The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's Certificate of Registration may lawfully be revoked.
Findings Of Fact The Department is an agency of the State of Florida pursuant to Section 20.21. The Department has the responsibility of administering the revenue laws of the state, including the laws relating to the imposition and collection of the state's sales and use tax, pursuant to Chapter 212. Spin and Marty is a Florida corporation doing business as Crabbit's Pub whose principal address is 10513 Spring Hill Drive, Spring Hill, Florida. Spin and Marty is a "dealer" as that term is defined in Chapter 212. It holds a certificate of registration issued by the Department that is numbered 37-8012056472-7. Spin and Marty initially registered with the Department on January 30, 1992. The sales and use tax collected by a registrant, such as Spin and Marty, become the property of the state at the moment they are collected. A registrant is an agent of the state when collecting the sales and use tax. Spin and Marty was required to remit the sales and use tax collected to the state on or before the 20th of each month. From November 1999 until December 2003, Spin and Marty filed no returns and paid no sales and use taxes to the Department. Also, Spin and Marty, in November 2005, did not file a return or pay sales and use taxes. In a letter dated November 20, 2001, Spin and Marty was notified that the Department was going to audit its records. The Department received no response. In a letter dated April 3, 2002, Spin and Marty was again asked to contact the Department's auditor so a mutually agreed date could be set to conduct the audit. The Department received no response to this letter. The Department thereafter conducted an audit. The result of the audit was a notice of proposed assessment which stated that Spin and Marty owed $146,044.74 in back taxes, penalties, and interest through September 4, 2002. Neither Spin and Marty, nor its principal, Mr. McNiff, contested the audit findings. A letter from the Department addressed to "Dear Taxpayer," dated August 5, 2002, was received by Spin and Marty. This letter stated that the Department wished to arrange a meeting in its office for the purpose of reviewing the Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes dated June 18, 2002. Spin and Marty did not avail itself of this opportunity. Six tax warrants were filed with the Clerk of Court in Hernando County against Spin and Marty. These warrants indicate that as of the day of the hearing Spin and Marty owed $175,299.93 to the Department. This amount includes the actual tax due, or in the case of warrant 1000000029678, the estimated tax due, penalties, interest, and filing fees. Interest continues to accrue. Pursuant to notice from the Department, on July 31, 2006, Theodore Faugno, who works for Mr. McNiff's CPA, and Mr. McNiff met with Debra B. Smith, a Revenue Specialist III with the Department. Neither Mr. McNiff nor Mr. Faugno contacted Ms. Smith following the meeting. This resulted in the Administrative Complaint seeking to revoke Respondent's Certificate of Registration. Mr. McNiff related that during the period he failed to submit returns and remit the taxes then due, he experienced adverse health issues and the unplanned birth of a baby. However, he was able to operate Spin and Marty and make a profit. It is indubitably concluded that he could have also reported and remitted the tax due, had he been so inclined.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue revoke Certificate of Registration No. 37-8012056472-7, held by Spin and Marty, Inc., d/b/a Crabbit's Pub. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Warren J. Bird, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Jarrell L. Murchison, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 J. Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 James McNiff Spin and Marty, Inc., d/b/a Crabbit's Pub 10050 Sleepy Willow Court Spring Hill, Florida 34608 James McNiff Crabbit's Pub 10513 Spring Hill Drive Spring Hill, Florida 34608-5047 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 104 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue properly denied Petitioner's March 10, 2000, Application For Refund of Sales and Use Tax, Petitioner having asserted that the Department of Revenue obtained the Closing Agreement through misrepresentation and intimidation.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Tuskawilla Learning Center, is a Florida corporation which operates a private Montessori School in Oviedo, Seminole County, Florida. Petitioner has elected to be an "S" corporation for federal income tax reporting purposes. Tuskawilla Learning Center is owned by its shareholders, Thomas E. Phillips; his wife, Lois; his daughter, Terry Lynn DeLong; and his son-in-law, Daniel F. DeLong. At all times material to this matter, a partnership comprised of the above-named owners of the Tuskawilla Learning Center also owned the real property upon which the Tuskawilla Learning Center operated. In early July 1997, Respondent audited Petitioner's corporate transactions for the period from July 1, 1992, through June 30, 1997, for compliance with sales and use tax and the local government infrastructure surtax. During the audit Petitioner was requested to provide all information and documents which Petitioner felt supported its business activities. Respondent issued a Notice Of Intent To Make Audit Changes on September 25, 1997, which advised Petitioner that the audit revealed that Petitioner had failed to pay use tax on purchases Petitioner made from out-of-state vendors, which Petitioner acknowledged and paid. The audit also revealed that Petitioner failed to pay sales tax on the monthly rental charges that Petitioner paid to the property owner on which the Tuskawilla Learning Center operated. Petitioner did not agree with Respondent's position on the sales tax on monthly rental charges. On October 28, 1997, an audit conference was held in Orlando, Florida, where the tax assessment on the monthly rental charges was discussed. The parties were unable to resolve the issue, and Petitioner requested that the issue be referred to Tallahassee for further review. The review in Tallahassee essentially confirmed the original audit findings, and a Notice of Proposed Assessment was issued on January 26, 1998. Petitioner filed a protest and requested a further review of the Notice of Proposed Assessment. As a result, the entire audit was reviewed, and Petitioner was allowed to provide additional documentation to support its position. On August 4, 1998, Respondent issued a Notice of Decision which essentially confirmed the findings of the original audit. At this point, Petitioner had certain rights of appeal which had to be exercised within specific time limits, or Petitioner could elect to pay the taxes and interest as set forth in a Closing Agreement in which Respondent waived the penalties which had accrued for failure to pay the tax. The various time deadlines passed without Petitioner electing one of the avenues of appeal nor did Petitioner execute the Closing Agreement. After all deadlines for appeal had passed, Petitioner contacted Respondent through an attorney seeking relief. Respondent found no basis for relief but renewed the opportunity for Petitioner to sign the Closing Agreement. On February 5, 1999, Petitioner executed the Closing Agreement and paid $71,693.87 (a $285.31 overpayment). The Closing Agreement clearly states: The taxpayer waives any and all rights to institute any judicial or administrative proceedings, including the remedies provided by ss. 213.21(2)(a) and 72.011(1), F.S., to recover, compromise, or avoid any tax, penalty or interest paid or payable pursuant to this agreement. This agreement is for the sole purpose of compromising and settling taxpayer's liability to the State of Florida . . . This agreement is final and conclusive with respect to the audit assessment or specific transaction/assessment and period described . . . and no additional assessment may be made by the Department against the taxpayer for the specific liability referenced above, except upon showing of fraud or misrepresentation of material fact . . . . On March 10, 2001, Petitioner filed an Application for Refund of the taxes and interest paid with the Closing Agreement. Attached to the Application for Refund was Petitioner's four-page "position paper," which outlined facts and arguments related to the sales tax issue. Petitioner's Application for Refund states that "the State has misled us." The Application for Refund went through the review process. On May 5, 2000, Respondent issued a Notice of Proposed Denial for the refund claim. Petitioner sought an informal review of the proposed refund denial. After an informal review of the proposed refund denial, on June 16, 2000, Respondent issued a Notice of Decision denying Petitioner's Application for Refund. On August 12, 2000, Petitioner forwarded a letter to Respondent, which was interpreted as a request for an administrative hearing to review the decision to deny the Application for Refund which resulted in the instant administrative hearing. Thomas E. Phillips has a Ph.D. in accounting from the University of Nebraska, is a Certified Public Accountant, and had taught accounting at the University of Central Florida for 23 years prior to his retirement. He and his family founded the Tuskawilla Learning Center. On behalf of Petitioner, Dr. Phillips maintains that the tax audit and subsequent review process were "intimidating" and that Respondent "misled" Petitioner. Notwithstanding Dr. Phillips' assertion that the audit and review process were "intimidating," he testified that he found the auditor and her supervisor "not intimidating, but were very pleasant." Dr. Phillips testified about several aspects of the audit and review process and activities that occurred during the audit and review process that he found objectionable. For example, Dr. Phillips testified that Respondent failed to respond to his inquiries in an appropriate way and that Respondent had misinterpreted certain case law that he felt applicable. Nothing offered by Dr. Phillips suggests any impropriety or misrepresentation by Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's Application for Refund. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of April, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph C. Mellichamp, III, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 John Mika, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Thomas E. Phillips 1625 Montessori Point Oviedo, Florida 36527 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner showed by a preponderance of the evidence that it is entitled to a refund of $1,500,216.60 in sales and use tax paid during the period from January 2005 through January 2007 to purchase industrial printing machinery that allegedly satisfied the statutory requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output for printing facilities that manufacture, process, compound or produce tangible personal property at fixed locations in the state within the meaning of Subsection 212.08(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Administrative Rule 12A-1.096.1/
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency responsible for administering the state sales tax imposed in Chapter 212. Petitioner is a "for profit" Florida corporation located in St. Petersburg, Florida. Petitioner is engaged in the business of publishing newspapers and commercial printing. Petitioner derives approximately 85 percent of its revenue from advertising and approximately 15 percent of its revenue from circulation subscriptions. In April, 2007, Petitioner requested a refund of $403,780.05 in sales and use taxes paid for the purchase of industrial machinery and equipment during the period from January, 2005, to January, 2006. In October, 2007, Petitioner requested a refund of $1,096,436.61 in sales and use taxes paid for the purchase of industrial machinery and equipment for the period from January, 2006, to January, 2007. The first refund request in April, 2007, became DOAH Case Number 08-3938, and the second refund request in October, 2007, became DOAH Case Number 08-3939. The two cases were consolidated into this proceeding pursuant to the joint motion of the parties. The parties stipulated that the only issue for determination in this consolidated proceeding is whether Petitioner satisfied the requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A- 1.096. If a finding were to be made that Petitioner satisfied the 10 percent requirement, the parties stipulate that the file will be returned to Respondent for a determination of whether the items purchased are qualifying machinery and equipment defined in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096. The issue of whether Petitioner satisfied the statutory requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096 is a mixed question of law and fact. The ALJ concludes as a matter of law that Petitioner did not satisfy the 10 percent requirement. The ALJ discusses that conclusion briefly, for context, in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Findings of Fact, and explains the conclusion and the supporting legal authority more fully in the Conclusions of Law. It is an undisputed fact that Petitioner counts items identified in the record as "preprints," "custom inserts," and "circulation inserts" separately from the "newspaper" as a means of exceeding the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). Respondent construes the 10 percent exemption authorized in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) in pari materia with the exemption authorized in Subsection 212.08(5)(1)(g) for "preprints," "custom inserts," and "circulation inserts" (hereinafter "inserts"). The latter statutory exemption treats inserts as a "component part of the newspaper" which are not to be treated separately for tax purposes. For reasons stated more fully in the Conclusions of Law, the ALJ agrees with the statutory construction adopted by Respondent. That conclusion of law renders moot and, therefore, irrelevant and immaterial, the bulk of the evidence put forth by the parties during the two-day hearing because the evidence assumed arguendo that Petitioner's statutory interpretation would be adopted by the ALJ, i.e., inserts would be counted separately from the newspaper for purposes of satisfying the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). In an abundance of caution, the fact-finder made findings of fact based on the legal assumption that inserts are statutorily required to be counted separately for purposes of the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). Those findings are set forth in paragraphs 9 through 11. The verification audit by Respondent's field office was able to verify an output increase of only 4.27 percent for 2005 and only 8.72 percent for 2006. A preponderance of evidence in this de novo proceeding did not overcome those findings. The trier of fact finds the evidence from Petitioner during this de novo proceeding to be inconsistent and unpersuasive. For example, Petitioner inflated production totals by counting materials printed for its own use, and materials in which the unit of measurement was inconsistent. In other instances, production totals for printing presses identified in the record as Didde and Ryobi presses varied dramatically with circulation. In other instances, Petitioner's reporting positions changed during the course of the proceeding. There is scant evidence that the alleged increase in production created jobs in the local market in a manner consistent with legislative intent. Rather, a preponderance of evidence shows that when Petitioner placed the equipment in service it was job neutral or perhaps reduced jobs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner did not satisfy the requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output defined in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096, and denying Petitioner's request for a refund. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 2009.
Findings Of Fact On October 21, 1988, DOR issued a notice of assessment and jeopardy findings against petitioners alleging that, pursuant to the provisions of Section 212.0505, Florida Statutes (1987), they owed $16,681,820.07 for having "engaged in the unlawful sale, use, consumption, distribution, manufacture, derivation, production, transportation, or storage of a medicinal drug, cannabis, or a controlled substance." The notice alleged further that petitioners made up a criminal enterprise which, among other things, had been engaged in the activity of laundering money derived from the sale and distribution of illegal drugs (cocaine). (Exhibit A of petition for formal hearing) On December 19, 1988, petitioners filed a complaint against DOR in the circuit court of the thirteenth judicial circuit in and for Hillsborough County, Florida. In that action, petitioners sought to have declared unconstitutional section 212.0505 and to contest DOR's jeopardy tax assessment. The complaint reflects that the contest of assessment was filed under Section 72.011, Florida Statutes (1987). (Exhibit A of amended motion for recommended order of dismissal) On December 19, 1988, petitioners filed a petition for formal hearing with the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) seeking to contest DOR's jeopardy tax assessment. (Exhibit A of petitioners' response to DOR's motion for recommended order of dismissal) A copy of the petition for formal hearing was received by DOR on December 20, 1988, or one day after the circuit court action was filed. (Exhibit B of amended motion for recommended order of dismissal)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent's amended motion to dismiss the petition for formal hearing be GRANTED, and the petition be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: B. Gray Gibbs, Esquire One Fourth Street North Suite 800 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Jeffrey M. Dikman, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Katie D. Tucker, Executive Director Department of Revenue 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Office of the General Counsel Department of Revenue 203 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to certain facts, legal issues, and their respective contentions, as follow: "1. At all times pertinent to this action, Petitioner Lawrence Nali Construction Company, Inc., was a Florida Corporation licensed and doing business in the State of Florida. At all times pertinent to this action, Respondent Department of Revenue, State of Florida, was an agency of the State of Florida exercising duties relating to the assessment and collection of sales and use taxes pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Respondent conducted an audit of tran- sactions involving Petitioner for the period November 1, 1972, through October 31, 1975. As a result of that audit, Respondent claims that as of September 17, 1976, the Petitioner had a balance due to the Depart- ment of Revenue of $17,383.58 in taxes, interest and penalties. The assessment indicating the above amount is attached as Exhibit A. Petitioner is in agreement that if the assessment is upheld, Petitioner owes to the Respondent the amount of $17,383.58 plus interest calculated to date of payment to Respondent. The tax assessment in this case is based upon two factual situations: Petitioner, manufactured and installed asphaltic concrete from raw material at a rate certain per ton determined by bid, as an improvement to the real property of political entities consisting of cities, towns, municipalities, counties, school boards, junior colleges and others. Petitioner also hauled the asphalt to the job cite (sic) at a fixed ton/mile rate determined by bid. Petitioner, as a subcontractor, manu- factured and installed asphaltic concrete from raw material at a rate certain per ton determined by bid, as an improvement to the real property of political entities above described. The general contractor contracted with the political entities in various fashions but the Petitioner's duties were always the same and included manufacture, installation and hauling of asphaltic concrete based on a rate certain per ton and per ton mile. The issue in this case is whether the Respondent is correct in contending that the Petitioner must pay a sales and use tax on the produced asphalt which it uses in the performance of the construction contract jobs described in paragraph 6. It is agreed by the parties that no sales or use tax was remitted, by the Petitioner on the produced asphalt. It is agreed by the parties that no sales or use tax was paid by the instant customers to the Petitioner. It is Respondent's contention that, pursuant to the above-cited rules, the Peti- tioner is required to pay sales or use tax on the produced asphalt which is used to construct real property pursuant to a con- tract described in Rule 12A-1.51(2)(a), F.A.C. It is Petitioner's contention that the above-cited rules do not apply in the instant case since the customers involved in the instant fact situations are political subdivision or because the transaction was of the type described by Rule 12A-1.51(2)(d), F.A.C. Petitioner is entitled to rely on the earlier 1967 audit by Respondent because neither Petitioner's method of doing business, nor the law, has changed materially since 1967. Respondent agrees that this is an issue but fails to agree that Petitioner is so entitled to rely." All purchase orders or invitations for bid received by petitioner from political subdivisions stated that the entity was exempt from federal and state sales taxes and that such taxes should not be included in the bid. Typical bid forms entitled "Specifications for Asphaltic Concrete" called for a lump-sum price per ton for delivery and placement of the material by the vendor plus a sum per ton per mile for transportation costs. No breakdown of amounts for the cost of materials and cost of installation is reflected in the bid documents. (Testimony of Cowan, Cook, Exhibits 3, 7 (late filed)) Respondent audited petitioner's operations in 1967 and, although it had had previous transactions with governmental entities prior to that date, no assessment for back taxes was issued for failure to pay sales tax on such transactions nor was petitioner advised to do so in the future by state officials. After 1967, petitioner did not seek information from respondent concerning the subject of sales tax. As a consequence of the 1967 audit, petitioner believed that it was unnecessary to charge or pay sales tax on such transactions with political subdivisions. (Testimony of Cowan, Cook) As of April 1, 1977, Brevard County had a population of over 250,000. Although it is a large county in terms of size, respondent has only two auditors in the sales tax division to cover the entire county. (Testimony of Alberto, Cowan, Exhibit 4)
Recommendation That the petitioner Lawrence Nali Construction Company, Inc. be held liable for sales tax, penalty, and interest under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, as set forth in respondent's proposed assessment. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of September, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Brown, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Andrew A. Graham, Esquire Post Office Box 1657 Cocoa, Florida 32922
The Issue Whether Respondent's sales and use Certificate of Registration should be revoked for failure to abide by the repayment terms agreed to in a Compliance Agreement entered into with Petitioner on August 29, 2013, as alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint for Revocation of Certificate of Registration.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with administering and enforcing Florida's revenue laws, including the laws related to the imposition and collection of sales and use tax pursuant to chapter 212, Florida Statutes (2014). Respondent is a Florida Profit Corporation doing business at 90791 Old Highway, Unit 1, Tavernier, Florida 33037. Respondent is a "dealer" as defined in section 212.06(2) and is required to comply with chapter 212. Respondent holds Certificate of Registration number 54- 8013269710-0 issued by the Department. A certificate of registration is required in order to do business in the state of Florida and authorizes its holder to collect and remit sales tax pursuant to chapter 212. The Department is authorized to revoke a dealer's certificate of registration for failure to comply with state tax laws. Prior to such revocation, the Department is required by statute to schedule a conference with the dealer. The dealer is required to attend the informal conference and may either present evidence to refute the Department's allegations of noncompliance or to enter into a compliance agreement with the Department to resolve the dealer's failure to comply with chapter 212. The Department issued and recorded warrants in the public records of Monroe County to secure collection of delinquent sales and use tax, plus penalties, filing fees, and interest from Respondent.1/ The Department initiated the process of revoking Respondent's Certificate of Registration by sending Respondent a Notice of Conference on Revocation of Certificate of Registration (Notice of Conference). The Notice of Conference advised that the informal conference would be held on August 29, 2013, and that the Department had initiated the process to revoke Respondent's Certificate of Registration for failure to remit sales and use tax and pay the reemployment tax that was determined to be due. The notice also informed Respondent that it would have the opportunity to make payment or present evidence to demonstrate why the Department should not revoke Respondent's Certificate of Registration. Respondent's President and Registered Agent, Spencer Slate, attended the informal conference on behalf of Respondent and entered into a Compliance Agreement with the Department. During the informal conference, Mr. Slate admitted to using the collected tax to pay for Respondent's payroll, fuel, and other business expenses instead of remitting the tax to the State. The Compliance Agreement states that due to Respondent's failure to timely file returns and pay all taxes due, Respondent admits to a past due sales and use tax liability of $51,506.55, consisting of tax, penalty, interest, and fees. The Compliance Agreement requires Respondent to make a down payment of $16,349.14 by August 29, 2013, and to make 12 monthly payments. The Compliance Agreement also provides that: IN CONSIDERATION for the Department refraining from pursuing revocation proceedings at this time, the taxpayer agrees: * * * To accurately complete and timely file all required returns and reports for the next 12 months, beginning with the first return/report due for 08/31/2013, payable on or before 09/20/2013. To timely remit all taxes due for the next 12 months, following the date of this agreement. Respondent made the down payment of $16,349.14, as required by the Compliance Agreement, and the first four scheduled payments, but defaulted on the terms of the Compliance Agreement as follows: Failed to make the monthly payments due, beginning with the fifth payment. Failed to timely remit taxes due for September 2013, October 2013, and November 2013. In addition, the payment for sales tax due September 2013 was returned due to insufficient funds. Failed to timely file sales and use tax returns and remit the taxes due for the tax periods May 2014, June 2014, and July 2014. The Compliance Agreement provides that "[i]f the taxpayer fails to comply with any obligation under this agreement, the Department has the right to pursue revocation of the taxpayer's certificate of registration." As provided by the Department's revocation worksheet dated December 5, 2014, Respondent currently has an outstanding sales and use tax liability in the amount of $67,501.98 and reemployment tax liability of $667.08, including tax, penalty, interest, and fees.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Revenue revoking the Certificate of Registration issued to and held by Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of January, 2015.
Findings Of Fact Having listened to the testimony and considered the evidence presented in this cause, it is found as follows: Dr. Melvin J. Hellinger is licensed to practice dentistry in the State of Florida by the State Board of Dentistry. Dr. Melvin J. Hellinger is currently practicing dentistry in Miami, Florida. Dr. Melvin J. Hellinger was indicted on three counts of income tax evasion in the United States District Court, District of Massachusetts. The indictment charged that Dr. Melvin J. Hellinger did willfully and knowingly attempt to evade and defeat a large part of the income taxes due and owing by him and his wife to the United States of America for the calendar years 1969, 1970 and 1971, by filing and causing to be filed with the District Director of Internal Revenue for the Internal Revenue District of Boston, in the District of Massachusetts, a false and fraudulent joint income tax return for the calendar years 1969, 1970 and 1971, each calendar year constituting a separate count. On March 10, 1975, Dr. Melvin J. Hellinger pled guilty to and was convicted of the offense of willfully and knowingly attempting to evade and defeat a large part of the income taxes due and owing by him and his wife to the United States of America by filing and causing to be filed with the Internal Revenue, a false and fraudulent joint income tax return, in violation of Section 7201, I.R.C., Title 26, U.S.C., Sec. 7201, as charged in Counts 2 and 3 of the aforementioned indictment. Count 2 charged that Dr. Hellinger did evade income taxes by filing an income tax return wherein it was stated that his and his wife's taxable income for calendar year 1970 was $47,883.08 and that the amount of tax due and owing thereon was $16,401.58, whereas, as he then and there well knew, their joint taxable income for said calendar year was $101,503.07, upon which said taxable income there was owing an income tax of $47,264.70. Count 3 charged that Dr. Hellinger did evade income taxes by filing an income tax return wherein it was stated that his and his wife's taxable income for calendar year 1971 was $50,877.52 and that the amount of tax due and owing thereon was $17,498.76, whereas, as he then and there well knew, their joint taxable income for said calendar year was $67,786.12, upon which said taxable income there was owing an income tax of $26,502.36. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts sentenced Dr. Melvin J. Hellinger to imprisonment for a period of three months, execution of prison sentence to be suspended and Dr. Hellinger placed on probation for a period of two years. As a special condition of his probation, he is to spend two days a month doing work at a charitable hospital or some similar institution under the supervision of the probation office. It was further ordered that Dr. Hellinger pay a fine in the amount of $10,000, payable on or before March 17, 1975. Dr. Melvin J. Hellinger is presently performing voluntary work one day a week at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami, Florida. Dr. Melvin J. Hellinger is a competent oral surgeon. Dr. Melvin J. Hellinger currently holds a valid license to practice dentistry in the state of Massachusetts, which license was renewed after his conviction for income-tax evasion. By his own statement, Dr. Hellinger can return to Massachusetts to practice dentistry. Dr. Melvin J. Hellinger was removed from the staff at Miami-Dade General Hospital because of the subject conviction for income tax evasion and omissions he made from his application to Miami-Dade General Hospital, which omissions reflected upon his character. Dr. Melvin J. Hellinger's membership in the American Dental Association and the American Society of Oral Surgeons has been revoked as a result of accusations by Blue Cross-Blue Shield concerning duplicate claims filed by Dr. Hellinger, which accusations have now been settled between Dr. Hellinger and Blue Cross-Blue Shield. Dr. Melvin J. Hellinger became a diplomate of the American Board of Oral Surgery in 1965, when in his late 20's. He has published in dental journals and taught at Tuft's University in oral pathology and Boston University in oral surgery. Dr. Melvin J. Hellinger came to Florida in December of 1974 from Wakefield, Massachusetts. In Wakefield, Massachusetts, Dr. Melvin J. Hellinger was very active in civic and religious affairs, contributing a substantial amount of time to community service. During the time within which Dr. Hellinger committed the subject felonies, his wife discovered that she had a cancer malignancy, which is presently being treated by a specialist in Miami. Also at that time, Dr. Hellinger's father-in-law, of whom he thought highly, suffered several strokes. Further, during that time, Dr. Hellinger suffered large stock-losses, putting a severe financial burden on him. Dr. Hellinger and his wife have four children, ages seven to twelve. Since moving to Florida, Dr. Hellinger has been active in his temple and coaches children's league football. Dr. Hellinger has no other criminal record. Dr. Melvin J. Hellinger pled guilty to and was adjudged guilty of a felony under the laws of the United States involving income tax evasion as set forth in Counts and 2 of the Accusation filed herein by the Florida State Board of Dentistry.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent should grant Petitioner's application for a sales tax exemption certificate as a charitable institution within the meaning of Section 212.08(7), Florida Statutes. 1/
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the governmental agency responsible for issuing sales tax exemption certificates in accordance with Section 212.08(7). Petitioner is a non-profit, Florida corporation and a charitable organization, within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, for purposes of the federal income tax. On December 29, 1995, Petitioner applied for an exemption from state sales and use tax ("sales tax") as a charitable institution. On February 8, 1996, Respondent denied Petitioner's application. The parties stipulated that Petitioner is a non-profit corporation. The parties further stipulated that the only exemption under which Petitioner may qualify for a sales tax exemption is the exemption for a charitable institution. In order to qualify as a charitable institution, Petitioner must provide one or more of seven services listed in Section 212.08(7). The parties stipulated that the only service Petitioner arguably provides as a charitable institution is that of raising funds for medical research within the meaning of Section 212.08(7)(o)2b(V). It is uncontroverted that Petitioner does not provide medical research directly. Petitioner raises funds for its national organization. The national organization then disburses funds raised by local affiliates. Petitioner failed to submit any competent and substantial evidence showing the disposition of funds by its national organization. Petitioner failed to show that its national organization either provides direct medical research or raises funds for one or more organizations that provide medical research.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order and therein DENY Petitioner's request for a sales tax exemption. RECOMMENDED this 4th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL S. MANRY, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1996.
