Findings Of Fact There are no disputed issues of fact. The parties stipulated to the following facts: (Exhibits referred to are not attached to this Recommended Order) As to Sun Oil Company: On February 14, 1978, a claim for refund was submitted to the Florida Department of Revenue and the Comptroller of the State of Florida. A copy of the transmittal letter is annexed as Exhibit 8 and a copy of the claim for refund is annexed as Exhibit 9. On August 31, 1978, another claim for refund, covering a subsequent time period was filed. A copy of the transmittal letter is annexed as Exhibit 10 and a copy of the claim for refund is annexed as Exhibit 11. Meanwhile, to the knowledge of all parties, the Exxon appeal referred to below was prosecuted. As to Exxon Corporation: On January 19, 1978, Exxon submitted to the Department of Revenue and to the Comptroller a claim for refund of severance tax which may have been overpaid by Exxon Corporation for the period March 1, 1974, through December 31, 1976. The claim reflected its contingent nature. A copy of the transmittal letter is annexed as Exhibit 1. A copy of the claim for refund of severance tax is annexed as Exhibit 2. (Subsequently, claims for subsequent time periods have also been filed with the Comptroller). By letter dated February 6, 1978, the Department of Revenue responded that the claim was barred by the one-year provision contained in Section 211.06, Florida Statutes. Enclosed with the response was a copy of an earlier letter to Exxon Corporation from the General Counsel of the Comptroller of the State of Florida, setting forth the position of the Comptroller that the contingent nature of the claim created no problem, but that the one-year provision in Section 211.06 was a statute of limitations. A copy of the letter of February 6, 1978, together with the enclosure, is annexed as Exhibit 3. On February 27, 1978, Petitioner wrote the Comptroller requesting consideration of the claim for refund under the provisions of Section 215.26, Florida Statutes. A copy is annexed as Exhibit 4. By letter dated March 7, 1978, the Comptroller wrote Petitioner denying the claim because it was not filed within one year from the date of payment of the tax as allegedly required by Section 211.06(2), stating that no further administrative review was available, and inviting judicial review, under Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. A copy of the letter is annexed as Exhibit 5. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the order contained in the letter of March 7, 1978 (Exhibit 5). The First District Court of Appeal of Florida in due course rendered a decision and opinion, a copy of which is annexed as Exhibit 6. The First District Court of Appeal held that the one-year period described in Section 211.06 did not bar the application for refund, that the refund provisions of Section 215.26, Florida Statutes, were applicable, and remanded the case. Thereafter, the Comptroller's Office asked for a further statement of Exxon's position on this matter, which was given in a letter dated May 24, 1979, a copy of which is annexed as Exhibit 7. As to Louisiana Land and Exploration Company: On January 25, 1978, Louisiana Land and Exploration Company submitted to the Department of Revenue and to the Comptroller a claim for refund of severance tax which may have been paid by Louisiana Land and Exploration company for the period March 1, 1974, through December 31, 1976. The claim reflected its contingent nature. A copy of the transmittal letter is annexed as Exhibit A copy of the claim for refund of severance tax is annexed as Exhibit 13. By letter dated February 6, 1978, the Department of Revenue responded that the claim was barred by the one-year provision contained in Section 211.06, Florida Statutes. Enclosed with the response was a copy of an earlier letter to Exxon Corporation from the General Counsel of the Comptroller of the State of Florida, setting forth the position of the Comptroller that the contingent nature of the claim created no problem, but that the one-year provision in Section 211.06 was a statute of limitations. A copy of the letter of February 6, 1978, together with the enclosure, is annexed as Exhibit 14. On October 31, 1978, Louisiana Land and Exploration Company again submitted to the Comptroller of the State of Florida a claim for refund of severance tax which may have been paid by Louisiana Land and Exploration Company for the period March 1, 1974, through December 31, 1976. The claim reflected its contingent nature. A copy of the transmittal letter is annexed as Exhibit A copy of the claim for refund of severance tax is annexed as Exhibit 16. Meanwhile, to the knowledge of all parties the Exxon appeal referred to above was prosecuted. As to Roadway Express, Inc.: On December 14, 1978, a claim for refund was submitted to the Florida Department of Revenue and the Comptroller of the State of Florida. A copy of the transmittal letter is annexed as Exhibit 17 and a copy of the claim for refund is annexed as Exhibit 18. On November 13, 1979, a similar claim for refund was submitted to the Department of Revenue and the Comptroller of the State of Florida. A copy of the transmittal letter is annexed as Exhibit 19 and a copy of the claim for refund is annexed as Exhibit 20. Meanwhile, to the knowledge of all parties the Exxon appeal referred to above was prosecuted. As to all Parties: In the case of each of the parties, by document entitled "Notice of Intent to Deny Refund" dated August 30, 1979 (and in the case of the second Roadway Express matter, Case No. 80-098, January 2, 1980), the Comptroller gave notice of his intent to deny refund solely because the contingent nature of the claim, stating as the sole grounds for denial: "At this time there is no basis under Section 215.26, Florida Statutes, to grant the requested refund." In response to the Notice of Intent to Deny Refund, Petitioners promptly requested a hearing, which has resulted in the above consolidated proceedings. There are no disputed issues of material fact with respect to this proceeding, at which the issue is whether or not the contingent claims filed within the three-year period prescribed by Section 215.26, Florida Statutes, should be held in abeyance until the contingency has occurred or it is determined that it will not occur. By agreeing that there are no disputed issues of material fact for the purpose of this proceeding, no party waives its right to present facts or contest facts in the event the case is considered in the future on its merits.
Findings Of Fact Certain hospital equipment ("Equipment") was sold in 1973 and 1974 by Hospital Contract Consultants ("Vendor") to F & E Community Developers and Jackson Realty Builders (hereinafter referred to as "Purchasers") who simultaneously leased the Equipment to Petitioner. These companies are located in Indiana. At the time of purchase, Florida sales tax ("Tax") was paid by the Purchasers and on or about March 18, 1974, the tax was remitted to the State of Florida by the Vendor. However, the Tax was paid in the name of Medical Facilities Equipment Company, a subsidiary of Vendor. In 1976, the Department of Revenue audited Petitioner and on or about April 26, 1976 assessed a tax on purchases and rental of the Equipment. On or about April 26, 1976, petitioner agreed to pay the amount of the assessment on the purchases and rentals which included the Equipment, in monthly installments of approximately Ten Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($10,000.00) each and subsequently paid such amount of assessment with the last monthly installment paid on or about November 26, 1976. On or about December, 1976, the Department of Revenue, State of Florida, checked its records and could not find the Vendor registered to file and pay sales tax with the State of Florida. Petitioner then looked to the State of Indiana for a tax refund. On or about January 4, 1977, Petitioner filed for a refund of sales tax from the State of Florida in the amount of Thirty Five Thousand One Hundred Four and 02/100 Dollars ($35,104.02). This amount was the sales tax paid to and remitted by various vendors for certain other equipment purchased in 1973 and 1974 and simultaneously leased. The amount of this refund request was granted and paid. Relying upon the facts expressed in paragraph 4 heretofore, Petitioner on or about June 2, 1977 filed with the Department of Revenue of the State of Indiana for the refund of the Tax. On or about June 7, 1979, the Department of Revenue of Indiana determined that the Vendor was registered in the State of Florida as Medical Facilities Equipment Company and therefore Petitioner should obtain the refund of the Tax form the State of Florida. So advised, Petitioner then filed the request for amended refund, which is the subject of this lawsuit, on July 16, 1979 in the amount of Seventeen Thousand Two Hundred Sixteen and 28/100 Dollars ($17,216.28). This request for refund was denied by Respondent, Office of the Comptroller, on the basis of the three year statute of non-claim set forth in section 215.26, Florida Statutes. Purchasers have assigned all rights, title and interest in sales and use tax refunds to Petitioner. During the audit of Petitioner in 1976 the lease arrangement on the equipment apparently came to light and Petitioner was advised sales tax was due on the rentals paid for the equipment. This resulted in an assessment against Petitioner of some $80,000 which was paid at the rate of $10,000 per month, with the last installment in November, 1976. The auditor advised Petitioner that a refund of sales tax on the purchase of this equipment was payable and he checked the Department's records for those companies registered as dealers in Florida. These records disclosed that sales taxes on the sale of some of this rental equipment had been remitted by the sellers of the equipment but Hospital Contract Consultants was not registered. Petitioner was advised to claim a refund of this sales tax from Indiana, the State of domicile of Hospital Contract Consultants. By letter on March 18, 1974, Amedco Inc., the parent company of wholly owned Hospital Contract Consultants, Inc. had advised the Florida Department of Revenue that Medical Facilities Equipment Company, another subsidiary, would report under ID No. 78-23-20785-79 which had previously been assigned to Hospital Contract Consultants Inc. which had erroneously applied for this registration. (Exhibit 2) Not stated in that letter but contained in Indiana Department of Revenue letter of April 18, 1979 was the information that the name of Hospital Contract Consultants had been changed to Medical Facilities Equipment Company. The request for the refund of some $17,000 submitted to Indiana in 1976 was finally denied in 1979 after research by the Indiana Department of Revenue showed the sales tax had been paid to Florida and not to Indiana.
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to the repayment of funds paid to the State Treasury through overpayment or error, in relation to use taxes? The refund claim is $37,837.91. See Section 215.26, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Rathon Corporation, formerly known as Diversey Corporation, is a Delaware Corporation authorized to do business in Florida. It manufactures various detergents, cleaners, and soaps, and the equipment to dispense those products. The products are marketed in Florida and other states. The customers of the products include hotels, hospitals, factories, and restaurants. The devices that dispense the detergents, cleaners, and soaps are referred to as "feeders." Those feeders can range from simple hand soap dispensers to electronically regulated machines that inject soap into commercial dishwashers. The feeders are loaned to Petitioner's customers at no additional charge for the period of time that the customer continues to purchase the product(s) dispensed by the feeder. These circumstances existed in the period of July 1993 through March 1995. In the period of July 1993 through March 1995, Diversey Corporation, now Rathon Corporation, paid the State of Florida $58,969.22 in use tax associated with the feeders. During the period in question, the Petitioner manufactured the feeders at a facility in Santa Cruz, California. The feeders were not warehoused in the Santa Cruz facility for an extended period. They were prepared for shipment and shipped to customers in the various states, to include Florida and California customers, to be used in the places of business operated by the customers. The feeders being shipped were not packaged with other products. During the period July 1993 through March 1995, the Petitioner not only paid use tax to Florida for the feeders, it paid use tax in forty-four other states and the District of Columbia, based upon the costs of manufacturing the feeders. California was among the other forty-four states. During the period in question, Petitioner accrued and paid use taxes to Florida and California limited to the feeders used by customers in those states, based upon the product sales allocation method it used in relation to the forty-three other states and the District of Columbia. The feeders that were provided to Florida customers were shipped by common carrier. Upon their arrival in Florida no tax had been paid to California pertaining to those feeders. When the feeders arrived in Florida during the period at issue, use tax would be remitted to Florida. Subsequently, the Petitioner paid the State of California a use tax associated with the feeders that had been shipped to Florida customers and upon which a use tax had been imposed by the State of Florida and paid. The California payment is described in detail below. Petitioner had paid Florida use tax on the feeders shipped to Florida customers based on the total manufactured cost of the feeders to Petitioner, including materials, labor, and overhead. The additional use tax paid to California for those feeders was based only on the cost of materials. The overall costs of feeders allocated to Florida for the refund period was $982,803.00. Petitioner remitted a 6% use tax to Florida totaling $58,969.22 for the period in question. In 1996, Petitioner was audited for sales and use tax compliance by the State of California. That audit process included the refund period that is in question in this case, July 1993 through March 1995. Following the audit, the State of California issued a Notice of Determination asserting additional liability for tax and interest that totaled $355,753.95. Petitioner paid that assessment. The California auditor had arrived at the assessment by concluding that Petitioner owed California for 44.57% of all feeders manufactured at Petitioner's Santa Cruz facility. The 44.57% represented all newly manufactured feeders that had been loaned by Petitioner to its customers during the refund period over the entire United States. As a consequence, the assessment of use tax by the State of California included tax on feeders for which Petitioner had paid Florida $58,969.22 in use tax prior to the California assessment of $355,753.95. Petitioner did not apply for credit in California for the portion of the $355,753.95 that would relate to the feeders brought to Florida during the period in question. Petitioner took no action to obtain a credit on the amount paid to Florida as a means to reduce the California tax obligation pursuant to the 1996 audit, because Petitioner had been told that the use tax for the feeders used by Florida customers was legally due in California and not in Florida. In arriving at the determination that 44.57% of the feeders manufactured during the period in question had been loaned to customers within the continental United States, the California auditor took into account that 21.8% of the feeders and feeder parts were sold for export, leaving 78.2% to be used in the United States. Of the 78.2% remaining for the United States, 57% were complete feeders sent to customers within the United States, and 43% were repair parts that were sent to Petitioner's Cambridge Division in Maryland, where those repair parts were being stored for future use. The percentage of 44.57% was arrived at by multiplying 57% times 78.2%, representing the percent of total feeders manufactured for use in the United States that were sent to customers within the United States and not held in inventory as repair parts. Again, California based its use tax for tangible personal property manufactured in that state to include only the cost of materials. Consequently, when the California auditor computed use tax to be collected by California using the 44.57% of total feeders manufactured to be used in the United States by Petitioner's customers in the United States, the California auditor used a cost factor of 55% of overall costs which was attributable to the cost of materials only. The total cost of feeders manufactured by Petitioner in California during the period in question, as related in the California tax audit, was $19,028,714.00. The total cost manufactured for use in the United States was $8,481,098.00, representing 44.57% of the overall cost of manufacturing. When the $8,481.098.00 is multiplied by 55%, representing the cost of materials only, the total costs of the goods subject to the use tax for the period in question is $4,664,604.00. A use tax rate of 7% was applied against the amount of $4,664,604.00. To attribute the portion of use tax paid to California following the 1996 audit associated with feeders that had been sent to Florida during the period in question, the answer is derived by multiplying $982,803.00 by 55% for a total of $540,542.00, and in turn multiplying that amount by 7%, the rate of tax imposed by California. That total is $37,837.91 in use tax that was subsequently paid to California after $58,962.22 had been paid to Florida for use tax on the same feeders. Diversey Corporation sought a tax refund in the amount of $58,977.00, through an application dated August 8, 1996, in relation to the period July 1993 through March. Eventually through the decision by the Respondent in its Notice of Decision of Refund Denial dated July 16, 1997, Respondent refused to grant the refund of $58,977.00. At present, Petitioner requests that it be given a refund of $37,837.91, which represents the portion of use tax paid to Florida that has been duplicated in a payment of use tax to California. Respondent, in its Notice of Decision of Refund Denial entered on July 16, 1997, and based upon the facts adduced at the final hearing, premises its proposed agency action denying the refund request upon the language set for in Section 212.06(1)(a) and (7), Florida Statutes. The determination to deny the refund request was not based upon reliance on Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code. The theory for denying the refund is premised upon Respondent's argument that use tax was due to Florida, "as of the moment" feeders arrived in Florida for use in Petitioner's business operations associated with its customers. Petitioner then paid the use tax to Florida at the time the feeders arrived in Florida. Having not paid California Use Tax prior to paying Florida Use Tax, Respondent concludes, through its proposed agency action, that it need not refund to Petitioner the use taxes it paid to California at a later date. Petitioner had referred to Rule 12A-1.091, Florida Administrative Code, following receipt of the Notice of Proposed Refund Denial issued on December 9, 1996, possibly creating the impression that Petitioner believed that Rule 12A-1.091, Florida Administrative Code, would support its claim for refund. It later developed that Petitioner did not have in mind reliance upon Rule 12A-1.091, Florida Administrative Code, to support its claim for refund. Instead, Petitioner made reference to that rule and specifically Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, as a means to perfect a challenge to Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 15, 1997, claiming that the challenged rule was an invalid exercise of authority. That challenge was assigned DOAH Case No. 97-5908RX. In summary, notwithstanding Petitioner's argument to the contrary, Respondent has never relied upon Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, or any other part of that rule in its proposed agency action denying the refund request. Absent Petitioner's affirmative reliance upon Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, the rule has no part to play in resolving this dispute.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner's request for repayment of funds paid to the State Treasury in the amount of $37,837.91, paid as use taxes for all years in question, be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Michael Madsen, Esquire Vickers, Madsen, and Goldman, LLP Suite 101 1705 Metropolitan Boulevard CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 1998. Tallahassee, Florida 32308-3765 John N. Upchurch, Esquire James McCauley, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, Esquire Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue 1. Whether the Emergency Rules on Sales and Use Tax on Services and Other Transactions adopted by the Respondent effective July 1, 1987, were adopted pursuant to Section 33, Chapter 87-6, l987 Laws of Florida, and Section 120.54(9), Florida Statutes (1987)? 2. Whether Rules 12AER87-31(1)(c), (5), (7)(i)(7)(k), (10), (12) and (13), Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority?
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida. It is charged with the responsibility to implement, enforce and collect the taxes levied by the State of Florida, including Chapter 212, Florida Statutes (1987). During the 1987 Legislative Session the Legislature enacted Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 777, which is codified as Chapter 87-6, 1987 Laws of Florida (hereinafter referred to as "Chapter 87-6"). This act, which amended Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, was signed into law by the Governor on April 23, 1987. Section 5 of Chapter 87-6, created Section 212.0594, Florida Statutes. This new Section of Chapter 212 imposed a sales tax on construction services performed on or after July 1, 1987. Section 33 of Chapter 87-6, authorized the Respondent to adopt emergency rules pursuant to Section 120.54(9), Florida Statutes, to implement the new law. In authorizing the adoption of emergency rules, the Legislature determined that the failure to promptly implement the provisions of Chapter 87-6 would present an immediate threat to the welfare of the State because revenues needed for the operation of the State would not be collected. On June 6, 1987, the Legislature enacted Committee Substitute for House Bill 1506, which is codified as Chapter 87-101, 1987 Laws of Florida (hereinafter referred to as "Chapter 87-101"). Chapter 87-101 is commonly known as the Sales Tax Glitch Bill. Chapter 87-101 was passed by the Legislature on June 6, 1987, signed into law by the Governor on June 30, 1987, and was effective beginning July 1, 1987. Section 5 of Chapter 87-101 repealed Section 5 of Chapter 87-6. Section 6 of Chapter 87-101, created a new Section 212.0594, Florida Statutes, taxing construction services, in replace of the Section 212.0594, Florida - Statutes, previously created by Section 5 of Chapter 87-6. Thus the Legislature substantially changed the manner in which sales tax was to be imposed upon construction services. Section 20 of Chapter 87-101 amended Section 33 of Chapter 87-6 but continued the authorization to adopt emergency rules and the justification for doing so. On May 8, 1987, the Respondent published notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly of its intent to hold public meetings and workshops on May 19 and 26, 1987, and June 6, 1987. Proposed rules relating to Chapter 87-6 were to be considered at these meetings and workshops. On May 22, 1987, the Respondent published notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly of its intent to hold public meetings and workshops on May 26, 1987, and June 26, 1987. Proposed rules relating to Chapter 87-6 were to be considered at these meetings and workshops. On May 29, 1987, the Respondent published notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly of its intent to hold a public meeting and workshop on June 6, 1987, to consider proposed rules relating to Chapter 87-6. On June 5, 1987, the Respondent published notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly of its intent to hold a public meeting and workshop on June 12, 1987, to consider proposed rules relating to Chapter 87-6. Ultimately, the Respondent held four workshops concerning the emergency rules: May 19 and 26, 1987, and June 6 and 12, 1987. The workshop conducted on June 12, 1987, was conducted to consider Rules 12AER87-31, Florida Administrative Code. The rules considered at the June 12, 1987, workshop had been redrafted to implement Chapter 87-101. The rules considered at the workshop were available for a short period of time before the workshop and during the workshop. Comments were received by the Department at the June 12, 1987, workshop from the public, including representatives of the construction industry. As a result of these comments, changes in the Emergency Rules were made following the workshop. The Emergency Rules took into account the method of taxing construction services provided for in Chapter 87-101 rather than the method previously provided for in Chapter 87-6. The Respondent's emergency rules, including Rule 12AER87-31, Florida Administrative Code, were certified by the Executive Director of the Respondent and delivered to the Secretary of State for publication on June 18, 1987. The Respondent delivered the full text of the emergency rules, a statement of the specific reasons for finding an immediate danger, a statement of the reasons for concluding that the procedure followed to adopt the rules was fair under the circumstances and a summary of the purpose of the rules for publication in the first available issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly. The emergency rules had to be filed with the Secretary of State no later than June 18, 1987, in order to be published in the Florida Administrative Weekly by July 1, 1987, the effective date of Chapters 87-6 and 87-101 and the emergency rules. The full text of the emergency rules was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on June 26, 1987. The text of this notice, which was accepted into evidence as Petitioner's exhibit 4, is hereby incorporated into this Final Order. The Emergency Rules had an effective date of July 1, 1987. Initially the Emergency Rules were to expire January 1, 1988, six months after their effective date, as specified in Chapter 87-101. Pursuant to Section 1, Chapter 87-539, 1987 Laws of Florida, the Emergency Rules are effective through June 30, 1988. Representatives of the Respondent and the Petitioner met between the passage of Chapter 87-101 by the Legislature and June 18, 1987, and discussed the act. The Respondent expended a great deal of time and effort in adopting the emergency rules implementing Chapters 87-6 and 87-101, and in providing information to the public. The method of taxation to be implemented was unique and, therefore, the Respondent was unable to look to other jurisdictions for guidance concerning implementation of the tax. The taxation of construction services was one of a multitude of services taxed. Chapter 87-101, required substantial redrafting of the emergency rules, including Rule 12AER87-31, Florida Administrative Code, within a relatively short period of time. The new tax necessitated the registration of 100,000 to 150,000 new sales tax "dealers" by July 1, 1987. Prior to July 1, 1987, the Respondent received thousands of telephone calls and thousands of written requests seeking information concerning the sales tax on services. The Respondent was extensively involved with the Legislature during the period of time when Chapters 87-6 and 87-101 were adopted. Representatives of the Respondent discussed the acts with Legislative members and staff. Dr. James Francis acted as a liaison between the Respondent and the Legislature. Dr. Francis also served on the Revenue Estimating Conference. In his capacity with the Revenue Estimating Conference, Dr. Francis prepared estimates of tax revenues from the services tax. A revenue impact analysis of the services tax was also provided by the Respondent to the Legislature based upon each amendment and proposed amendment to Chapters 87-6 and 87-101. Representatives of the petitioner expressed dissatisfaction with the method of taxation of construction services contained in Chapter 87-6 because of the required itemization of building material costs on each contract. The Respondent prepared a revenue neutral (no loss of tax revenue previously estimated to be generated by Chapter 87-6) method of imposing the services tax on construction services without requiring itemization of building material costs. Pursuant to this method, a set percentage, generally equal to the average percentage of building material costs, is backed out of "contract price" or "cost price." The remainder is treated as the amount of the "contract price" or "cost price" attributable to the construction services. The revenue estimated by the Respondent and provided to the Legislature, based upon the elimination of an average percentage of building material costs, was based upon the inclusion in "contract price" and "cost price" of all expenditures associated with the construction industry, including the total expenditures for building materials supplied by owners to contractors. The Legislature was aware of this fact before it adopted Chapter 87-101. Fiscal notes for Chapter 87-101, which the Respondent had available prior to the adoption of the Emergency Rules, numerically quantified the estimated revenue to be generated by Chapter 87-101. The Respondent also knew what amounts were included in the estimate of revenue contained in the fiscal notes. These amounts were consistent with the revenue estimates provided by the Respondent to the Legislature. The Emergency Rules represent a contemporaneous administrative construction of Chapters 87-6 and 87-101 by an agency charged with responsibility to administer the acts and which was intimately involved in the adoption of the acts. The Petitioner has challenged the validity of Rules 12AER87-31(1)(c), (5), (7)(i), (7)(k), (10), (12) and (13) Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioner withdrew its challenge of other portions of the Emergency Rules. Rule 12AER87-31(7)(i), Florida Administrative Code, defines the terms "contract price" which determines the amount of tax due on construction work performed pursuant to a contract and any speculative construction which is sold within six months of completion. The Petitioner has challenged Rule 12AER87-31(7)(i), Florida Administrative Code, to the extent that contract price is defined to include the fair market value of materials used by a contractor if the value of those materials is not otherwise included in the contract price. The Petitioner's contractor witnesses' understanding of Rule 12AER87- 31(7)(i), Florida Administrative Code, that the fair market value of materials supplied by the owner are to be included in the computation of contract price, is consistent with the Respondent's interpretation of the Rule. Prime contractors often estimate the cost of building materials in their daily business activities. The Respondent's interpretation of Rule 12AER87-31(1)(c), Florida Administrative Code, does not require a contractor or subcontractor who uses building materials which are purchased tax free to remit a tax. The rule simply makes it clear that there is not necessarily any link between the question of whether the purchase of building materials and the provision of construction services are tax exempt.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner showed by a preponderance of the evidence that it is entitled to a refund of $1,500,216.60 in sales and use tax paid during the period from January 2005 through January 2007 to purchase industrial printing machinery that allegedly satisfied the statutory requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output for printing facilities that manufacture, process, compound or produce tangible personal property at fixed locations in the state within the meaning of Subsection 212.08(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Administrative Rule 12A-1.096.1/
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency responsible for administering the state sales tax imposed in Chapter 212. Petitioner is a "for profit" Florida corporation located in St. Petersburg, Florida. Petitioner is engaged in the business of publishing newspapers and commercial printing. Petitioner derives approximately 85 percent of its revenue from advertising and approximately 15 percent of its revenue from circulation subscriptions. In April, 2007, Petitioner requested a refund of $403,780.05 in sales and use taxes paid for the purchase of industrial machinery and equipment during the period from January, 2005, to January, 2006. In October, 2007, Petitioner requested a refund of $1,096,436.61 in sales and use taxes paid for the purchase of industrial machinery and equipment for the period from January, 2006, to January, 2007. The first refund request in April, 2007, became DOAH Case Number 08-3938, and the second refund request in October, 2007, became DOAH Case Number 08-3939. The two cases were consolidated into this proceeding pursuant to the joint motion of the parties. The parties stipulated that the only issue for determination in this consolidated proceeding is whether Petitioner satisfied the requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A- 1.096. If a finding were to be made that Petitioner satisfied the 10 percent requirement, the parties stipulate that the file will be returned to Respondent for a determination of whether the items purchased are qualifying machinery and equipment defined in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096. The issue of whether Petitioner satisfied the statutory requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096 is a mixed question of law and fact. The ALJ concludes as a matter of law that Petitioner did not satisfy the 10 percent requirement. The ALJ discusses that conclusion briefly, for context, in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Findings of Fact, and explains the conclusion and the supporting legal authority more fully in the Conclusions of Law. It is an undisputed fact that Petitioner counts items identified in the record as "preprints," "custom inserts," and "circulation inserts" separately from the "newspaper" as a means of exceeding the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). Respondent construes the 10 percent exemption authorized in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) in pari materia with the exemption authorized in Subsection 212.08(5)(1)(g) for "preprints," "custom inserts," and "circulation inserts" (hereinafter "inserts"). The latter statutory exemption treats inserts as a "component part of the newspaper" which are not to be treated separately for tax purposes. For reasons stated more fully in the Conclusions of Law, the ALJ agrees with the statutory construction adopted by Respondent. That conclusion of law renders moot and, therefore, irrelevant and immaterial, the bulk of the evidence put forth by the parties during the two-day hearing because the evidence assumed arguendo that Petitioner's statutory interpretation would be adopted by the ALJ, i.e., inserts would be counted separately from the newspaper for purposes of satisfying the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). In an abundance of caution, the fact-finder made findings of fact based on the legal assumption that inserts are statutorily required to be counted separately for purposes of the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). Those findings are set forth in paragraphs 9 through 11. The verification audit by Respondent's field office was able to verify an output increase of only 4.27 percent for 2005 and only 8.72 percent for 2006. A preponderance of evidence in this de novo proceeding did not overcome those findings. The trier of fact finds the evidence from Petitioner during this de novo proceeding to be inconsistent and unpersuasive. For example, Petitioner inflated production totals by counting materials printed for its own use, and materials in which the unit of measurement was inconsistent. In other instances, production totals for printing presses identified in the record as Didde and Ryobi presses varied dramatically with circulation. In other instances, Petitioner's reporting positions changed during the course of the proceeding. There is scant evidence that the alleged increase in production created jobs in the local market in a manner consistent with legislative intent. Rather, a preponderance of evidence shows that when Petitioner placed the equipment in service it was job neutral or perhaps reduced jobs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner did not satisfy the requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output defined in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096, and denying Petitioner's request for a refund. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 2009.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that petitioner's request for a refund pursuant to F.S. 215.26 be denied. Respectfully submitted and entered this 4th day of March, 1977 in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE T. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald L. Lewis Comptroller State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Carl R. Pennington, Jr. Pennington, Wilkinson and Sauls Post Office Box 3985 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Patricia S. Turner Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner's application for licensure as a nonresident life, health and variable annuities insurance agent should be denied on the basis of his having pled guilty and been convicted of a felony. Embodied within that general issue are the issues of whether the felony involved is one of moral turpitude and whether the conviction, and the circumstances surrounding it, demonstrate that the Petitioner lacks fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Preston Hursey, Jr., filed an application for qualification in Florida as a nonresident life, health and variable annuities agent. The application was filed on November 13, 1989. On April 9, 1990, the Department of Insurance issued a letter of denial with regard to that application based upon a felony conviction of the Petitioner in the past. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged, in pertinent part, with enforcing the licensure, admission and continuing practice standards for insurance agents of all types, embodied in Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, and with regulating the admission of persons to licensure as insurance agents in the State of Florida. On August 12, 1988, an Information was filed with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, charging the Petitioner with three felony counts involving "aiding or assisting presentation of false income tax return". That is a felony violation of Title 26 U.S.C., Sections 7206(2). On November 15, 1989, the Petitioner was found guilty of three counts of aiding or assisting presentation of false income tax return in violation of that statutory section. The actual conduct for which he was convicted occurred prior to the charges. Prior to 1984, the Petitioner worked for some years as a medical examiner for insurance companies, taking medical histories, blood pressures, pulses and the like, for purposes of establishing insurance coverage for clients of the companies. Some time in early 1984, the Petitioner approached American Dynamics Corporation, as a client, with the intent of availing himself of the financial planning services of that company with the intent of saving on income taxes. The company was apparently counseling clients as to tax shelters in which they could invest or which they could claim, as a means of' avoidance of federal income tax. The Petitioner became very interested in that tax saving procedure and sometime in 1984 became involved with the firm as one of its financial counselor employees. The firm trained him in the service they offered to taxpayers, which involved financial planning by using trusts to defer taxes, as well as other means of sheltering income from tax liability. The company and the Petitioner counseled numerous clients and assisted them in taking advantage of alleged tax shelters, including the final act of preparing their tax returns. During the course of going to hearings with his clients, when their tax returns came under question by the Internal Revenue Service, the Petitioner became aware that apparently the service would not accept the tax shelter devices being used by his company and him as a legitimate means of avoiding taxes. He then sought legal advice from a tax attorney and received an opinion from him that the tax avoidance counseling methods, devices and tax return preparation the Petitioner and his employer were engaging in were not legal, and that the Petitioner should advise anyone he knew involved in such schemes to terminate their relationship. The Petitioner acted on that advice, terminated his relationship with the company and recommended to his clients that they terminate their relationship with the company and the tax avoidance devices being used. Through hindsight and learning more about relevant tax law in the last four to five years since the conduct occurred, the Petitioner realizes that the tax shelter schemes marketed by his employer at that time and, by himself, did not make financial or legal sense. The Petitioner at that time had very little training in financial counseling or advising and very little training in the Federal income tax laws arid regulations. In retrospect, after receiving much more such training as an agent of New York Life Insurance Company since that time, he realized the significance of the error he and his former employer committed. When the tax returns were prepared by the Petitioner and others employed with the firm involved, the tax return accurately reflected the gross income of he taxpayer, the "W2 forms", and all appropriate documentation. Then, the gross income of the taxpayer was shown as reduced by the amount of funds affected by the tax shelter system marketed by the Petitioner's former employer and the Petitioner. There was a statement on the tax return itself explaining the disparity in taxable income so that basically the Internal Revenue Service had the facts and circumstances of such situations disclosed to it. It, however, deemed anyone marketing such tax shelters as engaged in marketing "abusive tax shelters", in effect, in violation of the Internal Revenue Code. Ultimately, the Petitioner was prosecuted along with others involved in the transactions and suffered a felony conviction of three counts of violation of the statute referenced above. The Petitioner has steadfastly maintained both before and after his conviction that he had no intent to violate the tax laws of the United States, but rather believed, until he sought a legal opinion from a qualified attorney, that the service he was marketing was a legal one. After he came under prosecution by the Justice Department for the violation, the Petitioner cooperated fully with the Internal Revenue Service and the Justice Department. The felony violation of which he was convicted, by guilty plea, carried a sentence of three years imprisonment, one year for each tax return involved. That sentence was reduced by the court; however, in consideration of the circumstances of the Petitioner's offense and his cooperation with the prosecuting authorities, to one month of "work release", which he served by working during the day for senior citizens organizations and returning to a confinement facility in the evening. He also was required to render 200 hours of community service, which he has completed, and three years probation. Because of his excellent attitude and behavior and his demonstrated activities designed to further his education in the insurance and securities field, his successful pursuit of the insurance and securities marketing profession in other states and his obviously-positive motivation, his probation officer has recommended that his probation be terminated early, after only two years of it would have been completed in November, 1990. The sentence was reduced because of the Petitioner's positive record in his community, the fact that he had no prior criminal history and because of widespread support by responsible members of the community and by the probation officers who reviewed his case and situation. The judge, upon sentencing, also noted that he was impressed by the fact that the Petitioner wanted to continue to work in the insurance and securities field and was the sole support of a young son whom he was supporting and caring for as an active parent. He continues to do that. The record establishes that the Petitioner's conviction was the result of a guilty plea. That plea resulted from a negotiated "plea bargain" settlement with the prosecuting authorities. The Petitioner established with unrefuted testimony, that he never had any willful intent to commit a crime or defraud the Federal government and the Internal Revenue Service. While he had a general intent to offer the tax advice involved to clients and assist them in engaging in tax shelter arrangements and in preparing the related tax returns, he had no specific intent to commit acts which he knew to be illegal when he committed them, nor which he believed amounted to fraud or deceit of the Internal Revenue Service. Although he pled guilty to a crime involving, by the language of the above--cited statute, the element of falsity, which bespeaks of deceit or fraud, the evidence shows that the Petitioner harbored no such fraudulent or deceitful intent. This is corroborated by the fact that the Petitioner and his clients disclosed all income on the tax return and simply disclosed that a portion of it was sheltered, which procedure was determined by the Internal Revenue Service to be illegal. There was no evidence of record to indicate that the Petitioner sought to conceal income or otherwise commit a false or fraudulent act in the course of his financial and tax advice to these clients, nor in the preparation of their tax returns for submittal. While the statute he is convicted of violating appears to involve the element of moral turpitude because it refers to false or fraudulent tax returns, it is a very general type of charge which can cover many types of activities or conduct. Consequently, one should consider the specific conduct involved in a given instance, such as this one, to determine whether the crime committed factually involved moral turpitude. Based upon the unrefuted evidence of record culminating in the findings of fact made above, it is clear that the Petitioner committed no conduct involving moral turpitude at the time the activity in question was engaged in for the above reasons. The Petitioner has been in no legal altercation, criminal or otherwise, before or since the instance which occurred in 1984. He has become licensed in Washington DC, Maryland and Virginia as an insurance agent and as a broker agent. He represents numerous insurance companies, including, for approximately five years, the New York Life Insurance Company and other reputable companies. He has pursued his continuing education requirements and has earned more requirements than he needs for licensure in Florida and Maryland. He is actively seeking to improve his professional standing and competence in the insurance and securities field and is highly motivated to continue doing so. A great deal of his motivation comes from the fact that he is the sole support of his young 11-year-old son. He enjoys the insurance profession because it gives him time to participate in his son's many school-related and extracurricular activities, such as football. The Petitioner's testimony, and the proven circumstances of the situation, establish without question that he is an honest, forthright person who has candidly admitted a past mistake and who has worked actively, in the approximate six years which have elapsed since the conduct was committed, to rectify that blemish on his record. His efforts to rehabilitate himself personally and professionally involved his active participation as a parent for his son in his son's school life and otherwise, and participation in church and community activities. During the time period which has elapsed since the conduct in question occurred, he has sufficiently rehabilitated himself both personally and professionally so as to justify the finding that he has demonstrated trustworthiness and fitness to engage in the business of insurance. Indeed, three other states, after having the circumstances of his conviction fully disclosed to them, have licensed him or retained him as a licensee insurance agent. The Petitioner is a navy veteran of Vietnam, having served three tours in the Vietnam war, for which service he was decorated. He had a number of security clearances, including a top secret security clearance based upon his work in the field of communications and cryptology during that war. This honorable service, the efforts he has made to improve himself personally and professionally before and since the subject conduct occurred, the fact that it was an isolated incident on his record, the fact that it did not involve any established intent to defraud or deceive on his part, the fact that he is an active, positive parental role model, community member and church member, and his general demeanor at hearing of honesty and forthrightness convinces the Hearing Officer that the isolated incident of misconduct he committed did not involve a demonstrated lack of fitness and trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance. Quite positively, the Petitioner has demonstrated his fitness and trustworthiness to engage in that business.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's application for licensure as a nonresident life, health and variable annuities insurance agent should be granted. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-3069 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-4. Accepted. 5. Rejected, as not clearly established by the evidence of record. 6-14. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-4. Accepted. 5. Rejected, as not clearly established by the evidence of record. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, Esq. General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Preston Hursey, Jr., pro se Post Office Box 43643 Washington, DC 20010 Willis F. Melvin, Jr., Esq. Andrew Levine, Esq. Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency authorized to administer and enforce provisions of Chapter 520, Florida Statutes, regulating the granting or denial of applications for Home Improvement Contractor Licenses. On November 30, 1988, Petitioner submitted an application on behalf of a corporation known as "The Durocoat Company" (Durocoat) to Respondent for licensure as a home improvement contractor. On that application, Petitioner disclosed the identity of the two principals of the corporation and the position held by those two individuals. Petitioner listed himself as the president of the corporation and another individual, Russell W. Black, as the corporation's vice-president. Each principal owns 50 percent of the corporation. Following the section of the application providing for the disclosure of the identities and addresses of business principals, a number of questions are listed and the person executing the form is required to provide an "X" in a block to indicate a "yes" or "no" answer to each of those questions. Question number four reads as follows: Are there unpaid judgments against the applicant or any of the persons listed above? If "yes" attach a copy of the complaint and judgment(s). Petitioner placed an "X" in the space allotted for a "yes" answer to the inquiry regarding unpaid judgments against the persons listed as business principals, namely himself and Mr. Black. Petitioner then attached a copy of a document entitled "Notice of Levy" issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of the United States Department of the Treasury. In sum, the notice certifies the existence of a tax lien against Mr. Black, Durocoat's vice-president, in the amount of $27,546.25. It is undisputed by the parties that creditors held unpaid judgments against Petitioner at the time he submitted the application on November 30, 1988, and that he failed to attach copies of those judgments to the application. Further, Petitioner acknowledged at the final hearing that he was aware at the time of submittal of the application of the existence of one of these judgments. That judgement, entered in favor of The American Express Company (American Express) for $7,602, has existed since September of 1987. In mitigation of his failure to disclose the American Express judgement, Petitioner testified at hearing that he didn't have a copy of the judgement at the time he filed the application and was unaware of the requirement that he should attach a copy. In view of his action in attaching a copy of the existing tax lien against Mr. Black to the application, Petitioner's testimony that he was unaware that he should attach copies of unpaid judgments is not credited. A copy of Petitioner's credit report, introduced at final hearing by Petitioner, discloses that a business known as "Speeler Marine" obtained a judgement against him in the amount of $250 in March of 1986. Petitioner testified at hearing that he was unaware of the existence of this judgement. No settlement discussions have been initiated by him with the creditor. Petitioner's credit report further discloses that an outstanding loan to Petitioner in 1985 in the amount of $36,000 by a financial institution identified as "Sun Bank" is classified as a "bad debt, placed for collection." Petitioner testified that this debt represents loan funds obtained in a previous business venture and is the subject of settlement negotiations and that he has repaid $4,000 of the amount at the present time. Petitioner's testimony also establishes that the credit report's disclosure of a 1987 foreclosure certificate of title to real estate represented real property located in Gainesville, Florida, which Petitioner had taken in trade for money owed to him. In view of the distance to that city, Petitioner testified that he simply chose not to pay off the existing mortgage on the property or oppose foreclosure action by the mortgage holder. A representative of Nationwide Chemical Coating Company (Nationwide) testified at the final hearing regarding that company's business relationship with Petitioner's corporation. Since February of 1988, Nationwide has sold supplies valued at $250,000 to Durocoat. The company has always paid charges within the 30 day required time limit and is considered to be a "class A" customer. In regard to the federal tax lien which Petitioner attached to the application, Russell W. Black testified that the lien resulted from the disallowance by IRS of a tax shelter investment of $34,000 made by Black in 1977 or 1978. Black was notified by IRS in 1981 that the tax shelter was not considered to be a valid deduction for tax purposes. The amount owed by Black to IRS in 1981 was $20,630.64. The amount is now $27,546.25 and, according to Black, is still unpaid because he doesn't have the money. On advice of counsel, he has not contacted IRS to schedule payments on the debt. Respondent denied Petitioner's application by letter dated January 13, 1989, stating that Petitioner's failure to attach copies of the unpaid judgments against himself constituted a material misstatement of fact sufficient to authorize the denial. The letter further stated that the unpaid judgments, along with the federal tax lien against Mr. Black, demonstrated a lack of financial responsibility by both individuals and constituted an additional ground for denial of the application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of August, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1989. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings. Petitioner's proposed findings consisted of 10 unnumbered paragraphs which have been numbered 1-10 and are treated as follows: 1-8. Addressed in part, remainder rejected as unnecessary. Rejected, unsupported by direct admissible evidence. Rejected, unnecessary to result reached. Respondent's Proposed Findings. 1-2. Addressed. 3-4. Rejected, unnecessary. 5-11. Addressed in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: John L. Riley, Esq. 2325 Fifth Avenue North St. Petersburg, FL 33713 William W. Byrd, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Office Of The Comptroller 1313 Tampa Street, Suite 615 Tampa, FL 33602-3394 Hon. Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 Charles Stutts, Esq. General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Plaza Level, Room 1302 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact St. Petersburg Steel Corporation is a Florida corporation which manufactures and sells steel products in Florida and to out-of-state purchasers. During the three-year audit period ending May 31, 1981, some $1.9 million was billed by Petitioner for sales made. In conducting the audit for the period from June 1, 1978, through May 31, 1981, Respondent was provided all invoices and records of Petitioner. Due to the large volume of invoices involved, the auditor prepared the assessments by using Petitioner's sales register and did not check the entries therein with the source documents (invoices, bills of lading, sales slips, etc.). Some of the vendees were out of state, some were no longer in business, and the names of some could have been misread by the auditor since they were handwritten. Unless Petitioner was able to present a resale certificate for a vendee or the sales register did not show the sales tax paid, that sale was included in the assessment. Some of those vendees were no longer in business and could not be located by Petitioner to obtain their resale certificate numbers. Purchases for which Petitioner was assessed a use tax included some equipment such as fans and file cabinets and rent paid to its lessor on which Petitioner could not show a sales tax had been paid. Petitioner contended that the audit was improperly conducted because the source documents were not used as the basis for the assessment. The only evidence presented to support this contention was the testimony of Esposito, who did not qualify as an expert witness able to credibly present such opinion testimony. Petitioner further contended that he had remitted to Respondent some $1,900 in sales taxes improperly collected by him on out-of-state sales for which no tax was due. No claim for a refund of those taxes was made in these proceedings and no documentary evidence to support this contention was submitted by Petitioner.
