Findings Of Fact On July 31, 1987, a sign owned by Hodessa Corporation for whom Gia Associates is the agent was located on the right-of-way of U.S. 19 in Pasco County, .3 mile north of Floramar. When erected by the sign company some months earlier the sign was located in a legal location and not on the right-of-way of U.S. 19. Considerable construction work was being done on the property owned by Hodessa. Upon completion of the parking lot the sign was moved by the construction workers onto the right-of-way of U.S. 19. As soon as this error was discovered by Respondent the sign was relocated to its proper position.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner is entitled to additional points on the October 1996 Civil Engineering exam.
Findings Of Fact In October 1996, Jane A. Caldera (Petitioner) took the Principles and Practice of Engineering Examination. By grade report dated February 17, 1997, the Petitioner was notified by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (Department) that she had received a score of 67 points on the exam. A minimum score of 70 points was required to pass the October 1996 engineering examination. The Petitioner challenges the scoring of her responses on question 121 and question 423 (parts 1, 2 and 4). Question 121 required mathematical calculation of channel flow rates based on a hypothetical set of facts. On question 121, the Petitioner received four points from a total of ten available points. The evidence establishes that the Petitioner should have received a total of six points for her response to question 121. The scoring plan for question 121 provides that six points are awarded for "minimum competence." The scoring plan for question 121 defines minimum competence as follows: Must attempt all parts of part (a) and gives answers for flow depth and flow discharge within [plus or minus] 5 percent but omits flow state. OR Solves flow depth and flow discharge within accuracy of [plus or minus] 10 percent, for both, and provides demonstrated answer for flow state. OR Neglects inlet loss in solution of flow depth and flow discharge, and provides demonstrated answer for flow state. (Emphasis supplied.) The Petitioner asserts that her answer to question 121 meets the level of minimum competence because she provided the correct answer for flow state, depth and discharge, but neglected to allow for the inlet loss in her answer. The greater weight of the evidence supports the Petitioner's assertion. Respondent's Exhibit 4, a re-score result by the National Counsel of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying states that the Petitioner is not entitled to additional points on question 121 because the "examinee's solution does not meet the accuracy criteria set for a score of 6 and did more than required for a score of 2. Therefore, the solution was scored at a level of 4." The re-scoring report is uncorroborated hearsay. The re-scoring report does not appear to follow the specific criteria set forth in the scoring plan for the examination. The scoring of the Petitioner's response to question 121 was arbitrary and capricious. Question 423 requires calculations related to motor vehicle traffic flow. A hypothetical set of facts are included which identifies the percentages of passenger cars, three-axle trucks, four-axle trucks, and five-axle trucks passing a traffic count station. Question 423, part one, states "[t]he annual number of passenger cars (vehicles) passing through this count station is most nearly:" and provides four possible answers. In order to answer question 423, part one, an examinee must determine the total number of vehicles and then calculate the total number of passenger cars as a percentage of the total vehicle count, in order to correctly answer the question. Question 423, part two, states "[t]he annual number of five-axle trucks (vehicles) passing through this count station is most nearly:" and provides four possible answers. In order to answer question 423, part two, an examinee must determine the total number of vehicles and then calculate the total number of five-axle trucks as a percentage of the total vehicle count, in order to correctly answer the question. The word "(vehicles)" in question 423 parts one and two is extraneous. The question can be answered without inclusion of the reference to "(vehicles)." The Petitioner asserts that inclusion of the reference to "(vehicles)" in the question is confusing and prevents an examinee from responding appropriately. The evidence fails to support the Petitioner's assertion. Question 423, part four, states "[t]he 30th highest hourly volume (vehicles) at the count station is most nearly:" and provides four possible answers. In order to respond to question 423, part four, the "K-factor" must be considered. A K-factor is a ratio commonly expressed as a subscript, related to traffic flow computation. In question 423, part four, the hypothetical fact states that the "K-factor is 0.10" but does not state the K- factor in the form of a subscript. The Department asserts that the examinee should have assumed a value of K30. The Petitioner asserts, and the evidence establishes that the appropriate K-factor in an urban setting is K200. The Department's expert witness was asked if there was any basis to assume that the K-factor in the problem was K30 "as opposed to any of the other K's that are used in traffic engineering problems," to which he replied that there was not. The evidence fails to establish that question 423, part four, contains sufficient information which would lead an examinee to reasonably assume a factor of K30 was applicable under the set of hypothetical facts provided in the question. The Department's assertion that a factor of K30 should be assumed by an examinee is arbitrary and capricious.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a Final Order awarding to Jane A. Caldera such additional points as are set forth herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: R. Beth Atchison Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Jane A. Caldera 16810 Stanza Court Tampa, Florida 33624 Mario Romero, Esquire Bull and Associates, P.A. 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1700 Orlando, Florida 32801 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Angel Gonzalez, Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Two signs are located 0.8 mile west of State Road, 79 on Interstate 10, and 0.8 mile east of State Road 79 on Interstate 10. Both signs do not have permits attached to them. Both signs bear messages which are visible from the traveled way of Interstate 10. Neither sign is located within an incorporated municipality or town. Both signs advertise in part Simbo's Restaurant. Mr. Jim Williams, Outdoor Advertising Inspector for the Department of Transportation, testified that he had spoken with Mr. Simms on June 28, 1978. Williams stated that he asked Simms if Simms would remove the signs; however, Williams did not identify the signs to which he was referring. According to Williams, when Simms was asked if he would take the signs down, Simms stated he would leave them up and go to court. There was no substantial and competent evidence introduced that Simms was referring to the signs in question in this case. Both signs were measured by Charles Averitt, a surveyor with the Department of Transportation, and the sign 0.8 mile west of State Road 79 on Interstate 10 was determined to be 16 feet from the edge of the right-of-way of Interstate 10. The sign 0.8 mile east of State Road 79 on Interstate 10 was determined to be 16.5 feet from the edge of the right-of-way of Interstate 10. Gene Simms testified that he was the owner and operator of Simbo's Truck Stop and Restaurant. Simms testified the signs in question were the property of Simms' Enterprises, Inc., and had been at all times pertaining to this complaint. Simms stated that he owned 50 percent of the stock in Simms Enterprises, Inc., and the remainder was owned by his brother, Jimmy Simms. The notice of violation in this cause names Gene Simms as the Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Department of Transportation take no action regarding the subject DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: Phillip S. Bennet, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Richard C. Hurst, Administrator Outdoor Advertising Section Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mr. Gene Simms Simbo's Auto-Truck Stop and Restaurant Route 1, Box 186 Bonifay, Florida 32425
The Issue Whether the Respondent by erecting the two subject signs violated the state and federal regulation and laws by erecting one sign on the right of way of U.S. 319, a Federal Aid Primary Road, and erecting one sign within five (5) feet of said highway. Whether subject signs should be removed for lack of permits.
Findings Of Fact Claimant contended and Respondent admitted that the two subject signs were in violation of set-back requirements of Chapter 479 and the Federal Beautification Act as charged.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer would recommend that the agency head enter a final order permitting the voluntary removal of both signs to include the entire advertising structure within 30 days of the date of the agency head's final order, and directing employees of the Department of Transportation to remove the structures after the 30-day period without compensation to the owner. DONE and ORDERED this 31st day of October, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James P. Appleman, Esquire 206 Market Street Post Office Box 385 Marianna, Florida 32446 Charles M. Wynn, Esquire 310 East Jackson Street Post Office Box 793 Marianna, Florida 32446
The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Transportation ("Respondent"), has demonstrated that Petitioner, Frank C. Kunnen, Jr., d/b/a U.S. 19 Commerce Center's ("Petitioner"), right-out driveway to U.S. Highway 19 will present a safety and operational problem following Respondent's reconstruction of Highway 19. Whether Petitioner's access to the state highway system will be reasonable if Petitioner's existing right-out driveway is closed. Whether Respondent is legally entitled to administratively close Petitioner's driveway, pursuant to Rule 14-96.011, Florida Administrative Code, and applicable Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of real property located within the city limits of Clearwater, in Pinellas County, Florida, which property abuts U.S. Highway 19 (State Road 55). It has a right-in and right-out driveway connection to U.S. Highway 19. Petitioner's current right-in, right-out driveway does not create a safety or operational problem with the existing configuration of U.S. Highway 19. Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida created pursuant to Chapter 20, Florida Statutes. Respondent regulates access to the state highway system. Respondent initially cited Rule 14-96.011, Florida Administrative Code, in the Notice as authority for the intended agency action. This Rule pertains to closure or modification of permitted driveways. At hearing on March 20, it was discovered that Respondent had intended to cite Rule 14-96.012, Florida Administrative Code, which pertains to closure or modification of unpermitted driveways that had been in existence since before July 1, 1988, the effective date of the State Highway System Access Management Act. The Rule refers to these driveways as "grandfathered." As of March 20, Respondent was not aware that Petitioner's driveway might have been permitted. In order to provide Petitioner all due process to which he was entitled, Respondent requested that the hearing be continued. After reviewing its files, Respondent indicated to Petitioner on June 28, 2001, that Respondent would be requesting an additional continuance to conduct an engineering study pursuant to Rule 14- 96.011, Florida Administrative Code.¹ Petitioner agreed to both continuances. The study was dated August 20, 2001, and was delivered to Petitioner's counsel just after that date. This study was presented as Respondent's Exhibit 5 at the resumption of the hearing on September 20, 2001. The Study sets out the essential safety and operational bases for Respondent's agency action in this case and was signed and sealed by a professional engineer registered in the State of Florida. Prior to the reconvened hearing, Petitioner did not seek to depose the author of the engineering study nor did he request documents utilized in creating the study. Petitioner decided to wait until the hearing and make a series of objections to the study's admissibility. Prior to and after the study was admitted into evidence, Petitioner's counsel conducted extensive cross-examination of the engineer who signed and sealed the study, Vibert Griffith, P.E., and his assistant in the creation of the study, Julian Parsons. Petitioner did not present any evidence of prejudice resulting from the timing of the creation of the study. Any prejudice which may be presumed was cured by Respondent's requesting a continuance specifically to search its records for evidence of a permit; Respondent's requesting another continuance to create that study; Petitioner's agreeing to both continuances; and Respondent's producing the study approximately one month prior to hearing. This gave Petitioner time to conduct discovery regarding the study, not to mention sufficient time to prepare for the hearing itself. The Notice did not state whether mediation was available in this case. However, the lack of mention of mediation in the Notice was of no prejudice to Petitioner in light of the fact that that Petitioner proposed several alternative driveway designs to Respondent, and that these alternatives had been closely studied and considered. Petitioner did not present any evidence that he had asked whether mediation was available or was denied an opportunity to mediate this case. Accordingly, any error in the lack of information regarding mediation in the Notice was harmless, and any prejudice was cured. Petitioner elicited testimony with respect to a third procedural point in this case. Rule 14-96.011(1)(e), Florida Administrative Code, states that if Respondent seeks to close a driveway, Respondent will offer to meet with the property owner or his representative on-site. As Petitioner's counsel stated during his opening remarks, however, there is a long history of litigation between Petitioner and Respondent, including two pervious mediations. Again, the unrebutted testimony at hearing was that over the last several years Respondent evaluated three alternative designs submitted by Petitioner for access to U.S. Highway 19. Petitioner did not present any evidence of prejudice in not being able to meet on-site with Respondent in this case. Any error in relation to this issue was harmless. U.S. Highway 19 runs north-south through Pinellas County, Florida and is a part of the Florida Intrastate Highway System. In the vicinity of Petitioner's property, U.S. Highway 19 has three lanes of traffic each for northbound and southbound traffic (total of six lanes). As part of the reconstruction of U.S. Highway 19, Respondent has plans to create "grade separated intersections" or "urban interchanges" at the cross street to the south and north of Petitioner's property. The cross street to the south is Drew Street, and the cross street to the north is Coachman Road. Also, just to the north of Petitioner's property, U.S. Highway 19 is elevated over railroad tracks, and will continue to be so elevated after reconstruction. In its reconstructed state, vehicles will reach mainline U.S. Highway 19 by a series of frontage roads and on and off ramps. Vehicles that stay on mainline U.S. Highway 19 will not have to stop for signals at intersections with cross streets because the mainline will travel over the cross streets. The effect of U.S. Highway reconstruction will be to create a more efficient transportation facility by improving safety and capacity. The overall improvements to U.S. Highway 19 are necessary. Although Respondent is closing Petitioner's right-out driveway to mainline U.S. Highway 19, Respondent is not acquiring any property from Petitioner. Accordingly, Respondent provided Petitioner with notice of the intended agency action and right to an administrative hearing (the "Notice"). Respondent's Proposal Respondent proposes, as part of its planned improvements to U.S. Highway 19, to provide Petitioner a right- in only entrance from a frontage road running adjacent to and parallel to U.S. Highway 19. Respondent also proposes to build a new two-way road, referred to as Access Road A, which runs north-south, parallel to U.S. Highway 19, intersects Drew Street, and from that point provides vehicles the option of traveling either north or south on mainline U.S. Highway 19, or east or west on Drew Street. Petitioner's northerly neighbor, a maintenance yard owned by Pinellas County, would also send all of its traffic, including large trucks and emergency vehicles, out Access Road A to Drew Street. Other properties, including several car dealerships, to the south of Petitioner's property would also have access to Access Road A. No other property owner, including Pinellas County, objected to Respondent's proposed access system. It is undisputed that Respondent has all of the right-of-way necessary to construct Access Road A to Petitioner's property line. During construction, the City of Clearwater will install a temporary traffic signal at the intersection of Access Road A and Drew Street. Based on a traffic study conducted by the Pinellas County MPO and endorsed by the City of Clearwater and Pinellas County, the traffic light will become permanent when construction is completed. Even if the temporary light is removed after construction, Access Road A will function properly for right turns onto Drew Street which will provide access to the northbound and southbound mainline lanes of U.S. Highway 19. This is true, even assuming that all of Petitioner's neighbors send all of their traffic out Access Road A. In addition, Petitioner's neighbors to the south have several alternate means of access to travel west on Drew Street and either north or south on U.S. Highway 19. Respondent is closing Petitioner's right-out driveway to U.S. Highway 19 because, post-construction, the driveway would be located on an on-ramp. The frontage road and on-ramp, as currently designed by Respondent, would prevent placement of a right-out driveway in such a location. It is Petitioner's position that Respondent could have designed the frontage road and on-ramp in front of Petitioner's property in such a way as to allow the safe operation of a right-out driveway in the approximate location of Petitioner's current right-out driveway. Petitioner's Proposal In support of his contention that Respondent could have designed a right-out driveway, Petitioner offered an aerial map and overlay (Petitioner's Exhibit 3), which purported to show that Respondent could have designed an on-ramp from Drew Street and an off-ramp to Coachman Road to the north in such a way as to allow Petitioner a right-out driveway. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 was a concept based upon what was referred to as the "Lochner Study" at hearing. The "Lochner Study" was a study performed by the engineering firm H. W. Lochner, and showed a right-in, right-out driveway from Petitioner's property onto a frontage road/on-ramp in approximately the same location as Petitioner's current driveway. In the past Petitioner had proposed other alternatives for access to U.S. Highway 19. Petitioner withdrew from consideration at this hearing all other alternative designs for a right-out driveway for Petitioner. The Lochner Study was undertaken with the specific purpose of determining whether needed improvements to U.S. Highway 19 could be safely constructed within right-of-way already owned by Respondent. The Lochner Study concluded that placing a driveway for Petitioner in the location shown in the study would provide "substandard operation and is very undesirable from a safety stand point." The primary reason for this conclusion was that the physical separation of northbound mainline U.S. Highway 19 and the frontage road ended south of the driveway's location. This lack of physical separation would allow vehicles on northbound mainline U.S. Highway 19 to cross over the frontage road and enter Petitioner's property, creating unsafe traffic movements. Petitioner's witnesses agreed that this lack of separation would be a safety problem. Petitioner's Exhibit 3, prepared and testified about by Reginald Mesimer, attempted to alleviate this admittedly unsafe aspect of the Lochner plan by extending the physical separator between northbound mainline U.S. Highway 19 and the frontage road/on-ramp to a point just beyond the location of where Petitioner's driveway would be. The area of physical separation is the "gore" area. In effect, this extension also would shift the beginning of the on-ramp to the point of Petitioner's driveway. Thus, the issue raised was whether the location of the on-ramp could be safely designed to co-exist with the location of the off-ramp for the next interchange at Coachman Road. The standards for determining whether this design is safe are set by the American Association for State Highway and Transportation Officials ("AASHTO"), who publish these standards in the "Green Book," known as the "Bible" of transportation engineers. In examining Petitioner's Exhibit 3, as well as the requirements of AASHTO submitted in this case, it is clear that the requirements for an on-ramp followed by an off-ramp are: (1) an acceleration area for the on-ramp; (2) a weaving area for vehicles going from the on-ramp to mainline, and for vehicles going from mainline to the off-ramp; (3) a deceleration area for the off-ramp, and (4) a queue area for vehicles at the terminus of the off-ramp. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 shows the start of the acceleration area for the on-ramp at the location of Petitioner's right-out driveway, which indicates that the on- ramp for vehicles leaving Petitioner's property would begin at his driveway. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 shows a 2,000-foot weave area, also beginning at the location of Petitioner's right-out driveway. Placing the start of the acceleration area and the weave area at the same point on an on-ramp is contrary to AASHTO design standards. The beginning of the weave area should be near the end of the acceleration area, which, on Petitioner's Exhibit 3, is supposed to be where vehicles on the on-ramp are traveling at the design speed of the highway they are attempting to enter. AASHTO places the beginning of the weaving area where the outside lane of the mainline and the inside lane of the on- ramp are separated by two feet. The weave area extends to a point where there is a twelve-foot separation of the mainline and off-ramp lanes at the next interchange. The design speed of U.S. Highway 19 is 55 miles per hour. It is uncontested that vehicles leaving Petitioner's property will be in a stopped condition prior to entering the on-ramp. Thus, looking at Petitioner's Exhibit 3, the beginning of the weave area should be placed approximately 965 feet to the north of the current location shown on Petitioner's Exhibit 3. In turn, this forces the deceleration area for the off-ramp to Coachman Road shown on Petitioner's Exhibit 3 to be shifted 965 feet to the north. Petitioner's expert testified that the off- ramp deceleration area at Coachman Road could be shifted between 300 and 400 feet to the north. Assuming this to be correct, this places the start of the off-ramp deceleration area approximately 965 feet to the north of its current location, which is 565 to 665 feet beyond the farthest point Petitioner's expert testified it could be moved. Respondent's experts also examined Petitioner's Exhibit 3 under the dictates of AASHTO. Unlike Petitioner, Respondent assumed a design speed of 50 miles per hour, and assumed that shorter distances for acceleration, weaving, and deceleration could be applied in this situation under AASHTO. Respondent's findings demonstrate that under the "Petitioner's best case scenario" the off-ramp at Coachman Road would still have to be moved approximately 600 feet to the north, which is at least 200 feet past the farthest possible shift testified to by Petitioner's expert. Moving the off-ramp would obviously require redesign and delay of the Coachman Road project to the north, already designed and funded for construction. Further, Petitioner's Exhibit 3 also did not take into account any need for increased acceleration distance on the on- ramp due to the grade of the road. For certain portions of the acceleration area of the on-ramp in Petitioner's Exhibit 3 the grade is steeper that 3 percent, and averages over 2 percent. AASHTO does not require an increase in acceleration distance where the grade is "less that two percent." AASHTO requires an increase when the grade is more than 3 percent. This is, according to Petitioner's witness, a "gray area" in AASHTO. In this situation, while AASHTO may not require a multiplier be applied to the entire acceleration distance, it would be safer for the traveling public to apply the multiplier at least to the portions above 3 percent and perhaps to the entire acceleration distance, and to acknowledge that the grade of the road militates against application of strict minimum AASHTO standard distances. Adjusting at all for grade would result in a longer on-ramp and require pushing the off-ramp at Coachman even further north, which makes Petitioner's Exhibit 3 alternative even less viable. Another factor that Petitioner's Exhibit 3 did not take into account was that a significant amount of traffic leaving the proposed right-out driveway would be fully-loaded heavy trucks both from Petitioner's property and the Pinellas County maintenance yard. The AASHTO acceleration distance of 965 feet shown in that Exhibit is for automobiles. Knowing that heavy, fully loaded trucks would be utilizing this driveway on a regular basis, the acceleration distance for such trucks reaching 55 or even 50 miles per hour would be longer than for a normal passenger vehicle. Petitioner's alternative proposal was fatally flawed in its misplacement of the weave area, and was defective in other respects such as not considering the slower heavy truck traffic or the grade of the road. Thus, it is apparent that under any interpretation of the AASHTO standards, Respondent could not safely design an on-ramp from the Drew Street area and an off-ramp to the Coachman Road interchange and provide Petitioner a right-out driveway in the approximate location of his existing right-out driveway. Based upon all the evidence presented at hearing, Respondent demonstrated that AASHTO standards preclude moving the on-ramp to the location proposed by Petitioner. Therefore, closing Petitioner's right-out driveway to reconstructed U.S. Highway 19 is mandated for safety and operational reasons. Access-Reasonableness Issues Following the reconstruction of U.S. Highway 19, the access proposed by Respondent for Petitioner's property is reasonable. An objective comparison of the alternative proposed by Petitioner and Respondent's proposal reveals that Respondent's design results in safer and more efficient access to the state highway system for Petitioner and direct access to east and west travel on Drew Street. One measurable point of comparison is the relative distance a vehicle would have to travel to reach the state highway system under Respondent's proposal versus Petitioner's. Prior to Petitioner's withdrawing from consideration all alternatives other than what was represented in Petitioner's Exhibit 3, Respondent presented testimony regarding two of Petitioner's earlier alternative concepts. These previous alternatives were referred to as Proposal One and Proposal Two. Proposal One was basically a right-out driveway in the form of an on-ramp that would have tied in to mainline U.S. Highway 19 prior to the railroad tracks. Proposal Two was a right-out driveway/on-ramp that tied into the off-ramp for Coachman Road. As far as comparing relative travel distances, both Proposals One and Two are similar to the alternative in Petitioner's Exhibit 3. For vehicles to travel north from Petitioner's property on U.S. Highway 19 in Respondent's design, vehicles travel south on Access Road A, west on Drew Street, and then south on the frontage road/on-ramp. This is a distance of .44 miles. To reach the same point using the access provided in Proposal One, Proposal Two, or Petitioner's Exhibit 3, a vehicle must travel north to the Coachman interchange, and double back south, a distance of approximately 1.45 miles. Thus, when added together, the distances for vehicles to travel north and south on U.S. Highway 19 in Respondent's design total 1.12 miles, or .33 miles less than the 1.45 miles to reach the same points using any of Petitioner's alternative driveway proposals. In addition, for vehicles that wish to travel east or west on Drew Street from Petitioner's property, Respondent's alternative is much shorter. It is .32 miles to reach Drew Street along Access Road A, and 1.6 miles to reach Drew Street from Proposal One, Proposal Two, or Petitioner's Exhibit 3. Another measurable point of comparison are conflict points, places such as intersections and merge areas where vehicles can be expected to change lanes. In Respondent's design, there are four or five conflict points to travel north on U.S. Highway 19, three or four to travel south on U.S. Highway 19, and one to travel east or west on Drew Street. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 shows two conflict points to travel north (right-out turn to on-ramp and merge to mainline), six or seven to travel south on U.S. Highway 19, and seven or eight to travel east or west on Drew Street (same as south on U.S. Highway 19 plus turn from off-ramp). For vehicles traveling north and south on U.S. Highway 19 from Petitioner's property, the number of conflict points in either Respondent's design or Petitioner's alternative are essentially even, but when travel on Drew Street is included in the comparison Respondent's design is clearly safer. A third point of comparison is that Petitioner's alternative provides one way in and one way out. Respondent's design provides two ways in and one way out. Respondent's design provides reasonable access to Petitioner's property. In comparison to Petitioner's alternative, Respondent's design provides for shorter combined travel distances. In regard to conflict points, Respondent's design is as safe as Petitioner's alternative, and safer if travel on Drew Street is included in the comparison. Finally, Respondent's design provides an additional point of ingress. Both witnesses called by Petitioner opined that the access proposed by Respondent was not reasonable, primarily because the access is not "direct." The basis of that opinion was limited to their belief that a "better" access plan, the alternative shown in Petitioner's Exhibit 3, was viable. Neither of Petitioner's witnesses knew the relative travel distances, nor did either witness testify about actual conflict points or any other possible objective points of comparison. Petitioner's witnesses' view are flawed because the alternative shown in Petitioner's Exhibit 3 is not viable. Assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner's Exhibit 3 reflected a safe design, and assuming that this access is reasonable, it would be contrary to logic to conclude that Respondent's design results in unreasonable access. The only "advantage" in Petitioner's Exhibit 3 versus Respondent's proposal is a right-out "direct" connection to U.S. Highway 19 via the on-ramp. However, comparing travel distances, conflict points, and points of ingress, Respondent's design is comparable if not superior, and thus, reasonable. Petitioner stressed that all other property owners along the U.S. Highway 19 corridor have right-in and right-out driveways on frontage roads, and that Petitioner is the only property owner required to use a facility like Access Road A for egress. Even if true, this circumstance does not in and of itself change Respondent's designed access for Petitioner's property into unreasonable access. Based upon objective criteria, Respondent's design is comparable or superior to Petitioner's alternative, and Respondent's design is comparable or superior to the access enjoyed by all other property owners in this vicinity. Engineering Study Pursuant to Rule 14-96.011, Florida Administrative Code, Respondent conducted an engineering study to examine the closure of Petitioner's right-out driveway. Normally, an engineering study is prepared prior to Respondent serving its Notice of Intent to close or alter a permitted driveway connection. The engineering study documents that there is a safety or operational problem with a particular driveway connection, and ensures that Respondent has an engineering basis to seek closure or alteration of the driveway. However, at the time this case came to hearing on March 20, 2001, Respondent was not aware that Petitioner's driveway may have been permitted. That is the reason the study was conducted during a continuance of this case and delivered to Petitioner on or around August 17, 2001. Petitioner agreed to the continuance for Respondent to conduct the study, and Petitioner had adequate time to conduct any further discovery in this case after receipt of the study. Thus, any procedural error in the timing of the study was waived by Petitioner and/or cured by Respondent. The Study does provide safety and operational bases for Respondent's agency action in this case. The study summarizes the history of the U.S. Highway 19 improvement project, discusses the current conditions, explains the proposed improvements, and reviews the safety and operational issues specific to Petitioner's right-out driveway in the post construction condition. The study also explains why two alternative right-out driveway configurations were not acceptable to Respondent. The study contains exhibits showing traffic patterns in the existing and possible future post construction conditions. The study was signed and sealed by a professional engineer registered in the State of Florida. The study did not discuss the Petitioner's alternative advocated at hearing. The reason the study did not address this concept was that at the time of its creation, Respondent did not have Petitioner's Exhibit 3. One other item not addressed was traffic accident data. Since the improvements of U.S. Highway 19 have not been constructed, there is no accident data for the right-out driveway in the post construction condition. Respondent stipulated that Petitioner's existing right-out driveway is safe, so any accident data relating to current conditions is not relevant.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Transportation enter a final order approving the closure of Petitioner's right- out driveway as part of the future constructed improvements to Highway 19 and the construction of Access Road A. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 2001.
The Issue Whether three signs of Respondent are in violation of the Federal and State laws, rules and regulations by violating the set-back requirements and the requirements for state permit.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was issued a thirty (30) day Violation Notice by Petitioner for a sign located .5 of a mile west of State Road 79 on the south side of I-10 approximately twenty (20) feet from the fence on the outer edge of the right-of- way of I-10. The sign advertised gas, oil, food, camping, road service, and CEO radio shop and is owned by Respondent Rich Oil Company, Bonifay, Florida, a business in operation about .9 of a Mile from the sign. The violations were listed as improper set-back and no permit. A thirty (30) day violation notice was issued to the Respondent by Petitioner on a sign located .6 of a mile east of State Road 79 on the north side of I-10 approximately twenty (20) feet from the fence located on the outer edge of the right-of-way. The products advertised were gas, oil, food, camping, road services, CB radio shop of the business operation of Respondent which business was located about .9 of a mile from the sign. The violations were listed as improper set-back and no permit. A thirty (30) day violation notice was issued to Respondent by Petitioner for a sign located on the southeast corner of St. Johns Road and State Road 79 located six (6) to twelve (12) feet from the outer edge of the right-of-way of State Road 79 advertising the products of Respondent: gas, oil, food, camping, road service, CB radio shop. The business was Operated about one hundred and eighty (180) feet from the sign. The violation was listed as improper set-back and no permit. No state permits were applied for or granted for any of the three subject signs. The signs were set back from the federal aid highway as indicated on the Violation Notices. The signs referred to in (1) and (2) above located east and west of the intersection of State Road 79 and I-10 were placed there by Respondent who stated that they were essential for his business and that the business would be diminished if the signs were removed. The sign described in (3) above on State Road 79 is shown by photograph to have a trailer nearby with a sign on it. Said sign on the trailer is not a subject of this hearing.
Recommendation Remove the signs that are located east and west of the intersection of State Road 79 along the right-of-way of I-10 and described in Findings of Fact (1) and (2) herein. Remove the sign located along State Road 79 described in Findings of Fact (3) herein unless the Respondent removes said sign and relocates it within fifteen (15) feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way after obtaining a state permit. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of February, 1977 in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Russell A. Cole, Jr., Esquire 123 N. Oklahoma Street Bonifay, Florida 32425 John W. Scruggs, Esquire Department of Transportation Chipley, Florida 32425 George L. Waas, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mr. Glen E. Rich Rich Oil Company Post Office Box 158 Bonifay, Florida 32425 Mr. J. E. Jordan District Sign Coordinator Department of Transportation Post Office Box 607 Chipley, Florida 32428 Mr. O. E. Black Administrator Outdoor Advertising Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Philip Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 76-1605T RICH OIL COMPANY, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact On December 8, 1986, Respondent owned a sign that had been erected along the east side of U.S. 19 in Pasco County, Florida, approximately 51 feet from the nearest edge of the nearest through lane. U.S. 19 at this location is a part of the State Highway System. The DOT right-of-way at this location extends approximately 82 feet east of the eastern edge of the nearest northbound through lane of U.S. 19. Upon seeing the DOT violation notice posted, someone notified Respondent. Respondent had the sign removed from the DOT right-of-way within ten days of the notice of violation.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered assessing a $75 fine against All American commercial Properties, Inc., for owning a sign on the DOT right-of-way along the east side of U.S. 19 in Pasco County on December 8, 1986. ENTERED this 22 day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 All American Commercial Properties, Inc. Attn: Shelley A. Balduf 6847 County Road 54 New Port Richey, Florida 33552 Kaye N. Henderson, P.E. Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Attn: Eleanor Turner, M.S. 58 Thomas H. Bateman, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact Petitioner applied for a permit to erect a sign along the north side of SR 688, 500 feet west of U.S. 19 facing east (Exhibit 1). This application was disapproved because the proposed location is within 1000 feet of an existing sign along SR 688, facing in the same direction. With respect to outdoor advertising signs the character of SR 688 and U.S. 19 change at their intersection. North of SR 688 U.S. 19 is a federal-aid primary highway, south of SR 688 U.S. 19 is a federal-aid urban highway. For sign permitting purposes U.S. 19 is a controlled highway north of SR 688 and an uncontrolled highway south of SR 688. Similarly, SR 688 is a federal-aid primary highway east of U.S. 19 and is uncontrolled west of U.S. 19. A duly permitted sign, facing east, is located along the north side of SR 688 approximately 200 feet east of U.S. 19. This sign is within 1000 feet of the location for which Petitioner seeks the permit at issue in these proceedings. The proposed sign is intended to serve westbound traffic along SR 688; however, the sign can be seen by motorists traveling on U.S. 19 while stopped in the middle of the intersection of SR 688 and U.S. 19, but the message on the sign would be unreadable to the naked eye. Respondent contends the proposed sign is governed by the spacing requirements because the sign is located within 660 feet of the right-of-way of the federal-aid primary highway portion of U.S. 19.
