The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should be required to pay attorney's fees and costs to Petitioner to compensate her for the defense of an ethics complaint Respondent filed against her with the Florida Commission on Ethics.
Findings Of Fact Respondent J. Curtis Boyd ("Respondent" or "Mr. Boyd") owns property located at 111 Boston Avenue, Fort Pierce, Florida, that he bought in 2002 or 2003. The house on the property was once owned by the late Florida Governor Dan McCarty. Mr. Boyd testified that he has been offered $650,000 to sell the property with the house on it and $1.2 million to sell the land without the house. Mr. Boyd requested and received permission to demolish the house by a 5-to-1 vote of the Historic Preservation Board. That decision was apparently revoked by vote of the City Commission, including that of Petitioner Christine Coke ("Petitioner" or "Ms. Coke"). A complaint filed by Mr. Boyd with the State Attorney accusing Ms. Coke of "misuse of authority" was dismissed on July 6, 2009. Complaint No. 09-087, filed with the Florida Commission on Ethics ("Ethics Commission") on June 25, 2009, was dismissed on July 29, 2009. Mr. Boyd testified that, after the vote of the Historic Preservation Board, he believed Ms. Coke found some unnamed person to appeal the decision to the City Commission. He also testified that, some time later, he found out that the house was not in the historic district and that he did not need permission to demolish it. Mr. Boyd testified that he had overdue property taxes, but that he paid the back taxes and had the assessed value of the property reduced to lower his taxes because of the poor condition of the house. The City of Fort Pierce has waived approximately $70,000 in code enforcement fines on the property, and offered to pay $5,000 for a design fee, but Mr. Boyd noted that the design fee will not go to him but to an architect. Mr. Boyd alleges, with no supporting evidence, that the actions taken by Ms. Coke and others are intended to force him to sell the property to a friend of hers. Based on Mr. Boyd's testimony it is impossible to conclude, as he alleged, that Ms. Coke persuaded some one to appeal the decision of the Historic Preservation Board to the City Commission. There is also no evidence to support or refute Mr. Boyd's allegation that Ms. Coke was motivated by trying to force him to sell his property to a friend of hers. Related to costs and fees, Petitioner's counsel proffered an affidavit of an attorney, filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on September 23, 2009, representing that the attorney had reviewed the files of Petitioner's counsel and agreed that fees of $1,447.50 for one billing period and of $1,765.00 for another billing period were reasonable. In the absence of supporting testimony and after Petitioner rested her case, the objection to the admission of the affidavit as being untimely filed and unsupported hearsay was sustained. There is no competent substantial evidence that Respondent either made or did not make a complaint against Petitioner with knowledge that the allegations were false or with reckless disregard for whether the complaint contained false allegations. There is also no competent substantial evidence of the amount of fees and costs incurred by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is Recommended that the Florida Commission on Ethics dismiss the Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs filed by Christine Coke. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of October, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of October, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Kaye Starling, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Richard E. Coates, Esquire 200 West College Avenue, Suite 311B Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Patrick Farrell, Esquire c/o J. Curtis Boyd 120 Orange Avenue Fort Pierce, Florida 34950 Philip C. Claypool, Esquire Executive Director and General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics 3600 Macclay Boulevard, South Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 James Peterson, Esquire Linzie Bogan, Esquire Advocates for the Commission Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue Whether the petition for administrative determination of the invalidity of a proposed rule was filed within the time Section 120.54(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), prescribes for instituting challenges to proposed administrative rules?
Conclusions The time limit Section 120.54(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1987) sets for filing petitions which seek determinations of invalidity under Section 120.54, Florida Statutes (1987), before proposed rules ever take effect, is jurisdictional Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services vs. Alice P., 367 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Organized Fishermen of Florida vs. Marine Fisheries Com'n, No. 88-3821R (DOAH; Sept. 14, 1988); City of Gainesville vs. Florida Public Service Com'n., 3 FALR 2448-A (DOAH 1981). Contra, Florida Medical Center vs. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, No. 88- 3970R and consolidated cases, Nos. 88-4018R and 88-4019R (DOAH; Nov. 1, 1988). If a petition challenging a proposed rule is not filed within 21 days of the notice initiating rulemaking which Section 120.54(13)(b), Florida Statutes (1987) requires agencies to publish, those seeking invalidation are relegated to rule challenge proceedings under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1987), unless they are parties to the rulemaking, and take timely stems to secure judicial review of the agency action adopting the rule. See City of Key West vs. Askew, 324 So.2d 655 (Fla. 1st DCA). Substantially affected parties who fail to file a Section 120.54 challenge in time are not without an administrative forum in which to litigate both whether the substance of a rule is authorized by statute and whether the manner of its adoption was lawful. Since the petition alleges no constitutional infirmity in the rule, nothing petitioners have pleaded here would be foreclosed from consideration in a Section 120.56 proceeding. See Department of Environmental Regulation vs. Leon County, 344 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). On appeal from an order invalidating an existing rule which had been challenged pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1987), the court in Department of Administration vs. Herring, 530 So.2d 962 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), while rejecting the hearing officer's conclusions, considered the propriety of the procedures employed in rulemaking. Challenges to existing rules on grounds of inadequacy of economic impact statements are other instances in which rulemaking procedures have been tested in Section 120.56 proceedings. See Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services vs. Delray Hospital Corp., 373 So.2d 75 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Even where an agency makes no claim that it has followed any of the procedures required for rulemaking, challengers must ordinarily file under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1987). See State, Department of Administration vs. Stevens, 344 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). The petition in the present case may be read as alleging that DER published notice of proposing a mitigation rule in June of 1987, although the Florida administrative Weekly reflects publication on May 1, 1987. But it is clear from the petition that more than a year elapsed, after publication, before the present petition (or the earlier petition dismissed July 21, 1988) was filed. This makes the petition untimely under Section 120.54, Florida Statutes (1987) It is, accordingly, ORDERED: The petition for administrative determination of the invalidity of a proposed rule is dismissed, without prejudice to the filing of a petition pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1987). DONE and ENTERED this 15th November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter B. Belmont, Esquire 511 31st Avenue North St. Petersburg, FL 33704 David A. Crowley, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399 Janet E. Bowman, Esquire P.O. Box 1876 Tallahassee, FL 32302 James S. Alves, Esquire Thomas T. M. DeRose, Esquire P.O. Box 6526 420 First Florida Bank Building Tallahassee, FL 32314 Lawrence E. Sellers, Jr., Esquire P.O. Drawer 810 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Cindy L. Bartin, Esquire P. O. Box 271 Tallahassee, FL 32302
Findings Of Fact The policy being challenged provides that: The hearing may be cancelled if a petitioner or intervenor fails to timely file its prehearing statement. This provision is routinely and customarily embodied in the notices issued by Respondent to parties before it in matters arising under Florida Statutes 447.307 and 447.503. The Respondent acknowledges that it did not adopt and promulgate the policy pursuant to Florida Statutes 120.54 or any other relevant provision of Chapter 120. On 12 July 1979 Petitioner filed a petition with Respondent in which Petitioner sought to represent certain employees employed by the Collier County Board of County Commissioners. This petition was accepted by Respondent and on 30 July 1979 Respondent issued a Notice of Representation Hearing and a Prehearing Order. This Prehearing Order directed the parties to that proceeding to file with Respondent at least seven (7) days prior to the date of the hearing, and serve upon each other, a prehearing statement, identifying: Those fact disputes to be presented for resolution. Any and all legal questions to be presented for resolution. The legal authority to be relied upon by each party in presenting its arguments. Those witnesses to be called at the hearing, except rebuttal witnesses. The approximate time necessary to present the party's case. Any outstanding motions or procedural questions to be resolved. This Pre-Hearing Order then provided: The hearing may be cancelled if a petitioner or intervenor fails to timely file its prehearing statement. Petitioner did not file its prehearing statement within the prescribed 7-day period and on 21 August 1979 Petitioner was notified that the hearing scheduled to commence 23 August had been cancelled. On 22 August Petitioner was advised that a written order cancelling the 23 August hearing had been entered by the Commission. Thereafter Petitioner filed the petition here under consideration contending that the policy of Respondent to enter the cancellation-of-hearing notice in prehearing orders is a rule and invalid by reason of not being promulgated pursuant to Chapter 120. Respondent takes the position that the provision in the prehearing order is not a rule, but even if it could otherwise be considered to be a statement of general applicability, it is exempt from being so found by 447.207(6), Florida Statutes.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unfair employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of race, in violation of chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2012), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Nepton is a Hispanic man who worked as a collector for CCS from November, 2011, to February, 2012. CCS is a collection agency that employs approximately 80 collectors, who are divided into departments based on the different accounts they service. Mr. Nepton was originally hired to work under the supervision of Julio Castellon, and then was transferred to a unit supervised by Danielle Santilli. All of the work collectors perform is via telephone; persons who have outstanding bills are called in order to attempt collection of the debt. During his training in Ms. Santilli's department, he received most of his training from Ms. Santilli. According to Mr. Nepton, during these training sessions, Ms. Santilli made derogatory comments about Hispanic people. If the person being called was Hispanic, she would mention that Hispanic people were stupid, dumb, and never paid their bills. Mr. Nepton claims that the comments were made throughout his entire training, which lasted approximately one month. He claims that he reported his dislike of the derogatory comments to Ariel Castellon, a supervisor. Ms. Santilli testified, and denied ever making any derogatory or inappropriate remarks about Hispanics. Mr. Castellon also denied any knowledge of Ms. Santilli making any such remarks, and testified that Mr. Nepton never complained of any such comments while he worked at CCS. Lori French testified that in her capacity as the Human Resources Director, she never received any type of complaint regarding Ms. Santilli from any employee. The undersigned credits the testimony of the CCS employees, finding it consistent and credible in light of the scant evidence produced by Mr. Nepton. Mr. Nepton did not produce a single witness who could corroborate his testimony, despite the fact that the collectors worked in an open area, in close proximity to each other. The employee handbook instructed employees to report any workplace harassment of any type with the Human Resources Department. Mr. Nepton never filed such a complaint with the Human Resources Department. On February 1, 2012, Mr. Nepton received a call from a patient of a hospital inquiring as to whether the account was paid in full. Mr. Nepton requested the patient's date of birth, but the patient asked why that information was necessary. Mr. Nepton raised his voice and became argumentative with the patient. When Mr. Nepton was asked about the phone call by his supervisor, he became argumentative in the presence of the other collectors. On February 2, 2012, Mr. Nepton met with management regarding the incident on the previous day. He became agitated, raised his voice, and pointed his finger in the supervisor's face. Mr. Nepton, who was on probationary status, was discharged from his employment on that date.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JESSICA E. VARN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 2012.
Findings Of Fact Floralino Properties, Inc. is a small utility providing water and sewer service in Pasco County. During the period May 30, 1978 until March 12, 1979, it purchased a substantial portion of its water from the Pasco Water Authority, Inc. (PWA) for resale to its customers. In order to recoup the costs of those purchases, the Public Service Commission authorized the utility to assess a surcharge upon each customer's bill. (See Order No. 7494). However, because the surcharge exceeded the actual charges for water purchased, the utility was required to escrow all excess revenues. Respondent failed to do so thereby precipitating the issuance of Order No. 9320. A subsequent Commission audit reflected the excess revenues to be $2,228.05. Prior to the hearing, but after the issuance of Order No. 9320, the respondent escrowed the funds in a Pinellas County bank. The utility now agrees to make an appropriate refund with interest within 30 days to all customers who received service during the period in question.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that respondent be found guilty of violating Order No. 7494, dated November 2, 1976; that a fine of $250 be imposed upon respondent; that respondent make an appropriate refund of $2,228.05 with 6 percent interest to those customers entitled to such refund within 30 days; and that a final report setting forth the disposition of such monies be submitted to the Public Service Commission within 90 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: M. Robert Christ, Esquire 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 33542 Floralino Properties, Inc. 2320 East Bay Drive Clearwater, Florida 33516 Steve Tribble Commission Clerk 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Herman B. Blumenthal, III, Esquire 10401 Seminole Boulevard (Alt. 19) Seminole, Florida 33542
Findings Of Fact This cause comes on for consideration based upon the First Amended Petition by Capeletti Brothers, Inc., to determine the validity of Rules 17-4.02 and 17-4.28, Florida Administrative Cede, and is presented pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The First Amended Petition also makes allegations concerning the validity of an alleged rule purportedly found in the Notice of Intent to Deny the permit dated October 16, 1978; however, this statement is considered and ruled upon in the companion case, D.O.A.H. Case No. 79-1440R. The reason for this procedural disposition is due to the fact that the original Petition only contains allegations concerning the Letter of Intent to Deny of March 26, 1979, and any attempt on the part of the Petitioner to amend the Petition to include additional rules or purported rules that were not the subject of the original Petition was not deemed appropriate and, consequently, the attack on the validity of Rules 17-4.02 and 17-4.28, Florida Administrative Cede, was allowed to go forward only through an independent case consideration which is the case D.O.A.H. 79-1602RX. This approach was adopted to accommodate the notice requirements of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. In summary, the document entitled "First Amended Petition" has been divided into two cases, D.O.A.H. Case No. 79-1440R dealing with the Letter of Intent to Deny of March 26, 1979, and D.O.A.H. Case No. 79-1602RX dealing with the challenge to Rules 17-4.02 and 17- 4.28, Florida Administrative Code. (The evidential facts and certain related legal conclusions involved in considering the case sub judice, have been the subject of an Order of the undersigned in D.O.A.H. Case 79-891 involving the same parties to this cause, and the evidential fact determinations and legal conclusions in that Order dated December 7, 1979, are hereby incorporated into this Order by reference and through the act of attaching a copy of the prior Order are made a part of the present Order.)
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should have an administrative penalty imposed, take corrective action, and pay investigative costs for allegedly maintaining a sewage treatment plant in violation of applicable rules and statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Since 1969, Respondent, an active Florida corporation, has owned and operated a relatively small mobile home park (with around 55 mobile homes) at Two Tropic Wind Drive, Port Orange, Florida, known as Double D Mobile Ranch. In conjunction with the mobile home park, Respondent owns and operates a wastewater treatment plant (facility) for its residents. The facility is under the regulatory jurisdiction of the Department. Respondent's president is John D'Hondt, who is the only certified operator for the facility. On June 8, 2001, a Department representative inspected Respondent's facility and noted that Respondent had violated a number of statutes and rules. In accordance with Department protocol, on September 26, 2001, the Department sent Mr. D'Hondt by certified mail a "Noncompliance Letter" (First Letter), which identified the various violations and requested that Respondent respond within 14 days with a schedule of corrective action. Mr. D'Hondt received the First Letter but did not file a response. On February 27, 2002, a Department representative conducted a routine follow-up inspection of the facility. Mr. D'Hondt was present during the inspection. During the course of the inspection, the representative noted the following violations, some of which were repeat violations from the earlier inspection: Count I. The logbook on-site was not bound with numbered pages, and it did not contain the signature of the operators, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62- 602.650(4). Count II. A copy of the operation and maintenance manual was not on-site, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-600.410(4)(f). Count III. A copy of the certified operator's license was not on site, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-620.350(8). Count IV. Respondent failed to submit Discharge Monitoring Reports from May 2001 through January 2002, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-601.300(1)(b). Count V. After effluent samples were collected and tested, the tests revealed that the Total Suspended Solids were 185 milligrams per Liter (mg/L), which exceed the permit limit of 60 mg/L for a single sample, in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-600.740(1)(b)1.d. Count VI. Advisory signs were not posted at the facility indicating the nature of the project area, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rules 62-610.418(1) and 62-610.518(1). Count VII. The percolation pond located adjacent to the plant had less than one foot of freeboard, in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-610.516. In addition to the foregoing charges, by its Count VIII, the Department seeks to recover investigative costs totaling not less than $750.00, which the Department claims were incurred during the investigation and processing of the Notice. On April 2, 2002, the Department sent Mr. D'Hondt by certified mail a second Noncompliance Letter (Second Letter) outlining the various violations and requesting that he respond within 14 days after receipt of the Second Letter with a schedule of corrective action. Although Mr. D'Hondt received the Second Letter around April 20, 2002, he failed to file a response. On July 1, 2002, the Department sent another letter (Third Letter) by certified mail to Mr. D'Hondt requesting a reply to the Second Letter previously sent in April. The Third Letter advised Mr. D'Hondt that if he wished to avoid an enforcement action, he should file a response within 7 days from receipt of the letter. Mr. D'Hondt received the Third Letter around July 20, 2002, but he failed to respond to either the Second or Third Letters. On January 15, 2003, the Department issued its Notice alleging that Respondent had violated various statutes and rules (as described in Finding of Fact 3) in seven respects. After an informal conference failed to resolve the matter, Respondent eventually filed an Amended Petition on February 18, 2004, contesting the validity of the charges. The Charges Because Respondent has acknowledged that the allegations in Counts I-VI are true, no further proof as to those matters is necessary. Accordingly, it is found that the charges in those Counts have been established. In Count VII, Respondent is charged with having "a freeboard of less than one (1) foot" in its percolation pond, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-610.516. ("Freeboard" refers to the area between the top of the water in the pond and the top of the surrounding berm.) Under that rule, "[p]ercolation ponds . . . shall be provided with an emergency discharge device to prevent water levels from rising closer than one foot from the top of the embankment or berm." This means that a facility operator must maintain at least one foot of separation between the water level in the treatment pond and the top of the berm. The purpose of maintaining this amount of separation is to prevent an overflow of treated liquids in the event of an extremely heavy rainfall or a catastrophic event. This is especially important here since Respondent's percolation pond (which is used to dispose of treated liquids from the facility) appears to be no more than 30 feet or so from several mobile homes. See Petitioner's Exhibit 3. Testimony by the Department inspector established that when the inspection occurred, there was less than one foot of separation on the right side of the pond, as corroborated by, and reflected in, Petitioner's Exhibit 3, a digital photograph of the pond taken during the inspection. Respondent's contention that a separation of at least one foot existed in the pond at the time of inspection has been considered and rejected in light of the credible contrary evidence. Therefore, the charge in Count VII has been established. The evidence supports a finding that the Department incurred at least $750.00 in investigative costs while conducting the inspection, performing tests, attempting to informally resolve the case, and issuing the Notice. This amount is based on the cost of the field and laboratory tests, the hourly compensation of the inspector, and the hourly compensation of the supervisor who reviewed the inspector's work. It also includes the time expended by Department personnel in attempting to informally resolve the matter and later issuing the NOV. See Petitioner's Exhibit 9. Therefore, the charges in Count VIII have been sustained. Under the statutory scheme in place, the violations in Counts I through VII call for an administrative penalty in the amount of $5,750.00. The derivation of this amount is found in Petitioner's Exhibit 7, which is a penalty computation worksheet. Mitigating Evidence Although he was given an opportunity to offer mitigating evidence at the final hearing, Mr. D'Hondt failed to present any evidence that the violations were caused by circumstances beyond his control or that they could not have been prevented by due diligence. While Mr. D'Hondt did testify at final hearing that he has reduced the occupancy rate in the mobile home park to 70 percent to satisfy Department flow capacity requirements, this by itself is insufficient to warrant a reduction in the penalty.
