Findings Of Fact Respondent was licensed for the years 1977 and 1978 with the current license No. 080018 valid until 1 January 1979. During an inspection of Adams Rooming House in Belle Glade, Florida on 20 April 1977 only one fire extinguisher was located on each floor of the two floors used for rental units, numerous extension cords running from the same outlet were observed in the rental units, in the public toilets on each floor the bulbs were missing from the lighting fixtures, screens on windows were torn or missing, window was missing in toilet, doors on toilet split, no designation of sex on any bathroom, some windows in units boarded up with full panel doors, other windows had torn screens and broken jalousies, trash, junk and garbage littered on ground in vicinity of dumpster, and there were areas on stairways, landings and porch with railing missing. Respondent was notified of these violations. At an inspection on November 14, 1977 the proper number of fire extinguishers were present but two were empty. There was a direct conflict in the testimony regarding the fire extinguishers with neither witness saying how he ascertained the extinguisher empty or not empty. Accordingly, this alleged violation will be disregarded hereafter in this Recommended Order. At this inspection all of the other violations previously noted were still extant and some doors were also boarded up. No windows had both good screens and unbroken panes. Respondent was notified of these violations. On January 3, 1978 another inspection was conducted in company with Gilbert Adams. All violations previously reported were still uncorrected at this time. The premises were again inspected January 24, 1978 and all violations previously found remained uncorrected. At an inspection on March 8, 1978 the fire extinguishers had been recharged. When inspected again on April 10, 1978 the violations were still uncorrected. On April 25, 1978 an inspection was conducted in company with Adams. At this inspection some screening had been replaced, some windows and railings corrected, the grounds around dumpster had been cleaned, the doors to the bathrooms had been repaired and they had been designated for use by sex. However, all doors and windows were not corrected, some windows were still fully boarded up, bulbs were missing from fixtures in bathrooms, some railings were still loose, and the basic violations remained but not as many as before. On 25 January 1978 (Exhibit 2) Respondent executed a stipulation in which he agreed to pay a civil penalty of $25 and to correct all the violations previously reported within 30 days. The inspection conducted on 8 March was the follow-up inspection to ascertain if the violations had been corrected pursuant to the stipulation. Respondent contends that the rooming house caters principally to transients and that every time he puts bulbs in the bathrooms they are removed by the tenants; that tenants and passersby throw trash at the dumpster rather than put the trash in the dumpster; that he has a man who does repairs and cleanup at the rooming house; that he can't keep screens in either the unit windows or the bathrooms; that some tenants asked him to have their window boarded up to provide greater security; and that tenants disregard the sex signs placed on the bathrooms and will use whichever bathroom is vacant. Respondent does not visit the units frequently but does come to collect rent when due. He also contends that it is virtually impossible to keep tenants from running numerous extension cords from the same fixture. This is undoubtedly true if there are insufficient outlets in the rental units. Additionally, Respondent testified that he has the walls washed occasionally and provided paint to one tenant who wanted to paint his unit. He further stated that the units have been painted but the frequency of this painting was unclear. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner and Respondent have been considered. Those inconsistent with the facts noted above were not supported by testimony deemed credible. Those proposed findings not included herein were deemed immaterial to the results reached.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment act by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of age and retaliating against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Meikle is an African-American male. At hearing, Mr. Meikle withdrew his claim of age discrimination. Mr. Meikle is only pursuing the claim of retaliation. Mr. Meikle was employed with the Radisson Hotel (Radisson), which was owned by Hotels Unlimited. Mr. Meikle’s supervisor at the Radisson was Harland McPhun, who was the Assistant General Manager. Mr. McPhun’s supervisor at the Radisson was Diane Gray, who was the General Manager. During his employment at the Radisson, Mr. Meikle was promoted from a cook to the Kitchen Director. He was very proud of being in the position of Kitchen Director. Mr. McPhun had not encountered any problems with Mr. Meikle being on time for work or being a “no-show” for work as scheduled. However, Mr. McPhun had encountered problems with Mr. Meikle in other areas, such as Mr. Meikle's providing his sister, who was employed at the front desk of the Radisson, with larger portions of food than the other employees; and being in places other than the kitchen area talking, i.e., at or near the front desk. Mr. McPhun gave Mr. Meikle verbal warnings, regarding the incidents, but never documented any of the verbal warnings. At some point in time, Hotels Unlimited decided to convert the Radisson to a Double Tree Hotel (Double Tree). The Double Tree’s structure required the position of a Food and Beverage Manager, who would supervise the food and beverage personnel, kitchen staff, and restaurant servers. Gerald Brown was hired as the Food and Beverage Manager in January 2008. Mr. Brown began his employment before the completion of the conversion from the Radisson to the Double Tree. On February 14, 2008, Mr. Brown held his first staff meeting with the entire staff over whom he had supervision. Mr. Meikle was late for the staff meeting. On February 16, 2008, Mr. Brown issued a “Disciplinary Document” indicating that he was giving Mr. Meikle his first written warning for being late at the meeting. Mr. Meikle admits that he was late for the meeting. The Disciplinary Document was signed by Mr. Meikle (the date of the signature was not completed), by Mr. Brown, as the Manager (the date of the signature was not completed), and by Ms. Gray, as the General Manager, on February 18, 2008. Additionally, on February 16, 2008, Mr. Brown issued another Disciplinary Document indicating that he was giving Mr. Meikle his first written warning for failing to follow rules and direction involving four different matters about which Mr. Brown had repeatedly counseled Mr. Meikle on several occasions, but were not being adhered to by Mr. Meikle. The Disciplinary Document was signed by Mr. Meikle (the date of the signature was not completed), by Mr. Brown, as the Manager, on February 16, 2008, and by Ms. Gray, as the General Manager, on February 18, 2008. On February 25, 2008, Mr. Brown issued a Disciplinary Document for an incident that occurred on February 23, 2008, a Saturday night. Mr. Meikle was scheduled to work, but he departed the kitchen and the hotel property without informing and obtaining permission from the manager. Hotels Unlimited’s policy required the informing of the manager in order for the manager to take appropriate steps to make adjustments to accommodate the absence. Mr. Meikle was entitled to a break, but he failed to notify the manager of his absence in accordance with the policy. The Disciplinary Document included a statement that “Disciplinary Action to be decided by the General Manager.” The Disciplinary Document was signed by Mr. Meikle on February 26, 2008, by Mr. Brown, as the Manager, on February 25, 2008, and by Ms. Gray, as the General Manager, on February 26, 2008. Regarding Mr. Meikle’s absence from work on Saturday evening, February 23, 2008, he was working an 18-hour shift, without anyone to relieve him, which meant that he was unable to take a break. He was exhausted and needed to take a break. Before Mr. Brown was hired, Mr. Meikle was working the 18-hour shift, and after Mr. Brown was hired, Mr. Meikle agreed to continue working the 18-hour shift. Mr. Brown did not wish to disrupt what was already in place, so he agreed to allow Mr. Meikle to keep the 18-hour shift. It was not unreasonable for Mr. Brown to maintain Mr. Meikle on the 18-hour shift, as Mr. Meikle requested. On that same day, February 25, 2008, Mr. Brown issued a Disciplinary Document for an incident that occurred on February 25, 2008. Mr. Meikle raised his voice and became very loud, resulting in guests being disturbed. As Mr. Meikle had been absent from work on Saturday evening, February 23, 2008, Mr. Brown was inquiring of Mr. Meikle the reason for his (Mr. Meikle’s) absence. Further, during the conversation, Mr. Brown raised several other concerns. Mr. Meikle raised his voice and became very loud, which Mr. Brown determined was disturbing the guests. Mr. Brown requested Mr. Meikle to remove himself from the dining area. The Disciplinary Document was signed by Mr. Brown on February 26, 2008. Mr. Meikle refused to sign the Disciplinary Document where the employee’s signature is indicated; but, he (Mr. Meikle) noted on it, “Refuse to sign because I did what I was told,” and signed his name under the statement. Each Disciplinary Document indicated that Mr. Meikle’s termination was effective “2/29/08.” Mr. Brown did not indicate a date for termination on any Disciplinary Document and could offer no explanation as to why or how each Disciplinary Document contained such information. Furthermore, no testimony was presented as to why or how each Disciplinary Document contained such notation. Mr. Brown contacted Ms. Gray, recommending the termination of Mr. Meikle. Ms. Gray did not approve the recommendation; she wanted to continue to work with Mr. Meikle. On February 25, 2008, a letter, bearing the same date, from Mr. Meikle was faxed to Hotels Unlimited’s Human Resources. Among other things, Mr. Meikle notified Human Resources that he was working in a hostile work environment created by Mr. McPhun, providing examples of what he considered inappropriate action and conduct by Mr. McPhun; that Mr. McPhun “strongly dislike[s]” him “for whatever the reason”; that Mr. McPhun was taking food from the hotel and that he (Mr. Meikle) had reported it to the general manager; that all of his (Mr. Meikle’s) current problems at work stemmed from Mr. McPhun, providing examples of the problems that he (Mr. Meikle) had encountered2; that Mr. McPhun was the cause of all of his problems at work; that he (Mr. Meikle) had no one to ask for help; that Mr. McPhun was out to get him (Mr. Meikle) fired; that everyone was biased against him (Mr. Meikle) because of Mr. McPhun; and that a copy of the letter would be forwarded to the EEOC and the FCHR. Ms. Gray was notified by her superior that Human Resources had received a letter from Mr. Meikle, but she was not notified of the content of the letter nor did she receive or view a copy of the letter. Her superior told her to talk with Mr. Meikle and resolve the problem. Hotels Unlimited’s Employee Handbook, Employment Policies & Practices section, provides in pertinent part: Equal Employment * * * If you suspect discriminatory or harassing actions on the part of the Company or any other employee, you should immediately notify your General Manager or Corporate Department Head, as applicable, or, if you prefer, a Company Officer. Such notification will be held in confidence to the extent possible. Discriminatory behavior or action by any employee is cause for discharge. * * * Sexual and Other Forms of Harassment Policy Statement: Hotels Unlimited, Inc. is committed to a work environment in which all employees are treated with respect and dignity. It is the policy of Hotels Unlimited, Inc. to provide a work environment that is free from discrimination and harassment. Action, words or comments based on an individual’s sex, race, color, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, age, disability, marital status, citizenship or any other characteristic protected by law – either overt or subtle – are demeaning to another person and undermine the integrity of the employment relationship. . . . * * * Harassment on the basis of any other protected characteristic is also strictly prohibited. Such harassment is defined as verbal or physical conduct that denigrates or shows hostility toward an individual because of his/her race, color religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, age, disability, marital status, citizenship or any other characteristic protected by law, and that has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment; has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance; or otherwise adversely affects an individual’s employment opportunity. * * * Administration of Policy: * * * It is unlawful to retaliate in any way against anyone who has complained about harassment. Any incident of retaliation should be reported in the same manner as an incident of harassment. Any employee who engages in such retaliation will be subject to disciplinary action up to and including discharge. All allegations of discrimination, harassment, or retaliation will be subject to prompt, thorough and confidential investigation. All investigations will be designed to protect the privacy of, and minimize suspicion toward, all parties involved. . . . The Employee Handbook provided protection against employment practices for statuses beyond those set forth by law.3 In the early morning hours of February 29, 2008, Mr. Meikle was awoken by a telephone call from a co-worker inquiring as to why he (Mr. Meikle) was not at work. Mr. Meikle informed his co-worker that he was off that day, but his co- worker advised that he (Mr. Meikle) was scheduled to work. Mr. Meikle telephoned Mr. Brown, who informed Mr. Meikle to be at work. Mr. Meikle reported to work, but failed to report for his shift as scheduled. Regarding Mr. Meikle’s failure to report to work on time for his scheduled shift, all work schedules for Food and Beverage, during Mr. Brown’s tenure, were typed and posted, one week in advance. The work week for Food and Beverage was Monday through Sunday. The posted work schedule for the week of February 25, 2008, was prepared, typed, and posted by Mr. Brown and indicated that Mr. Meikle was required to work on Monday, February 25, 2008, and Tuesday, February 26, 2008; was not required to work on Wednesday, February 27, 2008, and Thursday, February 28, 2008; but, was required to work on Friday, February 29, 2008, specifically, from 5:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. Mr. Meikle reviewed a work schedule for the week of February 25, 2008, that was typed and hand-written. The work schedule indicated that it was prepared by Mr. McPhun and that he (Mr. Meikle) was not required to work on Friday, February 29, 2008. Based on that work schedule, Mr. Meikle did not believe that he had to report to work on February 29, 2008. However, Mr. Meikle was required to report to work on February 29, 2008, and work from 5:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. He failed to report to work for his shift as scheduled.4 No dispute exists that, at no time previously, had Mr. Meikle failed to report to work for his shift as scheduled. On February 29, 2008, Mr. Meikle was terminated for failing “to be at work on time for [his] schedule [sic] shift.” A Termination Report dated February 29, 2008, was signed by Mr. Brown, by Mr. Meikle, and Ms. Gray. Mr. Brown made the determination to terminate the employment of Mr. Meikle, and Ms. Gray agreed. Mr. McPhun did not participate with Mr. Brown and Ms. Gray in the determination to terminate the employment of Mr. Meikle. At the time of Mr. Meikle’s termination, Mr. Brown was not aware of Mr. Meikle’s letter to Hotels Unlimited’s Human Resources.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Hotels Unlimited/Double Tree did not retaliate against Marshall Meikle in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended and dismissing his petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 2009.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this matter, the Respondent was appropriately licensed by the Petitioner to operate an adult congregate living facility (ACLF), Enon Country Manor, in Pensacola, Florida. CASE NO. 88-5652 On October 9, 1986, an authorized representative of the Petitioner, James H. Temkin, a fire protection specialist, performed a complete routine fire safety inspection of Enon Country Manor. Mr. Temkin testified at the hearing following qualification as an expert witness in fire safety. During the October 9 inspection, Mr. Temkin found eleven deficiencies in the facility's compliance with fire safety regulations of the Petitioner. Mr. Temkin discussed the deficiencies with the Respondent and established a timeframe for the correction of the deficiencies. On December 9, 1986, Mr. Temkin again inspected the facility to determine whether the previously identified deficiencies had been timely corrected. At that time three deficiencies remained uncorrected. The remaining deficiencies were the lack of a documented fire safety plan including fire drills and alarm tests, the lack of steel supports for ceiling access panels, and the lack of one-hour fire rated construction of certain walls and ceilings including the inability to inspect certain locked rooms to which entry was not made available. The lack of a documented fire safety plan is a violation of Rules 10A- 5.023(15)(a), 4A-40.013, 4A-40.014 and 4A-40.017, Florida Administrative Code. The lack of steel supports for ceiling access panels is a violation of Rules 10A-5.023(15)(a) and 4A-40.005, Florida Administrative Code. The lack of one-hour fire rated construction is a violation of Rules 10A-5.023(15)(a) and 4A-40.005, Florida Administrative Code. The three deficiencies are classified as Class III violations under Section 400.419(3), Florida Statutes, which provides for the classification of violations of the ACLF operational standards established by the Department. Class III violations, are subject to a penalty of not less than $100.00 or more than $500.00 for each violation. The Petitioner has determined that in light of the nature of the violations and the prior history of the facility that a penalty of $250.00 for each of the three violations, or a total of $750.00, should be imposed. No evidence was presented to indicate that such a penalty was not warranted. CASE NO. 88-5649 On October 29, 1986, an authorized representative of the Petitioner, Richard Glover, performed a general operational inspection of Enon Country Manor for relicensure purposes. Mr. Glover testified at the hearing following qualification as an expert witness in general ACLF operations. During the October 29 inspection, Mr. Glover identified seventeen deficiencies in the facility's compliance with the operational standards regulations of the Petitioner. Mr. Glover discussed the deficiencies and established a timeframe for the correction of the deficiencies. On or about December 11, 1986, Mr. Glover again inspected the facility to determine whether the previously identified deficiencies had been timely corrected. At the time four deficiencies remained uncorrected. The remaining deficiencies included the failure of the facility to make fiscal records available for inspection, the failure to maintain a facility staff work schedule, the failure to maintain employee time sheets, and the failure to maintain a written kitchen cleaning schedule. The failure to make available the fiscal records of the facility is a violation of Rule 10A-5.024(1)(f), Florida Administrative Code. The failure to maintain a facility staff work schedule is a violation of Rule 10A-5.024(1)(a)(6), Florida Administrative Code. The failure to maintain employee time sheets is a violation of Rule 10A-5.024(1)(a)(7), Florida Administrative Code. The failure to maintain a written kitchen cleaning schedule is a violation of Rule 10A-5.020(1)(m), Florida Administrative Code. The failure to maintain a written kitchen cleaning schedule is a Class III violation under Section 400.419(3), Florida Statutes, and is subject to a penalty of not less than $100.00 or more than $500.00 for each violation. The Petitioner has determined that a fine of $100.00 is appropriate and no evidence was received which would indicate otherwise. As to the remaining violations, under the provisions of Section 400.419(4), Florida Statutes, they are unclassified and subject to a penalty not to exceed $500.00 for each violation. The Petitioner has determined that a fine of $250.00 should be imposed for the failure to make available the fiscal records, and that fines of $150.00 should be imposed for each of the two remaining violations. There was no evidence received which would indicate that such penalty was not appropriate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law and failure of the Respondent to appear at hearing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order imposing against the Respondent an administrative fine of $750.00 in Case No. 87-5652 and an administrative fine of $650.00 in Case No. 87-5649. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of October, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-5649 AND 87-5652 The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact were accepted as modified and reflected in the findings of fact in the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael O. Mathis, Esquire Senior Staff Attorney Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Office of Licensure and Certification 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Alfred Q. Gregory Enon County Manor 7000 Lindskog Street Pensacola, Florida 32506 Sam Power, HRS Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Bayfront commenced construction of the biological waste incinerator here at issue prior to March 21, 1992, the effective date of the moratorium on construction of biological waste incinerators and was exempt from that moratorium. An inspection of the premises on April 9, 1992, (exhibit 5) showed substantial work had been accomplished and the inspector concluded, and DEP's legal counsel concurred, that in order to have achieved the construction progress shown on April 9, 1992, the work had to have been commenced prior to March 21, 1992. Further, a building permit to renovate the building into which the waste incinerator was placed was issued November 12, 1991, (exhibit 7) and a building permit to install a waste incinerator was issued March 4, 1992, (exhibit 6). No contradictory evidence was submitted by Petitioner. Respondent's witnesses testified without contradiction that Bayfront's application for an operation permit was complete in all respects, including certification by a professional engineer; that all test results showed the emissions into the atmosphere were within the prescribed standards; that certain conditions contained in the construction permit as a result of the settlement agreement resolving the challenge to the issuance of the construction permit are contained in the operation permit; that those conditions exceed the conditions required by the rules for incinerators; and that Bayfront affirmatively provided the Department with reasonable assurance based on plans, test results, installation of pollution control equipment, or other information that the operation of the incinerator will not discharge, emit, or cause pollution in contravention of DEP's standards as contained in Rule 17-4.070(1), Florida Administrative Code. This testimony is accepted as factual. The draft permit authorizes Bayfront to burn a maximum of fifteen hundred pounds per hour of waste. Each time a test run is conducted to check the emissions, the pounds of waste burned per hour during the test establishes an upper limit on the rate of burning waste. As explained by James L. McDonald, the engineer processing air pollution applications for the Department at Transcript p. 50-51: The construction application asked for a permit at fifteen hundred pounds per hour. So the construction permit is -- the condition that we would want, the Department would normally want the test within ten percent of that fifteen hundred pounds an hour in order to go ahead and issue, if its in total compliance, to issue an operating permit at fifteen hundred pounds. Since the test came in at a reduced rate, below the ten percent, then that's why in the operating permit condition twenty-one says you're limited to the rate that we're, the test was conducted. [sic] Now, also, its interesting to note that in their test, if you look at their runs two and three -- because there are rules that say the Department could accept two runs out of three if a condition occurred that was out of their control -- if your average runs two and three, they would average within ten percent of fifteen hundred. So, as a permit processor, it even gave me some reasonable assurance that they could probably comply with the fifteen hundred. But, since the test of all three runs came in as an average of twelve fifty-one, then the operating permit included that twelve fiftyone. And like the real world out there, just like power plants, when it comes time for their annual testing, if they are at half speed, their business is down, it allows them to test at half speed. We won't require them to go up to full speed. They can test at half speed. But then they are limited there. And if they go above it at a later date they would have to retest. So they can work their way back up to where the Department has reasonable assurance that the upper limit of fifteen hundred pounds -- that's where later in condition twenty-one of the operating permit it says but in no case shall the maximum permit or burning rate of fifteen hundred pounds per hour be exceeded. Petitioner's second two grounds for challenging the issuance of the operation permit was answered by McDonald's testimony, above quoted, and this evidence was not rebutted by Petitioner. The primary thrust of the evidence presented by Petitioner was that Bayfront had somehow misled the City of St. Petersburg regarding the operation of the incinerator and had not complied with all of the City's requirements in other respects, ergo, Bayfront could not be relied on to comply with the conditions in the operation permit. This evidence is irrelevant to the determination of whether or not the operation of the incinerator complies with all of the Department rules. The conditions of the operating permit require Bayfront to submit periodic reports to the Department from which the Department can determine whether the conditions in the permit are being complied with. Furthermore, the Department requires the permittee to notify the Pinellas County Department of Environmental Management at least fifteen days prior to the date on which each formal compliance test is to begin (Permit Condition No. 22) to allow them to witness the test, if desired. The construction permit, complying with the settlement agreement, required Bayfront to adhere to more frequent testing and more extensive testing then is required by the rules for operating biological waste incinerators. All of the tests and reports submitted by Bayfront on the operation of this incinerator met all of the requirements in the construction permit and the draft operation permit.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Bayfront Medical Center be issued Permit No. AO52- 224337 to operate a biological waste incinerator at Fifth Avenue South and Eighth Street, St. Petersburg, Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of November 1993 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Adrian W. Helm, Esquire 925 14th Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33712 Daniel N. Burton, Esquire Thomas K. Maurer, Esquire Terri L. Gillis-Tucker, Esquire Foley and Lardner 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1800 Orlando, Florida 32801 W. Douglas Beason, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Kenneth Plante, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
The Issue In this disciplinary proceeding, the issues are whether Respondent, a licensed contractor, failed timely to renew the certificate of authority issued to his qualified business entity; failed to include, in a construction contract, the required notice regarding consumer rights under the recovery fund; abandoned a construction project; or committed any of these offenses, as alleged by Petitioner in its Administrative Complaint. If Petitioner proves one or more of the alleged violations, then an additional question will arise, namely whether penalties should be imposed on Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Respondent Vic George ("George") is a certified general contractor and a certified roofing contractor. As a licensee in these fields, George is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Construction Industry Licensing Board ("Board"). Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation ("Department") has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings for the Board. At the Board's direction, the Department is authorized to prosecute administrative complaints against licensees within the Board's jurisdiction. George's Businesses At times material to this action, George carried out the business of a contractor through, and was the qualifying agent of, a company known as South Florida Remodeling and Building Corporation ("S.F. Remodeling"). At other times material to this action, George carried out the business of a contractor through, and was the qualifying agent of, a company known as One Stop Remodeling and Building Corporation ("One Stop"). One Stop was a successor to S. F. Remodeling. The Department issued an initial certificate of authority to One Stop that, effective August 31, 2001, permitted the company lawfully to engage in the business of contracting for two years. One Stop failed timely to renew its certificate before the expiration date of August 31, 2003. In a Final Order Approving Settlement Stipulation entered on February 18, 2004, the Board disciplined George for, among other things, the failure of One Stop timely to renew its certificate of authority.iii The Board suspended George's contracting licenses indefinitely but stayed the suspension for 90 days to allow George to furnish evidence that corrective actions had been taken, which actions were to include the renewal of One Stop's certificate. Had George failed to provide such evidence, the stay would have been lifted and his licenses immediately suspended. George's licenses were not suspended in consequence of the Final Order just described. It is thus reasonable to infer, and is hereby found, that George satisfied the all of the conditions (including the renewal of One Stop's certificate) for preventing the suspension from taking effect. That being the case, One Stop's certificate was renewed before mid-May 2004.iv In light of the foregoing findings, the Department failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence its allegation that One Stop's certificate was delinquent until October 2004. The Hazard Project Anthony Hazard ("Hazard") is an insurance agent who sells property and casualty insurance in Miami-Dade County. Some time before September 2000, a man named Rick Nelson bought insurance through Hazard's insurance agency, and he and Hazard developed a friendly relationship. Mr. Nelson was an employee and officer of S.F. Remodeling, for whom he was a construction supervisor. As Mr. Nelson and Hazard got to know one another, they realized that each could be a source of business referrals for the other. In fact, Mr. Nelson did direct some persons in need of insurance to Hazard, and Hazard recommended Mr. Nelson to some persons in need of a contractor. It was natural, therefore, that when Hazard and his wife decided in the year 2000 to add an enclosed patio to their house, Hazard turned to Mr. Nelson for assistance. Mr. Nelson told Hazard that S.F. Remodeling could do the job. In a written price quote dated September 29, 2000, and delivered to Hazard on or about that date, Mr. Nelson, on behalf of his employer, represented that S.F. Remodeling could build an enclosed patio for the Hazards at a total cost of $9,938. The Hazards agreed to this proposal, and work preliminary to construction, such as the preparation of the architectural plans, commenced forthwith. The plans were drawn by Curtis Williams, a draftsman who worked for an architect named Charles Mitchell.v In the course of obtaining the local building official's approval of the plans, it was learned that the project as originally contemplated would need to be modified to comply with the zoning laws. The necessary design changes would increase the cost of construction slightly. Thus, effective November 21, 2000, the Hazards and S.F. Remodeling entered into a one-page agreement pursuant to which the contractor promised to build the Hazards an enclosed patio for $10,100. The contract did not contain an explanation of the owners' rights under the Florida Homeowners' Construction Recovery Fund, which was known at the time as the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. (Hereafter the referenced fund will be called the "Recovery Fund.") The agreement was a sweetheart deal for the Hazards. In an arms-length transaction, the project likely would have cost between $16,000 and $18,000. S.F. Remodeling agreed to do the work for little or no profit in the hope (and with the expectation) that Hazard would continue referring potential customers to Mr. Nelson. The building permit was issued on November 30, 2000, and S.F. Remodeling promptly began work at the jobsite. From then until at least February 14, 2001, work progressed at a reasonable pace. The contractor demolished and removed the existing slab, installed a new footing, poured a new slab, and framed the tie beam. Along the way, in the ordinary course of construction, local building officials inspected and approved the foundation and the new slab. One unforeseen development, however, had caused friction between the Hazards and the contractor. Beneath the existing concrete slab had been found another slab whose removal had entailed unanticipated expenses for excavation work and fill material. Mr. Nelson had asked Hazard to cover some or all of these costs, but Hazard had refused. Because the contract price left no room for error, it had become apparent within a short time after breaking ground that S.F. Remodeling would lose money on the project. Yet another unforeseen occurrence brought the work to a halt. At a routine inspection of the project on March 16, 2001, the local building official refused to approve the tie beam. He determined that the architect's plans, which had been approved prior to issuance of the building permit, were deficient for failure to depict how the tie beam would connect to the existing structure; hence, the plans would need to be revised and approved before construction could continue. Without delay, Mr. Nelson called Mr. Williams and explained the situation to the draftsman, who agreed to revise the plans. Not long thereafter, Mr. Nelson brought the job copy of the plans to Mr. Williams. Mr. Williams did, in fact, make the necessary changes to the plans. It is not clear, however, when exactly this work was completed. All that can be found with certainty on the existing record is that Hazard picked up a copy of the revised plans from Mr. Williams in December 2002, nearly two years after work on the project had stopped as of March 16, 2001. The Department urges the undersigned to infer that the reason for the delay was the contractor's failure——in breach of the contract——to pay the draftsman for revising the plans. The undersigned declines to draw this inference, however, because the evidence on the point is conflicting and ambiguous; the undersigned, ultimately, is just not convinced that this was the reason.vi At bottom, the cause or causes of the delay were not proved clearly and convincingly. (The person most likely to have personal knowledge regarding what happened——Mr. Williams—— was not called to testify, nor was anyone else from the architect's office, leaving a gaping hole in the record.) The undersigned therefore cannot make any inculpatory findings pinning the blame for the delay on S.F. Remodeling or its agents. In aid of its proof of the serious allegation that S.F. Remodeling or its successor One Stopvii abandoned the Hazard project, the Department relies upon a statutory provision under which the fact-finder is permitted to presume abandonment if it is shown that the contractor failed to perform work without just cause for 90 consecutive days. The Department's reliance on this statutory presumption is misplaced, however, because the Department did not prove, by the required quantum of evidence, that S.F. Remodeling failed to work without just cause for 90 days, a basic fact upon which the presumption must rest. The fact is, on March 16, 2001, S.F. Remodeling had just cause to cease working, for the simple reason that, as of that date, the contractor could not legally work on the project until such time as the architect had amended the plans and obtained approval thereof from the local building official. The Department's theory is that it took too long to attend to this situation, which might be true, and that S.F. Remodeling was at fault for the delay, which is possible, too; yet neither proposition was proved clearly and convincingly.viii To explain, there is no convincing evidence in the record as to the reasonable period of time for the preparation and approval of amended plans in the ordinary course of business, nor is there any proof regarding the steps that a reasonable contractor should take under such circumstances to expedite the process.ix In other words, there is no convincing evidence of applicable standards of conduct against which to measure this contractor's performance. In the absence of such evidence, the undersigned cannot, consistent with the rule of law, simply apply standards of his own devising, based on his personal preferences concerning how contractors should perform, no matter how sensible or wise those personal standards might be. In the absence of legal standards, the undersigned must withhold judgment, rather than render a personal one. It is therefore impossible, based on the evidence in the record, for the undersigned to fix the point in time, if there were one, when just cause no longer existed for S.F. Remodeling not to be working on the Hazard project. Without that reference point, it cannot be determined whether the contractor failed to perform work without just cause for 90 consecutive days. Thus, the undersigned cannot presume abandonment. Moreover, even if the Department had proved that S.F. Remodeling breached a legal or contractual duty to cause the revised plans to be prepared and approved sooner than these events actually occurred, the question at hand is not whether the contractor breached the contract or was negligent; the question is whether the contractor abandoned the project——i.e. quit the job with the intention never to resume working toward its completion. Simply put, the contractor's failure to prevent unreasonable delay in the work, if there were such a failure, would not, without more than was proved here, manifest the requisite intention never to complete the project. On November 4, 2002, Hazard signed a consumer complaint against S.F. Remodeling, which he then filed with the Miami-Dade County Building Code Compliance Office. In his complaint, Hazard accused the contractor of failing to complete the job and refusing to contact him about it. After investigating the matter, local officials referred Hazard's complaint to the Department, giving rise to the instant proceeding. Some time after bringing his consumer complaint, Hazard hired another contractor, Edwards Construction, Inc. ("Edwards"), to complete the project.x Edwards obtained a permit for the project in April 2003 and began working several months later, taking about four months to finish the job. A final inspection approving the project was had on November 7, 2003. All told, the Hazards invested $23,216.69 in their new patio. This grand total, however, included some extras (a concrete pad for parking a boat, a sidewalk, and some steps) that S.F. Remodeling had not been under contract to build. Breaking down the total amount paid, the Hazards incurred $9,419.73 in expenses while S.F. Remodeling was on the job, and $13,796.96 when Edwards was doing the work. On September 29, 2004, the Department issued a three- count Administrative Complaint against George. As of May 19, 2005, the Department had expended a total of $596.20 in investigative and prosecutorial costs, excluding attorney's fees. The Charges In Count I of its Administrative Complaint, the Department alleged that S.F. Remodeling had failed to include in its contract with the Hazards a statement explaining the consumers' rights under the Recovery Fund, as required by Section 489.1425, Florida Statutes. It is the Department's position that George, as the company's qualifying agent, is subject to discipline for this oversight pursuant to Section 489.129(1)(i), which makes it an offense materially to disobey any statutory provision or order of the Board. In Count II, the Department charged George separately under Section 489.129(1)(i), asserting that he, as qualifying agent, had failed to obey a statutory provision, namely Section 489.119(2)(d), which requires that a corporate contractor's certificate of authority must be renewed every two years. As the basis for this charge, the Department alleged that One Stop's certificate had expired on August 31, 2003, and not been renewed until October 2004. In Count III, the Department accused George of having abandoned a construction project, which is a disciplinable offense under Section 489.129(1)(j), Florida Statutes. In support of this Count, the Department, as mentioned, has relied upon an evidentiary device that permits the fact-finder to presume abandonment upon proof that the contractor failed to perform work without just cause for 90 consecutive days. Ultimate Factual Determinations Because the contract between S.F. Remodeling and the Hazards did not, in fact, include the statutorily required notice regarding the Recovery Fund, George, in his capacity as qualifying agent, is guilty of failing to obey a statutory provision, as charged in Count I. There is no dispute that One Stop's certificate of authority lapsed as of August 31, 2003. Indeed, the Board disciplined George for the oversight, entering a final order on February 18, 2004, with which he timely complied. As a result of this previous discipline, One Stop's certificate was renewed and the matter concluded. The Board cannot lawfully punish George twice for the same offense. Thus, George is not guilty of the offense charged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint. The undersigned is not convinced that S.F. Remodeling abandoned the Hazard project. At most it might be inferred that, after the local building inspector stopped the job due to faulty architectural plans——a problem not of the contractor's making——S.F. Remodeling, being in no hurry to resume working on a money-losing project, took a laissez-faire approach to the ensuing delay. But the Department did not prove "strategic sloth" by clear and convincing evidence, and such would not constitute abandonment even if it had. The evidence leaves open the reasonable possibility that S.F. Remodeling intended and expected to finish the job someday, even if it hoped that day would not come soon.xi Consequently, George is not guilty of the charge set forth in Count III of the Administrative Complaint.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order (a) finding George not guilty of the offenses charged in Counts II and III of the Administrative Complaint; (b) finding George guilty of the offense charge in Count I thereof; (c) imposing a fine of $1,000 for the notice violation, which is a repeat offense; and (d) assessing investigative and prosecutorial costs in the amount of $596.20. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.stae.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 2005.
The Issue The administrative complaint alleges that J. E. Patterson is licensed as a registered plumbing contractor and as a registered air conditioning contractor, and that he committed these violations of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes: that he did business in a name not included on his license, that he failed to properly update his address with the Board, and that he failed to properly supervise the activity of the firm which undertook construction work under his name. The issue for disposition is whether the violations occurred, and if so, what discipline is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact The records of the Department of Professional Regulation (DPR) reveal that J. E. Patterson has three active licenses, issued pursuant to Chapter 489, Florida Statutes, governing contractors: an electrical contractor's license (ER 0010700), a plumbing contractor's license (RF 005243), and an air conditioning contractor's license (RA 0052424). None of these licenses has ever qualified a firm named "Pro-Mech". The addresses on the licenses are Merritt Island and Titusville, Florida, in Brevard County. Bobby J. Hunter, Sr. is an Investigator Specialist II for DPR who has investigated construction industry license complaints for approximately fourteen years. After receiving a complaint from a building official, Mr. Hunter conducted an investigation of Mr. Patterson and a firm called "Pro-Mech". The investigation included a telephone interview and a personal contact with J. E. Patterson. Patterson admitted to Mr. Hunter that he had done contracting business as "Pro- Mech", and that he did not send change of status forms or apply to have the firm qualified because the firm had become insolvent. Patterson did not admit the other violations. No prior disciplinary actions against this licensee were alleged or proven.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: that J.E. Patterson be found guilty of violating Sections 489.129(1)(g) and 489.119, Florida Statutes and that a letter of guidance be issued. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: David Bryant, Esquire 1107 E. Jackson, Suite 104 Tampa, Florida 33602 J. E. Patterson Post Office Box 2505 Umatilla, Florida 32784 Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Lawrence A. Gonzalez Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Fred Seely Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201
Findings Of Fact During the period November 14 - 16, 1985, DHRS conducted a life safety survey of the Sanchez Retirement Apartments located at 1400 S.W. 26th Street, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. As a result of that survey, certain deficiencies were discovered which were discussed with Mrs. Sanchez, then the owner and operator of the facility. Some deficiencies were to be corrected by December 15 and others by January 15, 1986. Those due to be corrected by December 15, 1985 were, in fact, corrected, but because of the impending sale of the property by Mrs. Sanchez to Mr. Holck, Mrs. Sanchez requested an extension of the time for correction of the January 15, 1986 deficiencies until February 15, 1986. On January 30, 1986, Mr. Leroy C. Dykes, Area Supervisor for DHRS, advised Mrs. Sanchez that a 30 day extension was granted so that the prospective new owners could complete the fire safety deficiencies by February 15, 1986. Mr. Holck took over ownership and operation of the facility on February 7, 1986. This was somewhat later than had been anticipated and made it impossible for him to rectify the remaining deficiencies by February 15. He requested of DHRS that someone come to the facility to explain to him what exactly had to be done since he was not present during the original inspection. He wanted to know with detailed clarification, what had to be done and how, and consistent with this request, was advised that someone from DHRS would be there, he contends in April, 1986. As a result, he took no additional action to remedy the remaining deficiencies then. However, before this individual could come, Mr. Bravo of DHRS conducted a follow-up survey on March 18, 1986, and again, wrote up several of the deficiencies that had been cited on the original inspection report. These form the basis of the violations outlined in the Administrative Complaint, and include: smoke detectors not powered by the house electric current and interconnected to the fire alarm system, paneling in the means of egress is not fire rated as Class A or B, doors in the facility between the resident rooms and common areas are not solid core doors, doors between resident rooms and common areas are not self-closing, and the kitchen and storage area is not separated from other parts of the facility with a material having a one hour fire rating including a one hour self-closing fire rated door. Mr. Bravo recommended sanctions to include a $250.00 fine for each of the five deficiencies with the exception of (c) for which he recommended a $200.00 fine. This recommendation was approved by the area supervisor, Mr. Dykes; the Human Services Program Director, Mr. Chastain; and by Amy Jones, Director of the Office of Licensure and Certification. All of the violations were classified as Class III violations and all were ultimately corrected before the final follow-up inspection on July 15, 1986. Respondent contends that he did not take immediate corrective action when he took over the property because, due to his prior experience dealing with DHRS as the operator of an adult congregate living facility, he had come to the conclusion that when there was any question as to the exact meaning of a DHRS write-up, it was best to have clarification from the agency in detail prior to commencing any corrective action. He requested an explanation visit from DHRS and, he claims, was visited by a Mr. Grassi in April, 1986, who, answered his questions. Thien Grassi returned for a follow-up in June, he found all the deficiencies to be corrected. This latter Grassi visit is subsequent to Mr. Bravo's follow-up inspection in March, 1986. Petitioner contends, on the other hand, that it is Respondent's responsibility to get the work done. If he could not get the previous owner to make the corrections prior to the transfer of the property, it was his responsibility to have requested clarification earlier on and that if he did not get an answer that would satisfy him and answer his questions, he should have gone higher up in DHRS to get one. The agency claims, "He should have shaken DHRS up," and tried to negotiate more time. It is DHRS policy to grant an extension if there is a showing that Respondent has already taken some affirmative step to effect corrective action. Here Respondent had not done so but was apparently waiting until he got clarification from the agency before even beginning to solicit bids for corrective construction or before issuing any purchase or work orders to acquire the materials necessary to do so. The majority of deficiencies identified on the original write-up were corrected by either Mrs. Sanchez prior to transfer of the property or by the Respondent after transfer but before the follow-up visit by Mr. Bravo. It, therefore, cannot be said that Respondent had not made some substantial effort to correct the deficiencies. If Respondent's allegation is correct, and there is no reason to believe it is not, based on his prior experience, it was to his benefit to not proceed with the remaining corrective action until such time as DHRS had given a definitive clarification of the actual work that needed to be done. DHRS contends that no additional clarification was required since the violations are violations of the standard safety code and anyone familiar with the code, including the fire department, could have given the Respondent the information he needed. DHRS, therefore, contends it was not necessary for Respondent to wait for its agent to come out and give the clarification requested. This is specious reasoning since the citation was issued by DHRS and it is not at all unreasonable for Respondent to request clarification from the agency writing up the alleged violation in the first place.
Recommendation Rased on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the citations be upheld but that the civil penalties be waived. RECOMMENDED this 5th day of August, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of August, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald J. Holck, Administrator Sanchez Retirement Apartments 1400 Southwest 26th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33315 Leonard T. Helfand, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 5190 Northwest 167th Street Miami, Florida 33014 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Recommendation In consideration of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter its final order: Finding the Respondent guilty of Count One of the Administrative Complaint by (a) violating section 489.129(e), Fla. Stat. (1981), by aiding and abetting an uncertified and unregistered person to evade the licensing provisions of the Contracting Act, and (b) by violating section 489.129(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (1981), by knowingly combining and conspiring with an unregistered and unlicensed person with intent to evade the provisions of the Contracting Act. Finding the Respondent not guilty of the allegations in Count Two of the Administrative Complaint. For the violations of Count One, imposing a fine of five hundred dollars ($500). DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of May, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Reynolds Sampson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Martin F. Mann 2216 Bayshore Garden Parkway Bradenton, Florida 33507 Simon Rosin, Esquire Pflugner, Rosin & Hendricks Post Office Box 1918 Sarasota, Florida 33578 James Linnan, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board P.O. Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore Carpino General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee,, Florida 32301
