Findings Of Fact In the late 1960's Gulf Standard corporation, a corporation wholly owned by William V. Gruman, constructed the Pine Apartments which is the property involved in this hearing. Gulf Standard remortgaged the property in 1973 and in order to obtain the mortgage it was necessary for William V. Gruman and his wife to guarantee payment of the note secured by the mortgage. This unconditional guarantee agreement was entered into evidence with an accompanying letter dated March 15, 1978, as Exhibit 4. Without the Grumans, in effect, cosigning the promissory note for $1,849,000 secured by a mortgage on the property the loan would not have been made. In October 1975 Gulf Standard corporation was dissolved and by quitclaim deed dated October 28, 1975, Gulf Standard corporation transferred the property to William Victor Gruman and Eva Gruman. Minimum documentary stamp tax was placed on this deed. A proposed assessment dated January 20, 1978 (Exhibit 2) was issued on this transfer in the amount of $6,933.38; however this assessment was withdrawn when evidence was presented to the Department of Revenue that the corporation had been dissolved and the property transferred to the sole shareholders who had primary liability on the mortgage before and after the transfer. By quitclaim deed dated 30 September 1976 the Grumans transferred this property to Northwest Liquor Industries, Inc. (Northwest), a corporation wholly owned by Gruman. Minimum documentary stamp tax was placed on this deed. It is this transaction upon which Petitioner claims insufficient documentary stamp tax was paid and which is the basis for the proposed assessment. No issue was raised regarding the accuracy of the amounts alleged to be due in the proposed assessment; Respondent contending only that no consideration passed, therefore only the minimum documentary stamp tax that was placed on the deed was required. At the time of this conveyance the market value of the property was less than the mortgage encumbering the property and the payment of the note secured by this mortgage had been guaranteed by Gruman (Exhibit 4). Subsequent to the transfer to Northwest no more than one mortgage payment was made by Northwest before the loan was defaulted. Thereafter the lender foreclosed on the property and obtained a deficiency judgment against the Grumans based upon their guarantee of the note secured by the mortgage.
Findings Of Fact Philip Forelli is a registered real estate salesman. Forelli showed Henry and Rose Aquinas a house owned by the Rogers located across the street from Forelli's residence, after having the Aquinas referred to him by a mutual friend and neighbor. The Aquinas were interested in purchasing this home and selling their own home. The Aquinas desired to sell their home first before purchasing a new home. Forelli testified that he first had presented a blank MLS contract for their signatures, having made notes regarding the listing, so that the secretary could prepare the MLS papers before the weekend. However, that while this was being typed, the Aquinas called him and presented their offer to purchase, which he had typed. He then took both contracts to the Aquinas, delivering the previously signed MLS contract, and obtaining their signatures on the contract for purchase and deposit receipt for $500. The conflict arose because Henry Aquinas thought that the offer to purchase was contingent upon sale of his home, whereas Forelli stated that he had explained several times that such a contingent contract to purchase was not acceptable. The Aquinas also stated that they signed the contract for purchase in blank. Henry Aquinas and Rose Aquinas were unable to identify at hearing the contract for purchase as being the contract which they signed blank, although they identified their signatures. Henry Aquinas identified the listing contract as the contract which he signed in blank. The contract for purchase has no reference to any contingency provision.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the charges against Philip Forelli be dropped. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of October, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Philip Forelli Percent Triple A. Realty, Inc. 6217 Margate Boulevard Margate, Florida
The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent's certification should be revoked or otherwise penalized based on the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact William H. Wood was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on November 16, 1973, and issued certificate number 02-9291. On September 22, 1986, Wood answered an advertisement in a publication known as Linn's Stamp News. The publication caters to the interests of stamp collectors. The advertisement read as follows: MINT POSTAGE wanted. Ungummed, uncancelled postage under 10 and postage dues - 50%, ungummed, uncancelled postage over 9 , special deliveries, postal stationary and officials - 65%. The advertisement was placed by a Maryland stamp dealer who was assisting United States Postal Service inspectors. The advertisement was placed in an effort to identify persons engaged in the unlawful activity of reuse of previously used postage stamps for mailing. Wood answered the advertisement on September 22, 1986, by letter. He stated in the letter: Sir, you advertised in Linn's Stamp News that you are buying ungummed mint postage. The ad had no shipping instructions. I have the following. A quantity and various denomination of stamps that's listed, with dollar value at the stated percentage in the ad. Please advise shipping instructions. The cooperating stamp dealer forwarded a reply to Wood on September 29, 1986, which indicated a willingness to begin buying stamps from Wood if they were "ungummed, uncancelled." "Ungummed" refers to the condition of a postal stamp which lacks the adhesive backing usually present on unused postage stamps. "Uncancelled" postage refers to stamps which have not been previously utilized to post a letter or a parcel. "Mint" postage refers to stamps which are gummed, uncancelled, and in pristine condition. On October 6, 1986, Wood forwarded about 1800 postage stamps of various denominations with an aggregate face value of about $258.00 to the cooperating Maryland stamp dealer. Soon thereafter, Wood was sent a check for $164.89 in payment for the stamps. Many of the stamps supplied by Wood bore evidence of being previously used to post a letter or a parcel. The cooperating stamp dealer sent a letter to Wood on October 15, 1986, which thanked him for his shipment of stamps and indicated a need for stamps of $100.00 face value per month. The letter also stated that the stamp dealer knew a friend named Jenkins who was in the mail order business and had similar needs for stamps. On January 6, 1987, the cooperating stamp dealer, "Chuck," received another shipment of postage stamps from Wood. "Chuck" forwarded a check payable in the amount of $32.92 to Wood in payment for the receipt of stamps with a face value of $51.00. "Chuck" enclosed a letter to Wood with the check which stated in part: You will notice that it is a J.J. Enterprise check. Jeff has been needing so much of this postage for his business mailings he has been buying most all of my shipment that I get in. Therefore, if you would be kind enough to just send any future shipments directly to his address, I would appreciate it. I will still make my share. Thank you. For your records his address again is Jeff Jenkins, J.J. Enterprises, Box 22015, Baltimore, Maryland 21203. . . . "Jeff Jenkins" is an assumed name of Postal Inspector John T. Evans, acting in an undercover investigative capacity. "J.J. Enterprises" likewise is a fictitious, non-existent business created for purposes of the investigation of Wood by the Postal Service. Subsequent to January 6, 1987, seven more shipments of stamps were received from Wood by postal inspectors. The last arrived on June 16, 1988. In each case, Wood received a check in payment for the stamps. The types of stamps forwarded by Wood in all the shipments would have been of little value for stamp collection purposes. Accordingly, the market value for such a purpose would have been far below the amounts paid to Wood for the stamps. The sum of the face value of the stamps was $753.10. The price paid to Wood was consistent with the value of used stamps which were to be unlawfully reused for postage to lower mailing expenses. In one of the correspondences forwarded by Postal Inspector John Evans, posing as "Jeff Jenkins," Wood was told of a friend, Don Wilson, who lived in Alabama. The Respondent was told that Don Wilson was interested in buying "these type stamps." "Don Wilson" is an assumed name of Postal Inspector Larry Dodson, acting in an undercover investigative capacity. On June 23, 1988, Inspector Dodson telephone Wood, posing as Don Wilson. Inspector Dodson told Wood that he was interested in buying stamps in order to reduce mailing expenses. Wood stated that he would be willing to sell stamps to Don Wilson. On June 29, 1988, Inspector Dodson and four other postal inspectors served a search warrant at Wood's home. The search yielded thirteen shallow plastic trays and a plastic tub of the type used to soak stamps off paper envelopes. Inspector Dodson also found a quantity of stamps which had been removed from the corners of envelopes by soaking. Inspector Dodson found approximately 5100 mailing envelopes utilized by the West Florida Gas Company to receive utility payments. He also located about 1800 mailing envelopes utilized by Gulf Coast Electrical Cooperative to receive utility payments. The utilities' envelopes bore some cancelled and some uncancelled postage stamps. Inspector Dodson also found about 173,000 used postage stamps of various denominations, most packaged in glassine envelopes, one hundred stamps per envelope. The quantities and types of stamps which Wood had stored were of little collector value. On April 11, 1989, pursuant to federal charges filed against him by the United States Attorney in the Northern District of Florida, Wood pleaded guilty to the charge of dealing in cancelled postage stamps in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1720.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order and therein revoke the certification of William H. Wood. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1990. Copies furnished to: Joseph S. White Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 William H. Wood 104 North Claire Drive Panama City, Florida 32401 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rodney Gaddy, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to either a refund of employee contributions to the Florida State and County Officers' and Employees' Retirement System ("SCOERS") made from August 26, 1966, through June 3, 1974, or service credit toward retirement for this period of time.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for the administration of the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). § 121.025, Fla. Stat. (2004). Ms. Johnson has been employed by Jackson Memorial Hospital since February 1985, and she is an active member of the FRS. Ms. Johnson was also employed by Jackson Memorial Hospital from August 26, 1966, through June 3, 1974, and was a member of the SCOERS during that time. Under the SCOERS, both members and employers paid contributions into the system. Members of the SCOERS could request a refund of employee contributions into the system upon termination of employment.2 When Ms. Johnson terminated her employment at Jackson Memorial Hospital in June 1974, she completed a Division of Retirement Request for Refund card, in which she requested a refund of her contributions to the SCOERS. Ms. Johnson signed the Request for Refund Card, which directs that the refund be sent to the 17th Floor of the Dade County Courthouse, which was the address for the Miami-Dade County Finance Department. Ms. Johnson was an employee of Miami-Dade County when she worked for Jackson Memorial Hospital from 1966 until 1974. At the time Ms. Johnson terminated her employment in 1974, refund checks for employees of Miami-Dade County were sent to Miami-Dade County rather than to the employee, and all Request for Refund cards completed by Miami-Dade County employees had typed on the cards the Dade County Courthouse address of Miami- Dade County's Finance Department. Included on the Request for Refund card signed by Ms. Johnson was a statement that, by requesting a refund of contributions to the SCOERS, she waived the right to any retirement service credit for the time period covered by the refund. The normal business practice of the Division of Retirement is, and was at the times material to these proceedings, to notify the Comptroller's office to send the refund requested by a SCOERS member to the address indicated on the Request for Refund card. The normal business practice of the Division of Retirement is, and was at the times material to these proceedings, to affix to the Request for Refund card labels provided by the Comptroller's office confirming that refund checks were mailed to the member requesting the refund. The labels attached to Ms. Johnson's Request for Refund card indicate that two refund payments were sent by the Comptroller on Ms. Johnson's behalf to the address shown on the Request for Refund card: One, in the amount of $2,150.29, was sent on July 19, 1974, and one, in the amount of $242.18, was sent on January 31, 1975.3 Although Ms. Johnson claims that she did not receive any refund of her employee contributions to the SCOERS, she did not contact the Division of Retirement regarding the refund until August 2003, when she telephoned the Division of Retirement and stated that she had never received the 1974 refund. Because Ms. Johnson is an active member of the FRS, she is entitled to purchase the retirement service credit she accumulated between 1966 and 1974.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services enter a final order dismissing the request of Delores F. Johnson for a formal administrative hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 2004.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondents committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, SA Lee was licensed by the State of Florida as a real estate salesperson, having been issued license number SL-0640485 on July 15, 1996. Further, Respondent SA Lee was a real estate salesperson in association with Respondent Realty, a real estate broker corporation. At all times material hereto, Respondent SE Lee was licensed by the State of Florida as a real estate broker, having been issued license number BK-0594787. Further, Respondent SE Lee was the qualifying broker and officer of Respondent Realty. At all times material hereto, Respondent Realty was licensed by the State of Florida as a real estate broker corporation, having been issued license number CQ-0272573. In 1996, Brian Mulally (buyer) wanted to buy certain residential property located at 4397 Vicliff Road, West Palm Beach, Florida. Maryann Duchesne and Margaret Reppucci were the sellers of the property. Medallion Realty was the listing broker for the property. Paula Castro was the real estate salesperson representing Medallion Realty. The sellers authorized Medallion Realty and Ms. Castro to represent them, to be their agents in the sale of their property. Respondent SA Lee, as sales agent for Respondent Realty, notified the buyer that she was not representing him. The buyer knew at all times that Respondent SA Lee was not his representative in the purchase of the property. In a "Disclosure" document dated September 4, 1996, the buyer acknowledged that Respondent SA Lee was not representing him and that the sellers were compensating Respondent SA Lee.1 The sellers did not authorize Respondent SA Lee to represent them in the sale of their property and were not aware of the Disclosure document. Respondent SA Lee and Respondent Realty were not representing the sellers or the buyer. However, an inference is drawn and a finding of fact is made that Respondent SA Lee and Respondent Realty were working together with Medallion Realty in the sale of the property and that Respondent SA Lee and Respondent Realty were sub-agents of Medallion Realty.2 The buyer and sellers executed a Contract for Sale and Purchase (Contract) of the property, with the buyer executing the Contract on September 30, 1996, and the sellers on October 1, 1996. The effective date of the Contract was October 1, 1996. The Contract provided, among other things, that Respondent Realty would hold deposits in escrow; that the buyer's first deposit would be $100; that the buyer's second deposit of $1,900 would be made within five days of October 1, 1996; that, within five days of October 1, 1996, the buyer would make application for a mortgage loan; that, within 15 days of October 1, 1996, the buyer would obtain a written commitment for a mortgage loan; that the closing date was October 31, 1996; and that Medallion Realty and Respondent Realty were the listing broker and cooperating broker, respectively. The buyer was to obtain the money for the second deposit from a family member. He had planned a trip around the time of the execution of the Contract, during which he would obtain the money for the second deposit. When the buyer returned from his trip, he did not have the money for the second deposit. The buyer informed Respondent SA Lee of his failure to return with the money for the second deposit. Shortly thereafter, Respondent SA Lee and Ms. Castro had a telephone conversation regarding the property. During their conversation, Respondent SA Lee informed Ms. Castro that the buyer had not made the second deposit but that he was still going to obtain the money for the second deposit. The disclosure to the sellers' agent, Ms. Castro, of the buyer's failure to remit the second deposit was before the due date for the deposit, which was on or before October 6, 1996. Ms. Castro continued to make inquiries to Respondent SA Lee as to the payment of the second deposit by the buyer. Respondent SA Lee informed Ms. Castro that she was trying to get the deposit from the buyer who was advising her (Respondent SA Lee) that he was getting the money for the deposit. Ms. Castro was continuously aware that the buyer had not remitted the second deposit to Respondent SA Lee. Respondent SA Lee and Ms. Castro wanted the real estate transaction to proceed. Respondent SA Lee's communication with the sellers was through Ms. Castro. Respondent SA Lee did not have access to a telephone number for the sellers. The sellers obtained the services of a closing agent, who was also their attorney. On or about October 11, 1996, approximately five days after the due date for the second deposit, the sellers' attorney, acting as closing agent, contacted Ms. Castro regarding the second deposit. Ms. Castro informed the sellers' attorney that she would contact Respondent SA Lee and get back with her (the sellers' attorney). On or about October 15, 1996, approximately nine days after the due date for the second deposit, the sellers' attorney, in her role as the closing agent, contacted Respondent SA Lee and requested an escrow letter regarding the second deposit. Obtaining the escrow letter would allow the beginning of the preparation of the closing documents. Respondent SA Lee informed the sellers' attorney that she would contact Ms. Castro and that Ms. Castro would in turn contact the sellers' attorney. Respondent SA Lee contacted Ms. Castro. No escrow letter was forwarded to the sellers' closing agent because no second deposit had been made by the buyer. Even without the escrow letter, the closing agent began the preparation of the closing documents. Thereafter, the sellers' attorney, acting as closing agent, contacted Respondent SA Lee several times regarding the remittance of the second deposit, but Respondent SA Lee never gave the sellers' closing agent a forthright response; Respondent SA Lee never informed the sellers' closing agent that the buyer had not remitted the second deposit.3 Respondent continued to communicate with Ms. Castro regarding the second deposit. The sellers' closing agent was not informed until around October 28 or 29, 1996, that the buyer had not remitted the second deposit. Other problems, regarding the real estate transaction, in addition to the remittance of the second deposit, erupted between the buyer and the sellers. At that time Ms. Castro allowed the sellers' attorney to step-in and handle all matters regarding the transaction. The evidence indicates that this change occurred sometime between October 15 and October 30, 1996. When the sellers' attorney began to handle all matters regarding the real estate transaction, Respondent SA Lee should have, but did not, inform the sellers' attorney that the buyer had not remitted the money for the second deposit. The second deposit was eventually remitted by the buyer on or about October 30, 1996. The buyer forwarded the money directly to the sellers' attorney per Respondent SA Lee's instructions. For several reasons, including the buyer's failure to timely remit the second deposit, the closing did not occur on October 31, 1996, as provided in the Contract. The closing on the property occurred on November 27, 1996. Sometime after the closing of the real estate transaction, Respondent SE Lee ceased to be the qualifying broker for Respondent Realty. Sharon E. Lee became the qualifying broker and officer for Respondent Realty. No evidence was presented by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Petitioner) as to Respondent SE Lee's failure to properly supervise the activities of Respondent SA Lee or Respondent Realty. No evidence was presented as to whether Respondent SA Lee or Respondent Realty had a history of disciplinary action taken against them.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate enter a final order and therein: Dismiss Count III against Stephen E. Lee. Find Sherry Ann Lee guilty of Counts I and II. Find C. Mist Realty, Inc. guilty of Count IV. Impose upon Sherry Ann Lee an administrative fine of $1,000, payable under the terms and conditions deemed appropriate, and the completion of a 45-hour post-licensure course. Reprimand C. Mist Realty, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 2000.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, Michael Crudele, should be disciplined for alleged violations of the statutes and rules governing the conduct of insurance agents.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Michael Crudele, is currently eligible for licensure and is licensed in Florida as a life insurance agent and as a life and health insurance agent. The Respondent was the agent-of-record on two American Life and Casualty Insurance Company (American Life) annuities purchased by Mary Clem, one in the face amount of $30,000 dated October 28, 1992, and the other in the face amount of $20,000 dated December 28, 1992. Clem was 84 years old at the time and a widow. The annuities represented more than 80 percent of her life savings. The Respondent became agent-of-record on these annuities at the request of Charles Perks, a good friend and former fellow Metropolitan Life agent. Clem had been an insurance customer of Perks since approximately 1985. When Clem complained to Perks that "the bottom fell out of interest" on her certificates of deposit, he suggested the American Life annuities as a safe alternative that paid higher interest. But Perks was not an authorized agent for American Life, so he asked the Respondent to participate in the sales and split the commissions. In 1992, the Respondent became involved in the Zuma Engineering Co., Inc., a startup tire recycling venture. After being introduced to Zuma, the Respondent became very enthusiastic about its prospects. He invested $30,000 in Zuma, received stock in return for his investment, and became a thirty percent owner. He also became involved in all aspects of the startup business, from promoting the business to the public, to raising capital from and working with private investors, to cleaning up Zuma's recycling facility. He understood that he was a corporate director, but corporate filings with the Secretary of State indicate that he was a vice-president from October 27, 1993, until March 20, 1994. The Respondent not only solicited investors himself, he participated in recruiting a sales force. As part of this effort, he recruited his friend Charles Perks. In late 1993 and early 1994, Perks and the Respondent approached Mary Clem to solicit her investment in Zuma. It is not clear from the evidence how the solicitation of Mary Clem proceeded. It is believed that Clem may have initially contacted Perks around the time of the anniversary date of the $30,000 annuity to complain that she had been notified of a drop in the interest rate paid by the annuity. Mary Clem received a guaranteed 5.75 percent interest, plus a one percent interest "bonus" for a total of 6.75 percent interest during the first year of her two American Life annuities. The "bonus" interest automatically terminated at the end of the first year. In addition, the evidence was that the standard interest guarantee decreased to five percent starting with the second year. It is not clear when Clem received notice of the decrease in the interest guarantee or whether she received notice from American Life as to the elimination of the interest "bonus," but it is found that by December 2, 1993, Clem knew the interest rate on her $30,000 annuity was being decreased to five percent for the second year of the annuity. It is possible that she also knew by then that the interest on her $20,000 annuity was being decreased to five percent as well. Perks saw Mary Clem's dissatisfaction with the American Life annuities as an opportunity to sell Zuma promissory notes to her. On or about December 2, 1993, Charles Perks approached Mary Clem and sold her a $10,000 promissory note issued by Zuma. On its face, the promissory note was dated December 3, 1993, and paid twelve percent interest, with a single balloon payment of principal and interest due on June 3, 1995. The evidence was that the Respondent did not participate in this transaction on December 2, 1993. Mary Clem does not recall, and both Perks and the Respondent testified that the Respondent was not present. The Respondent testified that he was not even aware of this $10,000 Zuma note until the Department's Order of Emergency Suspension and Administrative Complaint on or about July, 1996, but this testimony is rejected as not being credible. It is found that the Respondent knew about Clem's purchase of the $10,000 promissory note either on December 2, 1993, or soon thereafter. It is found that by December 2, 1993, or shortly thereafter, Clem complained to both Perks and the Respondent about the interest on her annuities. It is found that all three of them discussed Zuma promissory notes as an alternative investment. Contrary to the Respondent's testimony, it is found that, if he did not already know about Clem's purchase of the $10,000 Zuma promissory note by then, the Respondent would have learned of the $10,000 Zuma promissory note during these discussions. It also is found that, based on those discussions, Clem decided to surrender her $20,000 annuity and use the money to buy Zuma promissory notes. It is found that Perks and the Respondent helped Clem with the surrender of her $20,000 annuity. It also is found, contrary to the Respondent's testimony, that Perks and the Respondent assisted in arranging for Clem to be able to purchase a Zuma promissory note in the face amount of $20,000 for the net cash surrender value of the $20,000 annuity, after deduction of premium tax and surrender penalty. When American Life was notified of Clem's desire to surrender the $20,000 annuity, the company contacted the Respondent and asked him to "conserve" the annuity, i.e., dissuade Clem from surrendering it. It is found that, if he did not already know about it by then, the Respondent would have learned of Clem's intentions to buy Zuma promissory notes when he contacted her on behalf of American Life to comply with American Life's request that he attempt to conserve the annuity. It also is found that, if he did not already know about Clem's purchase of the $10,000 Zuma promissory note, he would have learned of the $10,000 Zuma promissory note at this time. By letter dated January 24, 1994, American Life responded to Clem's request to surrender her $20,000 annuity. American Life's letter advised Clem that she was entitled to principal and $69.67 in interest, less premium tax in the amount of $213.69 and surrender charges in the amount of $1,625.65, for a net of $18,230.33. A check for the net amount was enclosed. A copy of American Life's January 24, 1994, letter was sent to the Respondent as the agent-of-record. On or about February 1, 1994, Perks and the Respondent went to Clem's home to complete the purchase of a $20,000 Zuma promissory note. The Respondent testified that, since all of the arrangements had been made in advance, the Respondent's role in the transaction was solely as "corporate director and verifier" on behalf of Zuma; however, the Respondent also would receive $900 of the $2,000 commission paid by Zuma on the transaction. Meanwhile, his additional role as American Life's agent required him to attempt to "conserve" the annuity policy. At one point, the Respondent testified that, as "corporate director and verifier," he inquired into Clem's assets (presumably to ascertain if the investment was appropriate for her). But he also testified that he assumed her assets were unchanged from 1992, raising a question as to whether the Respondent undertook any inquiry into Clem's assets on February 1, 1994, at all. At another point, the Respondent testified that he understood Mary Clem to have $200,000 in assets. See Department Exhibit 6. But, if so, those assets consisted of her home, the annuities and the $10,000 Zuma promissory note. It is found that the Respondent had no reason to believe she had any other assets. The Respondent also testified that he did not determine from his alleged inquiry into Clem's assets, and did not know, that Clem already had purchased a $10,000 Zuma promissory note. As previously found, it is considered incredible that the Respondent did not already know by February 1, 1994, that Clem had purchased the $10,000 Zuma promissory note; it is all the more incredible that he would not have learned of it from a diligent inquiry into Clem's assets for purposes of determining the appropriateness of the $20,000 Zuma investment. Mary Clem testified that the Respondent and Perks touted the safety of the Zuma investment as well as the higher interest it paid. The Respondent testified that, although acting in the conflicting roles described in the preceding finding, he discussed the differences between the two investments, including the risk of the Zuma investment. The Respondent testified that he read to Mary Clem from a written disclosure statement that defined Zuma's promissory notes as being a "risk investment," but no written disclosure statement was introduced in evidence. In any event, the "verification" was a mere formality; as the Respondent knew full well, Clem already had decided to buy the promissory note. Clem wrote a personal check in the amount of $18,230, and Perks and the Respondent gave her Zuma's $20,000 promissory note bearing twelve percent interest. The note was erroneously dated February 1, 1993, and erroneously stated on its face that the single balloon payment of principal and interest was due on February 1, 1995. The note was supposed to have a 24- month term from February 1, 1994, to February 1, 1996. (This discrepancy would lead to problems later. See Findings 32-33, infra.) In view of the conflict of interest inherent in the Respondent's multiple roles in the transaction, it is found that the Respondent did not make a good faith inquiry into appropriateness of the Zuma investment for Mary Clem and did not fully disclose the risk associated with it, as compared to the American Life annuity. If the Respondent disclosed the risk, it is found that he did not do so fully and clearly, again probably due to the conflict of interest inherent in his multiple roles. Neither Mary Clem nor her late husband had ever invested in any stocks, mutual funds or even bonds. Before Mary Clem invested in the American Life annuities, she and her late husband always invested in certificates of deposit. While it is true that Clem wanted higher interest than she was getting on her annuities, she also wanted safety and security. It is found that, if the Respondent had fully and completely disclosed the risk of investing in Zuma promissory notes, Mary Clem would not have invested in them. Mary Clem also surrendered her $30,000 American Life annuity and used the money she received to buy another Zuma promissory note. The Respondent claimed not to have known anything about the third Zuma note, and the Department was not able to prove that he did. It is not clear exactly when Clem decided to surrender her $30,000 annuity and buy a third Zuma note. It was before March 3, 1994, the date of the American Life letter responding to Clem's request to surrender her $30,000 annuity. American Life's letter advised Clem that she was entitled to principal and $16.04 in interest, less premium tax in the amount of $324.71 and surrender charges in the amount of $2,474.92, for a net of $27,216.41. A check for the net amount was enclosed. As with Clem's request to surrender her $20,000 annuity, American Life contacted the Respondent and asked him to try to "conserve" the annuity. The Respondent also received a copy of American Life's March 3, 1994, letter as the agent-of- record. The Respondent admitted that he telephoned Clem on or about February 28, 1994, to try to conserve the annuity but that Clem was adamant. He claimed that Clem did not tell him what she intended to do with the money and that he did not ask. The meeting at which Clem bought the third Zuma promissory note took place on March 10, 1994. Mary Clem thought the Respondent was there but could not swear to it. Perks also testified that he thought the Respondent was there. The Respondent testified that he definitely was not there and did not know the transaction took place. By that time of the meeting on March 10, 1994, the Respondent had become suspicious and distrustful of Zuma's principals. They had diluted his thirty percent share of the company to a mere 0.3 percent. In addition, the Respondent did not think that the principals were following the business plan they had "sold" the Respondent, and which the Respondent in turn had "sold" to private investors, including Mary Clem. By early March 1994, the Respondent began to take steps to attempt to protect the investors in Zuma, including himself, and force Zuma to follow its business plan. Eventually, he emptied Zuma's accounts and placed the funds in the trust account of the lawyers he hired to sue Zuma and its principals to enjoin them to follow the business plan. The court ruled against the Respondent and required him to return the money to Zuma. The Respondent paid his lawyers' fees out of his own pocket. Based on the timing of events, it seems probable that the Respondent did not meet with Perks and Clem on March 10, 1994. By that time, he was becoming deeply involved in his dispute with Zuma and its principals. It is less clear that the Respondent was completely ignorant of Clem's intention to use the money from the surrender of the $30,000 American Life annuity to buy a third Zuma note, but he may well have lost track of Mary Clem and her intentions in the midst of his dispute with Zuma and its principals. It had been arranged before the March 10, 1994, meeting for Clem to be able to purchase a Zuma promissory note in the face amount of $30,000 for the net cash surrender value of the $30,000 annuity, after deduction of premium tax and surrender penalty. The Respondent denied participating in making these arrangements or having any knowledge of them. A similar arrangement already had been made for the $20,000 annuity and Zuma note, and it is conceivable that Perks did not require the Respondent's participation to arrange it for the $30,000 annuity and Zuma note. It is found that the evidence did not prove the Respondent's participation. On March 10, 1994, Clem wrote a personal check in the amount of $27,2126.41, and received Zuma's $30,000 promissory note dated March 10, 1994. On its face, the note paid twelve percent interest, with quarterly payments of $900 interest and the principal payable on March 10, 1996. The Respondent contacted Mary Clem in June or July, 1994, to inquire about her Zuma investment. Clem told him everything was fine. In December 1994, the notes were revised to show Mary Clem's daughter as a beneficiary on the notes in the event of Clem's death. The revised $20,000 note preserved the erroneous issuance and due dates. See Finding 21, supra. The $900 interest payment due on the $30,000 Zuma note on March 1995, was seriously past due. In addition, no payments were made on the $20,000 note. On April 1, 1995, the $20,000 note was renewed upon payment of $6,200 interest and penalties. Under the renewal note, monthly interest payments of $200 were due, and a balloon payment of principal and remaining interest was due on September 1, 1995. By mid-1995, Zuma was in default again, and Clem received no payments after August 8, 1995. Zuma paid Clem a total of just $23,400 on the three promissory notes. The Respondent conceded that there was a high risk of losing one's entire investment in Zuma and that someone investing in Zuma had to be prepared to lose the entire investment. He also conceded that Mary Clem should not have invested the bulk of her life savings in Zuma. He also conceded that it would have been significant to know, and he should have wanted to know, the extent of Clem's investment in Zuma before increasing her investment in Zuma.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final order: (1) finding the Respondent, Michael Crudele, guilty of violating Sections 626.611(7), 626.621(3), and 626.621(6), Florida Statutes (1993); and (2) suspending his license and eligibility for licensure as a life insurance agent and as a life and health insurance agent for six months. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1998.
Findings Of Fact A Quit-Claim Deed was executed the 3rd day of March, 1975, by Bayshore 21, Inc., first party to Marc Broxmeyer an undivided 70 percent interest; Gerald Schefflan and Pearl Schefflan, his wife, an undivided 20 percent interest; and Yetta Young an undivided 10 percent interest. The deed was recorded in Official Records Book of Dade County, Florida. The deed reflects that no documentary stamp taxes were affixed to the deed. At the time of the conveyance there existed upon the property three outstanding mortgages: one in the amount of One Million Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($1,450,000) in favor of Washington Federal Savings and Loan; one in the amount of One Million Eight Hundred Eighty Thousand One Hundred Six Dollars ($1,880,106) in favor of Sidney Salomon, et al.; and Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($12,500) in favor of Harold Kravitz. The total consideration for the conveyance amounted to Three Million Three Hundred Forty- Two Thousand Six Hundred Six Dollars ($3,342,606). The undisputed facts of the transaction as outlined at the hearing and agreed to by the Petitioners' attorney are as follows: Prior to August 17, 1974, all the outstanding stock of a corporation known as Tepmon of Florida, Inc., (Marvin Glick, presidents and controlling person and Eugene J. Howard, secretary) was held by Sidney Salomon, Jr., Hid Salomon, III, Elliot Stein, the Estate of Preston Estep and John Soult. On or about April 17, 1974, these people entered into an agreement for purchase and sale of corporate stock with Bayshore 21, Inc., pursuant to which Bayshore 21, Inc., agreed to purchase for Three Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($3,500,000) all of the outstanding capital stock of Tepmon of Florida, Inc. At the time, Tepmon of Florida, Inc., had as its only asset a certain parcel of real property known as the Golden Strand Hotel, as shown by suit, Shoprite Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Tepmon, Inc., et al. in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, Case No. 74-29983. Pursuant to the purchase and sale agreement, a closing was to be held in various stages on August 19 and 20, 1974, at which time Sidney Salomon, et al., delivered to Bayshore 21, Inc., all of the capital stock of Tepmon of Florida, Inc. Bayshore 21, Inc., in turn executed and delivered at the closing a chattel mortgage in the amount of One Million Eight Hundred Eighty Thousand One Hundred Six Dollars ($1,880,106), the security for which there was sixty-nine (69) shares of capital stock of Tepmon of Florida, Inc., which stock represented the outstanding stock of Tepmon of Florida, Inc., and carried with it the ownership and control of said corporation. Also given to Sidney Salomon, et al, by Bayshore 21, Inc., at the closing was a purchase money mortgage in the amount of One Million Eight Hundred Eighty Thousand One Hundred Six Dollars ($1,880,106), which mortgage secured the real property known as the Golden Strand Hotel. The reason for the two separate security devices, one the chattel mortgage secured by the outstanding sixty-nine (69) shares of Tepmon of Florida, Inc., stock and the other the real property mortgage secured by the Golden Strand Hotel, was that the parties contemplated that upon Bayshore 21's acquisition of the outstanding Page 3 of 7' pages capital stock of Tepmon of Florida, Inc., Tepmon would be dissolved and completely liquidated. Mindful that such liquidation would render valueless as collateral the capital stock of Tepmon, the parties provided in a collateral security agreement, dated August 20, 1974, that the purchase money real estate mortgage would constitute the substitute collateral security for repayment of the outstanding purchase money obligation owed by Bayshore 21, Inc., to Sid Salomon, et al., effective upon the dissolution of Tepmon of Florida, Inc. Subsequent to acquiring all the capital stock of Tepmon of Florida, Inc., Bayshore 21, Inc., did in fact effectuate a complete dissolution and liquidation of Tepmon of Florida, Inc. Pursuant to such dissolution, the sole asset of Tepmon of Florida, Inc, the Golden Strand Hotel, should have become titled in the name of Tepmon of Florida, Inc.'s sole stockholder, Bayshore 21, Inc., in order to give effect to the validity of the purchase money mortgage. This is not what occurred however, as Sidney Salomon, et al., point out in their Cross-Claim to the aforementioned suit, the truthfulness of which assertions have been admitted by the Petitioners. The September 5, 1974 deed of conveyance of the Golden Strand Hotel from Tepmon of Florida, Inc., to Petitioners (which should have been to Bayshore 21, Inc.) contained only minimum stamps in the amount of eighty-five cents (85). As a result of the Cross-Claim in the aforementioned suit filed by Sidney Salomon, et al., against Petitioners, a stipulation and agreement was entered into resolving the matter in a manner which gave effect to the purchase money real estate mortgage given by Bayshore 21, Inc., to the Salomons. Pursuant to such stipulation, the Petitioners agreed that "the allegations made in the Cross Claim . . . are true and correct and Cross Claimants are entitled to the relief prayed for therein. Cross Defendants [Petitioners] have no defenses thereto, legal or equitable, or any kind whatsoever Pursuant to this stipulation, the Petitioners agreed to execute Quit-Claim Deeds conveying any interest they may have received in the property pursuant to the September 5, 1974 deed of conveyance from Tepmon of Florida, Inc., to Bayshore 21, Inc., the entity which was the sole stockholder of Tepmon of Florida, Inc., at the time of its dissolution and liquidation. By Quit-Claim Deeds dated January 2, 1975, Gerald and Pearl Schefflan conveyed their interest to Bayshore 21, Inc., Yetta Young conveyed her interest back to Bayshore 21, Inc., Marc Broxmeyer conveyed his interest back to Bayshore 21, Inc., and the last Board of Directors of Tepmon of Florida, Inc., comprised of Marvin Glick and Eugene Howard, also conveyed any interest that entity may have retained back to Bayshore 21, Inc. At this point Bayshore 21, Inc., finally held the title it was supposed to have acquired upon the dissolution and liquidation of Tepmon of Florida, Inc. Also at this point the validity of the purchase money real estate mortgage given by Bayshore 21, Inc., to Sidney Salomon, et al., was reestablished and the parties were returned to the posture called for and required by their purchase and sale agreement dated April 17, 1974. When, on March 3, 1975, Bayshore 21, Inc., conveyed title to the Golden Strand Hotel to the Petitioners in this action, by unstamped deed, the conveyance was a voluntary conveyance. At the time of the conveyance, three outstanding mortgages encumbered the real property. Such mortgages were a One Million Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollar ($1,450,000) mortgage in favor of Washington Federal Savings and Loan; the One Million Eight Hundred Eighty Thousand One Hundred Six Dollar ($1,880,106) purchase money mortgage in favor of Sidney Salomon, et al.; and a Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Dollar ($12,500) mortgage in favor of Harold Kravitz. When Petitioners took title to this real property, they took title subject to three outstanding mortgages. The Hearing Officer further in summary finds: The transactions related in the foregoing findings of fact ultimately transferred title of real property to Bayshore 21, Inc., pursuant to an agreement dated April 17, 1974. Fee simple title was then transferred from Bayshore, Inc., to Petitioners by Quit-Claim Deed dated March 3, 1975, subject to mortgage liens.
Recommendation Affirm the assessment of documentary stamp taxes made by the Respondent in this cause. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of March, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Eugene J. Howard, Esquire 2212 Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33137
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: On May 10, 1973, petitioner, a Tennessee business trust, loaned Hunt- Florida Enterprises, Inc. the principal sum of $1,300,000.00, receiving in return a mortgage deed and mortgage note on property owned by Hunt-Florida located in Broward County. (Exhibits 1 and 2) On September 30, 1975, petitioner loaned Hunt-Florida an additional sum of $125,000.00, receiving in return a "promissory note and mortgage modification agreement." This agreement reflected Hunt-Florida's entire indebtedness to petitioner for $1,425,000.00 and encumbered the mortgaged property for the full amount. This agreement ratified and confirmed the personal and individual guarantee of Richard E. Hunt and his wife, Joyce B. Hunt, of the mortgage note dated May 10, 1973. (Exhibit 3) No payments were made by Hunt-Florida to petitioner to reduce its indebtedness. On February 13, 1976, Hunt-Florida executed to petitioner a quitclaim deed to the subject property. (Exhibit 4). This quitclaim deed had three covenants. It was agreed that by acceptance of the deed, petitioner would not institute suit for the amount owed it by Hunt-Florida in the amount of $1,300,000.00, plus interest, nor would petitioner sue the individual grantors. It was further agreed that the quitclaim deed was subject to the aforementioned mortgage and promissory note and mortgage modification agreement and it was provided that the same shall not merge so that the right to foreclose was not extinguished by the quitclaim deed. Finally, the quitclaim deed provided that it was subject to a purchase contract executed between Hunt-Florida and SLC Oil and Gas Corporation. Hunt-Florida assigned to petitioner all its rights, title and interest in said purchase contract and the proceeds of the same. This quitclaim deed bore only minimal documentary stamps. The respondent Department of Revenue made a total assessment against petitioner in the amount of $16,086.80. This sum includes taxes and surtaxes on the February 13, 1976, quitclaim deed, taxes on the promissory note and mortgage modification agreement and penalties and interest. (Exhibit 5). Petitioner does not contest the mathematical computation or its liability for the assessment on the modification agreement. It does contest the taxes, surtaxes, penalties and interest as assessed upon the quitclaim deed.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that the assessment as set forth in the revised notice of proposed assessment of tax and penalty dated December 8, 1976, be upheld. Respectfully submitted and entered this 22nd day of March, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: John D. Moriarty, Esquire Department of Revenue Room 104, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 David L. Kline, Esquire Abrams, Anton, Robbins, Resnick and Schneider, P.A. Post Office Box 650 Hollywood, Florida 33020 David K. Miller Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether proposed Rule 69O-186.013 is an invalid exercise of legislatively delegated authority as defined in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Section 20.121(3), Florida Statutes, the Financial Services Commission (the Commission) serves as the agency head for the Office of Insurance Regulation for the purpose of rulemaking. On May 26, 2006, the Office of Insurance Regulation issued a Notice of Development of Rulemaking to amend existing Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-186.013. A workshop was held pursuant to this notice on June 15, 2006. On August 15, 2006, the Commission approved for publication a notice of proposed rule amendments to Rule 69O- 186.013. A Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on October 6, 2006. A public hearing was held October 31, 2006. On November 22, 2006, a second notice of hearing was published in the "Notices of Meetings, Workshops and Public Hearings" section of the Florida Administrative Weekly, advising of "an additional public hearing on the proposed amendments to Rule 69O-186.013, Title Insurance Statistical Gathering, published on October 6, 2006, in Vol. 32, No. 40, of the F.A.W." A public hearing was conducted as noticed December 5, 2006. Petitioners filed their Petition to Determine Invalidity of Proposed Rule December 21, 2006. On June 7, 2007, the Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Included in its Motion are several statements relevant to the Petitioners' position regarding dismissal of these proceedings: [The December 5, 2006, hearing] of course, was not the "final public hearing," was not noticed as a hearing at which any action would be taken and never intended to be the "final public hearing" as that term is used in Section 120.56(2)(a), Florida Statutes. In fact, the "final public hearing" would have been held before the FSC as the collegial body responsible for rulemaking for the Office. When it is appropriate, the FSC will hold such a "final public hearing" prior to adoption of a proposed rule. As in every other instance in which the FSC intends to adopt a rule, notice will be provided in the Florida Administrative Weekly (sample attached as Exhibit E). In this instance, the final hearing has not yet been held, or even scheduled. * * * 11. Therefore, this case must be dismissed as the Petition to Determine Invalidity of Proposed Rule was untimely filed. The Petitioners may, if they desire, challenge the proposed rule after the final public hearing. Nevertheless, they may not maintain this action at this time. Petitioners have responded to the Motion to Dismiss by consenting to dismissal of these proceedings, "in reliance on representations made by the State of Florida, Financial Services Commission/Office of Insurance Regulation (the Respondent) in paragraphs 5, 6, and 11 of Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (the Motion to Dismiss) filed on June 7, 2007, that no 'final public hearing' within the meaning of Section 120.54 . . . has been held . . . and that no 'final public hearing' shall be held unless Respondent has first provided to Petitioners proper notice and an opportunity to contest the validity of the Proposed Rule." Petitioners assert, however, that the Petition should be dismissed without prejudice, and that should Respondent attempt to promulgate the Proposed Rule without first holding a "final public hearing" with proper notice, they reserve the right to reinstate this proceeding.
