The Issue Whether, under the provisions of sections 604.15 - 604.34, Florida Statutes, Lester Towell Distributors, Inc., is entitled to recover $2,098 for agricultural products ordered by and delivered to VBJ Packing, Inc
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made. Lester Towell is a dealer in Florida-grown agricultural products. VBJ is a dealer in Florida-grown agricultural products. On May 22, 1995, VBJ placed an order with Lester Towell to purchase a quantity of extra-large green bell peppers. Lester Towell delivered 200 boxes of such peppers to VBJ on May 23, 1995. To fill this order, Lester Towell purchased 63 boxes of peppers from producer Ott Farms, Inc., in Estero, Florida, and 137 boxes from producer Thomas Produce, in Boca Raton, Florida. Lester Towell did not act as agent for these producers; it purchased the products outright. On May 22, 1995, VBJ placed an order with Lester Towell to purchase a quantity of yellow corn. Lester Towell delivered 100 boxes of such corn to VBJ on May 24, 1995. To fill this order, Lester Towell purchased 100 boxes of corn from producer Wilkinson-Cooper, in Belle Glade, Florida. Lester Towell did not act as agent for this producer; it purchased the products outright. On May 24, 1995, VBJ placed an order with Lester Towell to purchase a quantity of jalapeno peppers, white corn, and red radishes. Lester Towell delivered two boxes of jalapeno peppers, 26 boxes of white corn, and 20 boxes of red radishes to VBJ on May 25, 1995. To fill this order, Lester Towell purchased 2 boxes of jalapeno peppers from producer Ott Farms, Inc., in Estero, Florida, and 26 boxes of white corn and 20 boxes of red radishes from producer American Growers in Belle Glade, Florida. Lester Towell did not act as agent for these producers; it purchased the products outright. Lester Towell filed its complaint with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services ("Department") pursuant to the provisions of section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes, because VBJ did not pay for the products identified above. There is, however, no evidence to establish that Lester Towell was a producer or the agent or representative of a producer with respect to the products for which it seeks payment. It is, therefore, not a "person" entitled to file a complaint with the Department against VBJ and its surety.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order dismissing the complaint of Lester Towell Distributors, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 3nd day of July 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July 1996
The Issue Whether the Respondent should be fined for violation of Section 509.261, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact The Division is the state agency charged with regulating the operation of hotel and restaurant establishments pursuant to Section 20.165 and Chapter 509, Florida Statutes. The Respondent has at all times material hereto has been subject to the Division of Hotels and Restaurants' (Division) jurisdiction. The Respondent's last known business address is 1995 North Orange Street, Mount Dora, Florida 32757. On June 22, 2002, Henry Christwell, a Division inspector, observed the Respondent operating an outdoor, roadside food vending facility in the vicinity of US Highway 441 in Lake County, Florida. The operation consisted of a tent with a smoker partially under the tent. Christwell inspected the Respondent's premises, and noted that the Respondent was operating without a license; did not have proper hand-washing facilities; and did not have the smoker enclosed. Based on those deficiencies, Christwell issued a Administrative Determination and Order of Closure for the Mobile Food Vendor on that same day, and the Respondent immediately closed the facility, but not before Christwell purchased some ribs from the Respondent. An Administrative Complaint was issued on July 16, 2002, alleging the Respondent's violation of Chapter 509, Florida Statutes, for operating without a license; not having hand-washing facilities; and not having the smoker enclosed. The Respondent elected to dispute the factual allegations of the Administrative Complaint, and timely requested a hearing in accordance with Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. The factual allegations were: Operating without a license. No hand washing facilities available. The smoker was in operation without an enclosure so food was unprotected from possible contamination. At hearing, the Respondent did not controvert the allegations; however, he maintained that there is confusion over when such a facility must be licensed. For example, a local bait shop in the area in which the Respondent was operating does not have its smoker enclosed. Mr. Christwell advised that, because the bait shop sells soft drinks and snack foods, it is not regulated by the Department although it sells food to the public. The Respondent, who is the minister of a local African Methodist Episcopal Church, pointed out that had he been operating on the church's premises, he would have also been exempt. Mr. Christwell agreed that he would not be subject to regulation on the church's premises. The Respondent stated his intent was not to break the law, and he did not believe that he was required to obtain a license. Everyone agreed that on August 6, 2002, the Respondent became licensed for operation as a mobile food vendor. The Respondent also claims he had coolers filled with water in order that he could wash his hands. The fact that the alleged sanitary violations existed did not prevent Mr. Christwell from purchasing ribs from the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order finding that the Respondent violated the statutes as alleged and ordering him to pay an administrative penalty in the amount of $100.00 due and payable to the Division of Hotels within 30 calendar days of the date of this Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael E. Kennedy Mike's Tasty BBQ 1995 North Orange Street Mount Dora, Florida 32757 Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Geoff Luebkemann, Director Division of Hotels and Restaurants Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
The Issue Whether Petitioner demonstrated that she was terminated from employment by Respondent, Florida Department of Health- Volusia (Respondent or FDOH-Volusia), as the result of an unlawful employment practice based on her identification with a protected class, or as retaliation for Petitioner’s opposition to a practice which is an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a provider of health services in Volusia County, Florida. Among the programs administered by FDOH-Volusia is the Women, Infants, and Children program (WIC). WIC is a federally-funded nutrition program, which provides healthy foods, nutrition education and counseling, breastfeeding support, and referrals for health care and community services. At all times relevant to this proceeding, FDOH-Volusia operated WIC health clinics in Daytona Beach, New Smyrna Beach, Orange City, and Pierson. Petitioner began working for FDOH-Volusia in June 2010, as a nutrition program director. In her capacity as nutrition program director, Petitioner was responsible for certain management activities of WIC. The State of Florida maintains close supervision of WIC. FDOH-Volusia is required to provide an annual Nutrition Plan (the Plan) to the State. The Plan is a report of WIC operations, sites, hours of operation, various objectives, local agency plans for increasing participation, local agency disaster plan, and staffing. As nutrition program director, Petitioner is responsible for preparing the Plan, and submitting it for revisions and/or final approval by FDOH-Volusia’s administrator. Ms. Boswell became the administrator of FDOH-Volusia on or about April 1, 2016. Dr. Husband, who is African-American, became Petitioner’s direct supervisor beginning in July 2016. As Petitioner’s direct supervisor, Dr. Husband provided oversight of WIC. In 2016, FDOH-Volusia consolidated its Deland and Deltona WIC offices into the office in Orange City. Petitioner was very involved in the move and was, during the period of the move, reassigned from her primary duties in Daytona Beach to duties in Orange City. By all accounts, the move went well. On September 23, 2016, Ms. Boswell requested that Petitioner meet with her and Dr. Husband to discuss the draft Plan provided by Petitioner on September 21, 2016, and for Ms. Boswell and Dr. Husband to provide comments, suggestions, and revisions to the Plan, which was due for submission to the State of Florida on September 30, 2016. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the steps necessary to get the Plan in final form for submission. At the onset of the September 23, 2016, meeting, Ms. Boswell complimented Petitioner and her staff for getting DOH-Volusia’s new Orange City location “up and going.” Petitioner responded that “it’s good to hear something positive after so much negative.” The comment was directed at Dr. Husband, who Petitioner thought had been negative towards various aspects of her job performance. Petitioner’s comment led to tensions between Petitioner and Dr. Husband. Both said, at one time or another during the meeting, words to the effect of “don’t speak to me like that.” Ms. Boswell became a little uncomfortable with the interaction between the two. During the September 23, 2016, meeting, a number of deficiencies in the draft Plan were identified, including grammatical and syntax errors, discussion that did not align with the corresponding graphs, and a lack of data to support the Plan conclusions. Dr. Husband gave guidance and feedback on the Plan. Ms. Boswell indicated that, but for Petitioner’s comment regarding Dr. Husband’s negativity, the meeting was otherwise professional. At the hearing, Petitioner explained that Dr. Husband made other negative comments to her at various times, stating that at a meeting with the director of nursing regarding WIC work schedules, Dr. Husband said “we’re not going to nitpick”; and that on another occasion during a discussion on the difficulty of recruiting and retaining staff at base salary, Dr. Husband said to Petitioner “that’s the way you designed it.” According to Petitioner, Dr. Husband made similar comments to other of her direct reports. Dr. Husband testified at the hearing that she thought -- before and after the September 23, 2016, meeting -- that Petitioner was insubordinate, disrespectful to employees and supervisors, and rude. Petitioner would take meeting notes in red ink when she perceived instances of “negativity” and “unacceptable behavior” from her direct supervisor, which she described as her “red flag system.” Petitioner argued that since she “spoke up and spoke out” during the September 23, 2016, meeting, she has been the subject of retaliation by Ms. Boswell and Dr. Husband. She expressed her belief that Ms. Boswell was upset that Petitioner criticized Dr. Husband because Dr. Husband was Ms. Boswell’s direct report, i.e., that Petitioner’s criticism “was a reflection on her.” On or about October 5, 2016, Petitioner was informed that her duty station was being changed from Daytona Beach to New Smyrna Beach. Petitioner testified that she posed four questions to Dr. Husband as to the reasons for the transfer and that, in her opinion, Dr. Husband’s responses did not justify the action. Petitioner felt that as the WIC nutrition program director, she should be in Daytona Beach, the largest administrative office. Thus, Petitioner could think of no reason for the move other than retaliation for her criticism of Dr. Husband. Ms. Boswell testified credibly that the reason for Petitioner’s transfer was that New Smyrna Beach was reopening WIC services at the office. In light of how well things went with the opening of the Orange City office, she wanted Petitioner to go to New Smyrna Beach to make sure that location was up and running. She testified that the reassignment was not a punishment, rather, “that was her job” to make sure WIC was running well. Her testimony is credited. In addition to the fact that Dr. Boswell had perfectly legitimate reasons for having Petitioner cover the New Smyrna Beach office, it is clear that Petitioner suffered no adverse employment action as a result. Petitioner lives between Daytona Beach and New Smyrna Beach, and the New Smyrna Beach office is no further from her home than the Daytona Beach office. Petitioner’s pay was not changed, her title was not changed, and her benefits were not changed.1/ More to the point, Petitioner neither pled nor proved that the change in duty station had anything to do with discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; that it was taken because Petitioner opposed any practice engaged in by FDOH-Volusia based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; or that it was based on Petitioner having made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing regarding conduct based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. On or about October 18, 2016, Petitioner received a Documented Counseling and Performance Notification (Documented Counseling) from Dr. Husband. The Documented Counseling included a number of deficiencies in performance, and several corrective measures. The deficiencies included: that Petitioner failed to monitor and spend allocated WIC funding during the 2015-16 fiscal year; that the Plan submitted by Petitioner was rejected by the administrator for lack of detail, grammatical errors, and poor work product, and when the Plan was finally completed it was discovered that Petitioner’s staff performed the majority of the work; that the WIC participation rate (65 percent) was significantly less than the program goal (85 percent); and that Petitioner failed to support efforts to refer WIC clients to the dental hygienist at the Orange City location. The Documented Counseling also reflected that Petitioner had been disrespectful to Ms. Boswell and Dr. Husband. Petitioner refused to sign the Documented Counseling to acknowledge her receipt. Petitioner provided excuses for the deficiencies noted, e.g., she used most of the allocated WIC funding; the draft Plan was mostly complete, and she had never before been required to submit a draft nine days before its final submission date; she was only required to increase WIC participation by four percent per year; it was not in the WIC scope of work to facilitate clients to get dental services, just to refer them; she objected to co-location of the dental hygienist in the WIC office and, in any event, referrals were not the responsibility of management, only staff. None of Petitioner’s explanations were convincing. Rather, the testimony of Ms. Boswell and Dr. Husband that the Documented Counseling was completely performance-based and had nothing to do with the September 23, 2016, meeting, was compelling and is accepted. More to the point, Petitioner neither pled nor proved that the Documented Counseling had anything to do with discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; that it was taken because Petitioner opposed any practice engaged in by FDOH-Volusia based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; or that it was based on Petitioner having made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing regarding conduct based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. On or about December 16, 2016, Petitioner received an oral reprimand. The oral reprimand noted that Petitioner violated prior instruction and FDOH-Volusia written policy regarding absence from work and reporting such absences to her supervisor by telephone. The oral reprimand was documented. Petitioner refused to sign the oral reprimand documentation to acknowledge her receipt. Petitioner acknowledged that prior notice of absences is important so that FDOH-Volusia could make sure personnel were available to perform clinical services. Despite Petitioner’s prior knowledge that she would not be at work on November 28, 2016, she did not call her supervisor, Dr. Husband, until after 8:00 a.m. on November 28, 2016. She left an earlier voicemail with a direct report. The testimony of Ms. Boswell and Dr. Husband that the oral reprimand was completely performance-based and had nothing to do with the September 23, 2016, meeting, was compelling and is accepted. More to the point, Petitioner neither pled nor proved that the oral reprimand had anything to do with discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; that it was taken because Petitioner opposed any practice engaged in by FDOH-Volusia based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; or that it was based on Petitioner having made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing regarding conduct based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. On April 12, 2017, Petitioner was required to participate in an investigatory interview to determine why she was absent from her duty station on numerous occasions between January 4, 2017, and April 10, 2017. Petitioner testified that she saw no problem in coming to work late since, if she was not scheduled for clinic duties, there was no adverse affect on staff or the clinic. Petitioner thought the investigatory interview for her failure to be at work during scheduled hours “was a bit harsh,” and felt that FDOH-Volusia was “monitoring her coming and going.” She testified that the monitoring of her “daily schedule, coming and going,” was related to the September 23, 2016, meeting. Petitioner provided information on her “tardies” to Ms. Ayers. Ms. Ayers had by then been assigned as Petitioner’s supervisor since Petitioner had, in another act of “speaking up and speaking out,” filed a formal grievance against Dr. Husband for retaliation.2/ Ms. Boswell testified convincingly that Petitioner was not authorized to unilaterally “flex” her time; that an agency cannot be run when employees alter their schedules without notice; and that Petitioner’s excessive absences from her duty station violated the Employees’ Handbook. The documentation provided by Petitioner was deemed to be insufficient to justify her absences, and did not explain why Petitioner failed to get approval from a supervisor before modifying her work schedule. Thereafter, on or about June 22, 2017, Petitioner received a written reprimand for the absences. Petitioner refused to sign the written reprimand to acknowledge her receipt. The testimony of Ms. Boswell and Ms. Ayers that the written reprimand was completely performance-based and had nothing to do with the September 23, 2016, meeting, was compelling and is accepted. More to the point, Petitioner neither pled nor proved that the written reprimand had anything to do with discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; that it was taken because Petitioner opposed any practice engaged in by FDOH-Volusia based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; or that it was based on Petitioner having made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing regarding conduct based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. The June 22, 2017, written reprimand was the last of the retaliatory actions for the September 23, 2016, meeting alleged by Petitioner. Petitioner has alleged that the October 5, 2016, change in duty station; the October 18, 2016, Documented Counseling; the December 16, 2016, oral reprimand; the April 12, 2017, investigatory interview; and the June 22, 2017, written reprimand were all unwarranted retaliation for the statement she made during the September 23, 2016, meeting, i.e., that Dr. Husband had been negative towards her. Petitioner acknowledged that there was “some truth” in the discipline, but lots of “fluff.” To the contrary, the evidence is convincing that, if anything, FDOH-Volusia was, and remains, exceedingly lenient and accommodating to Petitioner with regard to the substantiated discipline meted out. As set forth previously, Petitioner has not been terminated or demoted, and has not suffered a pay decrease or a decrease in benefits. While her duty station was moved from Daytona Beach to New Smyrna Beach, those locations are approximately the same distance from Petitioner’s home, and she has since been moved back to Daytona Beach for “need” related reasons. Respondent in this case presented hours of compelling testimony from multiple credible witnesses regarding Petitioner’s poor management skills, poor interpersonal skills, poor leadership skills; her tense, argumentative, and disrespectful attitude; and more. The testimony was, presumably, offered to demonstrate that FDOH-Volusia had a legitimate, non- discriminatory basis for the alleged adverse employment actions taken against Petitioner. The testimony and evidence was unnecessary. Not once during the course of the hearing did Petitioner allege or argue that the actions taken as described herein had anything to do with discrimination or retaliation based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. Petitioner stated that the actions taken against her were the result of her having “spoken up and spoken out” against negative comments from her supervisor, Dr. Husband. There was nothing raised in Petitioner’s Employment Complaint of Discrimination, in her Petition for Relief, in her statement of position in the Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, in the testimony and evidence that she offered at the final hearing, or in her Proposed Recommended Order that even intimates that FDOH-Volusia committed an unlawful employment practice as established in section 760.10, Florida Statutes. As will be discussed herein, the failure to allege, argue, or prove discrimination or retaliation based on a protected class or opposition to an unlawful act constitutes a failure to meet the most basic jurisdictional element of an unlawful employment practice complaint.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioner, Lisa J. Funchess’s Petition for Relief, FCHR No. 201701356. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of January, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 2019.
The Issue Whether the Respondent violated provisions of Section 400.419(3)(c), Florida Statutes, and Chapter 10A-5, Florida Administrative Code, more specifically alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated April 10, 1992.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Sun 'N Lake Towers, is an ACLF located in Sebring, Florida, and is duly licensed for 224 beds. On May 14, 1991, the annual licensure survey of Sun 'N Lake Towers reviewed the facility's records to determine the current census and number of meals per day the facility had contracted to serve to its residents. The amount of non-perishable food that would be required to feed the facility's residents two meals per day for seven days was calculated. The supply of food in storage was deficient for every food group by about 50% of the necessary amount of food. A non-perishable food supply protects the residents in the event of a tornado, hurricane, or other disaster. Some of the residents at Respondent's facility were on physician ordered therapeutic diets. One resident, P.M., was on a diabetic diet, but was served orange juice. Orange juice is high in fructose and is not appropriate for such a diet. Tomato juice would have been appropriate, but it was not observed on hand at the facility. Another resident who was on a diabetic diet received a sugary dessert in violation of the physician's order. Another resident on a diabetic diet, M.F., received only one serving of bread and no milk instead of two servings of each group as ordered by the physician. Failure to comply with a physician ordered diabetic diet could result in very serious health problems for a patient. Resident, E.N., who was on a physician ordered 1200 calorie per day diet, received a 4 to 5 ounce serving of meat instead of the two ounce serving ordered by the physician. The facility served a boxed stuffing which was high in sodium content to six residents who were on physician ordered low sodium diets. The facility had no system in place to ensure that information regarding residents' therapeutic diets was transmitted to the food service staff, and the food service staff had no system in place to substitute a modified menu into the meal pattern when required. The food at Sun 'N Lake Towers is otherwise tasty and served in bountiful amounts. An advertisement for Sun 'N Lake Towers was placed the March 1991 edition of Senior Scene Magazine. The advertisement failed to state whether the facility was affiliated with any religious organization. Sun 'N Lake Towers' more recent advertisement now contains the requisite affirmative disclosure. Although the facility kept resident property in trust, it failed to provide a quarterly statements to the residents. The deficiencies cited following the May 14, 1991 visit were also cited during the licensure survey of April 24, 1990.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found guilty of all four citations, and that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order imposing a fine of $850.00 ($100 suspended) upon the Respondent, Sun 'N Lake Towers. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of January, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 1993.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioners, Mark K. Mast and Kirk E. Mast d/b/a Mast Farm, operate a sixty-acre potato farm on Cracker Swamp Road in or near East Palatka, Florida. The 1991 crop year was the first year in which the two brothers had operated their own farm. This activity was a part-time endeavor since the brothers worked full-time as logging contractors for Georgia Pacific Corporation. Respondent, G & G Sales Corporation, a Minnesota corporation licensed to do business in this state, is a dealer (broker) in agricultural products that purchases potatoes from growers throughout the country for resale to various potato chip companies. Its president and vice-president are Loren R. Girsbirger and George Wilkerson, respectively. As an agricultural dealer, respondent is required to obtain a license from and post a surety bond with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Affairs (Department). In this case, the bond has been posted by respondent, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company. The amount of the bond is not of record. In order to start their farming operation, it was necessary for the Mast brothers to secure a loan from the North Florida Production Credit Association. That lending institution had a practice of requiring farmers to secure their loans with contracts for the sale of all or a portion of their crop. That is to say, the lender required a farmer to have a sales contract which equaled the amount of the loan. So that petitioners could meet this requirement, on January 29, 1991, the parties executed a contract wherein petitioners agreed to sell respondent 8,000 bags of Atlantic variety potatoes at an agreed upon price of $5.75 per bag, for a total price of $46,000. The lending institution then agreed to loan petitioners that amount of money. Although the brothers asked that respondent purchase more than 8,000 bags, respondent declined since it had only that contract amount (with chip companies) available. A copy of the contract has been received in evidence as joint exhibit The contract was drafted by respondent and it may be inferred from the evidence that it is a "standard" type of contract used by farmers and dealers in the potato business. The contract contained the following relevant conditions in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6: Buyer assumes that Seller will have sufficient amount of potatoes to cover all contracts, including open market sales. This contract does not restrict these open market sales, but Seller does protect Buyer's amount due. In the event of fire, unauthorized strikes, wars, transportation shortages, Acts of God, or events beyond the control of Seller or Buyer which prevent Seller or Buyer from performance in full or in part of the terms of this agreement, it is agreed that such failure to perform shall not be excused and shall not form the basis for any claim of damage or breach of contract. Seller agrees to seed sufficient acreage to cover the potatoes sold for delivery under this contract and other contracts to all purchasers with whom the Seller has contracted for the delivery of potatoes during the upcoming farm season. If, however, on account of shortages of crops not due to any act within the Seller's control or other causes beyond the control of the Seller, he is unable to deliver the full amount of potatoes called for in this contract, the Buyer will accept a prorated delivery with other buyers of the potatoes covered by similar contracts without any claim for damages against the Seller. Seller will grant Buyer all necessary rights to insure and verify that he is receiving his fair and just pro-rate share. Such rights to include, but not limited to, inspection of all records, books, field reports, shipments, etc. Burden of proof rests with Sellers. Finally, paragraph 11 of the contract provided in part that "the terms of this contract cannot be re-negotiated without the written consent of the Buyer and the Seller." Thus, under the terms of the contract, petitioners were obliged to "have sufficient amount of potatoes to cover all contracts". However, if an Act of God prevented the seller from "deliver(ing) the full amount of potatoes called for in (the) contract", the seller was excused from full performance and could prorate its crop. Under those circumstances, respondent was required to "accept a prorated delivery with other buyers of the potatoes covered by similar contracts." In this case, there were no other buyers of potatoes covered by similar contracts. Finally, except for changes approved in writing by both parties, the terms of the contract could not be changed. Petitioners planted their crop on February 2 and 10, 1991. At that time, the brothers hoped to harvest 16,000 bags of potatoes, or around 267 bags per acre. Although the average yield per acre for Atlantic type potatoes in the area had been between 250 and 270 bags, most growers assume a more conservative yield of around 200 bags per acre to insure that all contractual requirements can be met. Here, however, except for a contract with respondent, petitioners had no other contracts with other dealers or individuals. When the contract was signed in January, the brothers expected to sell the remainder of their crop to other buyers on the open market. In this regard, they entered into an agreement (presumably verbal) with their father, who had co-signed the bank note, to split the net proceeds on all sales over and above that required under the G & G Sales Corporation contract. This latter agreement with the father was not a "similar contract" within the meaning of paragraph 6 of the contract and thus the G & G Sales Corporation contract is found to be the only relevant contract for crop year 1991. On April 23, 1991, a severe thunderstorm swept through a part of Putnam County. The storm was accompanied by high winds and hail and followed a path which ran through the potato farm belt in East Palatka. The Circle S farm, which lies about one-half mile from petitioner's farm, was "devastated" by the storm. Petitioners' farm received high winds, heavy rains and some hail. The extent of damage caused by the storm to petitioners' farm is in dispute, but it is agreed that the storm diminished the size of the crop. As it turned out, petitioners dug only 8,802 bags of potatoes, which still exceeded the amount required under their only contract. After the storm struck, Mark Mast immediately contacted Wilkerson by telephone and advised him that the farm had been hit with hail and asked that Wilkerson and Girsbirger survey the damage. On April 24, 1991, Wilkerson and Girsbirger visited the farm and found it "very wet" and muddy but the leaves on the plants still intact. This level of damage was generally corroborated by various other witnesses. Although the above conditions were present at that time, it was still impossible then for anyone to forecast exactly how the storm impacted the volume and quality of petitioners' crop. Most potato farmers purchase crop insurance prior to each farming season. A farmer has the option of purchasing either 50%, 65% or 75% coverage, although 65% coverage is the most common. This means that a farmer must lose at least 50%, 35% or 25% of his crop due to weather or insects in order to file a claim. The amount of insurance is based on a function of the percent of crop the farmer wishes to insure times the value per hundred weight of the crop. For first year farmers, such as petitioners, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) establishes a designated yield per acre which is based on FCIC's estimate, albeit conservative, of what the average yield should be. In the case of petitioners, who purchased 65% coverage, the FCIC (and insurer) set a designated yield of 184 bags per acre which meant petitioner would have a crop approximating 184 hundred weight per acre. Although petitioners had a crop insurance policy in 1991, they did not file a claim after the April 23 storm since they failed to meet the threshold requirements for coverage. Indeed, the local crop insurance agent visited the farm shortly after the storm and verified there was not enough damage to file a claim. However, he noted that there was excessive water for a few days and some of the leaves on the vines had holes caused by the hail. Between May 4 and 18, 1991, petitioners sold respondent nine loads of potatoes totaling 4,101 bags at a price of $5.75 per bag. During the period from April 30, 1991, through May 18, 1991, they sold ten other loads on the open market to two other buyers. The open market sales totaled 4,701.2 bags. Because potato prices had dramatically increased after the contract was executed, nine of these latter loads were sold at an open market price of $19 per bag while one was sold at a price of $18.50 per bag, for a total of $88,806. Petitioners contend respondent agreed that the above ten loads could be sold on the open market and thus it should not be heard now to complain that it was shorted on the contract. In this regard, the evidence shows that after the storm, which is the time period relevant to this contention, Wilkerson told Mark Mast that he had no problem with petitioners selling any extra potatoes on the open market as long as respondent received its 8,000 bags. Girsbirger also advised the Masts that it was okay to sell ten loads of potatoes on the open market if production was 200 bags per acre. However, he cautioned them to sell no more than four loads on the open market if the yield fell to 180 to 185 bags per acre since the remainder would be necessary to meet the terms of the contract. Thus, it is found that respondent did not agree to the sale of the ten loads on the open market if total production did not exceed 8,000 bags. Around May 3, 1991, Mark Mast approached Wilkerson and asked if respondent would renegotiate the contract price upward. Wilkerson declined to do so. On May 6, Mast sent Wilkerson a notice by registered mail advising him that due to the crop loss, which he estimated to be one-third of the crop, he intended to adjust the contract pursuant to paragraph 6 of the contract and supply only two-thirds of the 8,000 bags. This unilateral offer to modify the contract was never accepted by respondent, and in any event, petitioners failed to supply the amount offered in their May 6 letter. In all, respondent received only 51.3% of its contracted amount of 8,000 bags. Petitioners allocated respondent this amount on the theory they had originally planned to sell one-half of their total anticipated crop of 16,000 bags to respondent, that one-half of the anticipated crop was lost in the storm, and thus respondent should receive only one-half of the remaining crop, or around 4,000 bags. At hearing, petitioners defended this decision by treating the April 23 storm as an Act of God within the meaning of paragraph 6 of the contract. However, reliance on this provision was inappropriate since, despite the effects of the storm, petitioners could still deliver the full amount of potatoes called for in the contract. The testimony is in conflict as to whether petitioners offered respondent more than 4,101 bags during the harvest season. At various times, respondent was offered several "extra" loads at the market price of $19 per bag but declined since it still wanted the contract honored. According to petitioners, they were ready to load a truck on two occasions but respondent failed to send a truck. Respondent denies this assertion. In addition, petitioners claim that a truck arrived late one Sunday afternoon when their farm equipment was inoperable and thus they could not load any potatoes. Conversely, Wilkerson contended that Mark telephoned him on several occasions and told him not to send a truck because Mark was loading for "another contract". Accordingly, it is found that petitioners offered respondent only the 4,101 bags at the contract price but that additional loads were offered at the substantially higher open market price. After receiving the 4,101 bags, respondent presented petitioners a check dated June 17, 1991, in the amount of $4,777.92 as full payment for the 4,101 bags of potatoes. The check carried the notation "The undersigned, upon cashing check, accepts payment in full for attached invoices, with no recourse." It was never cashed by petitioners. Attached to the check was an invoice which calculated the $4,777.92 in the following manner. Respondent first calculated $23,598 by multiplying 4,101 bags times $5.75 per bag and then subtracted $82.08 for "Not Pat dues", an amount not explained but nonetheless unchallenged by petitioners. It then deducted $19,038 from that total for a net amount due of $4,777.92. The latter deduction of $19,038 represented a set-off for damages incurred by respondent in having to buy potatoes elsewhere by virtue of petitioners failing to supply the contracted amount of potatoes. It was calculated by assuming that petitioners would supply 2/3 (or 68%) of its commitment, or 5,440 bags. 1/ Since only 4,104 bags were delivered, this amounted to a shortage of 1,336 bags. Respondent represented, without contradiction, that it had to replace this shortage at the same price which petitioners received for non-contract sales on the open market. Respondent assumed that petitioners sold their potatoes at an open market price of $20, or $14.25 more than the contract price. Thus, it deducted 1,336 x $14.25, or $19,038 from the final payment. In actuality, petitioners sold the bulk of those potatoes at a price of $19 per bag. Thus, respondent's set-off should have been $17,702 rather than $19,038. This amount of set-off ($17,702) is deemed to be reasonable and should be subtracted from the amount owed by respondent to petitioners.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services requiring respondent to pay petitioners $5,813.92 within thirty days of date of final order. Otherwise, the surety should be required to pay that amount. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of May, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 1992. 1/ For purposes of determining damages, respondent decided that petitioners were entitled to some relief under the contract due to the storm. Accordingly, respondent assumed that it would receive only two-thirds of the contract requirement. APPENDIX Petitioners: 1. Covered in the preliminary statement. 2. Accepted in finding of fact 2. 3-4. Accepted in finding of fact 1. 5. Accepted in finding of fact 2. 6. Accepted in finding of fact 3. 7-8. Accepted in finding of fact 4. 9. Accepted in finding of fact 3. 10. Accepted in finding of fact 5. Accepted in findings of fact 1 and 5. Accepted in finding of fact 6. 13-14. Accepted in finding of fact 7. Accepted in finding of fact 8. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. The remainder has been rejected as being contrary to the more persuasive evidence. Partially accepted in findings of fact 11 and 12. Accepted in finding of fact 11. Accepted in finding of fact 9. 21-22. Accepted in finding of fact 14. Accepted in finding of fact 6. Rejected as being contrary to more persuasive evidence. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6 but this finding does not excuse performance under the contract. See finding of fact 12. Respondent: * Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. The remainder is covered in the preliminary statement. Accepted in finding of fact 1. Accepted in findings of fact 2 and 3. Accepted in finding of fact 4. Accepted in findings of fact 3 and 5. 6-8. Accepted in finding of fact 7. 9-10. Accepted in finding of fact 10. Accepted in finding of fact 7. Accepted in finding of fact 9. Accepted in finding of fact 14. * Respondent G & G Sales Corporation filed thirteen unnumbered paragraphs containing proposed findings of fact. The paragraphs have been numbered 1-13 by the undersigned for the purpose of making these rulings. COPIES FURNISHED: Joe C. Miller, II P. O. Box 803 Palatka, Florida 32178-0803 Ronald W. Brown, Esquire 66 Cuna Street, Suite B St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda D. Hyatt, Chief Bureau of License & Bond 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Charles T. Shad, Esquire 601 Blackstone Building East Bay & Market Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 (on behalf of St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co.) Richard A. Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture & Consumer Affairs The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondents owe Petitioner approximately $591 for a quantity of watermelons provided by Petitioner; secondarily, resolution of this issue 1 Correction of obvious error has been made to the style of this case, adding the name of Co-Respondent U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., and eliminating the Department of Agriculture and Consumer requires a determination of whether Respondents acted as an agent for Petitioner as opposed to a direct purchase of Petitioner's melons by Respondents.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a farmer who produces agricultural products, including watermelons. Petitioner also has trucks in which he hauls agricultural products, including watermelons. When all his trucks are in use, he frequently calls a friend, Freddy Bell, to provide some of Bell’s trucks to haul his products. Petitioner, in turn, helps Bell when Bell’s trucks are all in use. Respondent Wilson is a dealer of such products in the course of normal business activity. Respondent Wilson acts as a broker in these arrangements, receives the gross sales receipts from buyers and from that sum deducts costs of labor, freight, inspections, any other associated costs and his commission. The net balance of the gross sales receipts are paid to the melon producers. Respondent U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Company is the bonding agent for Respondent pursuant to Section 604.20, Florida Statutes. Petitioner had not discussed any arrangement for the sale of his melons with Respondent Wilson. Instead, Petitioner discussed the sales price of his melons with Freddy Bell. Petitioner testified that Bell represented to Petitioner that he could get a price of $4.00 per hundred weight for Petitioner’s melons. Petitioner relied on Bell to provide transport his melons and obtain the promised price. While Bell did not testify at the final hearing, the parties are in agreement that Bell arranged for sale and shipment of Petitioner’s melons through Wilson. Wilson’s President, Robert M. Wilson, testified at hearing that Bell was not empowered by him to represent a guaranteed price for melons to anyone and that he could not affirm that Bell operated as his agent. He added that Melons were plentiful this past season and no melons were brokered on a guaranteed price basis. Testimony of Robert M. Wilson at the final hearing establishes that the arrangement between Respondent Wilson and Freddy Bell on Petitioner’s behalf was a brokerage arrangement and that the sale of the melons was subject to conditions and demands of the market place, i.e., that the melons would sell for the best possible price which Wilson could obtain for them. Testimony of Petitioner is uncorroborated and fails to establish that the agreement between the parties contemplated a direct sale of the melons to Respondent Wilson or a guaranteed price by Wilson.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing Petitioner's complaint.DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of March, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Bo Bass 2829 Southwest SR 45 Newberry, FL 32669 John M. Martirano, Esquire US Fidelity and Guaranty Co Post Office Box 1138 Baltimore, MD 21203-1138 Robert M. Wilson, President Wilson and Son Sales, Inc. 2811 Airport Road Plant City, FL 33567 Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol - Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800
Findings Of Fact During January, February, and early March, 1982, Respondent entered into several oral contracts for the purchase of tomatoes from Petitioner. Specifically, orders were placed by Respondent on January 28, February 3 and 5, and March 3, 1982, for US. No.3 grade tomatoes to be shipped f.o.b. origin to receivers in Puerto Rico and Alabama. The first three orders were shipped by boat to Puerto Rico and the fourth by truck to Alabama. The shipment of January 28, 1982 (Shipment #1), consisted of 1,296 boxes, and the invoice cost was 9,288.90. Payment was due on or before February 17, 1982, per the handwritten note placed on the invoice by Ms. Ernst before it was mailed out. A similar notice as to payment due date was placed on each of the other invoices before they were mailed out. The shipment of February 3, 1982 (Shipment #2), consisted of 1,368 boxes; the invoice cost was $9,188.10; and "payment was due on or before February 22, 1982. The shipment of February 5, 1982 (Shipment #3), also consisted of 1,368 boxes; was priced at $9,188.10; and payment was due on or before February 24, 1982. The shipment to Alabama of March 3, 1982 (Shipment #4), consisted of 1,178 boxes; the invoice cost was $7,748.70; and payment was due on or before March 23, 1982. Shipment #1 was inspected by a United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) inspector in the receiver's cool room in Puerto Rico on February 5, 1982, eight days after it was shipped. At that time, the inspector noted that the condition of the tomatoes was "approximately 40 percent green and breakers, 45 percent turning pink, 10 percent light red and red. Decay ranges from 2 to 6 percent, average 3 percent, Bacterial soft rot in early stages." The grade was noted: "Fails to grade US. No. 3, account of grade defects." Quality was noted as: "Mature fairly clean to clean, well developed, generally fairly smooth to slightly rough. Grade defects ranges 40 to 56 percent, average 47 percent, mostly scars, catfaces, cuts and rough texture." Shipment #2 was inspected by a USDA inspector in the receiver's cool room on February 16, 1982, 13 days after shipment. At that time, the inspector noted as to condition: "Average approximately 95 percent red. From 2 to 8 percent, average 4 percent decay; Bacterial soft rot and Gray Mold rot in various stages." Quality was listed as: . . . grade defects ranges 12 to 28 percent, average 19 percent, mostly growth [sic] crack, catfaces, cuts and scars. Grade was noted: "Fails to grade US. No. 3 account of grade defects." Shipment #3 was inspected by a USDA inspector in the receiver's cool room on February 17, 1982, 12 days after shipment. On the inspection report, condition was noted: "Average approximately 85 percent red. Decay ranges 5 to 24 percent, average 14 percent. Gray Mold rot and Bacterial soft rot in various stages." Quality was listed as: . . . From 12 to 32 percent, average 18 percent grade defects, mostly scars, catfaces, mechanical damage and rough texture." Grade was listed as: "Fails to grade US. No. 3 account of grade defects." Shipment #4 was inspected by a USDA inspector in the receiver's warehouse in Alabama on March 5, 1982, two days after shipment. Upon inspection, condition was noted as: "Strano's Pride lot: Average approximately 30 percent green, 5 percent breakers, 20 percent turning, 20 percent pink, 15 percent light red, 10 percent red." As to Select Lot: "Average approximately 20 percent green, 20 percent breakers, 15 percent turning, 20 percent pink, 10 percent light red, and 15 percent red." Each lot was average 1 percent decay. Grade was not quoted, nor was quality. Ordinary shipping time by ship from the Port of Miami to Puerto Rico is four to five days. Inspections under the USDA Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act rules must be conducted within 24 hours after delivery. The USDA inspector is generally accepted as the only nonpartisan means of determining grade, condition, and quality of produce. While the condition of a shipment may change during transit, the grade of the produce normally will not. When the delivery inspections on Shipments #1, #2, and #3 were conducted in Puerto Rico and the receivers complained to Respondent about the produce they received, Elliott, who had been in daily telephone contact with his dissatisfied customers and had verified the condition of the shipments in conversations with the inspectors in question, contacted Tom Banks, Sales Manager for Petitioner, who authorized adjustments in payment saying, "Work it out and get back what you can, or words to that effect. Discussion between these two men as to the adjustments included such topics as charges for gassing and freight to the gashouse, along with the fact that the tomatoes failed to grade out at destination as US. No. 3, as ordered. Mr. Banks failed to get the approval of Mr. Strano before authorizing those adjustments, however Respondent had ordered green tomatoes without gassing so that there would be less chance of spoilage during the several days it took in transit for the tomatoes to get from Miami to Puerto Rico. Gassing, a procedure designed to speed up the ripening of tomatoes, would not have been an appropriate process in a situation such as this. With regard to Shipment #4, Respondent wanted vine-ripened tomatoes for quick delivery to a close-by market. He described his order as for 40 to 50 percent color in the shipment. The tomatoes delivered contained color well below the desired level; and as a result, the Respondent's customer, who had to hold them for an extended period before sale to allow them time to ripen, was dissatisfied with the shipment. The tomatoes in Shipments #1, #2, and #3 were graded as US. No. 3 by a USDA inspector at Petitioner's plant outside Miami prior to shipment. The procedure followed is for the inspector to inspect batch lots containing amounts far greater than that in any one of the shipments in question here. The inspector puts his stamp of grade on a master inspection certificate. Thereafter, whenever any tomatoes are drawn from that batch for sale and shipment, the Petitioner's employees are authorized to mark the appropriate grade for that shipment onto the documentation relating to it. There is no additional inspection by the USDA at origin. However, Petitioner could provide a document trail for only two shipments. One, of 1,368 boxes to Puerto Rico on February 3, 1982, was Shipment #2. Certificate No. B 135642, referring to Gas Lot 306, reflecting a grading of US. No. 3 on February 2, 1982, can be traced to that shipment. Certificate No. B 135588, which was offered in support of Shipment #3, on February 5, 1982, affords reasonable connection to that shipment. There is no documentation, other than Petitioner's own shipping memorandum, which relates to the preshipment grading of the tomatoes in Shipment #1. No credible evidence was introduced to establish the grade of produce in this shipment which failed to grade out as US. No. 3 upon delivery. I therefore find that the grade assigned by the inspector at the delivery point is controlling and that the shipment of 1,296 boxes on January 28, 1982, was not US. Grade No. 3. Respondent deducted $3.25 per box on Shipment #1 ($4,212), $1.50 per box on Shipment #2 ($2,050), $2.50 per box on Shipment #3 ($3,420), and $2 per box on Shipment #4 ($2,356), plus $752.40 each on Shipments #2 and #3 for gassing and freight to the gashouse.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter an order finding that Respondent is indebted to Petitioner in the amount of $5,470. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of June, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Chastain, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kenneth M. Clayton, Esquire Michael T. Hand, Esquire 220 North Palmetto Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Homestead Tomato Packing Company, Inc. c/o Mr. Rosario Strano Post Office Box 3064 Florida City, Florida 33034 Peerless Insurance Company 62 Maple Avenue Keene, New Hampshire 0343
Findings Of Fact Respondent, a Florida corporation, is engaged in the business of aerial pesticide spraying in the State of Florida. Wells Farm is a commercial potato farm owned and operated by Mr. William W. "Billy" Wells on an area of land in St. John's County located approximately 15 miles northwest of St. Augustine, Florida. The south corner of Wells Farm is located approximately 150 feet from the nearest edge of a man-made finger canal that is connected to Wells Farm by a drainage pipe under Colee Cove Road, which road is parallel to the southern border of Wells Farm. Between the cultivated area of Wells Farm and Colee Cove Road is a culvert or drainage ditch which parallels the border of Wells Farm and Colee Cove Road. This drainage ditch also runs up the eastern border of Wells Farm, perpendicular to Colee Cove Road. Deputy Sheriff Jimmy L. Evans lives in a house south of Colee Cove Road. The drainage pipe, perpendicular to and running under Colee Cove road, connects the culvert/drainage ditch on the Wells Farm (north) side of the road with the previously described man-made finger canal which is behind and to the south of Deputy Evans' house. This "canal" could legitimately be described as a "big drainage ditch," but it has 1-3 feet of water in it at all times and small boats can be pulled or paddled in it. Motorboats cannot run in it. All the surrounding fields used for agricultural purposes have interconnected drainage systems which eventually run off into the drainage pipe located under Colee Cove Road and all adjacent canals and ditches are affected by the tidal nature of the St. Johns River. Presumably all of these drainage apparatuses have at least some water in them at all times. On March 30, 1991 Terry Bosserman, principal of Respondent corporation, aerially applied Manzate 200 fungicide and Thiodan 3 E.C. insecticide to Wells Farm. Mr. Bosserman has sprayed Wells Farm between 100 and 150 times over the last 15 years. He has been operating the Respondent corporation for 18 years. Thiodan is a pesticide regulated by Petitioner agency. The active ingredient of the pesticide Thiodan is endosulfan. Endosulfan is designated a Class 1 Toxicity chemical, the most severe toxicity level for chemical compounds. Thiodan containers are imprinted with labels containing the following information, in relevant part: This product is toxic to fish, birds, and other wildlife. Birds feeding on treated areas may be killed. Do not apply directly to water or wetlands. Due to the risk of runoff and drift, do not apply within a distance of 300 feet of lakes, ponds, streams and estuaries . . . Apply this product only as specified on this label. During the Petitioner agency's investigation of a fish kill of approximately 50 fish in the adjacent canal behind Deputy Evans' home, Mr. Bosserman and Mr. Wells each made statements orally and Mr. Bosserman made a statement in writing, under oath, to the effect that Wells Farm constituted 335 acres and that the entire field had been sprayed by Mr. Bosserman d/b/a Respondent corporation. These statements were taken in the most literal sense by agency investigators who concluded that the March 30, 1991 spraying had been conducted with precision up to each exact edge of the Wells Farm property or the edge of potato cultivation within that property. Accordingly, the agency deemed these statements to be admissions that spraying had deliberately occurred within approximately 150 feet of the canal behind Deputy Evans' home. The potato field cultivation does end no more than 150 feet from the nearest edge of the canal. However, during formal hearing, both Mr. Bosserman and Mr. Wells testified credibly that over the last 15 years they had always attempted to avoid improper use of pesticides by voluntarily not making aerial application outside the Wells Farm boundaries and by otherwise attempting to avoid potential "drift" of pesticides which were sprayed within the target site. Mr. Bosserman specifically and credibly described affirmative efforts he had made on March 30, 1991 to run up his plane to his spray location (target site) in such a way as to force pesticide material down to the ground and prevent its rolling up and drifting out of the target site. He further credibly described shutting off his spray apparatus at what he believed to be "a safe distance" from the borders of the cultivated potatoes in an effort to prevent drift on March 30, 1991 and so as to comply with the Thiodan package labelling. Both Mr. Wells and Mr. Bosserman explained credibly and reasonably why their prior statements to the agency investigator should not be taken to mean literally that the March 30, 1991 aerial spraying had been done to each square inch of the cultivated area or property itself. For instance, the farm itself is in excess of 400 acres and the estimated amount of potato cultivation was 335 acres. Mr. Bosserman testified from his 18 years experience in aerial pesticide spraying that it is impossible to spray a field with absolute precision so as to cover the metes and bounds thereof within perfect rectangular borders, and that his prior statements were meant to convey to the agency that on March 30, 1991 he had sprayed the potato field, allowing for whatever drift was likely. Mr. Wells testified credibly that both before and after the March 30, 1991 incident he had purchased land sprayers to "trim" the edges of his property with pesticide, thus covering the rim of the cultivated property he had instructed Mr. Bosserman to avoid. Likewise, Mr. Bosserman was credible in asserting that on that date he had tried to spray in accord with Mr. Wells' cautionary instructions and his own hands-on experience. In adhering to his experience and Mr. Wells' instructions, on that date, Mr. Bosserman tried to avoid spraying the five acres closest to the road and hence closest to the canal and did not fly back around the edges of the Wells Farm property to "trim" the unsprayed edges with more pesticide, but left this area for the ground spraying equipment. Having observed the candor and demeanor of Mr. Wells, Mr. Bosserman, and Mr. Schlager, the agency investigator, and having carefully reviewed all of Petitioner's exhibits, including but not limited to P-1 and P-7, it is found that Mr. Wells' and Mr. Bosserman's testimony at formal hearing is credible to the effect that care was taken to avoid or minimize wind drift of the pesticide and that no willful spraying occurred within 300 feet of the canal in question. Likewise, it is found that the oral testimony of Mr. Bosserman and Mr. Wells on this issue did not actually contradict their prior statements and that their oral testimony is not inconsistent with, but is merely explanatory of, their prior statements. This is not a situation of prior inconsistent statements or a poor investigation. There was simply not a "meeting of the minds." However, Mr. Bosserman's description of when he turned off his spray apparatus was not very specific in that he stated that he could not say with any certainty whether he turned off his pesticide spraying apparatus within 280 feet, 450 feet, 500 feet or any other distance from the edge of potato cultivation or the border of Wells Farm. The most accurate estimate he could give was that he had turned off his pesticide spray "at a safe distance." Mr. Bosserman also conceded that he flew over the houses south of Colee Cove Road, including Deputy Evans' house, two times on March 30, 1991, pursuant to a Federal Aviation Authority waiver. Deputy Evans testified that on March 30, 1991, he clearly saw a sprayer nozzle on the left wing of Respondent's airplane spraying as it crossed over his property passing from south to north to go over the potato field on Wells Farm. If the plane were flying south to north with an open or leaky nozzle, it had to also have flown with an open or leaky nozzle over the canal behind and to the south of Deputy Evans' house. Respondent maintained he could have seen a leaky jet on the left wing of his plane and he did not see one. The fact that Mr. Wells felt entitled to receive $11,000 from Deputy Evans for damage allegedly caused to a prior Wells Farm potato crop by Deputy Evans' son, which damages Mr. Wells voluntarily did not collect from Deputy Evans, is insufficient to diminish Deputy Evans' credibility on the issue of Respondent's open nozzle. On this issue, the undersigned accepts Deputy Evans' testimony that the nozzle was leaking over the testimony of Respondent to the effect Respondent did not see that it was leaking, and finds that despite all reasonable precautions, Respondent had a leaky nozzle when he flew over Deputy Evans' house and over the canal south of Colee Cove Road on March 30, 1991. During his investigation of the fish kill in the canal which had been reported by the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, the agency's investigator collected water samples and dead fish for analysis on April 6, 1991. He collected a water sample from the canal south of the Deputy Evans' home, dead fish from the same location, and a water sample from the culvert/drainage ditch immediately adjacent to the southeast corner of Wells Farm. The sample from the canal behind Deputy Evans' home was taken from a location well in excess of 150 feet from the potato field, but upon the evidence in this record it is impossible to say if this sample site was more or less than 300 feet from the target site. The agency's tests revealed that the water sample collected from the culvert/drainage ditch adjacent to Wells Farm contained endosulfan at a concentration of 1.75 parts per billion. This means there was 1.75 gallons of contaminant in proportion to every one billion gallons of water. The sample collected from the canal south of Deputy Evans' home contained endosulfan at a concentration of 0.05 parts per billion. This means there was .05 gallons of contaminant in proportion to every one billion gallons of water. It may reasonably be inferred that there was some contaminant in the water at all points between the two sample points including within 300 feet of the target site. Numerically, these are very low concentrations of contaminant. Although it was the agency's witnesses' collective view that any amount of pesticide is bad, none clearly testified that these concentrations were "severe" or "not severe." Between March 30, 1991 and the date of taking samples, there was a heavy rain which would have contributed to runoff of the pesticide properly applied to the target area into the several connected drainage ditches/culverts/canals. The fact that the concentration of endosulfan diminished the further from the potato patch the sample was taken, is indicative of runoff of pesticide residue from the target site rather than a direct spray application to the canal behind Deputy Evans' home. There is no evidence of what level of endosulfan would be in the canal or drainage ditch simply from natural runoff from the properly sprayed target site. Evidence was also admitted (R-3) to the effect that an early "suspicion" of Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission biologists was that the fish kill here at issue resulted from runoff caused by heavy rains. This early, uncorroborated "suspicion" is probative of nothing. No samples were taken to determine if the presence of endosulfan in the canals was the result of wind drift from a distance deemed "safe" by the labelling. The fish sample was not analyzed by the agency. There is no evidence of how much thiodan or endosulfan it takes to kill a fish, but the label of the product provides, in pertinent part, This product is toxic to fish . . . shrimp and crab may be killed at application rates recommended on this label. Do not apply where fish, shrimp, crab, or other aquatic life are important resources. There was no evidence presented that the fish killed in Colee Cove were an important resource. There is no evidence that either of the respective concentrations of the endosulfan in the water samples analyzed were sufficient to kill fish, but endosulfan is not naturally found in Florida waters. Evidence (R-1) shows that a Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission inspector witnessed fish kills in the same man-made canals in Colee Cove almost every spring and summer resulting from lack of oxygen rather than endosulfan. It was Respondent's contention that heavy rains in combination with the tidal action of the St. Johns River which is only a quarter of a mile away, would have flushed the contents of the finger canals into the St. Johns River so that the pesticide on the canal waters was not attributable to Respondent, but no competent evidence of this supposed effect was introduced. There is no evidence that Respondent benefited from any deviation from the pesticide label above and beyond the usual payment for spraying the farm. Respondent would have received the same amount for correctly spraying Wells Farm, so there was no monetary inducement for him to spray contrary to the pesticide label. The amount he was paid by Mr. Wells is not in evidence. Respondent has a past history of compliance problems with Petitioner, but none involve endosulfan or deliberate, premeditated defiance of pesticide laws and regulations. On July 21, 1989, Respondent was issued two Notices of Warning, one for spray "drift" which had occurred on March 27, 1989. The other July 21, 1989 Notice of Warning was for a December 27, 1989 [sic] investigation showing that a fungicide had been applied at a higher concentration than the label recommendation, that there had been an aerial application to a non-target site through wind drift, that proper paperwork on chemicals used had not been maintained at Respondent's place of business, and that there had been a failure, on a single occasion, to use required protective equipment. On October 25, 1990, Respondent was cited for a December 9, 1988 elevated pesticide residue in the mixing area at Respondent's airport. Respondent demonstrated that regardless of the choice of words employed in these agency citations, he was not guilty of repeat offenses and that he had taken all reasonable steps to correct the violations cited and to prevent their reoccurrence. These violations are few and far between for 18 years of operation. Since the March 30, 1991 incident, Mr. Wells has purchased additional ground spraying equipment which in the future will be used for all "trim" areas, thereby permitting Respondent to spray aerially even further within the perimeter of Wells Farm than he did on March 30, 1991. Mr. Wells has also replanted his rows of potatoes in the opposite direction so as to further minimize pesticide problems.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating the statutes cited and assessing the nominal fine of $250.00. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of January, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 92-2503 DOAH CASE NO. 92-2503 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59 (2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF) Petitioner's PFOF: 1 Covered under preliminary matters. 2,3,4,7,8,9,10, 11,12,17 Accepted. 5,6 Rejected for the reasons covered in Facts of Finding 8-12 of the Recommended Order. 18 Rejected as immaterial as stated, but covered peripherally. 13,14,15,16,19 Except for unnecessary, subordinate, irrelevant, immaterial, or cumulative material, accepted. 20 Rejected as not supported by the record as stated; covered in FOF 5. 21-22 Rejected as stated as cumulative, argumentative and conclusory as opposed to factual. Also, as stated, not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence. See FOF 8-12 of the Recommended Order. 23 Rejected because, as stated, it is not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. However, covered in FOF 25 of the Recommended Order. The undersigned also notes date discrepancies of certain exhibits that render them of questionable probative value. Respondent's PFOF: Respondent has not numbered his proposals. However, starting with the first paragraph under his "Findings of Fact," the Hearing Officer has regarded each paragraph as a single proposed finding of fact and accordingly has numbered the paragraphs sequentially. 1,2,3,4,5, Except for unnecessary, subordinate, irrelevant, immaterial, or cumulative material, accepted. As stated, this proposal was not affirmatively proven in its entirety. What was proven was accepted. 7 Accepted that this was testified - to. Rejected as a finding of material fact. Covered in FOF 12 of the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: John S. Koda, Esquire Senior Attorney Office of General Counsel Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumers Services Room 515, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Terry Bosserman, pro se Terry's Ag Services, Inc. Route 5, Box 617 Lake City, Florida 32055 The Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings: Respondent, William R. Daniels, has been a farm labor contractor since 1949. Respondent retained the services of Edward J. Smith to assist him in fruit harvesting activities during the 1987 season. On February 18, 1988, Tommy L. Sumpter, a Compliance Officer employed by Petitioner, performed a compliance check on fruit harvesting activities located off 66th Avenue in Vero Beach, Florida. The compliance check by Sumpter revealed, that Edward J. Smith was supervising citrus workers on behalf of Respondent. Smith transported workers to the citrus field in Vero Beach in van owned by Respondent. Smith displayed his Federal Certificate of Registration which was valid through December 1988. Smith displayed his State Certificate which expired in December 1987. A confirmation check of Smith's Florida Certificate of Registration reveals that his certificate, in fact, expired on December 31, 1987. Smith registered at the Petitioner's Fort Pierce Job Service Office on February 23, 1988. Mr. Smith was cited for failing to register as required by section 450.30, Florida Statutes. Respondent submitted a verification of employment form which indicates that Smith was employed by him on October 15, 1987, and was paid $75.00 minus social security contributions, per truck load of citrus harvested by Smith's workers. By letter dated May 3, 1988, Respondent was issued the subject Administrative Complaint and notified that a civil money penalty was being assessed against him in the amount of $500.00 on the basis that he contracted for the employment of farm workers with a farm labor contractor before that contractor displayed a current certificate of registration issued by Petitioner. When Respondent retained the services of Smith, as a farm labor contractor, Smith's Florida Certificate of Registration was expired and he therefore could not have displayed a current certificate of registration to Respondent before he was employed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner enter a final order imposing a $500.00 civil penalty against Respondent payable within thirty days of the issuance of its final order, for contracting for the employment of farmworkers with a farm labor contractor before the farm labor contractor displayed to him a current certificate of registration issued by Petitioner. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of January, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Moses E. Williams, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 117, Montgomery Building 590 Executive Center Circle East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 William R. Daniel 227 Sterrett Circle Port St. Lucie, Florida 33395 Hugo Menendez, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 206 Berkeley Building 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Kenneth Hart General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 131 Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
Findings Of Fact Herbert W. Mize is a compliance officer for the Petitioner, the Department of Labor and Employment Security. On January 14, 1986, Mr. Mize was performing field checks in Hillsborough County. He arrived at a citrus grove, staying on the outside due to the canker problem. Ten to fifteen workers were up on ladders among the citrus trees. The Petitioner, Marvin James, was driving a vehicle loading up citrus. Mr. Mize asked Mr. James who was crew leader on the job at that time. Mr. James stated that he was the crew leader. A 1977 Dodge van was parked nearby. Mr. James told Mr. Mize that it was his van and that he drove workers to work that day in his van. The same 1977 Dodge van had previously been insured by Mr. James by the U.S. Fire Insurance Company, but Mr. James did not have insurance on the 1977 Dodge van on January 14, 1986. P. Ex. 4, 5, and 6. Mr. Mize gave a notice of noncompliance to Mr. James, and Mr. James acknowledged that he had seen it by signing it at the bottom. P. Ex. 3. Relevant to this case, Mr. James was informed by Mr. Mize that he was in noncompliance with state law by failure to carry and exhibit proper certificate of registration as a farm labor contractor and by failure to obtain adequate vehicle insurance. Id. Mr. James testified that he was very familiar with the law requiring farm labor contractor registration and vehicle insurance to transport workers since he had been a crew leader since 1978. Mr. James testified that on January 14, 1987, he was working for Carl Junior Mears, but only to load citrus, and that he did not transport workers in his van and did not supervise workers in the grove. His testimony is rejected as not credible for the following reasons: Mr. James testified that he was "under his van working" when Mr. Mize came up. He gave no explanation why he was working on his van instead of loading citrus as he testified at another point. Mr. Mears admitted that Mr. James did direct and supervise workers in the grove from time to time, and also admitted that Mr. James "sent" workers to him. Both of the worker witnesses presented by Mr. James testified that they had known James for a number of years, which indicates that they have had some sort of formal working relationship with him. If Mr. James in fact had told Mr. Mize that he was not the crew leader, it would have been logical for Mr. Mize to have then asked "well, who is the crew leader?" But Mr. James insisted that he did not tell Mr. Mize where the crew leader was because Mr. James said Mr. Mize did not ask. This is not believable. Mr. James testified that Mr. Mears was the crew leader, and that he was available in the grove on January 14, 1986. Considering the fact that Mr. James was familiar with the requirements of the law, if it were true that Mr. Mears was present in the grove, it would logically be expected that Mr. James would have tried to be helpful and would have voluntarily told Mr. Mize who Mr. Mears was and where he was even if Mr. Mize had somehow failed to ask. It is particularly unbelievable that Mr. James would not have, on his own, told Mr. Mize where Mr. Mears was located since Mr. James admitted that Mr. Mize that day cited him for crew leader violations, and Mr. James signed the citation. P. Ex. 3. The demeanor of Mr. Mize indicated credibility, while the demeanor of Mr. James indicated a lack of credibility. Mr. Mears paid Mr. James for his services as a crew leader. On January 14, 1986, Mr. James drove workers to the citrus groves in his 1977 Dodge van and he was supervising them as a crew leader, both for pay from Mr. Mears. Mr. James was not registered on January 14, 1986 as a crew leader, and did not have insurance on the 1977 Dodge van he used to transport workers.
Recommendation For these reasons it is recommended that the Department of Labor and Employment Security enter its final order finding that the Respondent, Marvin James, on January 14, 1986, violated section 450.30(1), Fla. Stat., by failing to have a certificate of registration in full force and effect and in his possession and violated section 450.33(5), Fla. Stat., by failing to have a policy of insurance on his 1977 Dodge van used to transport farmworkers, and assessing a civil penalty of two thousand dollars ($2,000). DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of July, 1987. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of July, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-1704 The following are rulings upon findings of fact by number or paragraph number as proposed by the parties which have been rejected. Findings of fact proposed by the Petitioner: None. Findings of fact proposed by the Respondent: Paragraph 2: Rejected for the reasons stated in finding of fact 7. Paragraph 3: Rejected for the reasons stated in fending of fact 7. Paragraph 4: Mr. Mize had no need to talk to workers in the grove since Mr. James admitted he was the crew leader, and did not tell Mr. Mize then that Mr. Mears was the crew leader. Paragraph 5: Mr. Mize testified that he saw workers on ladders, and made it clear that his number was only an estimate. Paragraph 6: Rejected for the reasons stated in finding of fact 7. Paragraph 7: Rejected for lack of testimony in the record as to these facts. Paragraph 8: Rejected in the conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Hugo Menendez, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 206 Berkeley Building 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Kenneth Hart, Esquire General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 131 Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Marvin James 1501 Island Avenue Dade City, Florida 33525 Moses E. Williams, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security Montgomery Building, Room 117 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
