incoherent; her speech was garbled, and she demonstrated erratic and violent behavior; That on or about December 7, 1982, Respondent prescribed Demerol for Maureen Lyewfong, the cost of which was charged to the Respondent; On December 17, 1982, an unidentified male brought Respondent to the hospital indicating she had snorted cocaine. She would not allow herself to be examined; That on December 24, 1982, Respondent was admitted to North Shore Hospital, Miami, claiming she had suffered an epileptic seizure. During the course of her workup, she indicated she was allergic to Demerol; and That by letter dated December 30, 1982, Dr. Morgan, head of the Impaired Physicians Program, informed DPR that Respondent had diverted for own use Demerol prescribed for her patients and that she had failed to keep appointments for treatment under the program. On January 18, 1983, sometime after the emergency suspension went into effect, the Board through the Department of Professional Regulation filed a seven-count Amended Administrative Complaint seeking to suspend, revoke, or otherwise discipline Respondent's license, listing as grounds for this action basically the same allegations as found in the emergency suspension order. On November 30, 1982, Respondent treated Ernestine Franklin for removal of a pilonidal cyst. Prior to the surgery, Respondent administered an injection of Demerol to the patient from a bottle for which she had written a prescription the previous day. This prescription had been filled at a pharmacy by Nurse Susan Dukes and charged to Respondent's account. When she brought the Demerol back to the office, Dukes placed it in the locked medicine cabinet and told Respondent where she had put it. When she went to set up for Ms. Franklin's surgery, the bottle of Demerol was not there. Dr. Krantz prepared the Demerol injection for the patient herself. The injection did not use up the entire amount on the prescription, and the unused portion was neither given to the patient nor seen in the office again. On December 7, 1982, Respondent wrote a prescription for Demerol for Maureen Lyewfong, the cost for which was charged to Dr. Krantz. Demerol is another name for meperidine hydrochloride, which is a Schedule II substance, as defined in Section 893.03(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981). Respondent first entered the Impaired Physicians Program (IPP) under the supervision of Dr. Dolores Morgan in March, 1981,,because of her abuse of Demerol, Quaaludes, and cocaine. After a month in the hospital, she was released to an outpatient program which, because of her failure to progress properly, resulted in her going to the inpatient facility at Ridgeview, Georgia, where she spent several months. According to the terms of the IPP for Respondent, when she was discharged from the Ridgeview inpatient treatment center, she was to be in the program for two years. Since the IPP main office is in Miami and Respondent practices in West Palm Beach, she was placed under the supervision of a doctor in her area. From June, 1982, the date of the Stipulation, to December, 1982, Dr. Morgan heard nothing to indicate Respondent was not living up to the terms of the agreement. However, in December, 1982, Dr. Morgan was contacted by Dr. Joan Barice, local chairman of the IPP, who informed her that Dr. Krantz was missing required meetings of Narcotics Anonymous, as well as by the administrator of a local hospital, Mr. Steven Southerland, to the effect that Dr. Krantz was not performing properly. As a result, Dr. Morgan set up an appointment with Respondent for an interview on December 23, 1982, which Respondent did not keep. Another appointment was set up to discuss the matter, but before the date scheduled for the meeting, Dr. Morgan was advised Respondent was admitted to a hospital in Miami for drug detoxification. At this point, Dr. Morgan reported the latter to DPR. As will be seen in the succeeding paragraphs, this admission was not for drug detoxification, but for epileptic seizures. On December 17, 1982, at approximately 5:15 p.m., Respondent was taken by paramedics to the emergency room at Jupiter Hospital, Jupiter, Florida. At the time she was first seen by the paramedics, an empty vial of Demerol was found in her possession. When found, at her office, she was unconscious for five to ten minutes and, upon regaining consciousness, appeared drowsy. However, by the time she was seen by the emergency room nurse, Mr. Pollack, she appeared to be coherent. She indicated to him she was allergic to Demerol and had had a seizure earlier in the day because the level of Dilantin, a drug used to control epileptic seizures, in her blood was not high enough. In fact, on December 23, 1982, Respondent contacted Dr. Jack Kammerman, an internal medicine specialist on the staff at North Shore Hospital in Miami. She explained her symptoms, and Dr. Kammerman, who knew of Respondent's background through her mother, who had worked for him, suggested she immediately be hospitalized for tests. Dr. Krantz agreed, and the initial tests taken failed to reflect a reason for her seizures. A second CAT scan ruled out a tumor, so a neurologist was called in for consultation. This expert's initial and final diagnoses were "ideopathic epilepsy," the term "ideopathic" meaning "of unknown cause." At the time of admission, blood and urine samples were taken for use in tests. The first blood screen result showed traces of meperedine hydrochloride (Demerol) and Darvon, a pain reliever. A second screening of more blood taken from the same sample, but run later, reflected minute amounts of Demerol, which could indicate that the patient had taken the substance within the prior 72 hours. It was the pathologist's opinion that Demerol had been taken by Respondent. On the other hand, a false positive test result for Demerol in the blood is possible because many external factors, such as infection or the menstrual period (which Respondent was experiencing at the time), could affect it. I find, however, that based on the findings of the pathologist, an expert in his field, the substance in Respondent's blood was in fact Demerol. Respondent's seizures are now completely controlled through the use of the drugs Dilantin and phenobarbital. Dr. Kammerman is of the opinion that an osteopathic physician who suffers from controlled seizures can safely practice within the disciplines of family practice and internal medicine. Classically, seizure patients can predict the onset of a seizure due to the symptoms they experience before the seizure. Once the patient experiences the preseizure symptoms, he or she may prevent the seizure from occurring depending upon how fast the medicine can be gotten into the bloodstream in amounts sufficient to prevent it. Though Dr. Kammerman has never seen the Respondent go through a seizure and therefore does not know how she would react, he knows it is not uncommon for a patient who has just come out of the unconscious state of a seizure to be disoriented, confused, aggressive, and talkative, even to the extent of refusing help. Mr. Steven L. Southerland, Executive Director of Community Hospital of Palm Beach and one of the individuals who contacted Dr. Morgan regarding Respondent's aberrant behavior, knew her when she was on staff in the Department of Family Practice of that hospital. In the course of his official duties, information was brought to his attention that a patient admitted to the hospital by the Respondent was not seen by her afterwards for several days. This type of conduct was confirmed by Respondent's nurse, Ms. Dukes, who noticed a decided deterioration in Respondent evidenced by days of forgetfulness and confusion. On the other hand, two qualified osteopathic physicians who worked with Dr. Krantz on staff at Community Hospital and who have observed her in the practice of osteopathic medicine off and on for six or more years are satisfied that she is an extremely competent physician. She has assisted one, Dr. Michael A. Longo, in surgery, and he found her work to be excellent. He is aware of her epileptic-based seizures, and this does not change his high opinion of her competence. The other, Dr. Kirsch, who has also collaborated with her on the treatment of several patients, has never had the slightest problem with her, nor has he ever seen her in any way incapacitated.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law rendered herein, it is RECOMMENDED THAT: The Respondent be found subject to disciplinary action for a violation of Subsections 459.015(1)(1), (q), (r), (s), and (t), Florida Statutes; The license of the Respondent, Dr. Barbara Anne Krantz, to practice osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida be revoked; The revocation be suspended for a period of three years and that she be limited to practice while under the supervision of a licensed osteopathic physician; and, with the further provision, The restrictions and limitations continue for such time and under such terms and conditions as the Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners determines necessary to ensure protection of Respondent's patients and her ability to practice osteopathic medicine with reasonable skill and safety. RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Administration 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William H. Pruitt, Esquire Pruitt & Pruitt 501 South Flagler Drive Suite 501 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Mr. Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ms. Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent, Alexandra Konowal, D.O., violated Subsections 459.015(1)(x) and (o), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a licensed osteopathic physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number OS 7169. Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of osteopathic medicine pursuant to Section 20.42, Florida Statutes. On July 20, 1998, Respondent first saw Patient B. M., a 75-year-old female, at Eye Health of Fort Myers, for a complaint of poor vision and cataracts. Respondent scheduled cataract surgery for July 30, 1998, at an outpatient surgery center. On Thursday, July 30, 1998, at approximately 10:30 a.m., Respondent performed the surgery, removing the lens of Patient B. M.‘s left eye and replacing it with an implant. Patient B. M. was discharged from the surgery center at 11:17 a.m., with instructions to go to Eye Health of Fort Myers for follow-up examination that afternoon. On Saturday, August 1, 1998, Patient B. M. telephoned Eye Health early in the morning complaining of inability to see from the left eye and severe pain in the left eye. At about 9:00 a.m., August 1, 1998, Patient B. M. was examined at Eye Health of Fort Myers by James Campbell, an optometrist with Eye Health. Dr. Campbell found residual cortex in the left eye, with corneal edema, but observed no pus in the eye. Dr. Campbell changed the antibiotic eye drops for the patient. At approximately 10:00 a.m., on August 1, 1998, Dr. Campbell had a telephone conference with Respondent and Dr. Franz to discuss the symptoms of Patient B. M. At approximately 4:45 p.m., on August 1, 1998, Patient B. M. again called Eye Health complaining of unbearable pain. Dr. Campbell, in turn, called Respondent at approximately 5:00 p.m. to advise her of Patient B. M.’s complaints. During the 5:00 p.m. telephone call from Dr. Campbell to Respondent, Dr. Campbell discussed the possible diagnosis of endophthalmitis. At 5:36 p.m., August 1, 1998, Respondent spoke with Patient B. M. on the telephone for nine minutes. During the 5:36 p.m. telephone call, Patient B. M. reported shooting pains in her eye and that her vision was bad. During the 5:36 p.m. telephone call, Respondent advised Patient B. M. that she needed to be evaluated. When Patient B. M. said she could not come in, Respondent advised of the possible risks including damage to the optic nerve from excessive pressure and infection. Respondent suggested going to the emergency room and offered to provide transportation, but Patient B. M. refused. During the 5:36 p.m. telephone call, Respondent recommended that Patient B. M. take Percocet that the Patient already had for the pain; Respondent would call in a prescription for erythromycin ointment and told the patient to call back if the eye didn’t improve. Following the 5:36 p.m. telephone call, Respondent did phone in a prescription for erythromycin to a Walgreens Pharmacy near Patient B. M.'s residence. It appears the patient did not pick up this prescription. The "standard of care" expert witness offered by Petitioner found it "difficult to answer" a hypothetical question directed to the "standard of care" of Respondent's care of Patient B. M., incorporating all relevant facts set forth hereinabove in these Findings of Facts and, essentially, failed to render an opinion incorporating all relevant facts; therefore, Petitioner has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent failed to practice osteopathic medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar osteopathic physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances as alleged in this matter. Respondent prepared an office note dated August 1, 1998, 7:30 p.m., as a record of Respondent’s telephone call to Patient B. M. This note was, in fact, prepared on the morning of August 3, 1998. The note reads in its entirety: 8/1/98 7:30 PM Spoke with patient. States having pain in left eye. Recommended artificial tears for shooting pain, and continue using Ocuflox and Pred Forte. Patient states she has been taking Percocet every four hours with no relief, but she takes Percocet regularly for neuropathy. Told to use two every four hours and call if no improvement. While the August 1, 1998, office note records a great deal of relevant information, Respondent's testimony revealed it does not reflect Patient B. M.'s refusal to come in for evaluation, Respondent's warnings regarding the risks of not being evaluated, an offer of transportation to an emergency room, or a prescription order for Erythromycin. Petitioner's expert witness testified on deposition that, "I'm not sure what the standard of care is" for charting weekend telephone calls. When he receives a telephone call at home from a patient, he makes notes on "a scrap of paper" and later records the note in the patient's record. Respondent testified that she now keeps a book at home in which she records every conversation when patients call her at home; she then brings the book to her office for reference in recording the entire conversation in the patient's record. However, she does not believe that anyone in her practice does it the way she now does. There is no standard procedure in the practice of osteopathic medicine for memorializing conversations in the patient's record between a physician and patient which occur outside the office or hospital setting. On August 3, 1998, Patient B. M. returned to Respondent’s office complaining of no vision and sharp pain. Respondent’s examination revealed Patient B. M.’s left eye to be swollen and with hypopyon (internal pus). Respondent diagnosed endophthalmitis and immediately referred Patient B. M. to a retinal specialist. On August 3, 1998, Patient B. M. was seen by the retinal specialist who found near total hypopyon, so that neither the iris nor any posterior detail could be visualized. Ultrasound showed dense mobile vitreal opacities, primarily anteriorly. The specialist recommended a vitrectomy with injection of antibiotics, and discussed at length the possibility of loss of vision, loss of the eye and uncertainty of any visual benefit. He performed the surgery for Patient B. M. the night of August 3, 1998. Endophthalmitis is a recognized complication of cataract surgery that occurs in less than one percent of patients, but does not presumptively indicate a departure from the standard of care. The standard of care required Respondent see Patient B. M. and treat her for endophthalmitis on August 1, 1998, or to warn Patient B. M. on August 1, 1998, of the serious consequences of endophthalmitis if Patient B. M. did not have an examination. The evidence revealed that Respondent warned Patient B. M. of the serious consequences of her failure to go to the clinic or an emergency room for treatment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED, that the Department of Health, Board of Osteopathy, enter a final order finding that Respondent, Alexandra Konowal, D.O., is not guilty of violating Subsections 459.015(1)(x) and (o), Florida Statutes, and dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed in this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce A. Campbell, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 39A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Bruce M. Stanley, Jr., Esquire Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt 1715 Monroe Street Post Office Box 280 Fort Myers, Florida 33902-0280 William H. Buckhalt, Executive Director Board of Osteopathic Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C06 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Theodore M. Henderson, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
