The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact On May 23, 2005, Petitioner was hired by Respondent as a ready-mix concrete truck driver at Respondent’s Gainesville plant. Petitioner was a good employee. He had a clean driving record, and he did not have any disciplinary problems while working for Respondent. On or about July 27, 2007, Petitioner had a “mild” heart attack and was placed on medical leave by Respondent. In September 2007, Petitioner was released by his personal physician to return to work. Thereafter, Petitioner returned to work for a couple of days and began the process of being recertified for his driving duties. He reviewed safety materials and videos and did “ride- alongs” with other drivers. Before Petitioner could return to his driving duties, he was required by federal Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations to pass a physical and be certified as “physically qualified.” Recertification is required every 24 months and after an injury that impairs the driver’s ability to perform his/her normal duties, such as the heart attack suffered by Petitioner. Petitioner understood that he could not return to his job as a ready-mix concrete truck driver until he passed a physical and received his DOT certification. On September 12, 2007, Respondent sent Petitioner to a DOT-approved physician in Ocala for his physical. Petitioner did not pass the physical. The DOT-approved physician expressed concerns about Petitioner’s cardiac surgery, possible sleep apnea (based upon a questionnaire filled out by Petitioner), and blood pressure issues. There is no credible evidence that Respondent influenced the DOT-approved physician’s decision in any way. Petitioner’s suspicion that Respondent had something to do with the decision is unfounded. Petitioner’s personal physician disagreed with the concerns expressed by the DOT-approved physician, and after Petitioner underwent a series of tests, it was determined that he did not have sleep apnea. On November 9, 2007, Respondent laid Petitioner off based upon his “failure to meet job qualifications.” Petitioner was 48 years old at the time of the lay- off. There is no credible evidence that Petitioner’s age or medical condition played any role in Respondent’s decision to lay Petitioner off. Rather, the decision was based solely upon Petitioner’s failure to have the DOT certification that was required for him to drive a ready-mix concrete truck. Respondent gave Petitioner ample time to obtain his DOT certification before it laid him off. Approximately two months passed between the time that Petitioner was cleared to return to work by his personal physician and the time that he was laid off for not having his DOT certification. Petitioner did not obtain his DOT certification until some point in January 2008. Petitioner was treated no differently by Respondent than other drivers -- both older and younger than Petitioner -- who lost their DOT certification. Like Petitioner, those drivers were fired because they did not meet the applicable job qualifications. Petitioner testified that he was told that he would be rehired when he got his DOT certification. This testimony is corroborated by the comment on the Employee Separation Notice for Petitioner, which stated “Jesse has been unable to get his DOT card/when he does he will be rehired.” By the time Petitioner obtained his DOT certification in January 2008, Respondent’s business had declined due to the slow-down in the economy and the building industry, and it did not have any work for Petitioner. Respondent laid off three drivers at its Gainesville plant in December 2007, and it laid off an additional five drivers at the plant in February 2008 because of the decline in its business. Six of the eight drivers who were laid-off were younger than Petitioner. After these lay-offs, there were still three drivers employed at Respondent’s Gainesville plant who had less seniority than Petitioner, but in order to rehire Petitioner, Respondent would have had to fire one of those drivers. There were also a number of drivers still employed at Respondent’s Gainesville plant who were older and had more seniority than Petitioner. Respondent’s decision not to fire one of the other drivers in order to re-hire Petitioner was reasonable under the circumstances. And, more importantly, there is no credible evidence that this decision was motivated in any way by Petitioner’s age or a perceived disability based upon his heart attack. Respondent has not hired any drivers at its Gainesville plant since the lay-offs described above. Petitioner has not worked since he was laid off by Respondent. He testified that he has tried to find another truck-driving job, but that like Respondent, most companies are not hiring drivers because of the slow-down in the economy and the building industry. Petitioner would likely still be employed by Respondent if he had obtained his DOT certification before Respondent started laying off drivers because Petitioner was a good employee with more seniority than all but one of the drivers who were laid off in December 2007 and February 2008. Petitioner believes that Respondent could have put him to work in the warehouse or on the yard until he obtained his DOT certification and could return to driving duties. However, the record does not reflect whether any positions were available in the warehouse or on the yard or whether Petitioner was qualified for those positions. Petitioner testified that he was told by other employees that they overheard Respondent’s managers stating that they did not intend to return Petitioner to his driving duties because his heart attack made him a “high risk driver.” No evidence was presented to corroborate this hearsay-based testimony. Petitioner also testified that a supervisor made a critical comment to him regarding his use of a cane immediately after he returned to work. The supervisor denied making the comment, and even if the comment was made, there is no credible evidence that it was anything more than an isolated comment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Dick's Auto Sales, Inc., is the holder of a motor vehicle dealer license issued by the Petitioner, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles ("the Department"). Richard R. Borst ("Borst") is the president of Respondent Dick's Auto Sales, Inc., and one of two stockholders in the company. At all times material hereto, the Respondent maintained a business address at 110 N.W. 18th Avenue, Delray Beach, Florida. Borst also operates an auto parts business at the same address as the motor vehicle dealership. On or about June 9, 1989, Borst appeared before the Honorable James C. Payne, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, and entered a plea of guilty to aiding and abetting the transportation of stolen motor vehicle parts in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2314 & 2 in Case Number 89-6032- Cr-PAYNE-(01), United States v. Richard Borst,. Based on the plea entered and the plea agreement then before the court, Borst was adjudicated guilty in a Criminal Judgment dated June 28, 1989. Imposition of a sentence of confinement was suspended and Borst was placed on probation for a period of three (3) years. Borst was also fined Fifty Dollars ($50.00). Borst's conviction arose in connection with his purchase of auto parts from a "chop shop" (i.e., an operation which dismantled stolen cars and sold the parts,) in the Connecticut area. The purchase took place in May, 1987. In April, 1988, Borst met with state and federal investigators and agreed to fully cooperate with a task force set up to investigate the operation. He also agreed to testify against the individuals involved. While Borst was in Connecticut waiting to testify, the other defendants entered guilty pleas. In Respondent's initial dealer license application dated September 24, 1987, Borst stated under oath that he was not facing criminal charges. On April 27, 1989, Borst, as president of Respondent, signed an application to renew Respondent's license, stating under oath: Under penalty of perjury, I do swear or affirm that the information contained in this application is true and correct and that nothing has occurred since I filed my last application for a license or application for renewal of said license, as the case may be, which would change the answers given in such previous application. On January 18, 1989, Borst and his attorney signed a "Consent to Transfer of Case for Plea and Sentence", in United States v. Richard Borst, Criminal No. B-89-6-(TFGD), United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (the "Connecticut Case"). This document expressly acknowledges that an Information was pending against Borst in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, that Borst wished to plead guilty to the offense charged, and that he consented to the disposition of the case in the Southern District of Florida. The Information entered in the Connecticut Case, charged Borst with violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2314 and 2, for transporting motor vehicle parts in interstate commerce knowing them to have been stolen. The date of this Information was not established, but it was clearly on or before January 18, 1989. Thus, sometime prior to January 18, 1989, Borst was charged with criminal violations of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2314 and 2, and these charges were pending when Borst signed and filed Respondent's renewal application for 1989. Petitioner contends that Borst's conviction is directly related to the business of being a motor vehicle dealer, especially since Borst operates a motor vehicle parts business in conjunction with his motor vehicle dealership. However, the evidence presented provided only a very limited factual background regarding the conviction, none of Petitioner's representatives talked with the investigators or prosecutors in the criminal case and no evidence was presented regarding the Respondent's role in the transactions leading to Borst's conviction. At the time of the hearing, Borst was fifty-three (53) years of age. Within the last twenty-four (24) months, he has suffered numerous health problems including a nervous breakdown which necessitated an eighteen (18) week period of confinement to his residence for rest. He currently undergoes twice- weekly therapy with a psychiatrist and has been taking an antidepressant prescription. In addition, in October of 1989, he was admitted to the hospital for a heart condition. Subsequently, a balloon angioplasty was performed on him. He was later re-admitted to the hospital for five (5) days as a result of post surgery complications. He is also an insulin dependent diabetic. He attributes most of these health problems to the stress and turmoil of his criminal conviction. In light of his emotional and physical condition, he has been required to reduce his work load. Borst has been actively trying to sell the existing business in order to retire the outstanding indebtedness on the business and the property on which it is located. There is no evidence that the Respondent and/or any of its duly elected officers or stockholders have ever been subjected to any other complaints and/or investigations by the Department or by any other investigatory or regulatory agency during the past seventeen (17) years since it was originally licensed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order which finds Respondent not guilty of the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint and dismisses the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of June, 1990. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 1990.
The Issue The issue for disposition in this proceeding is whether Respondent's motor vehicle dealer license should be revoked for his prior conviction of a felony, as proposed in an administrative complaint dated October 26, 1993.
Findings Of Fact It is uncontroverted that Respondent Lorenzo Reddick, Jr. (Reddick) holds an independent motor vehicle dealer license, issued by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV). The complaint fails to allege, and there is no evidence of, when the license was issued. The licensed place of business is 3214 Orange Center Boulevard, #C, Orlando, Florida. On April 27, 1993, Reddick pleaded, and was adjudged guilty of a single count offense in a multi-count superseding indictment, in U.S.A. v. Lorenzo Reddick, Case #92-104 Cr-Orl-19, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The offense, as described in the Judgment, was "Engaging in Monetary Transactions in Property Derived from Specified Unlawful Activity", on 12/30/91, pursuant to title 18 U.S. Code, section 1957(a), and title 18 U.S. Code, Section 2. (Petitioner's exhibit #1) Reddick was sentenced to twenty-four months imprisonment, commencing May 21, 1993, with two years supervision after release. According to the court documents comprising Petitioner's exhibit #1, the sentence was less than provided in sentencing guidelines "upon motion of the government, as a result of defendant's substantial assistance." Reddick is currently serving his prison term. At the time of the offense Reddick was not operating nor was he licensed as a motor vehicle dealer. There is no evidence of whether his license was obtained before or after his conviction. There is no evidence whatsoever of the offense other than what is found on the face of the judgment, as reflected above. DHSMV learned of Reddick's conviction in the process of investigating a filed complaint related to failure to transfer title and registration of a vehicle purchased from Reddick's dealership. Neil Chamelin was the manager of DHSMV's dealer license and consumer complaint programs and was responsible for evaluating requests for administrative action and preparing administrative pleadings for the division director. Chamelin received a copy of Reddick's Judgment of Conviction and Sentence and based the administrative complaint on those documents only. Chamelin has no independent knowledge of the offense. DHSMV has a longstanding policy that a single felony conviction may be sufficient for the agency to take action against a dealer's license. That is, the agency has interpreted the language of the relevant statute to mean that a licensee does not automatically get one free felony before his dealer's license is jeopardized, even after the language was amended seven or eight years ago to include a requirement of sufficient frequency of violations as to establish a pattern of wrongdoing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter its Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint that is the subject of this proceeding. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 17th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman Assistant General Counsel Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 James R. Cunningham, Esquire 200 East Robinson, Suite 1220 Orlando, Florida 32801 Charles J. Brantley, Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Room B439 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney, General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Debra Ann Vallancourt, was issued a Class "EE" Recovery Agent Intern License on August 12, 1992. Respondent has never held a Class "R" Recovery Agency License or a Class "E" Recovery Agent License. June MacWithey, who holds a Class "R" Recovery Agency License and a Class "E" Recovery Agent License, sponsored Respondent's internship beginning in April, 1992. Prior to that time, Respondent was sponsored under the Class "E" License of Septhanie MacWithey, one of June MacWithey's employees. The name of June MacWithey's recovery agency is Collateral Collection Corporation. The name was changed in February, 1993. The former name of the corporation was Midnight Auto Adjusters. In November, 1992, June MacWithey formally terminated her sponsorship of Respondent. At approximately the same time, Steve MacWithey had a conversation with Respondent regarding complaints made against her for allegedly contracting to perform repossessions without her sponsor's knowledge or permission. However, it is not clear whether she was informed at that time that her internship was being terminated. Steve MacWithey, June's husband, is a Class "EE" Recovery Agent Intern, and one of June's employees. Charles Mason is the manager of Auto Sports Center, Inc., in Apopka, Florida. In late summer, 1992, Sharon Landis introduced Respondent to Mason as a licensed repossessor. He hired Respondent to perform repossessions as an independent contractor, and paid her by check made payable to Debbie Vallancourt. He eventually hired Respondent as an employee in March or April of 1993. Respondent repossessed approximately 30-35 cars for Mr. Mason between October, 1992 and January, 1993. Respondent never advised Mason that she was working for Midnight Auto Adjusters or Collateral Collection Corporation. However, she would on occasion perform repossessions with Steve MacWithey who would pick her up at Mason's car lot. Some of the repossessions Respondent performed for Mason, between October and December, 1992, were done without the knowledge of her sponsor June MacWithey, and on some of the repossessions performed for Mason, Respondent would cash her check and split the money with Steve MacWithey, bypassing her sponsor. George Namlik, Sr. owns a used car dealership in Apopka, Florida. In early November, 1992, Respondent solicited Namlik for the purpose of performing repossessions for his dealership. She indicated to him that she was licensed to perform repossessions. She showed him her Class "EE" Recovery Agent Intern License, which he made a copy of, and told him that another license was in the mail. Next to the photocopy of the Class "EE" license, Respondent wrote her office number, her digital beeper number, and her quoted price for each repossession. Respondent did not tell Mr. Namlik that she was working with anyone else, and led him to believe that she had the necessary licenses to work as an independent contractor. Namlik assigned her two repossessions which she never completed. She returned the car keys to Namlik following numerous requests and his threat to complain to the Department of State, Division of Licensing. June MacWithey did not properly supervise and direct the activities of Respondent. Between October and December, 1992, Respondent solicited and performed repossessions independent of, and without the knowledge of, her sponsor. Petitioner's explanation for this conduct is not credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found GUILTY of violating Sections 493.6118(1)(g) and receive a written reprimand and pay an administrative fine in the amount of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000). DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1885 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1-19 Respondent's proposed findings of fact. Respondent did not submit proposed findings. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Debra Ann Vallancourt (pro se) Post Office Box 269 Apopka, Florida 32712-0269 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact On September 4, 1979, the Department of State levied a $200 civil fine against Weaver and Automobile Recovery by its letter of that date. As of that date, the Petitioner was not licensed by the Department of State under Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. The $200 fine was paid, and a formal hearing was requested.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the fine be set aside and the $200 be repaid to the Petitioners. This recommended in no way constitutes a ruling or finding on the underlying grounds upon which the fine was assessed. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of February 1980 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. John M. Weaver Automobile Recovery Bureau of Florida, Inc. Post Office Box 18452 Tampa, Florida 33679 W. J. Gladwin, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
