Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating the licensure and licensure status of motor vehicle dealers and enforcing the statutory and regulatory authority related to standards of business practice by such dealers. D.J.M. RV Center, Inc. (Respondent) holds recreational vehicle dealer license no. 5RV-1222 issued by the Petitioner. The Respondent's licensed place of business is located at 3635 Fowler Street, Fort Myers, Florida 33901. The Respondent is engaged in the business of buying, selling and trading recreational vehicles. It operates under the name D.J.M. RV Center, Inc. That name alone is depicted on the only exterior sign on the Respondent's place of business at the above address. For approximately a two-year period, one George Pieropan, with Respondent's permission, occupied an office in the building occupied by Respondent and bought and sold recreational vehicles at that same location as Respondent. Pieropan purported to be operating a separate recreational vehicle consignment dealer business named "Suncoast RV," a proprietorship. There was, however, no sign on the exterior of the Respondent's dealership building advertising Suncoast RV. Both businesses operated from the same location. There was no segregation of the recreational vehicle inventory of Suncoast RV and D.J.M. RV Center, Inc. The vehicles were intermingled on the display lot. George Pieropan was not a licensed motor vehicle dealer. George Pieropan and Suncoast RV had a separate checking account, but recreational vehicles purportedly being offered for sale by Suncoast RV were advertised in the newspaper as being offered for sale by D.J.M. RV Center, Inc., the Respondent. When individuals came to the sales lot to shop for are creational vehicle, they were shown vehicles by employees of both Suncoast RV and the Respondent, regardless of which entity the vehicle was being sold by or consigned to. Keys for the recreational vehicles purportedly being sold by Suncoast RV or Pieropan, were intermingled with the keys for vehicles being sold by the Respondent on a keyboard in the Respondent's office. Mr. Don Meyer, the President of the Respondent corporation, established that the Respondent purchased a 1978 "Honey" recreational vehicle from George Pieropan which George Pieropan had taken in trade from Mr. and Mrs. Leroy Kehrer. The Respondent sold that vehicle to one James Killem. The bill of sale to Killem for the vehicle was signed by George Pieropan on behalf of the Respondent corporation, D.J.M. RV Center, Inc. In approximately October of 1984, Mr. and Mrs. Kehrer had gone to the Respondent's location to shop for a recreational vehicle. While they were at the Respondent's dealership, Mr. and Mrs. Kehrer were shown a Yellowstone recreational vehicle by Howard Turner. Howard Turner was a salesman for the Respondent and also sold vehicles for Suncoast RV (Pieropan). During their initial visit, Salesman Turner advised the Kehrers that they would have to bring in their current recreational vehicle to have its trade-in value appraised. The Kehrers thus brought in their "Honey" recreational vehicle the next day and Mr. Turner discussed a price with them, with D.J.M. RV Center, Inc. ultimately purchasing the 1978 Honey vehicle. After Mr. Turner and the Kehrers agreed upon an appraised value for their Honey vehicle, which was to be a trade-in, they traded it in on a Yellowstone recreational vehicle which Mr. Turner showed them. The Yellowstone vehicle had been placed on consignment with George Pieropan by its owner, Marcus Heck. During this visit Mr. Turner introduced the Kehrers to George Pieropan, referring to him as "one of the owners of the business" or "his boss." The next day, Pieropan called Mr. Kehrer and shortly thereafter came to the Kehrer's home where a sales agreement was executed for purchase of the new Yellowstone recreational vehicle which had been shown them by Howard Turner, the Respondent and Pieropan's sales employee. As a result of the purchase agreement, the Kehrers issued a check and, at Pieropan's behest, made out the check to "Suncoast RV." At this same time, however, Pieropan told them that Suncoast RV was the branch of the Respondent's dealership that handled used recreational vehicles on consignment such as the subject Yellowstone vehicle. In any event, the Kehrer's paid George Pieropan $17,200 in cash and traded in their "Honey" recreational vehicle with an accompanying trade-in allowance of $13,542 to make up the purchase price for the Yellowstone recreational vehicle. Ultimately, D.J.M. RV Center, Inc. sold that Yellowstone vehicle to one James Killem and George Pieropan executed the bill of sale to Killem on behalf of the Respondent corporation, D.J.M. RV Center, Inc., after D.J.M. purportedly purchased that vehicle from Pieropan. The Kehrers have never received a title for the Yellowstone recreational vehicle they purchased through George Pieropan. Marcus Heck, the previous owner of that vehicle was contacted by Don Meyer, co-owner of the Respondent corporation and had been quoted a sales price for the Yellowstone vehicle by Meyer. Mr. Heck received a check for $15,200 from Pieropan, but that check was dishonored for insufficient funds. Sometime thereafter, Mr. Heck received another check for partial payment of the amount due him in the amount of $9,000. That check was drawn on the Respondent's account and signed by Richard E. Tessier, who was the Respondent corporation's sales manager at the time. Thus, although the Yellowstone vehicle was purportedly consigned by Marcus Heck its original owner to George Pieropan, George Pieropan was acting on behalf of the Respondent corporation in selling the vehicle to the Kehrers' with the assistance of Howard Turner, who was clearly the Respondent's salesman, as evidenced in part by the Respondent corporation's attempt to partially honor the check issued on insufficient funds by George Pieropan who had since left the state. Thus, although Pieropan purported to be operating a separate recreational vehicle dealer business named "Suncoast RV," his business and the Respondent's were so intermingled as to constitute one business entity for all practical purposes. This is borne out by testimony of Marcus Heck, who established that on one occasion when Don Meyer (owner of the Respondent) was on an extended vacation, the Respondent's entire business operation was run by Pieropan in his absence. The businesses were not segregated as to office space, office entrances, driveways, or fences and inventories were co-mingled. Marcus Heck had been contacted by Don Meyer, the co-owner of the Respondent corporation, and quoted the sales price for the Yellowstone vehicle which was to be sold to the Kehrers through Suncoast RV. Suncoast RV was described by Pieropan to Heck as being part of D.J.M. RV Center, Inc. Both Suncoast RV Center, Inc. and Pieropan paid office rent to the brother of Don Meyer, one of the co-owners of D.J.M. RV Center, Inc. Finally, it was established by Howard Turner, the salesman for both D.J.M. and Suncoast and Respondent's witness, that both entities used one common telephone line and that he, Turner, sold recreational vehicles for both Pieropan and Suncoast and D.J.M. RV Center and signed sales orders for both.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That the licensure of D.J.M. RV Center, Inc. be suspended for a period of one year and that Respondent pay to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles a fine of $1,000, and it is further RECOMMENDED that the suspension may be abated at such time as the Respondent provides good and sufficient proof to the Department that the seller of the motor home in question has been reimbursed in full for the sale price of the subject recreational vehicle and that, concomitantly, title to the same has been effectively transferred to the purchasers, Mr. and Mrs. Kehrer. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of October, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. _ P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 1985. APPENDIX Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1. Accepted. 10. Accepted. 19. Accepted. 2. Accepted. 11. Accepted. 20. Accepted. 3. Accepted. 12. Accepted. 21. Accepted. 4. Accepted. 13. Accepted. 22. Accepted. 5. Accepted. 14. Accepted. 23. Accepted. 6. Accepted. 15. Accepted. 24. Accepted. 7. Accepted. 16. Accepted. 25. Accepted. 8. Accepted. 17. Accepted. 26. Accepted. 9. Accepted. 18. Accepted. 27. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Undisputed and accepted. Undisputed and accepted. Undisputed and accepted. This proposed finding is rejected as not being supported by the competent, substantial and credible evidence and testimony of record. This proposed finding is rejected as not comporting with the competent, substantial and credible evidence and testimony of record. This proposed finding is rejected as not supported by competent, substantial, credible evidence and testimony of record. This proposed finding is accepted, but is not dispositive in itself of any issue at bar. This proposed finding is accepted, but it in turn is not dispositive of any issue at bar. This proposed finding is rejected as not being in accord with the competent, substantial, credible evidence and testimony of record in its entirety. This proposed finding of fact is accepted. This proposed finding of fact is accepted. This proposed finding of fact is accepted. 12 COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gregory E. White, Esq. PAVESE, SHIELDS, GARNER, HAVERFIELD, DALTON & HARRISON Post Office Drawer 1507 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Leonard R. Mellon, Executive Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File by Barbara J. Staros, an Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Petitioner’s Settlement Stipulation| and Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. i The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this Inatter. Accordingly it is FOUND and ORDERED as follows: 1. That Respondent shall pay an administrative fine in the amount $f two thousand a dollars ($2,000.00). The fine shal! be paid in four monthly payments. The first payment of i $500.00 to be paid on or before April 30, 2010. The second payment of $500.00 to be paid on or before May 30, 2010. The third payment of $500.00 to be paid on or before J unk 30, 2010. The fourth and final payment of $500.00 to be paid on or before July 30, 2010. All Hayments are to | be made by returning a copy of the order with payment to: Filed March 26, 2010 9:15 AM Division of Administrative Hearings. i i i 1 | Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehi¢les Office of the Hearing Officer Division of Motor Vehicles ; 2900 Apalachee Parkway, Room A308, MS-61 | Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0600 ; 2. If Respondent pays each installment of the amount specified in paragraph one above within the specified time the Department will impose no further penalties or sanctions against Respondent. However, if Respondent fails to pay any installment as specified in haragraph one, on the day following the due date of the installment, Respondent’s motor vehicle dedler license will be automatically suspended and Respondent will cease to do business as a motor vehicle dealer. 3. If, after suspension Respondent pays the past due installment before the due date of the next installment, its motor vehicle dealer license will immediately be reinstated without further penalties or sanctions. However, if Respondent fails to pay the past due installment by the due date of the next installment, the Department will revoke Respondent’s motor vehicle in license. 4. If the Department suspends or revokes Respondent’s motor veil dealer license for | non-payment as specified in paragraphs two and three said suspension or revocatibn shall be without recourse to the Respondent and Respondent hereby expressly waives any|right to appeal or otherwise contest the suspension and OY. DONE AND ORDERED this a 772 day of March 2010, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Carl A. Ford, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety a Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room Bajo, MS-60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0600 Filed in the official records of the Division of Motor Vehicles this ‘day of March 2010. Nalini Vinayak, Dealer ‘Administrator 2 if | ; NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS | Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court withi thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rule 9.110, Rules of App¢llate Procedure. CAF:jde Copies furnished: Deborah Osman Regional Administrator Dealer License Section i | | t | 1 I i i Joel Sharp, President Drive it Away Auto Sales, Inc. | 2527 West Tennessee Street i Tallahassee, Florida 32304 FALR | Post Office Box 385 Gainesville, Florida 32602 | i i i | | i i
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's establishment of North Tampa Chrysler Jeep Dodge, Inc. (North Tampa), as a successor motor vehicle dealer for Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge line-makes (vehicles) in Tampa, Florida, is exempt from the notice and protest requirements in Subsection 320.642(3), Florida Statutes (2009),1 pursuant to Subsection 320.642(5)(a).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner manufactures and sells Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles to authorized Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge dealers. Ulm is a party to Dealer Sales and Service Agreements with Petitioner for Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. Ulm sells Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles at 2966 North Dale Mabry Highway, Tampa, Florida 33607. Ferman is a party to Dealer Sales and Service Agreements with Petitioner for Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. Ferman sells Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles at 24314 State Road 54, Lutz, Florida 33559. It is undisputed that Petitioner has had four dealers in the Tampa metro market for a significant number of years. Petitioner's primary competitors also have had four or more dealers in the Tampa metro market. By appointing North Tampa as a successor dealer to Bob Wilson Dodge Chrysler Jeep (Wilson), Petitioner seeks to maintain the status quo of four Chrysler dealers in the Tampa metro market. In April 2008, Petitioner had four dealers in the Tampa metro market that each sold and serviced Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. The four dealers were: Ulm, Ferman, Courtesy Chrysler Jeep Dodge, and Wilson. On April 25, 2008, Wilson filed a Chapter 11 petition in United States Bankruptcy Court in the Middle District of Florida (the Bankruptcy Court). At or about the same time, Wilson closed its doors and ceased selling and servicing Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. The filing of Wilson’s bankruptcy petition precipitated an automatic stay under Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. The automatic stay prevented Petitioner from terminating Wilson’s franchise and dealer agreements (dealer agreements). But for Wilson’s bankruptcy filing, Petitioner would have sent Wilson a notice of termination when Wilson closed its doors and ceased dealership operations. Wilson’s cessation of business adversely impacted Petitioner. In relevant part, Petitioner lost sales and lacked a necessary fourth dealer to provide service to Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge customers in the Tampa metro market. Petitioner desired to reopen a dealership at or close to the former Wilson location as soon as possible to mitigate or eliminate the economic loss. During the automatic stay, Petitioner was legally precluded from unilaterally appointing a successor dealer to Wilson. Wilson still had valid dealer agreements for the Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles and, therefore, was still a dealer. During the automatic stay, Wilson attempted to sell its existing dealership assets, including the Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge dealer agreements. Any attempt by Petitioner to appoint a successor dealer or even negotiate with a successor dealer, would have undermined Wilson’s efforts to sell the dealerships and maximize the estate for the benefit of the creditors. A sale of the dealership required the consent of Wilson and Wilson’s largest creditor, Chrysler Financial. Petitioner did everything it could to accelerate a sale. However, Petitioner was not a party to the sale negotiations and had no ability to require or force Wilson to sell the dealership or its assets to any particular party or to do so within any particular time period. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner did anything to intentionally, or inadvertently, delay or manipulate the timing of a sale. On July 30, 2008, Petitioner filed a motion with the Bankruptcy Court to lift the automatic stay. The motion also sought the termination of Wilson’s dealer agreements. Petitioner filed the motion in the Bankruptcy Court in an attempt to hasten the sale negotiations. Petitioner also wanted to be able to terminate the dealer agreements as quickly as possible in the event that a sale was not consummated. The Bankruptcy Court did not initially grant Petitioner's motion. The court wanted to allow time for a sale of the dealership to proceed. During 2008 and early 2009, Wilson continued to negotiate with potential buyers for the dealership. On January 8, 2009, Wilson's motor vehicle dealer license expired. It became apparent to Petitioner that a sale of Wilson’s assets would be unlikely. Petitioner again asked the Bankruptcy Court to grant Petitioner's motion to lift the stay. On February 9, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order granting Petitioner's motion to lift the stay. However, the order did not terminate Wilson’s dealer agreements. On February 16, 2009, within a week of the entry of the order lifting the stay, Petitioner sent Wilson a notice of intent to terminate Wilson’s dealer agreements. Wilson received the notice of termination on February 23, 2009, and the termination became effective on March 10, 2009. A preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner attempted to manipulate or delay the timing of the termination of Wilson’s dealer agreements. Petitioner began working on establishing a replacement dealership as soon as Wilson’s dealer agreements were terminated. Establishing a replacement dealership is a lengthy process that primarily involves finding a suitable dealer candidate, finding a suitable location and facility, and making sure that the candidate has the necessary capital to start and maintain the dealership. Petitioner talked to several potential candidates to replace the Wilson dealership, including Jerry Ulm, the principal of one of the complaining dealers in these cases. By letter dated June 24, 2009, Mr. Ulm advised Petitioner that he opposed the opening of a successor dealership for anyone else but wanted the successor dealership for himself should Petitioner decide to proceed. Petitioner determined that Petitioner would not be able to locate the successor dealership at the former Wilson facility. Petitioner considered several potential alternative locations for the successor dealership, including property offered by Ferman. Ferman had a vacant site on Fletcher Avenue in Tampa, Florida, which Ferman leased from a third party unrelated to this proceeding. Ferman offered to sublease the property to Petitioner. In a letter to Petitioner's real estate agent dated July 17, 2009, Ferman stated Ferman's understanding that Petitioner intended to use the property to establish a Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge dealership. Petitioner ultimately decided to locate the dealership at 10909 North Florida Avenue in Tampa, Florida. It is undisputed that this location is less than two miles from the former Wilson location. Before establishing the successor dealership, however, Petitioner wrote a letter to the Department on February 5, 2010 (the letter). The letter requested the Department to confirm that the establishment of the successor dealership would be exempt under Subsection 320.642(5)(a)1. from the notice and protest requirements in Subsection 320.642(3). The letter explained that Wilson had filed bankruptcy and ceased operations and that the bankruptcy had prevented Petitioner from terminating Wilson and appointing a successor dealership. The letter also provided the relevant dates of the bankruptcy, the lifting of the stay, and the termination of Wilson dealer agreements and advised the Department of Petitioner's intent to locate the successor dealership within two miles of Wilson’s former location. The letter asked the Department to confirm that the establishment of a successor dealership would be exempt if it was established within one year of March 10, 2009, when Petitioner terminated the Wilson dealer agreements. By separate e-mails dated February 9 and 12, 2010, the Department twice confirmed that it had consulted with counsel and determined that the establishment of a successor dealership to Wilson in the manner outlined by Petitioner would be exempt. Petitioner relied on this confirmation by the Department before proceeding with the appointment of a successor dealership. On February 24, 2010, Petitioner sent a second letter to the Department, stating Petitioner's intention to appoint North Tampa as the replacement and successor dealer for Wilson (the second letter). In the second letter, Petitioner again asserted its understanding that the establishment of North Tampa was exempt from the relevant statutory requirements for notice and protest. On February 24, 2010, Petitioner also submitted to the Department an application for a motor vehicle dealer license for North Tampa. On March 3, 2010, the Department issued a license to North Tampa for the Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles at 10909 North Florida Avenue in Tampa, Florida. On March 7, 2010, North Tampa opened for business. North Tampa has operated successfully and continuously and employs approximately 30 individuals at the site.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that the establishment of North Tampa as a successor motor vehicle dealer is exempt from the notice and protest requirements in Subsection 320.642(3) pursuant to Subsection 320.642(5)(a). DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 2010.
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File by William F. Quattlebaum, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Respondent’s Notice of Withdrawal of Request for Hearing based on Respondent’s relinquishment of its motor vehicle dealer license, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is CLOSED. Filed June 9, 2010 8:49 AM Division of Administrative Hearings. DONE AND ORDERED this pi G. of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. RL A. FORD, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motor Vehicles this day of June, 2010. Ce ™ NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. CAF/vlg Copies furnished: R. Lee Dorough Dorough Calzada & Soto, LLP 419 North Magnolia Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Robert Hartman Seminole Scooters, Inc. 6227 Park Boulevard Pinellas Park, Florida 33781 James K. Fisher, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway, Room A308 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 William F. Quattlebaum Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator Florida Administrative Law Reports Post Office Box 385 Gainesville, Florida 32602
The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for a motor vehicle dealer license should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Global Express, LLC. (Global Express), is a limited liability company which has submitted to Respondent an application for a license as a motor vehicle dealer under the fictitious name of Auto Zone Auto Sales (the subject application). Johnny Romero and Rosangela Romero, who are husband and wife, are the members and managers of Global Express. Mr. Romero is also known as Johnny Guillermo Romero Peguero.1 Both Mr. and Mrs. Romero signed the subject application on behalf of Global Express before a notary public on May 4, 2009. The following language is contained above the signature lines: Under penalty of perjury, I do swear or affirm that the information contained in this application is true and correct . . . Part 5 of the application form requires that the “applicant, partner, or corporate officer or director” answer yes or no to certain questions (the Certifications). Each dealership officer is required to answer these questions under penalties of perjury. Relevant to this proceeding, both Mr. and Mrs. Romero answered the following question in the negative: Has this applicant, partner, or corporate officer or director ever had a surety bond cancelled? Relevant to this proceeding, both Mr. and Mrs. Romero answered the following question in the negative: Has this applicant, partner, or corporate officer or director ever been denied or had a dealer license suspended or revoked in Florida or any other jurisdiction? In addition to the foregoing, Mr. and Mrs. Romero answered the following question in the affirmative: Has this applicant, partner, or corporate officer or director ever been a licensed dealer in Florida or any other jurisdiction? Under their affirmative response Mr. and Mrs. Romero inserted information reflecting that they had previously been licensed dealers under the license numbered VI/1018283. Pursuant to application executed by Mr. and Mrs. Romero on January 11, 2007, Respondent issued motor vehicle dealer license numbered VI/1018283 to Pronto Cars Corp. (Pronto). Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer license bond was cancelled by its surety, Nova Casualty Company, by notice dated December 18, 2007. Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer license was suspended by Respondent by Order of Emergency Suspension and Administrative Complaint dated March 20, 2008. That case was assigned the following case number by Respondent: DMV-08-479. The Order suspended Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer license because Pronto’s surety had cancelled its bond. There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether Mr. Romero ever received a copy of the Emergency Final Order and Administrative Complaint in case DMV-08-479. That conflict is resolved by finding that Ms. Pierre-Lys, acting in her capacity as a compliance officer for Respondent, served a copy of the Order of Emergency Suspension and Administrative Complaint on Mr. Romero on April 16, 2008. Mr. Romero, on behalf of Pronto, signed and submitted an election of rights form dated May 5, 2008, which provided, in relevant part, as follows: “I have read the Administrative Complaint filed in this matter [DMV-08-479] and understand my options.” Immediately before Mr. Romero’s signature is a check in a box indicating that Mr. Romero was exercising the following option: “I have not obtained a surety bond and wish to voluntarily relinquish my motor vehicle license. I have completed and am returning the Voluntary Relinquishment of License form within 21 days from the date of my receipt of this administrative complaint.” On May 23, 2008,2 Respondent issued its Final Order in its case number DMV-08-479, thereby canceling Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer’s license. The Final Order directed Pronto to surrender its license and all dealer and temporary tags in its possession. The Final Order also contained the following: It is further ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Order of Emergency Suspension and Administrative Complaint filed herein is DISMISSED and this case is hereby CLOSED. Mr. Romero called Respondent’s compliance officer, Luz Irizarry, on March 6, 2009, told her that he wanted to obtain a motor vehicle dealer license, and asked whether he would have to go to a school for new dealers. Ms. Irizarry referred the inquiry to Ms. Buck, who determined that Mr. Romero would have to attend the school because Pronto had received consumer complaints, Pronto’s surety had cancelled its bond, and Pronto’s license had been suspended and subsequently revoked. On March 9, 2009, Ms. Irizarry informed Mr. Romero of the reasons he would have to go to dealer school, and specifically discussed with him the fact that Pronto’s operations had been suspended. When he signed the Certifications on May 4, 2009, Mr. Romero had actual knowledge that Pronto’s surety bond had been revoked and that Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer license had been suspended. Mr. Romero’s contends that he was confused about his answers because he thought he had bought the surety bond for its full term and because he thought the Final Order entered by Respondent dismissed the suspension of his license. Those contentions are rejected. It is clear from his answer pertaining to the license that had been issued to Pronto that Mr. Romero understood as a principal of Pronto he would have to disclose the revocation of Pronto’s surety bond and the suspension of Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer license on the subject application. Mr. and Mr. Romero’s Certifications under section 5 of the subject application pertaining to the revocation of a surety bond and the suspension of a motor vehicle dealer license are willful, material misrepresentations of fact. On February 26, 2008, Respondent discovered that Pronto had moved its business location and was doing business at a location that had not been approved by Respondent. On April 1, 2009, Mrs. Romero drove a motor vehicle displaying a “For Sale” sign. The vehicle had a temporary tag on it that had been issued to Pronto. The possession of that temporary tag violated the Final Order entered in Respondent’s case number DMV-08-479, which ordered Pronto to immediately surrender all temporary tags to Respondent. On April 27, 2009, Mrs. Romero displayed, or acquiesced in the display of, another car with a “For Sale” sign on it parked in front of Global Express’s proposed, but unlicensed, location. That car had a temporary tag on it that had been issued to Pronto. The temporary tag was filled out to show the name of another dealer. The possession of that temporary tag violated the Final Order entered in Respondent’s case number DMV-08-479, which ordered Pronto to immediately surrender all temporary tags to Respondent. On April 2, 2009, Mr. Romero had 13 motor vehicles titled in his name. Although he asserts that some of the motor vehicles were bought in conjunction with a taxi service he operated, he admitted that some of these vehicles had been purchased for resale. Mr. Romero acquired a 1966 Ford motor vehicle on May 9, 209, and sold the vehicle on May 21, 2009. Mr. Romero acquired a 1999 Chevrolet motor vehicle on May 18, 2009, and sold the vehicle on May 25, 2009. Mr. Romero acquired another Chevrolet motor vehicle on May 20, 2008, and sold the vehicle on May 31, 2009. Respondent established that during April and May 2009, Mr. Romero engaged in the business of dealing in motor vehicles without a license. On March 30, 2009, Mr. Romero paid Respondent for the registrations of ten motor vehicles with worthless checks.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Recommended Order. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order deny the subject application. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2009.
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction by June C. McKinney, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Respondent’s Notice of Withdrawal, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is CLOSED and no license will be issued to Polaris Sales, Inc., and Broward Motorsports of Palm Beach, LLC d/b/a Broward Motorsports to sell low-speed vehicles manufactured by Polaris Industries, Inc., (GEM) at 2300 Okeechobee Boulevard, West Palm Beach, (Palm Beach County), Florida 33409. Filed December 10, 2012 1:21 PM Division of Administrative Hearings DONE AND ORDERED this ( | day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Buréati of Issuance Oversight Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A338 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed in the official records of the Division of Motorist Services i rf Hol prcembe, 2012 Naini Vinayak, Dealer Yicense Administre'" NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. JB/jdc Copies furnished: A. Edward Quinton, Esquire Adams, Quinton and Paretti, P.A. Brickell Bayview Center 80 Southwest 8" Street, Suite 2150 Miami, Florida 33130 equinton@adamsquinton.com Michael W. Malone Polaris Sales, Inc. 2100 Highway 55 Medina, Minnesota 55340-9770 Sam Nehme Broward Motorsports of Palm Beach, LLC 4760 Sunkist Way Cooper City, Florida 33330 Marc Osheroff Broward Motorsports of Palm Beach, LLC 13600 Stirling Road Southwest Ranches, Florida 33330 Jonathan Brennen Butler, Esquire Akerman Senterfitt 222 Lakeview Avenue, Suite 400 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Jonathan.butler@akerman.com June C. McKinney Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction by Todd P. Resavage, an Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to the Parties’ Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction based on a Settlement Stipulation entered into between the parties, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly it is FOUND and ORDERED as follows: 1. That Respondent shall pay an administrative fine in the amount of two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) per count for a total of one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500.00) to be paid on or before September 30, 2013. All payments are to be made by returning a copy of the order with payment to: Filed August 29, 2013 2:08 PM Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Office of General Counsel 2900 Apalachee Parkway, Room A432, MS-61 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 2. If Respondent pays the amount specified in paragraph one above within the specified time the Department will impose no further penalties or sanctions against Respondent. However, if Respondent fails to pay the amount specified in paragraph one, on the day following the due date specified in paragraph one, Respondent’s motor vehicle dealer license will be automatically suspended and Respondent will cease to do business as a motor vehicle dealer. 3: If after suspension Respondent pays the amount specified in paragraph one above within 30 days following the date of suspension, its motor vehicle dealer license will immediately be reinstated without further penalties or sanctions. 4. If Respondent fails to pay the amount due by the 30" day following the date of suspension, on the 31" day following the date of suspension Respondent’s motor vehicle dealer license shall be revoked by the Department without further notice. If the Department suspends or revokes Respondent’s motor vehicle dealer license for non-payment as specified in paragraphs two and three above, said suspension or revocation shall be without recourse to the Respondent and Respondent hereby expressly waives any right to appeal or otherwise contest the suspension and revocation. DONE AND ORDERED this a | day of August, 2013, at Tallahassee. Leon County, Florida. Julie Baker, Chief Bureau of Issuance Oversight Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A338 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 i) Filed in the official records of the Division of Motorist Services this 2” day of August, 2013. ane , t leisnd ta Nalini Vinayak, Dealer Yicens NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rule 9.110, Rules of Appellate Procedure. JB:jde Copies furnished: Cathy Coleman Regional Administrator Dealer License Section Teresa Williams, Esquire Williams and Trese 12 Southeast 7" Street, Suite 703 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301
The Issue Whether Petitioner has standing under section 320.642, Florida Statutes, to file a petition with the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Department) protesting the establishment of an additional dealership at a proposed location.
Findings Of Fact As defined in section 320.60(11)(a), Recovery Racing is an existing motor vehicle dealer, and is a party to a Maserati franchise agreement. Recovery Racing sells Maserati vehicles from a licensed franchise located at 5750 North Federal Highway, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. As defined in section 320.60(8), Maserati is a licensee. Rick Case is the additional Maserati dealer that Maserati seeks to establish at 3500 Weston Road, Davie, Florida (proposed location). The Proposed Location is approximately 18 miles from Recovery Racing’s dealership located at 5750 North Federal Highway, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Recovery Racing is not within a radius of 12.5 miles of the proposed Rick Case location; accordingly, Recovery Racing is not claiming standing pursuant to section 320.642(3)(b)1. Recovery Racing relies on section 320.642(3)(b)2., to establish standing. Mr. Stockton, the expert presented by Recovery Racing, opined that Recovery Racing has standing to protest because it made more than 25 percent of its retail sales to persons with registered household addresses within a 12.5 mile radius of the proposed location. Mr. Stockton’s opinion is based on his assumption that “registered household address,” as set forth in section 320.642(3)(b)2., means the address where the persons who use or drive the vehicle reside, regardless of the household addresses where the purchased vehicles are registered. Mr. Stockton explained that in making his calculation, he did not rely on vehicle registration data; rather, he relied on the dealership sales files for each sale, and information provided to him by Mr. Hayim, the general manager for Recovery Racing. Mr. Stockton’s opinion on standing was also based on his definition of “retail sales” as set forth in section 320.642(3)(b)2. According to Mr. Stockton, sales to businesses are included as retail sales where the business is an “instrument” of the transaction, and the person using the car is a “beneficiary.” In contrast, he explained that a sale to a business is excluded as a retail sale when the business is the “beneficiary” of the transaction. Turning to the time periods referenced in section 320.642(3)(b)2., Florida Administrative Code Rule 15C-7.004(9) sets forth the manner in which the 36-month period within which the 12-month period for standing is calculated. The period ends on the last day of the month preceding the month in which notice is published, running through the end of the month prior to the date of publication of the notice. Given the date of the notice in this case, which is May 12, 2014, the relevant period in the instant case ends on April 30, 2014, and begins 36 months before that date on May 1, 2011. In calculating the time periods detailed in section 320.642(3)(b)2., Mr. Stockton was unaware of the Florida Administrative Code rule addressing the calculation of the 12-month period within a 36-month period. Accordingly, he began and ended his calculations mid-month, on May 19, 2011. He explained that there were approximately 730 possible 12-month periods to review; each one starting on a different day, going forward 12 months. Mr. Stockton’s method of reviewing the statutory time periods does not comply with the standards set forth in the Florida Administrative Code. In making a standing calculation, the automotive industry calculates the percentage using the following fraction: the denominator is the total number of retail sales, and the numerator reflects the number of retail sales that are within the geographic radius required by the statute (referred to as “the ring”). The records attached to Mr. Stockton’s reports, which are tabs 6 through 128 (although not consecutively numbered) in Exhibit 1, contain the documents that Mr. Stockton relied upon in making his standing calculation. Mr. Stockton calculated the fraction at least two different times; both calculations were presented to the undersigned. The first calculations were reported as follows: Date range Sales within ring Nationwide sales Percent within ring 5/19/2011-5/18/2012 32 127 25.20% 5/20/2011-5/19/2012 32 127 25.20% 5/21/2011-5/20/2012 32 127 25.20% 5/22/2011-5/21/2012 32 126 25.40% 5/23/2011-5/22/2012 33 127 25.98% Mr. Stockton’s revised calculations, after receiving more information about some of the sales, were reported as follows: Date range Sales within ring Nationwide sales Percent within ring 5/19/2011-5/18/2012 34 127 26.77% 5/20/2011-5/19/2012 34 127 26.77% 5/21/2011-5/20/2012 34 127 26.77% 5/22/2011-5/21/2012 34 126 26.98% 5/23/2011-5/22/2012 35 127 27.56% Sixteen of the sales included in the “sales within ring” (using either of the two reports detailed above) are not supported by any vehicle registration data. Those 16 sales are, as enumerated by the tabs attached to Mr. Stockton’s report, the following: 18, 19, 24, 34, 37, 43, 51, 61, 68, 76, 109, 112, 117, 118, 119, and 122. Interestingly, for two of the sales, tab 37 and tab 43, Mr. Stockton knew that the cars were registered in New Hampshire and Orlando, Florida, respectively. He included them, however, in the sales within the ring because he had knowledge that the vehicles were being used by persons with household addresses within the ring. Mr. Stockton’s method of reviewing the “end user” of a vehicle sale is wholly dependent on documents that vary from sales file to sales file and on information given to him by the general manager of the dealership. This methodology is subjective and easily manipulated by an interested party. Mr. Stockton also included two sales, tabs 24 and 122, that were sold to non-retail buyers, who purchase the vehicle wholesale. He included both because he had acquired information that the “end users” of the vehicles were persons with household addresses within the ring. Maserati’s expert, Mr. Farhat, opined that Recovery Racing did not have standing to protest because Recovery Racing did not meet the 25 percent requirement of retail sales within the 12.5 mile radius, within the time period mandated by the statute. Mr. Farhat’s calculations were based on the assumption that the statutory term “registered household addresses” means the household addresses to which vehicles are registered with the Department. Given this assumption, he reviewed the vehicle registration data for each retail sale. Mr. Farhat obtained the data from two authoritative sources in the automotive industry: Experian and IHS. Both of these entities obtain their vehicle registration data from state departments of motor vehicles. Mr. Farhat defined the term “retail sale” as sales to individuals, and to businesses that purchase less than 10 vehicles in a year. He explained that this definition is used industry-wide. Mr. Farhat ultimately opined that Recovery Racing never got close to reaching the 25 percent requirement, in any of the potential rolling 12-month periods in the preceding 36- months. Mr. Farhat’s testimony as to the definition of “registered household addresses” is found credible, as it gives meaning to all of the language contained in the statute. Mr. Stockton’s definition is not supported by the statutory language, is unreliable, subject to manipulation, fails to give any meaning to the word “registered” as used in the statute, and inserts the term “end user” into the statute. Mr. Farhat’s testimony as to the definition of “retail sales” is also found credible, as it is an objective standard used by the automotive industry. Mr. Stockton’s definition of “retail sales” is suspect in that it requires investigation into whether a business is a “beneficiary” or an “instrument”—-again, information that is highly subjective and easily manipulated. The plain meaning of the words “registered household addresses,” as used in section 320.642(3)(b)2., is the household address to which a vehicle is registered with the Department. Given that 16 of the sales included in the ring by Mr. Stockton had no vehicle registration data, they cannot be included in the numerator. Two of those 16 sales were also not retail sales, as defined by the automotive industry. Recovery Racing failed to meet its burden of proving that it has standing to protest the proposed Rick Case dealership location, as it did not establish that 25 percent of its retail sales, sold during the defined statutory timeframe, were within the 12.5 mile radius set forth in section 320.642(3)(b)2.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order dismissing Recovery Racing’s protest of the proposed establishment of an additional dealer for lack of standing. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JESSICA E. VARN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Jennifer Clark, Agency Clerk Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A430 2900 Apalachee Parkway, MS 61 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) J. Andrew Bertron, Esquire Nelson, Mullins, Riley, and Scarborough, LLP Suite 202 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South Tallahassee, Florida 32312 (eServed) Robert E. Sickles, Esquire Hinshaw and Culbertson, LLP Suite 500 100 South Ashley Drive Tampa, Florida 33602 (eServed) Elias C. Schwartz, Esquire Schwartz and Englander, P.A. 1900 Glades Road, Suite 102 Boca Raton, Florida 33431 (eServed) Robert D. Cultice, Esquire Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Door, LLP 60 State Street Boston, Massachusetts 02109 (eServed) Richard N. Sox, Esquire Jason T. Allen, Esquire Bass Sox Mercer, P.A. 2822 Remington Green Circle Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Terry L. Rhodes, Executive Director Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room B-443 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 (eServed) Steve Hurm, General Counsel Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 (eServed)
