The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner in connection with Petitioner’s employment by Respondent on the basis of his national origin.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Leneve Plaisime (“Plaisime”), whose country of origin is Haiti, was employed as a busboy and room service attendant at the Marriott Key Largo Bay Resort (“Marriott”)1 from 1995 to 1997. On September 13, 1997, upon returning to work after a vacation of several weeks, Plaisime was fired by a manager named Eric Sykas who said to him: “There is no job for you because the owner says he’s not interested in Haitians.”2 This statement was overheard by a co-worker of Plaisime’s named Fito Jean, who testified at the final hearing, corroborating Plaisime’s account.3 In around the middle of October 1997 (approximately one month after his discharge), Plaisime found a new job at Tak Security Corporation (“Tak”). Evidence introduced by Plaisime shows that he earned $7,862.52 at Marriott in 1997, which reflects an average monthly wage of about $925. Had he worked the entire year at Marriott, Plaisime would have earned a total of approximately $11,100. In contrast, working for Tak in 1998 Plaisime earned $11,396 (or approximately $950 per month)——a 2.7% increase in his annual income. There is no evidence showing what Plaisime’s likely income would have been in 1998 had he remained in the employ of Marriott. Ultimate Factual Determinations Marriott discharged Plaisime because of his national origin. Thus, Marriott committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The actual economic loss that Plaisime suffered as a result of Marriott’s unlawful discrimination against him was one month’s pay, or $925.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order declaring that Marriott discharged Plaisime on the basis of his national origin, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes; prohibiting Marriott from committing further such violations; and awarding Plaisime $925 to relieve the effects of the unlawful discrimination that Marriott perpetrated against him. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2003.
The Issue Whether Respondent is liable to Petitioner for public accommodation discrimination based on Petitioner’s handicap, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Eric Wendell Holloman, is a 60-year-old man who resides in Jacksonville, Florida, and has been diagnosed with arthritis, diabetes, and high blood pressure. Respondent, Lee Wesley Restaurants, LLC, is the owner and operator of the Burger King restaurant located at 210 East State Street in Jacksonville, Florida. The corporate headquarters are located at 6817 Southpoint Parkway, Suite 2101, Jacksonville, Florida 32216. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent employed more than 15 employees. Petitioner has a driver’s license, but he asserted that he does not know how to drive a car. Petitioner’s primary method of transportation is his bicycle. Petitioner eats at a number of fast-food restaurants in the area of State Street in Jacksonville. Petitioner testified that he can’t cook because he doesn’t have a wife. Petitioner administers his own insulin to treat his diabetes and takes medication for high blood pressure. Petitioner uses a walking cane which was provided to him by the local Veteran’s Administration where he receives medical care. Petitioner’s cane is metal with four “legs” extending outward from the bottom of the upright metal post. Each leg is capped with a rubber “foot.” The cane will stand up on its own when not in use. Petitioner recounts the following events in support of his claim of public accommodation discrimination: On June 4, 2013, Petitioner entered the Burger King in question, ordered a meal with a drink, and took it to a table in the dining area where he proceeded to eat. At some point while he was dining, Petitioner accidentally knocked over his drink with his cane, which he testified was on the table with his food. Petitioner testified that no employee of the restaurant spoke to Petitioner about the spill, offered to help him clean it up, or otherwise acknowledged that he spilled his drink. Petitioner did not clean up the spill either. Petitioner helped himself to a drink refill and left the restaurant without incident. The following day, June 5, 2013, he entered the same restaurant and attempted to order a meal. According to Petitioner, he was told by an employee that he must leave and he would not be served at that restaurant. Petitioner identified Randall Gibson, the man seated with Respondent’s Qualified Representative at the final hearing, as the employee that asked him to leave the restaurant on June 5, 2013. Petitioner exited the restaurant via the rear door, which he testified was close to the flag pole where he had parked his bicycle. According to Petitioner, two Burger King employees followed him outside and threatened him with “bodily harm” if he returned to the restaurant. Petitioner was clearly upset with Mr. Gibson and other employees of the Burger King. Petitioner explained that on June 4, 2013, when Petitioner ordered his food at the counter, Mr. Gibson and a female employee were engaged in behavior he found offensive. Specifically, Petitioner testified that Mr. Gibson was “up behind” the female employee engaging in hip and pelvic gyrations. Petitioner twice stood up from his chair and demonstrated the hip and pelvic gyrations to the undersigned. Petitioner testified that he has at least 50 cases pending in state and federal courts alleging civil rights violations. The final hearing was one and one-half hours in duration. Only a small portion of the hearing time was devoted to presentation of evidence relevant to Petitioner’s claim of discrimination based on a disability. During his testimony, Petitioner often strayed into lengthy tirades against racial discrimination, quoting from the United States Constitution, as well as the writings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and other leaders of the Civil Rights Movement. The undersigned had to frequently reign in Petitioner’s testimony to relevant events.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Eric Wendell Holloman in FCHR No. 2013-02160. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 2014.
The Issue The issue is whether, pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2015),1/ Petitioner forfeited his Florida Retirement System (“FRS”) Investment Plan account by entering a nolo contendere plea to two counts of violating section 893.13(2)(a)1., Florida Statutes, a second-degree felony.
Findings Of Fact The Events Giving Rise to this Proceeding Mr. Combs began working for DOC on May 25, 2001, as a Correctional Officer Level 1 at the Union Correctional Institution (“Union Correctional”) in Raiford, Florida. Union Correctional is a maximum security facility housing approximately 2,000 inmates, and Mr. Combs assisted with their care and custody. In January of 2006, Mr. Combs earned a promotion to Correctional Officer, Sergeant. While his responsibilities were very similar to those of his previous position, Mr. Combs was now supervising other correctional officers. In October of 2011, Mr. Combs earned a promotion to Correctional Officer, Lieutenant, and was responsible for supervising 50 to 70 correctional officers at Union Correctional. In April of 2013, Mr. Combs earned a promotion to Correctional Officer, Captain, and transferred to Florida State Prison in Starke, Florida. A captain is the highest ranking correctional officer on a given shift, and Mr. Combs supervised approximately 50 correctional officers at a time, including sergeants and lieutenants. Like Union Correctional, Florida State Prison is a maximum security facility housing approximately 2,000 prisoners. A colonel manages Florida State Prison, and it has two separate units. One of those units is a work camp housing lower- custody inmates who may work outside the facility, and the main prison is the other unit. Each of the units is run by its own major. In February of 2015, Mr. Combs was promoted to Major and took charge of the work camp at Florida State Prison. At some point in 2014 and prior to his promotion to Major, Mr. Combs had begun taking Oxycodone recreationally. Mr. Combs typically purchased one Oxycodone pill three to four times a week, and Dylan Hilliard (a Correctional Officer 1 at Florida State Prison) was Mr. Combs’ primary source of Oxycodone. Mr. Hilliard usually worked at the main prison, but he occasionally worked at the work camp. Mr. Combs knew Mr. Hilliard because of their employment with DOC. Mr. Combs purchased Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard at the latter’s home in Lawtey, Florida. However, some transactions occurred in Mr. Combs’ state-issued housing on the grounds of Florida State Prison. Mr. Hilliard charged Mr. Combs $35 for an Oxycodone pill, and that was a discount from the $38 price Mr. Hilliard charged others. Mr. Combs allowed his subordinates (Sergeants Jesse Oleveros and Evan Williams) to leave Florida State Prison during their shifts in order to purchase illegal drugs from Mr. Hilliard. After returning from their transactions with Mr. Hilliard, Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams would give Mr. Combs an Oxycodone pill free of charge. Operation Checkered Flag was a joint task force led by the Bradford County Sheriff’s Office, and its purpose was to arrest individuals involved with the distribution and use of illegal drugs. The authorities arrested Mr. Hilliard after he engaged in an illegal drug transaction with an undercover agent from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. A subsequent search of Mr. Hilliard’s cell phone revealed text messages between Mr. Hilliard and several other DOC employees, including Mr. Combs. Mr. Hilliard referred to Mr. Combs as “Chicken-Hawk” or “Hawk” in those text messages, and the two of them used car part terminology as a code for different milligram sizes of Oxycodone. Operation Checkered Flag ultimately resulted in the arrest of 10 DOC employees. The authorities arrested Mr. Combs on July 1, 2015, based on allegations that he had committed six felonies relating to the alleged unlawful and illegal purchase and distribution of Oxycodone. DOC fired Mr. Combs on approximately July 1, 2015. Mr. Combs initially denied all of the allegations. However, after spending nearly 56 days in jail, Mr. Combs reached an agreement with the State Attorney’s Office in Bradford County that called for his criminal charges to be reduced in exchange for his cooperation with Operation Checkered Flag. During an interview on August 20, 2015, with members of Operation Checkered Flag, Mr. Combs admitted that he had purchased Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. In addition, Mr. Combs admitted that on six or seven occasions he allowed Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams to leave the prison grounds so that they could purchase Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. The State Attorney’s Office in Bradford County chose to dismiss most of the charges against Mr. Combs. The Information ultimately filed against Mr. Combs set forth two counts alleging that he violated section 893.13(2)(a)1., by illegally purchasing Oxycodone on March 23, 2015, and March 31, 2015. Those purchases occurred approximately 10 miles from Florida State Prison at Mr. Hilliard’s residence in Lawtey, Florida. Neither Mr. Combs nor Mr. Hilliard was on duty during those transactions. On August 25, 2015, Mr. Combs pled nolo contendere. The Bradford County Circuit Court entered judgment against Mr. Combs based on the two violations of section 893.13(2)(a)1., but withheld adjudication. All of the conduct underlying Mr. Combs’ nolo contendere plea occurred while he was employed by DOC. The SBA Determines that Mr. Combs Forfeited his FRS Benefits At all times relevant to the instant case, Mr. Combs was a member of the FRS. The FRS is the legislatively-created general retirement system established by chapter 121, Florida Statutes. See § 121.021(3), Fla. Stat. The SBA is the governmental entity that administers the FRS Investment Plan, a defined retirement benefits contribution plan. § 121.4501(1), Fla. Stat. Via a letter dated August 3, 2015, the SBA notified Mr. Combs that a hold had been placed on his FRS account due to the criminal charges. As a result, no distribution of employer contributions from Mr. Combs’ account would be permitted until the SBA had evaluated the final disposition of those criminal charges. Via a letter dated September 3, 2015, the SBA notified Mr. Combs that he had forfeited his FRS benefits as a result of his nolo contendere plea. In support thereof, the SBA cited section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, which provides for the forfeiture of a public employee’s FRS retirement benefits upon the entry of a nolo contendere plea to certain types of offenses. The SBA’s letter closed by notifying Mr. Combs of his right to challenge the SBA’s proposed action through an administrative hearing. Mr. Combs requested a formal administrative hearing and asserted that the crimes for which he was convicted did not fall within the scope of section 112.3173(2)(e). In other words, Mr. Combs argued that his convictions were not associated with his employment at DOC and thus did not amount to a violation of the public trust. Testimony Adduced at the Final Hearing Mr. Combs testified that he was responsible for the work camp and the supervision of the correctional officers assigned there. He also testified that he would occasionally supervise correctional officers who normally worked in the main prison. Mr. Combs testified that Mr. Hilliard was his primary source of Oxycodone and that Mr. Hilliard occasionally worked at the work camp. Mr. Combs was aware that two Florida State Prison employees who worked directly under him (Sergeant Jesse Oleveros and Sergeant Evan Williams) were purchasing Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs testified that he allowed Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams to leave Florida State Prison grounds six or seven times in order to purchase Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs testified that Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams would give him an Oxycodone pill after returning from their transactions with Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs acknowledged during his testimony that DOC policy prohibits correctional officers from leaving prison grounds during their shift. Mr. Combs acknowledged that it was a violation of DOC policy and Florida law to allow a correctional officer to leave prison grounds during a shift for the purpose of purchasing illegal narcotics. Mr. Combs also acknowledged that it was a violation of DOC policy and Florida law to allow a correctional officer to be on prison grounds with illegal narcotics. Finally, Mr. Combs acknowledged that as a sworn officer with the Department of Corrections, he had an obligation to report any criminal activity committed by a correctional officer working at Florida State Prison, regardless of whether that correctional officer reported to him. Findings of Ultimate Fact An examination of the circumstances associated with Mr. Combs’ Oxycodone purchases from Mr. Hilliard demonstrates that there is a nexus between Mr. Combs’ employment as a correctional officer with DOC and his commission of the crimes to which he pled nolo contendere. For instance, Mr. Combs came to know his primary source of Oxycodone (Mr. Hilliard) through their mutual employment with DOC. Indeed, Mr. Combs supervised Mr. Hilliard when the latter was assigned to the work camp at Florida State Prison. Also, Mr. Combs knew that these transactions were illegal. As noted above, he and Mr. Hilliard used a code based on car part references to disguise the actual subject of their communications. Contrary to DOC policy and Florida Law, Mr. Combs allowed two of his subordinates (Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams) to leave Florida State Prison during their duty shifts in order to purchase illegal drugs from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs would then receive a free pill from Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams. Mr. Hilliard sold Oxycodone to Mr. Combs at a reduced price. It is reasonable to infer that Mr. Combs received this discount due to his high-ranking position at Mr. Hilliard’s place of employment and because Mr. Combs facilitated Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams’ purchases of Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs willfully violated DOC policy and Florida law by allowing correctional officers to leave prison grounds during a shift for the purpose of purchasing illegal narcotics. Mr. Combs knowingly violated his obligation as a sworn correctional officer by not reporting the criminal activity committed by Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs defrauded the public from receiving the faithful performance of his duties as a correctional officer. The public had a right to expect that one of its employees would not purchase drugs from someone he supervised. The public also had a right to expect that Mr. Combs would not use his authority at Florida State Prison to facilitate Mr. Hilliard’s illegal drug sales to other DOC employees. In addition, the public had a right to expect that Mr. Combs would not engage in illegal transactions on the grounds of Florida State Prison. Mr. Combs realized a profit, gain, or advantage through the power or duties associated with his position as a Major at DOC. Specifically, Mr. Combs satisfied his Oxycodone habit through purchases made from a DOC employee who he supervised. Also, Mr. Combs used his position to facilitate other sales by Mr. Hilliard, and Mr. Combs’ assistance led to him receiving free Oxycodone and a discounted price on his Oxycodone purchases. The findings set forth above in paragraphs 49 through 57 are the only ones needed to establish a nexus between Mr. Combs’ public employment and the two counts to which he pled nolo contendere. That nexus is evident from Mr. Combs’ testimony, Mr. Combs’ Responses to the SBA’s Requests for Admissions, and the Stipulated Facts. It was not necessary to consider the exhibits to which Mr. Combs raised objections, i.e., the arrest warrant, the warrant affidavit, and the audio recordings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration issue a final order finding that Petitioner was a public employee convicted of specified offenses that were committed prior to retirement, and that pursuant to section 112.3173 he has forfeited all of his rights and benefits in his Florida Retirement System Investment Plan account, except for the return of his accumulated contributions as of the date of his termination. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of May, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 2016.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner's claim is barred by Section 760.11(7), Florida Statutes (1999), because Petitioner filed a request for hearing more than 35 days after the time prescribed in Section 760.11(3) for a determination of reasonable cause by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (the "Commission"). (All statutory references are to Florida Statutes (1999) unless otherwise stated).
Findings Of Fact Respondent employed Petitioner from May 25, 1995, until September 1, 1995. Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Commission on October 3, 1995. The Charge of Discrimination alleges that Petitioner was forced to leave his position of employment because of Petitioner's sex, color, national origin, and age. The Charge of Discrimination contains no more specific factual allegation of an adverse employment action or other act of discrimination. Time Limits The Charge of Discrimination was timely filed pursuant to Section 760.11(1). The filing date of October 3, 1995, fell within 365 days of May 25, 1995, which is the first day on which the alleged discrimination could have occurred. Section 760.11(3) authorizes the Commission to issue a determination of reasonable cause within 180 days of October 3, 1995, the date Petitioner filed the Charge of Discrimination. Counting October 4, 1995, as the first day of the 180-day time limit, Section 760.11(3) authorized the Commission to determine reasonable cause no later than March 31, 1996. The Commission issued a Notice of Determination: No Cause on July 14, 1999. Section 760.11(7) required Petitioner to file a request for hearing within 35 days of March 31, 1996. Counting April 1, 1996, as the first day of the 35-day period, Section 760.11(7) required Petitioner to file a request for hearing no later than May 5, 1996. Petitioner did not timely file a request for hearing. Petitioner first requested a hearing in the Petition for Relief filed on August 13, 1999. Petitioner filed his request for hearing approximately 1,185 days late and 1,220 days after the expiration of the 180-day time limit prescribed in Section 760.11(3). Petitioner delayed the request for hearing because he did not have the form entitled Petition for Relief. Section 760.11(7) statutorily bars Petitioner's claim. Section 760.11(7) expressly provides, in relevant part: If the aggrieved person does not request an administrative hearing within the 35 days, the claim will be barred.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing this proceeding as barred by Section 760.11(7). DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Luis F. Hernandez 1116 Golden Gate Avenue Orlando, Florida 32808 Charles Williams, Jr., Esquire Scott A. Livingston, Esquire Williams and Davis, P.A. Suite 1220, Suntrust Center Post Office Box 1831 200 South Orange Avenue Olando, Florida 32802-1831
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes (Respondent or Division), acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying Christian Welvaert’s (Petitioner or Welvaert) application to be licensed as a yacht and ship salesmen under Chapter 326, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency charged with regulating and licensing of yacht and ship brokers under Section 326.002(2), Florida Statutes. On October 16, 2001, Welvaert submitted to the Division his application for licensure as a yacht and ship salesman. Licensure is a privilege granted to individuals who affirmatively demonstrate good moral character. The Division is authorized to, and does in fact investigate an applicant's criminal background if one exists. This is done so that the state may determine if the individual's criminal history is of a nature which would warrant denial of licensure. To facilitate the state's investigation, applicants are asked to fully disclose any criminal history. It is required that this question, and all the questions on the application, be answered truthfully. Welvaert falsely stated on his application that his only criminal background was "traffic offense." A Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) background check revealed that Welvaert had been arrested on several occasions on charges relating to possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia; domestic battery and resisting an officer without violence; probation violation by possessing drug paraphernalia and cannabis; and driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Welvaert did not offer any evidence to contradict the FDLE's findings in any material way. He asserted that he never violated probation, claiming that he didn’t know when his court date was because he had moved. This experience did not teach Welvaert the importance of attending to his legal affairs. In this case, he blamed his landlady for his failure to respond to the Division's Request for Admissions, which was properly served upon him at the address he had on file in this case. Welvaert stated, "I thought the person, the landlady I was staying with, I thought she was going to call me or tell me if I had something this important in the mail. I guess she didn't." Petitioner testified that he has "changed his life around" and is now rehabilitated. While he did not unequivocally deny the drug charges, he implied that he "just [took] the time" on the advice of the presiding judge. He further stated, "It was at someone's house. I was in a college town at the time." Nothing in Welvaert's testimony constitutes a legally or factually sufficient excuse for his failure to disclose his criminal background.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's application to be licensed as a yacht and ship salesman’s be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. Garwood, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Christian P. Welvaert 7 Kenmore Lane Boynton Beach, Florida 33435 Ross Fleetwood, Division Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioner, Roger Smith, is an inmate in the custody of the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, the Florida Parole Commission, including the Challenged Rule. The Petitioner is serving a "parole eligible sentence." The Petitioner's eligibility for parole has been determined by the Respondent. The Petitioner was convicted of the offense of escape and, therefore, the Respondent applied the Challenged Rule to the Petitioner. The Respondent. Sections 947.07 and 947.13, Florida Statutes, authorize the Respondent to adopt rules governing the parole of inmates in the State of Florida. Among other things, Section 947.13, Florida Statutes, authorizes the Respondent to determine who is placed on parole and to fix the time and conditions of parole. Pursuant to Sections 947.07 and 947.13, Florida Statutes, the Respondent promulgated the Challenged Rules. Rule 23-21.018(1) and (7), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 23-21.018(1) and (7), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: Vacation of presumptive or effective parole release date: The exiting of an inmate from the incarceration portion of his sentence, which shall include but not be limited to bond, escape, parole or MCR release, expiration of sentence, or transfer to a mental health facility, shall vacate any established presumptive parole release date. Any subsequent return to incarcerations will require an initial interview to establish a presumptive parole release date. Provided, however, inmates returning to court for modification of a previously imposed sentence or as witnesses shall not have their presumptive parole release dates vacated. Inmates returning to courts outside of Florida's jurisdiction, i.e, Federal or other state, shall not have their presumptive parole release dates vacated. However, information resulting from disposition of cases in court may be used as new information in accordance with applicable law and these rules. Inmates transferred to a Mentally Disordered Sexual Offender Program shall not have their presumptive parole release dates vacated. . . . . Conviction for crimes committed while incarcerated: Escape or any other crime committed during incarceration with an ensuing conviction and sentence vacates any previously established presumptive parole release date and shall cause the inmate to be considered a new admission. If the inmate is found to be eligible for consideration for parole, the Commission shall aggregate.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his religion and national origin in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact No findings are made concerning the merits of the allegations of discrimination. Petitioner did not appear and did not submit any evidence to support any findings of fact. Petitioner received adequate notice of the formal hearing. The ALJ issued a Notice of Hearing on July 19, 2005, notifying the parties of the time and place of the hearing conducted on August 12, 2005. DOAH mailed the Notice of Hearing, by United States Postal Service (mailed), to Petitioner at the address of record listed in the DOAH file as 10914 Mystic Circle, Apartment 204, Orlando, Florida 32836 (the address of record). The Notice of Hearing was properly addressed, stamped, and mailed. The U.S. Postal Service did not return the Notice of Hearing as undeliverable. On July 5 and 19, 2005, DOAH mailed an Initial Order and Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions (Pre-hearing Order) to Petitioner. The U.S. Postal Service did not return either order as undeliverable. The address of record in the DOAH filed is the same address that Petitioner listed in the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief filed with the Commission. The Commission addressed the "Notice of Determination: No Cause" to the same address as the address of record in the DOAH file. Petitioner was employed by Respondent on the date of the hearing. A representative of the personnel department for Respondent testified at the hearing (the witness). Petitioner had requested and been granted annual leave for the day of the hearing and the day before the hearing. On the date of hearing, Petitioner resided at the address of record. At the request of the ALJ, the witness telephoned Petitioner from the hearing room at the telephone number listed in Respondent's personnel file. The witness is the Director of Personnel for Respondent, knows Petitioner personally, and has a longstanding employment relationship with Petitioner. The witness spoke directly to Petitioner. English is not the native language for Petitioner, but the witness had no difficulty communicating with Petitioner. The witness informed Petitioner that the ALJ would recess the hearing and wait for Petitioner to appear at the hearing. Petitioner refused to avail himself of the opportunity to appear at the hearing. Petitioner claimed he was not prepared for the hearing and had not had adequate time to prepare for the hearing. Petitioner had adequate time to prepare for the hearing. The DOAH file shows the Commission referred this matter to DOAH by cover letter dated June 30, 2005. DOAH received the referral on July 5, 2005, and issued an Initial Order on the same date. On July 19, 2005, DOAH mailed the Pre- hearing Order and Notice of Hearing to Petitioner. When Petitioner received the Initial Order shortly after July 5, 2005, Petitioner knew, or should have known, of the need to begin preparing for the formal hearing. The Initial Order requires the parties, inter alia, to estimate how long the formal hearing will take for both parties to present their evidence. Petitioner knew, or should have known, of his right to discovery and the need to complete discovery no later than five days before the date of the hearing. The Summary of Procedures attached to the Initial Order provides, in relevant part: Discovery may be undertaken in the manner provided in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and should be initiated immediately if desired. Necessary subpoenas and Orders may be obtained through the assigned Judge. Discovery must be completed 5 days before the date of the final hearing unless an extension of time for good cause is granted. Petitioner did not respond to the Initial Order. Respondent filed a unilateral response to the Initial Order with DOAH on July 12, 2005. On the same date, Respondent served Petitioner with a copy of the unilateral response. When Petitioner received the Prehearing Order shortly after July 19, 2005, Petitioner knew, or should have known, of the need to prepare for the formal hearing. The Pre-hearing Order, dated July 19, 2005, provides, in relevant part: No later than 15 days prior to the final hearing Petitioner and Respondent shall provide each other with a list of the names and addresses of those persons which that party intends to call as witnesses during the final hearing in this cause and shall provide to each other copies of the documents which that party intends to offer as exhibits during the final hearing. Failure to do so may result in the exclusion at the final hearing of witnesses or exhibits not previously disclosed. . . . No later than 12 days prior to the final hearing in this cause, the parties shall confer with each other to determine whether this cause can be amicably resolved. Petitioner declined to participate in the discovery described in the Pre-hearing Order. Respondent unilaterally filed its witness list with DOAH on August 1, 2005. On the same date, Respondent served Petitioner with a copy of the witness list. On August 10, 2005, at 2:45 p.m., Petitioner filed with DOAH, by facsimile, a hand-written request for continuance (motion for continuance). The motion for continuance is written in English and signed by Petitioner; as were the Petition for Relief and Charge of Discrimination. The motion requests a continuance, "[S]o I can get a lawyer, witnesses, and prepare myself for hearing." The motion for hearing does not include a certificate of service or other indication that Petitioner served Respondent with a copy of the motion for continuance. On its face, the motion is an ex-parte communication. On August 10, 2005, an administrative secretary of DOAH telephoned counsel for Respondent to determine whether counsel had received a copy of the motion and whether Respondent objected to the motion for continuance. Counsel had not received the motion. Upon hearing the motion read to counsel, counsel objected to the motion. At the instruction of the ALJ, the administrative secretary telephoned Petitioner and spoke to a person who identified himself as the son of Petitioner. The administrative secretary advised him that the ALJ had denied the motion for continuance and that Petitioner should attend the formal hearing on August 12, 2005. On August 10, 2005, the ALJ also issued a written Order Denying Continuance that memorialized the ore tenus denial of the motion. DOAH mailed the written order to Petitioner on the same date to the address of record. The Order was properly addressed, stamped, and mailed. Insufficient time to prepare for the formal hearing arguably is good cause for a continuance. However, Petitioner knew, or should have known, that a motion for continuance for good cause must be filed no later than five days before the formal hearing. The Initial Order received by Petitioner shortly after July 5, 2005, provides, in relevant part: 4. Rule 28-106.210, Florida Administrative Code, provides that requests for continuances must be made at least 5 days prior to the date of the hearing, except in cases of extreme emergency, and will be granted only by Order of the Judge for good cause shown. The applicable rule arguably required Petitioner to file the motion for continuance based on good cause no later than August 8, 2005, because August 7, 2005, was a Sunday.1 However, Petitioner did not file the motion for continuance until August 10, 2005. The applicable rule authorized the ALJ to grant a motion for continuance filed less than five days before the formal hearing, only on grounds that satisfy the test of extreme emergency. Assuming arguendo that Petitioner had insufficient time to prepare for the formal hearing, that ground is not an extreme emergency. Petitioner knew, or should have known, long before August 10, 2005, that he would be unable to prepare for the formal hearing in the 24 days between July 19 and August 12, 2005. Respondent had adequate time to prepare for the formal hearing. Respondent produced seven witnesses at the formal hearing, including four current employees and three former employees. Respondent also arranged for the attendance of a certified interpreter at the hearing. Respondent prepared 24 exhibits for admission into evidence. The Commission arranged for a court reporter to record the hearing. The ALJ traveled from Tallahassee to Orlando after instructing Petitioner, through the ALJ's administrative secretary, to attend the formal hearing. If the ALJ were to have exercised discretion by granting a continuance requested less than five days before the hearing in the absence of an extreme emergency, such an exercise of discretion would have been inconsistent with a valid existing rule. A reviewing court would have been statutorily required to remand the case to DOAH for further proceedings consistent with the rule. § 120.68(7)(e)2., Fla. Stat. (2005).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 2005.
The Issue Whether the registration of the Respondent, Betty Lou Haber, license #0034988 should be revoked or suspended, or whether Respondent should be otherwise disciplined.
Findings Of Fact An administrative complaint was filed by the Petitioner, Florida Real Estate Commission, on September 29, 1978, seeking to revoke or suspend or otherwise discipline Respondent Haber. The administrative complaint charged that the licensee was presently confined in a state prison. Respondent requested an administrative hearing. A stipulation was entered by Barry A. Cohen, Esquire, the attorney for Respondent, confirming that Respondent Haber was and had been continuously confined in the Broward Correctional Institution since August 16, 1977. Said stipulation is attached hereto and made a part hereof. Prior to the hearing a letter was received by the Petitioner, Florida Real Estate Commission, advising the Petitioner that Respondent did not intend to proceed to hearing and requesting Petitioner to close the matter. The Division of Administrative Hearings was not so notified. A copy of said letter is attached hereto and made a part hereof. Petitioner presented the aforesaid stipulation and aforesaid letter and a witness at the hearing. The witness, Martha Iglesias, Inmate Records Supervisor for the Broward Correctional Institution, testified that Respondent Haber was an inmate of said institution, having been found guilty by a jury of First Degree Murder in Case #75-518 in the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County, Florida, and sentenced to be imprisoned in the State Penitentiary for a period of her natural life.
Recommendation Revoke the non-active salesman license held by the Respondent, Betty Lou Haber. DONE and ORDERED this 18TH day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Barry A. Cohen, Esquire 100 Twiggs Street, Suite 4000 Tampa, Florida 33602 DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was employed with the Respondent from August 3, 1985 until May 10, 1986, as a waitress in the dining room of the Kings Inn Restaurant in Pensacola, Florida. In March, 1987, the Petitioner became pregnant. She then informed her employer, Mr. Judge of her pregnancy. He told her initially that she could work as long as the doctor allowed her to. Shortly thereafter, he told her that she could not work after five months of pregnancy. On another occasion, his assistant manager, Mr. Dungan, told her that she could not work after she "started showing." Once the Respondent, Mr. Judge, learned of the Petitioner's pregnancy, he began a regime of harassing treatment. For instance, Mr. Judge made her do the "side work," filling up all the salt and pepper shakers and sugar bowls for all of the waitresses and waitress stations. It had always been uniform policy that each waitress had the responsibility to do her own side work for her own station and tables. Mr. Judge also began yelling and cursing at her in front of her workers and customers, causing her great humiliation and embarrassment. He criticized her publicly about her posture and the way she serviced customers, although she had always had an excellent record as a competent waitress and had no complaints from customers or former employers, before announcing that she was pregnant. Mr. Judge also began a practice of constantly questioning other employees about the Petitioner's job performance, although he apparently learned of no substandard performance in both her duties and her attitude toward her customers. He also took her to task about her "charge tips" being less than other employees, apparently the measure he used to determine if a waitress was serving her customers appropriately and adequately. This situation, however, was caused by his discriminatory conduct toward her in giving her fewer tables to serve and thus, reducing her tip income. Mr. Judge additionally assigned her to clean up a portion of the kitchen area, particularly the "bread shelves" when normal policy had been for kitchen personnel to perform all kitchen clean-up duties, with any clean up of the bread shelf area being rotated amongst the dining room personnel. The Petitioner, however, was singled out for this duty exclusively after it became known that she was pregnant. The Petitioner was also required to stay late and perform certain closing duties at the end of business late at night, much more often than other waitresses. In addition to performing restaurant closing duties, she was frequently required to wait on cocktail tables as late as 2:00 in the morning on many of the "late duty" occasions, even though she was hired as, and until she became pregnant worked exclusively as, food waitress. Petitioner's testimony and Petitioner's exhibit 2, in evidence, establishes that, although Petitioner was only scheduled to stay late three times in March, three times in April and once in May that, in fact, she worked late, that is, after all other employees or waitresses had been released for the evening seven out of nine days that she worked in March; nine out of twelve days she worked in April; and six out of the seven days she worked in May. Indeed, on May 10, 1986, the last day she worked for the Respondent, Mr. Judge required her to stay late and to "bus" all the tables, that is clean all the tables, in the dining room, allowing the waitress who was scheduled to stay late that night to leave early. The Petitioner became quite upset at this turn of events and resigned her position, due to the repeated pattern of harassment as described herein. Although Mr. Judge initially told the Petitioner that she could work as long as the doctor allowed her to during her pregnancy, in fact, on April 11, 1986, Mr. Judge hired the Petitioner's replacement. He hired Pamela Modes and had the Petitioner train her in her waitress duties. He stated to Ms. Modes privately when hiring her "that he needed a food waitress" because "he's got a girl that's pregnant." Additionally, he told the Petitioner that he objected to her working because of her pregnancy and claimed his insurance would not allow him to employ her after she was five months pregnant. These statements, coupled with the statement by his assistant manager, Mr. Dungan, to the effect that she would not be employed there "once she started showing" reveal an intent by the employer to terminate the employee, the Petitioner, because of her pregnancy. Instead of terminating her outright, the Respondent chose to put sufficient pressure on the Petitioner through extra, unscheduled work duties and the other above-mentioned forms of harassment, so as to coerce her into leaving the Respondent's employ. The Petitioner thus made a prima facia showing that she was forced to terminate employment due to her sex and her pregnancy, and no countervailing evidence was adduced by the Respondent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record and the candor and the demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida Human Relations Commission finding that an unlawful employment practice has occurred through the Respondent's discrimination against the Petitioner because of her sex (pregnancy) and that she be accorded all relief allowed under the above- cited section, including backpay and related benefits in accordance with the requirements of Section 760.10(13), Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 21st of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Debra A. Larson, Pro Se 9742 Aileron Avenue, Apt. 606 Pensacola, Florida 32506 Dracut Corporation d/b/a Kings Inn Restaurant Lawrence F. Judge, Jr. Owner/General Manager 1309 Maldonado Pensacola Beach, Florida 32561-2323 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
