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RICHARD L. MURPHY AND JACQUELYN W. MURPHY vs. DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE, 86-001704 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-001704 Latest Update: Nov. 13, 1986

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Stipulated Facts, Supplemental Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that Respondent, Department of Banking and Finance, enter a final order that the following disbursements from the Mortgage Broker Guaranty Fund be made Payee on the claims against Polk Investments, Inc.: Amount Amendolaro $ 2,661,22 Victorias 10,000.00 Fournier, Janice 10,000.00 Wilson 1,334.71 Ledfords 6,573.09 Fournier, Robert 10,000.00 Murphy 4,715.49 Murphy as Trustee 4,715.49 Total $50,000.00 RECOMMENDED this 13th day of November, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul C. Stadler, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dennis P. Johnson, Esquire SHELNUT AND JOHNSON, P.A. Suite One Belvedere Professional Center 1525 South Florida Avenue Lakeland, Florida 33806-2436 Cristy F. Harris, Esquire HARRIS, MIDYETTE & CLEMENTS, P.A. Post Office Box 2451 Lakeland, Florida 33806-2451 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Charles Stutts General Counsel Plaza Level The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 142.03984.24
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PAULINE SEELY COSYNS vs. FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 88-000241F (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-000241F Latest Update: Jul. 03, 1989

The Issue The issue to be resolved herein concerns whether the Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees in this proceeding. Embodied in that general issue are questions concerning whether the Petitioners are the prevailing parties; whether they meet the definition of "small business" parties, including the net worth amounts, enumerated in Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, as well as whether the disciplinary proceeding against both Petitioners was "substantially justified". See Section 57.111(3)(e) , Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with licensing and regulating the practices of real estate salesmen and brokers by the various provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Included within those duties is the duty to investigate conduct by realtors allegedly in violation of Chapter 475 and related rules and to prosecute administrative penal proceedings for which probable cause is found as a result of such investigations. At times pertinent hereto, both Ms. Maxwell and Ms. Cosyns, (then Pauline Sealey) were licensed realtors working as independent contractors for Mariner Properties, Inc. and V.I.P. Realty Inc. The complete file of the underlying proceeding DOAH Case No. 86-0140, was stipulated into evidence. That file included the Administrative Complaint filed against these Respondents and the Recommended and Final Order, which Final Order adopted the Recommended Order. The findings of fact in that Recommended Order are incorporated by reference and adopted herein. During the Petitioner's case, counsel for Petitioner voluntarily reduced the attorney's fees bills for both Petitioners such that Ms. Maxwell's bill is the total amount of $2,695.50 and Ms. Cosyns' bill is $17,200, rather than the original amounts submitted in the affidavit. Respondent acknowledged in its proposed Final Order that the fees and costs submitted by the Respondent were thus reasonable. The testimony the Petitioners presented through depositions, transcripts of which were admitted into evidence into this proceeding, was unrefuted. That testimony demonstrates that both Ms. Cosyns and Ms. Maxwell were prevailing parties in the administrative proceeding referenced herein brought by the Respondent, Department of Professional Regulation. They were individually named as Respondents in the Administrative Complaint whereby their professional licenses were subjected to possible suspension or revocation for alleged wrong doing on their part. There is no dispute that they were exonerated in that proceeding and are thus prevailing parties within the meaning of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. The Petitioners are also "small business parties". In that connection, they both were independently licensed Real Estate professionals during times pertinent to the underlying proceeding and were acting in the capacity of independent contractors for all the activities with which the administrative complaint was concerned. Each established that her net worth is below the limit provided by Section 57.111 as an element of the definition of "small business party". The reasonableness of the fees having been established in the manner found-above and the Petitioners having established that they meet the definitional requirements of prevailing small business parties, there remains to be determined the issue of whether the proceedings against the two Petitioners were "substantially justified", that is, whether the proceeding had a "reasonable basis in law and fact at the time it was initiated by a State agency." See Section 57.111(3)(e), Florida Statutes. The facts concerning each Petitioner's case regarding the three counts of the Administrative Complaint relating to them are as found in the Recommended Order incorporated by reference herein. Respondent Maxwell was charged in the complaint with having worked in conjunction with an office manager, Mr. Hurbanis of V.I.P. Realty, in conspiring with him to submit a fraudulent real estate sales contract to a lending institution for purposes of financing. This allegedly involved submitting a contract to the lending institution with an inflated purchase price in order to secure one hundred percent financing, the scheme being more particularly described in that portion of the findings of fact in the Recommended Order related to Jean Maxwell. In fact, Ms. Maxwell did not work in the realty office as charged in the Administrative Complaint, but rather was employed by Mariner Properties, which may have been a related company. The contract in question, although alleged to be fraudulent was, in fact, a bona fide contract which was a legitimate part of the Real Estate transaction submitted to the bank for financing purposes, about which the bank was kept fully advised. All details of the transaction were disclosed to the lender. Maxwell was specifically charged with concealing the true contract from the lender in order to enhance the percentage of the purchase price that the bank would finance, done by allegedly inflating the purchase price in a second contract submitted to the bank. It was established in the disciplinary proceeding that no such concealment ever took place. In fact, Ms. Maxwell was purchasing a lot from her own employer, Mariner Properties. Two contracts were indeed prepared for the purchase of Lot 69, a single family lot on Sanibel Island. In fact, however, the difference of $42,875 and $49,500 in the stated purchase price, as depicted on the two contracts, was the result of continuing negotiations between Ms. Maxwell and the seller, who was also her employer. The difference in the two prices depicted on the contracts was the result of, in effect, a set-off to the benefit of Ms. Maxwell, representing certain employee discounts and real estate commission due from the employer and seller to Ms. Maxwell, the purchaser. As Petitioners' composite Exhibit 5 reflects, the lender involved, North First Bank of Ft. Myers, Florida, was fully apprised of all the details concerning this transaction at the time it was entered into and the loan commitment extended and closed. Mr. Allan Barnes, the Assistant Vice President of North First Bank revealed, in the letter contained in this exhibit in evidence, that there was no concealment or misrepresentation of the facts to his institution by Ms. Maxwell. This letter is dated April 18, 1984. The other related letter in that exhibit, of May 2, 1984 from attorney Oertel to attorney Frederick H. Wilson of the Respondent agency, thus constitutes notice to the agency well before the complaint was filed, that no concealment or misrepresentation to the lender involved had occurred and the charges were requested to be dismissed. In spite of the fact that the agency was on notice of this turn of events well before the filing of the Administrative Complaint, it proceeded to file the complaint and to prosecute it all the way up to the date of hearing, requiring Ms. Maxwell's attorney to attend the hearing to defend her interests. At the hearing, counsel for the Department acknowledged that there was no basis for prosecuting Ms. Maxwell and voluntarily dismissed the complaint as to her. The Respondent's witness, Investigator Harris, in his deposition taken September 11, 1984, acknowledged that he did not discuss any details concerning the investigation, with attorney Frederick Wilson, who prepared the complaint, nor did he confer with him by telephone or correspondence before the filing of the complaint. Therefore, the complaint was prepared solely on the basis of the investigative report. The investigative report came into evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 1. It reveals that Mr. A. J. Davis the president of Mariner Group and Mariner Properties, who was Jean Maxwell's employer and the owner of the lot in question, signed one contract and his Executive Vice President signed the other. In spite of this, the investigative report does not reveal that the investigator conferred with either Ms. Maxwell, or the sellers concerning this transaction. He conducted a general interview of A.J. Davis concerning the alleged "problem" in his office of "double contracting," but asked him no questions and received no comment about the Jean Maxwell transaction whatever. Nor did the investigator confer with Mr. Allen Barnes or any other representative of North First Bank. If the investigation had been more complete and thorough, he would have learned from Mr. Barnes, if from no one else, that the bank had knowledge of both contracts and all details of the transaction underlying them and there had been no concealment or misrepresentation of the facts regarding the transaction by Ms. Maxwell. This information was learned by attorney Oertel as early as April 18, 1984 by Mr. Barnes' letter, referenced above, and it was communicated to the agency by Mr. Oertel on May 2, 1984. Nevertheless, the complaint was filed and prosecuted through to hearing. Therefore, the prosecution and filing of the Administrative Complaint were clearly not substantially justified. If the Department had properly investigated the matter it would have discovered the true nature of the transaction as being a completely bona fide real estate arrangement. Former Respondent, Pauline Sealy Cosyns was charged with two counts, III and V, in the Administrative Complaint at issue. One count alleged, in essence, that Ms. Sealey had engaged in a similar fraudulent contract situation regarding the sale of her residence to a Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Floyd. The evidence in that proceedings revealed no concealment of any sales contract occurred whatever with regard to the lending institution or anyone else. The facts as revealed at hearing showed Ms. Cosyns and the Floyds, through continuing negotiations after the original sales contract was entered into, amended that contract and executed a second one, in order to allow Ms. Cosyns to take back a second mortgage from the Floyds. This was necessary because Mr. Floyd, an author, was short of the necessary down payment pursuant to the terms of the original contract, because his annual royalty payment from his publishers had not been received as the time approached for closing. The second contract was executed to allow for a second mortgage in favor of the seller, Ms. Cosyns, in order to make up the amount owed by the Floyds on the purchase price agreed upon, above the first mortgage amount. The testimony and evidence in the disciplinary proceeding revealed unequivocally that the lending institution, Amerifirst Mortgage Company, was fully apprised of the situation and of the reason for the two contractual agreements. The $24,000 second mortgage in question is even depicted on the closing statement issued by that bank. There was simply no concealment and no effort to conceal any facts concerning this transaction from the lender or from anyone else. The investigation conducted was deficient because the investigator failed to discuss this transaction with the lender or with the purchasers. He discussed the matter with Ms. Sealy-Cosyns and his own deposition testimony reveals, as does his investigative report, that he did not feel that he got a complete account of the transaction from her. She testified in her deposition, taken prior to the instant proceeding, that she indeed did not disclose all facts of the transaction to him because she was concerned that he was attempting to apprehend her in some "legal impropriety". Therefore, she was reluctant to be entirely candid. The fact remains, however, that had he conducted a complete investigation by conferring with the lender and the purchasers, he would have known immediately, long before the Administrative Complaint was filed and the matter prosecuted, that there was absolutely no basis for any probable cause finding that wrong-doing had occurred in terms of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Thus, the facts concerning the prosecution as to Count III against Pauline Sealy-Cosyns, as more particularly delineated in the findings of fact in the previous Recommended Order, reveal not only that Ms. Cosyns was totally exonerated in the referenced proceeding, but that there was no substantial basis for prosecuting her as to this count at all. Concerning Count V against Ms. Cosyns, it was established through the evidence at the hearing in the disciplinary case that she was merely the listing agent and did not have any part to play in the drafting of the contract nor the presenting of it to the lender. Because there was no evidence adduced to show that she had any complicity or direct involvement in any fraudulent conduct with regard to the transaction involved in Count V of the Administrative Complaint at issue she was exonerated as to that count as well. It is noteworthy here that a statement was made by counsel for the agency, appearing at pages 20 and 21 of the transcript of the proceeding involving the Administrative Complaint, which indicates that the agency, based upon its review of certain documents regarding Counts III and V, before hearing, felt that indeed there might not be a disputed issue of material fact as to Mrs. Cosyns. The agency, although acknowledging that a review of the documents caused it to have reason to believe that it was unnecessary to proceed further against Ms. Cosyns nevertheless did not voluntarily dismiss those counts and proceeded through hearing. Be that as it may, the investigation revealed that Ms. Cosyns acknowledged that she knew that there were two contractual documents involved, but the investigation also revealed that Ms. Cosyns was only the listing agent. The selling agent was Mr. Parks. The investigation revealed through interviews with Ms. Cosyns, Mr. Parks and Mr. Hurbanis, the office Manager of V.I.P. Realty, that Ms. Cosyns, as listing agent, was merely present when the offer from the buyers was communicated to the office manager, Mr. Hurbanis, and ultimately to the sellers, the Cottrells. There was no reason for the investigator to believe that Ms. Cosyns had anything to do with the drafting of the contracts nor with the communication of them to the lending institution involved. That was done by either Mr. Parks or Mr. Hurbanis or by the buyers. The investigation (as revealed in the investigative report) does not show who communicated the contract in question to the lender. The investigation was simply incomplete. If the investigator had conferred with the buyers, the sellers and especially the lender, he could have ascertained-whether the lender was aware of all the facts concerning this transaction and whether there was any reason to believe that Ms. Cosyns had anything to do with the arrangement and the details of the transaction. It was ultimately established, by unrefuted evidence at hearing, that indeed Ms. Cosyns did not have anything to do with the transaction, nor the manner in which it was disclosed to the lender. The fact that she was aware that two contracts had been prepared did not give a reasonable basis for the investigator to conclude that she had engaged in any wrong-doing. The report of his interviews with Ms. Cosyns, Mr. Hurbanis and Mr. Parks, as well as Donna Ross, does not indicate that he had a reasonable basis to conclude that Ms. Cosyns had engaged in any fraudulent conduct with regard to the transaction, including the conveyance of a bogus contract to the lending institution involved, nor for that matter, that Mr. Hurbanis or Mr. Parks engaged in such conduct. In order to ascertain a reasonable basis for concluding whether Ms. Cosyns was involved in any wrongful conduct, he would have had to obtain more information than he did from these people or confer with the lender, the buyer or the seller, or all of these approaches, before he could have a reasonable basis to recommend to the prosecuting agency that an Administrative Complaint be filed against her concerning this transaction. In fact, he did not do so, but the Administrative Complaint was filed and prosecuted through hearing anyway, causing her to incur the above-referenced attorney's fees. It thus has not been demonstrated that there was any substantial basis for the filing and prosecution of Count V of the Administrative Complaint against Ms. Cosyn. Thus she is entitled to the attorneys fees referenced above with regard to the prosecution of the Administrative Complaint in question.

Florida Laws (3) 120.68475.2557.111
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs. LARRY K. SECHREST, 82-002617 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-002617 Latest Update: Jun. 30, 1983

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Larry K. Sechrest, was at all times relevant to the charges contained in the Administrative Complaint, licensed as limited surety agent in the State of Florida representing Allied Fidelity Insurance Company ("Allied"). In February, 1982, Respondent's accounts with Allied were audited by their representative at which time it was discovered that Respondent executed but did not report 202 powers of attorney. The aforementioned powers represented $11,464.51 in premiums due Allied, and an additional $5,732 due the buildup fund. On March 4, 1982, Allied demanded that the Respondent remit to them these premiums and buildup fund payments and account for and return the missing powers of attorney. Respondent had failed to comply with Allied's demands as of the date this Administrative Complaint was filed by Petitioner (July 20, 1982). Respondent subsequently offered to repay Allied at the rate of $1,000 per month, but this was refused. At the final hearing on February 16, 1983, Respondent offered to repay the total amount due within 30 days. On April 29, 1981, Respondent attempted to post a ne exeat bond in the amount of $25,000 for Douglas R. Valentine of Manatee County, Florida, based on power of attorney number FL2800913 issued by Allied. Respondent had not been given authority by Allied to post ne exeat bonds. Power of attorney number FL2800913 was by its language to be issued for appearance bonds only.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Subsections 648.45(1)(d), (h) and (j), Florida Statutes (1981), as charged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint, and suspending his limited surety agent's license for one year; provided, however, that such license shall not be reinstated until Respondent has made restitution to the Allied Fidelity Insurance Company. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Clark R. Jennings, Esquire Department of Insurance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jerry Surfus, Esquire 150 East Avenue, South Sarasota, Florida 33577 The Honorable Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER IN THE MATTER OF LARRY K. SECHREST Revocation of License and Case No. 82-L-162J Eligibility for Licensure DOAH Case No. 82-2617 Limited Surety Agent / ORDER REVOKING RESPONDENT'S LICENSES AND ELIGIBILITY TO HOLD LICENSES THIS MATTER came on to be considered upon the transcript of record of hearing held on February 16, 1983, in Sarasota, Florida, and the Report, Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Hearing Examiner dated May 20, 1983. Upon consideration thereof and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is ORDERED: The Findings of Fact of the Hearing Examiner are adopted. The Conclusions of Law of the Hearing Examiner are adopted. The Recommendation of the Hearing Examiner is rejected for the following reasons: Section 648.49, Florida Statutes prohibits the establishment of a period of suspension in excess of one (1) year. The Department lacks the authority to condition any Order upon financial restitution by a Respondent to any aggrieved party listed in an Administrative Complaint. Revocation of license and eligibility for licensure is an appropriate remedy under the statutory authority cited in the Administrative Complaint, and the Hearing Officer's Conclusions of Law. All licenses of the Respondent, LARRY K. SECHREST, heretofore issued within the purview of the Florida Department of Insurance and eligibility to hold said licenses be, and the same are hereby revoked. DONE and ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, this 28th day of June , 1983. BILL GUNTER Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer WILLIAM D. RUBIN Assistant Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry Surfus, Esquire 150 East Avenue, South Sarasota, Florida 33577 Clark R. Jennings, Esquire Department of Insurance 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (4) 648.25648.44648.45648.49
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. LOUIS S. OKONIEWSKI, 85-000837 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-000837 Latest Update: Jul. 12, 1985

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the charges, Respondent was a licensed real estate salesman and broker-salesman, license number 0326235. In 1983, Dorothy Nutt and Diane Falstad were the owners of a house located at 608 Hillcrest Street, Orlando, Florida. In December of 1983, Ms. Nutt and Ms. Falstad placed this house for sale with real estate broker Frank Daley. The listing was an exclusive listing except as to the Respondent and another individual, for which no commission would be paid, if a contract submitted by the Respondent was accepted by Nutt and Falstad prior to December 26, 1983. On December 25, 1983, the Respondent, along with his parents, Barbara Okoniewski and Louis Okoniewski, Jr., submitted a written contract to Diane Falstad and Dorothy Nutt for the purchase of the 608 Hillcrest Street property. The contract was accepted by the sellers on December 26, 1983. The contract, as executed by the Respondent and his parents, specified that a $1,000 deposit was to be held in escrow by "Closing Agents." Additionally, Respondent represented to Ms. Falstad that the $1,000 deposit was being maintained in an escrow account. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Respondent applied for a V.A. mortgage loan, but was later determined to be ineligible. Subsequent thereto, on or about February 8, 1984, application was made with Residential Financial Corporation (RFC), to obtain financing to purchase the 608 Hillcrest Street property. The application was in the name of the Respondent's parents, with Respondent handling the matter on their behalf. Thereafter, the Respondent requested that the loan officer (Charlyne Becker) at RFC not submit the loan application for approval to the underwriters. Pursuant to his request, the application was not submitted for approval. The transaction did not close. Subsequent to the scheduled date of closing both Ms. Falstad and Ms. Nutt made demands of the Respondent for forfeiture of the $1,000 deposit, due to their belief that, he had breached the contract by failing to secure financing. It was not until after the scheduled closing date that the sellers learned the $1,000 was not in escro. To date, Respondent has neither deposited the $1,000 in any trust account nor paid any money to the sellers. Respondent admits through his own testimony, that he did not make the deposit, nor was the deposit placed in any escrow account by his parents. Respondent's testimony, which was not rebutted, established that he and his parents sought to purchase the 608 Hillcrest Street property and that adjacent to it for rental purposes. However, they were advised by the RFC loan officer (Charlyne Becker) that the applications were not likely to be approved by RFC. Respondent did not thereafter pursue any of the loan applications.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order fining Respondent $500. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of July, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Mitchell, Esq. Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Louis S. Okoniewski 730 Lake View Avenue, N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30308 Harold Huff. Executive Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esq. General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================ =

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs MARVIN M. KORNICKI AND WATERWAY PROPERTIES, INC., T/A WATERWAY PROPERTIES, 90-005863 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 20, 1990 Number: 90-005863 Latest Update: Feb. 13, 1991

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto Respondent Marvin M. Kornicki has been a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued License Nos. 0265344 and 0252335. The last license issued was as a broker for Waterway Properties, Inc., t/a Waterway Properties. At all times material hereto, Respondent Waterway Properties, Inc., t/a Waterway Properties, has been a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued License No. 0265344. At all times material hereto, Respondent Kornicki was licensed and operating as the qualifying broker and an officer of Respondent Waterway Properties, Inc. On January 7, 1990, Respondents solicited and obtained an offer in the amount of $155,000 from Alda Tedeschi and John Tocchio, buyers, to purchase real property, to-wit: Unit 422 at Mariner Village Garden Condominium, Aventura, Florida, from Arthur Goldstein and Myra Goldstein, sellers. The buyers' offer reflected a $1,000 deposit to be held in trust by the Respondent Waterway Properties, Inc. The offer reflected that if the offer was not executed by and delivered to all parties, or fact of execution communicated in writing between the parties, on or before January 10, 1990, the deposit would be returned to the buyers and the offer would be withdrawn. The offer also reflected that "time is of the essence." On January 8, 1990, Respondents sent the buyers' offer to the sellers in New Jersey by air express. On January 10, 1990, the sellers signed the offer but made it a counteroffer by requiring the buyers to furnish an additional deposit of $14,500 by January 12, 1990, and requiring the buyers to sign a condominium rider and an agency disclosure form. The sellers returned the counteroffer with condominium rider and agency disclosure form to the Respondents. On January 12, 1990, Respondents sent the counteroffer, condominium rider, and agency disclosure form, together with a letter dated January 11, 1990, to the buyers for the buyers' initials and signatures. Although the buyers could not have received the counteroffer until after its expiration date, they advised Respondents by telephone that they had in fact initialed the counteroffer and mailed it back to Respondents. Respondents never received from the buyers that accepted counteroffer. The buyers subsequently verbally demanded the return of their $1,000 deposit, but Respondents wrote to the buyers on February 9, 1990, advising the buyers that they were in default. On February 8, 1990, Respondents had already disbursed the $1,000 deposit to Respondents' operating account since the sellers had told the Respondents to use the deposit to cover the costs incurred advertising the sellers' property. Since he was uncertain as to whether he had "conflicting demands upon an escrow deposit" Respondent Kornicki telephoned the Florida Real Estate Commission and discussed the matter with one of the Commission's attorneys. Because Respondent Kornicki believed that the buyers were "in default," Respondents failed to notify the Florida Real Estate Commission in writing that they had received conflicting demands. No explanation was offered as to why Respondent Kornicki believed the buyers were in default when the counteroffer could not have been signed by the buyers prior to its expiration and when Respondent Kornicki had never seen a fully executed document. Further, no explanation was offered as to why the sellers believed they were entitled to the money. Since that transaction, Respondents have experienced other transactions where conflicting demands were made. In those subsequent instances, they have timely notified the Florida Real Estate Commission in writing as to those conflicting demands. On June 18, 1990, Petitioner's investigator conducted an office inspection and escrow/trust account audit of Respondents' office and escrow/trust account. That audit revealed that Respondents wrote a trust account check on September 1, 1989, in the amount of $369.15, which was returned on October 3, 1989, for insufficient funds. A second trust account check in the amount of $800 was also returned for insufficient funds on October 3, 1989. Respondents had received rental monies from a tenant by check. Respondents had written checks out of those monies for the mortgage payment on the rental property, not knowing that the tenant's check would fail to clear. The worthless check written by the tenant caused these checks written by Respondents to be returned for insufficient funds. Respondents have changed their office policies so that they no longer accept checks from tenants except before tenants move into rental properties and the checks must clear before the tenants are allowed to take possession of the leased premises.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Finding Respondent Kornicki guilty of Counts I, III, V, VII, IX, and Finding Respondent Waterway Properties, Inc., guilty of Counts II, IV, VI, VIII, X, and XII; Dismissing Counts XIII and XIV; Ordering Respondent Marvin M. Kornicki to pay a fine of $1,000 to the Division of Real Estate within 60 days and revoking Respondents' licenses should such fine not be timely paid; Placing Respondents on probation for a period of one year if the fine is timely paid; Requiring Respondent Kornicki to complete and provide satisfactory evidence of having completed 60 hours of approved real estate post-licensure education for brokers, 30 hours of which shall include the real estate broker management course, during the probationary period; Establishing terms for the probationary period except that such probationary terms shall not require Respondent Kornicki to retake any state licensure examinations and Requiring Respondent Kornicki to appear before the Commission at the last meeting of the Commission preceding the termination of Respondents' probation. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 13th day of February, 1991. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 90-5863 Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 1 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting a conclusion of law. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-4, 6-14, and 16-19 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 5 has been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 15 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Jack McCray, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Legal Division 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Marvin M. Kornicki Waterway Properties, Inc. 16560 Biscayne Boulevard North Miami Beach, Florida 33160

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs NORMAN RIVERS, JR., AND NORMAN RIVERS JR. REALTY, INC., 96-003582 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Aug. 01, 1996 Number: 96-003582 Latest Update: Dec. 02, 1996

The Issue Whether or not Respondents' Florida real estate licenses should be disciplined for violation of Section 475.25(1)(b) F.S., by dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction; Section 475.25(1)(d)1. F.S., failure to account for or deliver funds; Section 475.25(1)(k) F.S., failure to maintain trust funds in their real estate brokerage escrow bank account or some other proper depository until disbursement thereof was properly authorized; and Section 475.25(1)(e) and Rule 61J2-10.032(1) F.A.C. for failure to provide written notification to the Real Estate Commission upon receiving conflicting demands within 15 business days of the last party's demand or upon a good faith doubt as to who is entitled to any trust funds held in the broker's escrow account and failure to institute one of the settlement procedures as set forth in Section 475.25(1)(d)1., F.S. within 15 business days after the date the notification was received by the Division.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Section 20.165, F.S., Chapters 120, 455, and 475, F.S. and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. The Respondent Norman Rivers, Jr. is and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker, issued license number 0189212 in the accordance with Chapter 475, F.S. The last license issued was as a broker c/o Route 1, Box 344, Alachua, Florida 32615. Respondent Norman Rivers Jr., Realty, Inc. is and was at all times material hereto a corporation registered as a Florida real estate broker having been issued license number 0214407 in accordance with Chapter 475, F.S. The last license issued was at the address of Route 1, Box 344, Alachua, Florida 32615. At all times material hereto, Respondent Norman Rivers, Jr. was licensed and operating as qualifying broker and officer of Respondent Norman Rivers Jr., Realty, Inc. On December 5, 1994, Respondent showed Charles E. and Elizabeth A. Smith (husband and wife) a tract of land located in Dixie County, Florida. Afterward, Respondent Norman Rivers, Jr. sent a $57,500 offer to Charles E. Smith for his signature. On December 7, 1994, Mr. Smith signed the offer and forwarded it with a $2,875 deposit to the Respondents. The next day, the Seller, Ed Dix, accepted the Smiths' offer. The contract provided that if the deal did not close on December 23, 1994, "...if the said Buyer fails to perform the covenants herein contained within the time specified, therefore said deposit made by the Buyer may be forfeited at the option of the Seller, as liquidated damages, upon 10 days' notice to the Buyer, and one half thereof shall be retained by or paid to said Realtor and the remainder to the Seller, unless because of expense incurred the latter shall agree or had agreed in writing to a greater percentage being paid to the Realtor,..." The property sale did not close on December 23, 1994. At some point in time, Mr. Smith conversed with Respondent Rivers by telephone and told him he could not afford to purchase the property since a greater amount would have to be financed and because his wife could not be persuaded to go through with the deal. He told Mr. Rivers that he would like Mr. Rivers to return any amount remaining in excess of Mr. River's expenses but that Mr. Rivers could retain his expenses. Mr. Rivers told Mr. Smith that his expenses had used up the entire $2,875 binder. Mr. Smith accepted this representation. He testified that he "considered the issue closed" at that point. Neither Mr. or Mrs. Smith made subsequent demands for all or part of the binder. The administrative complaint herein was urged quite some time later by Mrs. Smith. The Respondents affirmatively demonstrated that Mr. Rivers' business practice from 1991 to 1995 and continuing to date, is to promptly refund deposits upon a Buyer's request, if the Seller agrees. The significance of this evidence is that if a clear demand for refund or audit had been made by Mr. Smith, Respondents probably would have made some accounting and refund. In this case, Mr. Rivers did not do so because he did not consider that he had a clear- cut request to refund a deposit. Despite Mr. Smith's testimony that his final telephone conversation with Mr. Rivers as related above in Finding of Fact 11, occurred before Christmas 1994 and Mrs. Smith's deposition testimony that Mr. Smith's and Mr. River's phone conversation occurred on December 21, 1994, before the agreed closing date all other documentary evidence and credible testimony points to the conversation occurring in mid-January 1995. The parties stipulated that on 12/21/94, Alachua County Abstract Company sent the closing package by UPS overnight delivery to Mr. and Mrs. Smith. This package was received by Mr. and Mrs. Smith on 12/22/94. The significance thereof is that Mrs. Smith testified that the telephone call made by her husband in her presence from their home to Mr. Rivers cancelling the contract and demanding the return of their deposit occurred the night before the day they received the closing package, or December 21, 1996. However, the Smiths' long distance telephone records from 12/7/94 to 1/31/95 reveal that no long distance call was made from the Smith home to Mr. Rivers on 12/21/94 or any date other than 12/7/94, the day Mr. Smith initially signed and faxed the contract to Mr. Rivers. It is noted that at one point Mr. Smith wobbled and testified that Mr. Rivers telephoned him for the final phone conversation at some time prior to Christmas 1994. This is contrary to Mrs. Smith's testimony and Respondents' telephone records do not show that Mr. Rivers telephoned the Smith home on December 21, 1994, either. Between 12/30/94 and 01/17/95, Respondents' long distance telephone bills show charges for 15 calls to Mr. Smith's several work phone numbers and the home phone number. In Mr. Rivers' words, "I chased him like a hound," to find out what was going on, including when the deal could close. This demonstrates Mr. Rivers' continued belief after December 21, 1994 that the contract was still going to close and contradicts Mrs. Smith's testimony that Mr. Smith had orally cancelled the contract and demanded the return of his deposit on December 21, 1994. It further contradicts Mr. Smith's testimony this conversation occurred sometime before Christmas, 1994. The agency stipulated that Seller Dix and Norman Rivers, Jr. entered into an agreement whereby any binder forfeiture resulting from the Smiths' failure to close on December 23, 1994 would be used by Norman Rivers, Jr. and Norman Rivers, Jr. Realty, Inc. to cover their expenses incurred in marketing Mr. Dix's property. Respondents established that prior to the contract signing on December 7, 1994, they had expended at least $3,339.00 in advertising in order to market and sell Mr. Dix's property. There is no evidence Mr. Smith ever objected to paying the advertising costs incurred by Respondents or even inquired what Mr. Rivers' expenses were. Mr. Rivers did not remove any amount related to Mr. and Mrs. Smith from his escrow account before January 16, 1995. Then he did so by three checks made out to Norman Rivers Jr. Realty, Inc. Mr. Smith and Mr. Rivers concur that Mr. Smith made no specific demand for an audit of Respondents' expenses. Real Estate Commission Investigator Russell Lambert audited Respondents' accounts. He testified he "found no violations."

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the administrative complaint herein. RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of December, 1996, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Steve W. Johnson, Esquire Department of Business & Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 James F. Gray, Esquire Post Office Box 7100 Gainesville, Florida 32605 Lynda L. Goodgame, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Henry M. Solares Division Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900

Florida Laws (3) 120.5720.165475.25 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61J2-10.032
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MERELE DUNNE, IDA ORLICK, ILENE KIRSCHNER, VERA G. MARINO, ET AL., DAVID SWID, SAMUEL RUDNICK ET AL., AND WILLIAM AND OLIVIA PETRUZEL vs. DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE, DIVISION OF FINANCE AND FIDELITY STANDARD MORTGAGE CORPORATION, 86-003575 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-003575 Latest Update: Jan. 06, 1987

Findings Of Fact Introduction At all times relevant hereto, Fidelity Standard Mortgage Company (Fidelity Standard) and First Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. (First Fidelity) were mortgage brokers licensed by respondent, Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance (Division). In or around early 1983, Fidelity Standard and First Fidelity filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, Title 11, United States Code. By virtue of this action, numerous investors lost substantial amounts of money invested with the two brokers. In 1977 the legislature established in chapter 494 a mortgage brokerage guaranty fund from which payment is made to persons "adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction to have suffered monetary damage as a result of any (unlawful) acts by a mortgage broker... who was licensed under, this chapter at the time the act was committed." Certain conditions must be met in order to establish eligibility for payment from the fund, and payments for claims are limited in the aggregate to $50,000 per mortgage broker, regardless of the number of claimants. 1/ Among other things, section 494.043 requires that a claimant must have (a) received a final judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction against the broker, (b) caused to be issued a writ of execution upon the judgment and the return indicates insufficient assets to satisfy the judgment, (c) made a reasonable search to discover assets of the broker, and has found none, (d) applied any amounts recovered from broker to the damages awarded by the court, and (e) given notice to the Division by certified mail at the time the action was instituted. Where as here, the broker has filed for bankruptcy, steps (b) and (c) need not be taken by the claimant, except to file a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding. There is also a two year period in which investors may perfect their claims. These persons receive first priority to payment from the fund. In the case of both Fidelity Standard and First Fidelity, this period expired on June 18, 1986. Thus, in order to share in the first distribution of moneys from the fund, a claimant had to satisfy the above criteria by that date. In addition to these criteria, a claimant must assign to the Division any interest in the judgment received once all criteria in section 494.043 have been met. The statute imposing this requirement (s. 494.044) provides that this must be done after the claimant has received payment from the fund. In its proposed final order concerning Fidelity Standard entered on August 7, 1986, the Division concluded that the following claimants should receive payment from the fund in the amounts specified below: Claimant Claim Allowed David Swid $ 2,321.00 William & Olivia Petruzel 2,321.00 Vera G. Marino 2,321.00 Benjamin Rosenberg 2,321.00 Lee Rosenberg 2,321.00 Shasha Enterprises 2,321.00 Eli Krause 1,995.00 Eugene Brooks, M.D., P.C. 2,321.00 Eugene Brooks 2,321.00 Steven Jankovich 2,100.50 Stacy Sher 2,100.50 Frederick Low 2,321.00 Patricia Worthley 2,321,00 Alfred Vanderlaan 2,321.00 Ben Sakow 2,048.00 Thomas Shisler 1,229.00 David Irving 2,321.00 Betty Burwell 1,662.00 Alisa Kreimer 2,321.00 Samuel Rudnick 2,321.00 Bonnie & Howard Lenkowitz 1,204.00 Larry & Sally Lenkowitz 525.00 Stuart & Barbara Schrager 2,321.00 Helen & Eugene Loos 2,321.00 Total Payments $50,000.00 In a second order entered the same day involving First Fidelity, the Division proposed that the following claimants receive payment from the fund as indicated below: Claimant Fund Award Swid $ 2,620.00 Morton 2,620.00 Ghane 2,620.00 Petruzel 2,620.00 Marino 2,620.00 B. Rosenberg 2,620.00 L. Rosenberg 2,620.00 Shasha Enterprises 2,620.00 Krause 2,254.00 Brooks, M.D., P.C. 2,620.00 Brooks 2,620.00 Jankovich 2,372.00 Sher 2,372.00 Low 2,620.00 Worthley 2,620.00 Vanderlaan 2,620.00 Sakow 2,313.00 Shisler 1,389.00 Irving 2,620.00 Loos 2,620.00 Total Payments $50,000.00 After the entry of the proposed final order in Case No. 86-3575, petitioners, David Swid, Vera G. Marino et al., Samuel Rudnick et al., and William and Olivia Petruzel, who are named as recipients from the fund, requested a hearing to either contest or support the proposed payout from the fund. In addition, petitioners, Merele Dunne, Ida Orlick and Ilene Kirshner, whose claims were denied, challenged the proposed action. In Case No. 86-3576 involving First Fidelity, petitioners, William and Olivia Petruzel, David Swid, Esmail Ghane and Vera G. Marino et al., who are named as recipients of the fund, have requested a formal hearing to either challenge or support the agency action. Petitioners, Harry and Yetta Neiderman, Harold E. and Eva L. Roys and Harold S. Johnson, whose claims to participate in the initial distribution of the fund were denied, also requested a hearing to contest the action. The Claimants David Swid -- Swid satisfied all statutory criteria in section 494.043 for perfecting his claim against both Fidelity Standard and First Fidelity by June 18, 1986. His partial assignment to the Division of the judgment against the brokers was also filed on June 18, 1986, but was not furnished to the Division until July 9, 1986. Even so, Swid has satisfied all criteria, and is eligible to participate in the initial payout from the fund. Marino et al. -- This group of claimants includes fifteen investors. 2/ Marino et al. received two identical judgments against First Fidelity and Fidelity Standard and otherwise satisfied all statutory criteria by June 18, 1986. Because the group is not entitled to a double recovery, the amount awarded by the court has been divided in half. An assignment of the judgments was filed with the Division on June 12, 1986, but did not reflect the page and book number where the judgments were recorded. However, the judgments were filed with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, and records of that court are not kept by book and page number. Therefore, the assignment was in proper form, and all statutory criteria have been met. William and Olivia Petruzel -- The Petruzels obtained final judgments against First Fidelity and Fidelity Standard on April 11, 1985, in the United States Bankruptcy Court. Partial assignments of the judgments dated April 4, 1986, in favor of the Division were filed with the Division in April 1986. Therefore, all pertinent criteria have been met, and the Petruzels are eligible to share in the initial payout from the fund. Harold E. and Eva L. Roys and Harold S. Johnson -- These parties are claimants against First Fidelity. There is no evidence that they perfected their claims prior to June 18, 1986. Therefore, their claim to participate in the first distribution of moneys from the fund should be denied. Rudnick et al. -- This group of claimants includes six investors in Fidelity Standard. 3/ They obtained a final judgment against Fidelity Standard on June 10, 1986, in Broward County circuit court. Assignments of this judgment to the Division were executed in August 1986, and later filed with the Division. Therefore, Rudnick et al. have qualified for participation. Ida Orlick and Merele Dunne -- These two claimants were investors in Fidelity Standard and First Fidelity. They did not obtain a final judgment against those brokers until June 25, 1986, or after the two-year period to perfect claims had expired. Therefore, they are not entitled to participate in the first distribution of moneys from the fund. 4/ Harry and Yetta Neiderman -- These claimants were investors in First Fidelity. They obtained a final judgment in bankruptcy court against the broker prior to June 18, 1986. The Division proposed to deny the claim on the ground no documentation was submitted to prove that a claim had been filed with the bankruptcy court. At final hearing, the Neidermans submitted a proof of claim which reflected such a claim was previously filed with the court on July 15, 1982. Therefore, all statutory criteria have been met. Irene Morton -- Morton was an investor in First Fidelity who, like the others, lost her investment by virtue of illegal acts of that broker. She has perfected her claim in a timely manner and is entitled to participate in the first distribution of moneys from the fund. Esmail Ghane -- This investor lost approximately $30,000 due to the illicit acts of First Fidelity. He has subsequently obtained a judgment against the broker and has satisfied in a timely manner all other statutory criteria. Therefore, he has perfected his claim and is eligible for payment from the fund. At the same time, it is noted that Ghane's cause of action against the broker arose prior to October 1, 1985, and that he must share in the lower aggregate award ($50,000) that applies to claims arising before that date. Computation of Payments In addition to obtaining judgments for their lost principal, virtually all of the claimants were awarded either prejudgment or post-judgment interest, or both, by the courts adjudicating their claims. Further, some of the claimants have previously received payments from the fund for illegal acts occurring on the part of Franklin Capital Corporation, an affiliated corporation of First Fidelity and Fidelity Standard. By stipulation of counsel, the following amounts are the correct amounts due the claimants for losses arising from illicit acts by Fidelity Standard and First Fidelity assuming their claims are both timely and valid. The amounts are computed after deducting prior payments and by using only the principal amount awarded by the courts, and by including principal and pre- judgment interest. Fidelity Standard (without interest) Fund Claimant Award Swid $ 3,021.00 Petruzel 3,021.00 Marino 3,021.00 B. Rosenberg 3,021.00 L. Rosenberg 3,021.00 Shasha Enterprises 3,021.00 Krause 1,435.00 Brooks, M.D., P.C. 2,870.00 Brooks 1,888.00 Jankovich 1,511.00 Sher 1,511.00 Low 1,813.00 Worthley 1,813.00 Vanderlaan 2,417.00 Sakow 1,511.00 Shisler 906.00 Irving 2,553.00 Burwell 477.00 Kreimer 1,081.00 Rudnick 2,290.00 B & H Lenkowitz 1,686.00 L & S Lenkowitz 70.00 Schrager 3,021.00 Loos 3,021.00 $50,000.00 Fidelity Standard (with prejudgment interest) Claimant Fund Award Swid $ 2,279.50 Petruzel 2,279.50 Marino 2,279.50 B. Rosenberg 2,279.50 L. Rosenberg 2,279.50 Shasha Enterprises 2,279.50 Krause 1,959.50 Brooks, M.D., P.C. 2,279.50 Brooks 2,279.50 Jankovich 2,062.50 Sher 2,062.50 Low 2,279.50 Worthley 2,279.50 Vanderlaan 2,279.50 Sakow 2,011.50 Shisler 1,206.50 Irving 2,279.50 Burwell 1,531.50 Kreimer 2,219.50 Rudnick 2,279.50 B & H Lenkowitz 2,279.50 L & S Lenkowitz 474.50 Schrager 2,279.50 Loos 2,279.50 $ 50,000.00 Fidelity (without Standard interest) Claimant Fund Award Swid $ 3,021.00 Petruzel 3,021.00 Marino 3,021.00 B. Rosenberg 3,021.00 L. Rosenberg 3,021.00 Shasha Enterprises 3,021.00 Krause 1,435.00 Brooks, M.D., P.C. 2,870.00 Brooks 1,888.00 Jankovich 1,511.00 Sher 1,511.00 Low 1,813.00 Worthley 1,813.00 Vanderlaan 2,417.00 Sakow 1,511.00 Shisler 906.00 Irving 2,553.00 Burwell 477.00 Kreimer 1,081.00 Rudnick 2,290.00 B & H Lenkowitz 1,686.00 L & S Lenkowitz 70.00 Schrager 3,021.00 Loos 3,021.00 $50,000.00 Fidelity Standard (with pre-judgement interest) Fund Claimant Award Swid $ 2,279.50 Petruzel 2,279.50 Marino 2,279.50 B. Rosenberg 2,279.50 L. Rosenberg 2,279.50 Shasha Enterprises 2,279.50 Krause 1,959.50 Brooks, M.D., P.C. 2,279.50 Brooks, 2,279.50 Jankovich 2,062.50 Sher 2,062.50 Low 2,279.50 Worthley 2,279.50 Vanderlaan 2,279.50 Sakow 2,011.50 Shisler 1,206.50 Irving 2,279.00 Burwell 1,531.50 Kreimer 2,219.50 Rudnick 2,279.50 B & H Lenkowitz 2,279.50 L & S Lenkowitz 474.50 Schrager 2,279.50 Loos 2,279.50 $50,000.00 First Fidelity (without interest) Claimant Fund Award Neiderman $ 2,995.00 Swid 2,995.00 Morton 2,995.00 Ghane 2,995.00 Petruzel 2,995.00 Marino 2,995.00 B. Rosenberg 2,995.00 L. Rosenberg 2,995.00 Shasha Enterprises 2,995.00 Krause 1,422.50 Brooks, M.D., P.C. 2,845.00 Brooks 1,872.00 Jankovich 1,497.25 Sher 1,497.25 Low 1,797.00 Worthley 1,797.00 Vanderlaan 2,396.00 Sakow 1,497.25 Shisler 898.25 Irving 2,530.50 Loos 2,995.00 $50,000.00 First Fidelity (with prejudgment interest) Fund Claimant Award Neiderman $ 2,489.80 Swid 2,489.80 Morton 2,489.80 Ghane 2,489.80 Petruzel 2,489.80 Marino 2,489.80 B. Rosenberg 2,489.80 L. Rosenberg 2,489.80 Shasha Enterprises 2,489.80 Krause 2,140.44 Brooks, M.D., P.C. 2,489.80 Brooks 2,489.80 Jankovich 2,253.44 Sher 2,253.44 Low 2,489.80 Worthley 2,489.80 Vanderlaan 2,489.80 Sakow 2,197.44 Shisler 1,318.44 Irving 2,489.80 Loos 2,489.80 $50,000.00 The inclusion of post-judgment interest in the calculation of the awards has an inconsequential effect on the amounts to be paid and accordingly has been disregarded.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the initial payment from the mortgage brokerage guaranty fund for damages arising from illicit acts by Fidelity Standard and First Fidelity be made in accordance with the schedules set forth in finding of fact 16, said amounts to include prejudgment interest. All other claims for relief should be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1987.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68253.44531.50
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs ARMANDO CLEMENTE AND AMIGO REALTY, INC., 90-006136 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Sep. 26, 1990 Number: 90-006136 Latest Update: Dec. 03, 1992

Findings Of Fact Armando Clemente is licensed as a real estate broker, and has held license 315166 at the times pertinent to the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Amigo Realty, Inc., was a corporation licensed as a real estate broker, and held license 229372. The Respondents' business address was 2728 Davie Boulevard, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Mr. Clemente was the sole qualifying broker for Amigo Realty, Inc. In 1989, Mr. Clemente solicited and obtained the exclusive right to sell a residence located at 2840 Southwest Eighth Street, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. It was owned by Louise McNally, a widow who had recently obtained the property through foreclosure. The property was located in an undesirable neighborhood, and in need of cleanup and substantial repair and renovation before it could be sold or leased. Ultimately Mr. Clemente agreed with Ms. McNally that Clemente would repair the house and then try to sell it, or buy it himself. Mr. Clemente contacted an old friend of his, Candido Proenza, about the property. Both Mr. Clemente and Mr. Proenza are Cuban. Mr. Proenza agreed to undertake the renovations and repair of the property through his own labor, while Mr. Clemente was to find a buyer for the property. They agreed that Mr. Clemente would initially pay for the materials used in the repair and renovation, and the parties were to split the net profit equally after Mr. Clemente was repaid for materials from the sale proceeds. Mr. Clemente prepared a deposit receipt and contract for the sale and purchase of the property between himself and Mr. Proenza as buyers and Ms. McNally as the seller. The purchase price was $30,000 and the contract shows that a deposit of $500 had been made toward the purchase price and that the closing was to take place as soon as possible. The special clauses contained in the contract state house is being bought "as is" with not [sic] guarantee or insurance for anything in the house or on property. Buyers guarranty [sic] that they will fix the property under safe and living conditions. Seller does not have to pay any additional money to attorneys or real estate office. Buyers will pay 7% commission on $30,000, at closing to Century 21 Amigo Realty, Inc. and if the house is for sale after repairs have been done it has to be listed with Century 21 Amigo Realty, Inc. or its assigns. (Exhibit B). Although the contract shows on its first page that the deposit of $500 was to be held in trust by Century 21 Amigo Realty, Inc., the line on the final page of the contract which is meant to be signed by the broker to acknowledge the receipt of the deposit is not signed. The contract does bear the signature of both Mr. Clemente and Mr. Proenza as buyers and Ms. McNally as the seller. As will be explained more fully below, on January 10, 1990, Mr. Clemente executed a statement on the letterhead of Amigo Realty in his capacity as a real estate broker stating that Amigo Realty had received in its escrow account the sum of $5,000 towards the purchase price of the property, $2,000 having been received on November 6, 1989, and $3,000 received on December 7, 1989. See, Finding 9. None of these statements were true. The repairs were more expensive than anticipated. While the repairs and renovations to the property were being carried out, Mr. Clemente and Mr. Proenza began to have disputes about such matters as the color of the kitchen cabinets, which required repainting them. During the work Mr. Proenza hurt his back, and it was necessary to have work performed by others. The cost of the renovations also was increased by custom work done for a potential buyer who later was unable to qualify to purchase the property. Mr. Clemente had marital difficulties and while the renovation project was going on, Mr. Clemente separated from his wife. With the agreement of Mr. Proenza, Mr. Clemente moved into the partially renovated house. The divorce caused a financial strain on Mr. Clemente, who ultimately was forced to close down his real estate business, Amigo Realty. Mr. Proenza was as eager as Mr. Clemente to obtain his share of the profit from the renovation and Mr. Clemente needed a place to live because of his divorce. They decided that Mr. Clemente would apply for a mortgage and purchase the house himself. Mr. Clemente made application for a mortgage to the Continental Trust Mortgage Company, with which he had done business in the past. In his loan application which was executed on November 22, 1989, Mr. Clemente represented that a cash deposit towards the purchase price was being held by Amigo Realty in the amount of $3,000, not $500. He later signed a statement on January 10, 1990, certifying that Amigo Realty then held $5,000 towards the purchase price, which consisted of $2,000 deposited on November 6, 1989, and $3,000 on December 7, 1989. The inconsistency between this statement and the loan application is not explained in the statement, but neither are correct. There were never any moneys placed in the trust account by Mr. Clemente as a down payment for his purchase of the property. I do not find credible the testimony of Mr. Clemente that he was unable to recall the figure on the mortgage loan application for the amount in the Amigo Realty trust account, and reject Mr. Clemente's contention that the $3,000 figure was one inserted by Gonzalez on the application so that there would be something in the space. I also reject the argument that because Mr. Clemente was under emotional stress arrising out of his divorce during January, he did not understand the significance or appreciate the consequences of the statement he signed on January 10, 1990, that a total of $5,000 was held in the trust account of Amigo Realty towards the purchase of the property. That statement was given to the mortgage company for its use in determining whether to grant the mortgage loan. Mr. Gonzalez may not have testified directly that the representation that $5,000 was on deposit in Amigo Realty was material to the mortgage company in determining whether to grant the mortgage loan to Mr. Clemente. It is obvious that the mortgage company was sufficiently concerned to seek a certification from Amigo Realty about the monies on deposit as a follow- up to the mortgage application which Mr. Clemente submitted on November 22, 1989. It is reasonable to infer from this fact that Mr. Clemente's certification as the broker for Amigo Realty that it held $5,000 on deposit was a material representation made in connection with the loan application Mr. Clemente had made. That representation was made in the course of Mr. Clemente's activities as a broker, and the representation was false. When the sale of the McNally home was closed on February 2, 1990, only Mr. Proenza received title, which he took as trustee. A handwritten trust agreement says that Mr. Proenza will hold title solely for the use of Mr. Clemente, and will convey the property to Clemente when told to do so by Clemente. Exhibit H, page 4. The trust agreement says nothing about payment by Mr. Proenza of any fees, commissions, discount points or other charges for the benefit of Mr. Clemente. Ms. McNally received $28,423.70, which included the $500 which the contract had reflected as a deposit in the Amigo Realty trust account, but which had not been paid. No broker's commission was paid to Amigo or to Clemente and Ms. McNally had no basis for a complaint about the amount she ultimately received when the contract closed. Shortly after the closing of the sale of the house from Ms. McNally to Mr. Proenza, another transaction closed which passed title from Mr. Proenza, as trustee, to Mr. Clemente individually. Mr. Clemente purchased the renovated house for a gross price of $65,000. In this transaction, Amigo Realty received a commission of $3,250 which was deducted from the proceeds payable to Mr. Proenza (Exhibit E, line 703) as was an additional $2,996.42 loan discount fee of 4.5% of the mortgage amount which was paid to Continental Trust Mortgage, (Id., line 802), plus other miscellaneous charges. These charges had the effect of reducing the amount due to Mr. Proenza as seller by $9,802.80, (Id., line 1400) leaving cash due to him of $55,092.92 (Id., line 603). After deducting the $28,423.70 which Proenza had paid to Ms. McNally to acquire title to the property (Exhibit J), the net sales proceeds were $26,669.22. Mr. Proenza then paid Amigo Realty $13,160.58 for the materials Mr. Clemente had purchased for use in the renovations. This left a "profit" of $13,508.64. If the amount were divided equally between Proenza and Clemente each would have received $6,754.32. Mr. Proenza actually paid Clemente $6,348.14, which would appear to be $406.18 less than Clemente was entitled to receive if that amount were divided in two. Mr. Clemente is only "shorted" if one accepts that Amigo Realty was due a 5% commission from Proenza on the sale from Proenza, as trustee, to Mr. Clemente individually, and that Mr. Proenza was responsible for paying the 4.5% loan discount to Mr. Clemente's mortgage lender, Continental Trust Mortgage. The Trust Agreement signed by Mr. Proenza contains no such provisions. The Department has alleged in paragraph 11 of its Administrative Complaint that Proenza believes Clemente took advantage of his labor and that Proenza was short changed, and did not receive a fair share of the profit. Mr. Proenza's has limited fluency in English. He believes that he was entitled to $13,000 not $7,000. Without payments of the $3,250 commission Proenza paid to Amigo Realty and the $2,996.42 loan discount Proenza paid to Continental Mortgage Company for Mr. Clemente's mortgage loan Mr. Proenza would have been left with $6,246.46 more than the $6,160.50 he received, an amount much closer to the $13,000 Proenza believes he should have cleared when the sales of the house from Ms. McNally to him and then from him to Mr. Clemente had closed. Mr. Proenza's testimony that Mr. Clemente asked him to "lend" Amigo Realty money which Mr. Proenza had expected to receive, becomes understandable. Mr. Clemente manipulated the closing documents to charge Mr. Proenza $6,246.42 as (1) a real estate commission and (2) to pay the loan discount points on Mr. Clemente's mortgage, when he had no agreement from Mr. Proenza that Mr. Proenza should do so. The settlement statement which was used for the closing of the transaction from Mr. Proenza to Mr. Clemente is on a U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development form which, at first, is quite difficult to understand. It provided a means by which Mr. Clemente was able to defraud the relatively unsophisticated Mr. Proenza. At the closing of the sale from Proenza to Clemente, Clemente also had to come up with money to replace the $5,000 he had represented to the mortgage company was already in the Amigo Realty escrow account. The title company would not accept Mr. Clemente's personal check, so he wrote a check on the Amigo Realty escrow account for the $1,750 shortage. Mr. Clemente deposited this amount into the Amigo Realty escrow account at a drive through teller window at a Fort Lauderdale bank on his way to the closing, but it was after 2:00 p.m. on Friday and the bank records reflected that the check was not credited to the account until the following Tuesday, February 6th. Mr. Clemente had no basis for drawing check #278 on the escrow account of Amigo Realty for $1,750 when he did so. He knew or should have known that the $1,750 had not actually been credited to the Amigo Realty escrow account. On May 2, 1990, the Amigo Realty escrow/trust account was audited. The audit showed and Mr. Clemente acknowledged that Mr. Clemente had never put the $500 earnest money deposit in his escrow/trust account toward the purchase of the McNally property, he had never put the $5,000 deposit in his escrow account which he had represented to his mortgage lender was on deposit in that account. The statement which he gave to his mortgage lender on January 10, 1990, certifying that there was $5,000 in the Amigo Realty trust account was fraudulent. No other shortages were found in the Amigo Realty escrow/trust account. The Respondents have previously been disciplined and paid a fine of $200 for culpable negligence for breach of trust, pursuant to a stipulation executed in April of 1989. Mr. Clemente contends that that stipulation was a plea of convenience which he entered into because the fine was nominal and would have cost him a great deal more than that amount to clear himself of wrongdoing at a formal hearing. Mr. Clemente is a member in good standing of the Fort Lauderdale Board of Realtors. He has not been the subject of any complaints other than the one which Mr. Proenza has filed with the Department. He no longer works as a broker, but now is a sales associate working under the supervision of broker Mike De Rosa.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that both Armando Clemente and Amigo Realty be found guilty of having violated Subsections 475.25(1)(b), (d), and (f), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint. It is also recommended that Mr. Clemente be fined $1,500; that his license be suspended for two years. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of November, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Rulings on findings proposed by the Department: 1. Rejected as unnecessary. 2 - 4. Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 2. Adopted in Finding 3, except for the last sentence which is rejected. I cannot understand how a promise to pay 10% interest was involved in this transaction. Adopted in Finding 4. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Findings 6 and 9. Adopted in Findings 12, 13 and 17. 11a. Adopted in Finding 18. 11b. Adopted in Finding 9. 11c. Adopted in Finding 18. 12. Adopted in Findings 18 and 19. Rulings on findings proposed by the Respondent: Adopted in Finding 1. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Findings 2 - 4. Adopted in Findings 4 - 6. Adopted in Finding 7. Adopted in Finding 8. 7 and 8. Adopted in Finding 9. Rejected, see, Finding 10. Adopted in Finding 12. Adopted in Findings 13 and 14, but see, Findings 15 - 17. Discussed in Finding 18. Adopted in Finding 19. Adopted in Finding 20. Adopted in Finding 21. Rejected, Mr. Proenza was injured financially. It is by no means clear that the mortgage company was uninjured. The evidence is not convincing that there was more equity in the house, as renovated, than the amount of the loan although that fact is not pivotal here. These facts are evaluated in the assessment of the penalty. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Karen Coolman Amlong, Esquire AMLONG & AMLONG, P.A. 101 Northeast Third Avenue Suite 203 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-6053

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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