Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a medical doctor practicing in Green Cove Springs. He has been a "medicaid provider" for a number of years for purposes of this proceeding and the rules related hereto. The review period for medicaid claims submitted by health care providers relates to claims for services rendered submitted to the Petitioner on or after January 1, 1979, and paid by medicaid through October 27, 1980. (See Chapter 10-7, Florida Administrative Code.) The Petitioner presented Mr. Alex Szarto, a Florida Medicaid Program Monitor in the investigatory section of the Medicaid Program Integrity Office of the Petitioner. This witness has had twenty-five years' experience in performing such field auditing for a private insurance company. He established through his testimony, and Exhibit 1, that the Respondent had claimed seven hundred and three initial patient visits for payment from medicaid during the subject review period. The witness demonstrated that three hundred thirty-seven of those patient visits claimed were not initial visits, but were patients who bad already been seen during that same review period. The additional initial patient charge was claimed for these three hundred thirty-seven previously seen patients as well as for the remaining four hundred and two patients involved who were actually seen for the first time. The Respondent thus billed the Petitioner one thousand six hundred seventy-six dollars and ninety-cents for new patient charges for these three hundred thirty-seven patients whom he had seen at a previous time. Upon cross-examination the witness conceded that a hypothetical patient with an "ant bite" two years previously who then comes in with a totally unrelated complaint, such as a back problem, possibly should be considered under the medicaid code contained in the Rule cited below representing comprehensive re-evaluation or reexamination (and so charged for), but the witness opined that medicaid reimbursement payment rules do not consider such contingencies, rather merely allowing additional billing if a patient is a totally new patient, rather than an established one. The Respondent began treating medicaid patients in approximately February, 1979. He stated that at the medical office where he was formerly associated in practice, that the insurance clerk for the office informed him that a new patient means a patient who comes in with a different illness, even if that patient had been seen previously for another problem. Subsequently thereto, the clerk for insurance matters in his present office attended a seminar in August, 1980, and, based upon knowledge she gained there, also informed him that for medicaid purposes a new patient means a patient who comes in with an entirely new condition or complaint than that experienced with a past visit. The doctor believes that this seminar was taught by a representative of the Petitioner, but he was unable to state definitively if that was the case. In billing these patients as new patients, the doctor acted in the reasonable belief that he was entitled to do so based upon these instructions. He established without question that he had no intent to defraud the medicaid program or the Petitioner. He also established that he had in the past saved the medicaid program and the Petitioner a great deal of money in potential claims by not re-checking all medicaid patients a week after he initially saw them, as he is entitled to do. His medicaid claims have never been questioned before this occasion. The doctor genuinely felt that he was following appropriate medicaid procedure codes, relying on the judgment of the experienced insurance clerk in his office, which he in turn felt was predicated on instructions she received from a representative of the Petitioner. The Respondent maintains that a representative of the Petitioner instructed his insurance clerk regarding the processing of medicaid claims and he states he was advised by that instructor that a new illness meant a new patient."
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence in the record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Dr. Manuel R. Martinez, be required to refund to the Petitioner the sum of sixteen hundred seventy-six dollars and ninety-nine cents, representing excess new patient charges submitted to the Department, which refund shall be accomplished within sixty (60) days of the date of the final order entered herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of January, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Weiss, Esquire Medicaid Program Office 1317 Winewood Boulevard Suite 233 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Manuel R. Martinez, M.D. One Doctors Drive Green Cove Springs, Florida 32043 David H. Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1321 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Herman Ginsberg is a licensed pharmacist having been issued license number 0008019. The last known address of the Respondent is 775 Northeast 164th Street, North Miami Beach, Florida 33162. At all times material to this proceeding, the Respondent was the managing pharmacist at Jaffe Pharmacy, also known as Jaffe Discount Drugs, located at 737 Northeast 167th Street, North Miami Beach, Florida 33162. On or about November 26, 1980, the Respondent Ginsberg directed a clerk at the pharmacy, Lorraine Gronfine to remove nine (9) prescriptions from the class II prescription records and place them under a desk blotter. The scripts were pulled by Ms. Gronfine prior to a drug inspection by the authorities. According to the Respondent Ginsberg, he was ordered by the manager of the pharmacy, Ed Terry, to pull the prescriptions in order to inflate an insurance claim resulting from a burglary which occurred in September 1980. The Respondent complied with Mr. Terry's request and reported that drugs were stolen which were not in fact stolen in order to inflate an insurance claim to approximately $7,000. The prescriptions were discovered under the blotter by Irving Losee, another pharmacist employed by Jaffe, who turned them over to Graymark Security. Graymark personnel questioned both the Respondent and Ms. Gronfine about the prescriptions and both gave statements to Graymark concerning how the prescriptions came to be placed under the blotter. Many, although not all, of the prescriptions found by Losee were altered. No testimony expert or otherwise was introduced to prove that the Respondent altered the prescriptions in question. As noted by counsel for Respondent, no direct evidence was introduced to rebut the Respondent's sworn denial that he personally altered the prescriptions. In the normal course of business at Jaffee Pharmacy, a patient log was kept for all prescriptions filled on a daily basis. It is undisputed by the parties that the patient log, which was kept by the Respondent, was not altered and reflected the actual number of pills dispensed by the pharmacy. In order to divert classified drugs for personal profit, it is logical to assume that the Respondent would have altered the patient logs along with the prescriptions to consistently cover the amount of classified drugs ordered from pharmaceutical companies and placed on record with the Drug Enforcement Administration. Indeed, the failure to alter the daily patient logs to be consistent with the altered prescriptions was one of the ways that the problem with the altered prescriptions was uncovered. Although Mr. Terry examined the patient logs nightly to grade his employees on their sales of drugs, this would not have necessarily stopped the logs from being changed to conform to the altered prescriptions. The Respondent or anyone with access to the patient logs, could have altered the logs after the nightly review and conform the logs and prescriptions without arousing undue suspicion. No testimony was presented concerning this point other than that the logs did not go to accounting and were presented to Mr. Terry for his review. If Mr. Terry kept the logs and the Respondent had no further access to them, the Petitioner's theory concerning the alterations would be more plausible; however, the record failed to show that the Respondent lacked the ability to alter the logs subsequent to Mr. Terry's review. Each prescription placed into evidence and filled by the Respondent is marked as being "verified by the issuing physician." The Respondent has admitted that some of these prescriptions were not verified and that the certifications were erroneous. The Respondent admitted that a person named Fred Sessler, who was associated with a stress or obesity clinic, was permitted to pick up controlled drugs for the clinic without a prescription. Mr. Sessler was apparently permitted this privilege because the Respondent knew that one of the clinic physicians would eventually furnish a prescription. Additionally, the Respondent has admitted that in connection with the Sessler transactions, he failed to immediately record all the information required in order to dispense oral prescriptions and failed to notify the Drug Enforcement Administration that he was emergency dispensing via telephone. While acting as managing pharmacist at Jaffee, the Respondent ordered and distributed excessive quantities of a Schedule II drug. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 26 and Respondent's Exhibit 1.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the license of the Respondent Herman Ginsberg be suspended for two (2) years and that he be placed on probation for three (3) years thereafter, subject to attending appropriate continuing education classes and working under the direct supervision of a pharmacist approved by the Board. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of January, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1983.
The Issue Whether respondent's license as a registered nurse should be disciplined on charges that she improperly recorded the administration and disposal of controlled substances in violation of Section 464.018(1)(d) and (f), Florida Statutes (1981).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent be administratively fined $500.00 and reprimanded for violating Section 464.018(1)(f) on three separate occasions. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 6th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: W. Douglas Moody, Jr., Esquire 119 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Betty Bowman Fulk, pro se Apartment 1221 1500 N.W. 12th Avenue Miami, Florida 33136 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Helen P. Keefe, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Board of Nursing Room 504, 111 East Coastline Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Conclusions Having reviewed the Administrative Complaint and Amended Administrative Complaint, and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration finds and concludes as follows: 1. The Agency has jurisdiction over the above-named Respondent pursuant to Chapter 408, Part II, Florida Statutes, and the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. 2. The Agency issued the attached Administrative Complaint and Election of Rights form to the Respondent. (Ex. 1) The Election of Rights forms advised of the right to an administrative hearing. 3. The parties have since entered into the attached Settlement Agreement. (Ex. 2) Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED: lL. The Settlement Agreement is adopted and incorporated by reference into this Final Order. The parties shall comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The Respondent shall pay the Agency $2,375.00. If full payment has been made, the cancelled check acts as receipt of payment and no further payment is required. If full payment has not been made, payment is due within 30 days of the Final Order. Overdue amounts are subject to statutory interest and may be referred to collections. Any check made payable to the “Agency for Health Care Administration” and containing the AHCA ten-digit case number should be sent to: Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS 14 Tallahassee, FL 32308 Filed July 7, 2014 1:52 PM Division of Administrative Hearings Hteno_ , 2014. ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, on this _/ / day of A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review, which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 CERTIFY that a true and correct-capy of this Ffnal/Order was served on the below-named persons by the method designated on this/ vi day of a= , 2014. Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg. #3, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, FL. 32308-5403 Telephone: (850) 412-3630 Jan Mills Finance & Accounting Facilities Intake Unit Revenue Management Unit (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Nick Lynn, Executive Director Thomas Valdez, Esq. Spring Hills Lake Mary Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A. 3655 W. Lake Mary Blvd Lake Mary, FL 32746 | (U.S. Mail) 4905 W. Laurel St— Ste 200 Tampa, FL 33607 (U.S. Mail) David Selby, Senior Attorney Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail)
Findings Of Fact 1. On March 6, 1984, a person named Earl Cole, who is or was also known as Robert E. Cole entered pleas of nolo contendere in the Circuit Court, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm B3each County, Florida, to the following: Case No. Count(s) Crime 82-4836-CF A02 Check 1 Obtaining Property in Return for Worthless 82-7339-CF A02 Check 2 Obtaining Property in Return for Worthless 82-7745-CF A02 1 Uttering a Forgery
Findings Of Fact After an examination review challenge, the Petitioner was given a score of 74 percent on the written portion of the October 2, 1992, podiatric medicine examination. (He passed the other portions of the exam.) Since the written portion was a 300-question exam, the Petitioner is just three questions short of a passing grade. First Challenge On the first question challenged (Petitioner's Exhibit 1), the Petitioner's answer clearly was incorrect. But the Petitioner contends that none of the other answers were correct, either. The Petitioner's expert conceded that the answer for which credit was given is "technically correct," assuming that the drug in question is administered orally. But he contended that the answer for which credit was given would be incorrect if the drug were administered intravenously. The Department's expert disputed that the answer for which credit was given would be incorrect if the drug were administered intravenously. Moreover, the drug is not available for intravenous administration in the United States. Given those circumstances, it is found that the answer for which credit was given is a correct answer. Seventy of the examinees (58.8 percent) chose the answer for which credit was given. An even higher percentage (79.2 percent) of examinees who scored above the median grade on the exam chose that answer. Only 29 (24.4 percent) chose the Petitioner's answer. Only 13.4 percent of the examinees who scored above the median grade on the exam chose the Petitioner's answer. These results validate the Petitioner's score on this question. The Petitioner did not prove either that the answer he chose was correct, that he should have been given credit for his answer or that the question should have been discarded. Second Challenge On the second question challenged (Petitioner's Exhibit 2), credit was given for the answer "intermittent claudication in the limb." The Petitioner answered, "paroxymal pain in the limb." The Petitioner argues that the answer for which credit was given was incorrect because, while the question asked for a "finding," the answer for which credit was given was a "diagnosis." Intermittent claudication in the limb means cramping and pain in the limb after exercise. Paroxymal pain in the limb means pain in the limb that comes and goes. The Petitioner seems to argue essentially that a "finding" must be something that the patient would report to the physician or that the physician would observe on examination. Certainly, it is improbable that a patient would complain to a physician, "I am suffering from intermittent claudication." But it is no more likely that a patient would complain to a physician, "I am suffering from paroxymal pain in the limb." On the other hand, while it would not be surprising for a patient to report, "my leg has this pain that comes and goes," it would be no more surprising for a patient to report, "my leg has been cramping after exercise." It is found that both "paroxymal pain in the limb" and "intermittent claudication" can be termed "findings" and that the Petitioner's answer was wrong. 107 of the examinees (89.9 percent) chose the answer for which credit was given. An even higher percentage (95 percent) of examinees who scored above the median grade on the exam, chose that answer. Only six (5 percent) chose the Petitioner's answer. An even smaller percentage (3.4 percent) of the examinees who scored above the median grade on the exam chose the Petitioner's answer. These results validate the Petitioner's score on this question. The Petitioner did not prove either that the answer he chose was correct, that he should have been given credit for his answer or that the question should have been discarded. Third Challenge The third question challenged (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) was the last of a series of four questions based on a hypothetical case history. In the case history, the patient presented, had an office visit, had surgery and returned to the office three days later with another complaint. The crux of the Petitioner's argument on this question is that the question is ambiguous in giving as a time reference the time when treatment was initiated. The answer for which credit was given presumes that the treatment in question was the treatment initiated upon the patient's return to the office after surgery. The Petitioner answered the question as if the treatment in question was the surgical treatment. On its face the Petitioner's argument has some appeal. But it fails to address the logical sequence of the series of four questions that followed the case history. Bearing the sequence in mind, it was not logical or reasonable for an examinee to presume that the last question was intended to return the examinee to the very beginning of the case history. 78 of the examinees (65.5 percent) chose the answer for which credit was given. A significantly higher percentage (80.5 percent) of examinees who scored above the median grade on the exam, chose that answer. Even more telling, only 5.9 percent of all examinees chose the Petitioner's answer, and only 1.7 percent of the examinees who scored above the median grade on the exam chose the Petitioner's answer. These results validate the Petitioner's score on this question. The Petitioner did not prove either that the answer he chose was correct, that he should have been given credit for his answer or that the question should have been discarded. Fourth Challenge The fourth question challenged (Petitioner's Exhibit 4) asked the examinees to describe, by their choice of answers, the direction of blood flow in the veins of the lower extremities. The Petitioner's answer described flow from the "perforating veins to the deep veins." The answer for which credit was given described flow from the "superficial veins to the deep veins." The Petitioner argues that his answer was correct, and that the answer for which credit was given is incorrect because blood flows directly from the perforating veins to the deep veins. But the Petitioner's answer does not account for the fact that, within the veins of the lower extremities, blood first flows within the superficial veins towards and into the perforating veins, only then flowing directly from the perforating veins to the deep veins. The direction of blood flow in the veins of the lower extremity, taken as a whole, is most accurately described in the answer for which credit was given. 67 of the examinees (56.3 percent) chose the answer for which credit was given. A higher percentage (61.8 percent) of examinees who scored above the median grade on the exam, chose that answer. 24.4 percent chose the Petitioner's answer. 25.8 percent of the examinees who scored above the median grade on the exam chose the Petitioner's answer. These results are not particularly helpful in affirmatively validating the Petitioner's score on this question, but neither do they invalidate his score or the question. The Petitioner did not prove either that the answer he chose was correct, that he should have been given credit for his answer or that the question should have been discarded. Fifth Challenge The fifth question challenged (Petitioner's Exhibit 5) was the last of a series of three questions based on a hypothetical case history. But, in this case, the question did not depend on the case history. It simply called for the "minumum [sic] toxic dose" of a drug, in ccs. In support of his answer, the Petitioner cited documentation stating in part that the drug "has a maximum dosage of 350 mgms," which translates to 20 ccs. But the question asked for the minimum toxic dosage. The minimum toxic dosage was closer to 15, the answer for which credit was given. Initially, the Petitioner's answer erroneously was keyed in as the correct answer to this question. On review of the distribution of the answers given by the examinees, the question was "flagged" because only 20.2 percent of the examinees gave the Petitioner's answer, and even fewer of the examinees (11.1 percent) who scored above the median grade on the exam gave it. Later it was discovered that a wrong answer, namely the Petitioner's, had been keyed in as the correct answer on the answer key. The question was re-scored, using the corrected answer key. 69.7 percent chose the answer for which credit ultimately was given, and an even higher percentage (83.9 percent) of the examinees who scored above the median grade on the exam chose that answer. These results validate the Petitioner's ultimate score on this question. The Petitioner did not prove either that the answer he chose was correct, that he should have been given credit for his answer or that the question should have been discarded. Sixth Challenge On the sixth question challenged (Petitioner's Exhibit 7), the Petitioner questioned whether the answer for which credit was given produces what is described in the question, as the question asks, or whether it is a diagnosis, or description, of the condition characterized by what is described in the question. In addition, the authorities, and the expert witnesses, were in conflict as to whether, in the case of the answer for which credit was given, the fibrous thickening described in the question occurs in the intima of the veins, as the question states, or in the media of the veins. (On the other hand, there also was a conflict among the authorities and the experts as to whether the Petitioner's answer produces all of the indications listed in the question.) Only 46.2 percent of the examinees chose the answer for which credit was given. Not much more (50.6 percent) of the examinees who scored above the median grade on the exam chose that answer. 29.4 percent chose the Petitioner's answer, and 41.8 percent of the examinees who scored above the median grade on the exam chose the Petitioner's answer. While these results may not in themselves invalidate the Petitioner's score on this question, they seem to be consistent with the conflict in the authorities. The Petitioner may have proved at least that this question should have been discarded. But it is not necessary to reach a specific finding whether the Petitioner proved either that the answer he chose was correct, that he should have been given credit for his answer, or that the question should have been discarded. In light of the previous findings, even with credit for this question, the Petitioner would not have enough additional points to pass the exam.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of Podiatric Medicine, enter a final order denying the Petitioner's exam challenge. However, it also is recommended that the Department reconsider the use of the sixth question challenged (Petitioner's Exhibit 7) on future examinations. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of September, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2645 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the Department's proposed findings of fact (the Petitioner not having filed any: 1.-7. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that there is "no distention of superficial veins." Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Edmund J. McGrath, D.P.M. 1660 Gulf Boulevard, Apartment 601 Clearwater, Florida 34630 Vytas J. Urba, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Diane Orcutt, Executive Director Board of Podiatric Medicine Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay, Esquire General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Conclusions Having reviewed the Amended Administrative Complaint, and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration finds and concludes as follows: 1. The Agency has jurisdiction over the above-named Respondent pursuant to Chapter 408, Part II, Florida Statutes, and the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. 2. The Agency issued the attached Amended Administrative Complaint with an Election of Rights form to the Respondent. (Ex. 1) The Election of Rights form advised of the right to an administrative hearing. 3. The parties have since entered into the attached Settlement Agreement. (Ex. 2) Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED: 1, The Settlement Agreement is adopted and incorporated by reference into this Final Order. The parties shall comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The Respondent shall pay the Agency $750.00 in administrative fines. If full payment has been made, the cancelled check acts as receipt of payment and no further payment is required. If full payment has not been made, payment is due within 30 days of the Final Order. Overdue amounts are subject to statutory interest and may be referred to collections. A check made payable to the “Agency for Health Care Administration” and containing the AHCA ten-digit case number should be sent to: Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS 14 1 Filed May 9, 2012 10:23 AM Division of Administrative Hearings Tallahassee, Florida 32308 ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, on this 3 day of Mey. , 2012. ss, If Elizabeth Dudek, ere ary Agency for Health Care Administration
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review, which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I CERTIFY that a true and correct_capy of this Final Order was served on the below-named persons by the method designated on this_ "day of aa , 2012. Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg. #3, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Telephone: (850) 412-3630 Jan Mills Finance & Accounting Facilities Intake Unit Revenue Management Unit (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Thomas J. Walsh IT Jessica C. LaManna, Esq. Office of the General Counsel United Health Services, Inc. Agency for Health Care Administration 367 South Gulph Road (Electronic Mail) King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406-0958 (U.S. Mail) Elizabeth W. McArthur Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings (Electronic Mail)
