The Issue The issue in the case is whether Petitioner’s reclassification and transfer from career service to the selected exempt service pursuant to Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes (2001), was valid and lawful. All citations are to Florida Statutes (2001) unless otherwise stated.
Findings Of Fact Prior to July 1, 2001, Petitioner was a career service employee of Respondent, for whom she had worked since 1988. On that date, Petitioner was involuntarily reclassified as a selected exempt employee of Respondent. Both before and after her reclassification, Petitioner’s job required her to act as a liaison and contract administrator for technical consulting contracts relating to Respondent’s information technology systems. Respondent contends that it reclassified Ms. Georgalis to selected exempt service in July 2001 as a result of amendments to Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statues. Consequently, the Section then read, in pertinent part, as follows: (2) EXEMPT POSITIONS.--The exempt positions that are not covered by this part include the following: * * * (x) Effective July 1, 2001, managerial employees, as defined in s. 447.203(4), confidential employees, as defined in s. 447.203(5), and supervisory employees who spend the majority of their time communicating with, motivating, training, and evaluating employees, and planning and directing employees' work, and who have the authority to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline subordinate employees or effectively recommend such action, including all employees serving as supervisors, administrators, and directors. Respondent reclassified all persons who were "Level VI managers and Level 5 supervisors" to select exempt service as a result of the content of Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes. Respondent did not confirm that the responsibilities and duties of the position occupied by Petitioner necessitated reclassification to select exempt employee status. Petitioner’s job duties were substantively different from other persons within the DP Level VI occupational group.1 Petitioner did not primarily oversee the work of Respondent's employees as required by the career service exemption. Moreover, she did not even oversee the work of non-governmental supplemental or augment persons who were providing services that could otherwise be provided by departmental employees, assuming such oversight is relevant to the statutory exemption. Petitioner's role was primarily that of liaison and coordinator between Respondent's management and end users of Respondent’s planned technology services, including Respondent's employees who would use the technology that was being developed, as well as construction companies and engineers outside Respondent's department who would ultimately use such technology in working on department's construction projects in the future. Another part of her duties was the administration of contracts between the Department and outside contractors, and in doing so she dealt with independent subcontractor technical consultants who had subcontracts with those outside contractors. These technical subcontractor consultants were not augment employees, and Petitioner was not knowledgeable enough to supervise them on a technical basis. In Petitioner's words, "They spoke an entirely different language." She presented them with broad goals formulated by higher management and served as the conduit to inform them as to whether their work product was acceptable to Respondent and other end users. Petitioner’s job description, both before and after her transfer, confirmed that her position was a “senior level career service data processing position.” She was not required to spend the majority of her time “communicating with, motivating, training, and evaluating employees, and planning and directing employees’ work.” Petitioner was only expected to spend approximately 10 percent of her time overseeing the work of the two state employees working in her area. As established by her testimony, Petitioner never spent more than 3 percent of her time supervising those state employees. Furthermore, the two state employees assigned to specialized technologies were supervised by another employee after the Summer of 2001. At hearing, Respondent's only witness, suggested that Petitioner spent 60 percent of her time supervising “employees,” but he did not know what percentage of that time was spent overseeing the work of career service employees. Testimony of Respondent's witness, Nelson Hill, in this regard is not credited in view of his admission that he was not housed in the Rhynne Building in 2001, where Petitioner was located, and thus had no first-hand knowledge of the day-to-day activities of Petitioner or the other persons working at that building. In any event, a majority of the persons which Hill contends were “supervised” by Petitioner (six out of eight) were not employees of Respondent, but were rather independent subcontractors whose services Respondent retained through contracts with outside third parties. These technical consultants were subcontractors under state approved contracts. They were not “hired” by Respondent. Further, they were not paid by the State, but were rather compensated pursuant to their agreement with the third party state contractor. They were not provided with any insurance, pension, unemployment or worker’s compensation benefits, but were instead treated as true independent contractors; and, most importantly, they were not protected by career service protections, as would have been required if they were indeed state employees. In sum, Respondent's position, as expounded by Hill at the final hearing, is that the application of the exemption provided in Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes, may be justifiably applied to Petitioner due to Petitioner's alleged oversight of the independent subcontractors even though they were not “employees” of Respondent.2 The evidence does not support a conclusion that Petitioner spent a majority of her time “supervising” anyone. Petitioner’s position description confirms that her contract administration activities consumed no more than 35 percent of her time. By that description, Petitioner was required to provide “daily direction of consultant activities” and “manage, direct, and supervise technical and administrative staff." In actuality, Petitioner spent less than 25 percent of her time in such activities. Petitioner spent the vast majority of her time gathering and transmitting information regarding technological and budgetary needs and facilitating the flow of information from the end users (i.e., Respondent's employees or outside construction contractors and engineers who would use the proposed technology) to Respondent management and back again. Any oversight provided by Petitioner to the technical consultants was exactly the same as that provided to other third-party companies with which Respondent had contracts. These outside companies and technical consultants were engaged by Respondent because they had the skill to achieve the goals that were presented to them within the budget that was established by Respondent. Petitioner's interaction with these persons was not “supervision” of a state employee, but rather “contract administration.” Petitioner’s position descriptions specifically confirm that she was not a “managerial” or “confidential” employee as that term is defined in Section 447.203(4) and (5), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, based on the duties and responsibilities contained in Petitioner’s position description and the actual duties she performed, there is no basis for concluding that Petitioner was subject to exemption from career service as concluded by Respondent in July 2001.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Department of Transportation should enter a final order finding that the position held by Petitioner Mavis R. Georgalis on July 1, 2001, was not properly classified into the selected exempt service. Petitioner was, and should continue to be, classified as a career service employee. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of July, 2004.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Jerry O. Bryan began working for the State Road Department in 1968. In 1983, he started his most recent assignment with the agency, now called the Florida Department of Transportation, as an engineering technician III, in a career service position. An employee handbook respondent was furnished in 1983 had this to say about "JOB ABANDONMENT": After an unauthorized leave of absence for three consecutive workdays, the Department will consider you to have abandoned your position and resigned from the Career Service. It is very important that you coordinate any personal absences with your immediate supervisor, in accordance with our current leave policy. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, at page 43. Perhaps with this in mind, respondent requested leave without pay when he learned he faced six months' incarceration, as a result of his criminal conviction for cultivating marijuana on federal property. Respondent's supervisor, Robert Edward Minchin, Jr. denied his request for leave without pay, in accordance with a DOT policy against granting leave to DOT employees who are incarcerated. Mr. Bryan did not request annual leave, although some 220 hours' entitlement had accumulated. Asked whether he would have granted Mr. Bryan's leave request absent "a policy of not authorizing leave while someone was incarcerated," Mr. Minchin answered in the negative, saying Mr. Bryan "was going to be needed during ... [the time] he would be out. T.22. At no time did petitioner ever take disciplinary action against respondent, who received satisfactory or higher job performance ratings, the whole time he worked for petitioner. Aware that Mr. Bryan did not desire or intend to resign, relinquish or abandon his career service position, Mr. Minchin took steps to remove him from the payroll solely on grounds that he was absent without authorized leave for three consecutive workdays.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner reinstate respondent and award back pay, but without prejudice to instituting any appropriate proceedings before the Public Employees Relations Commission. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of November, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry O. Bryan Federal Prison Camp Post Office Box 600 Eglin AFB, Florida 32542-7606 William A. Frieder, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Robert Scanlon, Esquire Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner in September 1999.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this case, Petitioner, Ausbon Brown, Jr. (Petitioner), an African-American male born on April 25, 1943, contends that Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection (Department), unlawfully refused to hire him for any one of four positions he applied for on account of his race, gender, and age. The Department denies the allegation and contends that Petitioner did not meet all of the qualifications for the positions, and that it hired the most qualified employee in each instance. After a preliminary investigation was conducted by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission), which took almost two years to complete, the Commission issued a Determination: No Cause on August 18, 1999. Although not specifically established at hearing, it can be reasonably inferred from the evidence that Respondent employed at least 15 employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year and thus is an employer within the meaning of the law. Petitioner received a Bachelor of Science degree in biology in 1965 from Florida A&M University, a Master of Science degree in wildlife and fisheries science in 1978 from Texas A&M University, and a doctorate in wildlife and fisheries science in 1991 from Texas A&M University. From June 1965 until April 1994, Petitioner worked in various positions for the U. S. Department of Commerce, National Marine Fisheries Service, including as a "survey statistician," "operations research analyst," "chief turtle headstart," "fishery biologist," "fishery technician, and "equal employment opportunity counselor." Petitioner then presumably retired from federal service. Beginning on July 28, 1995, and continuing for several years, he was employed as a child support enforcement case analyst with the Florida Department of Revenue (DOR). His current employment is not of record. After leaving federal service, Petitioner says he filed around 120 job applications with various state agencies, including the Department. When a position becomes vacant and is ready to be filled, all state agencies provide a short summary of information regarding that position to the Department of Management Services (DMS) so that potential job applicants are aware of the vacancy. The information provided by the agencies constitutes "the bare essentials" about a job and includes a brief description of the job duties, the minimum qualifications necessary for the position, and an agency contact person. That information is then placed by DMS into a computer program (COPES), which generates a document known as a vacancy announcement. The vacancy announcements can be accessed by other state agencies who have a COPES terminal. While employed by the DOR, which apparently had such access, Petitioner relied upon the vacancy announcements generated by COPES for filing various applications with the Department. During the relevant time period, and even continuing until today, whenever a vacant position occurs, the Department prepares a Job Opportunity Announcement (JOA) which lists, among other things, the position's minimum qualifications; class title; description of job duties; required entry-level knowledge, skills, and abilities; a contact person in the Department who can provide further information; and the deadline for submitting an application. It is fair to say that this document contains far more information regarding the position than the vacancy announcement generated by DMS. The Department also prepares a Selection Criteria Form for each vacancy which enumerates a number of essential and preferred selection criteria which the applicant must satisfy in order to be considered for employment. In addition, the form contains the name, address, and telephone number of a Department employee who can be contacted for further information on the position. Like the JOAs, this document is available to an applicant upon request, and the Department's general practice is to fax or mail this form to the applicant within 24 hours after a request is made. Although each job application form advises the applicant to "[l]ist the knowledge, skills, and abilities that you will bring to the job," and to refer to the JOA or listed contact person to determine those specific requirements, Petitioner did not have the JOA or the Selection Criteria Form when he prepared and filed his applications, nor did he speak with the contact person. After a position has been filled, the Department prepares a Recruitment Report, which identifies demographic information regarding all persons who filed an application, the name of the successful candidate, and the hiring person's justification for choosing that individual. During the initial screening of all applications, a Department personnel specialist reviews the applications to determine if an applicant meets all essential and preferred selection criteria listed on the Selection Criteria Form. If an applicant fails to meet any of these criteria, the applicant is automatically cut from the list. The applicant is also cut from the list if the application is filed after the deadline or is incomplete. In determining whether an applicant meets all selection criteria, the personnel specialist will attempt to "glean" from the applicant's work history whether he or she satisfies a particular criterion. If the subject matter is highly technical, the specialist will seek technical advice from other Department personnel to make that determination. It goes without saying that the applicant who has the JOA and the Selection Criteria Form can better tailor his or her work experience on the application to the specifics of the job being sought. For those applicants who do not meet all selection criteria, who have filed their application after the filing deadline, or who have filed an incomplete application, the Department sends out a standard form letter advising them that they have not been selected for the position. Petitioner received such a letter after each application was filed. There is no requirement that the rejection letter contain a detailed explanation of the reasons why a specific candidate was not selected. Although Petitioner applied for a number of positions with the Department since 1994, only four applications are in issue here. They are positions 11390; 20340; 10084; and 10301. The first three positions were classified as an Environmental Specialist II, while the last position was classified as an Environmental Specialist III. Positions 20340 and 10301 were processed by the Department's Tallahassee office while positions 11390 and 10084 were processed by the Department's Pensacola office. Petitioner submitted virtually identical applications for each of these positions. As to position 10301, an Environmental Specialist III, 76 applicants applied for the job, and 10 were ultimately given an interview. Although Petitioner met the minimum qualifications listed in the vacancy announcement, he was "cut" from the list during the initial screening process because the position was a "groundwater position," and he had "little experience in water supply plans and development and large scale water management projects." Thus, he could not meet all essential and preferred criteria. On the other hand, the successful applicant, a white male (age unknown), met all essential and preferred criteria; he also had 16 years experience in water management with specific experience "on such issues as water supply planning, establishing minimum flows and levels, establishing pollutant load reduction goals and total maximum daily loads, and watershed management." The evidence shows that a better qualified person was hired for this position, and Petitioner did not meet all essential or preferred criteria. Position 20340, an Environmental Specialist II, required that the successful applicant have knowledge of the Everglades ecosystem. Ninety-eight persons applied for the job, and only six were invited for an interview. Petitioner met all minimum qualifications, but like many other candidates, he failed to meet all of the essential qualifications. In addition, "[o]ther applicants provided information indicating better qualifications with regard to essential and preferred selection criteria." The successful applicant, a Department employee, was a white male (age unknown) who "[f]ully [met] all essential selection criteria" and "nearly fully [met] all preferred selection criteria." Further, the successful applicant had "much relevant experience with monitoring, sample analysis and data interpretation relevant to/taken from the Everglades." In this instance, the most qualified person was hired, and Petitioner again failed to meet all essential qualifications for the position. As to position 10084, an Environmental Specialist II, 50 persons submitted complete and timely applications, but only 14 were interviewed. In addition, 20 other applications were filed by persons who were either unqualified or filed their applications after the deadline; they were automatically cut from any further review. Because Petitioner's application was filed after the December 23, 1996, deadline, his application was not considered. Therefore, on this basis alone, Petitioner's claim must necessarily fail. As it turned out, a white male (age unknown) who met all essential and preferred selection criteria was selected for the position; that individual was found to exceed the education, experience, and knowledge requirements of the job. The evidence shows that the most qualified person was selected for the job. Finally, as to position 11390, also an Environmental Specialist II, 42 persons applied for the position, but only 8 were given an interview. Petitioner submitted no information on his application which indicated that he had knowledge of the Department's Pollution Control Program, or that he was versed in ecosystem management, both essential selection criteria for the job. Ultimately, the successful candidate was a white female (under age 40), who had "hands on" experience in ecosystem management and grant writing and displayed outstanding public speaking skills. She also led the State "in the indicator studies." While Petitioner argues that based on his education and work experience, he "matches the criteria better than the selected applicant," the more persuasive evidence supports a finding that the position was filled by the best qualified person and that Petitioner did not meet all preferred and essential selection criteria for the position. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Petitioner contended that without the Selection Criteria Form, there was no way he could accurately tailor his work experience to the specific criteria required for the job. However, the form was readily available to any applicant by simply calling the number given on the vacancy announcement and requesting that it be faxed or mailed the same day. Petitioner also contended that he had no time to request a JOA or Selection Criteria Form since applications generally were due within a matter of days. This time constraint, however, uniformly applied to all candidates. Further, the evidence shows that if an applicant telephoned the Department contact person before the deadline had run and advised that he wished to file an application but could not file it before the deadline, a short extension would normally be granted. Petitioner next contended that in several instances the Department violated a DMS rule by using a vacancy to promote an existing employee. As to this contention, Petitioner misconstrued the manner in which the rule is applied, and the evidence shows that the Department fully complied with all DMS personnel rules when it filled the questioned positions. Petitioner further contended that the investigation conducted by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) was flawed, and that the reason given by the Commission investigator for recommending a determination of no cause was not true. He also criticized the length of time it took to complete the investigation, saying this deprived him of an opportunity to seek redress in state courts. Since Petitioner was given a de novo hearing to challenge the Commission's preliminary determination, the investigator's conclusions are irrelevant. At the same time, the Department should not be faulted for the Commission's delay in processing the complaint. Finally, Petitioner contended that his educational background surpassed that of the successful applicants, and that his rejection is a clear indication of discrimination on the part of the Department. The positions in question, however, are highly technical in nature; besides the educational requirements, a candidate must also satisfy essential and preferred selection criteria that fit the duties of the job. In most cases, these can only be met through direct work experience in the specified areas, which the evidence shows that Petitioner lacked. On the other hand, all of the successful applicants satisfied these essential and preferred selection criteria. There was no credible evidence that the Department "chang[ed] classifications and var[ied] conditions of employment" in an effort to deny Petitioner employment, or that the Department's actions were a pretext for discrimination, as alleged in the Petition for Relief. Further, there is no evidence that the employment decisions were grounded on discriminatory animus in any respect, or that a discriminatory reason motivated the Department in its actions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing, with prejudice, the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Ausbon Brown, Jr. Post Office Box 10946 Daytona Beach, Florida 32120-0946 Marshall G. Wiseheart, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Petitioner's employment position was properly reclassified from Career Service to Selected Exempt Service pursuant to Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes (2001).
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Petitioner was employed by the Respondent as a Vocational Rehabilitation Supervisor. As a Vocational Rehabilitation Supervisor, the Petitioner was responsible for supervising the performance of counselors and other employees in the Manatee County office. The Manatee County office employed nine persons, including five Vocational Counselors and four clerical and administrative employees. The position description applicable to the Petitioner's employment provided that he was responsible for hiring, evaluating, training, and managing employees in the office. He was responsible for managing and coordinating the fiscal resources available to the office. He was responsible for recruitment of new employees, and for the performance evaluation of existing employees. The Petitioner developed criteria used to hire new employees, created interview questions, and participated in the interview process. The Petitioner's employment recommendations were always approved by his supervisor. The review of the Petitioner's job performance focused primarily on his success in supervising his employees. He received an evaluation of "excellent" and "effective" in such categories as planning based on the missions and goals of the agency, implementation of quality control standards, efficient work organization, budget management, leadership, staff management and discipline, and effective evaluation of subordinates. As part of his supervisory responsibilities, the Petitioner was responsible for approval of all leave requests and travel reimbursement. He was also responsible for the employee evaluation process, including recommending staff members for performance based bonuses. The Petitioner was also responsible for any disciplinary action taken related to his subordinate employees. There is no evidence that the Petitioner did not perform his duties as described by the applicable position description. At the hearing, the Petitioner acknowledged that he was the supervisor for the office and its employees.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Education enter a Final Order finding that the "Vocational Rehabilitation Supervisor" position held by Britton Townsend on July 1, 2001, was properly classified into the Selected Exempt Service. DONE AND ORDERED this 13th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of April, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Margaret O'Sullivan Parker, Esquire Department of Education Office of the General Counsel 1244 Florida Education Center Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Britton Townsend 331 11th Avenue, West Palmetto, Florida 34221 Maria N. Sorolis, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. Hyde Park Plaza, Suite 350 South Hyde Park Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33606 Honorable Jim Horne, Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Daniel J. Woodring, General Counsel Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street 1244 Turlington Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Petitioners' layoffs from employment by the Respondent were lawful and if not, what remedies should be awarded.
Findings Of Fact On or about April 2, 2001, the Department notified Petitioners that their positions were recommended for transfer from Career Service to Select Exempt Service. On July 1, 2001, the Petitioners' positions were transferred from Career Service to Select Exempt Service. Prior to Special Legislative Session C of 2001, the Department's Office of Prevention and Victim Services consisted of 94 positions, organized into four bureaus: the Office of Victim Services; the Office of Partnership and Volunteer Services; the Prevention Office; and the Intensive Learning Alternative Program. During Special Legislative Session C, the Florida Legislature passed Committee Substitute for Senate Bill No. 2-C, which reduced appropriations for state government for fiscal year 2001-2002. This special appropriations bill was approved by the Governor on December 13, 2001, and was published as Chapter 2001- 367, Laws of Florida. As a result of Chapter 2001-367, 77 positions were cut from the Office of Prevention and Victim Services budget entity. The appropriations detail for the reduction from the legislative appropriations system database showed that the reduction of positions was to be accomplished by eliminating the Intensive Learning Alternative Program, which consisted of 19 positions; eliminating the Office of Victim Services, which consisted of 15 positions; eliminating the Office of Partnership and Volunteer Services, which consisted of 23 positions; and by cutting 20 positions from the Office of Prevention. Seventeen positions remained. Immediately after conclusion of the Special Session, the Department began the process of identifying which positions would be cut. A workforce transition team was named and a workforce transition plan developed to implement the workforce reduction. The workforce reduction plan included a communications plan for dealing with employees; an assessment of the positions to be deleted and the mission and goals of the residual program; a plan for assessment of employees, in terms of comparative merit; and a placement strategy for affected employees. Gloria Preston, Stephen Reid and Carol Wells were Operations and Management Consultant II's and worked in the Partnership and Volunteer Services Division. According to the budget detail from Special Session C, all of the positions in this unit were eliminated. Titus Tillman was an Operations and Management Consultant II and worked in the Prevention and Monitoring division. According to the budget detail provided from Special Session C, 20 of the positions in this unit were eliminated. On December 7, 2001, the Department notified Petitioners that effective January 4, 2002, each of their positions were eliminated due to the Florida Legislature's reduction of staffing in a number of Department program areas during the special session. Petitioners were provided with information regarding what type of assistance the Department would provide. Specifically, the notices stated that the employees would be entitled to the right of a first interview with any state agency for a vacancy to which they may apply, provided they are qualified for the position; and that they could seek placement through the Agency for Workforce Innovation. The notice also provided information regarding leave and insurance benefits, and identified resources for affected employees to seek more clarification or assistance. At the time Petitioners were notified that their positions were being eliminated, Florida Administrative Code Rules 60K-17.001 through 60K-17.004 remained in effect. These rules required agencies to determine the order of layoff by calculating retention points, based upon the number of months of continuous employment in a career service position, with some identified modifications. However, by the express terms of the "Service First" Legislation passed in the regular session of 2001, the career service rules identified above were to be repealed January 1, 2002, unless otherwise readopted. § 42, Ch. 2001-43, Laws of Fla. Consistent with the legislative directive new rules had been noticed and were in the adoption process. On January 4, 2002, each of the Petitioners were laid off due to the elimination of their positions. At the time the layoff became effective, new rules regarding workforce reductions had been adopted. Florida Administrative Code Rule 60K-33, effective January 2, 2002, did not allow for the "bumping" procedure outlined in Rule 60K-17.004. Instead, it required the Department to appoint a workforce transition team for overseeing and administering the workforce reduction; assess the positions to be deleted and the mission and goals of the remaining program after the deletion of positions; identify the employees and programs or services that would be affected by the workforce reduction and identify the knowledge, skills and abilities that employees would need to carry out the remaining program. The workforce transition team was required under one of the new rules to consider the comparative merit, demonstrated skills, and experience of each employee, and consider which employees would best enable the agency to advance its mission. Although the Department created a workforce reduction plan and Career Service Comparative Merit Checklist, it did not complete a checklist for any of the Petitioners because it had previously reclassified their positions as Selected Exempt Service. No checklist is expressly required under Rule 60L-33. While no checklist was completed on the Selected Exempt Service employees, each employee in the Office of Prevention and Victim Services was assessed based on the positions remaining and the mission of the Department in order to determine which employees to keep and which to lay off. Of the 17 remaining positions, the Department considered the legislative intent with respect to the elimination of programs and the individuals currently performing the job duties that were left. It also evaluated the responsibilities remaining, which included overseeing the funding of statewide contracts and grants. The Department also considered which employees should be retained based upon their ability to absorb the workload, their geographic location, and their skill set. The Department determined that the employees selected for the remaining positions were the strongest in their field, had fiscal management and programmatic experience, and were best equipped to undertake the workload. At the time of the layoff, Petitioners were each long- serving, well-qualified and highly rated employees of the State of Florida. Each was prepared to move in order to retain employment. In April 2002, AFSCME Florida Public Employees 79, AFL- CIO (AFSCME), filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) against the Departments of Management Services and Juvenile Justice. AFSCME alleged that the Department failed to bargain in good faith over the layoff of Department employees. The parties entered into a settlement agreement, effective June 28, 2002. The settlement agreement required the Department to provide timely notice to AFSCME of impending layoffs, bargain over the impact of workforce reductions, and provide assistance for employees who were laid off between December 31, 2001, and January 4, 2002, but who had not attained other full-time Career Service employment. There is no evidence the Petitioners in this case were members of AFSCME. Nor is there any evidence that the Department failed to assist Petitioners in seeking new employment. In July of 2003, the First District Court of Appeal decided the case of Reinshuttle v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 849 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), wherein the court held that employees whose employee classifications were changed from Career Service to Selected Exempt Service must be afforded a clear point of entry to challenge the reclassification of their positions. The Department notified those persons, including Petitioners, whose Career Service positions had been reclassified to Selected Exempt Service, that they had a right to challenge the reclassification. Each of the Petitioners filed a request for hearing regarding their reclassifications, which was filed with the Agency Clerk in August of 2003. However, the petitions were not forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings until May 2007. All four cases were settled with an agreement that their positions were reclassified as Selected Exempt Service positions in error, and that they should have been considered Career Service employees at the time their positions were eliminated. Petitioners and the Department also agreed that any challenge by Petitioners to the layoffs would be forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings. Gloria Preston began work for the State of Florida in 1975. Her evaluations showed that she continuously exceeded performance standards, and she had training and experience in managing and monitoring grants and contracts. However, no evidence was presented regarding how many retention points she would have been awarded under former Rule 60K-17.004, and it is unclear whether she was in a Career Service position during the entire tenure of her employment with the State. Stephen Reid began work for the State of Florida in 1977. He left state government for a short time and returned in 1984. With the exception of his initial evaluation with the Department of Corrections, he has received "outstanding" or "exceeds" performance evaluations. Reid has experience in contract creation and management. However, no evidence was presented regarding how many retention points he would have been awarded under former Rule 60K-17.004, or whether he was in a Career Service position during the entire tenure of his employment with the State. Carol Wells began employment with the State of Florida in 1975. Similar to Mr. Reid, all of her evaluations save her first one were at the "exceeds" performance level, and she has experience in writing and managing contracts. However, no evidence was presented regarding how many retention points she would have been awarded under former Rule 60K-17.004, or whether she was in a Career Service position during the entire tenure of her employment with the State. Titus Tillman began employment with the State of Florida in 1993. He was subject to a Corrective Action Plan in May 2000, but received "above average" or "exceeds" performance evaluations. Like the other Petitioners, no evidence was presented regarding how many retention points he would have been awarded under former Rule 60K-17.004, or whether he was in a Career Service position during the entire tenure of his employment with the State. Likewise, no evidence was presented regarding the retention points that were earned by any of the people who were retained by the Department to fill the remaining positions. No evidence was presented regarding the qualifications of those retained employees, in terms of their comparative merit, demonstrated skills, and experience in the program areas the Department would continue to implement.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the petitions for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry G. Traynham, Esquire Patterson & Traynham 315 Beard Street Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-4289 Kimberly Sisko Ward, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-100 Lezlie A. Griffin, Esquire Melissa Ann Horwitz, Esquire AFSCME Council 79 3064 Highland Oaks Terrace Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Manny Anon, Jr., Esquire AFSCME Council 79 99 Northwest 183rd Street, Suite 224 North Miami, Florida 33169 Jennifer Parker, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300 Frank Peterman, Jr., Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300
The Issue Whether this cause is barred by a release of all claims.
Findings Of Fact On January 16, 2019, on her last day of employment with Respondent, Petitioner executed a General Release. Petitioner does not dispute that she signed the General Release, which states, in pertinent part: I knowingly and voluntarily release and forever discharge [Respondent] of and from any and all claims, known and unknown, anticipated and unanticipated, asserted and unasserted, which I have or may have against the [Respondent] as of the date of execution of this General Release. These released claims include, but are not limited to, any alleged violation of ... Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the Americans with Disabilities Act; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; the Family and Medical Leave Act; ... [and] the Florida Civil Rights Act[.] * * * By signing below, I am knowingly and freely waiving and releasing all claims I may have against the [Respondent]. I further affirm I have been given a sufficient amount of time to consider whether to sign this General Release. The subject complaint of discrimination was brought by Petitioner, after she signed the General Release, pursuant to the FCRA, which is specifically referenced as a released claim in the General Release. By executing the General Release, Petitioner released Respondent from the claims that were the basis for her complaint of discrimination. Petitioner asserts that the General Release was signed under duress, she did not give up her rights because she had not yet received her final paycheck or belongings, and that there is no proof that she received consideration for signing the general release.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Kathy L. McKethan’s Petition for Relief due to a lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JODI-ANN V. LIVINGSTONE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Keith L. Hammond, Esquire Law Office of Keith L. Hammond, P.A. Post Office Box 547873 Orlando, Florida 32854 (eServed) Kathy McKethan Post Office Box 953304 Lake Mary, Florida 32795 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 1075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue Proposed transfer of Bernice Ino, as specified in letter of Anthony Ninos, Director of Division of Hotels and Restaurants, dated July 27, 1976. This is an appeal of a career service employee pursuant to Section 110.061, Florida Statutes. The appeal was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Career Service Commission on November 24, 1976.
Findings Of Fact By the General Appropriations act emanating from the 1976 state legislative session, 38 employee positions of the Respondent's Division of Hotel and Restaurants were abolished. Although the specific positions were not identified in the appropriations act, the Division director was informed by a staff representative of the legislative committee on appropriations that 25 Hotel and Restaurant Inspector I positions and six Inspector II positions should be among those eliminated. The Division previously had 103 Inspectors of the two classes. Respondent identified the positions statewide to be eliminated and requested the Secretary, Department of Administration, to approve the concept that the competitive area for layoff of employees be statewide within the Division. Approval of this plan was secured and Respondent proceeded to abolish the positions and to layoff Inspectors in its various districts throughout the state. Since the Division at the time had eight vacancies for Inspector positions only 23 employees were actually eliminated. Layoffs were carried out under a retention point system based on length of service and performance evaluations, computed and applied under the provisions of Department of Administration Emergency Rule 22AER76-1, Subject "Emergency Rule Governing Layoff of Career Service Employees". As to Inspectors I, the 83 such positions in the state were placed on a numerical list, according to total number of retention points of each employee, and those with the lowest numbers were selected for layoff. Seven employees were terminated in District I (Jacksonville) and one in District IV (Ft. Lauderdale). (Testimony of Ninos, Dorn, Exhibits 1, 9-12) As a result of the abolishment of Inspector positions, there was an imbalance in manning levels in the various state districts. In Jacksonville, there had been eight inspector positions. The abolishment of three of these left five vacancies that had to be filled. On the other hand, there were negative vacancies in the Ft. Lauderdale district. The Division director therefore instructed the Respondents' personnel officer, Lee Dorn, to reapportion the state to effectively cover all inspection areas. Specifically, he directed that five Inspector I positions be transferred to Jacksonville, 3 of them to come from the Ft. Lauderdale district. In a Memorandum to Dorn, dated July 15, 1976, the director identified the three positions in Ft. Lauderdale for transfer as those held by A. V. Maloni, Bernice N. Ino, and J. F. Friedman. The retention points of these employees had been calculated respectively at 210, 169, and 165. These three employees, and two others to be transferred to Jacksonville from District V, were those Inspectors who had the lowest number of retention points after those having less retention points had been laid off. It was stipulated by the parties that the number of retention joints calculated for Petitioner is correct based on the criteria set forth in the Department of Administration's Emergency Rule. (Testimony of Ninos, Dorn, Exhibit 2) It thereafter developed that of the three Ft. Lauderdale employees, Petitioner was the only one who would actually have had to take an involuntary transfer to Jacksonville. Mr. Friedman, who had less retention points, secured a new position with another agency. Maloni, who had more retention points than Petitioner, was reassigned to a position in the Ft. Lauderdale district that was vacated when the incumbent, in turn, was reassigned to another position made vacant by the illness and eventual separation of its incumbent, John W. Murray. The person replacing Murray, A. J. Pergament, had 792 retention points. (Testimony of Ninos, Dorn, Smith, Exhibits 4, 6-8, 14-21) Petitioner was orally informed in late June of her proposed transfer by her District Supervisor, Chauncey D. Smith. This was followed by a letter, dated July 27, 1976, from the Division director that formally advised her of the transfer of her position to the Jacksonville district, effective August 1, 1976. The letter gave as a basis for the transfer the fact that legislative abolishment of positions made it necessary for the Division to reapportion its staffing to effectively cover all inspection areas and that the proposed changes were being made to obtain "equity, effectiveness, and efficiency within our districts". The letter further advised Petitioner of her right to appeal the transfer to the Career Service Commission. Although this letter did not reach Petitioner through the mail due to an incorrect address, a copy was personally served on her on July 29. Petitioner acknowledges that the incorrect address was due to her negligence in advising Respondent correctly as to the same. In a memo to Petitioner, dated July 28, Smith had conveyed Division instructions for her to report to Jacksonville on August 2. Petitioner declined to accept the transfer. She filed her appeal by letter of July 31, 1976 and thereafter resigned, effective August 2, 1976. Her appeal letter stated that she had not been given sufficient notice to relocate and that the transfer would be a great financial hardship due to the fact that she had purchased a home in the area recently. (Testimony of Dorn, Smith, Ino, Exhibits 3, 13, 22-23) At a meeting with Smith and the Division's Chief of Enforcement, B. E. Fernandez, in early August, Petitioner was informed that she would be given the next opening in Ft. Lauderdale. In fact, Inspector Murray was not separated until November but his job had been filled on a temporary basis by Maloni. When Murray was finally separated, Maloni stayed in the position. Petitioner had been told by Smith that it would be a hardship for Maloni to suffer a transfer because of family considerations, but would not be so difficult for her because she could obtain unemployment compensation and she need not be concerned because her husband was working. When Murray finally departed, Petitioner called the Division director regarding the promise that she would have the next opening and he wrote her in December, 1976, that, although she was next in line for any vacancy, Maloni had received Murray's job because he had more retention points. Also, during this period, Fernandez and Smith offered Petitioner openings in Gainesville and Daytona Beach, but she declined to accept them because she wished to stay in Broward County. Smith also suggested that she get a job as a hostess or cocktail waitress because she was cute and petite. (Testimony of Ino, Smith, Fernandez, Exhibit 4) Petitioner testified that she was of the opinion her sex was a factor in the matter because nothing was done for her by Division personnel and because of the comments made by Smith concerning her eligibility for unemployment compensation and his comments concerning the possibility of her becoming a cocktail waitress. (Testimony of Ino) Petitioner was employed by Respondent from June 1, 1973 to August 2, 1977. She had performed her duties in an exemplary manner. (Testimony of McCulley)
Recommendation It is recommended that the Career Service Commission deny the appeal. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd of March, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence D. Winson Staff Attorney Department of Business Regulation The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Roger D. Haagenson 800 E. Broward Building Suite 610 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301
Findings Of Fact The findings of fact in the recommended order are supported by competent, substantial evidence. They are adopted with modification together with the following supplemental findings of fact and as such both constitute the complete set of findings of fact for purposes of this final order. Albury also engages in the private practice of law as a member of a law firm. He devotes a majority of his working hours in that practice and is prohibited from representing other school boards because of his work relationship with the Monroe County School Board (the School Board). Until 1980 or 1981, Albury utilized his private law office and his private secretary to perform his duties as school board attorney. There is no evidence that this was for the convenience of the School Board, and it was a known fact that he performed his work from his private law office. The new school board office was renovated in 1980 or 1981, but no office was set up for Albury until late 1983. At that time, one room was made available to both the school board members and to Albury as school board attorney who jointly shared the one room. Prior to late 1983, that room was used by a school board employee who retired in mid-1983. Albury spends very little time in this office since a majority of his duties are performed elsewhere. Until relatively recently, Albury's private secretary did most of his secretarial work in connection with his school board representation. She was a long time employee and very familiar with his working habits, etc. When he left his employment, his new secretary who was less familiar with his habits and school board matters did less work in this area. Consequently, Albury used any one of three school board secretaries for assistance. He does not supervise any of the three secretaries and must request permission from their supervisors before having them perform work for him.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division enter a final order declaring Hilary U. Albury eligible for membership in the Florida Retirement System both before and after July 1, 1979. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of May, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 1984.
The Issue Due to the pre-trial motion(s), the present issue is whether or not the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of this cause.
Findings Of Fact This cause was initiated by Petitioner's complaint of "age" and "sex" discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations on or about May 22, 1996. Petitioner (then-complainant) was a female corporal in the bailiff's unit of the Bay County Sheriff's Office. She complained of a hostile work environment. On July 28, 1999, the Florida Commission on Human Relations, by its Executive Director, entered a "Determination: No Cause" Order. Therein, the Commission found: Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, and the timeliness and all jurisdictional requirements have been met. Pursuant to Rule 60Y-5.004(1), Florida Administrative Code, an Investigatory Report has been submitted by the office of Employment Investigations. On the basis of the report and recommendation, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by Rules 60Y-2.004(2)(e) and 60Y-5.004, Florida Administrative Code, it is my determination that there is no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful practice has occurred. Thereafter, Petitioner's "Petition for Relief" was filed with the Commission. The date of filing is not apparent from the materials provided to the Division, so it is not possible to determine therefrom if the Petition for Relief was timely filed within 35 days of July 28, 1999, as required by law. However, the Commission did not give notice of the Petition to Respondent nor transmit it to the Division until September 24, 1999. Petitioner's Petition for Relief alleges discrimination against Petitioner on the basis of "gender" (female), "age," and "retaliation" on the basis of a hostile work environment. On the face of the Petition, it is not possible to determine if the added claim of retaliation is based upon an internal grievance, a prior complaint pursuant to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, or the discrimination complaint before the Commission which gave rise to the instant Petition for Relief before the Division.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief herein for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda G. Milkowitz, Esquire 2731 Blair Stone Lane Post Office Box 14922 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4922 R. W. Evans, Esquire Powers, Quaschnick, Tischler & Evans 1669 Mahan Center Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building f, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Respondent, PPC Products Corporation (PPC), manufactures power transistors, recitifers, diodes, and semiconductors. Approximately 80 percent of its business deals with government contracts. Petitioner is Sandra Boatwright, a black female, who worked for PPC for sixteen years. During her career with PPC she received good evaluations. In September 1989, Ms. Boatwright was working in the marking section of the production department. Her duties included putting product units in an oven and removing the units at the end of the baking period. She was a line leader with two to three employees reporting to her. Ms. Boatwright's immediate supervisor was Blynn Gause, the manager of the production department. Stringent government requirements called for the brands on the products to be permanent. During the summer of 1989, a problem had developed concerning the permanency of the marking or branding of the units. Some of the brandings were coming off prematurely. Mr. Gause asked Dolf Storz an employee in the engineering section to find a solution. In order to eliminate possible causes of the problem, Mr. Storz instituted the use of a logbook in the marking section to record the time the units went in and came out of the oven. Logbooks were a common requirement by the engineering section as a means of gathering data. In September 1989, Mr. Storz took the logbook to the marking section and requested the employees, including Ms. Boatwright, to use it. Ms. Boatwright admitted that, contrary to her initial charge, Mr. Storz was never her supervisor. In the latter part of September 1989, after Mr. Gause had returned from a vacation, Ms. Boatwright complained to him that Mr. Storz had been "acting like a king" while Mr. Gause had been away and requested a meeting to discuss the matter. On October 3 Ms. Boatwright, Mr. Gause, and Mr. Storz met in Mr. Gause's office. The discussion centered around the logbook, which the marking section had not been using. Ms. Boatwright did not feel that it was necessary to use the logbook because the marking section was already using an informal logbook to track the units in production. Mr. Storz's position was that the logbook was required by the production specifications and the informal logbook did not record the times the units went in and came out of the oven. Mr. Gause resolved the issue by requiring Ms. Boatwright and the other employees in the marking section to use the engineering log book. Ms. Boatwright thereafter used the engineering log book. On October 3, 1989, the process specification for the marking process, Device Branding Process Specification No. 200-140 was changed to require that the oven data be recorded in a logbook. This change was called Revision J. Ms. Boatwright signed off on this change. Race had nothing to do with the requirement that a marking logbook be maintained. Mr. Gause never advised Ms. Boatwright that he treated whites better than blacks. There was no disparate treatment of Ms. Boatwright in the terms and conditions of Ms. Boatwright's employment with PPC. In mid September 1989, a vacant position in the Lorlin automatic test area of the quality control department was posted. Ms. Boatwright had previously worked in the quality control department. Some time during late September or early October 1989, Ms. Boatwright approached Marleen Williams Coker (Ms. Williams), the quality manager, and asked to be transferred to that position. Ms. Boatwright knew the position was not a supervisory position. Ms. Williams told her she would agree to the transfer but Ms. Boatwright would have to talk to Mr. Gause about the transfer. Ms. Boatwright told Mr. Gause that she wanted to transfer to the quality control department. Mr. Gause, Ms. Williams, and Mindy Hill, the general manager of PPC, discussed the transfer. Although such a transfer was not common in the company due to the necessity for retraining the transferring employee, they agreed to approve the transfer due to Ms. Boatwright's long-term employment with the company. Although the position in quality control was a lower position than her position in production, Ms. Boatwright's pay was not cut. The transfer was approved in early October with an effective date of October 24, 1989. After the approval was given, applications were discontinued for the posted position, a decision was made to combine two other sections with the marking section, a new position with different tasks and responsibilities was created to oversee the merged sections, and the engineering section was contacted to move an engineering employee to the new position. Sometime between the approval and the effective date of the transfer, Ms. Boatwright changed her mind about wanting to transfer. Mr. Gause, Ms. Williams and Mindy Hill met to discuss Ms. Boatwright's change-of-mind. Ms. Hill decided not to reverse the transfer because of the changes that were being made to accommodate the transfer. Race played no part in the decision to allow the transfer or in the decision not to reverse the transfer. Ms. Boatwright's transfer from production to quality was not involuntary. Ms. Boatwright began working in the testing area of the quality control section on October 24, 1989. There were two other employees in that section, Steve Matthey and Mary Lou Rouse, who was the line leader for that section. Ms. Boatwright and Mr. Matthey reported to Ms. Rouse, and Ms. Rouse reported to Ms. Williams. In January 1990, Ms. Boatwright received a good performance evaluation from Ms. Williams. On February 10, 1990, Ms. Boatwright received a pay increase. On March 14, 1990, Ms. Boatwright filed an employment discrimination charge against PPC, alleging that she had been discriminated against based on race in the terms and conditions of her employment. Specifically, she alleged that in the middle of 1989, that all the white line leaders were promoted to supervisory positions and that she, a black, was not promoted. At the hearing Ms. Boatwright stated this allegation was incorrect and should be for the years 1984 through 1990. She alleged that she received increased scrutiny on her work, and her non-black coworkers did not. She charged that Mr. Gause had told her that he treated whites better than blacks. Her complaint stated that she had inquired about a transfer and later informed Mr. Gause she was not interested in the transfer, but was transferred anyway, resulting in a loss of job responsibilities and supervisory promotional opportunities. Each PPC employee is issued an employee handbook, which contains information on various employment related topics, including promotional opportunities. If an employee was interested in an opening, the employee was to contact his supervisor to make sure he was considered and if an employee was interested in advancing to another position, the employee was to discuss it with his supervisor to determine what additional skills or education might be needed to qualify for the position. Ms. Boatwright never discussed supervisory promotional opportunities with Mr. Gause or Ms. Williams, and never inquired of them what education or skills she might need to qualify for a supervisor position. No evidence was presented to show that Ms. Boatwright ever applied for a promotional opening. The employee handbook states that the final decision to promote would be based on the employee's demonstrated skills and capabilities, the employee's experience, education and service with PPC. One of the biggest factors to be considered is the employee's past work performance. In order to qualify for a supervisor position an employee would have to have knowledge of the area that the employee would be supervising, including the equipment and process specifications, to be able to supervise personnel, including disciplining personnel, and to be able to generate reports. Based on Mr. Gause's observations of Ms. Boatwright's past performance in dealing with personnel, she would not be qualified to handle disciplinary matters. As a line leader, Ms. Boatwright brought all personnel problems to Mr. Gause for him to resolve. In 1989 and 1990 there were no promotions from line leader to supervisor at PPC. No evidence was presented to show whether there were promotions from line leader to supervisor during the years 1984 through 1988. Race played no part in Petitioner's lack of promotion in marking and production. PPC maintains an affirmative action plan and annually files an Equal Employment Opportunity Employer Information Report EEO-1. The affirmative action plan, which is updated annually, sets forth PPC's policy with respect to equal opportunity for all employees in hiring, employment practices, recruiting, training, terms and conditions of employment, and compensation. Ms. Boatwright was in Production I job classification for purposes of PPC's Equal Employment Opportunity reports. From 1987 through 1992, the statistics collected by PPC indicate that PPC utilized more minorities and females in Ms. Boatwright's job classification than were available in the general work force in Palm Beach County. The employee handbook states that leaving early is the same as being absent. Before leaving early, an employee must have prior approval from his supervisor, preferably a day in advance. On April 2, 1990, Ms. Williams fired Audrey Shanahan, a white female, for leaving work without informing her supervisor or department manager. The employee handbook states that if work is not available in the employee's area the employee may be assigned another task. The handbook provides for immediate discharge for insubordination. Each employee is expected to follow the work instructions of his immediate supervisor or any other person having the authority of supervisor. If the employee does not think that the instructions are legitimate, the handbook tells the employee to do the work instructed and then take up his complaint with the appropriate person in authority. Bobby Mills was a quality manager at PPC in 1990. He and Ms. Williams were of equal rank, but supervised different sections. Both reported to Mindy Hill, the general manager. When Ms. Williams was absent from work, Mr. Mills would supervise her section as well as his own. When Ms. Williams was present on the job, Ms. Rouse, as line leader, would relay employee requests for permission to go home early to Ms. Williams for a final decision. Ms. Rouse would then relay Ms. Williams' decision to the employees requesting to leave early. On May 2, 1990, Ms. Williams was absent from work, and Mr. Mills filled in for her. Work in the Lorlin testing area was slow on that day, although work was expected to come later in the day. Ms. Boatwright had asked her line leader, Ms. Rouse, for permission to go home at lunch because of the lack of work. Ms. Rouse, believing that she had the authority to grant the permission in Ms. Williams absence, told Ms. Boatwright that she could go home early. Mr. Mills, observing that Ms. Boatwright, Mr. Matthey, and Ms. Rouse were not working, inquired of them why they were not working. Ms. Boatwright told Mr. Mills that she was going to go home at lunch. Mr. Mills informed the group that they could work in another area or go home then. Ms. Rouse told him she could not afford to go home early and she went to another area to work. Mr. Mills left and came back a few minutes later and told both Mr. Matthey and Ms. Boatwright to go to the back to work. Both indicated that they were going to go home early, which they did. To Mr. Mills, their leaving constituted a refusal to follow orders and was therefore insubordination. Although Mr. Mills had the authority to fire employees under his supervision without consulting the general manager, he did discuss the incident with Mindy Hill because Ms. Boatwright and Mr. Matthey were in Ms. Williams' section. He recommended dismissal; however, he was unaware at that time that Ms. Boatwright had filed a discrimination complaint. His recommendation for dismissal of Ms. Boatwright was not racially motivated. Mindy Hill made the final decision to dismiss Mr. Matthey and Ms. Boatwright for insubordination for leaving the workplace when requested to work. No evidence was presented to show that either race or retaliation played a part in her decision to terminate Ms. Boatwright and Mr. Matthey. Mr. Matthey learned of his termination when he spoke to Mr. Mills by telephone on the same day. Ms. Boatwright was verbally advised of her termination when she returned to work the next day. On February 26, 1991, Ms. Boatwright amended her discrimination charge to include her termination from employment with PPC. She alleged that she was discharged in retaliation for having filed a charge of unlawful discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. The statistics collected by PPC for its affirmative action plans show that for the year October 1, 1989 through September 1990, thirty-four Caucasians and eighteen blacks were terminated. For the previous year, thirty-two Caucasians and twenty-four blacks were terminated. On October 8, 1992, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued a Determination of No Cause relating to Ms. Boatwright's charges. The Florida Commission on Human Relations conducted a substantial weight review and issued a Redetermination: No Cause on April 8, 1993, adopting the October 8, 1992 determination of the EEOC. Ms. Boatwright filed a Petition for Relief on May 6, 1993.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Petitioner has failed to prove that Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of December, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2647 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1 - Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 2 and 3 - Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 4 - First, third, and fifth sentences accepted in substance. Second and fourth sentences rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 5 and 6 - Accepted. Paragraph 7 - First and second sentences accepted in substance. Third sentence rejected as not supported by the evidence to the extent that there was no evidence to show that Ms. Rouse on prior occasions had given employees permission to leave early without getting approval from her superiors. Paragraph 8 - First, third and fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted to the extent that Petitioner did leave early but rejected to the extent that she left immediately after the conversation with Mr. Mills at which Ms. Rouse was present. Paragraph 9 - Accepted. Paragraph 10 - Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found in this recommended order. Paragraphs 11 and 12 - Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1 - Accepted. Paragraph 2 - Accepted except as to the date of hire. The evidence shows Ms. Boatwright began her employment on 2-8-74. Paragraphs 3 and 4 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 5 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 6 - Accepted. Paragraphs 7 and 8 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 9 - Accepted. Paragraph 10 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 11, 12, and 13 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 14 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 15 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 17 -Accepted. Paragraphs 18-22 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 23 - The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 24 - Accepted. Paragraph 25 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 26 - The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary detail. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 27, and 28 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 29 - To the extent that the first sentence infers that Revision J was in operation prior to 10-3-89, it is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Storz testified Revision J instituted the logbook requirement and was not signed off until 10-3-89. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 30 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 31 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 32, 33, 34, 35 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 36 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 37, 38, 39 and 40 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 41 - The first sentence is rejected to the extent that it infers that Revision J was in effect prior to 10-3-89. The remainder of the sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 42 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 43 - Accepted. Paragraphs 44, 45, 46 and 47 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 48 - The third sentence is rejected as subordinate and unnecessary detail. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 49, 50, 51. and 52 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 53 - Accepted Paragraph 54 - Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 55, 56, and 57 - Rejected as subordinate. Paragraph 58 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 59 - The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence to the extent that the term "personnel" included. Ms. Rouse, Ms. Boatwright, and Mr. Matthey. The greater weight of the evidence shows that those three persons did not understand that Mr. Mills was their supervisor. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 60 - Accepted. Paragraphs 61, 62, 63, 64, and 65 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 66 - The last sentence is rejected to the extent that Mr. Mills instructed Ms. Rouse to go to the back upon his return. Ms. Rouse left before Mr. Mills returned. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 67 - Accepted in substance to the extent that Ms. Rouse complied with his instructions prior to Mr. Mills leaving the testing area to inquire if there was work in another area. Paragraphs 68 and 69 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 70 - The first and fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 71 and 72 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 73 - The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence to the extent that Mr. Mills clearly revoked Ms. Rouse's permission. It is obvious that it was not clear to Ms. Boatwright, Ms. Rouse, and Mr. Matthey. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 74 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 75 - Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary detail. Paragraph 76 - Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 77 and 78 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 79 - The first sentence is accepted in substance and the remainder of the paragraph is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 80 - Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found in this recommended order. Paragraph 81 - Accepted. Paragraph 82 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 83 - Accepted. Paragraphs 84 and 85 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 86 and 87 - Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found in this recommended order. Paragraph 88 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 89 - Accepted. Paragraph 90 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 91 - Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found in this recommended order. Paragraph 92 - Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 93 and 94 - Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found in this recommended order. Paragraph 95 - Accepted. Paragraph 96 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 97 - Accepted. Paragraph 98 - Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Sandra Boatwright 390 West 33rd Street Riviera Beach, Florida 33404-33036 Terry E. Lewis, Esquire Robert P. Diffenderfer, Esquire Suite 900 2000 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33409 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570
