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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs PATRICIA MARIE LORELLO, 00-001943 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida May 09, 2000 Number: 00-001943 Latest Update: Dec. 22, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs ARMANDO DEJESUS SILVA, 95-005926 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Dec. 06, 1995 Number: 95-005926 Latest Update: Jun. 17, 1996

Findings Of Fact Respondent is currently licensed in Florida as a residential property and casualty joint underwriting associate, a life and health insurance agent, and a general lines property, casualty, surety, and miscellaneous lines agent. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was an agent for Federal Kemper Life Assurance Company (Kemper Life). At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was employed as an insurance agent with All Dade Insurance Agency in Perrine, Florida (All Dade). In April 1987, Richard Camejo (a/k/a Ricardo Camejo) was an unlicensed person and employee of All Dade. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Mr. Camejo was a trainee and worked under Respondent's supervision. As a trainee, Mr. Camejo did some office work for the Respondent and tried to learn the insurance business. Mr. Camejo occasionally accompanied Respondent when he met with prospective customers outside the office. Prior to their employment by All Dade, Respondent had his own business named "A. Silva and Associates" where Respondent was the managing agent and Mr. Camejo worked under his supervision as a trainee. Mr. Camejo's responsibilities at both businesses were vague. He did not have regular hours and Respondent, his supervisor, often did not know where he was or what he was doing. Respondent had a difficult time monitoring Mr. Camejo's activities as a trainee at All Dade. Respondent tried to help Mr. Camejo get started in the insurance business because he regarded him as a friend. Mr. Camejo was not well-versed in insurance products. He had shown little interest in the insurance business and was not very productive. His main interest during the Fall of 1986 through the Spring of 1987 was in body building. Consequently, he spent a lot of his time in health clubs. Respondent knew that Mr. Camejo was not licensed to engage in the business of insurance. It is not uncommon for persons to work as trainees prior to being licensed in order to learn the insurance business. In the Fall of 1986, Charles David Countin was in the process of building a new restaurant in Bayside Mall, Miami, Florida. Mr. Camejo met one of Mr. Countin's associates at a health club and discussed the fact that Mr. Camejo was in the insurance business. Mr. Camejo met Mr. Countin through his associate in the Fall of 1986 and had discussions with him about his insurance needs. Mr. Camejo expressed an interest in aiding Mr. Countin with his insurance requirements for the new restaurant business he was starting and presented him with general marketing brochures. Toward the end of 1986, Mr. Camejo visited Mr. Countin on the construction site at Bayside Mall and at his home to further discuss Mr. Countin's insurance needs. Mr. Countin wanted several policies, including a health insurance policy and a retirement policy. Mr. Camejo did not understand that Mr. Countin wanted was a retirement policy. He thought the second policy was a life insurance policy to secure a buy-sell agreement relating to Mr. Countin's interest in the new restaurant. Respondent was not present during the preliminary discussions between Mr. Camejo and Mr. Countin about the latter's insurance needs. Mr. Countin never discussed with Respondent his desire for a retirement policy. Mr. Camejo presented Mr. Countin with a business card that indicated he was an agent of Federal Kemper employed by All Dade. This business card was printed without authority of anyone at All Dade. Respondent had no authority to order the printing of such cards. Mr. Camejo made verbal representations that led Mr. Countin to believe that Mr. Camejo was a licensed insurance agent. The presentation of the business card and the verbal representations by Mr. Camejo as to his status as an insurance agent were made without the knowledge or consent of the Respondent. Mr. Camejo introduced Respondent to Mr. Countin in April 1987. Respondent believed that Mr. Countin wanted a life insurance policy to secure a buy-sell agreement. Respondent had never sold a policy of insurance for a buy- sell agreement and was not certain how such agreements worked. There were at least two meetings involving Respondent, Mr. Camejo, and Mr. Countin. During the first meeting, Respondent made the presentation to Mr. Countin because Respondent viewed Mr. Camejo as being timid and knew that he was not experienced. Respondent testified that ". . . after we had established what Mr. Countin needed . . ." he presented Mr. Countin with two proposals for different life insurance policies. Respondent did not submit to Mr. Countin a proposal for a retirement policy because Mr. Countin did not tell Respondent that he wanted a retirement policy and not a life insurance policy. The brochures pertaining to the life insurance policies discussed cash surrender values, which may have contributed to the misunderstanding between Mr. Countin and Respondent. On April 13, 1987, Respondent, Mr. Camejo, and Mr. Countin met to finalize the insurance applications. Mr. Camejo asked Mr. Countin for the information that was necessary to complete the application and, based on that information, filled out the application for Respondent's and Mr. Countin's signatures. Mr. Countin testified that he signed the application, including the section stating that he has read all questions and that his answers are true and correct. Mr. Countin admitted that the application form contained no reference to retirement and that the questions pertained to life insurance, death benefits, and beneficiaries. In response to the question as to the purpose of the insurance, the "buy/sell" answer was circled. Respondent collected money from Mr. Countin, signed his application to Federal Kemper as agent and as a witness, and certified to Federal Kemper that the application had been prepared in conformance with the company's rules, guidelines, and instructions. As part of Kemper Federal's underwriting requirements, Respondent submitted a letter to Kemper Federal documenting that the insurance policy was being submitted for the purpose of executing a buy/sell agreement. Respondent gave Mr. Camejo portfolios or policy jackets within which a customer could keep his policy of insurance. These portfolios or policy jackets had the name "A. Silva and Associates" embossed upon them. Without Respondent's knowledge or consent, Mr. Camejo gave to Mr. Countin one of these portfolios and stapled one of his business cards to the portfolio. This business card identified Mr. Camejo as an insurance agent with Federal Kemper. The telephone number and address on the business card are the telephone number and address used by Respondent. Respondent submitted Mr. Countin's application to Federal Kemper. Federal Kemper issued to Mr. Countin a life insurance policy (No. 5006813) with an effective date of May 13, 1987. This life insurance policy does not provide a retirement benefit. Respondent received a commission for this policy. Mr. Countin is a college graduate and holds a Masters Degree in Administration. Mr. Countin did not read the cover policy or the policy itself. Had he read the cover page for the Federal Kemper policy or the policy itself, he should have known that the policy was a life insurance policy. Had he read the cover page, Mr. Countin would have known that he had a period of twenty days to cancel the policy and have his premiums returned if the policy was not what he wanted. In 1994, Mr. Countin read an article that Federal Kemper was about to be purchased by another insurer. When he contacted Federal Kemper to determine whether his policy would be impacted by the buy-out, he learned that his policy was a life policy and not a retirement policy. He thereafter employed an attorney in an attempt to require Federal Kemper to convert his life policy to a retirement policy. Mr. Countin incurred attorney's fees of approximately $2,000 in this unsuccessful effort. Thereafter, Mr. Countin complained to Petitioner about this transaction. Respondent was the Respondent in a Department of Insurance Consent Order in Case No. 07200-93-A, styled In the Matter of: Armando DeJesus Silva. On or about September 28, 1994, Mr. Countin complained to the Petitioner regarding the actions of Mr. Camejo and the Respondent as to the transaction of insurance which resulted in the Federal Kemper life insurance policy.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein and dismisses the charges brought against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of May 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-5926 The following rulings are made as to the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-9, 11-22, 27, 29-33, 35, 36, and 44-52 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 10 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached since the administrative complaint does not charge Respondent with that failure. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 23-25, 28, 34, 53, and 54 are subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 26 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order, but the proposed finding as to the date this meeting occurred is not substantiated by the record. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 37-43 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached since the proposed findings deal with transactions not alleged in the administrative complaint. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 55-61 are rejected as being argument or as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order or are subordinate to the findings made. COPIES FURNISHED: Ross S. Burnaman, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Charles J. Grimsley, Esquire 1880 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33129 Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (5) 120.57624.10626.112626.611626.621
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF INSURANCE AGENTS AND AGENCY SERVICES vs MARTA R. DE LA PAZ, 13-003820PL (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 30, 2013 Number: 13-003820PL Latest Update: May 29, 2014

The Issue Whether Respondent acted as an agent for a membership organization, International Water Safety Foundation (IWSF), and its insurance underwriter, North American Marine (NAM), that had been ordered to cease and desist transacting insurance related business in this state; if so, whether (and what) discipline should be imposed on Respondent's license to transact business as an insurance agent.

Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is the state agency charged with the licensing and regulation of insurance agents in Florida and is responsible for administrating the disciplinary provisions of chapter 626, pursuant to section 20.121(2)(g) and (h), Florida Statutes. At all times material to this case, Respondent was a licensed general lines insurance agent in the state of Florida. Respondent also is a director and officer of the Marta De La Paz Agency, Inc. (MDLPA), which she has co-owned with her daughter, Jenny Mondaca Toledo, since 2000. Respondent was a "captive agent" of Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) for the period of 2000 to 2010. During this time, pursuant to an agreement with Allstate, Respondent could only sell Allstate insurance products. If Allstate did not carry a particular insurance product line, Respondent was allowed to sell the products of other carriers to her clients if the other carrier was approved by Allstate. The Events Giving Rise to the Recommended Revocation Insurance agents licensed by the State of Florida are only permitted to sell insurance provided by entities which have a "certificate of authority" and which are authorized to sell in Florida. Agents are fiduciaries of the consumers who use their services. Sales of insurance through unauthorized entities place the consumer at risk because unauthorized entities do not participate in the Florida Insurance Guarantee Fund (FIGA), a fund maintained by the State to protect consumers from losses should an authorized insurance carrier become insolvent or unable to pay claims. IWSF is a membership organization which offers various benefits and services to its members, including watercraft insurance through a master policy with NAM. NAM, an unlicensed and unauthorized insurer, through IWSF, solicited Florida consumers to purchase insurance from NAM. On October 15, 2003, the Office of Insurance Regulation issued a cease and desist order (Order) against IWSF and NAM from conducting insurance related activities in Florida, including but not limited to, "transacting any new or renewal insurance business in this state, and from collecting any premiums from Florida insureds." The unlicensed, unauthorized, and, therefore, illegal transaction of insurance by IWSF and NAM was deemed to present an immediate danger to public health, safety, or welfare of Florida residents. On or about April 14, 2009, Carlos Guzman (Guzman), on behalf of himself and his brother-in-law, Jorge Saez (Saez), sought to purchase watercraft insurance for a boat which they co-own. Guzman went to MDLPA and met with employee, Odayls Chiullan (Chiullan). Chiullan, who has held a 2-20 Florida general lines insurance license for approximately 15 years, worked at MDLPA as an agent for approximately three months during the spring of 2009. Respondent, as the principal agent of MDLPA, had the responsibility to supervise Chiullan during the period she worked for MDLPA. In April 2009, Allstate was not providing watercraft insurance for customers in Florida. To determine which carrier, if any, could provide the insurance sought by Guzman and Saez, Chiullan referred to a list maintained in the office of MDLPA. Chiullan found the name of IWSF on the list and assumed that it was approved by Allstate as a licensed entity with which MDLPA could do business. Chiullan was unaware of the 2003 Order against IWSF and NAM. Chiullan contacted IWSF and secured an insurance price quote for Guzman and Saez. Chiullan arranged for Guzman and Saez to become members of IWSF, thereby enabling their boat to become insured under the master policy of IWSF with NAM for the initial period of May 6, 2009, through May 6, 2010, which was subsequently renewed for an additional year. Chiullan contacted Standard Premium Finance Company (Standard) on behalf of Saez and Guzman to assist them in financing the premium payments for their boat insurance. Respondent was on a cruise and not in contact with Chiullan during the period when Chiullan assisted Saez and Guzman with securing boat insurance or the financing for their premium payments. Although correspondence to and from IWSF and MDLPA was on MDLPA letterhead and fax transmittal sheets, Respondent had no contact with Saez, Guzman, IWSF, or NAM regarding this May 2009 transaction. Respondent became aware of the purchase of insurance from IWSF by Saez and Guzman when she was asked by Chiullan to sign the premium finance agreement with Standard as the owner of MDLPA. That was the full extent of Respondent's connection to this particular transaction which is at issue. Saez and Guzman renewed their policy through MDLPA with IWSF and NAM for the period of May 6, 2010, through May 6, 2011. Saez and Guzman made no claims against the policy or policies in effect from May 6, 2009, through May 6, 2011. Prior to receipt of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was unaware of the Order against IWSF and NAM. Respondent was also unaware that neither entity was authorized to transact business in Florida. Respondent received no notice of the Order from Petitioner, Allstate, IWSF, NAM, or Standard. While serving as a captive agent for Allstate, Respondent did not receive alerts from Petitioner regarding unauthorized insurers. Although Respondent was aware of her obligations under Florida to stay apprised of which entities were authorized to issue insurance in Florida, she did so by maintaining a list in MDLPA, provided by Allstate, which she presumed was vetted and approved as state-authorized insurers. In fact, Respondent sold her son, Osmany Mondaca, insurance for his boat through IWSF and NAM for the period of November 26, 2007, through November 26, 2008, and this policy was renewed for two additional years. Respondent also sold boat insurance through IWSF and NAM for the coverage period of June 24, 2010, through June 24, 2011, to her boyfriend for a boat which they co-own. Prior to purchasing insurance through IWSF for her boyfriend and son, Respondent checked with Petitioner regarding the status of IWSF and was told there was no problem. As recently as December 2013, Respondent checked again with Petitioner and was advised there was no problem writing insurance through IWSF and NAM. Respondent credibly testified that, had she known about the Order, she certainly would not have sold policies through IWSF and NAM for a boat she co-owns with her boyfriend or for her son's boat. Although Petitioner offered evidence that it regularly provides updates on its website and in newsletters alerting agents to unauthorized insurers attempting to do business in Florida, including but not limited to alerts about IWSF and NAM, no evidence was provided that these communications were sent to, received, or reviewed by Respondent or Chiullan. Further, Respondent's testimony, that this information was not available by telephone from Petitioner, was not contradicted.1/

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Insurance Agents and Agency Services, enter a final order which dismisses the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2014.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.6820.121626.611626.734
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs. JOHN ROGER PASCALE, 80-001504 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001504 Latest Update: Oct. 30, 1990

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Respondent, John Roger Pascale, currently holds an insurance license issued by the Florida Department of Insurance (Petitioner), and is eligible for the issuance of further licenses. It is admitted that Respondent was a licensed general lines agent during times material to the Complaint allegations herein. Respondent, however, has voluntarily elected not to renew his license since September, 1980. By its five count Administrative Complaint dated June 13, 1980, Petitioner advised Respondent that it intended to revoke, refuse to issue or renew, or to impose lesser penalties as may be proper under the provisions of Sections 626.611 and 626.621, Florida Statutes. The main thrust of Count I is that Respondent committed the following violations: Received premiums or other funds belonging to insurers or others in transactions under his license which were trust funds received by him in a fiduciary capacity, which funds he failed to account for or pay to the insurer, insured or other persons entitled thereto in violation of Chapter 626.561(1), Florida Statutes. Lacked one or more of the qualifications for the license or permit as specified in the Insurance code in violation of Chapter 626.611(1), Florida Statutes. Willfully, under his license, circumvented the prohibitions of the insurance code. Chapter 626.611(4), Florida Statutes. Was willfully deceptive with regard to an insurance policy in violation of Section 626.611(5), Florida Statutes. Demonstrated a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance contrary to the requirements contained in Chapter 626.611(7), Florida Statutes. Demonstrated a lack of reasonable and adequate knowledge and technical competence to engage in the transactions authorized by the license or permit. Chapter 626.611(8), Florida Statutes. Engaged in fraudulent or dishonest practices in violation of Chapter 626.611(9), Florida Statutes. Misappropriated, converted, or unlawfully withheld monies belonging to insurers, insureds, beneficiaries, or others and received in the conduct of business under his license. Chapter 626.611(10), Florida Statutes. Willfully violated an order, rule or regulation of the insurance department, or willfully violated a provision or provisions of the insurance code. Chapter 626.611(13), Florida Statutes. Withheld information from which the issuance of a license or permit could have been refused had it then existed and been known to the department contrary to the requirements of Chapter 626.621(1), Florida Statutes. Violated a provision of the insurance code contrary to Chapter 626.621(2), Florida Statutes. Violated a lawful order, rule, or regulation of the department in violation of Chapter 626.621(3), Florida Statutes. Has shown himself to be a source of injury or loss to the public or detrimental to the public interest in violation of Chapter 626.621(6), Florida Statutes. In support of the above allegations, Petitioner produced as its primary witness, Delores V. Cardet, who first purchased insurance from Respondent in November of 1977. The agent employed by Respondent with whom Ms. Cardet transacted business was Rigo Avila (Avila). (See Petitioner's Exhibit 1) Ms. Cardet's insurance application was transmitted to Lumberman's Insurance Company to effect the appropriate coverage. Her complaint against Respondent is that the wrong address was placed on her insurance application and that she was overcharged for insurance based on the premiums quoted by agent Avila. Respecting the allegation that agent Avila placed the wrong address on her insurance application, evidence indicates that when this matter was called to Respondent's attention, the matter was taken care of and Ms. Cardet subsequently received billing notices at the correct address. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3). During the time in which Ms. Cardet purchased insurance through Respondent's agency, she was employed as a manager for Beneficial Finance Company of Florida. As part of her employment duties, Ms. Cardet is involved in collections and has received management training from her employer. During the period in question Ms. Cardet had one address change. This change was properly brought to Respondent's attention and the change was effected without incident. Respondent quoted Ms. Cardet a total premium during 1978 of $699.00 whereas the insurer, Lumberman's Insurance Company, charged Ms. Cardet an annual premium of $677.00. The $22.00 overcharge represented the difference between the premium quoted by agent Avila and the actual premium charged. The excess was referred to the premium finance company (Sonny Financial Services) where it was handled as a credit toward the balance owed by Ms. Cardet. During 1979, Ms. Cardet was quoted a total annual premium of $797.00 for renewal of her insurance policy. Her policy reflects a premium of $662.00 plus two (2) motor club memberships for her two (2) vehicles at the rate of $50.00 each. The remaining difference of $35.00 was refunded from Kemper Insurance Company and forwarded to Sonny Financial Services as a credit toward the remaining balance of Ms. Cardet's premiums. 2/ Linda Manning, the underwriting service manager for Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Company, a subsidiary of the Kemper Insurance Group, acknowledged that in the insurance business, mistakes regarding insurance print-outs occur on a frequent basis. Ms. Manning services several hundred premium changes daily and testified that there are numerous reasons for an agency to give a prospective insured an improper quote. Among the reasons listed by Ms. Manning is the fact that drivers' records are not always available for a prospective insured and rate adjustments occur for various reasons. COUNT TWO The gravamen of Count Two is that Respondent's employees used an incorrect address when insurance was placed by Respondent's agency for Mr. Jeffrey Brown which resulted in the insured not getting a premium notice from the insurance company. It is also alleged that Respondent willfully listed an incorrect address for Mr. Brown in a lower rate territory which gave the insured the advantage of a lower premium. In support of the above allegations in Count Two, Petitioner introduced the testimony of Respondent's former spouse, Robin LaPlante. Ms. LaPlante's husband, Jeffrey Brown, purchased insurance through Respondent's agency on February 26, 1978. It is alleged that Respondent falsely indicated on the Brown application for automobile liability coverage with Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Company that Mr. Brown's address was in Lauderhill, Florida, whereas he actually resided in Miami, Florida. Ms. LaPlante's complaint with Respondent is that they sold a van, which was one of the two vehicles covered under the policy, and it took approximately nine (9) months before the van was deleted and a refund check was issued for termination of that coverage. Ms. LaPlante had no direct dealings with Respondent and/or his agents during the time in question. Respondent's dealings were with Ms. LaPlante's former husband, Jeffrey Brown, who did not appear to testify in these proceedings. COUNT THREE As amended by Order dated December 31, 1980, Count Three alleges that Respondent employed the services of someone other than his employees or himself to complete a portion of an insurance application; that the insured was sold membership in a motor club without his knowledge and consent and that the Respondent unlawfully endorsed a check payable to the insured from the insurance carrier to reinstate the insured's policy which had been cancelled by the insurance carrier. In support of Count Three, Petitioner presented the testimony of Stanley Friehofer. Friehofer went to Houston Motors in Dade County, Florida, for the purpose of purchasing a Subaru Brat. To do so, it was necessary for Friehofer to provide evidence of insurance on the vehicle in order to obtain financing through the dealership. Sam Houston, the salesman involved, arranged the financing on behalf of the automobile dealership. Friehofer had obtained an insurance quote from his stepmother who was also in the insurance business. After discussing the possibility of the stepmother's agency issuing a policy, Mr. Houston called Respondent, John Pascale, who was at the dealership on other matters, Respondent quoted a rate less than that quoted by Friehofer's stepmother. Friehofer paid Houston Motors $440.00 and was given an insurance binder by Sam Houston. (Petitioner's Exhibit 20). Friehofer was accompanied by his brother at Houston Motors. Also present at the time was Sam Houston. Friehofer testified that Sam Houston completed the entire insurance application and issued him the insurance binder 3/ Friehofer never received a policy for his insurance although he received a bill from Kemper Insurance Company of Orlando, Florida. (Petitioner's Exhibit 22). Friehofer noted three errors on his insurance application. Those errors were (1) his marital status (Friehofer is single), (2) the use of the vehicle was incorrectly noted, and (3) the premium quoted was the wrong amount. Friehofer also complained that he was incorrectly enrolled for membership in a motor club contrary to his consent. When Friehofer purchased the vehicle from Houston Motors, he was in the process of transferring from the Virgin Islands. Friehofer therefore used his brother's address on his insurance application. According to Friehofer, his first acquaintance with Respondent was during the taking of a deposition in this matter. Linda Manning confirmed the fact that Lumberman's Mutual charged Richard Friehofer a premium of $410.00 for insurance coverage to his vehicle. Friehofer received a cancellation notice dated April 30, 1979, from Kemper Insurance Company (Kemper) and was instructed by a Mr. Bell of Kemper to obtain "dual coverage" until Kemper could investigate the matter and refund the premiums expended by him to maintain dual coverage when the situation was resolved. Friehofer received an agency check from Respondent dated June 28, 1979. (Petitioner's Exhibit 23). Friehofer initiated the call to Kemper to advise that he intended to cancel his insurance which was effected by Respondent's agency. After Friehofer advised Kemper that he planned to cancel his coverage, he notified Respondent approximately four (4) days later. Respondent received a refund from Kemper and was unable to contact Friehofer. Respondent therefore endorsed the check and returned it to Kemper to reinstate the coverage. Respondent later learned of Friehofer's intention to, in fact, cancel the coverage and Respondent stopped payment on the check to Kemper. (See Respondent's Exhibit 1). Thereafter, Respondent refunded the premium paid from Kemper to Friehofer on June 28, 1979. (Respondent's Exhibit 13). COUNT FIVE 4/ Count Five charges Respondent with the sale of membership in a motor club to an insured and accuses the Respondent of misappropriating $38.00 of the insured's money. In support of this allegation, Petitioner introduced the deposition of Betty Monette. The thrust of this allegation is that Ms. Monette was quoted a renewal premium for her Personal Injury Protection (PIP) insurance coverage of $142.00. Thereafter, Respondent's employees determined that they could provide the same coverage through another carrier for $104.00. As a consequence, Respondent refunded the difference of $38.00 to Ms. Monette, however, the refund was accompanied by a transmittal which erroneously stated that the refund resulted from a cancellation of a motor club membership. Ms. Monette acknowledged having received the $38.00 refund, and the difference i.e. $104.00, coincides with the premium charged by Banker's Insurance for the PIP coverage. RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE Sam Houston is an official affiliated with Houston Motors. Houston contacted Respondent, who happened to be at the dealership attending to an unrelated business matter at the time the Friehofers were at the dealership to purchase a Subaru vehicle. Houston has not participated or otherwise benefited from insurance commissions derived by Respondent. Houston Motors has a policy of not being affiliated with insurance salesmen or other brokers based on legal requirements imposed upon the automobile dealerships. Houston was in charge of handling financing and insurance arrangements for purchasers of vehicles at the dealership when Stanley Friehofer purchased his vehicle from Houston Motors. Houston recalled copying basic pertinent data from a financing application onto an insurance application due to the rush that Respondent found himself in after he had quoted Friehofer a premium for coverage. Houston is not licensed to sell automobile or property insurance and is unfamiliar with the procedure of quoting premiums. When shown a copy of the insurance application executed on behalf of Friehofer, Houston recalled completing the name, address, company, telephone number, state, car information and lienholder on the insurance application. Houston was certain that he did not complete any item listed on page 2 of Petitioner's Exhibit 21 which was received in evidence herein. Houston is only licensed to sell credit life, accident and health insurance in connection with financing agreements. Houston finally recalled giving Friehofer a receipt for the $440.00 tendered for insurance premiums. Houston remembered that the Friehofer transaction was unique and to the best of his recollection, had not been previously handled by him in that fashion. Respondent, John R. Pascale, is, as stated herein, a licensed casualty, property agent who holds what is designated as a "220" license. Respondent received a bachelors degree in Business Administration from Pace University and has been involved in the insurance business since he was approximately nineteen (19) years old. Respondent started his first insurance agency in Florida during 1971, and the agency grew to five (5) offices employing approximately sixteen (16) to twenty (20) employees, presently. In response to the specific charges, Respondent had no personal dealing with Ms. Cardet on her purchase of insurance from the Pascale agency. The agent involved was Rigo Avila who was dismissed from Respondents employ on August 6, 1980. Respondent's agency files reflect that Ms. Cardet had several address changes during the three-year period in which she was insured with the assistance of Respondent's agency. Respondent countered the allegations that he incorrectly listed the wrong address for Ms. Cardet by assigning her to an area which charges lower premiums by asserting that there was no economic advantage to do this since the agency collects a commission on the amount of premiums charged. Thus, a lower premium nets the agency a lower commission. Therefore, during 1977, when Ms. Cardet was quoted a premium of $699.00, Kemper Insurance determined that the premium was approximately $677.00. A refund check was sent to Respondent which was forwarded to Segral Premium Finance Company for credit to Ms. Cardet's premium finance balance. Likewise, during 1978, Ms. Cardet was quoted a premium of $797.00 with a down payment of $300.00, with the balance financed over three (3) installments through a premium finance agency. Respondent was paid directly by the agency and the overcharge (alleged) represented a $100.00 motor club membership and a $35.00 refund which was remitted by the carrier. The refund was transferred to the premium finance agency for credit to Ms. Cardet's premium balance account. Sonny Financial Service received the $35.00 check in question. (See Respondent's Exhibits 2 and 3) Respondent acknowledged that it is an agency responsibility to correct an error once the agent learns of the error or through diligence, it is otherwise brought to the agent's attention. To correct errors, Respondent's agency usually amends the policy by means of a "declaration." Finally, Respondent acknowledged that the bookkeeping errors relative to the Cardet account had been the subject of a civil claim which was amicably settled in Ms. Cardet's behalf. (See Respondent's Exhibit 5 and 6) The insurance rates of residents in Lauderhill are generally less than the rates charged residents in Dade County. The producing agency has no control over a carrier's billing procedures. Respecting the allegations surrounding the Jeffrey Brown/Robin LaPlante matter, evidence reveals that Respondent sent policy changes per Jeffrey Brown's request to the carrier during April and September of 1978. (See Respondent's Exhibits 5 and 6) As to the allegations surrounding the Betty Monette incident, evidence revealed that Respondent was able to obtain the identical coverage through another carrier for Ms. Monette at a lower rate and thus was refunded $38.00 of a quoted $142.00 premium. The transmittal letter which accompanied the refund check, however, incorrectly stated that the $38.00 refund represented a credit for cancellation of a motor club membership. (Respondent's Exhibit 10) When all of these charges surfaced, Respondent attempted to get an understanding from his employee, Mr. Avila, who abandoned his employment with Respondent. However, Respondent did all that he could to effectively resolve the difficulties and terminated Avila's employment relationship by sending him a mailgram on August 6, 1980. (See Respondent's Exhibits 11 and 12) As to the allegations surrounding the Friehofer incident, Respondent was at Houston Motors in an effort to canvass and otherwise "drum up' additional business through the dealership. Respondent met Mr. Friehofer, quoted the insurance premium, explained the various coverages available, asked if there were questions and solicited Mr. Houston to complete the necessary basic data. Respondent acknowledged that it was not a good business practice for him to leave the insurance forms with Mr. Houston to complete, however, he considered the situation rare and unusual. He also felt that it was both an accommodation for Messrs. Houston and Friehofer. Respondent admitted that he benefited from the transaction by receiving the commission from the Friehofer insurance contract. Respondent completed the second sheet of the insurance application with the exception of the signature. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 21) Respondent did not leave any blank forms at the Houston agency or any other business enterprise. Respondent has not shared commissions received with any unlicensed or unemployed person who is not authorized to complete insurance forms. Respondent received the refund check from the Friehofer insurance application on June 20, 1979. He reviewed his file, and noted that there was no file notation regarding any intent by Mr. Friehofer to cancel his insurance coverage. He made an effort to contact Mr. Friehofer and learned that he was living with his brother-in-law in Miramar, Florida, and commuted on weekends to the Virgin Islands. He, therefore, redeposited the refund check to Kemper thinking that the policy had been erroneously cancelled. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 25 and Respondent's Exhibit 13)

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent be issued a letter of written reprimand cautioning him against the practice of allowing unlicensed or unauthorized persons to assist in completing forms which may be used to effect insurance coverage. In all other respects, it is RECOMMENDED that the complaint allegations filed herein be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of March, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1981.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57626.561626.611626.621
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JAMES G. YOUNG vs MELONS & POTATOES, INC., 01-004902 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Dec. 24, 2001 Number: 01-004902 Latest Update: Dec. 22, 2024
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DANIEL BRUCE CAUGHEY vs DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER, 90-004473F (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 19, 1990 Number: 90-004473F Latest Update: Dec. 27, 1990

Findings Of Fact On September 8, 1987, the Department of Insurance received a letter dated September 1, 1987, from Joseph F. Kinman, Jr., which stated: Another insurance agent (Daniel Bruce Caughey) from Pensacola, Florida and his incorporated agency (Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc.) are refusing to forward premium payments on to Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. despite a final judgment for such amounts here in Hillsborough County Circuit Court. Enclosed is a copy of the Final Judgment entered August 13, 1987, as well as a copy of the Complaint. We represent Jordan Roberts & Company, as well as Poe & Associates, Inc. here in Tampa, Florida. In approximately August of 1982, Daniel Bruce Caughey and Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. entered into a brokerage agreement with Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. wherein Mr. Caughey and the Agency were to collect premiums on behalf of Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. and in turn, Mr. Caughey and the Agency were to receive commissions. Mr. Caughey signed an Individual Guarantee Agreement on October 21, 1983, guaranteeing that Brokerage Agreement with Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. Mr. Caughey and the Agency failed to forward the insurance premiums collected on behalf of Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. despite repeated demands and inquiries. Finally, a lawsuit was filed against Mr. Caughey and the Agency in the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, in and for Hillsborough County in December of 1986. Final judgment for Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. against Mr. Caughey and the Agency was entered on August 13, 1987, for an amount of $6,595.94. Mr. Caughey and his Agency have unlawfully withheld monies belonging to an insurer, Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. and, accordingly, appear to be in violation of Florida Statutes 626 et seq. Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. has a judgment for unpaid insurance premiums against Mr. Caughey and the Agency, however, Mr. Caughey and the Agency refuse or fail to pay over to Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. premium funds rightfully belonging to Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. Accordingly, we would respectfully request that your office conduct an investigation of Mr. Caughey and the Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. Enclosed with this letter were copies of the complaint and final judgment in the circuit court case, Case No. 86-21454. As found in the main administrative case, Case No. 89-2651: In Count 1, JORO's complaint [in Case No. 86-21454] alleges the existence of a brokerage agreement between JORO and Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc., entered into "[o]n or about April 27, 1982"; execution and delivery of respondent's guarantee "[o]n or about October 21, 1983"; and the agency's indebtedness "for premiums on policies underwritten by [JORO] for the sum of $20,975.36." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. In Count II, the complaint also alleges execution and delivery of a promissory note "[o]n or about October 21, 1983," without, however, explicitly indicating its relationship (if any) with the guarantee executed the same date. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. The final judgment does not specify which count(s) JORO recovered on. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. Attached to the complaint are copies of the promissory note, executed by "CAUGHEY INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., By: D B Caughey Vice President"; the guarantee, executed in the same way; and the brokerage agreement, executed on behalf of Caughey Insurance Agency by "William C. Caughey, President." Although the Individual Guarantee Agreement names respondent as guarantor in the opening paragraph, the corporation is shown as guarantor on the signature line. The complaint does not allege and the judgment does not recite that respondent personally failed to remit premiums but says he is responsible as an officer of the agency. Without any further investigation, as far as the record shows, the Department of Insurance filed a complaint amended on April 24, 1989, to allege, inter alia, that "[o]n or about August 19, 1982 Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. entered into a brokerage agreement with Jordan Roberts and Company, Inc. . . . requir[ing] Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. to remit premiums, unearned commissions and additional premiums to Jordan Roberts and Company, Inc."; and that respondent "personally guaranteed the [agency's] obligation under this agreement in" writing, but "failed to remit five thousand five dollars and forty-four cents due under th[e] agreement" for which sum Jordan Roberts and Company, Inc. obtained judgment. After a formal administrative hearing, a recommended order was entered on April 2, 1990, recommending dismissal of the administrative complaint, because "ambiguities in the court papers do not clearly and convincingly rule out the possibility that the court's judgment rests on the dishonored promissory note . . . [rather than] a breach of respondent's [here petitioner's] fiduciary responsibilities." In its final order, the Department dismissed the administrative complaint; Daniel Bruce Caughey was the prevailing party in that case. The parties have stipulated that "Daniel B. Caughey qualifies as a small business party as defined in Section 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes." The parties also stipulated that the "total value of the reasonable attorney's fees and costs at issue is $2,830."

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.6857.111
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs FALCONTRUST GROUP, INC., 10-002443 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 06, 2010 Number: 10-002443 Latest Update: Feb. 10, 2011

The Issue Does Petitioner, Department of Financial Services (DFS), have authority to determine if Respondent, Alberto Luis Sotero (Mr. Sotero) and Respondent, FalconTrust Group, Inc. (FalconTrust), wrongfully took or witheld premium funds owed an insurance company while a civil action between the insurance company and Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust pends in Circuit Court presenting the same issues? Should the insurance agent license of Mr. Sotero be disciplined for alleged violations of Sections 626.561(1), 626.611(7), 626.611(10), 626.611(13), and 626.621(4), Florida Statutes (2007)?1. Should the insurance agency license of FalconTrust be disciplined for alleged violations of Section 626.561(1), 626.6215(5)(a), 626.6215(5)(d). 626.6215(5)(f), and 626.6215(5)(k), Florida Statutes?

Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and other evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Mr. Sotero is licensed by DFS as an insurance agent in Florida and has been at all times material to this matter. He holds license number A249545. FalconTrust is licensed by DFS as an insurance agency in this state and has been at all times material to this matter. It holds license number L014424. Mr. Sotero is an officer and director of FalconTrust and held these positions at all times material to this proceeding. Mr. Sotero also controlled and directed all actions of FalconTrust described in these Findings of Fact. Zurich American Insurance Company is a commercial property and casualty insurance company. FalconTrust Commercial Risk Specialists, Inc., and Zurich-American Insurance Group entered into an "Agency-Company Agreement" (Agency Agreement) that was effective January 1, 1999. The Agency Agreement bound the following Zurich entities, referred to collectively as Zurich: Zurich Insurance Company, U.S. Branch; Zurich American Insurance Company of Illinois; American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company; American Zurich Insurance Company; and Steadfast Insurance Company. The Agreement specified that FalconTrust was an "independent Agent and not an employee of the Company [Zurich.]". . .. The Agency Agreement also stated: All premiums collected by you [Falcontrust] are our [Zurich's] property and are held by you as trust funds. You have no interest in such premiums and shall make no deduction therefrom before paying same to us [Zurich] except for the commission if any authorized by us in writing to be deducted by you and you shall not under any circumstances make personal use of such funds either in paying expense or otherwise. If the laws or regulations of the above state listed in your address require you to handle premiums in a fiduciary capacity or as trust funds you agree that all premiums of any kind received by or paid to you shall be segregated held apart by you in a premium trust fund account opened by you with a bank insured at all times by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and chargeable to you in a fiduciary capacity as trustee for our benefit and on our behalf and you shall pay such premiums as provided in this agreement. (emphasis supplied. The Agency Agreement commits Zurich to pay FalconTrust commissions "on terms to be negotiated . . . ." It requires FalconTrust to pay "any sub agent or sub producer fees or commissions required." The Agency Agreement also provides: Suspension or termination of this Agreement does not relieve you of the duty to account for and pay us all premiums for which you are responsible in accordance with Section 2 and return commissions for which you are responsible in accordance with Section 3 [the Commission section.] The Agency Agreement was for Mr. Sotero and Falcontrust to submit insurance applications for the Zurich companies to underwrite property and casualty insurance, primarily for long- haul trucking. The Agency Agreement and all the parties contemplated that Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust would deduct agreed-upon commissions from premiums and remit the remaining funds to Zurich. On September 14, 2000, Zurich and Mr. Sotero amended the Agency Agreement to change the due date for premium payments and to replace FalconTrust Group, Inc. (FalconTrust) for FalconTrust Commercial Risk Specialists, Inc., and to replace Zurich-American Insurance Group and Zurich Insurance Company, U.S. Branch, with Zurich U.S. Mr. Sotero and Zurich's authorized agent, Account Executive Sue Marcello, negotiated the terms of the commission agreement as contemplated in the Agency Agreement. Mr. Sotero confirmed the terms in a July 20, 1999, letter to Ms. Marcello. The parties agreed on a two-part commission. One part was to be paid from the premiums upon collection of the premiums. The second part, contingent upon the program continuing for five years, was to be paid by Zurich to Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust. The total commission was 20 percent. FalconTrust and Mr. Sotero were authorized to deduct 13 percent of the commission from premiums before forwarding them to Zurich. The remaining seven percent Zurich was to pay to Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust at the end of the program or after the fifth year anniversary date. The letter spelled out clearly that Zurich would hold the money constituting the seven percent and was entitled to all investment income earned on the money. The passage describing the arrangement reads as follows: Our total commission is 20 percent however Zurich will hold and retain the first 7 percent commission where they are entitle [sic] to earn investment income. I understand that FalconTrust will not benefit from this compounded investment income. However you mentioned you would increase our initial commission that is set at 13 percent currently from time to time depending on FalconTrust reaching their goals, but it will never exceed a total commission of 20 percent. It is to our understanding that the difference will be paid at the end of the program or after the fifth year anniversary date being 12/31/2005, but not earlier than five years. I do understand that if Zurich and/or FalconTrust cancels the program on or before the fourth year being 12/31/2004 that we are not entitle [sic] to our remaining commission that you will be holding. If the program is cancelled after 12/31/2004 by FalconTrust and/or Zurich it is understood that all commission being held will be considered earned. (emphasis added.) Until the program ended, the parties conducted themselves under the Agency Agreement as described in the letter. At some point the parties agreed to decrease the percentage retained by Zurich to five percent and increase the percentage initially paid to and kept by FalconTrust to 15 percent. During the course of the relationship FalconTrust produced approximately $146,000,000 in premiums for Zurich. At all times relevant to this matter, all premium payments, except for the portion deducted by sub-agents and producers before forwarding the payments to Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust were deposited into a trust account. The various sub-agents of FalconTrust collected premiums and forwarded them to FalconTrust, after deducting their commissions, which were a subpart of the FalconTrust 13 percent commission. FalconTrust in turn forwarded the remaining premium funds after deducting the portion of its 13 percent left after the sub-agent deduction. This was consistent with the Agency Agreement and accepted as proper by Zurich at all times. All parties realized that the held-back seven percent, later five percent, was money that Zurich would owe and pay if the conditions for payment were met. The parties conducted themselves in keeping with that understanding. Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust described the practice this way in their Third Amended Complaint in a court proceeding about this dispute: "In accordance with the Commission Agreement, Zurich held the contingency/holdback commission and received investment income thereon." (Emphasis supplied.) In 2006 Zurich decided to end the program. In a letter dated December 8, 2006, Tim Anders, Vice President of Zurich, notified Mr. Sotero that Zurich was terminating the Agency-Company Agreement of January 1, 1999. The letter was specific. It said Zurich was providing "notification of termination of that certain Agency-Company Agreement between Zurich American Insurance Company, Zurich American Insurance Co. of Illinois, American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Co., American Zurich Insurance Company, Steadfast Insurance Company . . . and FalconTrust Grup, Inc. . . ., dated January 1, 1999, . . .." Mr. Sotero wrote asking Zurich to reconsider or at least extend the termination date past the March 15, 2007, date provided in the letter. Zurich agreed to extend the termination date to April 30, 2007. At the time of termination FalconTrust had fulfilled all of the requirements under the Agency-Agreement for receipt of the held-back portion of the commissions. Mr. Sotero asked Zurich to pay the held-back commission amounts. He calculated the amount to exceed $7,000,000. Zurich did not pay the held- back commission amounts. As the program was winding down and the termination date approached, FalconTrust continued to receive premiums. As the Agency Agreement and negotiated commission structure provided, FalconTrust deducted its initial commission from the premium payments. But, reacting to Zurich's failure to begin paying the held back commission amounts, Mr. Sotero engaged in "self help." He deducted at least $6,000,000 from the premium payments from customers, received and deposited in the trust account. He took the money as payment from Zurich of earned and held back commissions.3 Nothing in the Agency Agreement or negotiated commission agreement authorized this action. In March of 2007, Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust also brought suit against Zurich in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida. The issues in that proceeding include whether Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust wrongfully took premiums and how much Zurich owes them for commissions. As of the final hearing, that cause (Case Number 07-6199-CA-01) remained pending before the court and set for jury trial in August 2010. There is no evidence of a final disposition. But the court has entered a partial Summary Judgment determining that FalconTrust wrongfully took premium funds for the commissions that it maintained Zurich owed. The court's Order concludes that the issue is not whether Zurich owed money to FalconTrust, but whether FalconTrust was entitled to take the funds when it did. Like the undersigned, the court determines that it was not. Between December 8, 2006, the date of the cancelation letter, and April 30, 2007, the program termination date, Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust did not remit to Zurich any of the approximately $6,000,000 in premium payments received. Despite not receiving premiums, Zurich did not cancel or refuse to issue the policies for which the premiums taken by Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust were payment. The policies remained in effect.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services suspend the license of Adalberto L. Sotero for nine months and suspend the license of FalconTrust Group, Inc. for nine months. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 2010.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57626.561626.611626.621626.6215
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs STEVEN SCHNUR, 89-005555 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Oct. 10, 1989 Number: 89-005555 Latest Update: Apr. 19, 1990

The Issue The issues are (1) whether respondent's licenses as a life and health (debit) agent, life, health and variable annuity contracts agent, life agent, life and health agent, general lines agent and health agent should be disciplined for the reasons stated in the amended administrative complaint, and (2) whether respondent's applications for the issuance and renewal of a resident license should be granted.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Stephen Schnur, was licensed and eligible for licensure as a life and health (debit) agent, life, health and variable annuity contracts agent, life agent, life and health agent, general lines agent - property, casualty, surety and miscellaneous lines, and health agent by petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department). When the events herein occurred, respondent was licensed as a property and casualty insurance agent for Clarendon National Insurance Company (CNIC) and had placed his license as a general lines agent with Devor Insurance Agency (DIA), an incorporated general lines insurance agency located at 6611 West Hillsborough Avenue, Tampa, Florida. He has been licensed by petitioner for approximately nineteen years. In August 1987 respondent was associated with Bill Ely Insurance (Ely) in Tampa, Florida. Because that firm was unable to write automobile insurance on young drivers, Schnur referred some of Ely's business to DIA, a firm owned by one Marcia Cline, who held no insurance licenses. In September 1987 Schnur received an offer from Cline of a weekly salary of $150 if he would place his property and casualty general lines agency license with DIA. After obtaining independent verification from petitioner that DIA had no pending "problems", and accepting Cline's representation, albeit false, that the firm had an errors and omissions policy, respondent accepted Cline's offer and placed his license with DIA effective that month. He continued to utilize his other licenses to sell insurance for Ely, his principal employer. It should also be noted that another unnamed general lines agent had placed her license at DIA during this same period of time. At first Schnur attempted to review all automobile insurance applications received by DIA. However, because of his duties at Ely, he was unable to devote more than a few hours per week to DIA. In view of this, he agreed to sign in blank applications and binders for Cline to use in his absence. In doing so, he relied upon Cline's honesty and integrity and assumed she would forward all applications and premiums to the insurance company and secure coverage for DIA's customers. Under this arrangement, Cline was considered to be an employee of DIA and operating under Schnur's direct supervision and control. In October 1987 five customers purchased various types of automobile insurance from Cline. 1/ Each customer gave Cline either cash or checks as payment for their policies. Although none of the customers met with or spoke with respondent, and dealt exclusively with Cline, each received a binder from Cline signed by respondent evidencing insurance with CNIC. In addition, Cline gave each customer a receipt of payment also carrying respondent's signature. As it turned out, Cline did not process the applications or forward them to CNIC. She also failed to remit any monies to the insurance company. Consequently, none of the customers received a policy from CNIC or any other insurance company. However, respondent had no reason to suspect anything since he periodically examined the office files during this period of time and found all documents in order. On January 3, 1988, respondent learned from other office personnel that there was a problem with Cline's handling of insurance applications. He immediately telephoned petitioner's Tampa district office the same day and advised that DIA applications were found unprocessed and in the waste basket. When Schnur asked if he should pull his license from DIA, he was told by petitioner's representative not to do anything. In the meantime, the other general lines agent at DIA pulled her license and left the state. On January 28, 1988 DIA sent a form letter to various customers, including the five who had purchased policies in October 1987. The letter read as follows: Dear We are writing you this letter concerning the insurance policy which you sought through our agency. Please consider this letter as official notification from our agency that you need to purchase insurance coverage from another agency or agencies as soon as possible. You have no insurance coverage on your vehicle or vehicles. Again, you must secure insurance on your vehicle or vehicles immediately, as in today!! Sincerely, Devor Insurance Agency It should be noted that none of the five customers received any refund of monies. In early February 1988 respondent pulled his license with DIA. Since then, he has worked full-time with Ely. Respondent has fully cooperated with the Department during the course of this investigation. At hearing, Schnur was can did and forthright and admitted he used extremely poor judgment in signing in blank the binders and receipts and relying on Cline's honesty. However, there was no intent on his part to violate the insurance code or otherwise harm the customers. He strongly desires to continue in the insurance profession, a field in which he has worked without a blemish for the last nineteen years. His present employer, Ely, has expressed complete trust and confidence in Schnur, allows him to handle all of the firm's money, and intends to reward him with a part ownership of that business. Other than the charges set forth in the pending amended administrative complaint, there is no basis upon which to deny the applications for renewal and issuance of a resident license.

Conclusions Paragraph 2 of Petitioner's exceptions takes exception to the Hearing Officer's Statement of the Issues, Preliminary Statement, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation because none of these sections of the Recommended Order address the April 9, 1990 denial of the renewal of Respondent's resident license to represent C M Life Insurance Company as a life and health insurance agent. Petitioner filed a motion for consolidation regarding the April 9 denial on April 17, 1990. Although the record contains no Order ruling on-the last motion for consolidation, it appears that the parties agreed that the April 9 denial be considered together with the administrative complaint and the denial of Respondent's application to represent United States Life Insurance Company of NY as a life and health insurance agent (February 14, 1990) and the denial of Respondent's application to represent Acceleration Life Insurance Company as a life and health insurance agent (April 6, 1990). Because the three denials of Respondent's applications for licensure or renewal of licensure were based upon the allegations in the administrative complaint in this case, all three denials (February 14, April 6, and April 9, 1990) will be consolidated with the administrative complaint for disposition by this Final Order. Accordingly, Petitioner's exception numbered 2 is accepted. RULING ON PETITIONER'S EXCEPTION TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Paragraph 3 of Petitioner's Exceptions takes exception to the Hearing Officer's Conclusion of Law numbered 4 because that Conclusion of Law refers to Section 626.611(6), Florida Statutes, which was not alleged in the administrative complaint, and the Conclusion of Law does not refer to Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes. Section 626.611(6), Florida Statutes addresses misrepresentations by insurance claims adjusters or agents in effecting claims settlements. Clearly, Section 626.611(6), Florida Statutes has no application to the instant case, and violation of that section was not charged in the administrative complaint. On the other hand, Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes lists the demonstration of lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance as grounds for the-suspension or revocation of an insurance agent's license. This statute was included in the charges in each count of the administrative complaint. The hearing officer apparently considered Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes, in his Conclusions of Law numbered 3 and 4. Accordingly, the citation to Section 626.611(6), Florida Statutes is deemed to be a typographical error and it is assumed that Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes was the intended citation. In light of the foregoing, Petitioner's exception in Paragraph 3 is accepted. RULING ON PETITIONER'S EXCEPTION TO RECOMMENDATION Paragraph 4 of Petitioner's Exceptions takes exception to the Hearing Officer's Recommendation that Respondent's license be suspended for fifteen (15) days and that Respondent's applications for licensure be granted after the expiration of the fifteen-day suspension. After a complete evaluation of the record the hearing officer's recommended penalty of a 15-day suspension and acceptance of Respondent's applications after the 15-day suspension is hereby rejected for the following reasons: The Hearing Officer found, in Findings of Fact numbered 2, that Respondent accepted an offer to "place" his general lines insurance agent license with Marcia Cline, an unlicensed person. This finding is supported by the Respondent's testimony at hearing. (Tr. 71, 72) Respondent was compensated with a weekly salary of $150. (Tr. 72); The Hearing Officer found, in Findings of Fact numbered 3, that Respondent had signed, in blank, applications and binders for Cline to use in Respondent's absence. This finding is supported by Respondent's testimony at hearing. (Tr. 72, 79, 81); The Hearing Officer concluded, in Conclusions of Law numbered 4, that Cline wrongfully withheld premiums from the insurer, made willful misrepresentations to her customers, demonstrated a lack of trustworthiness, engaged in fraudulent and dishonest practices, and misappropriated monies belonging to others, as proscribed by sections 626.561(1), 626.611(5), 626.611(7), 626.611(9) and 626.611(10), Florida Statutes. The Hearing Officer further concluded that Respondent is responsible for Cline's wrongdoing pursuant to Section 626.734, Florida Statutes. (Concl. of Law #4); The Hearing Officer was of the opinion that Respondent was "the victim of circumstances which happened to place his license with the wrong person at the wrong time, and because of poor judgment, is now saddled with Cline's misconduct." (Concl. of Law #5). This circumstance, together with the facts that Respondent immediately notified the Department when he learned that Cline had misused his license (Finding of Fact #6) and that Respondent was candid and forthright under oath at the hearing of this matter and admitted that he used poor judgment (Finding of Fact *8), led the Hearing Officer to recommend the 15- day suspension. It should be noted that Respondent voluntarily "placed" his license with an unlicensed individual. (Tr. 71, 72). Not only was this "placing" of the license the result of poor judgment, but it is prohibited by Section 626.441, Florida Statutes. That section provides: 626.441 License or permit: transferability.--A license or permit issued under this part is valid only as to the person named and is not transferable to another person. S626.441, Fla. Stat. Accordingly, it is illegal to place an insurance agent's license on the wall of an agency in order to assist unlicensed persons in selling or servicing insurance policies in the absence of the licensed agent. However, because a violation of Section 626.441, Florida Statutes was not alleged in the Administrative Complaint, this final order does not rule on that issue. Additionally, agents are prohibited from supplying blank forms, applications and other supplies to unlicensed persons for use in soliciting, negotiating, or effecting contracts of insurance. S626.342, Fla. Stat. Respondent admitted that he signed blank applications and binders for Cline, an unlicensed individual, to use in his absence. (Fact Stipulation of March 5, 1990; Finding of Fact *3). Violation of Section 626.342, Florida Statutes was not alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and is not addressed by this Order. While Respondent was not charged with violation of Sections 626.342 and 626.441, Florida Statutes in the Administrative Complaint, his "poor judgment" in becoming involved in this illegal arrangement is an aggravating rather than a mitigating factor in this case. Accordingly, this aggravating factor should be considered together with the mitigating factors referred to by the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer concluded that Respondent is liable for the acts of Cline while his license and signature were used by Cline, and that therefore, Respondent is guilty of violating five subsections of Section 626.611, Florida Statutes. Section 626.611, Florida Statutes compels the Department of Insurance to deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew or continue the license of any agent who commits any of the acts listed in Section 626.611, Florida Statutes. However, the mitigating factors found by the Hearing Officer in Conclusion of Law numbered 5, namely Respondent's immediate notification of the Department when he learned of possible wrongdoing and Respondent's cooperation in the investigation, make the 15-day suspension an appropriate, if lenient, penalty in this case. However, the aggravating factor of the improper situation entered into by Respondent in "placing" his license and supplying forms to Cline renders acceptance of Respondent's applications at the end of the 15-day suspension period inappropriate in this case. Petitioner's exception to the Hearing Officer's Recommendation is therefore accepted. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: That the Findings of Fact of the Hearing Officer are hereby adopted in toto as the Department's Findings of Fact. That the Conclusions of Law of the Hearing Officer are hereby adopted in toto with the exceptions noted above; That the recommendation of the Hearing Officer is hereby rejected for the reasons set forth in paragraph 4 above, Ruling on Petitioner's Exception to Recommendation; That Respondent is guilty of violating subsections 626.561(1), 626.611(1), 626.611(5), 626.611(7), 626.611(9), and 626.611(10), Florida Statutes; That as a result of Respondent's violations of the above referenced statutes, the licenses and eligibility for licensure of Respondent, Steven Schnur, are hereby SUSPENDED for a period of fifteen (15) days, effective upon the date of this Order. The denial letters dated February 14, 1990, April 6, 1990, and April 9, 1990 are hereby AFFIRMED. Upon expiration of the suspension period, Respondent is free to reapply for any insurance licenses, and the Department of Insurance shall not deny Respondent's applications based upon any of the facts and circumstances at issue in this action. Any party to these proceedings adversely affected by this Order is entitled to seek review of this Order pursuant to Section 120,68, Florida Statutes and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Review proceedings must be instituted by filing a petition or notice of appeal with the General Counsel, acting as the agency clerk, at 412 Larson Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32399- 0300, and a copy of the same with the appropriate district court of appeal within thirty (30) days of the rendition this Order. ORDERED this 21 day of June , 1990. TOM GALLAGHER Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Honorable Donald R. Alexander Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Alan J. Kerben, Esquire 8814 Rocky Creek Drive Tampa, FL 33615 C. Christopher Anderson, III, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is: RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating subsections 626.561(1) and 626.611(5),(6),(9) and (10) that his licenses be suspended for fifteen days. The other charge should be dismissed with prejudice. It is further recommended that his applications for renewal and issuance of resident licenses be approved after the suspension is lifted. DONE AND ORDERED this 19 day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19 day of April, 1990.

Florida Laws (6) 120.57626.342626.441626.561626.611626.734
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs. KEVIN DENIS COX, 82-003540 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-003540 Latest Update: Oct. 30, 1990

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this hearing, Petitioner held a license issued by the Florida Department of Insurance as a general lines insurance agent. On or about April 3, 1979, Steven B. Atkinson entered the Okeechobee Insurance Agency in West Palm Beach, Florida, from whom he had purchased his auto insurance for approximately three years. His intention at this time was to purchase only that insurance necessary to procure the license tags for his automobile, a seven-year-old Vega. He told the person he dealt with at that time at the insurance agency that this was all he wanted. He did not ask for auto club membership, did not need it, and did not want it. He asked only for what he needed to get his tags. However, he was told by a representative of the agency that he needed not only "PIP" insurance, but also auto club membership and accidental death and dismemberment insurance. Of the $144 premium, $31 was for the required "PIP" coverage, $75 was for auto club membership (not required), and $38 was for accidental death and dismemberment (AD&D) (not required). Representatives of the agency told him that he needed all three to get the tags and, though he knew what he was getting and knew he was purchasing all three, he agreed because he was told by the agency representatives that he needed to have all three in order to get his tags. 3 Diane Phillipy McDonald contacted the Okeechobee Insurance Agency in April, 1979, because she had heard on the radio that their prices were inexpensive. All she wanted was personal injury protection (PIP), which was what she thought the law required to get tags on her automobile. When she first called the agency and asked how much the coverage she wanted would be, she was told she could pay a percentage down and finance the rest. When she entered the agency, she was waited on by a man whose name she cannot remember. However, she did not ask for auto club coverage or accidental death and dismemberment coverage, nor did those subjects ever come up in the conversation. She asked only for PIP, and she paid a $50 deposit on her coverage. In return for her deposit, she was given a slip of paper that reflected that she had purchased PIP coverage. She was not told she was charged for auto club membership or accidental death and dismemberment. The forms that she signed, including those which reflect a premium for all three coverages in the total amount of $137, bear her signature, and though she admits signing the papers, she denies having read them or having them explained to her before she signed them. In fact, she cannot recall whether they were even filled out when she signed them. In regard to the papers, the premium finance agreement signed by the witness on April 3, 1979, reflects in the breakdown of coverage total premium of $137. However, immediately below, the total cash premium is listed as $158, $21 more than the total of the individual premiums for the three coverages, and the financing charge is based on that amount1 less the down payment. Marvin W. Niemi purchased his auto insurance from the Okeechobee Insurance Agency in March, 1979, after he heard their advertisement on the radio and went in to get the insurance required by the State in order to get his license tags. When he entered the agency, he asked personnel there for the minimum insurance required to qualify for tags because he was strapped for money at the time and could not afford anything else. He definitely did not want auto club membership. In fact, discussion of that did not even arise, nor did he want the accidental death policy. When he left the agency, he thought he was only getting what he had asked for; to wit, the PIP minimum coverage. All the forms that he signed were blank when he signed them. This application process took place very quickly during his lunch hour from work. He admits giving his son's (David Robert) name as the beneficiary on his insurance, but did not realize at the time that he was purchasing coverage other than the minimum coverage required. His rationale for giving his son's name as beneficiary was that agency personnel asked and the witness felt if there was any money involved, it should go to his son. In fact, Mr. Niemi was sold not only the PIP, but membership in an auto club and PIP coverage with an $8,000 deductible. Again, the total premium was $137, when the actual premium for the coverage he asked for was only $24. Frank Johnson purchased his insurance from Okeechobee Insurance Agency in April, 1979, because he had heard and seen their advertisement on radio and television and it appeared to be reasonable. He wanted only PIP coverage as required by law sufficient to get his license tags. When he entered the agency, he spoke with a man whose name he does not know, who after consulting the books came up with the premium for the coverage to be purchased. During this meeting, the question of motor club or AD&D coverage was not mentioned. His signature does not appear on the statement of understanding, which outlines the coverage and the premium therefor. In this case, because Mr. Johnson had had some prior traffic tickets, his total premium came to $243. His coverage, however, included bodily injury liability, property damage liability, PIP, and auto club. After paying a $50 down payment, he made two additional payments which totaled approximately $50, but thereafter failed to make any additional payments. On August 1, 1980, Marguerite and Steven von Poppel entered the Federal Insurance Agency in Lake Worth, Florida, to purchase their automobile insurance coverage. They purchased policies which included bodily injury and property damage liability, PIP coverage, and comprehensive and collision coverage. The PIP coverage had a deductible of $8,000, and the comprehensive and collision coverage both had $200 deductibles. Mrs. von Poppel indicates that it was not their intention to have such large deductibles on their coverage. In any event, on that day, they gave a check for down payment in the amount of $320 and advised the employee of the agency that upon billing for the balance due of the $915 total premium, they would send the check. Neither Mrs. von Poppel nor Mr. von Poppel desired to finance the balance due of $595, and Mrs. von Poppel did not affix her signature to an application for premium financing with Devco Premium Finance Company dated the same day which bears the signature of Kevin D. Cox as agent. This premium finance agreement lists a cash premium of $966, as opposed to $915. The receipt given to the von Poppels initially reflects a down payment of $320, which is consistent with the receipt, and an amount financed of $646, as opposed to $595, which would have been the balance due under the cash payment intended and desired by the von Poppels. Somewhat later, Mrs. von Poppel received a premium payment booklet from Devco in the mail. When she received it, she immediately went to the Federal Insurance Agency, told them she did not desire to finance the payments, and that day1 September 3, 1980, gave them a check in the amount of $595, which was the balance due on their insurance coverage. This check was subsequently deposited to the account of Federal Insurance Agency and was cashed. This did not end the von Poppel saga, however, as subsequently the von Poppels were billed for an additional amount of $116.18, which reflects the interest on the amount ostensibly financed. When the von Poppels received this statement, they contacted the Federal Insurance Agency and were told that there was some mistake and that the matter would be taken care of. They therefore did not make any further payments, except a total payment of $20, which they were told was still owing. This $20 payment was made on May 29, 1981, after their insurance had been cancelled for nonpayment of the balance due on the finance agreement. The policy was, however, subsequently reinstated, back-dated to the date of cancellation, after the von Poppels complained. Their complaints, however, did nothing to forestall a series of dunning letters from a collection agency to which Devco had referred the von Poppels' account. It is obvious, therefore, that Federal Insurance Agency did not notify Devco of the fact that the amount due and payable had been paid, and did not clear the von Poppels with Devco or with the collection agency thereafter. As a result, the von Poppels filed a complaint with the Insurance Commissioner's office. That terminated their difficulty on this policy. On September 15, 1980, Federal Insurance Agency submitted a check in the amount $595, the amount paid to them by the von Poppels in full settlement of their account, to Devco. There appears to have been no additional letter of explanation, and though Devco credited this amount to the von Poppel account, it did not know to cancel the finance charges since the von Poppels' decline to finance their premium. Of the total amount of the von Poppel premium, the majority, $636, was attributable to the basic insurance in the amount of $10,000-$20,000 liability written by American Risk Assurance Company of Miami, Florida. The supplemental liability carrying a premium of $180 and covering $40,000-$80,000 liability was written by Hull and Company, Inc., out of Fort Lauderdale for Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company. The third portion of the coverage carrying a charged premium in the amount of $150 covered the AD&D covered by Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company (RSLIC) of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This coverage, in the principal sum of $10,000 in the case of Mr. von Poppel and $5,000 in the case of Mrs. von Poppel, was included without the knowledge or the cosnet of the von Poppels. The policies, numbered 10753 R and 10754 R, were never delivered to the von Poppels as, according to an officer of RSLIC, they should have been, but are in the files of the Federal Insurance Agency. Further, the von Poppels were overcharged for the coverage. Respondent, however, did not remit any of the premium to Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company Instead, on August 1, 1980, the same day the von Poppels were in to purchase their insurance, he issued a sight draft drawn on Devco Premium Finance Company to Reliance Standard Life in the amount of $150. Reliance Standard Life was not the same company as Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, was not controlled by Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, and in fact had no relation to Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company. Reliance Standard Life was a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida in which Kevin D. Cox was president and Howard I. Vogel was vice president-secretary. Of the $150 premium, 90 percent was retained by Respondent or his company as commission and 10 percent was transmitted to Nation Motor Club along with a 10 percent commission on policies written for other individuals. Nation Motor Club would then transmit the bona fide premium of 24 cents per $1,000 coverage to RSLIC. More than a year later, on October 16, 1981, Federal Insurance Agency reimbursed the von Poppels with a check for $42.50, representing the unearned portion of the unordered AD&D coverage. Clifford A. Ragsdale went to the Federal Insurance Agency in Lake Worth on April 19, 1982, to purchase his auto insurance because after calling several agencies by phone and advising them of the coverage he wanted, this was the least expensive. To do this, he would read off the coverage from his old policy and get a quote for the identical coverage. After getting this agency's quote, he went to the office where, after talking with two different ladies to whom he described the coverage he desired, he got to the person with whom he had talked on the phone and read his current coverage, and who already had some of the paperwork prepared. During all his discussions with the agency's employees on the phone and in person, he did not speak of, request, or desire auto club membership. He has been a member of AAA since 1977, and his membership there covers all the contingencies he is concerned with. Additional auto club membership in another club would be redundant. He gave the agency representative a check for $247 as a down payment and agreed to finance the balance due through Premium Service Company. Though he was given a receipt for the $247 deposit, the premium finance agreement he signed that day at the Federal Insurance Agency reflected a cash down payment of only $147, thus falsely inflating the balance due to be paid by the client. The $100 difference was refunded to Mr. Ragsdale by Federal Insurance Agency on October 25, 1982, some six months later after he complained to the Insurance Commissioner's office and was told that the $100 difference was for membership in a motor club that he did not desire or agree to. As late as December 29, 1982, over eight months later, the agency had still not remitted the $147 to Premium Service Company, who then added this deposit already paid by the client back to the account balance. Mr. Ragsdale did not read all the documents he signed at the agency, and he never received the policy he ordered. He was told he was signing an application for insurance and signed several instruments in blank at the request of the personnel at Federal Insurance Agency. He was told they would later fill in what wad needed. Respondent was the general lines agent of record for the Okeechobee Insurance Agency, located at 1874 Okeechobee Boulevard, West Palm Beach, Florida, during March and April, 1979, and at the Federal Insurance Agency, 3551 South Military Trail, Lake Worth, Florida, during the period which included August, 1980, and April, 1982. In each agency, he had instructed his' personnel how to serve and handle customers who came to the agency requesting the lowest minimum required insurance in which the agency specialized and which the agency, through its advertising program, purported to offer. As testified to by Linda Holly, an employee of Federal Insurance Agency, and as admitted by Respondent, when a prospective customer entered the agency requesting the minimum required coverage, the agent was to ask if the customer knew what the minimum was. The agent would then explain what was required and quote a premium which included not only the minimum required insurance, but also some additional service which, depending on the time, could be AD&D, towing, motor club, or the like, none of which was required by the State of Florida. Respondent instructed his employees to do this on the rationale that the premiums and commissions on the minimum required insurance were so low that the agency could not make sufficient profit on the sale of it, alone, to stay in business.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent's license as a general lines agent in the State of Florida be revoked. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Administration 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1983 COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Y. Sumner, Esquire William W. Tharpe, Jr., Esquire Department of Insurance Legal Division 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Kevin Denis Cox 1483 S.W. 25th Way Deerfield Beach, Florida 33441 The Honorable Bill Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301

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