The Issue Count I of the Amended Administrative Complaint as modified by the August 22, 1991 Order on Reconsideration alleges Respondent Certified Public Accountant (CPA) practiced public accounting in an unlicensed firm by appending the CPA designation after her name in the telephone book and on business cards in violation of Sections 473.323(1)(a), (g), and (h) F.S. and Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C. Count II of the Amended Administrative Complaint as modified by the August 22, 1991 Order on Reconsideration alleges that Respondent CPA violated Sections 473.323(1), (g), and (h) and Rule 21A-24.001(1)(g) F.A.C. by appending the certified financial planner (CFP) designation along with the CPA designation after her name in the telephone book and on business cards, in that the CFP designation allegedly is an unapproved specialty of accountancy. Count III of the Amended Administrative Complaint as modified by the August 22, 1991 Order on Reconsideration alleges that Respondent CPA practiced public accounting by holding herself out as a CPA by appending the CPA designation after her name in the telephone book and on her business cards, implying that she abides by the provisions of Chapter 473 F.S., and is thereby in violation of Sections 473.323(1)(f), (g), and (h) F.S. and Rule 21A-24.001 F.A.C. [no specific subsections cited].
Findings Of Fact Respondent Silvia S. Ibanez is a practicing attorney, a member of the Florida Bar, and holds active Florida CPA License No. 10842, currently in good standing. She is also a Registered Investment Advisor with the Florida Division of Securities and a certified financial planner (CFP). At all times material, she has been actively certified as a CFP in good standing with the International Board of Standards and Practice for Certified Financial Planners (IBCFP). The IBCFP is a corporation. "CFP" and "certified financial planner" are registered trademarks. The IBCFP has no governmental affiliations within the state of Florida. The Florida Board of Accountancy has no involvement in the CFP accrediting process and no proprietary interest over the CFP mark. As a licensee with the federal Securities and Exchange Commission, Ibanez is required to, and does, disclose the fact that she is a CPA. Ibanez' CPA certificate (like all Florida CPA certificates) authorizes her to display her CPA credentials. The CPA certificate represents that the recipient, . . . has passed all examinations and has met all other requirements prescribed by law and by rule of this board for certification as an expert public accountant, and *is therefore entitled to append the letters CPA after this registrant's name to evidence registration by this board as a Certified Public Accountant.* [Emphasis supplied between *] The Board of Accountancy's only classifications of CPA licenses/licensees are "active" or "inactive." "Active" and "inactive" refer to the status of the CPA license and do not refer to or imply that the licensee is actively practicing public accounting. One can be an actively licensed CPA and not be practicing public accounting. The Board of Accountancy issued a letter opinion to Ibanez that a CPA who offers financial planning services for a fee but who does not hold out as a CPA or become associated with financial statements would not be practicing public accounting. Ibanez is listed in the yellow pages under the heading, "Attorneys," as, "Ibanez, Silvia, S., CPA, CFP." Respondent also is listed in the white pages as "Ibanez, Silvia S., CPA CFP atty." On their face, there is nothing false or fraudulent about these listings. As an attorney, Petitioner also places "CPA" after her name on her business cards and on her letterhead. The Respondent's business card states "Silvia Safille Ibanez, JD, CPA, CFP." DPR contends that because Petitioner "holds out" to the public as a CPA, uses accounting skills, and provides one or more types of management, advisory or consulting services, she is currently "practicing public accounting." Ibanez is not listed in the yellow pages under "accountants," "accountants, certified," or "CPAs." Neither the CFP nor CPA credential is part of the firm name, "Silvia S. Ibanez, P.A. - Law Offices," which also appears on Ibanez' business card. Ibanez' telephone directory listings and card at issue show the CPA and CFP credentials strictly appended to Respondent's individual name. Louis Dooner, accepted as an expert certified public accountant, testified that the Respondent is involved in the practice of public accounting because by merely appending the CPA designation after her name on her business cards, she is telling the public that she is offering to perform services that CPAs perform. Respondent Ibanez currently operates as a sole practitioner of law employed by the law firm of "Silvia S. Ibanez, P.A." As such, she provides specialized legal services for her clients not provided by CPAs. As part of her current, normal professional activities as an attorney, she provides all types of tax services to her clients, including tax opinion work, representation before the Internal Revenue Service, and evaluation of the tax consequences of certain transactions. She also performs financial counselling and planning for her clients. In doing so, she utilizes both her legal education, training, and experience and her education, training, and experience as a CPA. Prior to admission to the Florida Bar, Ibanez was employed by two CPA firms where she did substantially similar work, plus audits. It is conceded by the parties that it is possible to practice law and public accounting in the same business activity and that many activities conducted by professionals and nonprofessionals other than by CPAs and other than by attorneys are identical to activities performed by CPAs engaged in public accounting. For instance, anyone can legally prepare a tax return. Bookkeepers and free-lance tax assistors of all sorts are unregulated in any way. Truthful use, communication, or disclosure of the CPA credential by an actively licensed CPA does not per se constitute false, misleading, or deceptive advertising. The evidence does not support a finding that withholding truthful disclosure that one has earned the CPA credential benefits the public welfare or effects the purposes of the enabling legislation, or indeed, how such nondisclosure could promote them, particularly since it has been shown that persons of considerably lesser competency and achievement levels in the discipline of accounting may legally offer to the public almost all the services provided by CPAs. The use of the term "CPA" implies a specific competency to the public. The fact that Ibanez is a CPA is valuable to her legal clients. CPA status is a valuable property right to each CPA, and the ability of a practicing attorney to publicize the fact that s/he holds an active CPA license is a valuable asset to that individual. The only activity among public accounting activities that is a unique activity of CPAs is the "attest" function. See, Section 473.322(1)(c) F.S. There is no evidence that Respondent Ibanez attests as a CPA in the course of her law practice or that she personally performs audits. Ibanez testified credibly that her intent in appending the CPA and CFP credentials solely to her own name is to indicate that she is, in her own right, individually licensed as a CPA and CFP. Respondent Ibanez has clearly marked her office premises with all the indicia of a law office, including two signs posted outside the building itself. One sign specifies that the building constitutes "law offices," that "Silvia S. Ibanez, P.A." is located there, and that Ibanez is an "attorney at law," with no reference to her CPA or CFP credentials. Another sign specifies, "law offices," without any reference to her CPA or CFP credentials. A potential client must pass these two signs just to enter the building that houses Ibanez' law office. Once in the building, a potential client also must be admitted by a secretary to Ibanez' inner office. Ibanez has consistently required her secretary to screen all telephone calls and potential clients who enter the office to be certain that persons seeking out Ibanez will be fully informed that Ibanez is not offering strictly accounting services and that she is practicing law. Ibanez also personally makes that information clear to individuals at each initial office consultation and consistently follows up office consultations at which her legal employment has been negotiated with letters and/or employment contracts which set forth the parameters of the legal services she has agreed to perform for clients. Elise Rice is an employee of Petitioner Department of Professional Regulation who has earned a vocational school accounting diploma. She is not a CPA, nor is she an attorney. Ms. Rice testified that she, personally, drew the conclusion from looking at Respondent's business card that the Respondent was a CPA, but that she did not know what CFP or JD signified and therefore she would not assume from the card that Ibanez was a lawyer or a certified financial planner. Clearly, the designation "CFP" did not suggest to Ms. Rice that Ibanez was advertising either a specialty or particular competence in public accounting. Ms. Rice further stated that, despite Ibanez' business card's clear use of the term "law offices," she would continue to believe that Ibanez was doing both CPA work and legal work out of "law offices." Ms. Rice further stated that even if she telephoned ahead and spoke to a secretary who clearly indicated that Ibanez was a CPA but was working as a lawyer, she would persist in believing that Ibanez was doing both CPA work and legal work out of "law offices." Ms. Rice also testified that if she arrived at Ibanez' office building and was confronted by the sign posted there which clearly indicates Ibanez is an attorney at law and the two signs that clearly state that the building houses only "law offices," she would then believe that she had come to the wrong place to find Ibanez the CPA. However, Ms. Rice conceded that, under the latter circumstances, the premises were, indeed, law offices. Ms. Rice's personal view that Ibanez must be acting as a CPA in the face of significant information to the contrary is not persuasive that the average layman would be misled by Ibanez' business card and telephone listings in the face of all her other disclosures. One who has initially consulted the yellow pages of the telephone directory under the heading "attorneys" would most logically infer from Ibanez' yellow pages listing that Ibanez is a practicing attorney who is dually licensed as a CPA and who possesses a CPA's education, training, experience, and skills and that Ibanez is offering to act as a lawyer capable of applying her additional education, training, experience, and skills as a CPA and CFP. The inferences that the average viewer might draw from Ibanez' white pages telephone listing and her business card are more blurred, but Ibanez demonstrated, and it is conceded by both parties, that an individual may have the opportunity to disabuse members of the public that s/he is engaged in the activity of the practice of public accounting or that s/he is offering all the services normally associated with a CPA, as opposed to law or some other profession, at least where there is direct contact by letter or telephone. It may be reasonable that at least until making direct contact with Ibanez or her office staff, the average viewer of either the telephone listings or the card would assume that, as a CPA, Ibanez is subject to disciplinary oversight by the licensing authority for accounting functions only and that she abides by all Board of Accountancy regulations while doing accounting. However, prior to any meaningful employment, Ibanez exercises reasonable care to disabuse the average viewer of that belief. Since 1982, the Board has consistently issued letter opinions on an individual basis to the effect that the designation "certified financial planner" is an accountancy specialization which has not been approved by the Board and further holding that "CFP" could not be displayed by CPA licensees on stationery or in yellow pages listings in conjunction with the CPA designation. The Executive Director of the Florida Board of Accountancy did not know how "certified financial planner" came to be viewed as a specialty designation of certified public accounting, and the letter opinions do not set forth the Board's rationale for considering it as a specialty. The Board has adopted no rule to that effect. Further, in this proceeding, the agency has not proven any rationale for the policy set forth in the Board opinions. The agency presented no evidence by way of anecdotal experience, professional studies, or accumulated data to show that licensed CPAs or certified CFPs have ever mislead members of the public purely by displaying their credentials in the manner Ibanez has done here. DPR knows of no complaint and has never received any complaint from a member of the public regarding Ibanez' professional activities or advertising. Nor is there any evidence that any member of the public has ever been confused about whether or not Ibanez was practicing accounting or law or financial planning or that any member of the public was mislead into hiring Ibanez under the impression that she would be acting as a CPA solely and not as an attorney, or that she would be performing audits or performing the attesting function of a CPA. Upon the scenario established in the case sub judice, Ibanez is not guilty of any fraudulent advertising so as to mislead the public to the effect that she abides by all regulations of the Board of Accountancy.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Accountancy enter a Final Order that: Finds Respondent Ibanez is not "holding herself out as a certified public accountant" and Finds her not guilty of all charges alleged under Counts I through III and dismisses them. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of January, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 1992.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the termination of Respondent was in accordance with the personnel policy and procedures established by Emerald Coast Utility Authority.
Findings Of Fact ECUA was created in 1981 pursuant to Chapter 81-376, Laws of Florida. By law, it provides utility services throughout Escambia County, Florida. On September 25, 2006, Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a lead service worker. At the time, Respondent was given a copy of the employee handbook and the Drug Free Work Place Program notice. Receipt of both documents was acknowledged by Respondent. Until the time of the incident described in this order, Respondent was considered an excellent employee with high potential for advancement. The handbook is a summary of Petitioner’s human resource policies. Specific human resource policies are contained in Petitioner’s Human Resource Policy Manual. The Human Resource Policy Manual states, in relevant part, as follows: * * * Section F-4 Disciplinary Offenses (29) Use of or Being Under the Influence of any Controlled Substance as Defined in Section 893.03, Florida Statutes or Federal regulation, Not Pursuant to Lawful Prescription While on Duty; or Possession, Sale, ‘Illegal drug’ means any controlled substance as defined in Section 893.03, Florida Statutes or Federal regulation, which is not possessed, sold, distributed, or dispensed in accordance with law. * * * (33) Violation of ECUA Rules or Policies or State or Federal Law. The failure to abide by ECUA rules, policies, directives or state or federal statutes . . . . Chapter G Drug and Alcohol Abuse Policy It is a condition of employment with the Escambia County Utilities Authority for an employee to refrain from reporting to work or working with the presence of drugs and alcohol in his or her body. If an employee tests positive for alcohol or drugs, his or her employment may be terminated . . . Section G-2 Definitions B. ‘Drug abuse’ means the use of any controlled substance as defined in Section 893.03, Florida Statutes, as amended from time to time, not pursuant to lawful prescription. The term ‘drug abuse’ also includes the commission of any act prohibited by Chapter 893.03, Florida Statutes, as amended from time to time. The use of illegal drugs, or being under the influence of illegal drugs on the job, by ECUA employees is strictly prohibited. Section G-5 Rehabilitative/Corrective Action B. Any employee found to have possessed, used or been under the influence of illegal drugs or alcohol while on duty shall be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including dismissal . . . . E. Any employee who tests positive for alcohol or who tests positive for illegal drugs on a confirmation test shall be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including dismissal . . . . On August 14, 2009, Respondent was driving an ECUA vehicle while performing his job duties for Petitioner. Respondent did not see a low-hanging tree branch and struck the branch with the vehicle, causing minor damage to the vehicle. Respondent contacted his supervisor to report the accident. Respondent’s supervisor met Respondent at the accident site. He did not observe any behavior by Respondent that would indicate he was under the influence of any substance. However, because a vehicle accident had occurred, Respondent was required by ECUA policy to undergo a urine test for drugs and alcohol. That day, Respondent reported to LabCorp, ECUA’s occupational testing services company. LabCorp is a licensed facility under state and federal law to obtain urine samples for drug-testing purposes. Respondent was seen by a LabCorp technician who was well-qualified to obtain and process urine samples. The technician checked Respondent’s identification and had him empty his pockets prior to the test. The technician gave Respondent a sample cup, with a temperature strip on it. The temperature strip helps ensure that the liquid in the cup is close to body temperature indicating the liquid is urine and has not been adulterated. Respondent took both cups in the bathroom and urinated in them. Respondent returned the sample to the technician. In the presence of Respondent, the technician checked the temperature of the sample, which was normal. The technician then split the sample into to two test tubes, sealed each tube, labeled them and had Respondent initial each tube. The technician recorded her activity in processing the sample on a custody and control form which Respondent then signed, acknowledging the sample-taking process. Again in the presence of Respondent, both the custody and control form and the two samples were placed in a sample bag which was sealed with an evidence sticker and placed in a locked specimen box for transport to a licensed testing facility in North Carolina. There was no evidence that appropriate procedures were not followed by LabCorp in processing Respondent’s urine sample. Respondent’s sample arrived at LabCorp’s testing facility at Triangle Park in North Carolina on August 17, 2009. Sample A was used for initial testing and Sample B was frozen to preserve it for later testing if required. The sample was tracked through the test process by number and the name of Respondent is not known to the technician performing the tests. The first test performed on Respondent’s sample A was an immunoassay test. The sample was initially tested with a cut-off level of 15 nanograms per milliliter. The cut-off level is used to limit the possibility of a positive result due to secondhand exposure. Respondent’s sample tested positive for Cannabis. Since the sample was positive, it was sent for gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GCMS) confirmation testing. GCMS tests for the presence of THC, the exact metabolite of marijuana. Respondent’s sample produced a positive result for THC. The results were reported to ECUA’s medical review officer and to ECUA. Upon learning of the positive test results, Respondent requested that the second sample be tested by another lab. The sample was sent to another LabCorp testing facility in Houston, Texas. Unfortunately, the second sample tested positive for marijuana. Respondent had no explanation for the positive test results and testified that he had not used marijuana for some 15 years. However, no credible evidence was produced at hearing that demonstrated the samples were adulterated, mixed up or improperly tested. Given these facts, Petitioner has established that Respondent tested positive for marijuana and that such results violate its drug policy.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is Recommended that the Executive Director of the Emerald Coast Utility Authority find that Respondent violated its Human Resource Policies F-4 (29) and (33) and impose such discipline on Respondent as determined appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of May, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of May, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: John E. Griffin, Esquire Carson & Adkins 2930 Wellington Circle, North, Suite 201 Tallahassee, Florida 32309 Terrance D. Peace 5748 Juergen Way Milton, Florida 32570 Richard C. Anderson, SPHR Director of Human Resources & Administrative Services Emerald Coast Utilities Authority 9255 Sturdevant Street Pensacola, Florida 32514 Steve Sorrell, Executive Director Emerald Coast Utilities Authority 9255 Sturdevant Street Pensacola, Florida 32514
Findings Of Fact Case History On April 10, 1987, Petitioners filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing and for Administrative Determination of Invalidity of a Rule as described in the Issues statement to this Order. On April 20, 1987, Intervenors requested intervention. On April 20, 1987, Respondent Board moved to dismiss the petition filed by the Petitioners and to stay the proceedings. On April 27, 1987, oral argument was held on the petition to intervene, the motion to dismiss, and the request to stay proceedings. On April 29, 1987, an order was entered which granted the intervention, and denied the motions to dismiss and to stay. The case was originally scheduled to be heard on May 5 and 6, 1987. Upon stipulation and agreement of the parties to waive the requirement set forth in Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, calling for the conduct of the final hearing within 30 days of assignment of this matter to a Hearing Officer, the case was rescheduled for hearing to be held on June 11 and 12, 1987. The First District Court of Appeal in Dept. of Professional Regulation, et al. v. William J. Broussard, M.D., et al., Case Nos. 87-238/87-260, issued an order staying the conduct of the hearing to be held on June 11 and 12, 1987. The stay was eventually dissolved as a result of an order entered by the First District Court of Appeal on July 23, 1987, in the aforementioned appellate court cases. The administrative case was then returned to an active status before the Division of Administrative Hearings and scheduled for hearing on dates including October 5 and 6, 1987, the eventual dates for hearing. Prior to the commencement of the hearing, Intervenors sought action on a motion to dismiss the Florida Medical Association as a petitioner. That motion was denied. Another preliminary matter related to the September 2, 1987, request for production of documents from the physician petitioners. On October 2, 1987, Petitioners had objected to that request for production. On October 5, 1987, Intervenors had filed a motion to compel physician petitioners to produce certain economic information and financial records related to allegations of standing. Prior to the commencement of the hearing on October 5, 1987, and in the face of remarks by counsel for the Petitioners, it was determined that the physician petitioners did not intend to advance a claim of economic injury in the sense of a change in economic circumstances in their practices with the advent of the licensure of certified optometrists. As a consequence, the requested production became a moot question and the motion to compel was denied. Enabling Legislation In 1986, the Florida Legislature reenacted the Optometry Practices Act, as Chapter 86-289, Laws of Florida. Section 6 of that Act set forth the opportunity for practitioners licensed as certified optometrists to administer and prescribe topical ocular pharmaceutical agents for the diagnosis and treatment of ocular conditions of the human eye and its appendages. The specific provisions which establish the requirements for certification are announced in Section 463.0055(2), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.) as: The board shall issue certification for the administration and prescription of topical ocular pharmaceutical agents in the diagnosis and treatment of ocular conditions to licensed practitioners who have completed the appropriate forms as required by the board and who have submitted proof of fulfilling all of the following requirements: Successful completion of at least 110 hours of approved transcript-quality coursework and clinical training in general and ocular pharmacology, as determined by the board. However, no course in pharmacology shall be approved by the board unless the course is conducted by an institution which has facilities for both the didactic and clinical instructions in pharmacology and which is accredited by a regional or professional accrediting organization that is recognized and approved by the Council on Post-secondary Accreditation or the United States Department of Education. Completion of at least 1 year of supervised experience in differential diagnosis of eye disease or disorders as part of the optometric training or in a clinical setting as part of optometric experience. Successful completion of an examination approved by the board which tests knowledge of general and ocular pharmacology with particular emphasis on the topical applica- tion of pharmaceutical agents for the eye and the side effects of such pharmaceutical agents. A related provision at Section 463.002(9), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.), describes "transcript-quality" as follows: (9) "Transcript-quality" means a course which is in conjunction with or sponsored by a school or college of optometry or equivalent educational entity, which course is approved by the board and requires a test and passing grade. Section 463.0055(3), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.), pertains to the payment of fees associated with becoming a certified optometrist. It states: (3) The board shall establish by rule an application fee, not to exceed $250, and an examination fee, not to exceed $250, for certification pursuant to this section. Section 463.0055(4), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.), establishes a formulary committee which will assist DPR in identifying those topical ocular pharmaceutical agents that may be utilized by the certified optometrist in his or her practice. The decision to enact legislation providing for certification of optometrists to use topical ocular pharmaceutical agents for the diagnosis and treatment of ocular conditions in the human eye was passed in a setting in which optometrists within Florida had historically been involved with the administration and prescription of diagnostic and therapeutic drugs. The overall facts of this case demonstrate that this legislation was designed to specifically set forth the framework for allowing the employment of those pharmaceutical agents or drugs in the future. Adoption of Rule 21Q-10.001, Florida Administrative Code, etc. In an attempt to effectuate the purposes of Section 463.0055(2), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.), the Board adopted Rule 21Q-10.001, Florida Administrative Code. The rule was first noticed for adoption in Vol. 12, No. 38 of the Florida Administrative Weekly, published September 19, 1986. The rule was adopted by the Board and filed with the Secretary of State on October 31, 1986. The effective date of Rule 21Q-10.001, Florida Administrative Code, is November 20, 1986. In the issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly described in the previous paragraph, the Board published amendments to the rule pertaining to fees which is Rule 21Q-6.001, Florida Administrative Code. Those amendments were filed with the Office of the Secretary of State on October 31, 1986. They became effective on November 20, 1986. Within that set of amendments on fees, the Board created a $100 application fee "for certification as a certified optometrist" and a $250 examination fee "for certification as a certified optometrist." The text of Rule 21Q-10.001, Florida Administrative Code, states: 21Q-10.001 Application for Certification. To be certified to administer and prescribe topical ocular pharmaceutical agents a licensed practitioner must submit a completed application form provided by the Board, remit the application fee for certification speci- fied in Rule 21Q-6.001(9), and demonstrate compliance with the following requirements: Successful completion of at least 110 hours of Board approved transcript quality coursework and clinical training in general and ocular pharmacology conducted by an accredited institution which has facilities for both didactic and clinical instruction in pharmacology. The institution must document the applicant's successful completion. The Board will accept coursework and clinical training in general and ocular pharmacology received by the applicant during his basic optometric curriculum or at postgraduate courses if this coursework and training was provided by a Board approved school of optometry or equivalent educational entity; Completion of at least one (1) year of supervised experience in differential diagnosis of eye diseases or disorders. The one year of supervised experience shall be received either during optometric training or in a clinical setting as part of optometric experience. The requisite one year of supervised experience in a clinical setting may be obtained in an academic or non- academic environment. For the purpose of this rule, one year of supervised experience in an academic setting is understood to mean three (3) quarters or two (2) semesters and one (1) year of supervised experience in a non-academic setting is understood to mean a twelve month period; Successful completion of a Board approved examination testing knowledge of general and ocular pharmacology with particular emphasis on the topical application of pharmaceutical agents. In order to be approved by the Board, the examination must have been administered in a Board approved school of optometry or at the conclusion of a post- graduate course conducted by a Board approved school of optometry, and the examination must be approved by the Board. Board Activities in Certifying Optometrists In preparation for implementing the statute, in July 1986 Board Chairman Edward K. Walker, O.D., appointed Jon S. Jacobs, O.D., as an ad hoc committee of one to begin gathering information from the schools and colleges of optometry. Dr. Jacobs' mission was to gather information from the schools and colleges to present to the Board so that it could determine whether the level and quality of the education, curriculum, examinations and supervised clinical experience in differential diagnoses received by optometry graduates of the various schools satisfied the criteria contained in Section 463.0055(2), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.). Licensed practitioners of optometry in Florida have been educated at eighteen different schools and colleges of optometry. Dr. Jacobs contacted either the president or dean of each of these institutions in order to obtain information for the Board's consideration. On August 1, 1986, Dr. Jacobs wrote each of the schools and colleges. In his letter Jacobs cited the language of the statute and asked the schools to respond to the different sections of the law by providing the Board with information concerning whether and when graduates of their institution satisfied the statutory criteria. He requested specific information from the schools concerning how many clock hours of coursework in general and ocular pharmacology they required and in what years they required them. He inquired whether or not students had to pass the pharmacology courses in order to graduate. He asked that the schools provide the Board with the pharmacology examinations given to their graduates. Dr. Jacobs also requested that the schools provide the Board with the information which would establish the beginning year in which the institution required of their graduates one year of supervised experience in differential diagnosis of eye disease or disorders. In addition to requesting information concerning the school's basic curricula leading to the O.D. degree, Dr. Jacobs also requested information on postgraduate and continuing education coursework offered by the institutions. The Board interprets the 110-hour requirement as referring to "clock hours" and not to "credit hours." The Board has determined that the accreditation of a school is evidence of its having facilities for both the didactic and clinical instructions in pharmacology. The optometric schools in question are accredited. All of the schools responded with information from which the Board could determine if and when the school met the 110 clock hour requirement and the requirement of one year of supervised experience in differential diagnosis. All of the schools provided information to the Board which indicated that their students were required to pass the pharmacology courses in order to graduate and therefore satisfied the "successful completion of at least 110 hours" criterion. Follow-up correspondence and telephone conversations with the presidents or deans were necessary to clarify the Board's request and verify the school's response. Many of the schools and colleges expressed concern about the confidentiality of the examinations which the Board had requested. The Board assured the schools that it would not be reviewing the exams for any purpose other than complying with its statutory responsibilities. The information was submitted to the Board in various forms by the schools and colleges and included catalogs, lists of pharmacology courses, and narrative or individual curriculum descriptions of pharmacology courses offered by the institutions. All of the schools and colleges submitted examinations to the Board, but not all examinations given in the relevant courses. Some of the schools submitted as many as eight examinations. The exams submitted were administered by the schools at various times. Many of the schools submitted information which indicated that they maintain computerized banks of examination questions from which they draw randomly in constructing examinations. In some instances, the Board received representative examinations because all of the exams the school had ever administered were not available. With the assistance of the Board's executive director, Dr. Jacobs compiled the information he had gathered from the various schools in chart form and presented it to the Board for its consideration. The ad hoc committee of one composed of Dr. Jacobs evolved into a three member certification committee. In August of 1986, Peter Liane, O.D., became chairman of the Board and appointed Dr. Jacobs as chairman of the Board's Certification Committee. Dr. Liane also appointed himself and Dr. Walker to the committee. The mission of the certification committee was to determine the minimum requirements of the statute, further organize the information Jacobs had gathered, and recommend to the Board those who were to be certified or not based upon documentation and evidence of what they deemed to be compliance with the statute. In reviewing the information it had gathered, the Board viewed the statutory criteria as requiring it to answer three questions: (1) Have applicants for certification received the requisite quantity and quality of coursework?; (2) Have applicants obtained the requisite differential diagnosis experience?; and (3) Are applicants safe to prescribe and administer topical ocular pharmaceutical agents based on passage of a Board approved examination which tested their knowledge of pharmacology and the side effects related to topically applied pharmaceutical agents? The Board reviewed the curriculum and the catalogs and information it received from the schools of optometry. The Board was satisfied about the accuracy of the information it received from the schools and colleges based upon the Board's knowledge of the programs in the schools, including experiences of four members of the Board who sit on the boards of trustees of various colleges of optometry. The Board relied upon the information, statements, and representations they received from the deans and colleges concerning when their graduates complied with certain statutory criteria. The Board determined that it would accept education, training, and examinations from the schools and colleges of optometry and other equivalent entities in order to satisfy statutory criteria for certification. When asked to describe in general terms what the Board was looking for in reviewing the exams to determine if the coursework in pharmacology was in compliance with Section 463.0055(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.), Board members identified that they reviewed examinations to determine whether the course content, as set forth in the exam instrument, was at least 75 percent related to general and ocular pharmacology. The 75 percent standard was chosen by the Board as an arbitrary number which represented "a substantial portion of the test." A number of courses and their exams were not recommended for approval on the basis that the examinations lacked enough questions related to pharmacology to meet this requirement established by the Board. Although the deans and colleges assured the Board that their school's coursework satisfied the pharmacology criterion, it was the Board's understanding that the Legislature intended for the Board to "approve" the coursework by looking at it to determine the quality and level of that coursework. The Board was of the view that, even though an applicant took a course for the requisite number of hours, unless the Board specifically approved the course and determined that it was of sufficient quality, the course would not satisfy the first statutory criterion. Therefore, the Board reviewed the material each institution submitted on an individual basis, and approved portions of that material as satisfying the criterion for coursework. The Board believed that the best way to evaluate the quality of a course was to look at the examination which was required in that course. The Board reviewed each of the examinations which they received from the schools or colleges. Although the Board did not review each and every exam administered by all schools, it did review exams from all schools. Each Board member received copies of the exams. The exams were reviewed and discussed question by question at public meetings. The Board conducted its review based on the expertise of its members who are practicing optometrists with a knowledge of optometric education and professional practice. The statutory term "successful completion" was determined by the Board to mean successful passage of an examination for the course. The deans of the schools certified to the Board that their graduates were required to have taken 110 hours of coursework in pharmacology and had passed an exam in such coursework. With regard to the "110 hours," the Board determined that even if an applicant indicated that he or she had received that quantity of coursework, at least 75 percent of the 110 hours (83 hours) would need to be satisfied in a core course. None of the exams which the Board reviewed for the 83 hour core courses were "take home" exams. Some examinations for which partial credit was given were of that type. In satisfying the statutory criterion of "transcript-quality coursework," the Board determined whether the coursework was given by a school or college of optometry or equivalent entity, and whether the student had taken and passed an examination on the coursework. The Board also determined that the coursework which was submitted in satisfaction of the 110 hour requirement, in fact, included "clinical training." The Board made this determination by observing that information in the curriculum presented by the various schools and colleges. As to the specific clinical training criterion for certification, Dr. Jacobs assumed that the schools "automatically would have their clinical training in their curriculum." Also, Dr. Jacobs indicated that, because the schools were accredited, "we could then assume that these were the quality schools and, therefore, would be administering quality coursework and quality testing." The courses which were approved by the Board as having satisfied the 110 hours of "pharmacology" criterion were courses which dealt with the properties, chemistry, actions and uses of drugs. The courses approved also dealt with the effects of drugs on the body and on the eye, the diagnostic use of drugs, the therapeutic use of drugs, and the side effects of drugs. The Board also determined that the pharmacology coursework was "conducted by an institution which has facilities for both the didactic and clinical instruction in pharmacology." The Board did not approve courses taught by individuals, but only recognized courses conducted by colleges of optometry with both the physical facilities and faculty expertise in teaching and research necessary to provide didactic and clinical instruction in pharmacology. The Board also determined that each approved course was conducted by an institution accredited by the Council on Post-secondary Accreditation. This information was readily accessible to the Board because of the Board's continuing responsibility to review the accreditation status of various optometry schools in order to enforce the Board's existing requirement that applicants for licensure in Florida be graduates of accredited schools. Accreditation, however, did not mean a school's coursework was automatically accepted as satisfying the statutory criterion. Of the eighteen accredited schools of optometry recognized for licensure purposes in Florida, coursework from only sixteen were approved for certification purposes. Two accredited schools, the University of Montreal and Interamerican University of Puerto Rico, were disqualified because they did not meet the statutory requirements for certification. However, the Board believes that the statutory and rule requirement that approved coursework must be "conducted by" an accredited institution which has facilities for both didactic and clinical instruction in pharmacology does not require that such courses be taken at that institution or at a location that, in fact, has didactic and clinical instruction facilities. The Board also reviewed and approved continuing education courses and postgraduate courses which could be used in partial satisfaction of statutory criterion number one. The Board went through the same process with regard to reviewing and approving the examinations for the continuing and postgraduate courses. However, unlike the groups of representative exams which the Board was sent by schools and colleges, the Board reviewed each and every one of the continuing education and postgraduate examinations. Although the Board had previously reviewed and approved the continuing education course exams when the courses were approved for continuing education credit, the Board reviewed the exams a second time to determine if they satisfied the certification criterion concerning appropriate coursework. The Board has approved approximately forty continuing education, seminar, extension and postgraduate courses. The Pennsylvania College of Optometry continuing education course referred to as "PCO 701" is an example of this type of course approved by the Board. The "PCO 701" course was designed for practicing optometrists. The instructors for the course were Ph.D.s in pharmacology and ophthalmologists from the Jefferson Medical School in Philadelphia. The instructors flew in to several areas of Florida every weekend to conduct the three month continuing education course. As to the requirement of one year of supervised experience in differential diagnosis, the Board has determined that this may be obtained in either an academic or a non-academic environment. In order to determine compliance with the "one year of supervised experience" criterion, the Board requested the schools and colleges to provide it with the year in which the institution required at least one year of clinically supervised training in differential diagnosis of their graduates. The catalogs and curricula submitted by the schools to the Board also indicated that clinical training was provided as part of pharmacology coursework. The third criterion requires an examination approved by the Board. The Board did not prepare or administer an examination in order to determine an applicant's compliance with this criterion. Concerning the requirement of successful completion of an examination which tests knowledge of general and ocular pharmacology, the rule implements the Board's policy decision to not prepare and administer a separate pharmacology exam for certification purposes. The Board has determined that examinations administered in optometry school or in postgraduate courses suffice. In order to determine whether applicants satisfied the third criterion, the Board reviewed and approved the examinations which applicants had been required to pass either at the end of their coursework in optometric school or at the end of their postgraduate education. Since 1972, the Board has tested for the side effects of pharmaceutical agents as required by criterion three on the pharmacology portion in its general licensing examination, to become a "licensed practitioner." The pharmacology portion of the Board's exam is a prerequisite to obtaining licensure in Florida. Part I of the examination tests ocular pathology and pharmacology. Applicants must obtain a score of 70 percent or better in each subject in Part I of the exam in order to obtain a passing grade. Part II of the exam consists of the clinical portion and a pharmacology/ocular disease portion. An applicant must obtain a score of 80 points or better in order to secure a passing grade on the clinical portion of the practical exam. The National Board of Examiners in Optometry Education also tests ocular pathology, ocular pharmacology, and treatment and management of ocular disease. The NBEO exam tests: Clinical science which measures a candidate's application of the fundamental knowledge base to the prevention, diagnosis, management, and treatment of clinical conditions within the scope of optometric practice and consists of the following subject areas: systemic conditions; ocular disease/trauma. The International Association of Boards of Examiners in Optometry examination on the treatment and management of ocular disease (IAB examination) is an examination which must also be passed by Florida applicants in order to obtain general licensure. The IAB examination is designed to assess the cognitive skills deemed essential in utilizing pharmacologic agents for therapeutic purposes. A passing score is 75. The subject areas tested on the IAB examination include selection of the therapeutic regime; dosage and/or duration; contraindications/side effects; and the follow-up prognosis. The Board of Optometry approves the Florida examinations for general licensure. This function includes reviewing all of the examinations, working with DPR staff in the design of those examinations, actual selection of examination questions, and determination of the scope of the exam. The Board has approved all of the general licensure examinations which have been administered subsequent to 1972. Although Board members have been aware that since 1972 applicants for general licensure have been required to pass the Board approved examination in pharmacology which tests for side effects, the Board has never specifically stated or adopted a policy that this examination satisfies the third criterion to become a certified optometrist. While the Board seems satisfied that the post-1972 licensure exam would be sufficient to satisfy that criterion, the Board relied on and approved the exam which the applicant took either in school or at the end of their postgraduate training as the exam which satisfied the third criterion. Eight hundred seventy three (873) optometrists had been certified in Florida at the point of final hearing. Each of the 873 optometrists who have been certified were existing licensed practitioners in Florida at the time they were certified. Paradoxically, though the Board did not rely on the general optometric examinations for certification, it did rely on the 1972 and forward examination results in classifying the successful candidates for certification. The Board related that 570 of the 873 certified optometrists took the Florida licensure exam in 1972 or thereafter. Three hundred three (303) took the Florida licensure exam prior to 1972. Two hundred sixty three (263) of the 303 took and passed the PCO 701 course for which the Board reviewed each examination and determined that it satisfied the third criterion because it tested for the use of topical application of pharmaceutical agents and side effects. Of the remainder of the applicants who were examined for general licensure prior to 1972, 37 took the PCO 750-B course which was another course in pharmacology for which the Board had reviewed exams and found that they satisfy the third criterion. Of the remaining three applicants, one took the New England diagnostic pharmacology course and one took the Indiana DBF course in ocular pharmacology. The Board reviewed and approved each of these exams as having satisfied the third criterion. The lone applicant remaining of the 873 was a 1971 graduate from the University of Houston. The Board did not review the actual exam which the University of Houston applicant took, although the Board reviewed a number of representative exams which were sent by the University of Houston. Based on its review of the representative exams provided by the University of Houston, the Board determined that the one applicant for certification who had taken an examination which tested for side effects, but which actual exam was not approved by the Board, was sufficiently qualified to demonstrate compliance with the third criterion. The Chairman of the Board personally knows the single candidate from the University of Houston and has a personal knowledge of his practice abilities and competence. The Application/Certification Form The application form, which is challenged as an unpromulgated rule, sets out an activity section for the benefit of the Board which would indicate if a candidate has been approved for certification, the assigned certification number if approved, and other items related to this review. The application form contains a place where the applicant sets forth his or her name and the mailing address. The application form identifies the fact that $100 fee for application is required. The form asks that the candidate name the school or college of optometry which he or she attended and the year of graduation, and to provide and 8 1/2 X 11 inch photocopy of the diploma received from that school. The application form provides for the applicant's signature which is to be notarized. The application form in its second page gives further instruction and cites the text of Rule 21Q-10.001, Florida Administrative Code, and Rule 21Q-10.002, Florida Administrative Code. The latter rule deals with the administration and prescription of topical pharmaceutical agents. The application form in its substance, set out in Sections 1 through 4 of the first page, establishes the exact formula for obtaining certification to practice optometry, beyond the payment of fees and other preliminary matters which have been addressed in these factual findings. In effect, there are four alternatives by which a candidate may obtain certification. This has formed the basis for examining the credentials of candidates since the inception of the certified optometrist program within the State of Florida. The only changes that have been made concern the fact that the application form has been expanded upon through the recognition of additional postgraduate courses which could count toward the obtainment of 110 hours of approved coursework in general and ocular pharmacology. The form does not contemplate the idea of independent testing to address the third statutory criterion. The details of the four alternatives are as set forth below: 1. I am applying to become a certified optometrist based on graduation from an approved school or college of optometry which his certified to the Board that graduates received 110 hours of approved coursework in general and ocular pharmacology, including clinical training, and passed a Board approved examination (463.0055(1)(a)(c)). At least one year of supervised experience in differential diagnosis of eye diseases or disorders was included as part of the optometric training for graduation (463.0055(1)(b)). Optometrists who graduated from the following schools in the year listed below, or in subsequent years, have been approved by the Board as meeting all of the requirements of 463.0055(1)(a)(b)(c) F.S. PLEASE CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX, IF THIS IS YOUR CATEGORY. Univ. of Alabama 1973 Univ. of Houston 1975 U. of CA at Berkley 1977 Illinois College 1976 Southern California 1979 Indiana Univ. 1976 Ferris State College 1979 Univ. of Missouri 1984 Pennsylvania College 1976 Southern College 1976 Waterloo, Canada 1976 New England College 1977 Northeastern State 1983 Ohio State 1972 Pacific University 1977 State Univ., New York 1975 I am applying to become a certified optometrist based on graduation from an approved school or college of optometry which has certified to the Board that graduates received 88 or more hours of approved coursework in general and ocular pharmacology, including clinical training, and passed a Board approved examination. At least one year of supervised experience in differential diagnosis of eye disease or disorders which included as part of the optometric training for graduation. I graduated from the school checked below and have attended the following approved courses, as indicated, to meet the 110 hour requirement for certification. SCHOOLS Univ. of Houston 1966-74 90 hours Illinois College 1974-75 102 hours Waterloo, Canada 1972-76 84 hours COURSES (attach verification of passing the exam) FOA/Univ. of AL-2/7-8/87 10 hours FOA/Univ. of AL-10/83 6 hours FOA/Univ. of AL-10/85 6 hours FOA/Univ. of AL-10/86 6 hours FOA/PA College-5/78 6 hours FOA/PA College-10/84 6 hours I am applying to become a certified optometrist based on 88 or more hours of approved transcript quality courses in general and ocular pharmacology, which included clinical training and passing a Board-approved examination. At least one year of supervised experience in differential diagnosis of eye diseases or disorders was included as part of my optometric training for graduation. The following courses have been approved by the Board as meeting the criteria above: (Check any courses you attended and attach proof of passing the exam.) PA College Course 750B 110 hours Illinois College Courses 1986-87 85 hours PA College Course 701 98 hours PA College Course 701 105 hours Florida Optometric Assoc/ PA College 1/31/87 110 hours If applicable to meet the 110 hours, the following approved courses may be included in your documentation for certification: FOA/Univ. of AL-2/7-8/87 10 hours FOA/Univ. of AL-10/85 6 hours FOA/PA College-5/78 6 hours FOA/Univ. of AL-10/85 6 hours FOA/PA College-10/84 6 hours FOA/Univ. of AL-10/86 6 hours I do not fit into any of the above categories. However, my educational coursework and clinical training meet all three (3) requirements of 463.055(2)(a)(b) and (c). I have attached a detailed report and all required documentation as necessary. Sections 1-4 within the application form are based upon the information gathered by Dr. Jacobs from the schools of optometry and concerning postgraduate coursework. The Certification Committee reviewed the information which Dr. Jacobs had gathered, and made a recommendation to the Board pertaining to how the information should be used. Dr. Jacobs presented a suggested format for the application form to the Board's office based upon the charts he prepared which summarized the information he had gathered. The Board's office modified Dr. Jacobs' suggested format and sent it to the Board members for their approval. After the Board approved both the use of the information gathered and the format of the application, the Board office prepared the application form for printing and distribution. By including the information concerning the school and year attended by the applicant, the Board was able to avoid having to search through existing Board licensure files which already contain this information and also enabled the Board to refer to the data which the Board had already gathered and analyzed, without the necessity to do it for each applicant. The Board did not accept the form alone in its decision-making process. The associated documentation was reviewed by the Board prior too approval for certification. Applicants were disqualified if they did not provide proper documentation. The Certification Committee reviewed all individual applications and made recommendations to the Board. Each application was reviewed individually by two different committee members. If the two committee members disagreed on certifying the applicant, the third member of the committee reviewed the application and cast the deciding vote concerning whether to recommend certification or not to the Board. The Board then voted on the application and decided whether or not to certify the applicant. The form was designed to act as a facilitator. Nonetheless, it is the substantive standard for review in all instances. The application form implements the Board's previous decision to accept the substantive information which it had been provided. Within the form, Section 1 applicants are those optometrists relying solely on their graduation from one of sixteen optometry schools in the United States and Canada on or after the year designated on the form for that school. Section 2 applicants are those optometrists relying on graduation from the University of Houston (1966-1974), Illinois College of Optometry (1974-1975), or University of Waterloo (1972-1976), in conjunction with completion of courses sponsored by the Florida Optometric Association. Section 3 applicants are those optometrists seeking certification based on completion of one post-graduation "core course" of 83 hours or more, and additional continuing education courses necessary to achieve the 110-hour total. Section 4 was created for applicants who may not fit in any of the three previously-described sections, but who may be able to establish their qualification for certification through other means. An example of use of the form is that when an applicant checked Section 1 on the form indicating the school and year of graduation, the Board reviewed the diploma to determine whether the graduation date on it coincided with the date of graduation, and the school checked in Section 1. Having previously determined that graduates of that institution subsequent to the year indicated on the form satisfied the statutory criteria, the Board used the form to confirm the applicant's credentials in the request for certification. The determination as to whether or not to certify the applicant was made after the Board examined the application form and verified that the applicant had graduated from that particular school by checking the diploma, signature, and notary certificate. Section 3 of the form shows eleven courses. As mentioned before, there are other courses that since have been determined by the Board to be acceptable towards the 110 hour total. These courses were not listed on the form because the Board was unaware of them at the time the form was printed. An applicant under Section 3 who wanted to claim credit for courses which were not listed, could write in those courses and send documentation from the school in the form of a letter or transcript which indicated that the applicant had been tested on the course and had passed the exam. The Board would then confirm that the course was given and would review the exam for course quality. With respect to applicant who checked Section 3, the Board also determined satisfaction of the one year of supervised clinical experience requirement by referring back to the information which had been provided previously by the optometry schools. For Sections 2 and 3 applicants, the continuing education courses relied on to supplement optometric school coursework or post-graduation "core courses" were all sponsored by the Florida Optometric Association in conjunction with optometric schools. Section 4 of the application form afforded applicants who did not fit categories 1, 2 or 3 an opportunity to demonstrate that they satisfied the statutory criteria. For instance, one applicant who applied under this category was a pharmacist before he was an optometrist. He did not fit into any of the other categories because his coursework was obtained in pharmacy school, and he wished to rely on that training to satisfy requirements for certification. A review of the minutes of the Board meetings from the amendment of Chapter 463 in June, 1986, through August, 1987, indicates that the certification form was not adopted as a Board rule. Dr. Walker, Board member, in his testimony confirmed that the application form was not adopted as a Board rule. The certification form-was first used by the Board at the first meeting at which it certified optometrists, April 11, 1987. It certified 455 optometrists at that first meeting; 200 more at its May 9, 1987 meeting; 174 more at its July 6, 1987 meeting; and 45 more at its August 28, 1987 meeting. Of the continuing education courses for which information is available, the "smaller courses" of 10 hours or less were offered in a "seminar" setting, with faculty from optometry schools, most notably UAB, Pennsylvania, Southern College, New England, Indiana, and Houston. In addition to the Florida Optometric Association, other non-school entities such as the Southern Council of Optometrists, the American Academy of Optometry, the Southwest Florida Optometric Association, the Northeast Florida Optometric Society, and the Bay Point Anterior Segment Symposium, Inc., sponsored some of these continuing education courses. Some of the approved continuing education courses described in the form were given at resorts, hotels, or meeting centers. Legislative Intent Petitioners' Composite Exhibits Nos. 6 and 7 were offered in an attempt to describe legislative intent related to Senate Bill 3-B, which forms the basis of the amendments to Chapter 463, Florida Statutes, which took place in 1986. This included Section 463.0055, Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.). Having considered those exhibits and the proposed facts of the parties, the intent which the Legislature had in the passage of Section 463.0055, Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.) cannot be gleaned. Therefore, conclusions about the meaning of that legislation must be made based upon a literal reading of its text, together with other provisions within Chapter 463, Florida Statutes. In a related vein, the Board of Optometry and the Intervenors have suggested facts concerning an April 15, 1987, Senate Committee on Economic, Community and Consumer Affairs request for information from the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, on the topic of the Board of Optometry's implementation of the certification process. In particular, reference is made to that committee's request concerning which schools and coursework satisfied the 110 hour and one year of supervised clinical experience requirements contained within the statute. The committee also wanted documentation of the procedures and standards used in approving examinations which satisfied the requirement for examination set forth in the third criterion. The Secretary of DPR requested the Board of Optometry to prepare the report and it was prepared and delivered to the Senate Committee. That report generally describes the activities of the Board of Optometry in its efforts at certification, as announced in the fact findings herein. Because the Senate Committee did not respond to the report made by the Department of Professional Regulation, the Intervenors and the Board urge that the silence by the Senate Committee somehow recognizes the acceptability of the procedures employed by the Board of Optometry in its certification process. Likewise, the Intervenors and the Board of Optometry seem to take some comfort in the fact that no further legislation was passed in 1987 pertaining to Section 463.0055(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.), which dealt with the need to have the Board prepare an independent examination document as opposed to the technique which has been employed of using other examination instruments to satisfy the terms of that statutory reference. The exact position of the Senate Committee concerning this dispute and the need for independent testing to address the third criterion is not described in this record, nor can its silence or that of the full Legislature in its 1987 Session be seen as creating any inference about the proper construction to be given the language within Section 463.0055, Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.), and especially Section 463.0055(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.). Standing Ophthalmologists and optometrists who practice their professions in Florida are to a significant extent offering similar health care. In particular, the opportunities provided the certified optometrist for practice coincide with part of the practice available to ophthalmologists. Petitioner, Florida Society of Ophthalmology, is an organization concerned with, among other things, the educational interests of ophthalmologists and the quality of eye and health care delivered to the patients of ophthalmologists. It is also concerned on behalf of its members about the quality of eye care and health care of Floridians treated with medication by optometrists. Petitioner Florida Medical Association has the same concerns, responsibilities and purposes. Petitioner, Tully C. Patrowicz, M.D., is a physician and ophthalmologist practicing in Mount Dora, Florida, since 1972. Dr. Patrowicz is a Board-certified ophthalmologist since 1974, and is also a past officer and president of Petitioner Florida Society of Ophthalmology. He is currently a member of both Florida Society of Ophthalmology and Florida Medical Association. Petitioner, William J. Broussard, M.D., is a physician and ophthalmologist who has practiced in Melbourne, Florida, since 1967. He is a Board-certified ophthalmologist since 1966. Dr. Broussard is also a member and former office of Petitioner Florida Society of Ophthalmology. Florida Optometric Association is a not-for-profit organization with membership comprised of licensed optometrists in Florida. The purpose of Florida Optometric Association is to promote and protect the general public in ensuring the availability of high quality optometric services at affordable prices. Approximately 850 of the 1,100 practicing optometrists in Florida are members of Florida Optometric Association. Approximately 650 certified optometrists are members of Florida Optometric Association. Florida Optometric Association participates in administrative proceedings, legislative activities, and court litigation on behalf of optometry. The president of Florida Optometric Association has authorized retention of counsel for those purposes with the permission of the Executive Board and a vote of the membership. Florida Optometric Association members who are certified optometrists are subject to Rule 21Q-10.001, Florida Administrative Code. Florida Optometric Association participated in the legislative activities which resulted in the Optometric Practice Act of 1986. Dr. Howard J. Braverman, O.D., is President of the Florida Optometric Association and is a certified optometrist engaged in the active practice of optometry in Florida. If the certified optometry rule is invalidated, it will have a significant impact on the practice of certified optometry by Dr. Braverman and by the members of the Florida Optometric Association who are certified optometrists. It would also significantly affect their patients. Petitioner Baxter H. Byerly, M.D., and Intervenor Frank A. Broome, O.D., did not appear at the hearing and no indication was given concerning the exact nature of their claims as petitioner and intervenor, respectively. Respondent State of Florida, Board of Optometry, is an agency of the State of Florida within the Department of Professional Regulation with authority to regulate the practice of optometry. Sections 463.001, 463.003, 463.005, Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.). Activities subject to the Board's regulatory and rulemaking authority include standards of practice of optometry, the administration and prescription of topical ocular pharmaceutical agents, and the certification of optometrists to administer and prescribe such drugs in their practice. See Sections 463.005(1)(a) and (g), and 463.0055, Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.). Respondent State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, is an agency of the State of Florida that generally assists the various professional regulatory Boards, such as the Respondent Board of Optometry, in the examination and licensure of professionals. See Section 455.217, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Leo Y. Lewis, from 1969 to date had been employed by the State of Florida as Internal Audit Coordinator for the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Respondent applied for and was issued a reciprocal certificate by the State Board of Accountancy on January 28, 1972. The reciprocal certificate was issued under the provisions of Florida Statutes, Section 473.201. 473.201 Certificates granted to holders from other states Upon application, the board shall issue a reciprocal certificate to the holder of a valid, unrevoked certificate issued by, or under the authority of, another state or political subdivision of the United States only if: The original certificate was secured as the result of a written examination which in the judgment of the board was the equivalent of the examination given by the board at the time the applicant passed such written examination; provided, however, that if such written exami- nation did not include the subject of ethics the application shall not be denied for that reason. In any event, the board shall require all applicants to take and pass the same current open book examination in ethics given to applicants for the written examination in the state before issuance of a reciprocal certificate; The applicant meets all the requirements in effect, at the time of the application, for applicants to take the Florida examination; The applicant is a resident of and domiciled in the state; The applicant intends to enter into the full-time, year-round practice of public accounting in the state; and The board is otherwise fully satisifed as to the moral and technical fitness of applicant." The Board now seeks to revoke the reciprocal certificate issued to Respondent for failure to comply with Section 473.201(2), Florida Statutes, "(2) Failure of the holder of a certificate issued under this section to be domiciled in and practice public accounting on a substantially full-time basis in the state for a continuous period of three years immediately after issuance of much certificate shall be prima facie evidence of the lack of the requisite intent and sufficient grounds for revocation of the reciprocal certificate issued by the board.", contending that Respondent has not been practicing public accounting for the three years immediately subsequent to the issuance of his certificate. There was no contention by the Board in its original revocation procedures that the Respondent has failed to meet all of the requirements of Section 473.201(1) and (2), Florida Statute, with the exception of the contention that Respondent has not practiced "public accountancy". At the hearing and in the Memorandum of Law there is an argument by the Petitioner that the Respondent did not actually intend to practice public accounting at the time that he received a reciprocal certificate. There is no showing that any fraud was involved and the grounds upon which the motion for revocation of Respondent's license is on the ground that Mr. Lewis did not engage in the practice of public accounting on substantially full-time basis for a period of three years after issuance of his reciprocal certificate. His intent at the time he received his reciprocal certificate is not necessary to the determination of the issue at hand. Petitioner contends: That Respondent is not in the practice of public accounting; That Section 473.08(2)(c) applies only to the Auditor General and tlie Chief Auditor of the Public Service Commission and that Section 473.08(2)(c), infra, is an exception to the general requirement that persons who have taken and passed an examination and become CPA's must have one year of public accounting experience or equivalent education in order to obtain their CPA certificates; and That the exception is not a recognition that either the Auditor General or the Chief Auditor of the Public Service Cotmission is engaged in the practice of public accounting. Respondent contends: That he is in fact a Florida practitioner engaged in the practice of public accounting; That the legislature and the Board have recognized that works similar to that which the Respondent performs constitutes the practice of public accounting. Said statute as passed by the legislature is Section 473.08, Florida Statutes. "473.08 Qualifications of applicant for examination; certificates to successful examinees; standards A person who qualifies to take such examination pursuant to provisions of subsection (1) and who takes and passes such examination shall receive a certificate as a certified public accountant issued by the board and shall be permitted to practice public accounting in this state if he:... Shall have completed one year of employment in the office of a Florida practitioner or an out-of-state practitioner or shall have successfully completed an additional one year accounting course at an accredited college or university. However: Any person employed as an accountant in the accounting department of the Florida public service commission who is qualified to take an examination for the purpose of determining whether or not such person shall be permitted to practice in this state as a certified public accountant, and who takes and passes such examination, shall be entitled to receive a certificate under the provisions of authorizing practice in this state as a certified public accountant upon completion of one year of accounting work for said commission under the supervision and direction of a certified public accountant serving as director of commission's accounting department. Any person employed as an accountant or post auditor on the staff of the auditor general who is qualified to take an examination for the purpose of determining whether or not such person shall be permitted to practice in this state as a certified public accountant, and who takes and passes such examination, shall be entitled to receive a certificate, under the provisions of this authorizing such person to practice in this state as a certified public accountant upon the completion of one year of experience as an accountant or post auditor under the supervision and direction of a certified public accountant serving as auditor general. Proof of compliance with the provisions of this introductory paragraph of this subsection shall be established in such form as is prescribed by the board;. The Florida Statutes do not clearly define the term "public accounting", but the definitions in Section 473.011 are helpful. "473.011 Definitions of terms used in chapter whenever the terms `certified public or public accountant are used in this chapter, except as used in subsection (3), they shall be deemed and construed to mean a person holding a certificate to practice as such, issued by the state under this chapter, or any law of the state heretofore in force and effect. [(3) not applicable] whenever the term `Florida practitioner' is used in this chapter it shall be deemed and construed to mean a certified public accountant or public accountant, as defined in subsection (1), engaged in the practice of public accounting in Florida, whether as an individual, a partner or employee of a partner- ship, or a stockholder, officer, or employee of a professional corporation. It shall also be deemed and construed to mean a partnership or professional corporation of Florida practitioners. (5) Thenever the term `public accounting is used in this chapter, it shall be deemed and construed to mean: All services offered to or performed for the public by a Florida practitioner or an out of state practitioner involving the use of accounting skills, specifically including, but not limited to, management services, and All services offered to or performed for the public by any other person, acting as an individual, as a partner or employee of a partnership, as a stockholder, officer or employee of a professional corporation, or as an officer or employee of any other corporation, involving the use of accounting skills, except as follows: (not applicable) Under the definition section of Rule 21A-1.10 of the Florida Administrative Code, practice of or practicing public accounting is defined as: "Practice of, or practicing public accounting. 'Practice of, or practicing public accounting' shall be deemed and construed to mean offering to perform, performing, or holding oneself out as being qualified to perform, those services described in Section 473.011(5), F.S." [supra] as: Rule 21A-1.11 of the Florida Administrative Code defines practitioner "'Practitioner' shall be defined as either a Florida practitioner (as defined in Section 473.011(2), F.S.), or an out of-state practitioner (as defined in Section 473.011(3), F.S.), engaged in the practice of public accounting in Florida under a special permit." Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, defines public as: "PUBLIC, adj. Pertaining to a state, nation, or community; proceeding from, relating to, or affecting the whole body of people or an entire community. Open to all; notorious. Common to all or many; general; open to common use. Morgan v. Cree, 46 Vt. 786, 14 Am.Rep. 640; Crane v. Waters, C.C.Mass., 10 F. 621. Belonging to the people at large; relating to or affecting the whole people of a state, nation, or community; not limited or restricted to any particular class of the community. People v. Powell, 280 Mich. 699, 274 N.W. 372, 373, 111 A.L.R. 721." Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, defines accounting as: "ACCOUNTING. An act or system of making up or settling accounts; a statement of account, or a debit and credit in financial transactions. Kansas City v. Burns, 137 Kan. 905, 22 P.2d 444." The Hearing Officer finds: That the work the Respondent does in his position as Internal Audit Coordinator for the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services involves the use of accounting skills and includes management services and that he is a Florida practitioner as defined in Chapter 473, Florida Statutes, and in Chapter 21A-I, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner contends that the Respondent is a state employee and therefore cannot be independent of his client However, the evidence shows that much of the work performed by Respondent and his staff are for agencies and organizations outside the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services which employs Respondent. There is no employee-employer relationship between Respondent and these organizations. Further, no showing has been made that the employer, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, attempts to or has ever directed the work of Respondent or in any way exercised control over the audits of Respondent. Respondent is in the practice of public accounting in his capacity as Internal Audit Coordinator.
Recommendation Dismiss the petition of the State Board of Accountancy. DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of May, 1976. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Carlton Building, Room 530 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 1976.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner completed an academic program in accounting at the University of South Florida in March, 1976. She applied to sit for the May, 1976 Certified Public Accountant's examination, and paid her fee. There are four sections to the examination: Auditing, Law, Theory, and Practice. At the May, 1976 examination the Petitioner passed the Law section, but failed the sections on Auditing, Theory and Practice. Accordingly, under the Board's rules, the Petitioner was not credited with having passed any sections of the examination, and needed to take the entire test again. She applied to sit for the November, 1976 examination, paid her application fee, and sat for the examination. On this occasion she passed the Theory and Practice sections of the examination but failed the Auditing and Law sections. Under the Board's rules the Petitioner at this juncture was credited with having passed the Theory and Practice sections, and would be allowed to sit for the next three consecutive examinations in order to pass the remaining two sections. She applied to sit for the May, 1977 examination, paid her fee and sat for the examination. She passed the Law section and failed Auditing. At this juncture she needed to pass only the Auditing section, and had two examinations within which to accomplish that. She applied to sit for the November, 1977 examination. The deadline for making application was September 1, 1977. The Petitioner, through her own mistake, was lake in making application, and her application was rejected. She was not permitted to sit for the November examination. She did timely apply for the May, 1978 examination. She again failed the Auditing section with a score of 69. Under the Board's rule her application for certification as a CPA was considered she would need to being again the testing process, without being credited with having passed any sections. She applied for a regrading of the May, 1978 examination. The examination was regraded, but her score was not changed. The Petitioner is seeking, through this proceeding, an opportunity to retake the Auditing section of the examination, while continuing to receive credit for having passed the Law, Theory, and Practice sections. Under the Board's interpretation of its rules, she would not receive credit for having passed the sections, but would need to begin the testing procedure as a new applicant.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Gary L. Wheeler, Respondent, is a graduate of Bob Jones University, having received a Bachelor of Science degree therefrom in accounting in 1974. On July 27, 1979, Respondent received his California certificate as a certified public accountant. Thereafter, Respondent filed an application to obtain a reciprocal C.P.A. certificate in Florida based on his certificate issued by the State of California (Certificate No. E-28234). His application was denied by the Petitioner on October 26, 1979, for the following reason: Applicant failed to satisfy the requirements set forth in Section 7(3)(b), Chapter 79-202, Laws of Florida, inasmuch as the license issued to Gary L. Wheeler in California is not issued under criteria substantially equivalent to that in effect in Florida at the time the California license was issued. Bob Jones University was not recognized as an accredited university in Florida by the Board when Respondent received his California certificate inasmuch as it was not listed among the institutions of postsecondary education by the Council on Postsecondary Accreditation (COPA). During September, 1976, Petitioner adopted the COPA list of schools as the schools from which it would accept graduates to sit for its examination. This was done for the avowed purpose of ensuring minimum competence and technical fitness among the ranks of Florida accountants. Douglas H. Thompson, Jr., the Petitioner's Executive Director since 1968, is the Board's chief operating officer and carries out its functions respecting applications for licensure. As such, Mr. Thompson was the person charged with examining Respondent's application pursuant to his California certificate to determine whether the Respondent's certificate was issued under criteria "substantially equivalent" to Florida's licensing criteria. Respondent's application was considered by the Board on two (2) occasions and rejected because Respondent's alma mater, Bob Jones University, is not listed among the accredited schools and universities by COPA. See Sections 473.306; 473.307 and 473.308, Florida Statutes, as amended; and Chapter 21A-28.06, Florida Administrative Code. As an aside, it was noted that the Board, in adopting its procedure for evaluating the criteria for applicants who were seeking to obtain certificates based on the reciprocal qualifications guidelines also adopted other equivalency procedures which provide Respondent an alternative method for which he may obtain a Florida certificate. In this regard, Respondent is only approximately six (6) quarter hours away from obtaining his certificate under the alternative equivalency procedures established by the Board. See Chapters 21A-9.01 through 9.04(4), Florida Administrative Code.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent's appeal of the Board's action in denying his application for a reciprocal license to practice public accounting based on the issuance of his California certificate be DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 26th day of March, 1980. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
The Issue Did Respondent, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners (County), discriminate against Petitioner, Annette Whitner, on account of her age?
Findings Of Fact At the time of the alleged discrimination, Ms. Whitner was 71 years old. Ms. Whitner claims that the County discriminated against her by not interviewing her for its business services director position due to her age. Ms. Whitner claims that she was discriminated against because the position required an applicant to be a Certified Public Accountant (CPA). She argues that older people are less likely to hold a CPA certification. The weight of the credible evidence did not establish this claim. Ms. Whitner did not establish any connection between possessing a CPA certification and age. On November 10, 2014, the County posted the position online. It was a newly created position, established as part of a reorganization by the County. Because of previous audit errors and the departments the position would oversee, the County determined the minimum qualifications for the position should be: Bachelor’s degree with major course work in public administration, business administration, accounting, finance or related field and possession of Certified Public Accountant (CPA) professional certification or equivalent is required. Master degree in business administration, finance management, public administration, or related discipline is preferred. In determining the equivalent to a CPA, the County referred to the Guide for Certifications for Accounting, Finance and Operations Management (Guide). This was a reasonable non- discriminatory decision. Based on the Guide, the County determined a Certified Government Auditing Professional, Certified Governmental Financial Manager, and Certified Internal Auditor would constitute an equivalent to a CPA certification. The certifications were deemed equivalent because they required similar education, experience, and completion of an examination, similar to one taken for a CPA certification. The closing date for all applicants was December 15, 2014. Ms. Whitner submitted her application near midnight of December 15. Ms. Whitner is not a CPA. In addition, Ms. Whitner did not follow the instructions on the application. She scratched out the instructions on the application and wrote “first” above where it read “current or most recent employer.” Ms. Whitner’s application contained typed and handwritten information. Ms. Whitner’s application did not provide her complete work history as the application instructed. In one of the fields of employment, after 1992, Ms. Whitner wrote “various employers.” Ms. Whitner’s application left an unexplained gap in work history, from 1992 to the present. Ms. Whitner’s application included copies of her Bachelor of Science in Business Administration degree, Master of Public Affairs degree, certification as a Certified District Manager, Certificate of Recognition from the Indiana Executive Program, and a letter of reference from Al Grieshaber, General Manager at Sun ‘N Lake of Sebring, dated February 8, 2010. Ms. Whitner’s application indicated she had a certification as a Certified Professional Government Accountant. Ms. Whitner asserts that a certification as a Certified Professional Government Accountant should be equivalent to a CPA certification. However, the Guide does not include a certification for a Certified Professional Government Accountant as a CPA equivalent, nor does the County consider it equivalent. Additionally, Ms. Whitner did not attach a copy of her certification or provide persuasive evidence of the certification criteria and their similarity to CPA criteria. The County could not determine if Ms. Whitner had worked since 1992. Ms. Whitner argues that her letter of reference from Al Grieshaber demonstrated her employment since 1992. However, the letter did not include the dates Ms. Whitner worked, the position held, or her duties and the type of work she performed at Sun ‘N Lake of Sebring. Randal Vosburg, Assistant County Administrator, was involved in the hiring and selection process for the position. The primary criteria he was looking for when reviewing the applications was whether the applicant had a CPA. Mr. Vosburg did not have any contact with Ms. Whitner and did not know her age when reviewing her application. Mr. Vosburg did not consider Ms. Whitner’s age when reviewing her application. The County did not select Ms. Whitner for an interview because she was not a CPA and did not possess a certificate that is equivalent to a CPA certification. Additionally, Ms. Whitner presented an unprofessional application, did not provide a complete work history so that there appeared to be more than a twenty-year gap in employment, and did not follow the instructions on the employment application. These were all reasonable non-discriminatory bases for deciding not to interview Ms. Whitner. On January 5, 2015, Ms. Whitner submitted an addendum to her employment application. This was after the application deadline and after the County had selected candidates to interview. Ms. Whitner’s addendum did not provide documentation or certification that she possessed a CPA certification or the equivalent. The County selected Tanya Cannady and Stanoil Raley for interviews. Both possessed CPAs. Both were reasonably deemed to be more qualified than Ms. Whitner. A panel of three people interviewed Ms. Cannady and Mr. Raley. Randal Vosburg, June Fisher, County Administrator, and Mark Hill, then-Development Services Director, served on the panel. Ms. Cannady performed much better than Mr. Raley during the interview. Additionally, Ms. Cannady’s work experience was more relevant to the position than Mr. Raley’s work experience. The County selected Ms. Cannady for the position because she met the requirement of having a minimum of five-years of progressively responsible relevant experience, was a CPA, and was more qualified than Mr. Raley and the other applicants. The County offered the position to Ms. Cannady. She did not accept the offer and withdrew her application. On August 5, 2015, the County re-posted the position online. The county changed the CPA requirement from “required” to “preferred” because the County was having trouble finding CPA applicants. Ms. Whitner did not reapply for the position. The County conducted additional interviews and selected Tasha Morgan. Ms. Morgan was female and was a CPA. The preponderance of the credible, persuasive evidence did not establish that the County discriminated against Ms. Whitner due to her age. The preponderance of the credible, persuasive evidence established that the County had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for not interviewing Ms. Whitner.
The Issue Whether or not existing Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C. is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. See, Sections 120.52(8) and 120.56 F.S.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Silvia S. Ibanez is a practicing attorney and a member of the Florida Bar, and holds active Florida CPA License No. 10842, currently in good standing. She is also a Registered Investment Advisor with the Florida Division of Securities and a certified financial planner (CFP). She has been charged with violating Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C. in DOAH Case No. 91-4100 which is currently pending before the Division of Administrative Hearings. As a licensee with the federal Securities and Exchange Commission, Petitioner is required to, and does, disclose the fact that she is a CPA. Petitioner Ibanez is listed in the yellow pages under the heading "Attorneys" as "Ibanez, Silvia, S., CPA, CFP." On its face, there is nothing false or fraudulent about this listing. As an attorney, Petitioner also places CPA after her name on her business cards and on her letterhead. Respondent contends that because Petitioner "holds out" to the public as a CPA, uses accounting skills, and provides one or more types of management, advisory, or consulting services, she is currently "practicing public accounting." Intervenor James R. Brewster is also a practicing attorney, a Board- certified tax lawyer, and a member of the Florida Bar, and holds an active Florida CPA license. Mr. Brewster has been charged with violating Rule 21A- 20.012 F.A.C. in DOAH Case No. 90-3278 which is currently pending before the Division of Administrative Hearings. The administrative complaint therein charges violations of Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C. and Sections 473.323(1)(a), (g), and (h) F.S. on the basis that Brewster's law firm letterhead designates him as a "CPA" and the law firm is not licensed by the Board of Accountancy as a public accounting firm. Intervenor American Association of Attorney Public Accountants (AAA- CPA) is a not-for-profit corporation with its principal place of business in Mission Viejo, California. Founded in 1964, the AAA-CPA is an active professional organization of persons dually qualified as both attorneys and CPAs. Its membership is comprised of practitioners in public accounting, law, government, education, and other activities. One of the functions of the AAA- CPA is to engage in the analysis and discussion of ethical and other issues related to practitioners who are dually licensed in the accounting and law professions. This includes monitoring and commenting upon legislation affecting the practice of law and public accountancy and participating in the development of ethical standards of lawyers and CPAs. AAA-CPA's substantial interests are affected by this proceeding in that its members are CPAs who are directly affected by the definition, scope, and regulation of the practice of public accounting by Florida statutes and rules. Respondent Board of Accountancy is an agency of the State of Florida established pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 473 F.S. Pursuant to Section 473.301 F.S., the Board is authorized in the following language to regulate the "practice of public accounting": Purpose.--The Legislature recognizes that there is a public need for independent and objective public accountants and that it is necessary to regulate the practice of public accounting to assure the minimum competence of practitioners and the accuracy of audit statements upon which the public relies and to protect the public from dishonest practitioners and, therefore, deems it necessary in the interest of public welfare to regulate the practice of public accountancy in this state. Respondent Department of Professional Regulation is an umbrella agency for the Board of Accountancy, established under the provisions of Section 20.16 and Chapter 455 F.S. Intervenor Florida Institute of Certified Public Accountants (FICPA) is a Florida not-for-profit corporation with its principal place of business in Tallahassee. Founded in 1905, the FICPA is an active professional organization with approximately 17,800 members. Its membership is comprised of practitioners in public accounting, industry, government, education, law, and other activities. One of the functions of the FICPA is to engage in the analysis and discussion of issues related to the accounting profession. This includes monitoring the scope of services provided by certified public accountants in Florida and throughout the United States, monitoring legislation affecting the practice of public accountancy, and participating in the development of auditing, accounting, and ethical standards of CPAs. Intervenor FICPA's substantial interests are affected by this proceeding in that its members are CPAs who are directly affected by the definition, scope, and regulation of the practice of public accounting by Florida statutes and rules. It is even recognized in the statute. See, Section 473.302 F.S., infra. Challenged existing Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C., also referred to as the "holding out" rule, provides as follows: 21A-20.012 Holding Out. "Holding himself or itself out" as used in Section 473.302(4), F.S. is defined as publicizing that the licensee is a certified public accountant when providing, or offering to provide services or products to the public, in such a manner that an uninformed person may not be able to differentiate whether or not the licensee may also be in the practice of public accounting. The display of the CPA certificate and license issued by the Department of Professional Regulation shall not constitute holding out under the terms of this rule. All other publication of the fact that a licensee is a CPA constitutes holding oneself out. The specific statutory authorities currently cited by the agency for the rule are Sections 473.302, 473.304 and 473.307 F.S. and the law implemented is cited as Section 473.302 F.S. Section 473.307, dealing with "experience," does not impinge on these proceedings. The remaining authorities provide as follows: Definitions.--As used in this act: "Board" means the Board of Accountancy. "Department" means the Department of Professional Regulation. "Certified public accountant" means a person who holds a license to practice public accounting in this state under the authority of this act. "Practice of," "practicing public accountancy," or "public accounting" means: Offering to perform or performing for the public one or more types of services involving the use of accounting skills or one or more types of management advisory consulting services, by a certified public accountant or firm of certified public accountants, of this state, including the performance of such services in the employ of another person; or Offering to perform or performing for the public one or more types of services involving the use of accounting skills or one or more types of management advisory or consulting services, by any other person holding himself or itself out as a certified public accountant or firm of certified public accountants, including the performance of such services by a certified public accountant in the employ of a person so holding himself or itself out. However, these terms shall not include services provided by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the Florida Institute of Certified Public Accountants, or any full service association of certified public accounting firms whose plans of administration have been approved by the board, to their members or services performed by these entities in reviewing the services provided to the public by members of these entities. [Emphasis supplied] 473.304 Rules of board.--The board shall adopt all rules necessary to administer this act. Every licensee shall be governed and controlled by this act and the rules adopted by the Board. Also relevant to these proceedings is Section 473.322 F.S. which provides as follows: 473.322 Prohibitions; penalties.-- No person shall knowingly: Practice public accounting unless the person is a certified public accountant or a public accountant; Assume or use the titles or designations "certified public accountant" or "public accountant" or the abbreviations "C.P.A." or any other title, designation, words, letters, abbreviations, sign, card, or device tending to indicate that such person holds an active license under this act, unless such person holds an active license under this act; Attest as an expert in accountancy to the reliability or fairness of presentation of financial information or utilize any form of disclaimer of opinion which is intended or conventionally understood to convey an assurance of reliability as to matters not specifically disclaimed unless such person holds an active license under this act. This subsection shall not prevent the performance by persons other than certified public accountants of other services involving the use of accounting skills including the preparation of tax returns and the preparation of financial statements without expression of opinion thereon. Present as his own the license of another; Give false or forged evidence to the board or a member thereof for the purpose of obtaining a license; Use or attempt to use a public accounting license which has been suspended, revoked, or placed on inactive status; Employ unlicensed persons to practice public accounting; or Conceal information relative to violations of this act. Any person who violates any provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. [Emphasis supplied] Although it has not been challenged, Rule 21A-21.009 F.A.C., the "other business activity rule," is relevant to these proceedings. That existing rule currently provides as follows: 21A-21.009 Other Business Activities. A licensee engaged in the practice of public accounting may concurrently engage in another business, occupation, or profession if: The licensee does not hold himself out as a certified public accountant in that activity, The activity is conducted under a name which the public will not associate with licensee's practice of public accounting, The other business, occupation, or profession is not used to promote the practice of public accounting in any manner prohibited by Chapter 473, F.S., Facilities used by the licensee in his public accounting practice and other activity conform to the requirements of 21A-26.001(3), The entity's dealings with the licensee's public accounting clients shall not violate the provisions of Chapter 473, F.S., and 21A, Florida Administrative Code, relating to integrity and objectivity, The entity does not interpret financial statements, forecasts or projections audited, reviewed, compiled or prepared by others. [Emphasis supplied] Although it has not been challenged, Rule 21A-20.011 F.A.C. is relevant to these proceedings. That existing rule currently provides as follows: 21A-20.011 Practice of, or Practicing Public Accountancy. "Practice of, or practicing public accountancy" as defined by Section 473.302(4), F.S., shall exclude any of the following: Services rendered by a licensee as an employee of a governmental unit or an employee rendering accounting services only to his employer as long as that employer is not required to be licensed under F.S. 473, or Activities of licensees who do not hold themselves out as CPAs and who are not associated with financial statements, or Activities of licensees who do not hold themselves out as certified public accountants. [Emphasis supplied] Petitioner's and Intervenor Brewster's CPA certificates (like all Florida CPA certificates) authorize them to display their CPA credentials. The CPA certificate represents that the recipient . . . has passed all examinations and has met all other requirements prescribed by law and by rule of this board for certification as an expert public accountant, and is therefore entitled to append the letters CPA after this registrant's name to evidence registration by this board as a Certified Public Accountant. [Emphasis supplied] The Board's only classifications of CPA licenses/licensees are "active" or "inactive." "Active" and "inactive" refer to the status of the CPA license and do not refer to or imply that the licensee is actively practicing public accounting. One can be an actively licensed CPA and not be practicing public accounting. Attainment of the CPA credential is an accomplishment that is recognized in the business community. The CPA credential of a Florida-licensed CPA connotes high competency and achievement levels in the discipline of accounting. Truthful communication of the CPA credential by actively licensed CPAs for identification purposes constitutes valuable disclosure to the public. The use of the term "CPA" implies a specific competency to the public. The fact that Petitioner Ibanez or Intervenor Brewster is a CPA is valuable to their respective legal clients. CPA status is a valuable property right to each CPA, and the ability of a practicing attorney to publicize the fact that s/he also holds an active CPA license is a valuable asset to that individual. It is conceded by all parties that it is possible to practice law and public accounting in the same business activity. There are firms that simultaneously hold themselves out as law firms and public accounting firms. The activities of other regulated professionals, such as members of the Florida Bar, which overlap those of practicing CPAs are subject to the regulatory standards of their principal regulated professions and applicable judicial and administrative remedies for malpractice and negligence. It is conceded by all parties that many activities conducted by professionals and nonprofessionals, other than by CPAs and other than by attorneys, are identical to activities performed by CPAs engaged in public accounting. For instance, anyone can legally prepare a tax return. Bookkeepers and free-lance tax assistors of all sorts are unregulated in any way. The only activity among public accounting activities that is a unique activity of CPAs is the "attest" function. See, Section 473.322(1)(c) F.S. Truthful use, communication, or disclosure of the CPA credential by an actively licensed CPA does not per se constitute false, misleading, or deceptive advertising. The evidence does not support a finding that withholding truthful disclosure that one has earned the CPA credential benefits the public welfare or effects the purposes of the enabling legislation, or indeed, how such nondisclosure could promote them, particularly since it has been shown that persons of considerably lesser competency and achievement levels in the discipline of accounting may legally offer to the public almost all the services provided by CPAs. Prior to 1984, when the "holding out" rule was adopted, a Florida- licensed CPA who offered one or more types of accounting services to the public or who offered one or more types of management advisory or consulting services to the public was considered to be "practicing public accountancy," whether or not that person appended the initials "CPA" after his or her name. The "holding out" rule became effective on September 17, 1984. Chapter 89-87 Laws of Florida amended Section 473.302(4) F.S. (i.e., the definition of public accountancy) but the amendment did not change the previously existing "holding out" language therein. The "holding out" rule was adopted more than one year before the initiation of this rule challenge. There is no dispute among the parties that the definition within the challenged Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C. is circular. In attempting to define the term "holding out" so that the use of that term in Section 473.302(4) F.S. may be clarified, the rule incorporates the statutory phrase "practice of public accounting," and the term "practice of public accountancy/accounting" in Section 473.302(4)(b) F.S. incorporates the term "holding out," 1/ as does Rule 21A- F.A.C., 2/ which creates exemptions to the statute. At least one purpose of the second sentence of the existing rule seems to have been to allow all CPAs to display their CPA certificates on their inner office walls without fear of disciplinary action by the Board. The Board's expressed rationale for excluding "display of a CPA certificate" from its "holding out" rule is premised on the fact that during an office visit, a CPA can immediately disabuse any individual of the fact that s/he is practicing public accounting once that individual is inside the CPA's office. However, Petitioner demonstrated, and the Board conceded, that an individual may have the opportunity to disabuse members of the public that s/he is engaged in the activity of the practice of public accounting or that s/he is offering all the services normally associated with a CPA, as opposed to law or some other profession, at least where there is direct contact by letter or telephone. Clearly, there are many ways a nonattesting, actively licensed CPA who is dually licensed can clarify to those seeking his or her services which profession, function, or service s/he is willing to perform for that client. On the other hand, the challenged rule does not deal with all members of the public, or members of the public specifically seeking CPA services, or members of the public seeking some other service. The rule deals with "uninformed persons." As used in the rule, the term "uninformed person" is undefined and has been subject to differing speculative interpretations by the Board and by non-Board witnesses, some of which interpretations address such broad categories as anyone using a telephone book. The Board also suggested that only display of the original CPA certificate on an inside office wall would be exempt from prosecution for publication, but a reasonable person could interpret the rule on its face to permit posting the CPA certificate or an exact facsimile of the certificate on a sign outside an office building or circulating as business cards exact reduced- size copies of the certificate even though these types of "publication" or "display" would not provide the same opportunity as an office visit would provide for the CPA to disclose to individuals the actual services the CPA was offering to perform. Accordingly, there has been no rational basis for the "holding out" rule's distinction between "display" of the licensee's CPA certificate and other forms of truthful, nonmisleading publication of the CPA licensure/status. The agency's expressed rationale behind its adoption of the "holding out" rule was to define the meaning of the statutory term "holding out," as used in Section 473.302(4) F.S., a term which has also been adopted into a number of other rules (see, supra), so as to provide guidance on when a person who has been licensed as a CPA is engaged in the "practice of public accounting." Specifically, the Board maintained that the "holding out rule" and the "other business activity rule" give licensees two options. Under the first option, the "holding out" rule permits licensees to retain their CPA certificates when not in compliance with all of the provisions of Chapter 473 F.S. and the rules promulgated thereunder, as long as they do not publicize themselves as CPAs. Alternatively, the Board perceives that under the second option, if licensees do publicize themselves as CPAs when performing services for the public, licensees become subject to regulation by the Board and are held to the standards of competency and conduct which are applicable to all CPAs who use their accounting skills for the public while trading on the fact of their licensure as a Florida CPA. However, the words "publicizing" and "publication" as used in the "holding out" rule are also undefined. Although Respondents submitted that the "common usage" of these words is sufficient to embrace listings in the yellow pages, it is also quite possible to give these words a far broader reading to encompass the "assumption" and "use" of the designation "CPA" and the "assumption" and "use" of the CPA credential, which "assumption" and "use" are specifically reserved to all actively licensed CPAs and which designation is permitted to be inserted after their names on signs, cards, or devices by Section 473.322(1)(b) F.S. [see Finding of Fact No. 11] and by the CPA certificate itself which permits them to "append" CPA after their names [see Finding of Fact No. 14]. The rule has actually subjected CPAs, and specifically has subjected Petitioner and Intervenor Brewster, to DPR disciplinary proceedings independent of any other act or wrongdoing merely for any "publication" of the CPA credential in a form other than display of the original CPA certificate on an inner office wall. The rule may automatically subject attorney-CPA licensees to DPR disciplinary proceedings independent of any other act or wrongdoing merely on the basis of passive, truthful communications which are otherwise in full compliance with the standards of the Florida Supreme Court and Florida Bar. The rule has the potential for being interpreted so as to prohibit CPAs such as Petitioner and Intervenor Brewster from making disclosures of their earned status as CPAs to various regulatory bodies to which they are required by law to disclose that information. See, Findings of Fact 1 and 2, supra. The rule can be invoked to limit their income by chilling their appearances as expert CPA witnesses for a fee even if they never work for an uninformed layman at all. Applicants for certain state employments and candidates for public office may run afoul of the rule due to the disclosure requirements of public office. Even at risk is the CPA called as a factual witness who is then sworn to tell the truth and asked innocuous biographical information. One's desire to attain a CPA credential may be chilled by the hazard of using it. Chapter 473 F.S. contains limitations on competitive negotiation, prohibits accepting contingent fees, prohibits the payment of certain commissions, and establishes other prohibitions to which persons who are deemed to be "practicing public accountancy" must adhere. Some of these prohibitions are contrary to normal, ethical practice of other professions, i.e., acceptance of contingent fees by lawyers. If the rule remains intact, the Board and DPR under Chapters 473 and 455 F.S. have the potential of breaching the confidentiality of CPA-attorneys' legal clients' files. See, Section 473.316(5) and 473.318 F.S. Since attorneys are exclusively overseen by the Florida Supreme Court, the rule potentially violates the doctrine of "separation of powers" among the three branches of state government. Therefore, the definitional rule creates a wedge whereby the Board may insinuate its discipline into other professions and confuses dually licensed CPAs from knowing how they may behave in each profession without running afoul of discipline in the other. In application with other rules, the "holding out" rule sets confusing and varying standards for agency decisions involving attorneys, bankers, CPAs employed by private corporate employers, and CPAs with their own financial consultant firms. The Board of Accountancy has issued a series of letter opinions based on the "holding out rule" or based on that rule read in conjunction with Rule 21A-21.009 F.A.C., the "other business activity rule," which indicate that a Florida CPA who does not "hold out" to the public as a CPA and who is not associated with financial statements is permitted by the Board to engage in other business activities without complying with the provisions of Chapter 473 F.S., that is, not being subject to DPR discipline, because the Board does not view that CPA in those activities as "practicing public accountancy." Also, the Board of Accountancy has issued a series of opinions to the effect that, by virtue of Section 473.302(4) F.S. and the "holding out rule," a CPA who "holds out" (publicizes his or her status as a CPA) is automatically, by definition, "practicing public accounting," regardless of what actual business activity s/he is performing. These opinions also indirectly insinuate the Board of Accountancy into many other professions, including the practice of law, which the Board has no statutory mandate to regulate pursuant to Section 473.301 F.S. The plethora of opinions issued by the Board dramatize the confusion experienced by CPAs who have sought to have the Board interpret the rule in question on a case-by-case basis. Testimony of the Chairman of the Board was offered to establish that absent the challenged rule, the Board cannot reasonably regulate negligence in the profession and that absent the rule, only fraud could be prosecuted by the Board. He testified that, in his opinion, the challenged rule means that a CPA performing tax services for a client is not doing "public accounting" if "CPA" is not appended after the CPA's name in advertising and that that CPA cannot be disciplined by the Board for negligence, any more than he could be disciplined if he were a non-CPA doing tax services. The Chairman further opined that a CPA doing tax services is doing public accounting only if he appends CPA after his name, and in that instance, the Board can and will discipline that CPA for negligence, should he commit any. Further, the Chairman indicated that if Rules 21A-21.009, 21A-20.011, and 21A-20.012 F.A.C. were not simultaneously in place, the actively licensed CPA who places CPA after his name could not be disciplined by the Board for negligence, but only for fraud. Precisely how this would occur was not made clear, but upon the foregoing, together with the Board opinions admitted in evidence, it is concluded that the Board has utilized what purports to be purely a definitional rule to establish disciplinary jurisdiction and that in certain instances the rule puts DPR in the precarious position of only being able to prosecute CPAs with "CPA" appended after their names, but not CPAs who perform the same services and who do not append "CPA" after their names. Such a result is nonsensical. The Board does not seriously suggest that if Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C. is invalidated, Rule 21A-20.011 would provide a blanket exclusion from all provisions of Chapter 473 F.S. for CPAs "using" or "assuming" or "publicizing" their status. At a minimum, such CPAs would have to maintain their credential as would any other CPA for good character, payment of fees, and recertification for competency based on continuing education. What has actually occurred here is that the Board has consciously utilized Rules 21A-20.011 and 21A-20.012 F.A.C. so as to not enforce Section 473.302(4)(a) as written and so as to selectively enforce only Section 473.302(4)(b) F.S. Then, by its selective enforcement of Rule 21A-20.012, the Board has gone a step further. The Board has "interpreted" Section 473.302(4)(b) to include within Board jurisdiction not those functions, activities, or skills a CPA practices or holds out to the public for a fee as constituting "practicing public accountancy" but has made the definition of "practicing public accountancy" encompass any disclosure of CPA status or skill attainment, regardless of the disclosure's truth and regardless of whether or not the CPA is utilizing any of the functions, activities, or skills of a CPA. By so doing, the Board has exceeded its statutory mandate and legislative purpose as set forth in Section 473.301 F.S. On its face, Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C. consists of three sentences, which, in relationship to each other, are inconsistent and contradictory. Specifically, sentence ONE seems to be based on the overall representation made by a CPA to "uninformed persons." It simultaneously presumes fraud in the communication of what otherwise would be truthful, passive information. 3/ Sentence THREE subjects the CPA to discipline absent any fraud and totally without consideration to the impression formed by "uninformed persons" from the use of the CPA designation in any manner other than display of the certificate. 4/ Because there are two incompatible definitions in the challenged rule as now drafted, the Board is at liberty to selectively enforce the statute. One CPA could be prosecuted for simple disclosure of credential status or neutral biographical information (Ibanez). Another CPA might be prosecuted only after examination of the totality of his circumstances to determine if the circumstances mislead "uninformed persons" into believing he abides by all the regulations promulgated under Chapter 473 F.S., and still another CPA would never be prosecuted unless he performs the attest function. This is nonsensical and clearly unfair.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Linda S. Powell, began her original employment associated with Orange County on February 19, 1975. The period from February 19, 1975, to July 1, 1980, is 5 years, 4.4 months. In order to be entitled to disability benefits under the Florida Retirement System (FRS), Ms. Powell must have completed five years of creditable service with the County on or before July 1, 1980. The period from February 19, 1975, through September 7, 1975, equals approximately 6.4 months. It is this 6.4 months which is at issue in this case because the Respondent, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, maintains that Ms. Powell was ineligible for creditable service because she was a temporary CETA employee. If the 6.4 months of CETA employment is deducted from the 5 years 4.4 months of total service before July 1, 1980, Ms. Powell has 4 years 10 months of creditable service, 2 months short of the 5-year requirement. Ms. Powell began employment with the Orange County Board of County Commissioners on February 19, 1975, as a keypunch operator under the CETA Program. At this time, and for several months prior to her beginning employment, Orange County had been operating under a federally subsidized program known as the Comprehensive Education and Training Act (CETA), which was operated by Orange County under two separate programs known as Title I and Title II. Title I was an on-the-job training program which provided employment positions to individuals in addition to the regular employment positions already maintained by the County. These individuals were brought on the regular payroll of the County and were given full benefits, including retirement and social security. Approximately 20 to 25 individuals took part in this program. In the latter part of 1974, the CETA Title II program was begun by the County. This program was for certain identifiable population groups of unemployment within the County. Individuals hired under Title II were put on the regular County payroll, and the County would submit a bill to CETA for payment of the individual's salary and benefit, which included retirement (FRS) and social security. In February 1975, the CETA Title VI program was implemented by Act of Congress. Title VI was a federal emergency employment measure designed to get people into productive job situations and to provide an immediate salary payment. In implementing Title VI, the County determined that no fringe benefits, including social security and retirement, would be paid for these individuals, since this method would allow approximately 20 percent more individuals to be hired in the program. The County determined that individuals in the Title VI program were to be temporary employees of the County. Individuals were further notified on the first day of employment during an orientation session that they were temporary employees and would receive no fringe benefits. Petitioner signed a statement on her first day of employment that she understood that she was placed in a federally funded program and had no assurance of continued employment at the end of the funding for such program. (Respondent's Exhibit 1). CETA Title VI funds were placed in a special, separate bank account by the County, and from this account the County would pay salary to Title VI individuals and other bills such as equipment and supplies purchased. This account was not a regular payroll account. Upon payment of Title VI individuals, the County would then invoice the federal CETA office for the salaries paid and receive reimbursement. Employees who worked under Title VI performed work in nonprofit agencies, such as United Nay, as well as work for the County. Petitioner continued to be an employee under CETA Title VI from February 19, 1975, to September 7, 1975, at which time she was transferred from CETA Title VI to CETA Title II and placed in a regularly established position. (Respondent's Exhibit 2). At this time, an employment history file was begun on the Petitioner, and said file reflected a service date of September 7, 1975. In addition, an "employee change notice" was completed on Petitioner, signifying a transfer from CETA Title VI to permanent status. (Respondent's Exhibit 3). The County began payment of retirement contributions on Ms. Powell in September 1975, as reflected by the certification of earnings provided by the County to Respondent. Ms. Powell filed an application for disability retirement benefits on April 5, 1983. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Linda S. Powell be denied service credit for her employment under CETA from February 19, 1975, to September 7, 1975. Said service is not creditable under the Florida Retirement System. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of May, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Terry C. Young, Esquire 109 East Church Street, Suite 301 Post Office Box 2631 Orlando, Florida 32802 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Division of Retirement 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 207-C, Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Nevin G. Smith, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
