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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. GLEN H. MILLER, 78-002225 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-002225 Latest Update: Apr. 13, 1979

Findings Of Fact Glen H. Miller is a registered real estate broker holding license #0060204 issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission. Miller was the registered real estate broker in a transaction between David and Marsha Ewan, and Roy and Marilyn Cutrell. Miller prepared a contract for sale and purchase of real estate, Exhibit #5, for Roy and Marilyn Cutrell as buyers and presented it to Marsha and David Ewan, as sellers. The terms regarding the mortgage to be assumed in Paragraph B in Section 2 were based upon information given Miller by the Ewans when the property was listed. It is uncontroverted that as of the date the contract was prepared Miller had no knowledge that Ewan had refinanced the house and the mortgage terms had changed. This contract was presented in the presence of the Cutrells to the Ewans on January 20 or 21, 1977. There is a controversy as to when the Cutrells became aware the mortgage terms were different from those stated in the contract. The Ewans testified that they told the Cutrells the terms were different after the contract had been signed by both parties but not in Miller's presence. The Cutrells stated that they learned the mortgage terms were different when they inquired about the mortgage to Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan, holders of the mortgage. This occurred on January 24, 1977. In either event, both parties agree that Miller had no knowledge of the change in the terms of the mortgage until January 24. Miller prepared and presented a new contract to the Ewans and Cutrells which correctly reflected the mortgage data. The Cutrells represented to Miller and the Ewans that they did not consider the mortgage terms important and did not desire to sign the revised contract. The Ewans did not insist upon the revised contract. Subsequently, the Cutrells failed to deliver the additional deposit of $14,000 on February 1, 1977. Their reasons for failure to do so had nothing to do with the amount of the mortgage or the terms thereof. The Cutrells were advised by Miller's wife, a real estate salesman, that they would be in default if they did not deliver the $14,000 additional deposit and if they defaulted they would lose their initial $1,000 deposit. The Cutrells did not contest the forfeiture of their initial deposit and advised that they did not wish to complete the transaction. On February 4, 1977, a check was prepared by the broker to the Ewans in the amount of $700. The Ewans picked this check up on February 7, 1977. The remaining $300 was retained in the escrow account at all times. The Cutrells first demanded the return of the deposit orally on February The subsequently made written demands on February 23, 1977. Between the oral demand and the written demand, the broker reported the controversy existing with the Cutrells to the Florida Real Estate Commission, which eventually resulted in these charges being brought.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission take no action against the registration of Glen H. Miller as a registered real estate broker. DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 ADDENDUM The Hearing Officer has read and considered the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by Petitioner, Florida Real Estate Commission. The facts presented in the Recommended Order are based on Substantial and competent evidence contained in the record. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings COPIES FURNISHED: Mark A. Grimes, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Harvey R. Klein, Esquire 333 NW 3rd Avenue Ocala, Florida 32670

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. WILLIAM H. KLEBOLD AND WOODMONT REALTY, INC., 84-000724 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-000724 Latest Update: Sep. 04, 1984

Findings Of Fact On January 23, 1984, the Secretary of the Department of professional Regulation (hereinafter "Department") signed an Administrative Complaint, count one of which alleges, in pertinent part: Respondents in their capacity as real estate brokers employed Doris H. Swanton as a real estate broker and office manager from approximately October 20, 1980 to April 18, 1982. On or about April 8, 1982 to the present, Doris H. Swanton has made numerous and repeated demands upon Respondents for the payment of a share of the compensation received by Respondent and earned by Doris H. Swanton while in the employ of the Respondents in the amount totalling approximately $7,815.52 involving a number of brokerage transactions. A copy of a list reflecting the transactions, dates and amounts owing is attached as Petitioner's Exhibit 1. Since April 8, 1982, Respondents have failed, refused and neglected to give a reasonable accounting or to pay Doris H. Swanton the $7,815.52 or any part thereof notwithstanding the demands for same made upon Respondents by Doris H. Swanton, the person entitled to said money. That by reason of the foregoing, Respondents are guilty of having failed to account and deliver a share of a real estate commission and other compensation to Doris H. Swanton in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes. The Administrative Complaint signed on January 23, 1984, does not contain an allegation that there has been a judicial determination that Respondents are not entitled to retain the property claimed by Doris H. Swanton. On February 22, 1984, the Respondents served an Answer and Written Defenses in which the Respondents, inter alia, admit the first of the paragraphs quoted in finding number 1, above, and deny the other three paragraphs quoted above. The Respondents' Answer and Written Defenses also sets forth a detailed itemization of Respondents' reasons for contending that Doris H. Swanton is not entitled to the full amount of a single one of the twelve commissions she claims are due her from the Respondents. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES The thesis of the Motion to Dismiss filed by Respondents is that a broker cannot be disciplined for failure to account for and deliver non-escrowed property until there has been a judicial determination that the broker is not entitled to retain the property in dispute. The case of Golub v. Department of Professional Regulation, F.R.E.C., 9 FLW 460 (Fla. 5th DCA, Feb. 23, 1984), appears to be exactly on point. There a majority of the court concluded: Once there is a judicial determination that a broker is not entitled to retain non-escrowed property then this statute [475.25(1)(d)] is authority to discipline the broker for a failure to account and deliver the property to any person, including a salesman, who is entitled to its prossession. Corollary to the quoted language from Golub is the conclusion that until there is a judicial determination that a broker is not entitled to retain non- escrowed property, the statute does not authorize discipline of a broker for failure toe account and deliver the property. In other words, when the property in dispute is non-escrowed property, a judicial determination that a broker is not entitled to retain the property is an indispensable prerequisite to the establishment of a violation of Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, on the basis of a failure to account for or deliver such property. Accordingly, until a court determines that the Respondents in this case are not entitled to retain the property in dispute in this case, it cannot be established that Respondents have violated Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes. And inasmuch as the Administrative Complaint fails to allege that there has been any such judicial determination, the Administrative Complaint is fatally deficient.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Analysis of the Issues, and Conclusions of Law, I recommend that the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a Final Order in this case dismissing the Administrative Complaint without prejudice to the refiling of an Administrative Complaint against these Respondents if and when a court determines that the Respondents are not entitled to the property claimed by Doris H. Swanton. DONE and ORDERED this 3rd day of July, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert W. Lee, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 G. Michael Keenan, Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Mr. Harold R. Huff, Director Division of Real Estate Legal Section 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. JOYCE A. CHANDLER, 84-000400 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-000400 Latest Update: Apr. 24, 1985

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the charges, the Respondent Joyce A. Chandler, was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, holding license number 0348072. Respondent's license was suspended for a period of one year pursuant to a Final Order of the Florida Real Estate Commission on August 4, 1983, which became effective September 3, 1983. To date, the Respondent has failed to take steps necessary to reactivate her license and she remains in a suspended status. Gerald and Mary Anne Jennings were the owners of a home located at 15413 S.W. 105th Avenue, Miami, Florida. There was a first mortgage on the home held by Stockton, Whatley and Davin. In the early part of 1981, the Jennings were experiencing financial difficulties and in an effort to help pay off debts secured a second mortgage in the amount of $15,000.00 from Davide and Associates, Inc. This mortgage from Davide and Associates, Inc., was a wrap-around mortgage making the total obligation (Stockton, Whatley and Davin plus Davide) approximately $44,000.00. In August of 1981, Davide and Associates, Inc. sold the wrap-around mortgage to Mr. and Mrs. Leon Shiff. In January of 1983, the Jennings made a decision to sell their home as they were having difficulty making payments to Shiff. The Jennings contacted Mr. Shiff and informed them of their decision, and Mr. Shiff attempted to secure prospective purchasers for them. On or about January 30, 1983, the Respondent Chandler made an offer to purchase the Jennings home, which offer was rejected by the Jennings. On or about February 2, 1983, the Respondent made a second offer to purchase the Jennings home which offer was accepted. The terms of this February 2, 1983 contract provided that the Respondent was to give sufficient funds to the Jennings to catch up on all mortgage arrearages, tender to the Jennings approximately $4,000.00 in cash, and the Jennings were to take back a third mortgage in the amount of $4,000.00. Respondent, in turn, was to assume the Stockton, Whatley and Davin mortgage and agreed to pay off the Shiff mortgage within 90 days. The Jennings desired to return to West Virginia immediately. Therefore, the Respondent promised and represented to the Jennings that she would secure tenants to occupy the residence while she attempted to obtain the necessary financing and to close the transaction and would use the proceeds from the rental money to make all mortgage payments. On or about February 22, 1983, the Respondent and the Jennings signed yet a third contract. Said contract has not been produced and the location of it is unknown. On this same date, the Respondent had the Jennings sign, in blank, a Warranty Deed. The Respondent represented to the Jennings that the Warranty Deed was nothing more than a Power of Attorney which enabled the Respondent to rent the house and use the rental money to make the mortgage payments while the Respondent sought the financing per the terms of the contract. Based on the Respondent's representations and promises, the Jennings vacated the residence and stopped making mortgage payments. Thereafter, the Respondent secured a Mr. and Mrs. Hill as tenants for the property. Mr. and Mrs. Hill came to the Respondent as tenants from Prudential Life Insurance Company. Mr. and Mrs. Hill had recently experienced damage to their home due to a fire and the Respondent secured rental property for the Hills on behalf of Prudential. In regards to this matter, Prudential paid via a double party check made payable to Robert Hill and Princess International, Inc. $1,950.00. The Respondent goes by the name of P. J. Chandler, Princess Chandler, Princess international and Princess International, Inc. These tenants remained in the Jennings' home for approximately two months. The Respondent made no mortgage payments to either Stockton, Whatley and Davin or to Mr. Shiff for the period of February 1983 to August 1983. Further, the last mortgage payment made was for the January payment delivered to Mr. Shiff by Mrs. Jennings. In order to keep the first mortgage in good standing with Stockton, Whatley and Davin, Mr. Shiff took it upon himself to make these mortgage payments although he was receiving no mortgage payments on the wrap-around from Mr. & Mrs. Jennings or the Respondent. In June of 1983, Mr. Shiff enlisted the aid of Herman Isis, attorney at law, to begin foreclosure proceedings on the residence. In August of 1983, the residence was sold to Shiff at the foreclosure sale. Thereafter, a certificate of title was received by Mr. Shiff in regards to said foreclosure purchase. The Jennings received only $3,248.00 from the Respondent as opposed to the approximate $8,000.00 contract amount. The transaction never closed as promised by the Respondent. Finally, the Respondent failed to make the necessary mortgage payments as represented and promised by her to the Jennings.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent Joyce A. Chandler's license as a real estate broker be revoked. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of March, 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Mitchell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred Graves, Esquire 315 S.E. Seventh Street Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Harold Huff Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. EDWARD M. O'CONNOR AND WILLIAM BERG, 84-000180 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-000180 Latest Update: Feb. 05, 1986

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent hereto Respondent O'Connor was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license lumber 0065137. Respondent Berg was a licensed real estate salesman having been issued license number 0391098. At all pertinent times alleged in the Administrative Complaint Respondent Berg was licensed and operated as a real estate salesman in the employ of broker Respondent Edward M. O Connor. On or about February 15, 1953, Respondent Berg entered into a contract as purchaser seeking to purchase certain real property in Charlotte County, Florida, described as: Lot 26, Block 1, Charlotte Harbour Subdivision, also known as 201 Cortex Street, Charlotte County, Florida. The property was owned by Louis J. Knetter. Mr. Knetter, as seller, was represented by Emanuel Consalvo, a licensed real estate salesman or broker. This proposed contract, contrary to the allegations of Petitioner, made no mention in its terms of any $500 binder or earnest money deposit. Rather, the contract, instead of mentioning a cash deposit, had the words "commission" clearly written on the top, being Berg's pledge to pay $300 of the real estate commission he would be entitled to on the transaction to the buyer at closing. The proposed contract was tendered to Emanuel Consalvo , the seller's agent, who examined it thoroughly with his client Louis Knetter. Mr. Knetter subsequently refused to enter into that proposed contract. Respondent Berg then made a second offer to purchase the same property which was accepted by the seller. This offer was made on April 18, 1983. The contract regarding the second offer was prepared from a rough draft which Respondent Berg had handwritten. He handwrote the word "commission" precisely as on the original offer of February 15, 1983. On the final typed copy of the contract the abbreviated word "comm.," was typed into the contract to indicate (and it was Respondent Berg's intent) that the commission to be earned by Berg would be used as a down payment at closing rather than any proposal by Berg (or O'Connor) to post $500 or other amount of cash earnest money deposit upon the offering of the contract. Respondent Berg genuinely believed that anything of value could be inserted into a contract to provide consideration and could serve as sufficient consideration therefor including his offer to pay to the buyer a part of the real estate commission he would be entitled to with regard to that transaction Neither Respondents Berg nor O'Connor made any representations or statements, verbally or written, to Louis Knetter or Emanuel Consalvo to the effect that there ever was an earnest money deposit in any amount posted by the purchaser Berg, or on account at O'Connor Realty. Kevin O'Connor, the son of Respondent O'Connor, is also a licensed real estate broker who holds a degree in the field of real estate. He established that the textbook practice and indeed, the general real estate industry custom or practice in the Charlotte County area allows for anything of value to be used as consideration for a real estate contract and that a cash earnest money deposit is not necessary. He established the industry practice with regard to the posting of earnest money deposits for real estate sales contracts and demonstrated that unless a contract, by its terms, clearly indicates that an earnest money deposit has been posted, there is no basis for a seller or his agent to assume that to be the case. Kevin O'Connor, a witness for the Respondents, had personal contact with the seller's agent, Emanuel Consalvo, regarding the transaction and established that the Respondent Edward M. O'Connor was not even in his office or in the area during the time of the contract proposal or offer. Kevin O'Connor was operating the office in the Respondent Edward O'Connor's absence. Kevin 0'Connor established that the question of an earnest money deposit was never discussed with Consalvo and that neither Consalvo nor Knetter ever raised a question during the pendency of the transaction concerning the existence of an earnest money deposit. Kevin O'Connor never told Consalvo that any money was in escrow nor did Respondent Berg or Edward O'Connor. No representation was ever made to Consalvo or Knetter, singly or jointly, to the effect that any money had been placed on deposit or in escrow with regard to either of the two offers. Indeed, Mr. Consalvo acknowledged that no one at 0'Connor Realty ever told him of any money being placed in an escrow account. The transaction ultimately failed to close because the seller failed to include all the furniture with the home as required by the contract. At that juncture, the seller demanded the supposed $500 earnest money deposit to be paid him as a forfeiture on the mistaken belief that an earnest money deposit had been posted with regard to the transaction. Such was not the case however, nor was it ever represented to be the case.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the complaint filed by Petitioner against Respondents William Berg and Edward M. 0'Connor t/a O'Connor Realty, be DISMISSED in its entirety. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of February, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 84-0180 PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected as not comporting with the competent, substantial, credible evidence presented. Accepted, but not in itself dispositive of the material issues presented. Rejected as not comporting with the competent, substantial, credible evidence presented. Accepted, but not dispositive of the material issues presented in itself. Accepted, but not dispositive of the material issues presented. Accepted, but not dispositive of the material issues presented. RESPONDENT EDWARD O'CONNOR'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Accepted. Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. RESPONDENT WILLIAM BERG'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Elwood P. Safron, Esquire SAFRON, RODNEY & DZUPAK 306 E. Olympia Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Jesus Hevia, Esquire WOTITZKY, WOTITZKY, WILKINS, FROHLICH & JONES 201 West Marion Avenue Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.15475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. GEORGE N. SULLIVAN, 83-002597 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-002597 Latest Update: Jan. 30, 1984

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, George N. Sullivan, held real-estate license number 0128470 issued by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission. His current address is 22 East Spruce Street, Orlando, Florida. At one time, respondent also held a registered general contractor's license and operated a construction firm under the name of George N. Sullivan, Inc. in Vero Beach, Florida. On or about December 7, 1979, George N. Sullivan, Inc. and Vero Fore, Incorporated entered into a construction agreement wherein Sullivan agreed to construct a residence at Lot 27, Unit III, the Moorings of Vero Beach, in Indian River County for a price of $155,628. The difference between this price and the price of $171,688 alleged in the administrative complaint is due to "extras" agreed upon by the parties to be added to the project. Sullivan began construction on the residence but abandoned the project before it was completed. When he left the job he had been paid all sums due under the agreement except one final $18,000 draw. Vero Fore later discovered that approximately $66,000 in unpaid bills were left by Sullivan. It also learned that Sullivan had obtained releases from three material suppliers by issuing worthless checks in the amounts of $5,849, $2,883.48, $1,913.14, $4,988.92 and $3,847.23. To date, Vero Fore has not been repaid by Sullivan. Sullivan was later adjudged guilty of passing worthless checks by the circuit court of Indian River County on July 8, 1981 and was sentenced to eighteen months probation and required to make restitution to the subcontractors. The official records of Indian River County reflect that Sullivan was found to be in violation of probation on March 23, 1983 for failure to make restitution. It is unknown what, if any, penalties were imposed upon him for this violation, or if restitution has ever been made. On or about September 5, 1980, Sullivan entered into a contract with Mr. and Mrs. James L. Cain to remodel their residence located at 2075 DeLeon Avenue, Vero Beach, Florida. The agreed upon price was $46,900. The Cains paid Sullivan $46890, or 10 percent, as a downpayment for the work on September 8, 1980. Sullivan sent three men to the Cains' house a few days later to build a platform. No other work was ever done. Sullivan did not pay the three workmen and the Cains were forced to pay them $788 to obtain a release of liens. To date, they have never been reimbursed by respondent.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent George N. Sullivan be found guilty as charged in Counts I, III, and IV and that Count II be DISMISSED. It is further RECOMMENDED that respondent's real estate sales license be suspended for a period of ten years with the condition that said license be reinstated after a period of three years if respondent can demonstrate that restitution to the three material suppliers, Vero Fore, Inc. and the Cains has been made. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 10th day of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary Lee Printy, Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Mr. George N. Sullivan 22 East Spruce Street Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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VICTOR KEVIN KOELLNER vs. FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 89-002402 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-002402 Latest Update: Sep. 28, 1989

The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for a real estate salesman's license should be approved.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Victor Kevin Koellner. By application, he sought licensure as a real estate salesman. Petitioner was a unsuccessful candidate for the December 1988 real estate salesman's licensure examination. Petitioner received a score of 74. A score of 75 is required for licensure. Each correct answer has a grade value of one (1) point. Candidates are instructed to choose the most correct answer from among the multiple choice answers given. Petitioner challenges the answers selected by the Florida Real Estate Commission as correct as to questions numbered 15 and 52, on the test administered on December 5, 1988. Question 15 is confidential under the provisions of Section 119.07(3)(c), Florida Statutes, but appears in Respondent's Exhibit 1. The commission holds that the correct answer to question 15 is D. (Do any of the above). The Petitioner alleges that the better answer is A. (Request an Escrow disbursement order from the Florida Real Estate Commission). Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, supports the Respondent's conclusion. Seventy-three (73%) percent of the candidates taking the examination on December 5, 1988 answered the question correctly. Question 52 is confidential under the provisions of Section 119.07(3)(c), Florida Statutes, but appears in Respondent's Exhibit 1 (page 2). The commission holds that the correct answer is C. (Pay it at the closing). The Petitioner alleges that the correct answer is D. (Not pay it). The question asked what should the seller do concerning the sales commission at the closing. Based on the facts given in the Florida Real Estate Handbook, 1987 Edition, page 272, the seller would have no option but to pay the commission at closing. Sixty and 3/10 (60.3%) percent of the candidates taking the examination on December 5, 1988 answered question 52 correctly.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1989. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Respondent's Proposed Findings: 1-8. Adopted in substance. Petitioner's Proposed Findings: Paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5 (in substance), 7, and 10 are accepted. Paragraphs 6,8 and 9 are rejected as not relevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Victor Kevin Koellner, pro se 1385 Taurus Court, Merritt Island, Florida 32953 E. Harper Field, Esquire Deputy General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Real Estate Legal Services 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (4) 119.07120.57475.181475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. ALLAN R. HEUTON, 81-002994 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002994 Latest Update: Oct. 04, 1982

The Issue The issues in this case are as follow: Did Respondent violate Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by representing to Laverne Hahn that he would rent his house to her if she sold her house, representing to Ms. Hahn that he would deliver certain papers to her attorney, and representing to Ms. Hahn that the closing on her house would not occur until after February 15, 1981? Did Respondent violate Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, by failing to deliver survey, abstract and title insurance policy documents to Ms. Hahn or her attorney?

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, the Respondent, Allan R. Heuton, held real estate salesman license #0313305 Assued by the Board of Real Estate (now Florida Real Estate Commission). At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was registered as a salesman with Hugh Anderson Real Estate, Inc., at 2631 East Oakland Park Boulevard, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33339. Respondent listed with his employer, Hugh Anderson Real Estate, Inc., Laverne Hahn's offer to sell her residence and advised Ms. Hahn at that time that upon the sale of her residence she could rent his residence for a period of six months at the rate of $300 per month. In reliance on Respondent's statement, Ms. Hahn proceeded to sell her residence and made no other arrangements for a place to live, expecting to move into Respondent's house upon closing as per their agreement. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Pages 5 and 8.) Respondent testified to the events surrounding the transaction which gave rise to the Administrative Complaint. The Board presented the deposition of Ms. Hahn taken in Lakeland, Florida. Respondent admitted that he had advised Ms. Hahn it was not unusual to have closings delayed 60 days, and did offer and stood ready to rent his house to Ms. Hahn. Respondent testified that he did not recall picking up any documents from Ms. Hahn, but that had he done so it was his normal business practice to immediately deliver the documents to the attorney handling the closing. Ms. Hahn's deposition reflects that she could not locate the Respondent although she attempted to contact him through his broker's office. This was the reason she could not rent his house. Respondent testified that Ms. Hahn never asked to rent his house. Respondent testified that on January 14, 1981, the day after his birthday, he was suddenly taken ill and had to have emergency surgery in the early morning hours of that day. Respondent's testimony was corroborated by the testimony of Sheilah Kirk, who testified that she visited Respondent in the hospital on January 14 or 15, 1981, and that he was recovering from surgery at that time. Respondent testified that he was hospitalized for more than one week. Respondent testified that he was visited by the manager of the brokerage office for which he worked. It is hardly credible that Ms. Hahn could not find a man who was sick in a hospital for more than one week and whose whereabouts were known to his brokerage office. Wherefore, the Hearing Officer disregards the deponent's testimony and accepts the Respondent's testimony as the more credible concerning the rental of his house Ms. Hahn's deposition reflects that Respondent told her she would not have to move out until February of 1981. Respondent admits he told Ms. Hahn that closings were frequently delayed 60 days or more. The contract for sale originally provided for closing on December 29, 1980, a time which was changed to January 15, 1981, by persons unknown on a date unknown. The contract was signed by Ms. Hahn, who is presumed to have known its terms. Notwithstanding Respondent's statements as to delayed closings, Ms. Hahn had no basis for using such statement as a basis for planning in light of the contract which she signed. Again, Respondent's testimony is deemed to be more credible in light of the closing date provided in the contract for sale. A further conflict exists between Ms. Hahn's deposition and Respondent's testimony regarding the allegation that Respondent picked up certain documents from her but failed to deliver them. Respondent's statement that he had no recollection of the events, but that his regular practice was to deliver such documents immediately, and that since the time in question he has not discovered any such documents in his papers, is deemed credible.

Recommendation Having found that the allegations against the Respondent, Allan R. Heuton, were not proven, it is recommended that the Administrative Complaint against Respondent be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of July, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Allan R. Heuton 6891 Forrest Street Hollywood, Florida 33024 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. ORLANDO METRO REALTY, INC., AND C. CONRAD MERSHO, 75-001179 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-001179 Latest Update: Dec. 10, 1976

Findings Of Fact The Defendants are registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission as brokers. The Defendant Mershon is the President of the Defendant Orlando Metro Realty, Inc. During May, 1971, the Defendant Mershon, acting as a real estate broker, negotiated a sale of land from Carolina Caribbean Corporation to Edye Lynn. The property is located in North Carolina, and the contract for sale was signed in an airplane between North Carolina and Florida. For reasons that are not relevant to this proceeding, Ms. Lynn became disenchanted with the transaction. The Defendant Mershon agreed to assist her in finding a purchaser. On January 23, 1972, Charles Schiller Martin, signed a contract to purchase Ms. Lynn's property. The Defendants acted as brokers in securing the purchaser. The contract was signed in North Carolina. The contract was received in evidence, and is marked as Exhibit number 1 to each of the four depositions. Mr. Martin deposited the sum of $500 with the Defendant when he signed the contract. A copy of the cancelled check from Mr. Martin to the Defendants was received in evidence and is marked as Exhibit number 2 to each of the depositions. Ms. Lynn accepted Mr. Martin's offer. Mr. Martin submitted the contract to his attorney, George W. English III. On March 7, 1972 Mr. English wrote to Henry J. Prominski, an attorney who represented Ms. Lynn, requesting that several items respecting the property be forwarded to him. This letter was received in evidence and is marked as Exhibit number 5 to each of the depositions. On March 22, 1972, Mr. English wrote to Mr. Prominski informing him that Mr. Martin wished to cancel the contract to purchase. A copy of this letter was received in evidence, and is marked as Exhibit number 3 to each of the depositions. Mr. English advised Mr. Martin that marketable title could not be delivered, primarily because there were deed restrictions applying to the property which were not mentioned in the contract for sale. Assessments for water, sewer, and road grading were cited by Mr. English as particularly onerous. The March 22 letter was followed on April 25, 1972, with another letter. This letter was received in evidence, and is identified as Exhibit number 4 to each of the depositions. Mr. English never made any direct demand upon Mr. Mershon for return of the $500 deposit to Mr. Martin. He did make a demand upon Mr. Prominski. It is Mr. English's legal opinion that the seller could not deliver marketable title to the buyer. Mr. Prominski, representing the seller, is of the opinion that marketable title was available to be delivered to the buyer. Mr. Prominski stated that his client did not default in her obligations under the contract. Mr. Mershon opted to construe the purchase contract between Mr. Martin and Ms. Lynn as breeched by Mr. Martin. He forwarded $250 of the deposit to Ms. Lynn and retained $250 for himself. He explained his action in this regard in a letter to Mr. Prominski dated September 13, 1972. This letter was received in evidence, and is marked as Defendants' Exhibit number 1. This arrangement was apparently satisfactory to Ms. Lynn, and Mr. Prominski communicated Ms. Lynn's approval through a letter dated October 11, 1972. This letter was received in evidence, and is marked as Exhibit number 8 to each of the depositions. Approximately three weeks prior to the time that Mr. Martin signed the contract to purchase the Lynn property, Mr. Mershon delivered copies of various reports to Mr. Martin, including the restrictions that would apply to the property, and the contract to purchase from Carolina Caribbean Corporation which had been executed by Ms. Lynn. At approximately the time that Mr. Martin signed the contract, Mr. Mershon advised him that title insurance was available. The Defendants acted as brokers in many transactions in the development in which the property involved in this case is located. They had obtained title insurance on many similar lots. Only in this case was there any objection to title. Prior to his distributing $250 of the $500 deposit to Ms. Lynn and his retaining the remaining $250, Mr. Mershon consulted with attorneys for Carolina Caribbean Corporation who advised him that the Martins had defaulted in their obligations. Mr. Mershon personally spent approximately $1,000.00 in transporting Mr. Martin from Florida to North Carolina. Defendants did not seek the advice of the Florida Real Estate Commision respecting the disposition of the deposit monies, did not submit the issue to arbitration, did not interplead the parties, and did not otherwise seek an adjudication in a proper court. No evidence was offered with respect to standards for determining the marketability of real property in North Carolina. No evidence was offered respecting the marketability of title to the land in this case, other than the opinions of Attorney English, Attorney Prominski, and Defendant Mershon.

Florida Laws (2) 120.72475.25
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