Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was a licensed real estate salesman having been issued license number 0413725. On November 8, 1983 Respondent submitted a Request for Active Salesman's License indicating the name of the firm at which he would be employed as Corporate Investments of Florida, Inc., d/b/a Corporate Investment Business Brokers and his broker as Lynne Levy. Respondent worked as a salesman with Lynne Levy as his broker until he was terminated by her on or about May 22, 1984. Respondent testified he was not told of his termination until 4:00 p.m. on May 25, 1984 at which time Lynne Levy also resigned as broker with Corporate Investments of Florida, Inc. Respondent's license was cancelled on May 29, 1984 due to the fact that his license was no longer placed with a broker. From May 29 until July 9, 1984 Respondent's license was not placed with a broker and was therefore in a "cancelled" status. On July 9, 1984 Respondent's license was reactivated since he had been employed by another real estate broker. On or about June 1, 1984 Respondent attempted to have Mr. Bert Malone register as broker for Corporate Investments of Florida, Inc., d/b/a Corporate Investment Business Brokers, but that application was never accepted by the Florida Real Estate Commission due to Respondent's failure to submit information requested by the Commission, including a copy of the corporation's minutes when Lynne Levy's resignation was accepted and Respondent was elected an officer or director. Respondent was co-owner with Robert L. Levy, Lynne Levy's husband, of Corporate Investments of Florida, Inc., d/b/a Corporate Investment Business Brokers. Lynne Levy was President, Vice President, Secretary and Treasurer of the Corporation, as well as its broker. Robert L. Levy and Respondent each owned 50% of the corporation, but Respondent held a 51% voting interest to Levy's 49%. Respondent obtained his franchise on June 17, 1983 to open an office in Florida from Corporate Investment Business Brokers, Inc., a franchisor. Respondent contributed the franchise to the corporation he formed with Levy and agreed to keep the franchise current. The franchisor terminated its franchise agreement with Respondent on May 17, 1984 due to Respondent's failure to make payments due thereunder. On June 12, 1984 the franchisor notified Respondent that it would not reconsider the termination of the franchise. On or about May 30, 1984 Respondent attended the closing of a real estate transaction between Fred Hage, seller, and Frank De Santo, buyer. This was while Respondent's license was cancelled and inoperative. The property had been listed by Respondent and he received a check for $9000 made out to Corporate Investments of Florida, Inc., which represented the broker's commission. On the same day Respondent opened a checking account at Barnett Bank of Central Florida, Longwood Office, and deposited the $9000 commission check in that account without the knowledge or consent of Lynne Levy, his former registered employing broker. On August 16, 1984 Respondent disbursed $3750 to Robert L. Levy, Lynne Levy's husband, from this checking account as the co-partner's share of the $9000 commission. Respondent had obtained the listing agreement from Fred Hage on this property on March 14, 1984 at which time Respondent and Hage agreed to a $6000 commission, or 12% of the total price upon consummation of a sale. Or or about April 4, 1984 Hage signed another listing agreement which reflected a $9000 commission. When the transaction closed on or about May 30, Respondent collected the $9000 commission. Hage signed the closing statement and the purchase contract for this transaction, both of which disclosed the $9000 commission. Hage did not question the commission amount at the closing but waited until June 6, 1984 to raise his objection in a letter to Lynne Levy. On or about May 21, 1984 Respondent discussed with Paul Russell, II, the acquisition of a 50% partnership interest in his real estate franchise in the central Florida area for $50,000. Respondent admits that he was informed on May 17, 1984 that his franchise had been terminated and this termination was reconfirmed on June 12, 1984. Respondent did not inform Russell during their discussions that his franchise had already been terminated, but Russell decided not to go through with the deal. On or about June 2, 1984 while his license was cancelled and inoperative, Respondent received a check for $400 from Kenneth L. and Mary Lou Welker which represented one- half of the appraisal cost on certain property they were selling through Respondent as the selling agent. Respondent represented that he immediately ordered the appraisal as the Welkers requested, but Mrs. Welker learned that it had not been ordered by June 5 and stopped payment on the check.
Conclusions The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this case. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. In pertinent part Petitioner contends that Respondent is subject to disciplinary action for having been guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing or breach of trust in a business transaction in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b) having failed to account for or deliver a share of a real estate commission to a person entitled thereto or to notify the Florida Real Estate Commission concerning doubts or conflicting demands being placed upon such funds as required by Section 475.25(1)(d): and having failed to immediately place with his registered broker money entrusted to him by persons dealing with him as a real estate salesman in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), F.S. Petitioner also urges that Respondent violated Sections 475.42(1)(a) and (b), F.S., by operating as a broker or real estate salesman without a valid and current license, or for a person not registered as his employer. Finally, it is alleged that Respondent violated Section 475.42(1)(d), F.S. which states, in part: No salesman shall collect any money in connection with any real estate brokerage transaction, whether as a commission, deposit, payment, rental, or otherwise, except in the name of the employer and with the express consent of the employer: . . . The evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that between May 29 and July 9, 1984, Respondent did not have a current active salesman's license due to his termination by his broker, Lynne Levy. Yet during this time when his license was inoperative and cancelled, Respondent engaged in real estate transactions with Fred Hage on May 30, and with Kenneth L. and Mary Lou Welker on June 2. In each transaction Respondent collected money from these persons without the express consent of an employing broker since Respondent's license had been cancelled and was not placed with an employing broker at the time. Respondent did not immediately place these moneys which he received while acting as a salesman with a registered broker. Thus, Respondent violated Sections 475.42(1)(d) and 475.25(1)(k) on these two occasions. His actions on these occasions also constituted violations of Sections 475.42(1)(a) and (b) since he was operating during these real estate transactions as a salesman without a current valid license and without a registered employing broker. Respondent also violated Section 475.25(1)(d) by improperly placing the $9000 commission he received from Fred Hage in a checking account he opened on the same day he received the commission check. At the time he was not properly licensed to engage in real estate transactions and receive commissions, and he should reasonably have foreseen that doubts would arise and conflicting claims would be made for these funds, as in fact they were. Under these circumstances, Respondent was required to notify the Florida Real Estate Commission of such doubts or conflicting demands, which he never formally did. Respondent did subsequently resolve the conflicting demand on these funds with the disbursement $3750 to Robert L. Levy on August 16, 1984, but his technical violation of Section 475.25(1)(d) by failing to formally notify the Commission remains. The evidence presented at the hearing does not establish clearly or convincingly that Respondent violated Sections 475.25(1)(b), F.S. It cannot be concluded that Respondent dealt fraudulently or dishonestly with Fred Hage when he collected a $9000 commission from the transaction on May 30. Although Hage had previously signed a listing agreement with Respondent that provided for a lesser commission, Hage did sign a second listing agreement on April 4 which called for the $9000 commission. There is no evidence of fraud or misrepresentation in the execution of this second agreement. In fact, Hage specifically acknowledged the $9000 commission at closing by signing the closing statement and the purchase contract, both of which disclosed the commission amount. Hage did not object to the commission until June 6, one week after the closing and two months after he signed the second listing agreement with Respondent which provided for this commission. Respondent's discussions with Paul Russell, II, about acquiring an interest in his franchise do not constitute a violation of Chapter 475. Although at the time of these discussions on May 21 Respondent had been notified by his franchisor of the termination of his franchise, the franchisor did not reconfirm this termination until June 12. By this time Russell had already decided not to go through with the deal or pursue discussions with Respondent. Russell was not harmed by these discussions and the simple fact that these discussions took place prior to the reconfirmation of the franchise's termination does not constitute a violation of Section 475.25(1)(b). In summary, it has been clearly and convincingly established that Respondent violated Sections 475.42(1)(a)(b) and (d) and 475.25(1)(k) in his dealings with Fred Hage and the Welkers on May 30 and June 2, 1984, and also that he violated Section 475.25(1)(d) in his handling of the $9000 commission he received from Hage. However, no violation of Section 475.25(1)(b) has been established. The violations in this case arise from two transactions occurring within a three day period. There is no evidence that Respondent engaged in a recurring course of conduct which would justify the imposition of the penalty of revocation of his license under the circumstances as established herein. Pauline v. Borer, 274 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973) Kopf v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 379 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1980). Therefore, a reasonable suspension of Respondent's license is appropriate in this case.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a Final Order be issued suspending Respondent's license for a period of ninety (90) days. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of July, 1985 at Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Wallace E. Hunter 214 East Hornbeam Drive Longwood, Florida 32779 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, George N. Sullivan, held real-estate license number 0128470 issued by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission. His current address is 22 East Spruce Street, Orlando, Florida. At one time, respondent also held a registered general contractor's license and operated a construction firm under the name of George N. Sullivan, Inc. in Vero Beach, Florida. On or about December 7, 1979, George N. Sullivan, Inc. and Vero Fore, Incorporated entered into a construction agreement wherein Sullivan agreed to construct a residence at Lot 27, Unit III, the Moorings of Vero Beach, in Indian River County for a price of $155,628. The difference between this price and the price of $171,688 alleged in the administrative complaint is due to "extras" agreed upon by the parties to be added to the project. Sullivan began construction on the residence but abandoned the project before it was completed. When he left the job he had been paid all sums due under the agreement except one final $18,000 draw. Vero Fore later discovered that approximately $66,000 in unpaid bills were left by Sullivan. It also learned that Sullivan had obtained releases from three material suppliers by issuing worthless checks in the amounts of $5,849, $2,883.48, $1,913.14, $4,988.92 and $3,847.23. To date, Vero Fore has not been repaid by Sullivan. Sullivan was later adjudged guilty of passing worthless checks by the circuit court of Indian River County on July 8, 1981 and was sentenced to eighteen months probation and required to make restitution to the subcontractors. The official records of Indian River County reflect that Sullivan was found to be in violation of probation on March 23, 1983 for failure to make restitution. It is unknown what, if any, penalties were imposed upon him for this violation, or if restitution has ever been made. On or about September 5, 1980, Sullivan entered into a contract with Mr. and Mrs. James L. Cain to remodel their residence located at 2075 DeLeon Avenue, Vero Beach, Florida. The agreed upon price was $46,900. The Cains paid Sullivan $46890, or 10 percent, as a downpayment for the work on September 8, 1980. Sullivan sent three men to the Cains' house a few days later to build a platform. No other work was ever done. Sullivan did not pay the three workmen and the Cains were forced to pay them $788 to obtain a release of liens. To date, they have never been reimbursed by respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent George N. Sullivan be found guilty as charged in Counts I, III, and IV and that Count II be DISMISSED. It is further RECOMMENDED that respondent's real estate sales license be suspended for a period of ten years with the condition that said license be reinstated after a period of three years if respondent can demonstrate that restitution to the three material suppliers, Vero Fore, Inc. and the Cains has been made. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 10th day of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary Lee Printy, Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Mr. George N. Sullivan 22 East Spruce Street Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact In October, 1975, Priscilla Alwin, now known and hereafter referred to as Priscilla Tolman or "buyer", entered into an oral agreement with the Respondent to purchase property located at 13 Westchester Drive, Kissimmee, Florida, for $39,000. At the time of the agreement, title to the property was vested in Aime and Lilian Giguere, parents of the Respondent. On October 8, 1975, in furtherance of this agreement, the buyer gave the Respondent a $1,000 cashiers' check as a deposit. The buyer gave the Respondent an additional $600 towards the deposit for a total of $1,600. Another check for $400 was given to the Respondent and in turn, endorsed over to the Respondent's husband who testified that the check was in payment for a lawnmower purchased by the buyer's employer. Due to difficulties the buyer had previously encountered in obtaining mortgage financing, the Respondent agreed to an oral contract for sale which called for monthly rental payments of $375 and a total down payment of $4,000. 1/ The buyer assumed possession in October, 1975, and in November and December of 1975, paid $375 to the Respondent, who in turn assigned the checks to the title owner, Aime Giguere. Following the buyer's marriage in December, 1975, the buyer and Respondent met and discussed the buyer's desire to vacate the property and possibly recoup the monies paid to Mr. Giguere. The Respondent agreed to refund the monies if another buyer could be secured and a contract executed which would leave Mr. Giguere with a net profit. On December 24, 1975, a contract for sale was executed and on December 26, 1975, an agreement for deed was signed by Mr. Giguere and Howard and Jewel Daniels on the subject property. The selling price was $40,000 with $1,600 paid as a brokerage fee to Makinson Realty, the listing agency. The Daniels' inspected the property prior to executing the sales contract and before Mrs. Tolman vacated in January, 1976. In selling the property for her father, the Respondent was not acting as a real estate salesman and received no fee or commission.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint filed against Grace Makuch, be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of July, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
Findings Of Fact At all pertinent times, both respondents held real estate broker's licenses. The corporate license is No. 0222663 and the individual license is No. 0159888. The individual respondent has been the only owner of the corporate respondent and the only broker the corporation has ever employed. At one time Angela Lewis worked for Broker Jim, Inc. as a licensed real estate salesperson. On October 6, 1981, it was she who signed, on the broker's behalf, a listing agreement with Laverne Lockhart and Faith Willis, the sisters who jointly owned the house at 1535 NW 116th Street in Miami, Florida (the house) . Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. Kenneth G. Wilson, who wanted to buy the house, had $5000 available. The house was encumbered with a mortgage in the approximate amount of $33,000 and the sisters eventually agreed to take $44,000 for the property. On the form contract signed by both owners and Mr. Wilson, and dated November 25, 1981, under the heading "Terms and conditions of Sale:", the following was typewritten: 1,000 as mentioned above. Purchaser agrees to make an additional deposit in the amount $4,000 before closing. Purchaser agrees to assume an existing first mortgage in the Approx. amount $33,000, payab[l]e $340.00 P.I.T.I at 10.5 percent per annum in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth therein. Purchaser to obtain a P.M. 2nd mort[g]age in the amount of $6,000 at 18 percent per annum payable Approx. $152.37 for a period of 5 yrs. Balance of purchase price to be paid in cash or cashier check at time of closing. Property being purchased in its present as is condition. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. Elsewhere on the printed form appears the following: When this contract is executed by the purchaser and the seller and the sale is not closed due to any default or failure on the part of the purchaser, the seller, at his option, may seek to enforce this contract, or else the seller may direct the holder of the deposit to pay the broker his brokerage fee not to exceed one-half of the deposit and to pay the balance of the deposit to the seller as consideration for execution of this agreement, and the holder of the deposit shall be held harmless by all parties for disbursement in accordance with this agreement. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. Ms. Lewis prepared the form contract. Mr. Muhammad, as he is now known, read it over and approved it. In retrospect, he believes this was a mistake, because the contract fails clearly to reflect the parties' understanding that the offer was contingent on Mr. Wilson's ability to borrow $6,000, to be secured by a second mortgage on the house. A deposit ticket dated November 25, 1981, accompanied Mr. Wilson's check for $1000 when respondents deposited it to their escrow account. The bank credited the escrow account on December 1, 1981. Neither Mr. Wilson's efforts to obtain a loan, nor those of respondents on his behalf, availed, and word reached Ms. Lockhart that the transaction was doomed for want of sufficient purchase money. Over the phone, Ms. Lockhart told Helen Jackson, respondents' secretary, that she wanted a "refund" of the deposit. A lawyer Ms. Lockhart consulted communicated a similar demand to respondent Muhammad personally. Respondents gave Ms. Lockhart no money and no accounting. The money stayed in respondents' escrow account until it was used on Mr. Wilson's behalf in the purchase of another house respondents had listed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was arrested in St. Petersburg, Florida, in February, 1977, for driving under the influence of alcohol, found guilty and sentenced to a $100.00 fine, loss of driver's license for three months and a Driving While Intoxicated course. In June of 1981, Petitioner was arrested for possession of marijuana and subsequently pled guilty to the charge of possession of marijuana. Petitioner is currently employed as a meter reader with the Florida Public Utilities Company. The testimony of a coworker established that he is a reliable, trustworthy employee of the company. The testimony of other witnesses established that Petitioner has a reputation for honesty in the areas where he grew up and where he currently resides. Petitioner is 25 years old. He accepts responsibility for his misconduct and demonstrates a degree of maturity which he apparently lacked at the time of the above violations.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a Final Order granting the application for licensure. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1982.
The Issue Should Respondent have his Florida Real Estate Broker's License disciplined by Petitioner for violating provisions within Chapter 475, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to discipline its licensees for violations of Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes and associated rules. Those actions are brought through administrative complaints. Petitioner regulates Respondent's real estate practice in Florida. Respondent practices in accordance with a Florida Real Estate Broker's license, No. 0605307. At times relevant to this inquiry Respondent has not acted as an independent broker. Rather, Respondent has conducted real estate business as a broker-salesperson with McAfee Enterprise, Inc. t/a Re-Max On Park Avenue, located at 2233 Park Avenue, Suite 500, Orange Park, Florida, 32702-5567. Within the relevant time period Respondent's supervising broker at the Re- Max firm was Ann McIvey. On February 28, 1995, Respondent, as listing agent for Re-Max On Park Avenue, entered into an exclusive right of sale listing agreement with Marguerite A. Barr to sell Ms. Barr's real estate located at 6720 S. Long Meadow Circle in Jacksonville, Florida. By the terms of the listing agreement Ms. Barr agreed to pay Re-Max on Park Avenue: . . . 5 ½% of the total purchase price whether a buyer is secured by the REALTOR, the SELLER, or by any other person, or if the Property is afterwards sold within 6 months from the termination of this agreement or any extension thereof, to any person to whom the Property has been shown during the term of this Agreement. The listing agreement entered into between Respondent in behalf of Re-Max On Park Avenue and Ms. Barr also stated that: . . . in the event this Agreement is cancelled by SELLER before its expiration, or SELLER otherwise prevents performance hereunder, the SELLER agrees to pay REALTOR on demand, as liquidated damages, the brokerage fee due REALTOR as though Property had been sold, or the amount of broker's expenses, the same being bonafide, fair and reasonable as a result of an arm's length negotiation. Separate and apart from the terms set forth in the listing agreement, Ms. Barr requested, before she signed the contract, that Respondent inform her concerning her opportunity to cancel the contract at any time. Respondent answered that the contract could be cancelled by Ms. Barr before the home was sold, in which case Ms. Barr would be responsible for paying the advertising cost by Re-Max on Park Avenue. Ms. Barr was amenable to that arrangement. On May 8, 1995, Ms. Barr called to inform Respondent that she was terminating the contract to sell her home. This was followed by correspondence dated May 9, 1995, addressed to Re-Max On Park Avenue, attention to Respondent, notifying Re-Max On Park Avenue that the contract to sell the home was being cancelled. In response to the cancellation Respondent wrote the following letter to Ms. Barr: Mrs. Marguerite A. Barr 1364 Lamboll Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32205-7140 Dear Meg: As you requested I have withdrawn your property located at 6720 Longmeadow Circle South from active listing for sale in the MLS and in my files. I hope you will be happy with your new arrangement and I wish you and your daughter the best. According to our contract, you agreed to reimburse me for expenses I incurred in marketing your property the event you decided to cancel prior to the expiration of said contract. A list of expenses follows: Two insertions in Homes & Land Magazine $249.21 500 Flyers to Realtors (250 twice) @ $.06 each 30.00 Total $279.21 Please forward a check in that amount to me at my office. Please remember that in the terms of our contract if anyone who has seen the property during my active term of the contract purchases the property you will still be obligated to pay the agreed upon commission to my firm. Regards, W. Wane Wier Broker-Salesman Per the request in the correspondence from Respondent to Ms. Barr, Ms. Barr contacted the Respondent and arranged to pay $50.00 a month to reimburse the costs described by the Respondent. Ms. Barr wrote three checks to the Respondent in his name, Wane Wier, without reference to Re-Max On Park Avenue. Respondent put those checks in his personal checking account. Respondent had originally taken money from his personal account to advertise the Barr property. On or about August 31, 1995, Ms. Barr sold her home on S. Long Meadow Circle to Jane Richardson. Respondent learned of the sale. Believing that the sale was a transaction that entitled Re-Max On Park Avenue to collect the 5 ½% real estate fee in accordance with the listing agreement, Respondent spoke to his supervising broker, Ms. McIvey, to ascertain the proper course for collecting the commission. Ms. McIvey advised Respondent that he should contact his attorney to see if the commission that was allegedly due Ms. McIvey and Respondent could be obtained by Respondent's counsel. Respondent took the advice of his supervising broker and contacted Thomas C. Santoro, Esquire, who was practicing at 1700 Wells Road, Suite 5, Orange Park, Florida 32073. In conversation Respondent explained to Mr. Santoro, that he believed that Ms. Barr owned the real estate commission. Respondent asked Mr. Santoro to write a letter to Ms. Barr to solicit the commission. Respondent feels confident that he told Mr. Santoro that Mr. Santoro should advise Ms. Barr to pay the commission to Re-Max On Park Avenue, given that was the normal course of events in seeking payment for commissions. To assist Mr. Santoro, Respondent left a written memorandum which among other things stated: . . . I feel that Ms. Barr has violated our listing agreement and should pay me and my company the full commission due under the terms of that agreement. Please take any steps necessary to have Ms. Barr honor our agreement, and advise me what I should do. On January 12, 1996, Mr. Santoro wrote Ms. Barr requesting payment of the commissions in the amount $3,397.50 related to the claimed balance due, after crediting Ms. Barr with $150.00 paid for advertising costs. This correspondence stated: Please be advised that you must forward a cashier's check in the amount of $3,397.50 made payable to W. Wane Wier, Re-Max On Park Avenue, within ten (10) days of receipt of this letter, which I have forwarded by certified mail as well as regular U.S. Mail. I have been instructed to proceed with appropriate action should you fail to make the payment as stated above Please Govern Yourself Accordingly. Respondent did not see the January 12, 1996, letter before it was sent to Ms. Barr. He did receive a copy of the correspondence. Respondent has no recollection of noticing that the correspondence said that the $3,397.50 should be made payable to W. Wane Weir, Re-Max On Park Avenue. In any event, Respondent did not take any action to correct the letter to reflect that the payment should be made to Re-Max On Park Avenue only. Prior to the charges set forth in the present Administrative Complaint Respondent has not been the subject of accusations about his conduct as a realtor.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding the Respondent in violation of Section 475.42(1)(a) and (d), Florida Statutes, dismissing the complaint for alleged violations of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, imposing a $1,000.00 fine consistent with Section 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and Rule 61J2-24.001, Florida Administrative Code. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Christine M. Ryall, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Orlando, FL 32801-1772 Thomas C. Santoro, Esquire 1700 Wells Road, Suite 5 Orange Park, FL 32072 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Linda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional; Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue Should Petitioner discipline Respondent's real estate sales- person's license for alleged conduct evidencing fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in a business transaction in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. In particular, Petitioner carries out its duties in compliance with Chapters 20, 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes and the rules promulgated under authority set forth in those statutes. At times relevant to the inquiry, Respondent was, and is now, a licensed Florida Real Estate salesperson. Her license number is 0591902. That license was issued in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. At times relevant to the inquiry, Respondent worked as a licensed real estate salesperson for Ideal Real Estate Central Florida, Inc., t/a Coldwell Banker Ideal Real Estate in Orange City, Florida (Ideal). The broker for that firm was John S. Chinelli. On April 13, 1993, Respondent listed an exclusive right of sale for property owned by Jason and Kelly Foster at 2853 Sweet Springs Avenue, Deltona, Florida. That listing contemplated that Ideal would earn a real estate commission of 7 percent of the gross purchase price. The listing price in the exclusive right of sale was $69,900. In arriving at the sales price, Mr. Foster relied upon Respondent's advice. That advice included a consideration of the price received for the sale of comparable homes. The establishment of comparable prices as a means to arrive at the listing price for the Foster property involved the use of the Coldwell Banker buyer/seller presentation booklet, as well as a marketing analysis. The price $69,900 was chosen to attract those buyers who were looking for homes that cost less than $70,000. That choice was designed to garner more interest in the home. While the Foster home was being advertised, it was available through the multiple listing pool. Respondent showed the house two times between April 13, 1993, and May 14, 1993. This did not involve a showing to any prospective buyers. Other brokers or salespersons showed the house twice to prospective buyers, but no offers were generated from those showings. Subsequently, Respondent suggested to Mr. Foster that the Foster residence might be appropriate for her use. Respondent offered to buy the Foster property for $65,000. On May 14, 1993, Respondent and Mr. Foster entered into a contract for sale and purchase of the Foster residence. The purchase price was $65,000. Respondent deposited $500 into the escrow account managed by Ideal in furtherance of her interest in the property. The earnest money deposit was placed with Mr. Chinelli pending the closing of the sale. The contract called for Respondent to assume an existing mortgage of $63,556. The contract identified that the Respondent was a licensed real estate agent in Florida, but the purchase was not being made through Ideal. Under this contract, the real estate commission that had been contemplated initially would not be paid to Ideal and Respondent. When Respondent entered into a contract to buy the Foster property, she did not tell Mr. Foster that she would no longer be representing him as a real estate salesperson. The contract between Respondent and Mr. Foster called for a closing date on or before June 30, 1993. In entering into the agreement for Respondent to purchase the home, Respondent told Mr. Foster that she intended to personally occupy that property. Respondent never told Mr. Foster that she entered into the contract to purchase his home with the intent to sell the home to another person. Originally that was not her intention. Respondent held to the view that in the event that her purchase of the home was not concluded, Respondent would still represent Mr. Foster in his desire to sell the home. This is taken to mean that she would be representing Mr. Foster as a real estate salesperson. Sometime around June 20, 1993, Kai and Denise M. Hansen, husband and wife, contacted Ideal to show the Hansens property in the Deltona area. Respondent assisted the Hansens in this pursuit, acting as a real estate salesperson. There was no written agreement between Respondent or her firm signed with the Hansens to represent them in their attempt to purchase a home. Respondent showed the Hansens 8 to 12 homes in the Deltona area. The Hansens were not interested in purchasing those homes. At that point, Respondent suggested that the Hansens look at the home that she was purchasing from Mr. Foster. Respondent told the Hansens that Respondent was buying the Foster house from the Fosters who were moving out of town and that Respondent was helping the Fosters "out of a bind." Respondent told the Hansens that the home might be "too big for her anyway." Respondent told the Hansens that if she could help the Hansens out she would sell the Foster home to the Hansens if the Hansens liked that property. If a suitable home had been found through a real estate listing, other than the Foster residence, a commission would have been paid from the seller of the hypothetical house to the broker for Ideal. In that circumstance, the Hansens would not be responsible for paying a commission to the Respondent or Ideal. The properties other than the Foster property which Respondent was showing the Hansens were shown by Respondent as a sub-agent for the sellers. Respondent showed the Hansens the Foster residence during the week of June 20, 1993. On June 24, 1993, Respondent entered into a contract with the Hansens for sale and purchase of the Foster property. An addendum to that contract indicated that "this contract is contingent upon seller obtaining clear Title on 2853 Sweet Springs, Deltona, FL." The Hansens paid a $1,000 earnest money deposit toward the purchase of the Foster property. That deposit was placed in the escrow account for Ideal. That deposit was to be held until the closing date scheduled for July 16, 1993. Again, it was not contemplated that a real estate commission would be paid to Respondent and Ideal. The price arrived at between Respondent and the Hansens to purchase the Foster property was $72,500. Initially, Respondent had offered to sell the property for $73,000. The Hansens counter-offered to pay $72,000 leading to the final purchase price of $72,500. The contract between the Respondent and the Hansens called for an assumption of a mortgage in the amount of 63,500. Although Respondent had advised the Hansens that the property was being purchased from the current occupants, the Fosters, Respondent did not advise the Hansens of the price the Respondent was paying the Fosters to purchase that property. Respondent never advised the Fosters that the Hansens had sought to purchase the Foster home and that Respondent had entered into a contract with the Hansens for the Hansens to purchase that property. On June 29, 1993, the closing occurred between Respondent and the Fosters and a warranty deed was prepared noting the change in ownership. At the closing Respondent told the Fosters that she still intended to occupy the home. On July 16, 1993, the closing occurred between the Respondent and the Hansens and a warranty deed was drawn conveying the property from the Respondent to the Hansens. As established by Mark A. Carper, a real estate appraiser, the value of the Foster property on April 13, 1993 was between $65,000 and $72,500. In anticipation of moving into the Foster home, Respondent had made arrangements to move out of the residence where she had been living by giving notice that she intended to move.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED That a Final Order be entered which dismisses the administrative complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day of July, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Christine M. Ryall, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 William A. Parsons, Esquire Woerner & Parsons 2001 South Ridgewood Avenue South Daytona, Florida 32119 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact George A. Heyen is a duly registered real estate salesman with the Florida Real Estate Commission, and was so registered and has been so registered continuously since October 1, 1972, as evidenced by Petitioner's Exhibit number 1. While serving in the capacity as a real estate salesman, the Respondent entered into a listing agreement with one Thomas S. Bowers and Brenda L. Bowers, his wife. This agreement was drawn on December 11, 1973 and is Petitioner's Exhibit number 4. On February 6, 1974, a purchase and sell agreement was drawn up by the Respondent and entered into between Maria A. Hindes and the Bowers. This purchase and sell agreement is Petitioner's Exhibit number 3. This contract of February 6, 1974 was submitted to Molton, Allen and Williams, Mortgage Brokers, 5111 66th Street, St. Petersburg, Florida. The contract, as drawn, was rejected as being unacceptable for mortgage financing, because it failed, to contain the mandatory FHA clause. When the Respondent discovered that the February 6, 1974 contract had been rejected, a second contract of February 8, 1974 was prepared. A copy of this contract is Petitioner's Exhibit number 5. The form of the contract, drawn on February 8, 1974, was one provided by Molton, Allen and Williams. When, the Respondent received that form he prepared it and forged the signature of Mr. and Mrs. Bowers. The explanation for forging the signatures as stated in the course of the hearing, was to the effect that it was a matter of expediency. The expediency referred to the fact that the parties were anxious to have a closing and to have the transaction completed, particularly the sellers, Mr. and Mrs. Bowers. Therefore, in the name of expediency the signatures were forged. Testimony was also given that pointed out the Bowers were very hard to contact in and around the month of February, 1974, and some testimony was given to the effect that the Bowers made frequent trips to Ohio, but it was not clear whether these trips would have been made in the first part of February, 1974. The Bowers discovered that their name had been forged when they went to a closing on April 11, 1974. They refused to close the loan at that time. On April 24, 1974, a new sales contract was followed by a closing which was held on April 26, 1974 and a copy of the closing statement is Petitioner's Exhibit number 6. The Respondent has received no fees or commissions for his services in the transaction and there have been no further complaints about the transaction. Prior to this incident, the Respondent, George A. Heyen, was not shown to have had any disciplinary involvement with the Florida Real Estate Commission and has demonstrated that he has been a trustworthy individual in his business dealings as a real estate salesman.
Recommendation It is recommended that the registration of the registrant, George A. Heyen, be suspended for a period not to exceed 30 days. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of April, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. R. Parkinson, Esquire Associate Counsel Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 George A. Heyen c/o Gregoire-Gibbons, Inc. 6439 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, Florida 33710
The Issue The issue in Count I is whether Section 475.42(1)(j) absolutely prohibits a broker or salesman from filing a lien or other encumberance against real property to collect a commission. The issue in Count II is whether the Respondents violated a lawful order of the Commission by failing to remove the motion of lis pendens contrary to Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes.
Conclusions Section 475.42(1)(j), Florida Statutes, provides as follows: "No real estate broker or salesman shall place, or cause to be placed, upon the public records of any county, any contract, assignment, deed, will, mortgage, lien, affidavit, or other writing which purports to affect the title of, or encumber, any real property, if the same is known to him to be false, void, or not authorized to be placed of record, or not executed in the form entitling it to be recorded, or the execution of recording thereof has not been duly authorized by the owner of the property, maliciously or for the purpose of collecting a commission, or to coerce the payment of money to the broker or salesman or other person, or for any unlawful purpose." Clearly the Respondents placed or caused to be placed the notice of lis pendens in question. A notice of lis pendens is clearly an "other writing which purports to effect the title of, or encumber, any real property." The Florida Real Estate Commission argues that this provision is an absolute bar to the filing of any lien for the purpose of collecting a commission. The Respondents argue that this provision is not an absolute bar and there are circumstances when a broker may file a notice of lis pendens. They also assert that the notice of lis pendens falls within the exception because the Circuit Court refused to remove the notice of lis pendens upon motion of the property owner. Lastly, it is argued that the notice was filed by counsel for the Respondents in good faith on an action at law and that this mitigates their action even if there was a violation. The language of Section 475.42(1)(j) cannot be read to absolutely prohibit a broker from obtaining a lis pendens. When given this construction, it effectively denies brokers and salesmen access to the courts for redress of injury as provided in Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution. Section 475.42(1)(j) is a complex provision which is subject to two interpretations. One interpretation would prohibit a broker or salesman from filing an encumberance if the same were known to him to be false, void or not authorized by law; if not authorized to be upon the public records; if not executed in the form entitling it to be recorded; if the execution of recording thereof has not been duly authorized by the owner of the property; if maliciously (filed); if for the purpose of collecting a commission, if to coerce payment of money to the broker or salesman or other person; or if for any other unlawful purpose. This first interpretation would consider each clause a separate limitation on filing an encumberance. The facts analyzed under this interpretation do not show any knowledge by Respondents that the lis pendens was false, void or not authorized to be filed or not on a form entitling it to be recorded. The facts do not show that Respondents filed the lis pendens maliciously, for the purpose of collecting a commission, or for the purpose of coercing payment of money to the broker or salesman, or for any unlawful purpose. The nature of lis pendens would not require the owner's authorization of execution for recording. The facts show that the lis pendens was filed by Respondent's attorney in conjunction with a suit brought by the Respondents against Perrin. The record also shows that the circuit court determined that the lis pendens was recordable when it denied the motion to remove it. The notice of lis pendens was neither malicious, coercive or for the purpose of collecting the commission. The notice was for the purpose of perfecting the claim against the property for execution of the judgment if the Respondents prevailed in the suit. Executing on a judgment is different from collecting the commission or coercing payment. Under this interpretation the Respondents have not been shown to violate Section 475.42(1)(j). A second interpretation would read the clause, ". . . if the same is known to to him to be false, void, or not authorized to be placed of record, or not executed in the form entitling it to be recorded, or the execution of recording thereof has not been authorized by the owner of the property. . ." as the first of two criteria to be met to establish a violation. The second criteria would consist of proof that the encumberance was recorded maliciously or for the purpose of collecting a commission, or to coerce payment of money to the broker or salesman, or for any unlawful purpose. Again the facts do not show there was knowledge by the Respondents of the falsity, or impropriety of the notice of lis pendens, as stated above. Again the facts show that the lis pendens was filed in conjunction with a law suit pending between the Respondent and the property owner, and that the court before which the action was pending refused to remove it. The file of the notice by Respondent's counsel was a legitimate method of perfecting the Respondent's claim should they prevail and obtain judgment. The facts do not indicate that the filing of the notice was malicious, coercive or for the purpose of collecting a commission. Under either interpretation, Respondents did not violate the statute. COUNT II The Respondents are charged in Count II with violation of Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, which provides that the registration of a registrant may be suspended for up to two years for violation of a lawful order of the Commission. Clearly, the facts reveal that the Respondents had a substantial interest involved in the litigation with Perrin. The order, of the Florida Real Estate Commission to remove the notice of lis pendens substantially affected their rights in this litigation. Therefore, any final order directing Kay to remove the notice of lis pendens should have issued after an opportunity for hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. The evidence reveals that the Florida Real Estate Commission did not notice a hearing under Section 120.57, and therefore its order cannot be "lawful." The provisions of Section 475.25(1)(d) require that registrants not violate lawful orders. The Respondents have not violated Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, by not removing the notice of lis pendens as directed by the order of the Florida Real Estate Commission.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that no action be taken against the Respondent, Sam Kaye and Sam Kaye, Inc. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of September 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce I. Kamelhair, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 William E. Boyes, Esquire Cone, Owen, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson & McKeown, P.A. Post Office Box 3466 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received, the post-hearing memorandum and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found: By letter dated February 18, 1983, the Florida Real Estate Commission (sometimes herein referred to as the respondent or the Commission) advised the petitioner that his application for licensure as a real estate salesman was denied based upon petitioner's answer to question 6 of the licensing application and his criminal record. On September 1, 1982, petitioner held a Mutuel Clerk's Occupational License (NOP-00455) issued by the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Department of Business Regulation, State of Florida. While acting in the capacity of a mutuel clerk at Calder Race Course in Dade County, Florida, Petitioner, on September 1, 1982, cashed a winning one dollar ($1.00) trifecta ticket for the eighth race on August 28, 1982, valued at six hundred thirty-six dollars and eighty cents ($636.80) for Metro-Dade Organized Crime Bureau Detective, Jonas Sears, for a cash fee payable to Petitioner. Petitioner did not require Detective Sears to complete the necessary internal revenue service form W-2G which is required of any patron winning six hundred dollars ($600.00) or more. On October 22, 1982, petitioner entered into a consent order with the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering wherein petitioner agreed to certain findings. Based on those findings, petitioner agreed to a suspension of his pari-mutuel license for a period of seventy-five (75) days. A clerk who engages in such conduct violates Section 550.16(7), Florida Statutes and Rule Section 7E- 6.07(3)(6), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner also admitted to deducting sixty dollars and eighty cents ($60.80) as a cash fee payable to him for not requiring Detective Sears to complete the necessary Internal Revenue Service form W-2G.
Recommendation That the respondent enter a Final Order denying petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesman. RECOMMENDED this 14th day of September, 1983 in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 1983.
