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BEST WESTERN TIVOLI INN vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 78-002180 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-002180 Latest Update: Apr. 11, 1979

Findings Of Fact The signs located one mile east of State Road 79 on Interstate 10 and one-half mile west of State Road 79 on Interstate 10 and bearing copy advertising Best Western Tivoli Inn are owned by Mr. Fleming. These signs are located within 15 feet of the right-of-way of a federal interstate highway outside an incorporated municipality or town. The copy of these signs is visible from the interstate highway. The signs do not have permits issued by the Department of Transportation attached to them.

Recommendation Based on the violation of Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Department of Transportation direct the owner to remove said signs. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: James Moore, Esquire Post Office Box 746 Niceville, Florida 32570 Gerald Holley, Esquire Post Office Box 268 Chipley, Florida 32428 Frank King, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION IN RE: NOT EFFECTIVE UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND BEST WESTERN TIVOLI INN, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 78-2180T FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent. /

Florida Laws (3) 479.07479.11479.111
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DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, DIVISION OF MOTORIST SERVICES vs MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON, D/B/A A STAR AUTO AND TRUCK SALES, 14-003187 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Jul. 14, 2014 Number: 14-003187 Latest Update: Sep. 11, 2014

Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction by William F. Quattlebaum, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Petitioner’s Notice Of Voluntary Dismissal, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is CLOSED and Respondent shall abide by the terms of the Settlement Agreement entered into in this matter. Filed September 11, 2014 2:09 PM Division of Administrative Hearings DONE AND ORDERED this \\ day of September, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon Cobur Julie Baker, Chief Bureau of Issuance Oversight Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A338 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 County, Florida. Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services this } { day of September, 2014. NOTICE OF APPEALRIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. JB/jdc Copies furnished: Richard A. Filson, Esquire Filson and Penge, P.A. 2727 South Tamiami Trail Sarasota, Florida 34239 filsonlawfirm@gmail.com Damaris E. Reynolds, Esquire Department of Highway Safety And Motor Vehicles 2900 Apalachee Parkway, Room A430, MS61 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 damarisreynolds@flhsmv.gov William F. Quattlebaum Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 6 fees. eat

Florida Laws (1) 120.68
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs STEVEN P. WILLIAMS, 00-002781PL (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Apopka, Florida Jul. 06, 2000 Number: 00-002781PL Latest Update: Feb. 07, 2001

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of failing to maintain good moral character.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner certified Respondent as a correctional officer on September 23, 1988, and issued him certificate number 101535. For an undisclosed period of time, Respondent has been employed as a correctional officer by the Orange County Correctional Department at the Orange County Jail on 33rd Street in Orlando. About 10:17 PM on the evening of May 2, 1999, Respondent was operating his motor vehicle on Rock Springs Road in north Orange County. A deputy sheriff in a parked car noticed that the tag light on Respondent's vehicle was out. The deputy pursued Respondent's vehicle and, when they reached a safe place to turn off the highway, turned on her emergency lights and directed Respondent to pull over. Respondent's operation of the vehicle did not disclose any impairment, although one time, during the relatively long period that the deputy trailed Respondent, his right rear tire of briefly left the narrow, poorly lighted road and traveled on the grass for a short distance. Once the two vehicles were stopped, the deputy ordered Respondent out of his vehicle. At first Respondent did not respond, so the deputy ordered him a second time to get out of his vehicle. He promptly responded to the second order, and the deputy could not rule out that Respondent had not heard her first order. As she approached Respondent, the deputy detected the smell of beer and noticed that Respondent had spilled beer on the right leg of his pants. His eyes were bloodshot and glassy. When he spoke, his speech was thick-tongued. Respondent swayed slightly from side to side as he stood talking to the deputy. The deputy asked Respondent if he would undergo field sobriety tests. Respondent declined, but agreed to the deputy's request that he submit to an examination of his eyes. The test that the deputy administered is the horizontal gaze nystagmus test (HGN), which detects involuntary jerking of the eyes that is indicative of intoxication. The tests that Respondent declined to perform were the walk and turn and one leg stand tests. A subject taking the HGN may score a maximum of six points. The HGN consists of three parts, which are applied to each eye individually. Each of the three parts measures the smoothness of eye travel, as it tracks a moving pen, and the onset, if any, of involuntary jerkiness. Respondent flunked all six parts of the HGN. Absent a physiological condition, failing all six parts is an indicator of intoxication. Respondent suffers from no such physiological condition that would cause him to fail the HGN while not intoxicated. However, as discussed in the Conclusions of Law, failure to pass the HGN, in isolation, does not supply clear and convincing evidence of legal impairment. In this case, it is clear that Respondent had consumed beer, but the evidence is less than clear and convincing that he had consumed a sufficient amount of alcoholic beverages so as to become legally impaired. Respondent testified candidly that he had a drinking problem during 1999. His marriage of 28 years had recently ended, and he was feeling alone. He became depressed and drank. However, he has not had a drink since July 8, 1999. He attended Alcoholics Anonymous and, later, more individualized counseling. Petitioner has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent's actions on May 2, 1999, constituted a failure to maintain good moral character.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: A. Leon Lowry, II, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Gabrielle Taylor Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Steven P. Williams Post Office Box 2652 Apopka, Florida 32704

Florida Laws (32) 119.07120.57316.193316.1934327.35741.31784.03784.048790.01790.15794.027800.02806.101810.08812.015817.235817.563828.12831.31837.012837.06843.02843.06847.011870.01893.147943.13943.133943.139943.1395944.35944.39 Florida Administrative Code (1) 11B-27.0011
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DISCOUNT AUTO PARTS RETAIL STORE NO. 228 vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 95-002794 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lakeland, Florida May 31, 1995 Number: 95-002794 Latest Update: Jan. 16, 1996

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the Department was the state agency responsible for regulating vehicular access and connections to or from the State Highway System in accordance with Sections 335.18 through 335.188, Florida Statutes, known as the State Highway System Access Management Act. The property which Petitioner filed an application for an access connection to US Highway 17 (SR 35) is located on the southeast corner of the intersection of SR 35 and Sixth Street in Fort Meade, Polk County, Florida. Petitioner's property abuts the east right-of-way of SR 35, with frontage of approximately 235 feet and the south right-of-way of Sixth Street, with frontage of approximately 235 feet. SR 35 has been designated as an intrastate system route. The segment of SR 35 involved in this proceeding has been assigned an Access Management Classification of Four with a design speed of 50 miles per hour and a posted speed of 40 miles per hour . Also, this segment of SR 35 has a "non-restrictive median" as that term is defined in Rule 14-97.002(23), Florida Administrative Code. The distance between all cross streets running east and west which intersect SR 35 within Fort Meade, Florida, including Sixth Street, is approximately 440 feet. (See Petitioner's exhibit 2, Department's aerial photo of the area) Petitioner's application proposes a full movement access connection to be located south of Sixth Street on SR 35 with a connection spacing between Sixth Street and the proposed connection of 190 feet. This distance was determined by measuring from the south edge of the pavement of Sixth Street to the north edge of pavement of proposed access in accordance with Rule 14- 97.002(19), Florida Administrative Code. The centerline of the proposed connection on SR 35 is located approximately 220 feet south of the centerline of Sixth Street. Petitioner's application also proposes an access connection to Sixth Street which would give Petitioner indirect access to SR 35 through Sixth Street. The centerline of the proposed connection on Sixth Street is located approximately 135 feet east of the east curb of SR 35 presently in place. Petitioner's proposed access connection to SR 35 is located immediately north of a crest of a rise over which SR 35 traverses. Both south and north of the crest is a depression through which SR 35 traverses. The point where Sixth Street intersects SR 35 is located approximately at the bottom of the depression north of the crest. A motorist attempting to enter SR 35 from the proposed access connection would have a full view of any vehicle moving north through the depression to the south of the crest or moving south through the depression to the north of the crest. A motorist attempting to enter SR 35 from the east on Sixth Street would have only a partial view of a vehicle moving north through the depression to the south of the crest but a full view of any vehicle moving north through the depression north of the crest. Both Dennis Wood and Michael Tako testified that each had viewed the traffic moving north through the depression south of the crest from a point where Sixth Street intersects SR 35. They also testified that each had, from a point where Sixth Street intersects SR 35, at least a partial view at all times of the vehicles moving north through the depression south of the crest. Based on the above and their assumption that the distance between cross streets along SR 35 was 600 to 700 feet rather than approximately 440 feet as indicated in Petitioner's exhibit 2, Department's aerial photo of the area, Wood believed and Tako concluded that there was minimum clear sight distance that would allow a motorist exiting Sixth Street to cross SR 35 safely, or turn left to enter the southbound lane of SR 35 safely or turn right to enter the northbound land of SR 35 safely. Because of the continuous partial view of the vehicles moving north through the depression south of the crest from a point where Sixth Street intersects SR 35 it may appear that there was minimum clear sight distance in that area. However, there is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that a minimum clear sight distance was established because the height of the originating clear sight line above the pavement or the height of the clear sight line above the pavement at the vehicle observed, which are required to establish a minimum clear sight distance (See Department's exhibit 10), were not established. Also, the estimate of the distance between the originating point of the clear sight line and the ending point of the clear sight line at the vehicle observed was flawed due to the use of incorrect distances between the cross streets. There is insufficient evidence to show that a motorist looking south from the point where Sixth Street intersects SR 35 would have the required minimum clear sight distance as calculated by Department, as shown in Department's exhibit 10, to allow a motorist to cross SR 35 safely or turn left to enter the southbound lane of SR 35 safely or turn right to enter the northbound lane of SR 35. Presently, there are three access connections of approximately 20 feet in width on SR 35 where Petitioner's property abuts SR 35. These access connections where constructed before Petitioner had ownership of the property. However, since there will be a change in land use, these access connections will be closed if the site is developed whether this access permit is granted or denied. Petitioner plans to close two of these access connections and extend the opening to the third one if the application is approved. SR 35 is a moderate volume road with approximately 17,000 average daily trips (ADT's), increasing approximately 500 ADT's annually over the past five years. Sixth Street has approximately 100 to 150 ADT's at present with the ADT's projected to increase to approximately 300 if the site is developed and Petitioner's application for the access connection to SR 35 is denied. However, the number of vehicles entering SR 35 which constitutes traffic utilizing Petitioner's establishment will be the same no matter where this traffic enters SR 35. Without the direct access connection to SR 35 there will be problems with internal customer traffic flow and with the movement of semi-tractor trailers that Petitioner uses to make deliveries to its store. Although the present site plan design may be modified so as to utilize the indirect access to SR 35 through Sixth Street, the modification of the site plan design would create problems that would most likely result in the City of Fort Meade not approving the modified site plan design. Although using Sixth Street as an indirect access to SR 35 from the site may provide a safe ingress and egress to and from SR 35, the lack of a minimum clear sight distance notwithstanding, the Petitioner's proposed access connection would provide a much safer ingress and egress to and from SR 35 because of a better clear sightdistance. Although the indirect access to SR 35 through Sixth Street may provide safe ingress and egress to and from SR 35, the indirect access does not provide reasonable access to the site as the term "reasonable access" is defined in Rule 14-96.002(22), Florida Administrative Code. The primary purpose of limiting access to SR 35 is to provide safer conditions for vehicles utilizing SR 35.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a final order granting Petitioner's Connection Application Number C-16-010-90 and issuing Petitioner a nonconforming permit for the construction of the access connection to SR 35 as designed and shown in the site plan attached to the application with conditions deemed appropriate by the Department and provided for under Rule 14.96.009, Florida Administrative Code. RECOMMENDED this day 30th of October, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-2794 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed findings of fact 1 through 16 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 21. The Respondent elected not file any proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary ATTN: Diedre Grubbs Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thornton J. Williams, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 695 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Douglas E. Polk, Jr., Esquire BROWN CLARK & WALTERS, P.A. 1819 Main Street, Suite 1100 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Francine M. Ffolkes, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, MS 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458

Florida Laws (4) 120.57335.18335.187335.188 Florida Administrative Code (3) 14-96.00214-97.00214-97.003
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs STEVE SHAMBLIN, 89-005941 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Oct. 31, 1989 Number: 89-005941 Latest Update: Mar. 09, 1990

The Issue The issues to be decided in this case are those associated with the question of whether the Respondent is required to have a permit for the connection of his business property to State Road 206 or is exempt from that requirement. See Section 335.187, Florida Statutes. If he is required to have a permit the issue becomes the acceptability of his current drive, i.e., does it comply with the commercial use design criteria contemplated by Chapter 335, Florida Statutes, and further described in the Florida Department of Transportation "Policy and Guidelines for Vehicular Connections to Roads on the State Highway System," February, 1985, which was recognized and incorporated by reference through Rule 14- 15.013, Florida Administrative Code. These issues are raised through an alleged violation of the Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code set out in the Notice to Show Cause which was forwarded to Respondent from Petitioner leading to the formal hearing. The date of that Notice to Show Cause was July 18, 1989. Within the statement of violations there were also allegations concerning irregular signs as alleged under Section 479.11(8), Florida Statutes, associated with the commercial activities by Respondent and the unauthorized parking on the right-of-way at State Road 206 in violation of Section 337.406, Florida Statutes. These latter allegations were conceded by the Respondent at hearing and are resolved through those concessions.

Findings Of Fact At the time of the hearing Respondent operated a roadside fruit and vegetable stand at property adjacent to State Road 206 in St. Johns County, Florida. In addition to fruits and vegetables, by local ordinance of St. Johns County, Florida, he is allowed to sell poultry and fish. There is no indication that he has taken advantage of that opportunity other than to sell fresh shrimp from a cooler during 1989. In addition to these products he sells honeys, jellies, and jams. He also sells soft drinks from a dispensing machine. A mainstay in his business is peanuts which he sells fresh. Another product sold is pork skins. The drink machine that is described was added in March, 1989. Before that time he sold fountain drinks and cold drinks that were dispensed from a cooler. He has always had soft drinks available from the inception of his operation of the roadside stand. That began in March, 1985. At the time the Respondent purchased the property there was an operation ongoing whereby fruit was being sold on two tables. Respondent replaced those structures with a portable trailer which was anchored to the lot, and display and sell of fruit on a 16-foot table and use of an 8-foot table upon which tomatoes were displayed and sold. The trailer was used to store his products over night. The trailer described was a pop-up camper trailer. The principal products being dispensed at that time were peanuts, vegetables, and tomatoes. Through Ordinance No. 86-68, passed by St. Johns County, a copy of which may be seen as Respondent's exhibit No. 1, the property was recognized as C1, commercial intensive, with the conditions that the property would be limited to outdoor sale of produce, vegetables, fruit, poultry, and fish. It was also stated that there would be no access/egress to United States Highway 1, which is also known as State Road 5. This property is located at the intersection of State Road 5 and State Road 206. Present access/egress to the property is from State Road 206 and that has been the situation since Respondent purchased the property. The ordinance described dates from August 12, 1986. Over time Respondent has taken a number of steps to improve his business. In March, 1988, Respondent obtained permission from St. Johns County to place a storage shed on his property. In August of that year he obtained permission to install a metal awning or carport of dimension 18 feet by 45 feet which is anchored to the ground. At that same time he placed the body from an old milk truck on the property for purposes of cold storage. In March, 1988, he had received an electrical permit from St. Johns County. Prior to that time he did not have electricity. In the spring of 1989, a well was drilled to provide running water. Prior to that time Respondent used bottled water. Respondent's composite exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence describes various permits obtained from St. Johns County. If Respondent was required to remove the structures on his property it could be done in three days. This goes to identify the nature of the structures and to demonstrate that they are not permanent fixtures to the realty. According to Respondent, whose testimony is accepted, the business that he is experiencing at present has remained fairly constant in dollar amounts. He does not sell as many peanuts as he did before. Concerning traffic, Respondent indicates, and his testimony is accepted, that the number of cars that are located at his business would be a maximum of 12 on a busy Sunday afternoon and that at most times there are one or two cars. The hours of the business are from 8:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. in the winter time and somewhat longer in the summer time. The business is open seven days a week. A rough description of the nature of the property by design may be found in the documents contained in Respondent's exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. The property is approximately 280 front feet and 280 feet at the rear with 41 feet on each side. The frontage runs approximately east-west on State Road 206 and one of the sides abuts State Road 5. The basic design of the driveway entrance from State Road 206 is also set out in those drawings. As Marshall W. Sander, engineer in the permit department for Petitioner in its St. Augustine, Florida, maintenance office, explains the driveway is an unimproved dirt shell connection. This is the same driveway that was there at the time that Respondent purchased the property and has remained in that state since that time. Notwithstanding Mr. Sanders' concern that the driveway is not up to current commercial business criteria for access/egress, there have been no accidents as a result of access/egress from the business. There are two turnouts or turn- ins into the property. Mr. Sander believes that at least one paved driveway is needed leading into the property. The dimensions of that drive would be 24-foot wide which allows a 12-foot wide lane in and a 12-foot wide lane out. This impression of Mr. Sander is drawn in the face of the Respondent's presenting himself at the office of Petitioner in St. Augustine, Florida, with an application and plan showing the intention to improve the property to include restrooms, a beer and wine cooler with parking on site. Under those circumstances Mr. Sander felt it necessary to improve the drive connection. At hearing there was no suggestion that restrooms are available on the premises or will be in the near future, nor was there any indication that a beer and wine cooler would be installed. Therefore it cannot be said that the basic nature of the business has changed from its inception to the present. Mr. Sander concedes that within the records of the Petitioner there are no indications that the business has increased by way of records concerning traffic flow or otherwise. His remarks about increased traffic at Dupont Center is not specific enough to gain a useful impression of that circumstance. Mr. Sander relies upon the observations of the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and the St. Johns County Public Health Unit as were testified to by George L. Sigman, Environmental Health Director II for that organization. He also spoke to certain records of the health unit which may be found as Petitioner's composite exhibit 1 admitted into evidence. Nothing about his testimony or that exhibit identifies a noteworthy change in the basic nature of the business from Respondent's establishment of the roadside stand in March, 1985 until the present. Throughout the existence of his business Respondent has operated without the benefit of a driveway permit issued by Petitioner.

Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and in view of the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: By way of disposition of the Notice to Show Cause, that a Final Order be entered which recognizes the concessions made by the Respondent concerning the sign in question, calling for its removal if still in existence and his acknowledgment of the problem of parking on the right-of-way and which absolves the Respondent of any necessity to obtain a driveway permit. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX The following discussion is given concerning proposed facts. Petitioner' s Facts Paragraphs 1 and 2 are subordinate to facts found. The first sentence in Paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found. The second sentence is contrary to facts found. The third sentence is subordinate to facts found. Sentences 4 and 5 depict testimony as opposed to suggesting fact finding. However, the last sentence in that paragraph is one upon which facts were found in the Recommended Order. Respondent' s Facts Paragraphs one and two pertain to withdrawal of the request for hearing concerning signs and parking and are not part of fact finding. The first sentence in paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found. The remaining sentence is legal argument, as are paragraphs 4 and 5. Paragraphs 6-11 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 12 is not relevant. Paragraphs 13 and 14 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Leo O. Myers, Esquire Post Office Box 1621 Jacksonville, FL 32201 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458

Florida Laws (5) 120.57335.1825335.187337.406479.11
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JANE A. CALDERA vs BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS, 97-005588 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Nov. 21, 1997 Number: 97-005588 Latest Update: Jan. 27, 1999

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner is entitled to additional points on the October 1996 Civil Engineering exam.

Findings Of Fact In October 1996, Jane A. Caldera (Petitioner) took the Principles and Practice of Engineering Examination. By grade report dated February 17, 1997, the Petitioner was notified by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (Department) that she had received a score of 67 points on the exam. A minimum score of 70 points was required to pass the October 1996 engineering examination. The Petitioner challenges the scoring of her responses on question 121 and question 423 (parts 1, 2 and 4). Question 121 required mathematical calculation of channel flow rates based on a hypothetical set of facts. On question 121, the Petitioner received four points from a total of ten available points. The evidence establishes that the Petitioner should have received a total of six points for her response to question 121. The scoring plan for question 121 provides that six points are awarded for "minimum competence." The scoring plan for question 121 defines minimum competence as follows: Must attempt all parts of part (a) and gives answers for flow depth and flow discharge within [plus or minus] 5 percent but omits flow state. OR Solves flow depth and flow discharge within accuracy of [plus or minus] 10 percent, for both, and provides demonstrated answer for flow state. OR Neglects inlet loss in solution of flow depth and flow discharge, and provides demonstrated answer for flow state. (Emphasis supplied.) The Petitioner asserts that her answer to question 121 meets the level of minimum competence because she provided the correct answer for flow state, depth and discharge, but neglected to allow for the inlet loss in her answer. The greater weight of the evidence supports the Petitioner's assertion. Respondent's Exhibit 4, a re-score result by the National Counsel of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying states that the Petitioner is not entitled to additional points on question 121 because the "examinee's solution does not meet the accuracy criteria set for a score of 6 and did more than required for a score of 2. Therefore, the solution was scored at a level of 4." The re-scoring report is uncorroborated hearsay. The re-scoring report does not appear to follow the specific criteria set forth in the scoring plan for the examination. The scoring of the Petitioner's response to question 121 was arbitrary and capricious. Question 423 requires calculations related to motor vehicle traffic flow. A hypothetical set of facts are included which identifies the percentages of passenger cars, three-axle trucks, four-axle trucks, and five-axle trucks passing a traffic count station. Question 423, part one, states "[t]he annual number of passenger cars (vehicles) passing through this count station is most nearly:" and provides four possible answers. In order to answer question 423, part one, an examinee must determine the total number of vehicles and then calculate the total number of passenger cars as a percentage of the total vehicle count, in order to correctly answer the question. Question 423, part two, states "[t]he annual number of five-axle trucks (vehicles) passing through this count station is most nearly:" and provides four possible answers. In order to answer question 423, part two, an examinee must determine the total number of vehicles and then calculate the total number of five-axle trucks as a percentage of the total vehicle count, in order to correctly answer the question. The word "(vehicles)" in question 423 parts one and two is extraneous. The question can be answered without inclusion of the reference to "(vehicles)." The Petitioner asserts that inclusion of the reference to "(vehicles)" in the question is confusing and prevents an examinee from responding appropriately. The evidence fails to support the Petitioner's assertion. Question 423, part four, states "[t]he 30th highest hourly volume (vehicles) at the count station is most nearly:" and provides four possible answers. In order to respond to question 423, part four, the "K-factor" must be considered. A K-factor is a ratio commonly expressed as a subscript, related to traffic flow computation. In question 423, part four, the hypothetical fact states that the "K-factor is 0.10" but does not state the K- factor in the form of a subscript. The Department asserts that the examinee should have assumed a value of K30. The Petitioner asserts, and the evidence establishes that the appropriate K-factor in an urban setting is K200. The Department's expert witness was asked if there was any basis to assume that the K-factor in the problem was K30 "as opposed to any of the other K's that are used in traffic engineering problems," to which he replied that there was not. The evidence fails to establish that question 423, part four, contains sufficient information which would lead an examinee to reasonably assume a factor of K30 was applicable under the set of hypothetical facts provided in the question. The Department's assertion that a factor of K30 should be assumed by an examinee is arbitrary and capricious.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a Final Order awarding to Jane A. Caldera such additional points as are set forth herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: R. Beth Atchison Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Jane A. Caldera 16810 Stanza Court Tampa, Florida 33624 Mario Romero, Esquire Bull and Associates, P.A. 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1700 Orlando, Florida 32801 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Angel Gonzalez, Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES vs JIMMIE SHANE MURPHY, LLC, D/B/A MURPHY AUTO SALES, 13-002454 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Jul. 03, 2013 Number: 13-002454 Latest Update: Aug. 29, 2013

Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Dismissing Case and Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Petitioner’s Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is CLOSED. DONE AND ORDERED this ay day of August, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Julie Baker, Chief Bureau of Issuance Oversight Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A338 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services Filed August 29, 2013 2:07 PM Division of Administrative Hearings this “ve of —_ 2013 Yea _ f fekses- ee ‘ficens NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. Copies furnished: Jimmie Murphy, Manager Jimmie Shane Murphy, LLC 4601 Saufley Field Road Pensacola, Florida 32523 Damaris E. Reynolds Assistant General Counsel Department of Highway Safety And Motor Vehicles 2900 Apalachee Parkway, Room A432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Diane Cleavinger Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 i)

Florida Laws (1) 120.68
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FAITH AND TRUTH MINISTRIES, INC. (UNIQUE LADY'S OF CHARACTER) vs DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, 11-003769 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Jul. 27, 2011 Number: 11-003769 Latest Update: Oct. 18, 2011

Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File by William F. Quattlebaum, an Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, entered October 7, 2011. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this matter. Said Order Closing File was predicated upon Petitioner’s notice of dismissal without prejudice of the Amended Complaint contesting the intended denial of Respondent’s application for licensure. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Petitioner’s application for licensure as a DUI Program in the 13" Judicial Circuit is denied. — DONE AND ORDERED this | [ a day of October, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Sou _-“ SANDRA C, LAMBERT, Direct Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services this { pte day of October, 2011. NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal! for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. Copies furnished: Lilja Dandelake, Esquire Judson M. Chapman, Esquire Assistant General Counsels Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Donna Blanton, Esquire Bert Combs, Esquire Attorneys for Intervenor Radey Thomas Yon & Clark, P.A. 301 S. Bronough Street, Suite 200 2900 Apalachee Parkway, Rm. A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Scott Boardman, Esquire David Scott Boardman, P.A. Attorney for Petitioner 1710 E. Seventh Ave. Tampa, Florida 33605 Tallahassee, FL 32301 William F. Quattlebaum Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399

Florida Laws (1) 120.68
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