The Issue The issue in the case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaints filed by the Petitioner against the Respondents are correct and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency responsible for licensure and regulation of limited surety agents (bail bondsmen) operating in the State of Florida. The Respondents are individually licensed as limited surety agents in Florida and are officers and directors of "Big John Bail Bonds, Inc.," a bail bond agency. In November of 1999, Gustavo Porro contacted the Respondents regarding bail for Jessie James Bray, a friend of Mr. Porro's son. Mr. Porro did not know Mr. Bray. Based on the charges against Mr. Bray, four bonds were issued, two for $1,000 each and two for $250 each, for a total bond amount of $2,500. The $1,000 bonds were related to pending felony charges and the small bonds were related to pending misdemeanor charges. Mr. Porro signed a contingent promissory note indemnifying American Bankers Insurance Company for an amount up to $2,500 in the event of bond forfeiture. Bray did not appear in court on the scheduled date and the two $1,000 bonds were forfeited. For reasons unclear, the two $250 bonds were not forfeited. The contingent promissory note signed by Mr. Porro provided that no funds were due to be paid until the stated contingency occurred, stated as "upon forfeiture, estreature or breach of the surety bond." After Bray did not appear for court, the Respondents contacted Mr. Porro and told him that the bonds were forfeited and he was required to pay according to the promissory note. On April 15, 2000, Mr. Porro went to the office of Big John Bail Bonds and was told that he owed a total of $2,804, which he immediately paid. Mr. Porro was not offered and did not request an explanation as to how the total amount due was calculated. He received a receipt that appears to have been signed by Ms. Vath. After Mr. Porro paid the money, Ms. Vath remitted $2,000 to the court clerk for the two forfeited bonds. The Respondents retained the remaining $804. Bray was eventually apprehended and returned to custody. The Respondents were not involved in the apprehension. On July 11, 2000, the court refunded $1,994 to the Respondents. The refund included the $2,000 bond forfeitures minus a statutory processing fee of $3 for each of the two forfeited bonds. On August 9, 2000, 29 days after the court refunded the money to the Respondents, Mr. Porro received a check for $1,994 from the Respondents. Mr. Porro, apparently happy to get any of his money back, did not ask about the remaining funds and no explanation was offered. In November of 2000, Ms. Vath contacted Mr. Porro and informed him that a clerical error had occurred and that he was due to receive additional funds. On November 6, 2000, Mr. Porro met with Ms. Vath and received a check for $492. At the time, that Ms. Vath gave Mr. Porro the $492 check she explained that he had been overcharged through a clerical error, and that the additional amount being refunded was the overpayment minus expenses. She explained that the expenses included clerical and "investigation" expenses and the cost of publishing a notice in a newspaper. There was no documentation provided of the expenses charged to Mr. Porro. At the time the additional refund was made, there was no disclosure that the two $250 bonds were never forfeited. At the hearing, the Respondents offered testimony asserting that the charges were miscalculated due to "clerical" error and attempting to account for expenses charged to Mr. Porro. There was no reliable documentation supporting the testimony, which was contradictory and lacked credibility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order requiring that the Respondents be required to refund $318 to Mr. Porro, which, combined with the previous payments of $1,994 and $492, will constitute refund of the total $2,804 paid by Mr. Porro to the Respondents. It is further recommended that the limited surety licenses of Matilda M. Vath and John L. Vath be suspended for a period of not less than three months or until Mr. Porro receives the remaining $318, whichever is later. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street, Room 612 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Joseph R. Fritz, Esquire 4204 North Nebraska Avenue Tampa, Florida 33603 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the allegations of the Amended Administrative Complaint are correct and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Charles Bernard Smith (Respondent) was licensed as a limited surety agent (bail bond agent) by the Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department) at all times material to this matter. On or about June 3, 1997, the Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of larceny by embezzlement, a felony in violation of Section 648.295, Florida Statutes, in Case No. 96-1922F in the Twelfth Circuit Court, Manatee County, Florida. On or about June 3, 1997, the Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of giving a worthless check, a felony in violation of Section 832.05(2)(a), Florida Statutes, and to one count of unlawful deposit of an item, a felony in violation of Section 832.05(3)(a), Florida Statutes, in Case No. 96-1982F in the Twelfth Circuit Court, Manatee County, Florida. Based upon the two nolo contendere pleas, the Court withheld adjudication, placed the Respondent on two years probation, ordered restitution and payment of court costs, and imposed a public service requirement of 100 hours. At the formal administrative hearing, the Respondent acknowledged the resolution of the criminal charges as set forth herein. There is no evidence that the Respondent has previously been subjected to disciplinary action by the Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a Final Order revoking the licensure of Charles Bernard Smith as a limited surety agent. DONE AND ORDERED this 29th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Division of Legal Services 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite N-321 Miami, Florida 33128 Charles Bernard Smith 1701 4th Avenue West Palmetto, Florida 34221 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against him in the instant case and, if so, what disciplinary action should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent Respondent is now, and has been for the past seven years, a Florida-licensed bail bond agent (license number A134458). He is the owner of Big Larry's Bail Bonds (Agency), a bail bond agency located in Broward County, Florida, with which two other Florida-licensed bail bond agents, James Jones (who is Respondent's brother) and Ron Striggles, are affiliated. Count I On April 23, 2002, Hugh Clarke went to the Agency, where he obtained from Respondent a $4,500.00 bail bond for a friend, Richard Dyke, who had been arrested in Palm Beach County, Florida, on a theft charge. To obtain the bail bond, Mr. Clarke had to pay a bail bond premium fee of $450.00 and provide collateral in the amount of $1,050.00. Payment was made by a single check (check number 611) for $1,500.00 made out to the Agency. Mr. Clarke also signed a promissory note, which read as follows: On Demand Hugh McGrath Clarke after date, for value received, I Promise to pay to the order of CONTINENTAL HERITAGE INSURANCE COMPANY Four Thousand Five Hundred DOLLARS, at Big Larry's Bail Bonds, 1310 Sistrunk Blvd., Ft. Laud., Florida[,] [w]ith interest thereon at the rate of 20 percent, per annum[,] from Call Date until fully paid. Interest payable semi-annually. The maker and endorser of this note agrees to waive demand, notice of non payment and protest; and in case suit shall be brought for the collection hereof, or the same has to be collected upon demand of an attorney, to pay reasonable attorney's fees and assessable cost, for making such collection. Deferred interest payment to bear interest from maturity at 20 percent, per annum, payable semi-annually. It is further agreed and specifically understood that this note shall become null and void in the event the said defendant Richard Dyke shall appear in the proper court at the time or times so directed by the Judge or Judges of competent jurisdiction until the obligations under the appearance bond or bonds posted on behalf of the defendant have been fulfilled and the surety discharged of all liability thereunder, otherwise to remain in full force and effect. Respondent provided Mr. Clarke a signed Receipt and Statement of Charges, acknowledging that he had received from Mr. Clarke payment in full for the $450.00 bail bond premium fee. Respondent also presented Mr. Clarke with a pre-printed form entitled "Collateral Receipt and Informational Notice" (Collateral Receipt) that Respondent had filled out and signed (on the appropriate signature line), acknowledging that, on behalf of the surety, Continental Heritage Insurance Company, he had received from Mr. Clarke $1,050.00 as collateral to secure the bail bond that Mr. Clarke had obtained for Mr. Dyke. The Collateral Receipt contained the following "note," "informational notice," and "indemnitor information": NOTE: Unless a properly drawn, executed, and notarized legal assignment is accepted and acknowledged by the surety agent and the surety company named above, the collateral listed above will be returned only to the person(s) named on line (1) above [Mr. Clarke]. Collateral, except for those documents the surety must retain as directed by the law, will be returned within 21 days after the bail bond(s) has been discharged in writing by the court. The undersigned hereby acknowledges receipt of a copy of all collateral documents indicated above, and the Informational Notice printed below. * * * INFORMATIONAL NOTICE CONDITIONS OF BOND: The SURETY, as bail, shall have control and jurisdiction over the principal during the term for which the bond is executed and shall have the right to apprehend, arrest, and surrender the principal to the proper officials at any time as provided by law. In the event surrender of principal is made prior to the time set for principal's appearance, and for reason other than as enumerated below in paragraph 3, then principal shall be entitled to a refund of the bond premium. It is understood and agreed that the happening of any one of the following events shall constitute a breach of principal's obligations to the SURETY hereunder, and the SURETY shall have the right to forthwith apprehend, arrest and surrender principal and principal shall have no right of any refund whatsoever. Said events which shall constitute a breach of principal's obligations hereunder are: If principal shall depart the jurisdiction of the court without the written consent of the court and the SURETY or its Agent. If principal shall move from one address to another without notifying SURETY or his agent in writing prior to said move. If principal shall commit any act which shall constitute reasonable evidence of principal's intention to cause a forfeiture of said bond. If principal is arrested and incarcerated for any other offense other than a minor traffic violation. If principal shall make any material false statement in the application. * * * INDEMNITOR INFORMATION In addition to the terms and conditions of any Indemnity Agreement or other collateral documents which you have executed, this is to notify you that: The Indemnitor(s) will have the defendant(s) forthcoming before the court named in the bond, at the time therein fixed, and as may be further ordered by the court. The Indemnitor(s) is responsible [for] any and all losses or costs of any kind whatsoever which the surety may incur as a result of this undertaking. There should not be any costs or losses provided the defendant(s) does not violate the conditions of the bond and appears at all required court hearings. Collateral will be returned to the person(s) named in the collateral receipt, or their legal assigns, within 21 days after the surety has received written notice of discharge of the bond(s) from the court. It may take several weeks after the case(s) is disposed of before the court discharges the surety bonds. Respondent read to Mr. Clarke that portion of the Collateral Receipt that explained that the collateral would be returned "within 21 days after the surety ha[d] received written notice of discharge of the bond(s) from the court." Nonetheless, for some reason, Mr. Clarke was under the impression that he would be receiving his collateral back within 30 days of April 23, 2002, the date of the transaction, even in the absence of a discharge. In late May 2002, sometime after the 23rd of the month, Mr. Clarke began telephoning the Agency to inquire about the return of his collateral. On each occasion he called, he asked to speak with Respondent, but was told by the person who answered the phone that Respondent was not available. He left messages, but Respondent never returned his calls.2 Mr. Clarke telephoned the Agency approximately twice a month until November 2002, when, frustrated by his inability to reach Respondent by telephone,3 he sent, by facsimile transmission, a letter to the Department of Insurance requesting that it help him in his efforts to gain the return of his collateral. Although Mr. Clarke had been advised in September 2002 by Mr. Dyke that Mr. Dyke's criminal case "was over," Mr. Clarke never got to directly communicate this information to Respondent and to personally ask Respondent to give him back his collateral. Any information Mr. Clarke may have provided about the status of Mr. Dyke's criminal case and any demands Mr. Clarke may have made for the return of his collateral were provided and made to a person or persons at the Agency other than Respondent, who did not communicate them to Respondent. Pat Anthony, a Special Investigator with the Department of Insurance,4 was assigned the task of looking into the allegations Mr. Clarke had made in his letter. Ms. Anthony met with Mr. Clarke on December 6, 2002, and took his statement. The statement was reduced to writing (by Ms. Anthony, who wrote down what she understood Mr. Clarke to have said), and it then was "subscribed and sworn to" by Mr. Clarke. Mr. Clarke's statement read as follows: On 4/23/02, I went to Larry Jones' office to put up bail for Richard Dyke. I gave him a $450 check and a $1,050 check.[5] Richard told me the case was over with in 9/02.[6] I started calling Larry about a week later.[7] He had told me the $450 was his premium and I would get the $1,050 when the case was completed.[8] I have called several times. The man who answered the phone tells me Larry is not there. In January 2003, Ms. Anthony telephoned the Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County (Clerk's Office) to inquire about the status of Mr. Dyke's criminal case. She was told by the person who answered the telephone that the case had concluded and that Mr. Dyke's bond had been discharged, but that there was "no way to know" whether Respondent had been notified of this information inasmuch as the Clerk's Office did not "always notify the out of town bondsman." Ms. Anthony subsequently advised Respondent as to what she had been told and suggested that he go to the Palm Beach County Courthouse to confirm the information she had been provided. Respondent followed Ms. Anthony's suggestion and went to the Palm Beach County Courthouse on January 21, 2003 (which was "within a week" of his conversation with Ms. Anthony). There, he obtained a certified copy (under seal of the Clerk's Office) of a summary or disposition sheet reflecting that Mr. Dyke's bond had been discharged. That same day, when Respondent returned to the Agency, he telephoned Mr. Clarke and made arrangements to have Mr. Clarke come by the Agency on January 27, 2003, to sign paperwork and pick up a check from Respondent for $1,050.00 (the amount of the collateral Mr. Clarke had given Respondent). Mr. Clarke picked up the check on January 27, 2003, as scheduled. It was not until March 2004 that Respondent received from the Clerk's Office a copy of the actual court order discharging Mr. Dyke's bond. Count II On or about September 1, 2002, the Department of Insurance filed a one-count Administrative Complaint (in Department of Insurance Case No. 43742-02-AG) against Respondent, alleging that "he [had] failed to return collateral and charged an amount in excess of the bond premium." On November 13, 2002, the Department of Insurance issued a Consent Order in Case No. 43742-02-AG, which provided as follows: THIS CAUSE came on for consideration and final agency action. Upon consideration of the record including the Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order dated October 25, 2002, and being otherwise advised in the premises, the Insurance Commissioner hereby finds: The Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner, as head of the Department of Insurance, has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case and parties hereto. The entry of this Consent Order and compliance herewith by the Licensee, LARRY LORENZO JONES, shall conclude the administrative proceeding of Case No. 43742- 02-AG before the Department of Insurance of the State of Florida. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: The Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order dated October 25, 2002, is hereby approved and fully incorporated herein by reference; Within thirty (30) days of the date of issue of the Consent Order, pursuant to Section 648.387, Florida Statutes, Licensee shall file[9] notice with the Department of the designated primary agent for each location of all bail bond agencies owned by the Licensee. Failure to file said notice will result in immediate suspension of Licensee's license and eligibility for licensure. Licensee shall be placed on probation for a period of twelve (12) months. As a condition of probation, Licensee shall strictly adhere to the Florida Insurance Code, Rules of the Department and the terms of this agreement. If during the period of probation period [sic] the Department has good cause to believe that Licensee has violated a term or condition of probation, it shall suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue, renew or continue the license of appointment of Licensee. Licensee shall pay a fine of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2500.00) within thirty (30) days of the date of issue of the Consent Order, pursuant to Section 648.52, Florida Statutes. Failure of Licensee to pay the fine within the specified time limit shall result in the immediate suspension of Licensee's license and eligibility for licensure in this state without further proceeding for a period of sixty (60) days. Reinstatement shall be conditioned upon Licensee's compliance with all terms of the Consent Order, including payment of the administrative fine.[10] Sometime in December 2002, Sally Burke, who was then a Bail Bond Coordinator with the Department of Insurance, visited the Agency for purposes of conducting an audit of the Agency's records. Ms. Anthony accompanied her on the visit. During the audit, Ms. Burke asked Respondent if he had completed and "turned in [the] designation form" required by Section 648.387, Florida Statutes. Respondent replied that he had "never received" a blank form to fill out. At Ms. Burke's request, Ms. Anthony handed Respondent a blank designation form. Respondent proceeded to complete it in Ms. Burke's and Ms. Anthony's presence. When he was finished, he attempted to give the completed form to Ms. Burke, but she told him, "Larry, you have to mail it in yourself, but make me a copy for my file." As requested, Respondent made a copy and gave it to Ms. Burke, who, in turn, handed it to Ms. Anthony. He then left the Agency and mailed the original to the Department of Insurance. When he returned to the Agency, Ms. Burke and Ms. Anthony were still there. Months later, in September 2003 at around the time of the issuance of the instant Administrative Complaint, Respondent received a telephone call from Greg Marr, an attorney with Petitioner, who told Respondent that Petitioner had never received his completed designation form.11 Respondent informed Mr. Marr that the completed form had been mailed in December 2002. Mr. Marr responded, "[O]ur records show that it's not in,"12 and asked Respondent to "send in another one," which Respondent did (on or around September 19, 2003). Petitioner received this completed designation form on September 26, 2003.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a final order dismissing, in its entirety, the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent in the instant case. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 2004.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was first licensed as a ball bondsman in 1961 or 1962. In 1969 (Exhibit 2), Petitioner was charged with being incompetent and untrustworthy as a bail bondsman, found guilty and placed on one year's probation which was successfully completed. In 1973, Petitioner was again charged with conducting himself in a manner unbecoming a bail bondsman (Exhibit 3). These charges alleged failure to return the premium paid on a supersedes bond when the prisoner was not released from jail on the bond and failure to maintain his office open to the general public as required. In the Final Order issued in this case, Petitioner was fined $850 and placed on probation for two years. Upon failure of Petitioner to comply with the terms of the Final Order, his license was revoked for a period of ten months after which the revocation was set aside and his license restored. In 1979, a hearing was conducted by the undersigned Hearing Officer on charges alleging that Petitioner had failed to maintain the minimum requirement for permanent office records and failed to maintain a place of business accessible to the public and be actively engaged in the bail bond business in violation of Chapter 64B, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was found guilty as charged, and the recommendation that his license be revoked was adopted by the Commissioner of Insurance in the Final order. In 1986, Petitioner was arrested for operating a donut shop in Tampa utilizing topless waitresses in violation of Tampa Ordinance 24-11. These charges were dismissed on appeal to the circuit court (Exhibit 5). Witnesses called by Petitioner included the attorney who prosecuted the 1979 case (Exhibit 4) against Respondent; the investigator who investigated the 1979 charges for the Department, and a sitting circuit court judge who filed an appeal of the 1979 revocation order on behalf of the Petitioner At the time the charges which led to the revocation were preferred, Respondent was without power to write bonds, but still had an obligation to service bonds still outstanding. The two witnesses who testified in these proceedings on the status of a licensed bail bondsman without power to write new bonds both concurred that this places a bail bondsman in the anomalous position of one who has no need for an office to provide bail bonds for the public but who still needs to be accessible to those clients for whom he has outstanding bonds. This distinction was not clarified at the 1979 hearing. All three witnesses who testified on behalf of Petitioner were aware of nothing that would disqualify Petitioner as a bail bondsman at this time. No evidence was submitted that Petitioner was convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, except for the admission by Petitioner that on or about August 11, 1966, he pleaded guilty to uttering a check without sufficient funds on deposit with which the check could be honored. This offense occurred more than 20 years ago and prior to Petitioner twice being found qualified for licensure by Respondent as a bail bondsman.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether petitioner's application for licensure by examination as a professional bail bondsman should be approved.
Findings Of Fact By application dated April 20, 1991, and filed with respondent, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department), on April 26, 1991, petitioner, Fatmir Frank Haxho, requested that he be licensed by examination as a professional bail bondsman. Such application was executed by petitioner, under oath, before a Notary Public of the State of Florida, and he did solemnly swear that all answers to the questions contained in the application were true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. Among the questions contained in the application was one designed to secure information concerning petitioner's criminal history, if any. That question, as well as petitioner's response, read as follows: Q: Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or pleaded guilty or no contest to a crime involving moral turpitude NO, or a felony NO, or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more under the law of any state, territory or county, whether or not a judgment or conviction has been entered? No If yes, give date(s): What was the crime:? Where and when were you charged? Did you plead guilty or nolo contendere? Were you convicted? Was adjudication withheld? Please provide a brief description of the nature of the offense charged: If there has been more than one such felony charge, provide an explanation as to each charge on an attachment. Certified copies of the information or indictment and Final Adjudication for each charge is required. Petitioner's response to such question was false. On January 29, 1987, a True Bill was filed in the Superior Court of Clayton County, Georgia, Case No. 87-CR-26344-4, which charged petitioner with the offense of trafficking in cocaine, a felony. Thereafter, on April 7, 1987, petitioner was convicted of such charge, and sentenced to a term of thirteen years and fined $100,000.00. Such conviction was, however, reversed on March 16, 1988, by the Georgia Court of Appeals, and petitioner, who had been incarcerated in the Georgia Penitentiary in the interim, was released from confinement. On April 21, 1987, while petitioner was incarcerated in Georgia, an information was filed in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, Case No. 87- 9159, which charged him with having failed to redeliver a hired motor vehicle, a felony. Section 817.52(3), Florida Statutes. Upon petitioner's release from confinement and return to Miami, Florida, he was arrested on such outstanding charge. Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge, and on April 13, 1989, the court entered an order which withheld adjudication of guilt, sentenced petitioner to credit for time served (2 days), directed that petitioner make restitution in the amount of $1,276.00 to Hertz, and imposed costs in the sum of $225.00. 2/ At hearing, petitioner averred that he did not intend to mislead the Department by his response to the foregoing question, and sought to ascribe any fault in his response to his difficulty with written English. Notably, however, the application also required petitioner to list his residence address and record of employment for the past five years, and with respect to the period in which he was incarcerated in the Georgia Penitentiary he answered "out of country." Overall, petitioner's explanation, as well as the proof offered to support it, are not compelling. Rather the proof supports the conclusion that petitioner's failure to disclose such criminal history was not occasioned by any difficulty he may have had with written English, but by his desire to conceal such information from the Department. 3/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a final order be rendered denying petitioner's application for licensure as a professional bail bondsman. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 21st day of May 1992. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May 1992.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated sections 648.442(1), 648.442(2), 648.442(4), 648.571(1), 648.45(2)(e), 648.45(2)(h), 648.45(2)(j), 648.571(3)(b)1., and 648.571(3)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2007),1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rules 69B-221.145(4)(a) and 69B- 221.145(4)(b), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for regulating insurance and insurance-related activities, including limited surety (bail bond) licensees in Florida. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Mr. Wilson has been licensed in this state as a limited surety (bail bond) (2-34) agent, license number D012026. Mr. Wilson is the owner of Against All Odds Bail Bonds (Against All Odds), which is located in Tampa, Florida. As a bail bond agent, Mr. Wilson's duties include writing bail bonds for defendants who are incarcerated; ensuring the defendants appear for court dates; arresting defendants who fail to appear in court and returning them to jail; and returning collateral to defendants when requested. In 2007, Mr. Wilson was the only limited surety agent working at Against All Odds. In May 2007, Michael Wisher (Mr. Wisher) was arrested for driving under the influence, and his bond was set at $2,000. Mr. Wilson was contacted to post a surety bond on Mr. Wisher's behalf. On May 12 or 13, 2007, Mr. Wilson met Mr. Wisher at the Hillsborough County Jail, where Mr. Wisher was being held. Mr. Wilson advised Mr. Wisher that the premium for the bail bond was $200 and that an additional $1,800 for collateral was required. Mr. Wisher agreed to the arrangement and gave Mr. Wilson permission to use his credit card for the payment. Mr. Wilson used Mr. Wisher's credit card at the jail to pay for the premium and collateral for a total of $2,000. Mr. Wilson secured an appearance bond with United States Fire Insurance Company on May 13, 2007. Mr. Wilson was released and accompanied Mr. Wilson to the office of Against All Odds, where he executed an Indemnitor/Guarantor Check List dated May 12, 2007. Two of the provisions of the checklist provide: I understand that my collateral cannot be released until all bonds posted on my behalf for defendant have been exonerated and written notice form the court received by the bail agency. I understand that it is my [Mr. Wisher's] responsibility to request return of any collateral provided. There may be a delay of return of collateral until the bail agency has researched the exoneration date and verified the bail bond status with the appropriate courts. The process may be done faster if I obtain written verification of the bond exoneration from the court and provide it to the bail agency. Mr. Wilson did not issue a receipt to Mr. Wisher, showing that Mr. Wisher had paid $2,000. Based on Mr. Wilson's testimony, the Indemnitor/Guarantor Check List is not the receipt. Mr. Wilson claims that he did issue a collateral receipt, but that receipt did not show the credit card fee that was being imposed. According to Mr. Wilson, the copy of the receipt was destroyed in a fire. Mr. Wisher's testimony is credited that he did not receive a receipt. Computer records of the Clerk of Hillsborough Circuit Court show that on September 18, 2007, the bond was deactivated and a certificate of discharge of bond was issued in Mr. Wisher's case. Mr. Wilson claims not to have received the certificate of discharge, and no certificate of discharge was entered in evidence. Mr. Wisher contacted Mr. Wilson on December 17, 2007, requesting that his collateral be returned. Mr. Wisher advised Mr. Wilson that the bond had been discharged. Mr. Wilson was aware that the bond had been discharged because he had checked the computer records of the Clerk of the Hillsborough Circuit Court and saw the record showing the discharge of the bond. Mr. Wilson sent Mr. Wisher a money order for $500 on January 3, 2008. He sent Mr. Wisher another money order dated January 31, 2008, for another $500. Mr. Wisher did not agree to have his collateral returned in installments. By the end of January 2008, Mr. Wilson still owed Mr. Wisher $800. Mr. Wisher made numerous telephone calls to Mr. Wilson in an attempt to get the remaining amount of his collateral. In June 2008, Mr. Wisher wrote Mr. Wilson two times in an attempt to get his collateral returned. Both letters were returned by the United States Postal Service as unclaimed. Mr. Wisher did not receive any additional money from Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson claims that he mailed Mr. Wisher an additional $400, but the evidence does not support his claim. He submitted a copy of an envelope addressed to Mr. Wisher with a first class stamp on it. The envelope did not bear a post mark. The exhibit also had a portion of a customer receipt from the United States Postal Service, which states return of collateral in the section entitled "Pay To" and Michael Wisher in the section labeled "C.O.D. or Used For." The receipt contains no date and does not specify what service or goods for which the receipt was issued. Additionally, it appears that the receipt is not complete based on the wording at the bottom which states serial number; year, month, day; post office; and amount. Such wording would suggest that additional information would be part of the receipt, but the receipt provided by Mr. Wilson did not contain the additional information. In addition to the premium of $200, Mr. Wilson charged Mr. Wisher $400 for a credit card fee. This amount represented percent of the total bond amount, not just the collateral amount. The credit card fee which Mr. Wilson charged was more than the fee which the credit card company charged him for use of the credit card. Mr. Wilson claims that he was taught at the bail bond school held in Fort Lauderdale that up to 20 percent of the total bond amount could be charged to the client for the use of a credit card. The Department did not establish that Mr. Wilson failed to have a sign in his office posting the credit card fee schedule when Mr. Wisher visited his office. However, Mr. Wisher was not provided a copy of the credit card fee schedule.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Mr. Wilson did not violate sections 648.442(1), 648.442(4), and 648.571(3)(b)2.; finding that Mr. Wilson violated sections 648.442(2), 648.571(1), 648.571(3)(b)1., 648.45(2)(e), 648.45(2)(h), and 648.45(2)(j) and rules 69B-221.145(4)(a) and 69B-221.145(4)(b); suspending Mr. Wilson's license for six months; imposing an administrative fine of $5,000; and requiring Mr. Wilson to return the remainder of Mr. Wisher's collateral to him. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of November, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN BELYEU KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 2011.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to licensure as a Temporary Limited Surety/Bail Bond Agent.
Findings Of Fact On February 7, 2002, Petitioner applied to Respondent for licensure as a Temporary Limited Surety/Bail Bond Agent. Respondent is the agency of the State of Florida responsible for licensure of Temporary Limited Surety/Bail Bond Agents. In processing Petitioner’s application, Respondent conducted a routine investigation of his criminal history which revealed the facts set forth in paragraphs four and five of this Recommended Order. On July 15, 1996, Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendre to two third degree felony offenses (both felonies were Resisting an Officer with Violence) and one first degree misdemeanor offense (Battery). Adjudication of guilt was withheld on all counts and Petitioner was placed on probation, which he successfully completed. On July 20, 1999, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to a third degree felony offense (Possession of Cocaine). Adjudication of guilt was withheld and Petitioner was placed on probation, which was subsequently extended. Petitioner successfully completed the extended term of probation. Respondent denied Petitioner’s application based on his criminal history.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner’s application for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of May 2004.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated provision of the Florida Insurance Code by employing a convicted felon in the bail bond business. Whether Respondent violated the provisions of the Florida Insurance Code by failing to report a change of address to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referred to in this matter, Respondent Clarence Luther Cephas, Sr., was licensed in the State of Florida as a bail bond agent. Pursuant to Florida law, Petitioner has jurisdiction over the bail bond licensure and appointments of Respondent. Records of the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (Criminal Division), show that Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, pleaded guilty and was adjudicated guilty on March 28, 1975, in case number 75-239 CF, of buying or receiving or aiding in concealment of stolen property, a felony. Records of the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (Criminal Division), show that Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, pleaded guilty and was adjudicated guilty on October 22, 1975, in case number 75-2390 CF, of violation of drug abuse law, a felony. Records of the State of Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) show that the conviction set forth in paragraph 4 above included convictions on March 28, 1975, and July 17, 1975, for parole violations. On or about March 7, 1980, the State of Florida Office of Executive Clemency restored the civil rights of Pamela Jean Coleman, relative to Coleman's criminal convictions in Palm Beach County, Florida, in 1975. Records of the FDLE show that on or about November 25, 1991, Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, plead nolo contendere, was adjudicated guilty, and convicted of retail theft in Polk County, Florida, a misdemeanor of the first degree, which constituted a crime of moral turpitude. Records of the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Polk County, State of Florida, show that on or about November 25, 1991, Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, in case number CF91-1923, pled nolo contendere, was adjudicated guilty and convicted of petit theft, a misdemeanor of the first degree, which constituted a crime of moral turpitude. Records of the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Polk County, State of Florida, show that on or about December 16, 2002, an Amended Information was filed against Pamela Jean Coleman (a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman) in case number CFO2-00597A-XX, charging that between November 27, 2000, and January 25, 2002, in the County of Polk and State of Florida, having been convicted of or pled guilty or no contest to a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under the law of any state, territory, or county, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld, did participate as a director, officer, manager, or employee of a bail bond agency or office thereof or exercise direct or indirect control in any manner in such agency or office or own shares in a closely held corporation which had an interest in a bail bond business contrary to Section 648.44, Florida Statutes. Further, the records of said court show that on or about January 31, 2002, Pamela Jean Coleman (a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman) in case number CFO2-00597A-XX, was tried, found guilty and adjudicated guilty of a violation of Section 648.44(8), Florida Statutes, acting as a bail bondsman while being a convicted felon, a felony of the third degree, as charged in the aforesaid Amended Information. Said conviction is presently on appeal before the Florida Second District Court of Appeal. Respondent knew or should have known the foregoing information. Documents under Seal from the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, pertaining to Clarence Luther Cephas, Sr., Bailbonds, Ltd., Inc., show that Pamela Jean Coleman filed original documents on behalf of Respondent's corporation and corresponded with the Department of State, Division of Corporations, on behalf of the said corporation. She was listed as both the registered agent of the corporation and also a vice-president and director of the said corporation as set forth on a document filed over the signature of Respondent. Other filed documentation show Pamela Jean Coleman as the president, secretary, and as director of said corporation. These documents are accurate and valid. The original license application form, Florida Insurance Temporary License Application, under Section 11, Screening Question Information, contains the following language: "If you were adjudged guilty or convicted of a felony crime and your civil rights were lost, provide evidence that your civil rights have been restored." There is no evidence in the record that Coleman provided that information to Petitioner at the time the original application was filed or at any time subsequent to that period, and Coleman signed the application. Respondent gave a statement, under oath, before Luis Rivera, Special Investigator for Petitioner's predecessor (Department of Insurance), on November 27, 2000, wherein he stated: I have known Pamela Coleman/Jones for approximately four years and she has been affiliated with me for most of the time that I have been in the bail bond business. I had asked her if she had ever been convicted of a felony and she said that she had been convicted as a teenager. She had a Certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights from the Office of Executive Clemency that is dated March 7, 1980. I was under the impression that if her rights had been restored, that it would not be a problem with her working for me. I named Pamela as an officer in my corporation because I did not have any family that I could list as an officer except for my daughter, who is a deputy sheriff and could not be an office of the corporation. Respondent had a business address-of-record with Petitioner of B & B Bail Bonds, 580 North Broadway Avenue, Bartow, Florida 33830-3918, when in fact his business address was 2095 East Georgia Street, Bartow, Florida 33830-6710. Respondent did not notify Petitioner of a change of address for his corporation as required by law. In November 2000 during an interview, Luis Rivera and another Special Investigator from his office advised Respondent that Petitioner (then the Department of Insurance) considered him to be in violation of Section 648.44(8), Florida Statutes, notwithstanding any restoration of civil rights granted to Pamela Jean Coleman. Luis Rivera visited the home office of Respondent, on March 7 and 21, 2000, at 2095 East Georgia Street, Bartow, Florida 33830-6710, and knew of no other office location for that agent after that date. Constance Castro, a Special Investigator with the Tampa Office, Petitioner (then the Department of Insurance), Bureau of Agent and Agency Investigations, during September 2001, made an undercover visit to the bail bond office of Respondent, and pretended to be in need of a bail bond for a fictitious relative. She dealt directly with Pamela Jean Coleman who proceeded from the home living area of the house where Respondent was also located, to the office area of the home where Coleman conducted bail bond business with Castro. Special Agent Michael Kreis, Drug Enforcement Agency, in early 2001, had business with Cephas Bail Bonds. He went to the office thereof where he observed Pamela Jean Coleman sitting behind the desk. Coleman told him that she had posted bond the night before for the people he was asking about, and was very familiar with the street names of the people that were being sought. Coleman helped to arrange what was supposed to be a meeting between her and one of the suspects using the ruse that she needed the suspect to sign some bail bond paperwork. Kreis observed Respondent in the office but Coleman seemed to be in charge. Kreis observed her on the phone and dealing with people who came into the Cephas' bail bond office, and noted that by her actions and conduct, she was acting as a bail bond agent. On or about June 19, 2001, Noel Elizabeth "Nikki" Collier was working as a paralegal in her husband's law office when Pamela Jean Coleman visited their office with paperwork for one of their mutual clients to fill out. Coleman left her business card which read "Pamela J. Coleman, President, Clarence L. Cephas, Sr. Bail Bonds." Coleman was dressed in a black outfit with a badge attached to her belt. Coleman told her that if the mutual client did not sign the paperwork then the bail bonds would be revoked. When in the law office, Coleman identified herself as an agent for Clarence Cephas Bail Bonds. Respondent acknowledged that Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 8 was indeed a sworn statement made by him during a visit to Petitioner (then Department of Insurance), Bureau of Agent and Agency Investigations, at its offices in Tampa, Florida, in November 2000, and that he was indeed warned by Petitioner's personnel that he was in violation of Section 648.44(8), Florida Statutes. He was subsequently warned by the filing of an Administrative Complaint in June 2001, an Amended Administrative Complaint in December 2001, and a Second Amended Complaint in March 2003. Respondent acknowledged that Pamela Jean Coleman was indeed listed as an officer and as a registered agent as well as the filer of various corporation documents, regarding his corporation and on file with the Department of State, Division of Corporations, and that he did sign the paperwork indicating that she was a corporate officer. Respondent further acknowledged that Coleman did participate in his bail bond business and that he did make payments to her as an employee, which included filing of a W-2 Form indicating said payments. During the pendency of this action, the State of Florida, by and through Jerry Hill, State Attorney for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, prosecuted Respondent for criminal violations of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes (2003), in the case styled State of Florida v Clarence Luther Cephas, Florida Tenth Circuit Court, Case Number CF02-00598A-XX (the "criminal case"). The Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit conducted a jury trial in the criminal case. On December 17, 2003, the jury rendered a verdict of "not guilty," and the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit rendered a judgment of not guilty in the criminal case. The allegations contained in the criminal case were identical to the allegation contained in Count one of Petitioner's Second Amended Administrative Complaint. During the approximate period of time March 1997 to at least December 2001, Respondent did employ and/or did otherwise allow Pamela Jean Coleman to participate in the bail bond business. Respondent did fail to notify the Department of Financial Services of a change of address as required by law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order as follows: Finding Respondent guilty of employing a convicted felon in the bail bond business, in violation of Sections 648.30, 348.44(8)(b), 648.45(2)(e) and (j), and 648.45(3)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes; Finding Respondent guilty of failing to report a change of address; and Revoking the bail bond agent license and eligibility for licensure of Respondent pursuant to Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Franklin, Esquire The Franklin & Carmichael Law Firm, P.A. 301 East Main Street Post Office Box 50 Bartow, Florida 33806 Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Financial Services 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite N-321 Miami, Florida 33128 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
