The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner was the victim of discrimination by the Respondent because of an alleged disability and whether the Respondent retaliated against the Petitioner for filing a complaint of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner Gregory L. Stubbs, was employed by the Respondent Department as a maintenance yard Welder for approximately five and one-half years. In 1993, he suffered a back injury on the job, resulting in chronic pain. On January 28, 1997, the Petitioner accepted a position with the Department's Office of Motor Carrier Compliance (MCC) as a Weight Inspector. The Weight Inspector position accepted by Mr. Stubbs was an open, advertised position at the time, for which the Department accepted applications and conducted interviews, including that of Mr. Stubbs. He applied for the position, was interviewed and selected for the position. When Mr. Stubbs was offered the Weight Inspector position, he was advised that appointment to the position would amount to a demotion from his current position with the Department, in the sense that he would have to accept a base rate of pay of 5 percent less than he had been earning. He voluntarily accepted that position and the reduction in pay. The pay for the position was set when the position was released for hire and was not changed because Mr. Stubbs elected to apply for the position and became the selected candidate hired for the position. Weight Inspectors work at fixed-scale weigh stations where trucks are weighed. Mr. Stubbs was assigned to the "Northbound scales" on Interstate 95 near Yulee, Florida in Nassau County. Weight Inspectors are responsible for enforcing the motor vehicle weight laws, writing citations for violations, as well as writing citations for fuel tax violations and enforcing the dimensional limits on motor vehicles. The job involves weighing and measuring vehicles, writing citations, answering the telephone, operating a computer and checking vehicle tags and registration numbers. The job does not involve any heavy lifting, loading or any physically demanding tasks. Weight Inspectors employed by MCC work alone at the scale houses, except when a new inspector is present for training. Mr. Stubbs was able to perform these duties and, when present for work, performed them well. Mr. Stubbs was supervised by Sgt. Robert Bryan. Sgt. Bryan participated in interviewing Mr. Stubbs and in selecting him for the position. During the interview process Sgt. Bryan informed Mr. Stubbs of the Weight Inspector's job duties. Mr. Stubbs never informed Sgt. Bryan that he would have any trouble performing the job duties. Mr. Stubbs also did not tell Sgt. Bryan, at that time, that he had trouble with his back or that he would have trouble reporting for work on time. Sgt. Bryan later learned that Mr. Stubbs had trouble with his back, but did not consider the problem to restrict Mr. Stubbs' ability to perform the Weight Inspector job. Weight Inspectors are required to report for work on time. The failure to report for work timely, results in closure of the scale facility. When a Weight Inspector has to be late or is unable to report for work before the beginning of a shift, he is required to advise the supervisor before the scheduled time for the shift. This requirement is contained in the Department's published Conduct Standards. Copies of the Department's published Conduct Standards are provided to all Weight Inspectors that work for MCC, including the Petitioner. Department employees are advised that unexcused tardiness or absences will be grounds for disciplinary action and the Petitioner was so informed. On October 19, 1997, Sgt. Bryan counseled Mr. Stubbs about failing to notify him of an absence from work. Sgt. Bryan stressed the need for Mr. Stubbs to contact him as soon as he became aware that he would not be able to timely report for work. On October 12, 1998, Sgt. Bryan counseled Mr. Stubbs for failing to report to work on time. Sgt. Bryan again stressed the need for Mr. Stubbs to timely report to work. On December 31, 1998, Mr. Stubbs acknowledged receipt of a Memorandum from Lt. Vicki D. Thomas concerning tardiness and the use of leave. Lt. Thomas is the Jacksonville Field Office supervisor for MCC and is Sgt. Bryan's immediate supervisor. Lt. Thomas' Memorandum requires Weight Inspectors to contact both the main MCC office and the inspector who they are scheduled to relieve whenever they will be tardy or absent. On January 13, 1999, Sgt. Bryan again counseled Mr. Stubbs about failing to report to work as scheduled In 1998, Mr. Stubbs filed a grievance through his union, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). The subject of the grievance was the reduction in pay Mr. Stubbs' sustained by accepting employment with MCC. He sought re-instatement of the pay he had received as a Welder. Lt. Thomas received the AFSCME grievance on August 17, 1998, and responded to it by noting that the grievance was untimely and that Mr. Stubbs had voluntarily accepted the Weight Inspector position and attendant reduction in pay. Although the grievance was unsuccessful Mr. Stubbs continued his employment with MCC. On or about February 9, 1999, the Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC alleging that the Department had discriminated against him on the basis of race and disability by reducing his pay when he accepted the Weight Inspector position. On May 13, 1999, the EEOC advised the Petitioner that it could not investigate his charge because it was not filed within the time required by law. A copy of the EEOC Dismissal and Notice of Rights was provided to the Department. A copy of the EEOC Notice was also sent to Mr. Stubbs at the Department's address. This copy was mistakenly opened by the Department and then forwarded to Mr. Stubbs. Sgt. Bryan became aware of the complaint when the letter was opened in the Department offices, but the complaint was not a factor in his supervision of Mr. Stubbs. On April 2, 1999 through June 25, 1999, the Petitioner was absent from work. He exhausted all of his sick leave and was authorized additional, unpaid leave under the Family Medical Leave Act. On June 25, 1999, Mr. Stubbs returned to his Weight Inspector assignment. He was scheduled to work on July 2, 7, 8, 9, 13 and 16, 1999. He did not report for work on those days. On July 8, 1999, he failed to advise Sgt. Bryan that he would not be reporting for work. Sgt. Bryan checked with other supervisors to see if Mr. Stubbs had advised anyone else that he would be absent, and learned that Mr. Stubbs had not contacted them. Lt. Thomas issued a written reprimand to the Petitioner for these absences. The reprimand was issued because he was absent from work without authorized leave and failed to follow the Department's rules concerning advance approval for leave. Neither the Petitioner's prior complaint to the EEOC or his back problem motivated Lt. Thomas to issue the reprimand. On July 20, 1999, Sgt. Bryan spoke with Mr. Stubbs about a cash penalty that Mr. Stubbs had collected on a "load report." Weight Inspectors who collect cash penalties are required to convert the cash funds to a money order or cashier's check within 48-hours after the date the report is issued. Weight Inspectors are allowed to use work time to convert cash penalties to money orders or cashier's checks. Sgt. Bryan asked the Petitioner about the cash because the load report involved was apparently issued six days earlier. The Petitioner told Sgt. Bryan that he had not converted the cash to a money order, that he had the cash with him and that he believed the inquiry was ridiculous. Sgt. Bryan then had to go to Mr. Stubbs's doctor's office to retrieve the cash penalty. Mr. Stubbs received a suspension for his handling of the cash penalty and related behavior. Lt. Thomas investigated the allegations contained in the suspension letter and believed them to be correct. She prepared the letter for signature. Neither Mr. Stubbs' prior complaint to the EEOC or his back problem motivated Lt. Thomas to issue the suspension. During the period from July 21, 1999 to August 6, 1999, the Petitioner was repeatedly absent and late to work. At 12:25 p.m., on August 1, 1999, the Petitioner advised Lt. Thomas that he had not worked as scheduled on July 31, 1999, and had not reported for work on the morning of August 1, 1999. On August 26, 1999, the Petitioner received a suspension for his unauthorized and excessive absences. Lt. Thomas investigated the allegations contained in the suspension letter, believed them to be correct and prepared the letter for signature. Neither the Petitioner's prior complaint to the EEOC or his back problem motivated Lt. Thomas to issue the suspension. The Petitioner was advised that any further violations of the Department's Conduct Standards would result in more severe discipline, up to and including dismissal. The Petitioner was scheduled to work from October 11 through October 15, 1999, but did not report for work on those days. He did not contact Sgt. Bryan or Lt. Thomas to advise them that he would not be at work. Lt. Thomas and Sgt. Bryan checked with other MCC supervisors and staff but were not advised that Mr. Stubbs had contacted anyone. Sgt. Bryan and Lt. Thomas did not hear from Mr. Stubbs from October 11 through October 15, 1999, and had not authorized his absences. The Department dismissed Mr. Stubbs from employment for those unauthorized absences. The Petitioner was apparently ill during that period but did not provide the Department with a doctor's note until approximately six weeks after the absences. The doctor's note does not indicate that the Petitioner was unable to call his supervisors to report his anticipated absence. The Petitioner did not establish that he was unable to report to his supervisors as required. The Department's discipline of the Petitioner and the ultimate decision to dismiss him from the Department were not motivated by Mr. Stubbs' prior complaint to the EEOC. Although some of his absences from work may have resulted from his back injury, the evidence does not establish that all of his absences were related to his injury. He was absent for material amounts of time in excess of his available leave. In 1999, he exhausted his accrued leave and used twelve weeks of unpaid leave under the Family Medical Leave Act. After returning from family medical leave, he continued to be absent for a significant period of time. There was no showing that additional leave would enable Mr. Stubbs to return to work on a regular basis. Additionally, he failed to notify his superiors in advance of his absences as required and instructed.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witness and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations denying the Petition in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert M. Burdick, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Gregory L. Stubbs 3563 North Hampton Cove Court Jacksonville, Florida 32225 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Conclusions The Director, Division of Hotels and Restaurants, Department of Business and Professional Regulation (the Division), after consideration of the complete record of this case on file with the Division, enters this Final Order. 1. On November 10, 2009, the Department issued an Administrative Complaint attached hereto as exhibit "A." 2. On April 27, 2010, a hearing in this cause was held before the Honorable Lawrence P. Stevenson, Administrative Law Judge, Division of Administrative Hearings. 3. On July 14, 2010, the Honorable Lawrence P. Stevenson issued a Recommended Order, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "B." The Statement of the Issues, Preliminary Statement, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation contained in the Recommended Order are hereby adopted in toto and incorporated herein by reference. Based upon the foregoing, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises it is, hereby ORDERED that: for Respondent's violations of Section 509, Florida Statutes, and/or the rules promulgated thereto the following penalty is imposed: 1. Respondent shall pay a fine in the amount of $500.00, due and payable to the Division of Hotels and Restaurants, 1940 North Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1011, within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this Order is filed with the agency clerk. 2. This Final Order shall become effective on the date of filing with the Agency Clerk DONE AND ORDERED this 2O day of Angus ,2010. L. Veach, Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Hotels and Restaurants 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1015
Appeal For This Case Unless expressly waived, any party substantially affected by this final order may seek judicial review by filing an original Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, and a copy of the notice, accompanied by the filing fees prescribed by law, with the clerk of the appropriate District Court of Appeal within thirty (30) days rendition of this order, in accordance with Rule 9.110, Fla. R. App. P., and Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished via Certified U.S. Mail to Boardwalk Fries, c/o Halim Hanna, 848 Eagle View Drive, Tallahassee, Florida 32311; by regular U.S. Mail to the Honorable Lawrence P. Stevenson, Administrative Law Judge, Division of Administrative Hearings, 1230 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399- 3060; and by hand delivery to Marc Drexler, Chief Attorney, Division of Hotels and Restaurants, Department of Business and Professional Regulations, 1940 North Monrog .@breet, Tallahassee, Floxida 3¥399-2202, this day of ~ , 2010. - ° For the Division of Hotels and Restaurants
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent from August 26, 1986 to November 6, 1986 as a millworker cutting wood for floor joists used in the manufacture of mobile homes. His employment was terminated by Respondent on November 6, 1986 due to his inability to keep up with production. Petitioner timely filed his request for hearing with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Respondent is an employer within the terms of the Human Rights Act of 1977, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and manufactures mobile homes. Petitioner is handicapped by virtue of the amputation of his left arm above the elbow due to a motorcycle accident in 1977. During the approximately two and one-half month period that Petitioner was employed by Respondent, four mobile homes per day were being produced. However, Respondent determined in late October, 1986 to increase production to five mobile homes per day and implemented this increased level of production in November, after Petitioner was terminated. All employees are evaluated within thirty days of their employment by Respondent. Petitioner's thirty day evaluation was conducted on September 23, 1986. On a five point scale, with one being excellent and five being poor, Petitioner received a rating of four in productivity. This is a low average rating. Comments by his group leader on the evaluation form state that Petitioner "needs to get a system down in order to increase productivity." Petitioner was counsel led about the need to increase his productivity at the time of this evaluation. From September 23 to October 24, 1986 Petitioner's productivity did not improve. His group leader at the time he was terminated, Frederick W. Moulder, testified that it took Petitioner 3 1/2 hours to do a job which it took Moulder 1 1/2 to 3 hours to do. Moulder also helped Petitioner finish his work since Moulder regularly finished early and Petitioner never completed his work early, even though production at the time was four homes per day and had not yet been increased to five. On October 24, 1986 Petitioner's supervisor, Tim Powers, prepared a written warning notice which stated that Petitioner "needs to improve his speed to enable him to keep up with his production . . . ." Petitioner refused to sign this warning notice to acknowledge receipt, and instead stated to Powers that his production was fast enough. Petitioner was assigned to work with Charles Rogers on the last day of his employment to show Rogers how the machines he worked with operated. Rogers replaced Petitioner after his termination. There is no evidence that Petitioner ever asked for a reassignment due to production demands of his millworker position. To the contrary, Petitioner continues to feel that he was working fast enough and was meeting production that he felt was sufficient. In any event, there is no evidence that alternative positions were available. During October and November, 1986 Respondent terminated eleven employees for slow or insufficient production, in addition to Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that a Final Order be issued by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing Petitioner's charge of discrimination against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd Day of November, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 1987. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 87-3407 Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-3 Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 8-9 Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 10-11 Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 12 Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 13-16 Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph Scott Shepherd 108 Flores Way Auburndale, Florida 33823 Jeffrey W. Bell, Esquire 600 Peachtree At The Circle Building 1275 Peachtree Street, N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30309 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director 325 John Knox Road Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel 325 John Knox Road Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Sherry B. Rice, Clerk 325 John Knox Road Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue Did Respondent, Commercial Concrete Systems, LLC (Commercial Concrete), discriminate against Petitioner, Bernard Maybin, because of his race or color?
Findings Of Fact Mr. Maybin was an employee of Commercial Concrete in 2019. Mr. Maybin is a dark-skinned African-American. In 2019, Commercial Concrete reprimanded Mr. Maybin for tardiness and absenteeism on January 18, April 15, and August 16, 2019. On November 8, 2019, Commercial Concrete terminated Mr. Maybin for being absent all of the preceding 30 days. This was consistent with its policy of terminating employees who were absent for thirty days without communicating with the company. During at least some of the days that he was absent, Mr. Maybin was recovering from an automobile accident. He advised Commercial Concrete of the accident. But he did not advise it which days he would be unable to work due to the accident or request leave. He also did not communicate with Commercial Concrete during the period of absenteeism, beyond advising it of the accident when it first occurred. There is no evidence that any non-African-Americans or light-skinned employees with attendance failings similar to Mr. Maybin's were treated differently than him. There is no evidence of statements by any manager or other employee of Commercial Concrete alluding to Mr. Maybin's race or color. There is no evidence that non-African-American or light-skinned employees were paid more than Mr. Maybin or received vacation pay that he did not, although his petition makes that allegation. When Commercial Concrete discharged Mr. Maybin, it was not aware that he had filed a complaint of discrimination with the Commission.
Recommendation Based on the preceding Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief of Petitioner Bernard Maybin. 2 Federal case law dealing with Title VII applies when interpreting chapter 760. School Bd. of Leon Cty. v. Hargis, 400 So. 2d 103, 108 n. 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us COPIES FURNISHED: Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day February, 2021. Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Peter Shoup Commercial Concrete Systems, LLC 6220 Taylor Road, Suite 101 Naples, Florida 34109 Bernard Maybin 290 Lowell Avenue North Fort Myers, Florida 33917 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Micheline Verello, timely filed a Petition for Relief in connection with a claim filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations.
Findings Of Fact On or about March 15, 2003, the Petitioner, Micheline Verello, submitted an Amended Employment Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Such complaint alleged that the Respondent, United States Cellular Corporation, had discriminated against the Petitioner in an employment action based upon the Petitioner's age. On April 21, 2004, the Florida Commission on Human Relations entered a Determination: No Cause regarding the Petitioner's claim. That determination set forth that there was "no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred." The Notice of Determination: No Cause was also entered and mailed to the Petitioner on April 21, 2004. The notice provided, in pertinent part: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a Determination has been made on the above referenced complaint that there is no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred. A copy of the Determination is attached. Complainant may request an administrative hearing by filing a PETITION FOR RELIEF within 35 days of the date of this NOTICE OF DETERMINATION: NO CAUSE. A Petition for Relief form is enclosed with Complainant's notice. It may be beneficial for Complainant to seek legal counsel prior to filing the petition. If the Complainant fails to request an administrative hearing with (sic) 35 days of the date of this notice, the administrative claim under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Chapter 760, will be dismissed pursuant to section 760.11, Florida Statutes. The Notice of Determination: No Cause was dated April 21, 2004. The Petitioner received the Notice of Determination: No Cause on April 26, 2004. Based upon the date stated on the face of the Determination: No Cause, the Petitioner was required to file a Petition for Relief not later than May 26, 2004. The Petitioner did not mail her Petition for Relief until June 1, 2004. The Florida Commission on Human Relations received the Petition for Relief on June 3, 2004. Thereafter, the matter was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings and filed for formal proceedings on June 9, 2004.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the claim filed by this Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___________________________________ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Andrew DeGraffenreidt, III, Esquire Powers, McNalis & Torres Post Office Box 21289 West Palm Beach, Florida 33416 Adrianne Mazura, Esquire Piper Rudnick, LLP 203 North Lasalle Street, Suite 1800 Chicago, Illinois 60601-1293
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made. The Agency is authorized to license nursing home facilities in the State of Florida and, pursuant to Chapter 400, Part II, to evaluate nursing facilities and assign ratings. The Agency conducted a survey of Petitioner's facility from October 8 through 10, 2001. As a result of the survey, the Agency cited Petitioner for "fail[ing] to adequately assess and develop a plan of care to maintain acceptable parameters for a resident resulting in significant weight loss," and issued a Notice of Intent to change its licensure status to conditional. Petitioner timely challenged the conditional rating and filed a Petition for Formal Hearing. Pursuant thereto, a formal hearing was held on March 28 and 29, 2002. The Recommended Order, which was issued on August 14, 2002, recommended that the Agency enter a final order issuing a standard licensure rating to Petitioner and rescinding the conditional licensure rating. On February 18, 2003, AHCA issued a Final Order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Recommended Order, ordering that a standard licensure rating be issued to replace the previously-issued conditional licensure rating, and rescinding the conditional licensure rating. As such, Petitioner was the prevailing party in the underlying case, DOAH Case No. 02-0049, AHCA 2001-071241. No appeal of the Final Order in the underlying proceeding was filed. On April 21, 2003, Petitioner filed a Petition for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs (Petition) with supporting affidavits. In the Petition, Petitioner sought relief under both the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, Section 57.111, as well as pursuant to Subsection 120.569(2)(e). The Agency opposed the Petition. Although Petitioner requested an award of attorney fees under Subsection 120.569(2)(e), it presented no evidence that the Agency had filed any pleadings, motions, or other papers not properly signed or that any were interposed for any improper purpose. Accordingly, the undersigned will not consider an award of attorney fee's under Subsection 120.569(2)(e), and the focus of the evidence presented will be as to Section 57.111. The parties stipulated as to the reasonableness and amounts of the attorneys fees and costs. Reasonable attorney's fees are $21,547.50. The reasonable amount of costs is $4,183.82. The amount of attorney's fees and costs that may be awarded is limited to $15,000.00, based upon Subsection 57.111(3)(d)(2), which the parties agree is applicable to this proceeding. The Health Care Center of Naples, Inc., is a corporation with its principal office in Florida. At the time the underlying action was initiated by the Agency in October 2001, the Health Care Center of Naples, Inc., had a net worth of not more than $2 million. The net worth of Health Care Center of Naples, Inc., on October 31, 2001, was $158,048.65. The net worth of Health Care Center of Naples, Inc., for September 2001 was $190,829.22. The net worth of Health Care Center of Naples, Inc., for November 2001 was $171,726.44. The Administrative Complaint in the underlying proceeding, DOAH Case No. 02-0049, alleged that Petitioner failed to ensure that a resident maintained acceptable parameters of nutritional status. The basis of this allegation was the result of a survey which found that a resident had a significant weight loss from the period between July 30, 2001, to August 11, 2001. The Agency's Final Order, adopting the Recommended Order in Case No. 02-0049, found that the patient's weight loss was expected due to edema or third space fluid, resulting from the patient's being over-dehydrated before her recent surgery. Moreover, in the underlying proceeding, it was found that in determining that the resident had a significant weight loss, "the Agency surveyors based their calculations on an inaccurate usual body weight for the resident." As a result of these and other findings, the Agency's decision to change the status of Petitioner's licensure rating to conditional was rescinded. Although the Agency did not prevail in the underlying proceeding, the surveyors were substantially justified in citing Petitioner for the alleged deficiency, and the Agency was substantially justified in initiating the action. The Final Order found that the usual body weight relied upon by the surveyors in determining that the resident had a significant weight loss was obtained from the records of Petitioner. Also, the record in the underlying proceeding found that many of Petitioner's staff members were concerned about the resident's weight loss and did not consider that the weight loss was caused by edema. Finally, there is no indication in the record that at the time of the survey, Petitioner's staff gave the Agency surveyors any reasonable explanation for the resident's alleged significant weight loss. The evidence, which was the basis of the findings in the Final Order in the underlying proceeding, while available at the time of the survey, was not discovered or known to the surveyors and, to some extent, to Petitioner's staff.
The Issue Whether or not the July 21, 1991 civil penalty imposed against Respondent's truck for weighing more than the weights posted for the bridge at the St. Mary's River on US-17 (SR 5), Nassau County, was correct and properly assessed pursuant to Sections 316.545 and 316.55, F.S.
Findings Of Fact On July 21, 1991, the bridge at St. Mary's River on US-17 a/k/a SR 5 in Nassau County, Florida was posted on both sides of the river at 32 tons (64,000 pounds) for a combination truck-tractor semi-trailer. (P-1) On that date, and in that place, Weight Inspector Harvey L. Vickers stopped Respondent's combination truck-tractor, semi-trailer and subsequently weighed it at the #2 scale at Yulee, Florida. He then issued Load Report 37553K (P-2) to Respondent's driver. In so doing, Inspector Vickers checked a box on the Load Report showing that the vehicle in question was traveling north. However, his more detailed written narrative Case Report described the vehicle as traveling south. (R-3) Inspector Vickers also filled out the Load Report to show that the vehicle weighed 79,340 pounds and was in excess of the posted legal weight by 15,340 ponds. The appropriate subtraction showing overweight poundage was not originally done by Inspector Vickers in the proper columns or boxes of the Load Report, but Inspector Vickers corrected the Load Report by inserting arrows to show the proper location of the figures. He used the arrows, instead of making erasures, because the Load Report form is on NCR paper which cannot be erased. The weighing and fine were imposed between 7:50 p.m. and 8:25 p.m. on July 21, 1991. The vehicle's weight/overpoundage was calculated out at $.05 per pound for a fine of $767.00. In this instance, the "carrier" technically was Unit Transportation, but the fine was actually paid by Respondent. Respondent's Bill of Lading (R-2) indicated that the vehicle picked up its shipment in Doraville, Georgia. The load was comprised of paper weighing 44,000 pounds, destination Sanford, Florida. (R-2) Sanford Florida is south of the location where Respondent's truck was stopped and weighed by Inspector Vickers. The logical and reasonable inference therefrom is that the truck was traveling south and had crossed the low-weight bridge prior to the time it was stopped by Inspector Vickers. Also, the vehicle would have had to have been traveling south in order to have already crossed the bridge when stopped by the Florida inspector because the north end of the bridge is in Georgia and the south end of the bridge is in Florida. On July 2, 1991, the #2 scale which was used by Inspector Vickers on July 21, 1991 to weigh Respondent's truck had been inspected and certified as weighing "light" by 40 pounds. This certification had been done, pursuant to statutory mandate, by the Florida Department of Agriculture. (P-4) Thus, it is probable that Respondent's vehicle actually weighed 40 pounds more than that recorded by Inspector Vickers on his Load Report. 1/ Respondent presented a Brunswick Georgia weight ticket purportedly showing that the vehicle in question had a gross weight of 76,760 pounds 2/ on July 21, 1991 at 5:42 p.m. However, the truck I.D. number on this weight ticket (R-5) did not match that of the unit number on the Load Report (P-2), and there is no direct evidence as to whether or not any weight was added to either truck after that weighing in Brunswick Georgia and before the truck which was penalized crossed the St. Mary's Bridge. There is, therefore, no competent evidence to show that Respondent's truck weighed less than the 79,340 pounds recorded by Inspector Vickers on the Load Report.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that the penalty of $767.00 was correctly assessed against Respondent pursuant to the provisions of Sections 316.545 and 316.555, F.S. and that since Respondent has already paid his fine, nothing else is owed between the parties. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of March, 1992. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March, 1992.
