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TILFORD FLYING SERVICE, INC., AND AIR CAB, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 77-001392 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-001392 Latest Update: Mar. 03, 1980

The Issue Petitioners' alleged liability for sales tax, interest and penalties under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel and the stipulation of facts entered herein, the following facts are found. Petitioners are Florida corporations having their principal place of business at Palm Beach International Airport, West Palm 8each, Florida. Petitioners conduct a fixed base aircraft operation by which they provide services to both aircraft owners and aircraft users. Petitioners are licensed, qualified and certified by the Federal Aviation Administration, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the State of Florida, and Palm Beach County to conduct its operation. Petitioners employ qualified mechanics, technicians, flight instructors, pilots, and consulting and sales personnel for conducting these services, which are described in detail below. Petitioners lease and occupy facilities appropriate for the storage, use, and repair of aircraft. Petitioners have written contractual agreements with aircraft owners in which Petitioners obtain the use of the aircraft. Petitioners pay the owners an agreed amount per hour for the use of the aircraft, which amount varies with the aircraft age and type. (Examples of said agreements are attached to Joint Exhibit number 1.) These agreements use the term "lease" to describe the Petitioners' rights to use the aircraft. The agreements provide that Petitioners will have exclusive supervision, control, and custody of the aircraft during the term of the agreement. The agreements permit the owner of the aircraft to use the aircraft for personal needs, however, so long as such use does not conflict with Petitioners' scheduled use thereof. Petitioners use the aircraft to conduct approved flight instruction for the public, to engage in charter transportation of passengers and property, and to rent to qualified pilots. Petitioners charge the third parties for instruction, charter, or rental and report the proceeds as "income" on their federal tax returns. Petitioners' payments to the aircraft owners are reflected as an "operating or overhead expense" for federal tax purposes. When using the aircraft, Petitioners employ and pay qualified flight instructors, pilots, crews and mechanics to fly and service the aircraft. The aircraft owners have no contractual agreement with these persons. Petitioners are responsible for providing all required inspection, maintenance, and repair services to the aircraft, subject to reimbursement by the owners. The aircraft owners pay the costs of fuel and lubricants used during Petitioners' use of the aircraft. Petitioners provide property damage insurance on the aircraft and liability insurance for the pilots, crew, and third parties who charter or use the aircraft. Petitioners are responsible, at the expiration of the agreement, to return the aircraft to the owner in substantially the same condition as at the commencement of the agreement, except for normal wear and depreciation. Petitioners advertise themselves to the public as a charter flying service and flying instruction service and actively solicit customers for these services. Petitioners are also in the business of selling aircraft and are authorized dealers for Cessna and Piper aircraft companies. Some of Petitioners' purchasers enter into agreements like those attached hereto, granting Petitioners exclusive use and control of the aircraft. Petitioners' purchasers properly pay sale tax under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, when they purchase aircraft. They do not, insofar as Petitioners are aware, furnish Petitioners with resale certificates which certify that the purchase is solely for resale, in the manner designated by Rule 12A-1.38, Florida Administrative Code. Some of the purchasers have furnished exemption certificates, however, so those purchases were not taxed. Petitioners contend that they are an integrated business for the selling, storing, maintenance, and servicing of aircraft for aircraft purchasers and the provision of chartering and instruction services for third parties. Petitioners contend that their experience and expertise in providing all these services to owners and the general public is economically feasible only through an integrated operation of this nature, or through a substantially greater capital investment. Petitioners assert that the agreements by which they obtain exclusive use of the aircraft are agreements to provide expert management services to the owners, and are not subject to sales tax under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Respondent contends that the agreements by which Petitioners obtain exclusive use of the aircraft are separate and distinct from the rest of Petitioners' business, for sales tax purposes. Respondent also contends that the remainder of Petitioners' business is immaterial to the incidence of the tax. Respondent asserts that the agreements described herein are agreements to lease tangible personal property which are taxable as "sales" under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Petitioners also assert that certain of the agreements are not taxable because the aircraft owner paid sales tax on the initial purchase of the aircraft, as described in Paragraph 13 above. The Respondent contends that the prior payment of tax at the time of purchase is immaterial, since the purchase was not for resale. The issues thus presented herein are: whether the agreements are taxable transactions, as disputed in Paragraphs 14 and 15; and whether certain of the agreements are specifically nontaxable by virtue of the owner's payment of tax at the time of purchase, as disputed in Paragraph 16. The Respondent originally assessed Petitioners for tax, penalty, and interest in the amount of $19,149.08. It then appeared that in certain of Petitioners' transactions, the aircraft owners were already remitting sales tax. Respondent thereupon revised its assessment. The Respondent now alleges that the following amounts were due on March 15, 1978: Tax $11,144.68 Penalty 557.22 Interest 1,652.86 Total $13,354.76 The penalty and interest figures are subject to revision with the passage of time. The Respondent will update those figures upon issuance of a final order. Petitioners have paid no part of the foregoing assessment. Petitioners have not placed the computation of the amount due in issue, however, in the event they are held to be liable.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties, and Interest under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, dated March 15, 1978, be asserted against Petitioners pursuant to applicable law, with interest computed to reflect the passage of additional time. ENTERED this 20th day of August, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: John A. Gentry, III, Esquire David K. Miller, Esquire Moyle, Gentry, Jones, Flanigan Assistant Attorney General & Groner, P.A. Department of Legal Affairs Post Office Box 3888 The Capitol, LL04 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (5) 120.5720.05212.02212.07212.08
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BAXTER`S ASPHALT AND CONCRETE, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 83-003373 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-003373 Latest Update: May 21, 1990

The Issue Whether DOT should disqualify Baxter's bid on State Job 55320-3425, because Baxter's uncompleted work might hinder prompt completion of Job No. 55320-3425, or on account of Baxter's not being "responsible" within the meaning of Section 337.11(3), Florida Statutes (1983), or, under Rule 14-22, Florida Administrative Code, on account of Baxter's falsely certifying current capacity?

Findings Of Fact In their prehearing stipulation, the parties agreed that: Baxter submitted the lower bid on Project No. 55320-3425, on August 31, 1983. On September 19, 1983, DOT advised Baxter its bid would not be considered the lowest, responsible bid because of the failure of Baxter's to complete Job Nos. 49010-3535, 50060-3503, 49060-3508, 50030-3522, 50050-3506, 56010-3510, and 50010-3531 within the time allowed by their contract . . . . [E]ach of these projects w[a]s not completed within the allowed contract time and requests for extension of time are pending. The parties further stipulated that DOT's Bid Award Committee voted unanimously to award the job to Solomon and caused notice of intent to award Job No. 55320- 3425 to Solomon to be posted on October 10, 1983. At hearing, the parties stipulated on the record that Solomon is ready, willing and able to perform Job No. 55320-3425, and will perform, if the contract is awarded to Solomon. In Baxter's proposed findings of fact, Baxter concedes that "[t]here is no dispute that SOLOMON is a "responsible bidder?" In their prehearing stipulation, the parties also agreed that the form Certificate of Current Capacity filed by Baxter on August 31, 1983, did not list the status of the contracts it had on hand to which DOT was not a party. SPECIALTY JOB Solomon and Baxter were the only bidders on Project No. 1R-10-3 (71)198-55320-3425 (Job No. 55320-3425). The job involves light grading, installing underdrains and some small drainage structures, covering the underdrains with type III asphalt course, sealing the shoulder joint, miscellaneous asphalt and concrete paving, paving a ditch with concrete, installing guardrails, striping and marking the pavement, and grassing the shoulders on Interstate Highway 10, from Timberlane Road to a point 0.6 miles east of the intersection of I-10 and U.S. 90, a stretch of 6.903 miles, in Leon County. Installation of the underdrains would require about 300 tons of asphalt and some 2800 tons of asphalt would be required to do the whole job, but the production and spreading of asphalt is a relatively minor part of the whole project. Baxter's bid of $936,554.57 was lower than Solomon's by $21,255.63. The work is to be performed within 230 calendar days. TIME OVERRUNS Baxter finished on time at least five projects under contracts DOT let to Baxter in 1981, using all or virtually all of the time allowed to complete Job Nos. 56010-3508, 56020-3508 and 61080-3418, aggregating $2,568,784, but finishing substantially ahead of schedule on Job Nos. 51010-3522 and 53070- 3506, aggregating $384,069. Under contracts DOT let to Baxter in 1982, however, only two projects were finished within the time allowed. In all, DOT let twelve or thirteen contracts to Baxter in 1982. DOT's Exhibit No. 1. Of the 1982 contracts on which Baxter fell behind, DOT cited only five or six 1/ as evidence of Baxter's irresponsibility, in Secretary Pappas' letter of September 19, 1983. LATE STARTS Only one of the 1982 contracts was begun on or before the date specified in the contract as the date time charges were to begin to run. On Job No. 49010-3535 (U.S. 98 or SR 30 in Franklin County) Baxter did not begin work until after the completion date called for in the contract. The contract on U.S. 98 in Franklin County was for $1,170,887.72. On Job No. 50060-3503 (SR 65 in Gadsden County), on which time charges began to run on August 10, 1982, and which was to have been completed within 200 days, Baxter began work on January 7, 1983, which was 235 days after the contract was executed. The contract on SR 65 in Gadsden County was for $744,134.34. The contract DOT awarded Baxter for Job No. 49060-3508 (SR 65 in Franklin County) was for $1,380,270.15. Under the contract, time changes on SR 65 in Franklin County began on September 1, 1982, but Baxter did not begin work until February 23, 1983, which was 250 days after the contract was executed. The SR 65 Franklin County contract between DOT and Baxter contemplated completion of the project within 276 calendar days from the start of work. Both Job Nos. 50030-3522 and 50050-3506 (State Roads 10 and 12 in Gadsden County) were let under an agreement specifying that time charges would begin on November 4, 1982. Baxter started work on the first of these on February 11, 1983, and did not begin the second till well after the date it had agreed to have it finished. Baxter started work on Job 56010-3510 (State Road 20 in Liberty County) on April 13, 1983, about six months after the contract was executed and about four and a half months after time charges began. 1983 Secretary Pappas also cited Job No. 50010-3531 in his letter of September 19, 1983, as one of the jobs on which Baxter's performance had indicated, at least to DOT, Baxter's irresponsibility. This contract was for work on State Road 10 in Gadsden County and was referred to at hearing as the "mini-contract." The contract allowed 30 days for completion of the work and was in the amount of $34,975. Under this contract, time charges began on May 30, 1983, so that work should have been completed by the end of June. Baxter began work on September 9, 1983, more than two months after it had agreed it would finish the job. On the three other DOT jobs that Baxter was to begin in 1983, Job Nos. 53030-3521 (U.S. 231 in Jackson County), 61040- 3515 (SR 79 in Washington County), 54030-3507 (SR 19 in Jefferson County) , Baxter started work 26, 44 and 81 days late respectively. DELINQUENCY DISPUTED Whenever a contractor falls behind to the point that he has completed 20 percent less than he projected he would have on his progress chart and the amount he has completed expressed as a percentage of the whole is 20 points or more less than the amount of time elapsed expressed as a percentage of the total time allowed, DOT issues a preliminary notice of delinquency. The contractor has 15 days thereafter in which to request extensions of time. DOT may grant extension requests that render the contractor no longer delinquent, or it may issue a final notice of delinquency. Only if the contractor fails to file timely a petition for administrative proceedings does the "final" notice become final in law. Otherwise final agency action must await the outcome of proceedings pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1983). DOT has issued final notices of delinquency to Baxter with respect to both jobs on SR 10 in Gadsden County, and the jobs on SR 79 in Washington County, SR 19 in Jefferson County, State Road 20 in Liberty County, State Road 10 in Gadsden County, State Road 65 in Franklin County, State Road 65 in Gadsden County, and U.S. 98 in Franklin County. Since 1973, Baxter has received more final notices of delinquency from DOT than any other road contractor. As of final hearing, there was no other road contractor in the Tallahassee residency with as many as two jobs uncompleted as of the date time expired. With respect to each contract as to which DOT has issued a final notice of delinquency to Baxter, Baxter has filed requests for extensions of time. Some of these requests were granted. Others were not. If all of them had been granted, final notices of delinquency would not have issued. Baxter has also timely filed for formal administrative proceedings as to each final notice of delinquency directed to Baxter. At least one of these was scheduled for final hearing as early as August 5, 1983, but was, on Baxter's application, enjoined by court order. Baxter's Asphalt and Concrete, Inc. v. State of Florida, Department of Transportation; State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings; and R. T. Benton, II, No. 7-83-123 (Fla. 14th Cir.; Aug. 4, 1983). The parties stipulated that they have since agreed that the injunction be dissolved, although no order dissolving it has been entered. In arriving at the times specified in DOT road contracts, DOT staff estimates the number of work days necessary to complete the project, then multiplies by 1.825, on the assumption that the road contractor will only be able to work four days a week, fifty weeks a year. On paving jobs, considerable additional time is built into the estimates to allow contractors to bid on and schedule several jobs. DOT allows time extensions nevertheless for inclement weather, when the weather interferes with the controlling items of work, and also allows time extensions for certain unforeseen problems beyond the contractor's control. At hearing in the present case, Baxter made a colorable showing of a design problem on the SR 20 job in Liberty County, of a shortage of "friction course one materials" throughout 1982 and the first half of 1983, and of a shortage (of much shorter duration) of a chemical used to recycle milled asphalt, called HMA. Even if established, these claims would not excuse Baxter's lateness on all of the contracts mentioned in the Secretary's letter of September 19, 1983. For example, the evidence showed work had not progressed to the point that Baxter could have used the HMA during the time of the shortage. Baxter has even contended that it is not delinquent on jobs it did not begin until after the date by which Baxter had agreed to have finished. The evidence showed, however, that Baxter was delinquent in fact on these and other jobs. The specifications for Job No. 55320-3425 included the 1982 Edition of the Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction, Section 2-11 of which provides that a bidder may be disqualified on account of "Uncompleted work which in the judgment of the Department might hinder or prevent the prompt completion of additional work if awarded." Section 2-6 provides for rejection of qualified or conditional bids. ASPHALT PRODUCTION At all pertinent times, Baxter has had an asphalt plant in operation in Marianna, Florida (Plant No. 1). In the summer of 1982, Baxter erected a second asphalt plant in Liberty County. (Plant No. 2) After failing to obtain rezoning for a Gadsden County site, Baxter caused a third asphalt plant to be built in Franklin County. (Plant No. 3) By February of 1983, Baxter had obtained the requisite environmental permits for all three plants, although technical problems at Plant No. 3 were not overcome until later. Baxter can operate two, but not all three, of these plants simultaneously. The capacity of the Marianna plant is such that all the asphalt necessary for all the jobs Baxter contracted with DOT could have been produced there in time for Baxter to perform the DOT contracts on time. Baxter had other uses for some of its asphalt, however. Among them was a $4,000,000 job in Alabama in 1982 which Baxter finished more than 100 days early. The fraction of Baxter's total production used on DOT jobs varied from .02 percent in March of 1982, when Baxter produced 10,769.9 tons, and 7.31 percent in June of 1983, when Baxter produced 16,109.26 tons, to 97.96 percent in August of 1982, when Baxter's total production was 37,846.72 tons and 92.88 percent in April of 1983, when Baxter produced 13,210.34 tons. CAN DO William D. Baxter, who owns petitioner, and Louis W. Seay, Jr., petitioner's vice-president since 1979, are capable and successful businessmen. According to J. Vern Williams, a C.P.A. familiar with Baxter's operations, Baxter is very well managed, with the possible exception of the accounting department. Mr. Baxter began with a pick-up truck and a hot pot, and his company now has some $10,644,000 in heavy equipment and transportation equipment (original cost). If anything, Baxter's equipment inventory is larger than necessary. Baxter could perform Job No. 55320-3425 without buying or leasing any heavy equipment other than a trencher. Bonding companies reportedly stand ready to write an additional $14,000,000 in bonds for Baxter's. Its working capital and its capitalization generally are adequate for what it has undertaken. Among its 150 employees are 15 who have been with Baxter for ten to fifteen years, including H. H. Barber, the general superintendent, and Timmy Jones and Spud Berry, each of whom has worked as an asphalt superintendent for ten years. CHOSE NOT TO Baxter's managers deliberately postponed work on DOT jobs closer to the sites chosen for Plants Nos. 2 and 3 (including the Gadsden County site originally chosen for Plant No. 3), in order to avoid the costs of transporting asphalt the longer distances from Plant No. 1, even when it was uncertain when Plant Nos. 2 and 3 would go into production. They also decided not to purchase asphalt from any other producer closer to the job sites, as a means of performing timely under the DOT contracts mentioned in Secretary Pappas' letter of September 19, 1983. Notwithstanding the number of DOT contracts Baxter undertook to perform and notwithstanding the extent to which work fell behind on many of them, Baxter never had more than a single asphalt crew at work at any one time on the whole group of jobs listed in Secretary Pappas' letter of September 19, 1983. Since DOT indicated its intention to award Job No. 55320-3425 to Solomon, Baxter has made significant progress on the jobs listed in Secretary Pappas' letter. By January 18, 1984, it had completed four of them, all behind schedule, and was nearing completion on SR 65 in Gadsden County. Work on SR 65 in Franklin County was behind schedule and about one quarter completed. Delays of this kind cause problems for DOT, whose employees are permanent and full-time. Months in advance, DOT schedules at least one employee on each job site, for at least part of each day for the duration of the job. These schedules are based on the road contractors' commitments under the contracts DOT lets and on the progress charts they file. Inefficient use of DOT staff time is a common result when road contractors fail to perform work as scheduled. DOT schedules supervisory and testing personnel for 500 to 600 jobs annually. DOT WAFFLES On January 25, 1984, DOT issued a corrected notice of intent to award Job No. 59010-3514 to Baxter. This $594,174.56 asphalt paving job in Wakulla County will require significantly greater quantities of asphalt than Job No. 55320-3425, at issue in these proceedings. None of the other bidders on Job No. 59010-3514 protested the award to Baxter within the time allowed. ERRONEOUS CERTIFICATE Until recently, Baxter's consistent practice has been to omit contracts with parties other than DOT on the certificate of current capacity filed with bids on DOT jobs. Mr. Seay testified he had not realized that contracts with parties other than DOT were required to be listed. On the form certificate filed on August 31, 1983, in conjunction with its bid on Job No. 55320-3425, Baxter failed to report about $500,000 in uncompleted work under private contracts, while reporting $5,478,000 in uncompleted work for DOT. At the time, Baxter had approximately $22,000,000 in unused capacity. Perhaps this is why Peter J. White, Director of DOT's Division of Construction testified that there was no material irregularity in the bid papers. Petitioner submitted Baxter's proposed findings of fact and respondent filed a proposed recommended order which the intervenor adopted. Proposed findings have been adopted, in substance except to the extent they have been deemed unsupported by the weight of the evidence, immaterial, subordinate or cumulative.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That DOT award Job No. 55320-3425 to Solomon. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1984.

Florida Laws (5) 120.53120.57337.11337.167.31
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SILVER SAND COMPANY OF LEESBURG, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 75-001876 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-001876 Latest Update: Apr. 25, 1977

Findings Of Fact Silver Sand is in the aggregate business. A major portion of this business involves the trucking of sand, rock, and shell. Diesel fuel, a special fuel, is used in these trucking operations. Approximately fifteen percent of the trucking takes place off of highways and roads. Fuel utilized for off-road operations is not subject to the Florida excise tax on special fuel. To facilitate its trucking operations, Silver Sand purchases diesel fuel in bulk, and uses it in its own trucks and sells it to lease operators who are under contract to Silver Sand. Silver Sand holds a Florida Department of Revenue license which entitles it to purchase diesel fuel in bulk without paying the excise tax. The assessment period involved in this case is April, 1973 through December, 1973. During that period the United States was in the middle of a fuel crisis, and motor fuels, including diesel fuel, was difficult to obtain. During the relevant period Jeremiah J. Kelly, Jr., was Silver Sand's lease operations manager. He was responsible for obtaining diesel fuel. In April, 1973, a Mr. Carruthers, representing Handy Haul-It, approached Kelly and told him that Handy Haul-It could provide Silver Sand with diesel fuel. Kelly had the authority to negotiate diesel fuel purchases on behalf of Silver Sand. Kelly did not know where Carruthers or Handy Haul-It could get diesel fuel, and he assumed that Handy Haul-It was a fuel distributor. Carruthers told Kelly that he would need to have a "Purchaser's Blanket Resale and Exemption Certificate" issued by Silver Sand in order to obtain the fuel. Carruthers presented Kelly with such a certificate. The certificate was addressed to Radiant Oil. Kelly went to his superior, Kenneth Surbaugh, and asked whether he should issue the certificate. Surbaugh authorized Kelly to sign the certificate. Kelly signed the certificate that day, and left it on his desk. When he returned the following day the certificate was gone. Kelly did not write the name "Silver Sand Company" on the certificate, and did not date it. The name "Silver Sand Company" and the date were placed on the certificate after Kelly signed it. The certificate came into Carruthers' possession. The evidence did not reveal whether the certificate was delivered to Carruthers by anyone at Silver Sand, but Kelly did intend to deliver the certificate to Carruthers. A copy of the certificate was received in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 1. The name Silver Sand Company is inserted as the purchaser, and it is dated January 1, 1973. The document was predated. It was actually signed during April, 1973. NCJ is in the business of distributing motor fuels, including diesel fuel. Joseph Capitano is the President and Chief Executive Officer of NCJ. During April through December, 1973, NCJ had a relative abundance of diesel fuel. In April, 1973, Bill Simms, a friend of Capitano who is also in the fuel distribution business, told Capitano that he had a customer who desired to purchase substantial quantities of diesel fuel. This customer was Carruthers. Simms introduced Carruthers to Capitano. Capitano told Carruthers that he would need a Purchaser's Blanket Resale and Exemption Certificate in order to sell him diesel fuel. Capitano gave Carruthers a certificate to be executed which would fulfill this function. This is the certificate that was signed by Kelly, and received in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 1. Carruthers ultimately returned the form to Capitano. The form is addressed to Radiant Oil, not to NCJ. NCJ and Radiant Oil are separate entities. NCJ and Radiant Oil are separately registered with the Department of Revenue as motor fuel dealers. The corporations are somewhat related. Joseph Capitano's father owns Radiant Oil. NCJ leases office space from Radiant Oil, and the two corporations share clerical help. The companies use common gas tanks. The companies also utilize many of the same business forms. NCJ had on occasion utilized Radiant Oil's "Purchaser's Blanket Resale and Exemption Certificate" form for its use. NCJ was a new company, and did not have its own forms. Respondent's Exhibit 3 is a compilation of such forms which were used by NCJ during the relevant period. Some of these were Radiant Oil's forms. In utilizing Radiant Oil's forms, the name Radiant Oil Company was marked off and NCJ Investment Company was inserted. That was not done on the form signed by Kelly on behalf of Silver Sand. After Carruthers delivered the exemption certificate to Capitano Handy Haul-It proceeded to purchase fuel from NCJ and resell it to Silver Sand. The fuel was generally picked up at NCJ's tanks by Handy Haul-It's truck. Occasionally Handy Haul-It hired trucks from another common carrier to pick up the fuel. Handy Haul-It paid for the fuel by check made out on the account of Handy Haul-It. NCJ invoices reflected, however, that the purchaser was Silver Sand. Copies of these invoices were not mailed to Silver Sand, and never came into the possession of Silver Sand. No one at Silver Sand was aware of the existence of NCJ. Handy Haul-It purchased 1,753,027 gallons of special fuel from NCJ in this manner. Handy Haul-It did not pay the special fuel tax on any of the purchases. While NCJ was selling tax free based upon the Purchaser's Blanket Resale Exemption Certificate (Respondent's Exhibit 1) it did not place Silver Sand's dealer or distributor license number on many of the invoices. NCJ never made any inquiry of anyone at Silver Sand as to Carruthers' or Handy Haul-It's authority to purchase fuel on Silver Sand's behalf. 882,264 gallons of the special fuel purchased by Handy Haul-It from NCJ was delivered to Silver Sand. This fuel was delivered either in Handy Haul-It's own truck, or in a truck hired by Handy Haul-It. Silver Sand paid Handy Haul-It directly by check when it received each of the deliveries. Handy Haul-It delivered invoices to Silver Sand. The invoices do not reflect a separate itemization showing that motor fuel taxes were paid. The price paid for the fuel would indicate that the price included the tax. Carruthers represented to officials at Silver Sand that the price included the tax, and that he would pay the taxes. In its monthly reports to the Department of Revenue, Silver Sand did not report the purchases because it believed that it was not required to report purchases upon which taxes had been paid. The evidence at the hearing was insufficient to establish the ultimate destination of the fuel which Handy Haul- It purchased from NCJ but did not sell to Silver Sand. Handy Haul-It did make sales to several other trucking companies, including Keystone Trucking Company, Montgomery Trucking, Montgomery Hauling, Keys of the Coast, Florida Bulk Transport, Dirt Haulers, Inc., and Mid Florida Hauling. Handy Haul-It had purchased some fuel from sources other than NCJ, and it cannot be gleaned from the evidence whether the fuel purchased from NCJ was ultimately delivered to these other companies. It is clear from the evidence that the remaining fuel was not delivered to Silver Sand, and that Silver Sand was not aware that Handy Haul-It had purchased such additional quantities from NCJ in Silver Sand's name. Handy Haul-It was not licensed as a distributor or dealer of motor fuels by the Florida Department of Revenue. By agreeing to purchase diesel fuel from Handy Haul-It, Silver Sand authorized Handy Haul-It to obtain diesel fuel on behalf of Silver Sand. Handy Haul-It was therefore Silver Sand's agent for the purpose of obtaining fuel for Silver Sand. When Kelly signed the Purchaser's Blanket Resale and Exemption Certificate, he authorized Handy Haul-It to use Silver Sand's special fuel dealer's license to obtain diesel fuel tax free from Radiant Oil Company of Tampa, the addressee on the certificate. Silver Sand thus clothed Handy Haul-It and Carruthers with the apparent authority to purchase diesel fuel tax free utilizing Silver Sand's special fuel dealer license number from Radiant Oil Company of Tampa. NCJ knew, or should have known, that in making sales to Carruthers and Handy Haul-It, it was not dealing directly with Silver Sand. Although the exemption certificate had the name Silver Sand on it, and NCJ chose to address its invoices to Silver Sand, all of the purchases were made by Handy Haul-It and Carruthers. There was no evidence that Carruthers ever represented to NCJ that he had authority to speak for Silver Sand. NCJ took no action to inform itself as to Carruthers' authority to act on Silver Sand's behalf, other than to obtain the exemption certificate. The exemption certificate, however, was not made out to NCJ. The only authority of Handy Haul-It to act on Silver Sand's behalf that NCJ was entitled to rely upon was the authority to purchase fuel from Radiant Oil Company of Tampa. The authorization is very specific in this regard, and although it may be that Silver" Sand would gladly have executed an exemption certificate addressed to NCJ, it did not do that. The fact that the certificate was back-dated, and was issued to the wrong entity, should have caused NCJ to take action to contact Silver Sand. If NCJ had done that, Handy Haul-It would never have been in a position to purchase fuel from NCJ and to deliver it to someone other than Silver Sand. Indeed, it is possible that Handy Haul-It would never have been placed in the position of buying fuel under Silver Sand's license number at all. Knowing that it was dealing with an agent, NCJ should have sent copies of the invoices to the principal, Silver Sand. If NCJ had done that, Silver Sand would have been on notice that Handy Haul-It was purchasing considerable fuel in its name, and delivering it elsewhere. Silver Sand did not give Handy Haul-It the authority to obtain fuel for any purpose except delivery to Silver Sand. When Handy Haul-It utilized the exemption certificate to purchase fuel for purposes other than delivery to Silver Sand, it exceeded the scope of its authority. NCJ did not obtain special fuel taxes from Handy Haul-It on the sales which NCJ made to Handy Haul-It. NCJ did report the sales to the Department of Revenue. Silver Sand believed that it was paying special fuel taxes to Handy Haul-It. The fact that the price which Silver Sand paid to Handy Haul-It included the tax was not, however, placed on the invoices. Handy Haul-It did not pay any special fuel taxes.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED: That the assessment for Special Fuel Tax in the amount of $154,644.50 imposed against Silver Sand Company of Leesburg, Inc., by the Department of Revenue be upheld. CERTIFICATION I certify that the foregoing is the Final Order of the Department of Revenue adopted by the Governor and Cabinet on the 19th day of April, 1977. Harry L. Coe, Jr., Executive Director State of Florida, Department of Revenue Room 102, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Dated this 20th day of April, 1977.

Florida Laws (5) 206.23206.49206.86206.87206.97
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RHINEHART EQUIPMENT COMPANY vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 11-002567 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida May 18, 2011 Number: 11-002567 Latest Update: Aug. 12, 2014

The Issue The two issues for determination are: (1) whether Rhinehart Equipment Co. (Rhinehart) a foreign corporation domiciled in Rome, Georgia, during the period July 1, 2002, through June 30, 2005, had "substantial nexus" with the state of Florida through its advertising, sale, and delivery into Florida of new and used heavy tractor equipment, sufficient to require it to collect and remit sales tax generated by these sales to the Florida tax authorities; and (2) Whether the applicable statute of limitations for assessing sale tax had expired when DOR issued its "final assessment" on September 11, 2009.

Findings Of Fact The Parties Rhinehart Equipment Co. (“Rhinehart”) is a retail heavy equipment dealer located in Rome, Georgia, and does not own or maintain a showroom or office location in Florida or directly provide financing to any Florida resident for any of its sales. Rhinehart does not provide Florida customers with any after-sale services such as assembly, technical advice, or maintenance. Rhinehart does not have any employees residing in Florida. Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with the regulation, control, administration, and enforcement of the sales and use tax laws of the state of Florida embodied in Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and as implemented by Florida Administrative Code Chapter 12A-1. Background In early March 2005, the Department received an anonymous tip pursuant to section 213.30, Florida Statutes. The caller alleged that Rhinehart was selling equipment to Florida residents without including sales and use tax in the sales price and was delivering the equipment to Florida customers using its own trucks. The tipster also alleged that Rhinehart was advertising in a commercial publication Heavy Equipment Trader, Florida Edition. By letter dated March 31, 2005, Respondent contacted Rhinehart and advised that its business activities in the state might be such as to require Rhinehart to register as a “dealer” for purposes of assessing Florida sales and use tax, and that it could be required to file corporate income tax returns, potentially subjecting it to liability for other Florida taxes. Included with this letter was a questionnaire for Rhinehart to complete and return to the Department "to assist us in determining whether Nexus exists between your company and the State of Florida." On May 2, 2005, Rhinehart, without the advice of counsel, responded to the Department’s inquiry by returning the completed questionnaire, which was signed by its president, Mark Easterwood. By letter addressed to Mr. Easterwood dated May 4, 2005, the Department advised that it had determined that Rhinehart had nexus with the state of Florida and that therefore Rhinehart was required to register as a dealer to collect and remit Florida sales and use tax. According to the letter, the Department's determination was "based on the fact that your company makes sales to Florida customers and uses the company's own truck to deliver goods to customers in the State of Florida." By application effective July 1, 2005, Rhinehart registered to collect and/or report sales and use tax to the state of Florida, In a letter dated June 8, 2005, the Department invited Rhinehart to self-disclose any tax liability that it may have incurred during the three-year period prior to its registration effective date, to wit, July 1, 2002, through June 30, 2005 (the audit period). Specifically, the letter stated: At this time, we would like to extend an opportunity for you to self-disclose any tax liability that you may have incurred prior to your registration effective date (for the period July 1, 2002, through June 30, 2005). This Self-Disclosure Program affords you an opportunity to pay any applicable tax and interest due for the prior three-year period (or when Nexus was first established) without penalty assessments. In response to the Department's June 8, 2005, letter, Rhinehart's legal counsel sent a letter dated August 8, 2005, requesting a meeting or conference call to discuss a "few legal issues" concerning the Department’s determination regarding nexus. Thereafter, Rhinehart began filing the required tax returns relating to its Florida sales, noting in writing by cover letter that the returns were being filed “under protest.” Rhinehart began collecting and remitting sales and use tax starting in July 2005. However, Rhinehart declined to provide any information regarding sales made prior to July 1, 2005. On September 30, 2005, Rhinehart's legal counsel sent the Department a detailed protest letter and advised that, in Rhinehart's view: (1) the Department had not established “substantial nexus” with Florida as interpreted under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution; and (2) Rhinehart was not required to register as a Florida dealer for sales and use tax purposes. On May 23, 2008, the Department issued a "Notice of Intent to Make an Assessment," and on September 11, 2009, a "Notice of Final Assessment," for the audit period. The assessment totaled $354,839.30, which was comprised of $229,695.00 in taxes and $125,144.30 in interest. The assessment was calculated by Respondent using Rhinehart’s sales tax returns filed from July 2005 through March 2008. The Notice of Final Assessment advised Rhinehart that the final assessment would become binding agency action unless timely protested or contested through the informal protest process, or by filing a complaint in circuit court or petition for an administrative hearing. Rhinehart unsuccessfully sought to resolve the matter through informal review and then ultimately filed its petition seeking an administrative hearing to challenge the Department's September 11, 2009, assessment. Based on sales records and other information provided by Rhinehart, on March 9, 2011, the Department revised its September 11, 2009, assessment. The revised assessment totaled $380,967.89, which included the past due sales and use tax liability, and interest accrued through that date. Rhinehart's Florida Activities Rhinehart produced records of its sales to Florida customers during the audit period. Those records reflected sales to 116 different Florida customers as follows: one sale in the second-half of 2002; 12 sales in 2003; 84 sales in 2004; and 19 sales thorough June 2005. The total value of the merchandise sold to Florida residents was $2,928,981.00. The majority of Rhinehart's sales during the audit period were "sight unseen" by the customer, and were negotiated by telephone. Numerous hurricanes made landfall in Florida during the 2004 and 2005 hurricane season. Since 2005, Rhinehart’s sales to Florida customers have substantially dropped, with no sales occurring in some quarters. During the audit period Rhinehart accepted a number of trade-ins toward the purchase of new equipment. The records showed trade-in transactions as follows: none (0) in 2002; five (5) in 2003; eleven (11) in 2004; and none in 2005. Concurrent with the delivery of the new equipment purchased from Rhinehart, used equipment taken in trade was transported by Rhinehart employees using Rhinehart transport equipment back to Rhinehart’s location in Georgia. In these instances, the trade-in equipment remained with the Florida customer following negotiation of the sale and prior to Rhinehart physically taking possession of it. During the audit period the equipment accepted as trade-ins had a total value of $168,915.00. The valuation of trade-in equipment was done based on a customer’s representations (i.e. sight unseen, with no Rhinehart employee personally inspected the equipment) and pursuant to industry guidelines. Rhinehart’s drivers would deliver the purchased equipment, load any trade-in equipment, and return to Georgia, if possible, on the same day. To the extent that the Department of Transportation regulations mandated that they cease driving in a given day, the drivers would rest in the back of their trucks for the required amount of time, sometimes overnight, and then complete their journey back to Georgia. Rhinehart's dealership is located approximately 300 miles north of the Florida state line. Sales invoices reflect that Rhinehart's customers were located throughout the state of Florida, as far south as Miami on the east coast and Naples on the west coast. During the audit period, Rhinehart placed advertisements with with the Trader Publishing Company, located in Clearwater, Florida. The Trader Publishing Company is the publisher of the Heavy Equipment Trader magazine which is distributed in Georgia, Alabama, Florida, and Tennessee. Trader Publishing Company publishes a "Florida Edition" of the magazine which is directed to potential heavy equipment customers located in Florida. Stipulated Exhibit 19 consists of advertising invoices for advertisements placed by Rhinehart in the Florida Edition of Heavy Equipment Trader magazine during the audit period. These invoices establish that Rhinehart regularly and systematically purchased advertising for its products which was targeted toward potential customers located in Florida.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Revenue: Confirming that substantial nexus existed during the audit period and that Petitioner was therefore subject to the taxing authority of the state of Florida; Confirming that the assessment at issue is not time- barred; Allowing Petitioner a reasonable period of time to determine whether any of the sales it made during the audit period would have qualified as exempt sales pursuant to section 212.08(3) and if so, to obtain the required certifications from the purchasers; and Imposing on Petitioner an assessment for the unpaid taxes, with accrued interest, for all sales during the audit period not qualifying for exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of August, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 2012.

Florida Laws (14) 120.569120.57120.68212.02212.0596212.06212.08212.18212.21213.30220.23570.0272.01195.091
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CHUCK BUNDSCHU, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 82-000312 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-000312 Latest Update: Jul. 07, 1982

The Issue The questions presented here concern the entitlement of the Petitioner or Intervenor to be awarded lease rights under the Respondent's proposed Lease No. 590:8026, in that Petitioner and Intervenor have claimed that entitlement to the exclusion of the other party.

Findings Of Fact Respondent invited bid proposals for the provision of approximately 32,000 square feet of office space for its District VIII operation in Fort Myers, Florida. Petitioner, Chuck Bundschu, Inc., and Intervenor, Walter Lee Johnson d/b/a Walco Leasing Company, responded to the bid proposal by offering to provide the office space. Those responses may be found as part of the Composite Hearing Officer's Exhibit. Following the October, 1981, submittal of bid proposals, a bid evaluation committee was appointed by the Subdistrict Administrator for District VIII to consider the bids. In turn, he afforded guidance to that committee on the subject of the evaluation of the proposed bids offered by Bundschu and Walco, the only bidders for the project. The evaluation committee performed the task of weighing the bid proposals, in keeping with evaluation criteria which are outlined in Respondent's "Facilities, Acquisition and Management Manual" dealing with the procurement of lease space, which criteria are set forth in a form referred to as "HRSM 70-1, page A1-4-8," which is attached to chapter four of the manual. All criteria used for the evaluation process were drawn from that form with the exception of criterion No. 7, related to staff and client marking which was a product of this bid evaluation effort. (A copy of the HRS manual and forms may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. The evaluation committee's summarization utilizing the form criteria and the additional parking criterion may be found as a part of the Hearing Officer's Composite Exhibit, which is a replication of the original.) The HRS manual for procuring leased space is a publication of February, 1980, and establishes uniform guidelines by which bid proposals are considered by local officials who are part of Respondent's organization. Nonetheless, the exact weight to be afforded each criterion outlined in the manual is determined by the local evaluation committee. Weighing concerns the subject of awarding numerical values for beach bidder related to the various criteria with a maximum possible score being 100 points. On the basis of the evaluation performed by the committee, the Bundschu total was 88.25 points and the The Walco point total was 82 out of the possible 100 points. Consequently, the evaluation committee recommended that Bundschu be awarded the lease. Mark Geisler, in his capacity as Subdistrict Administrator, for District VIII, concurred in this evaluation as may be seen in his November 6, 1981, transmittal of the bid materials and associated evaluation, which transmittal may be found as pert of the Hearing Officer's Composite Exhibit. The District Administrator, District VII, in the person of Frances Clendenin, who was acting for the District Administrator, Ivor D. Groves, Ph.D., also recommended acceptance of the Bundschu bid. This position was made known by a memorandum of November 16, 1981. A copy of that recommendation is found as a part of the Hearing Officer's Composite Exhibit. The recommendations spoken to thus far were made known to Lester C. Missman, an official within the Division of General Services of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. This division was, at the time of the bid proposals, and is now, headed by Dr. Homer Ooten, whose function within Respondent's organization includes the responsibility to evaluate lease proposals involving the Respondent agency and to make a final decision on the question of the lease award, based upon a review of the local subordinate unit's recommendation. By this, it is meant that the lease by Health and Rehabilitative Services as "user agency" is signed by Ooten based upon a delegation of authority to him through the vehicle of correspondence signed by the agency head. Ooten, upon considering the recommendation of the District Administrator's office, the Subdistrict Administrator and the evaluation committee, did not find fault with the criteria nor the point weighing scheme used in the evaluation process. He did question the cost analysis performed by the evaluation committee on the subject of client mileage for those clients receiving services from Respondent in a move from the HRS office in the Bundschu building where they were located at the time, to the building where Walco intended to let property. This was a distance of seven/tenths (7/10) of a mile and based upon the number of clients receiving services, there would be an estimated $100,000.00 in client mileage cost increase. This item was not deemed to be an appropriate consideration by Ooten and was disregarded in his review of the cost analysis performed by the evaluation committee. That cost analysis may be found as part of Respondent's Composite Exhibit No. 2, and includes interlineations by Ooten in his opinion on the subject of the cost analysis. That analysis had indicated an overall advantage of approximately $11,000.00 in favor of Bundschu and was premised upon costs related to Item 12 in the criteria, which criterion is cost of moving. It assumed a difference of over $131,000.00 in moving costs, the majority of which costs pertained to client inconvenience ($100,000.00), discounting $120,000.00 plus dollars related to the difference in the bid amount between the Walco and Bundschu bids which bid estimate was in favor of Walco. Ooten's opinion on the subject of the priority of including $100,000.00 plus dollars in clients' travel costs, when considered in the context of point awards under Item 12 in the criteria, lead Ooten to believe that the differential in point awards would not result in a 9.25 value of Bundschu versus a zero value for Walco. In his mind, the differential would be much less. Ooten made his own evaluation of moving costs per se, and through that process determined that approximately $15,600.00 would be necessary for a move into the Walco facility whereas $5,600.00 would be involved in the Bundschu move, which required the expansion of existing space in the Bundschu facility. Based upon an evaluation of the point differential in the rental rate criterion which was a differential of 2, that is 30 points out of a possible 30 for Walco and 28 points out of a possible 30 for Bundschu, Ooten also opined the this was an unreasonable assessment in view of the fact that the Walco bid amount was more than $120,000.00 less than the Bundschu bid. This taken together with the fact that there only existed approximately a $9,000.00 difference on moving costs between Bundschu and Walco, which was in favor of Bundschu, and there having been indicated a 9.25 out of a possible 10 point difference in Item 12 on the question of costs related to moving, led Ooten to believe that the true factual status of criteria Nos. 1 and 12 was not as depicted by the evaluation committee. Per Ooten, with proper assessment Walco would have received a higher point count than Bundschu through the process of applying the bid criteria, as well as being the lower bidder from the point of view of rental rates alone. After several exchanges with the District level personnel of Respondent who had been involved in the lease evaluation process, in which, on two (2) occasions, the local officials continued to support their initial opinion of the propriety of the award to Bundschu, a decision was made at the District VIII level to support the award of the lease to Walco as may be seen in the January 6, 1982, correspondence from the District Administrator to Missman, a copy of which may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 4, admitted into evidence. On January 6, 1982, Ooten issued a letter to the District VIII Administrative Services Director indicating the authority to award Lease No. 590:8026, formerly referred to as No. 590:1472, for the benefit of Walter Lee Johnson d/b/a Walco Leasing Company. Having learned of this decision and in keeping with the provision Subsection 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, Bundschu, through counsel, indicated opposition to that award on January 12, 1982, followed by a formal petition letter setting forth grounds for the opposition, which petition was filed on January 19, 1982. This series of documents is part of the Hearing Officer's Composite Exhibit, through copies. Subsequently, Items 4 and 6 in the petition letter were resolved between the parties without the necessity of a hearing and this is borne out by a copy of the February 1, 1982, correspondence from counsel for the Respondent to counsel to the Petitioner, part of the Hearing Officer's Composite Exhibit. The matter was then referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a formal Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing by correspondence from the Assistant General Counsel for Respondent, dated February 4, 1982, a copy of which may be found as a part of the Hearing Officer's Composite Exhibit. There followed the intervention of Walter Lee Johnson as a party of record and the hearing was held on April 27, 1982. Petitioner's first contention deals with the idea of discounting the lease value based on the value of the "stream of future lease payments." This theory is contended for through Robert Sizemore, C.P.A., expert witness of the Petitioner. He would call for the discount of lease payments on the theory that present dollars will have a discounted value in the future, as the lease period unfolds. Taking into account the method of payment by the Respondent and the vicissitudes involved in attempting to establish the value of today's dollar at a future time, this theory of discounted dollars at a 10 percent or 12 percent rate per annum in succeeding years is not indicated. Assessment through the legislative appropriations process of sufficient funds to meet lease payment demands is not contingent upon the value of the dollar at any given point in the history of the lease. Therefore, the "stream of future lease payments" concept is inapplicable here. Likewise, trying to project the value of today's dollar at some future date is so tenuous as to be an unacceptable method to evaluate the competing lease proposals. Finally, even if this method was used, a 10 percent discount rate for inflation would leave approximately a $67,000.00 difference in the bid proposals and a 12 percent per annum discount rate related to inflation would leave approximately $52,000.00 difference in the bid proposals, in favor of the Walco bid. Petitioner has contended that Respondent failed to properly account for direct moving expenses. In that regard, the calculations made by Ooten on the question of moving expenses as reported above are accepted as fact. As a third claim, Petitioner has alleged the agency s disregard for recommendation of its evaluation committee in making the lease award. While the initial recommendations of the evaluation committee and staff were disregarded, the District Administrator eventually accepted the point of view of the Division of General Services within the Respondent's Department. Moreover, even if the local officials within the Respondent's Department had not accepted Ooten's viewpoint, the initial evaluation committee's development of criteria was flawed and the Ooten perception was correct, leading to a decision in favor of Walco. Finally, the contention by Petitioner that the agency did not seek adequate input from third parties affected by the relocation of the facility was not demonstrated through testimony. The method for review of the proposed lease was acceptable and to the extent that it required an appreciation and response to the needs of others not directly involved in the lease process, it has been amply afforded. Evaluation was in keeping with Respondent's "Facilities, Acquisition and Management Manual, HRSM 70-1, fourth chapter" and the award is based upon concurrence of the Division Director of the General Services Division of HRS pursuant to that chapter. Through argument, counsel for the Petitioner has also referred to the fact that in the initial evaluation process set forth in the sixth criterion, superior points of 2.5 for Walco as opposed to 2.25 for Bundschu had been awarded, when in fact the narrative summary of the reasons for such awards indicate an advantage to Bundschu. Even if the .25 points were allowed in the favor of Bundschu, this would not change the result.

Florida Laws (3) 120.53120.57255.25
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FLORIDA EXPORT TOBACCO COMPANY, INC. vs. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, 80-001785 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001785 Latest Update: Apr. 28, 1981

Findings Of Fact Florida Export Tobacco Co., Inc., Petitioner, operates, as a concessionaire, duty-free stores at Miami International Airport. The premises are owned by the Dade County Aviation Department and the stores are leased to Petitioner pursuant to the terms of a lease and concession agreement dated 19 July 1977, effective 1 August 1977 and continuing until 30 September 1987. (Exhibit 1 to Deposition) Pursuant to this agreement Petitioner occupies six stores and additional warehouse space at the Terminal Building and the International Satellite Facility. Article II in Exhibit 1 entitled Rental Charges and Payments provides for rental payments for each store and space occupied based upon a fixed fee of $X per square foot per year with the dollar per square foot cost varying with the space occupied. In addition to this minimal rental fee, Section 2.03 of this agreement provides: County Profit Participation: As additional consideration for the rights and privileges granted Concessionaire herein, Concessionaire shall pay the County a portion of its profits. As a convenience and in order to eliminate requirements for detailed auditing of expenditures, assets and liabilities and in order to provide an even flow of annual revenues for budgeting and bond financing purposes, said portion of the profits of the Concessionaire shall be calculated as the amount by which sixteen percent of the monthly gross revenues, as defined in Arti- cle 2.07, exceeds the sum of monthly rental payments required by Articles 2.01 and 2.04. Concessionaire shall pay such portion of its profits to County by the twentieth (20th) day of the month following the month in which the gross revenues were received or accrued. For the period October 1, 1982 through September 30, 1987, the percent of monthly gross revenues to be paid by Concessionaire as a portion of its profits shall be eighteen percent, payable and calculated in the same manner as above. The lessor provides air conditioning, garbage and sewage disposal facilities, security, and many other services to the lessee in addition to the space leased. From October 1976 through September 1977 Petitioner paid $40,499.66 in additional sales tax over the guaranteed minimum amount; for the year ending September 1978 this additional sales tax was $66,284.85; for the year year ending September 1979 this additional sales tax was $93,837.15; and for the year ending September 1980 this additional sales tax was $137,521.87. (Exhibit 2 to the Deposition) As the owner of the facility Dade County has the option of operating the various facilities and services available to the public or having these operated by a concessionaire. Dade County has opted for the manner it believed more profitable to the county and in the case of the duty free stores this has resulted in leasing the space to a concessionaire. The hotel at the airport is operated by the Aviation Department under a management contract. It is Petitioner's and Dade County's position that a sales tax should not be paid on the county profit participation charges because, if the Aviation Department operated the stores there would be no sales tax on any rental income and the County operates the facilities at the airport so as to maximize profits to the county. Therefore by requiring the concessionaire to pay sales tax, this reduces the profit available to share with the County.

Florida Laws (4) 2.012.04212.031499.66
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OTHER SIDE SOD, LLC vs C. FULLERTON AND LANDSCAPING CO., INC., AND GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE GROUP, AS SURETY, 17-003275 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Arcadia, Florida Jun. 07, 2017 Number: 17-003275 Latest Update: Feb. 05, 2018

The Issue Whether C. Fullerton and Landscaping Co., Inc., is indebted to Other Side Sod, LLC, for the purchase of sod and pallets; and, if so, in what amount.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida Limited Liability Corporation located in Arcadia, Florida, and at all times relevant hereto was a producer of agricultural products, as defined by section 604.15(9), Florida Statutes. Petitioner is also a “dealer in agricultural products” within the meaning of section 604.15(2). Respondent, during all times relevant hereto, was a “dealer in agricultural products,” within the meaning of section 604.15(2). At all times relevant to this proceeding, Great American served as surety for Respondent. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was a customer of Other Side Sod. Respondent purchased sod from Petitioner and thereafter resold and installed the sod to Respondent’s customers. Petitioner sold sod to its customers on wooden pallets. An integral part of each transaction involved the pallets. There are 10 invoices in dispute which cover the period October 14, 2016, through February 10, 2017. For the underlying transactions that relate to the invoices in question, the following language is contained on each field/delivery ticket: Terms of Sale: Payment due upon receipt. All payment[s] applied to pallet balance first. Interest at the rate of 1 1/2% per month will be charged on unpaid invoice amounts after 14 days. Invoices will be charged $0.02 per square foot additional after 30 days. Purchaser agrees to pay all costs of collection, including attorney fees, in [the] event it is necessary to institute suit for collection. Venue will be in DeSoto County, Florida. All Sales F.O.B. Shipping Point. On or about October 14, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 47293, which showed a balance due of $462 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 83,200 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($1,664). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $124.80 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($1,664 x 7.50 percent). On or about October 23, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 47378, which showed a balance due of $224 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 70,400 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($1,408). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $105.60 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($1,408 x 7.50 percent). On or about October 24, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 47420, which showed a balance due of $280 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 16,000 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($320). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $24 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($320 x 7.50 percent). On or about November 13, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 47549, which showed a balance due of $1,526 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 103,200 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($2,064). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $154.80 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($2,064 x 7.50 percent). On or about December 6, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 47755, which showed a balance due of $434 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 30,400 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($608). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $45.60 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($608 x 7.50 percent). On or about January 8, 2017, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 48093, which showed a balance due of $1,256 for 12,800 units of Bahia sod, $224 for a pallet deposit, and $72 for sales tax. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 12,800 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($256). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $19.20 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($256 x 7.50 percent). On or about December 13, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 48166, which showed a balance due of $343 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 163,200 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($3,264). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $244.80 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($3,264 x 7.50 percent). On or about January 29, 2017, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 48285, which showed a balance due of $3,000 for 40,000 units of Bahia sod, $308 for a pallet deposit, and $225 for sales tax (total = $3,533). On February 3, 2017, Respondent submitted to Petitioner partial payment in the amount of $3,210.50, which left an unpaid balance of $322.50. The balance remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 40,000 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($800). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $60 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($800 x 7.50 percent). On or about January 31, 2017, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 48301, which showed a balance due of $390 for 5,200 units of Bahia sod, $91 for a pallet deposit, and $29.25 for sales tax (total = $510.25). On February 15, 2017, Respondent submitted to Petitioner partial payment in the amount of $468.33, which left an unpaid balance of $41.92.1/ The balance remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 5,200 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($104). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $7.80 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($104 x 7.50 percent). On or about February 10, 2017, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 48409, which showed a balance due of $390 for 5,200 units of Bahia sod, $21 for a pallet deposit, and $29.25 for sales tax (total = $440.25). On February 15, 2017, Respondent submitted to Petitioner partial payment in the amount of $398.33, which left an unpaid balance of $41.92. The balance remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 5,200 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($104). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $7.80 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($104 x 7.50 percent).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order approving the claim of Other Side Sod, LLC, against C. Fullerton and Landscaping Co., Inc., in the amount of $4,981.34. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of November, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of November, 2017.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569210.50604.15604.21604.347.50
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