The Issue At issue in this proceeding is the following clause on Form DBF-F-24, which form is incorporated by reference in Rule 3D-40.09(2), Florida Administrative Code: If the above commitment or a commitment in an amount and/or upon terms acceptable to the undersigned is obtained and said mortgage loan is not closed because (I) (We) have not fulfilled our part of this agreement, (I)(We) agree to pay $ the application deposit being a part, for obtaining said commitment. The Association contends that this type of charge is not authorized in Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, and is prohibited by other provisions of law. The validity of the above-cited clause is the sole issue here.
Findings Of Fact During 1982 and 1983, Petitioner was licensed as a mortgage broker and real estate broker in the State of Florida. His mortgage broker's license expired in September, 1983. At all times material hereto, Petitioner utilized his mortgage broker's and real estate broker's license to engage in real estate development speculation. He worked closely with Jeffrey Graham, who was also licensed as a mortgage broker and who was a co-owner with Petitioner of Continental Development, Continental Mortgage Company and the Real Estate Spot. They were engaged in buying and selling existing residential properties and constructing new homes for sale. Financing for Petitioner's speculative real estate transactions was provided primarily by The Bank of Florida, located in St. Petersburg, Florida. The Bank provided financing on 80 to 85 percent of his transactions, but at some point in 1982 or 1983, Petitioner and Graham found themselves unable to obtain further construction financing from the Bank. In order to continue receiving financing from the Bank, Petitioner and Graham initiated the use of "stand-in" buyers. A "stand-in" buyer would not have to use any of his own money as a deposit or down payment, even though real estate contracts executed in connection with these transactions would show an earnest money deposit by such buyers. The buyer's role was simply to lend his credit to the transaction and to share in any profits on the eventual sale of the property. On or about March 25, 1983, Petitioner executed, as seller, a contract for sale of real estate and deposit receipt with Norman Tanner, buyer. The transaction involved the sale of real estate in Pinellas County, Florida, and reflects a total purchase price of $25,000, with an earnest money deposit of $5,000 which the contract specified was to be held by Petitioner, as seller, until closing. Petitioner also executed a Settlement Statement on March 29, 1983, in connection with a loan obtained by Tanner from The Bank of Florida which indicated that Tanner had paid an earnest money deposit of $5,000. Based upon the testimony of Norman Tanner at hearing, it is found that he did not provide the earnest money deposit indicated on the sales contract or Settlement Statement which Petitioner executed as seller. Petitioner testified that this transaction was carried out in his individual capacity as a personal investment, and not under the authority of his mortgage broker's license. In fact, Petitioner did not deal directly with Tanner in this transaction. Tanner's dealings were with Petitioner's partner, Jeffrey Graham. Nevertheless, the evidence and demeanor of the witnesses establishes that Petitioner was aware of the fact that Tanner had not paid the deposit reflected on the instruments he executed, and that such instruments were used to induce the Bank to make a mortgage loan to Tanner. Petitioner, as seller, received $19,665.56 cash at settlement from this transaction with Tanner. On or about February 24, 1982, Petitioner executed a contract for sale of real estate and deposit receipt with Joseph Armendinger, buyer. The transaction involved the sale of real estate in Pinellas County, Florida, and reflects a total purchase price of $48,000, with an earnest money deposit of $6,500 which the contract specified was to be held in escrow by The Real Estate Spot, Inc., until closing. Petitioner and Armendinger also executed an Affidavit of Purchaser and Vendor in connection with obtaining financing for this transaction, and said Affidavit also indicated the buyer's purported cash equity of $6,500 in the property. At the time, Petitioner was co-owner of The Real Estate Spot, and Armendinger was an electrician who was doing some work at The Real Estate Spot and became interested in the "stand-in" buyer transactions he observed while doing electrical work at Petitioner's office. On or about October 27, 1982, Petitioner and Armendinger executed another contract for sale and deposit receipt for a second piece of property, which reflects a total price of $85,000 and an earnest money deposit by Armendinger of $5,000. Thereafter, they executed an Affidavit of Purchaser and Vendor and Settlement Statement reflecting Armendinger's purported cash equity of $4,250.00. Petitioner used the proceeds from this transaction to pay off an existing mortgage and judgment on the property, and realized $1,607.46 in cash, which was shared with Jeffrey Graham, co-seller. Petitioner knew that the contracts for sale and Affidavits which he executed with Armendinger were to be presented to The Bank of Florida and used for the purpose of Armendinger obtaining financing for the purchase of these properties. Based upon the testimony of Joseph Armendinger at hearing, it is found he did not provide any earnest money deposit or downpayment in connection with these two transactions with Petitioner. Armendinger relied on Petitioner, a licensed mortgage broker and real estate broker, in these transactions, and was told by Petitioner that he would not have to put any money of his own into these transactions. Petitioner knew that Armendinger had not made any deposit or downpayments concerning these transactions at the time he executed the contracts for sale and deposit receipts, Affidavits and Settlement Statement. On December 16, 1982, Petitioner executed two mortgages in favor of Patricia G. Herren on property he had previously sold to Armendinger. These mortgages totalled $21,793.35, and were recorded in Pinellas County, Florida, on December 28, 1982. These mortgages were used by Petitioner, along with a $10,000 mortgage he executed in Herren's favor, to obtain a satisfaction from Herren of a mortgage she held on a piece of property she sold to Petitioner in October 1982 in St. Petersburg Beach. The $10,000 Herren mortgage was also recorded on December 28, 1982. Having obtained the satisfaction, Petitioner then sold the St. Petersburg Beach property to Juanita Murdaugh and Jeffrey Graham on December 17, 1982, prior to recording the $10,000 Herren mortgage. He did not disclose on the Affidavit of Purchaser and Vendor which he executed that he had an outstanding $10,000 mortgage in favor of Herren on this St. Petersburg Beach property, although this mortgage should have been disclosed as "secondary financing." In each of the Affidavits of Vendor and Purchaser executed by Petitioner in connection with sales of property as described herein, there is the following statement in Item VII: The certifications of this affidavit are for the purpose of inducing the Lender named above or its assignees to make or purchase the first mortgage described by this affidavit.... By signing the Affidavits of Vendor and Purchaser, Petitioner, as the "Property Vendor," made the following certification: The PROPERTY VENDOR hereby certifies that to the extent PROPERTY VENDOR is a party, the Financial Terms, including Total Purchase Price, and the Liens are as set forth in Items III and IV above, [and] hereby acknowledges the inducement purpose of this affidavit as set forth in Item VII above....
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner's application for licensure as a mortgage broker be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th of October, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 1987. APPENDIX (DOAH No. 87-0033) Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 1.(a) Adopted in Findings of Fact 2, 4. 2.(a) Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. 2.(b) Rejected in Findings of Fact 5, 6. 2.(c) Rejected in Finding of Fact 10. 2.(d) Rejected in Findings of Fact 6-10. 2.(e), (f) Rejected in Finding of Fact 11. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2, 3. 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 4. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 4. 5-6. Rejected as not based upon competent substantial evidence. 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5, 6. 9. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7, 10. 10-11. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7, 9, 10. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8, 10. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8, 9, 10. 14-19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. COPIES FURNISHED: John Swisher, Esquire Dillinger & Swisher 5511 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, FL 33710 Stephen M. Christian, Esquire Office of Comptroller 1313 Tampa Street Tampa, FL 33602-3394 Honorable Gerald Lewis Department of Banking and Finance Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 Charles L. Stutts General Counsel Plaza Level The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged, under Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, with enforcing the licensure standards embodied in Chapter 475, and regulating the manner of practice of licensed real estate brokers pursuant to the standards enumerated in Chapter 475, Florida Statutes and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. The Respondent, Stewart J. Love, at all times pertinent hereto, has been a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, holding license number 0145076. That license is issued to Stewart J. Love, t/a Love Realty, 2120 Westfield Road, Pensacola, Florida 32505. A previous Administrative Complaint was filed against the Respondent by Petitioner on June 23, 1988. That Complaint, in essence, also charged two violations of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes involving alleged fraud and misrepresentation, concealment, dishonest dealing, culpable negligence and the like It involved two separate real estate transactions which the Respondent engaged in. The first transaction concerned a piece of property Respondent purchased with an existing mortgage and shortly thereafter resold. The Respondent was charged with failing to assume the existing mortgage and, in essence, with not keeping the mortgage payments current, with receiving funds from his purchasers without properly accounting for them in proper escrow accounts and with failing to formally consummate the sale, as well as with issuing a check to the mortgagee bank holding the delinquent mortgage upon insufficient funds. With regard to the other transaction, the Respondent, in essence, was charged with purchasing a piece of property, recording his warranty deed from the sellers, but never properly paying the sellers monies that were due them for the property nor carrying through with the promise to assume the mortgage on that piece of property. That complaint culminated in DOAH Case No. 88-4570, in which the Respondent was charged in pertinent part with violations of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. During the course of that proceeding the Petitioner and Respondent entered into negotiations such that a stipulated adjudication of that proceeding by the agency was effected. The Respondent neither admitted nor denied the charges, but rather agreed to a fine of $500.00, as well as to making restitution of all monies owed to the alleged injured parties and to having his license being placed on probationary status for a period of one year for "culpable negligence" in violation of 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. A final order is in evidence as part of Petitioner's Exhibit 1 in this proceeding. Donald and Teresa Winingar, husband and wife, in 1986 found themselves in rather straitened financial circumstances. Their home mortgage was in arrears and was threatened by foreclosure by the mortgagee. The ultimate result of their financial problems caused them to search for a new place to reside. They located six acres of land owned by Donna Day Bowers. The acreage had a small frame house approximately 20 years of age on it. They began negotiating with Ms. Bowers concerning purchasing the property from her The Winingars discussed the price with Ms. Bowers and ultimately a purchase price of approximately $12,000.00 was agreed upon. The Winingars realized that they could not pay cash for the property but would have to secure financing arrangements in order to purchase it. The Winingars had approximately $4,500.00 in cash and at first attempted to have the balance financed by the owner and seller, Ms. Bowers. That arrangement did not come to fruition and so the Winingars searched for another source of funds in order to finance the purchase of the Bowers property in this search they somehow came in contact with the Respondent Stewart Love, a real estate broker. After negotiations with Mr. Love he agreed to finance the purchase of the Bowers property for the Winingars. This resulted in a verbal agreement entered into between the Winingars and the Respondent whereby the Winingars would pay Love $4,500.00 in cash and he would finance the balance of $8,500.00 of the purchase price by a mortgage. Love, or the corporation of which he was president and part owner, Courthouse Investments, Inc., would collect interest on the $8,500.00 mortgage and note from the Winingars. Love also assessed the Winingars a $2,000.00 fee for handling the transaction, the purpose of the fee being unclear. It was apparently some sort of "broker's fee," although Love did not represent the Winingars as a realtor. On October 16, 1986 Respondent entered into an agreement called a "Warranty Deed to Trustee Under Land Trust Agreement pursuant to Section 689.071, Florida Statues," with the seller of the property, Donna Day. That instrument conveyed title to the property to the Respondent as Trustee in fee simple. The "warranty deed to trustee" document granted the trustee, Love, full power and authority to sell, lease, encumber and otherwise manage and dispose of the property in accordance with the terms of that instrument and with a trust agreement. The trust agreement itself, providing for powers and duties of the trustee and beneficiary of the trust is not evidence and the terms of it are unknown. In any event, having purchased the property from Donna Day (also known as Donna Day Bowers) the Respondent the following day, October 17, 1986, agreed to sell the property to Donald and Teresa Winingar. The Winingars on that day gave the Respondent $4,500.00 in cash as a down payment for the Bowers property. Thereafter, on or about October 31, 1986, the Winingars executed a mortgage note for the amount of $8,500.00 remaining on the purchase price, payable in favor of Courthouse Investments, Inc., a corporation partially owned by and represented by the Respondent Love and of which the Respondent was President. That mortgage note provides that the note was to be for a principal balance of $8,500.00 with payments of $130.00 per month for 265 months at an interest rate of 18% per annum. The note provided for no prepayment penalties and for $6.00 for late fees for each late payment. Additionally, the Winingars executed a promissory note payable to Stewart J. Love for the above-mentioned fee, in the amount of $2,000.00. That note provided that one balloon payment was to be due six years from October 30, 1986 at the rate of 12% per annum, payable in one payment. The Winingars began making monthly payments on the mortgage note of $130.00 per month and made those payments to Stewart J. Love. They were frequently behind in their payments but made payments sporadically until approximately May of 1988. When the Winingars and Mr. Love first engaged in negotiating the financing arrangement, Love informed the Winingars that he would have his attorney draft an agreement whereby the property would be held in trust by Love on behalf of the Winingars allegedly so that it could not be attached by any creditors of the Winingars. This was apparently because the Winingars were involved in a foreclosure action concerning their previous residential property and feared a deficiency judgment from that foreclosure proceeding which might endanger their rights to the land in question. Whether or not their credit was in such peril, Love assured them that he would obtain title to the property from the seller in the form of a trust arrangement, with the beneficial interest to be conveyed to the Winingars, in order to allegedly protect their interest in the six acres from the claims of creditors. Love then at some point showed a photocopy of a document entitled "Warranty Deed to Trustee Under Land Trust Agreement pursuant to Section 689.071, Florida Statutes," to the Winingars and advised them that form of agreement would be drafted to represent their mutual arrangement regarding the sale and ownership of the property, pending final payment by the Winingars. After the initial down payment of $4,500.00 was made by the Winingars, however, they had to make repeated demands of the Respondent for the execution of an agreement or contract to to formalize their arrangement regarding the purchasing of the Bowers property. The purchase arrangements from October 1986 to May 1987 were merely verbal aside from the execution of the mortgage note in question. Finally, on May 1, 1987, a document entitled "Agreement to Convey Beneficial Interest" was signed and executed by the Respondent as President of Courthouse Investments, Inc., "beneficiary," and the Winingars. That agreement provided, in pertinent part, that the total purchase price should be $8,500.00, which acknowledged, in effect, that the remaining $4,500.00 of the originally agreed upon purchase price had already been paid. The agreement also provided that when the principal sum of the purchase price had been paid in full that the beneficiary would instruct the trustee (Stewart Love) to deliver to the grantees (the Winingars) a warranty deed showing good and marketable title to the property. The beneficiary held the beneficial equitable interest in the property with the legal title being held by the Respondent as trustee. The beneficiary was Courthouse Investments, Inc., of which the trustee, the Respondent, was the President. He signed the agreement to convey beneficial interest as the President of that corporation. The agreement also provided that the grantees would be, permitted to go into possession of the property immediately on the date of its execution (May 1, 1987) and would assume all liability for insurance, taxes and maintenance after that date. ,It was also expressly agreed that all oil, gas and mineral rights were to be conveyed to the grantee. Presumably, that meant that all gas and mineral rights were to be conveyed upon the conveying of the warranty deed to the grantees when the purchase price was paid in full. In any event, the agreement clearly provided that when the principal sum of the purchase price was paid in full that a warranty deed conveying good and marketable title would be immediately conveyed to the grantees and, in that connection, the mortgage note already executed at that time by the grantees and the respondent provided that there would be no penalty for early payment of the purchase price or principal amount of the mortgage note referenced in the Agreement to Convey Beneficial Interest. This Agreement to Convey Beneficial Interest reveals additionally that Courthouse Investments, Inc. was the beneficiary of the trust set up by the above-mentioned warranty deed instrument from the original owner to the Respondent, as well as the fact that the Respondent is the President of the beneficiary corporation. Thus, there is no doubt, based upon the terms of the Agreement to Convey Beneficial Interest and the manner in which it was executed by the Respondent as President of the beneficiary corporation, that the Respondent knew that the parties thereto had agreed that all oil, gas and mineral rights were to be conveyed to the grantee upon the payment of the principal sum of the mortgage involved and that the trustee (the Respondent) would be obligated to transfer fee simple title to the grantees by warranty deed upon full payment, at any time, by the grantees. The "Warranty Deed to Trustee . . . " referenced above, however, clearly reveals that the seller, Donna Day (a/k/a Donna Day Bowers) had retained one-half the mineral rights and thus neither the Respondent/Trustee nor the beneficiary corporation had any ability to convey all gas and mineral rights to the grantees simply because the Respondent as trustee with legal title and the beneficiary corporation, the holder of equitable title, only owned one-half of the oil, gas and mineral rights. Since the Respondent/trustee arranged and conducted the purchase transaction with Ms. Bowers whereby he took fee simple title as trustee to the property in question under an instrument which revealed on its face that Ms. Bowers retained half the mineral rights, and since that same Respondent executed the agreement to convey beneficial interest (analogous to a contract for deed) to the Winingars as president of the beneficiary corporation which was the Grantor under that instrument purporting to convey all oil, gas and mineral rights (upon payment of the full purchase price), the Respondent is chargeable with knowledge that the representation concerning oil, gas and mineral rights contained in the Agreement to Convey Beneficial Interest did not accurately represent the ownership situation with regard to those oil, gas and mineral rights. After the Winingars made the initial down payment of $4,500.00 cash in October 1986 and during the time when they were making repeated demands for the execution of a contract to formalize their agreement regarding purchasing of the Bowers property, Mr. Love brought a representative of a financial institution known as "C&S Family Credit" (C&S) to the Winingars' home, sometime in January 1987. This representative and the Respondent informed Teresa Winingar that C&S Family Credit was considering the purchase of their mortgage from the Respondent. The Respondent and the C&S representative, however, advised Ms. Winingar to continue making her monthly payments of $130.00 to the Respondent and not to C&S. The Following year, in May, 1988, Teresa Winingar went to the Respondent's office to pay off the balance of the $8,500.00 mortgage note. Mr. Love informed her at that time that he could not accept the payoff because he did not have a clear title to the property to transfer to the Winingars at that time. The Agreement to Convey Beneficial Interest required the Respondent to transfer marketable title by general warranty deed upon tender of the payoff of the principal balance on the mortgage note. This he did not do. Thereafter, in June of 1988, a representative from C&S again visited the Winingars at their home. This time he informed Mrs. Winingar that his company was about to foreclose on the property at issue because a mortgage on the Winingar's property was in arrears. This was a mortgage executed by the Respondent in favor of C&S as mortgagee and which encumbered the property the Winingars were purchasing. At some point after that June 1988 visit by the C&S representative, C&S filed a foreclosure action against Stewart J. Love and the Winingars. Prior to the May 1988 offer by Mrs. Winingar to pay off the mortgage note, the Respondent's because he could not convey clear title, and the visit by the C&S representative informing Ms. Winingar of the delinquency of the Respondent's mortgage, the Winingars had no knowledge that the Respondent had executed a mortgage on their property in favor of another party. The mortgage executed in favor of C&S encompassed several pieces of property owned by the Respondent, including the piece of property being purchased by the Winingars. The evidence does not reflect that the Respondent made any arrangements with C&S to obtain a partial release of that mortgage as to the Winingar's property at such point as they should tender full payment of the balance of their purchase money mortgage note. While the Respondent, as trustee and holder of fee simple title to the Winingars' property might have had legal authority to mortgage the property to C&S, he was equally obligated under the agreement to convey beneficial interest to insure that their equitable interest in the property was protected, such that he would be able to convey good and marketable title by warranty deed upon the payment by the Winingars of the principal sum of the purchase price. This he was unable to do because he had failed to make arrangements with C&S for a partial release of mortgage or other means of insuring that the Winingars' property was unencumbered at the point of their tendering payment of the remaining purchase price. This negligent failure to insure that the Winingars' equitable interest in the property was protected resulted in the foreclosure action filed by C&S against the Respondent and the Winingars' interest in the property because the Respondent had not made payments on the C&S mortgage in a timely manner. The conveyance of fee simple title to the Respondent by the "Florida Land Trust Agreement" containing the reservation in the original owner of one- half of the oil, gas and mineral rights was recorded, so that any prospective purchaser or his representative searching the title of the subject property could have determined that the Respondent only owned one-half of the mineral rights to the property. Nevertheless, the Winingars were under the impression that they were to receive all mineral rights to the property. This impression may have arisen from the fact that the clause in the agreement to convey beneficial interest provides that . . . "All oil, gas and mineral rights are to be conveyed to the grantee." This agreement appears to be a form or "fill-in- the-blank" agreement prepared by the Respondent himself and not an attorney. Thus, it appears that the mineral rights clause referenced above is a "standard one" which was probably inadvertently left in that form in the agreement when it was executed due to the Respondent's negligence. It has not been established that he intentionally misrepresented the state of his ownership of mineral rights which he would be able to convey to the grantees. In fact, some eighteen months after the original purchase transaction between the Winingars, the Respondent and Courthouse Investments, Inc. was entered into, the Respondent executed the renewal of a preexisting oil lease with regard to the subject property. He, or his corporation, collected the sum of $238.00 lease payment as a result of that renewal. At the time of that lease renewal the Respondent still had legal title to the property and one-half of the mineral rights. This would not have been the case, however, had he timely transferred title to the Winingars in May of 1988 when they tendered payment in full of the remaining balance of the purchase price and at which point he was unable to convey marketable title for the reasons delineated above. In any event, the Winingars were shown to have been entitled to the Respondent's mineral rights at the point of their tender of full payment of the remaining purchase price in May of 1988, at which point title should have been transferred, together with the mineral rights held by the Respondent, which did not occur. As a result of the Respondent's failure to convey title upon the fulfillment of the condition in the above-referenced agreement regarding payment and the dispute which arose between the parties concerning the mineral rights and the proceeds from the lease, the Winingars apparently obtained counsel and instituted legal proceedings against the Respondent of an undisclosed nature. Criminal proceedings were instituted by the State's attorney against the Respondent. These proceedings resulted in a plea of "Nolo Contendere" by the Respondent in order to avoid the expense and anguish of trial and was a negotiated settlement of the criminal charges. Through the plea negotiation arrangement which was accepted by the Court, on February 14, 1990, an order withholding adjudication of guilt and placing the defendant (Respondent) on probation was entered in the case of the State of Florida v. Stewart J. Love, Case NO. 88-5765 CFA. See Petitioner's exhibit (3) in evidence. That order was entered pursuant to the plea of Nolo Contendere entered by the Respondent to the offense of petit theft. The subject matter of the theft charge was the $238.00 lease payment which the Respondent had maintained he or his corporation was entitled to and which the Winingars believed they were entitled to. In any event, the Respondent was placed on probation for a period of six months and was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of the $238.00 to the Winingars. He was also ordered to pay certain costs and was ordered to set a firm closing date by which the Winingars could obtain clear title to the property upon their payment of the balance due, as well as applicable closing costs, including one- half title insurance. The Respondent was ordered by the Court to attend and assist in the closing of the transaction. The Court also ordered that the Respondent would not be liable to clear any encumbrances to the title to the property which had been caused by the Winingars. Ultimately, the Winingars failed to tender the remaining purchase price and therefore the closing never occurred.
The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether Respondents, Samuel T. Henson and DuPont Funding Corporation, committed multiple acts in violation of applicable statutes and administrative rules and, if so, what, if any, penalties should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the administrative agency charged with responsibility for administering and enforcing the provisions of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes.3 Respondent, DuPont Funding Corporation ("DuPont") is a Florida corporation engaged in the mortgage brokerage business at a single location at 7300 West Camino Real Drive, Boca Raton, Florida 33442. DuPont is registered with Petitioner under registration number HB 592710662. Respondent, Samuel T. Henson, ("Henson"), is the principal mortgage broker for DuPont. Henson is licensed by Petitioner as a mortgage broker pursuant to license number HA 247542864. As the mortgage broker for DuPont, Henson is responsible for his compliance with Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, as well as that of DuPont. Petitioner examined and investigated Respondents in response to five complaints received by Petitioner. The investigation involved events allegedly occurring between January 1, 1989 through August 31, 1990. Misuse And Misapplication Of Deposits The Smith Transaction Respondents failed to refund a deposit in the amount of $1,493.00 to Mr. J. W. Smith (the "Smith transaction"). Mr. Smith deposited $1,493.00 with Respondents to pay the costs of a mortgage applied for by the purchaser of commercial property owned by Mr. Smith. According to the terms of the Mortgage Loan Agreement and Application, the deposit was refundable if Respondents were unable to obtain financing for the proposed transaction. After Respondents were unable to obtain the financing applied for, they refused to refund Mr. Smith's deposit. Mr. Smith owned the Esmeralda Inn in Chimney Rock, North Carolina (the "Inn"). The Inn was listed for sale with Daniel Murr of First Commercial Brokers in Asheville, North Carolina, in the amount of $650,000.00. In October, 1989, Mr. Smith received a full price offer to purchase the Inn from Mr. and Mrs. William C. Robeck. Mr. and Mrs. Robeck were represented by a Mr. Castaldi as the their agent. The terms of the offer required Mr. and Mrs. Robeck to pay $25,000.00 and for Mr. Smith to carry a second mortgage in the amount of $185,000.00. The balance of the purchase price was to be paid in the form of a first mortgage in the amount of $440,000.00. Mr. Smith did not accept the offer of purchase from Mr. and Mrs. Robeck because he considered the amount of the cash invested by the purchasers to be insufficient. Sometime in December, 1989, Mr. Smith received a full price offer to purchase the Inn from Mr. Andrew Okpych. The terms of the offer required Mr. Okpych to pay $100,000.00 and for Mr. Smith to carry a second mortgage in the amount of $200,000.00. The Branch Bank and Trust Company in Asheville, North Carolina agreed to provide a first mortgage in the amount of $350,000.00. Mr. Smith wanted to minimize the amount of his second mortgage. He was advised by Mr. Daniel Murr that Respondents had represented to Mr. Murr that they could obtain a first mortgage for the purchase in the amount of $440,000.00 to finance the Smith-to-Okpych transaction. This financing proposal would reduce the second mortgage held by Mr. Smith to $110,000.00. Mr. Smith authorized Mr. Murr to contact Respondents. Henson contacted Mr. Smith by telephone to discuss the proposed financing in the amount of $440,000.00 on or about December 19, 1989. During that telephone conversation, Henson represented to Mr. Smith that Henson had located a lender which had already approved the needed $440,000.00 loan. Henson refused repeated requests by Mr. Smith to identity the lender. Henson insisted that Mr. Smith sign an agreement to pay the costs of the loan transaction and deposit $1,500.00 with Respondents before Henson would identify the lender which had pre-approved the loan in the amount of $440,000.00. Mr. Smith and Mr. Okpych signed a Mortgage Loan Agreement and Application (the "agreement") with Respondents on January 5, 1990. Mr. Okpych signed the agreement as borrower and Mr. Smith signed as the person responsible for all expenses incurred in connection with the agreement. The agreement was signed by Henson on January 5, 1992, and sent by facsimile to Mr. Smith and Mr. Okpych from the office of Mr. Smith's attorney. Mr. Smith and Mr. Okpych made several changes to the agreement and initialed the changes. One such change made the deposit from Mr. Smith a refundable deposit by deleting the prefix "non-" from the word "non-refundable" in the typed form of the agreement. Mr. Smith and Mr. Okpych sent the modified agreement to Henson by facsimile on the same day. Mr. Smith telephoned Henson on January 5, 1992, to advise Henson that the modified agreement had been sent by facsimile. Henson stated that he had received the agreement and stated that the modifications were acceptable. Henson directed Mr. Smith to wire transfer the $1,500.00 deposit. Mr. Smith wired $1,500.00, less the $7.00 charge for the wire transfer, on January 10, 1990. The wire transfer in the amount of $1,493.00 was sent to the account of Dupont Funding Corporation, account number 3601345943, NCNB, Deerfield Beach, Florida. Henson notified Mr. Smith by telephone on or about January 15, 1992, that he could not procure the needed financing. The reason given by Henson was that the lender did not want to make the loan because the property was located in North Carolina. Henson still refused to identify the lender to Mr. Smith, but suggested that the needed financing may be obtainable from "General Electric." See Exhibit 12 at 24. The next day, Henson telephoned Mr. Smith and stated that the loan was not available from any lender and that the deposit of $1,493.00 would be refunded to Mr. Smith later in the week. After repeated requests and written demands, Mr. Smith's deposit in the amount of $1,493.00 has not been refunded. The Robeck Transaction Respondents failed to refund a deposit in the amount of $2,500.00 to Mr. and Mrs. William C. Robeck (the "Robeck transaction"). Mr. and Mrs. Robeck deposited $2,500.00 with Respondents when the Robeck's applied for a mortgage in the amount of $440,000.00 on October 11, 1989, in their unsuccessful attempt to purchase the Inn from Mr. Smith. When Mr. Robeck questioned whether the deposit was refundable, Henson changed the typed form of the Mortgage Loan Agreement and Application (the "loan application") by deleting the prefix "non-" in the typed word "non-refundable". The modified loan agreement was signed by the Robeck's and Henson. Respondents were unable to obtain financing for the proposed transaction. After the Robecks were unable to obtain financing, Respondents refused to refund the Robeck's deposit. Mr and Mrs. Robeck made an offer to purchase the Inn from Mr. Smith sometime in October, 1989. The offer was rejected, and the Robeck's asked Henson to refund their deposit sometime in January, 1990. Henson refused to refund the deposit and told Mr. Robeck to find another bed and breakfast inn. Mr. Robeck found another bed and breakfast inn for sale in Franklin, North Carolina. He offered to acquire the inn by lease-purchase. His offer was accepted, but Mr. Robeck later found approximately $1,000,000.00 in stolen property on the premises. The owner was arrested, and the lease-purchase transaction was not consummated. Mr. Robeck again requested the refund of his deposit, and Henson again refused the request. Mr. Robeck has never been refunded any portion of his deposit. The Shuster Transaction Respondents failed to refund a deposit in the amount of $2,500.00 to Mr. Sanford Shuster (the "Shuster transaction"). Mr. Shuster deposited $2,500.00 with Respondents when he applied for a mortgage in the amount of $3,500,000.00 on February 8, 1990, to finance the acquisition of an Assisted Care Living Facility ("ACLF"). Henson changed the typed form of the Mortgage Loan Agreement and Application (the "mortgage application") by deleting the prefix "non-" in the typed word "non-refundable". The modified mortgage application was signed by Mr. Shuster and Henson. Mr. Shuster was unable to obtain financing, and Respondents refused to refund Mr. Shuster's deposit. Mr. Shuster made repeated attempts to obtain his refundable deposit from Respondents including several telephone conversations with Henson and two written demands for payment on April 10, 1990, and on June 2, 1990. In every instance, Henson agreed to refund the deposit but never did so. Mr. Shuster and Henson entered into a compromise agreement on September 10, 1990. Pursuant to the terms of the compromise agreement, Henson agreed to pay Mr. Shuster $2,000.00 in full settlement of the $2,500.00 claim by Mr. Shuster. Henson paid none of the $2,000.00 required under the settlement agreement with Mr. Shuster. Mr. Shuster sued Henson in Palm Beach County Court and obtained a Final Judgment against Henson on January 31, 1992, in the amount of $2,058.75. On May 7, 1991, Henson paid Mr. Shuster $100.00 toward the amount due under the Final Judgment, but made no other payments. Mr. Shuster has never received the balance of the deposit owed to him and has a claim pending with the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund. The Linker Transaction Respondents failed to refund deposits totaling $22,500.00 to Mr. Gerald Linker (the "Linker transaction"). Mr. Linker deposited $22,500.00 with Respondents when he applied for a mortgage in the amount of $1,250,000.00 in May, 1990, to finance the acquisition of an alcohol and drug abuse center (the "center"). Henson obtained a written loan commitment from Nationwide Funding, Inc. ("Nationwide"), on May 23, 1990. Neither Nationwide nor Respondents performed in accordance with the terms of the commitment. Mr. Linker never received his loan and never received his deposits. Mr. Linker's attorney made repeated attempts to have Mr. Linker's deposits refunded to him. Mr. Linker's attorney filed suit in the Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit in Palm Beach County, Florida, and obtained separate judgments against Henson and Dupont in the respective amounts of $69,023.01 and $69,520.78. Respondents paid none of the $138,543.79 owed to Mr. Linker. Mr. Linker has a claim pending with the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund. The Barth Transaction Respondents failed to return a refundable deposit in the amount of $10,000.00 to Mr. Andrew J. Barth (the "Barth transaction"). Mr. Barth deposited $10,000.00 with Respondents when he applied for financing in connection with the purchase of the Cardinal Retirement Village in Bradenton, Florida, on November 17, 1989. Mr. Barth was to assume an existing mortgage of approximately $9,800,000.00 in the transaction. Respondents agreed to arrange the assumption. The owners of the Cardinal Retirement Village refused to proceed and Respondents never refunded Mr. Barth's deposit. The agreement between Mr. Barth and Respondents provided in relevant part: The deposit will be refunded no later than thirty (30) days from this date if this real estate and mortgage transaction is not successfully completed and closed. Mr. Barth made repeated attempts to have his deposit refunded to him. In May, 1990, Mr. Barth's attorney negotiated a Pay Back Agreement with Respondents in which Respondents agreed to pay $1,500.00 a month to Mr. Barth to refund the deposit with interest. Respondents paid only $3,000.00 to Mr. Barth. Mr. Barth has never received the balance owed to him for his refundable deposit. Failure To Maintain Escrow Accounts Respondents failed to maintain an escrow account during 1988 and 1989 and failed to place deposits in escrow. Respondents failed to place deposits in escrow for the Smith, Robeck, Shuster, Linker, and Barth transactions. The accounts to which the monies were deposited by Respondents were not escrow accounts. Respondents failed to place deposits from numerous other transactions in escrow. Respondents failed to deposit in escrow the following amounts: an appraisal fee of $250.00 and a credit report fee of $150.00 collected from Mr. Eric Jason prior to closing a mortgage for $101,650.00 on November 30, 1989; an appraisal fee of $250.00 and a credit report fee of $50.00 collected from Francis J. and Barbara A. Lynch prior to closing a mortgage for $50,000.00 on February 5, 1990; a deposit of $2,000.00 in part payment of the brokerage fee collected from Mr. Nicholas A. Paleveda and Ms. Marjorie Ewing prior to closing a mortgage for $356,400.00 on April 20, 1990; a deposit of $350.00 collected from Mr. Richard L. Trombley prior to closing a mortgage for $40,000.00 on November 2, 1990; and a deposit of $350 collected from the Sun Bay Development Corporation prior to closing a mortgage for $292,500.00 on February 6, 1990. Excessive, Duplicate, And Undisclosed Charges Respondents imposed excessive, duplicate, or undisclosed charges in numerous mortgage transactions. The costs itemized and collected from borrowers in these transactions were not supported by actual expenditures. Respondents collected $625.00 from Mr. and Mrs. Ernest L. Sego for an appraisal that cost $250.00. Mr. and Mrs. Sego paid $325.00 for an appraisal report at the time they executed a Mortgage Brokerage Agreement on August 17, 1988, for a mortgage in the amount of $151,000.00. At the closing on April 7, 1989, Mr. and Mrs. Sego were charged an additional $300.00. Respondents collected $50.00 from Mr. and Mrs. Sego for a credit report at the time the Mortgage Brokerage Agreement was executed. At the closing, Mr. and Mrs. Sego were charged an additional $45.00 for a credit report. Respondents underestimated the closing costs for: Mr. Jason in the amount of $590.00; The Lynch's in the amount of $492.50; and Mr. and Mrs. Sego in the amount of $1,140.00. Failure To Disclose Respondents failed to disclose costs incurred by numerous borrowers. Respondents failed to disclose changes in the cost of title insurance which occurred between the time the borrowers signed Good Faith Estimate forms and the time the mortgage transactions closed. The estimated cost for title insurance for the Lynch's was $460.00 while the actual cost was $637.50. The estimated cost of title insurance for Mr. and Mrs. Sego was $200.00 and the actual cost was $263.00. The Mortgage Brokerage Agreement/Good Faith Estimate was not signed by two borrowers in separate transactions. Neither Mr. and Mrs. Knowlton nor Mr. Trombley signed those documents. Respondents failed to disclose payments made to a co- broker in two separate transactions. Mr. Nicholas Cancel was hired by Respondents to process loans. Loan processing is limited to preparing the documentation necessary to close a loan. Mr. Cancel is a licensed mortgage broker who was employed by a broker other than Respondents. Respondents failed to disclose payments made to Mr. Cancel in his capacity as an independent broker in the mortgage loans to the Lynch's and Mr. Jason. Failure To Maintain Books And Records And Failure To Cooperate Respondents failed to maintain books and records at the principal place of business. Respondents maintained only one business location. When Petitioner's investigator visited Respondents' office and asked for the books and records, Henson told the investigator that there were no books and records at the office. Petitioner subsequently served Respondents with a subpoena to produce Dupont's books and records. Respondents produced 57 mortgage files and some banking records. The files produced by Respondents were incomplete. Most contained only brochures. No files were produced on the Shuster and Linker transactions. During the investigation Henson represented to the investigator that he was neither president nor a corporate officer of Dupont. However, Henson repeatedly signed loan application and loan closing documents as president of Dupont including the Smith, Robeck, and Shuster transactions. Henson also entered into numerous co-brokerage arrangements as president of Dupont including arrangements with Mr. Cancel and Ms. Patricia Towers, president of Towers Mortgage Corporation, 6971 North Federal Highway, Boca Raton, Florida 33487. Fraud, Deceit, Misrepresentation, And Gross Negligence Respondents' intent to defraud and deceive the public is evidenced by a consistent pattern and practice of incompetence, gross negligence, misrepresentation, and failure to disclose material facts in multiple transactions over an extended period of time. Respondents knew or should have known that the acts committed by them constituted violations of law. Respondents violations resulted in financial loss to numerous individuals and to the public generally. Respondents failed to comply with agreements voluntarily executed by them and failed to pay amounts due under judgments duly entered against them by Florida courts. Respondents failed to cooperate with state investigators and failed to maintain books, records, and escrow accounts required by law.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner issue a final order revoking the license of Respondent, Henson, and revoking the registration of Respondent, Dupont. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of September 1992. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September 1992.
Findings Of Fact John F. Cole, David J. Hayes and Andre LeClerc conveyed certain real estate situated in Broward County ("the property") to respondent by quitclaim deed dated December 16, 1976, and recorded on December 29, 1976. This instrument reflects payment of a documentary stamp tax in the amount of thirty cents ($0.30) as well as a documentary surtax. On September 30, 1971, Thomas N. Sprague and Peggy A. Sprague had mortgaged the property to Merle Ford to secure repayment of the principal sum of twenty-three thousand five hundred dollars ($23,500.00). On October 1, 1971, the Spragues mortgaged the property to Atlantic Federal Savings and Loan Association of Fort Lauderdale to secure repayment of the principal sum of one hundred three thousand dollars ($103,000.00) On November 21, 1973, John A. Kasbar, as trustee, mortgaged the property to the Spragues to secure repayment of the principal sum of twenty- three thousand one hundred dollars ($23,100.00) On June 5, 1969, Esther E. Adams conveyed the property by warranty deed to Andre LeClerc, as trustee. The warranty deed reflected payment of a documentary stamp tax in the amount of five hundred forty-three dollars ($543.00). The property which was the subject of these transactions is evidently worth a substantial sum of money, but the evidence fails to establish the value of the interest quitclaimed on December 16, 1976, and does not establish what consideration for the quitclaim deed was given, if any was given.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the notice of proposed assessment be withdrawn. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Edwin J. Stacker, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Mr. Ronald Payne, Esquire 621 South Federal Highway Fort Lauderdale, Florida
The Issue The issue in Case No. 94-2065 is whether National Mortgage Bankers, Inc. violated certain disciplinary proceedings governing mortgage brokers and, if so, what penalty should be imposed. The issue in Case No. 94-2066 is whether National Mortgage Bankers, Inc. is entitled to licensure as a correspondent mortgage lender.
Findings Of Fact As of September 3, 1992, the Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance (Department), issued a mortgage lender's license to National Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (NMB). At all material times, NMB acted as a mortgage broker, not a mortgage lender. NMB originated mortgaged loans, which were funded by third parties. NMB's principal place of business was in Pt. Charlotte. At all material times, Sheldon Voron was employed as the chief executive officer of NMB. Business was slow for NMB during the first few months after it acquired its mortgage lending license. NMB was operated by Mr. Voron, who supervised loan officers and the processing of loan applications, and Mark Asciutto, who handled bookkeeping, payroll, and the checking accounts, including the escrow account. Mr. Asciutto left the company in September 1993. By the end of 1992, the net worth of NMB was $89,115.23, according to an audited financial statement issued on February 12, 1993. The net worth deteriorated during 1993, dropping to $63,533 by December 31, 1993, according to an audited financial statement issued on March 7, 1994. At no time did NMB ever advise the Department that its net worth was below $250,000. In early 1993, business picked up from late 1992, and NMB hired a second loan processor. Refinancing activity in early 1993 required that NMB continually add new help. At this time, the approval of uncomplicated conventional loan applications took 30-45 days, and the operation ran smoothly. But business continued to increase. From March to June, NMB opened up offices in Naples and Sarasota. A branch in office in Englewood was opened and quickly closed due to its proximity to other offices. By April, the volume of business at NMB was increasing rapidly, aided in part by the addition of government loans. An average of 75 cases monthly during the first three months increased to 125 cases in April. Employing four to five loan processors, NMB continued to hire additional employees, but soon had problems finding qualified persons, as competition in the lending business was increasing due to considerable refinancing activity. Mr. Asciutto handled the escrow account during these busy months, until another employee assumed these duties in late July or August 1994. Mr. Asciutto routinely transferred money from the escrow account to the general operating account when Mr. Asciutto determined that NMB was entitled to retain the money, such as when customers had not been responsive to inquiries from NMB employees. The only such transfer for which a specific amount was identified at the hearing was $860, which was swept from escrow to general operations by check dated April 16, 1993. As is obvious from the trend in net worth, profitability did not increase in direct proportion to increases in business volume. In fact, total income increased from $82,716.01 in 1992 to $556,907 in 1993, but net income increased only from $30,714.88 to $43,528. NMB simply could not keep up with the business, as is evidenced by the experiences of its customers. In July 1993, William Zinser read an NMB advertisement in the newspaper offering an adjustable mortgage rate and a low fixed-rate mortgage. He called the number and set up an appointment to visit the office. He met with an employee of NMB, who discussed interest rates and closing fees. She assured Mr. Zinser that it would take only about 30 days to close the loan. Mr. Zinser submitted a loan application, and the employee said NMB would be back in touch with him. Mr. Zinser waited three or four weeks and heard nothing. He called and was told that there were no problems. On two or three occasions, an NMB employee requested from Mr. Zinser a profit and loss statement or a verification of his wife's income. However, NMB had the wife's income information since the start of the loan application process and twice had received the profit and loss statements. On January 4, 1994, Mr. Zinser applied for a loan with another lender. Shortly thereafter, an NMB employee called him and said that his loan was approved. When he said that he had gone elsewhere, she reminded him that he had obligated himself to pay a $1250 fee in connection with the loan. He refused to pay. On or about July 15, 1993, Janice Hamann first contacted NMB about refinancing her home. She applied for a mortgage, and an NMB employee asked for more information. She supplied it the following day, and the employee said everything was fine. The employee said that it would probably take 4-6 weeks to close. On August 13, 1993, Ms. Hamann called NMB to check on the status of the loan application. An NMB employee said that they would probably close when she returned from a week's vacation. On August 23, Ms. Hamann called and was told to provide some additional information on her payment history. She provided the requested information by September 20. For a second time, she had to provide verification of her husband's employment. On September 18, Ms. Hamann received notification from her homeowner's insurer that they had changed her insurance, evidently to show a new loss payee. No one from NMB had told her that the loan was ready to close. A couple of months later, surveyors showed up and surveyed the property that was to have been the subject of the loan and additional property. Ms. Hamann called NMB and informed them of the mistaken inclusion of additional property. On November 22, Ms. Hamann called NMB and said that she wanted her paperwork and was withdrawing her application. Ten days later, someone from NMB called her and said they were ready to close. Ms. Hamann restated her demand for her paperwork and refused to close. A few days later, she received a letter demanding $1500 in addition to the $300 that she had paid for the credit check, survey, and appraisal. She still receives bills from the surveyor. On September 9, 1993, Richard Chadbourne contacted NMB about refinancing a mortgage. At the first office visit, he completed an application and delivered a check to NMB in the amount of $300. An NMB employee said they would contact him for more information and said it would take 30-45 days to close his loan. At the first meeting, Mr. Chadbourne stated that he wanted the 3.259 percent variable rate mortgage with a six point cap, which NMB was offering. An NMB employee said that they could get him a 3.375 percent rate. On the one or two occasions that NMB contacted Mr. Chadbourne for more information, he provided it to them immediately. Repeated calls to NMB by Mr. Chadbourne or his agent were never returned. No one from NMB ever called Mr. Chadbourne to tell him whether his loan was approved or denied, and he never withdrew his application. On September 10, 1993, Katherine Healey and her husband visited the NMB office to apply for a refinancing loan. Responding to a newspaper advertisement for a 3.375 percent interest rate, the Healeys learned that they would have to pay $1250 in fees to obtain such a low rate. They agreed to pay the sum. They were asked only for salary information and certain documentation concerning their liabilities. An NMB employee said they could lock in the quoted rate when they returned from vacation in a couple of weeks. After returning from vacation, the Healeys called NMB repeatedly, but often could not find anyone to speak to or to return their calls. When they finally talked to someone about their loan, they were told they had to pay another $100 or $150 to lock in at 3.375 percent. They continued calling NMB without much success for two months after returning from vacation. They could not get a closing date, and nothing was happening. In response to their repeated requests to lock in an interest rate, they were told only that they could not lock in until two weeks before closing. By the end of November, the Healeys applied elsewhere for a refinancing loan. Shortly after the Healeys applied elsewhere for a loan, which closed about three weeks later, they received a call from an employee of NMB, who told them that they had a closing date. They said that they had decided to obtain a loan elsewhere. The employee demanded the $1250 fee, which the Healeys had not yet paid, and threatened to sue them if they did not pay. The Healeys refused to pay the fee and were able to use the appraisal, for which they had already paid, with their new application. However, they had to pay for a second credit report. In November 1993, Wendy Harrison contacted NMB for two mortgages--one on a home in Massachusetts and one on a home in Punta Gorda. She filed mortgage applications on or about December 15, 1993, but, by mutual agreement, she withdrew her application on the Florida home. Ms. Harrison subsequently left several telephone messages that were not returned. In January, she was assigned a new loan processor, who still did not return calls. Around this time, Ms. Harrison's husband received a notice from the mortgagee on the Florida property concerning a payoff amount. The Harrisons contacted NMB and told them that this was the wrong property. Mortgage rates began to increase in January. Ms. Harrison called repeatedly on the status of her mortgage refinancing from mid-January to mid- March. A new person assumed loan processing duties on her file. She called Ms. Harrison on or about March 9 and said that the credit report raised some problems. This was the first time either Mr. or Ms. Harrison had been told that there were problems with the credit report, which NMB had received in late December. Ms. Harrison mailed the requested explanatory documents on the following day. Two weeks later, after hearing nothing, Ms. Harrison called NMB and learned that the interest rate would be 8 percent annually, which was higher than the rate in effect when she initiated the loan approval process. The NMB employee explained that the higher rate was due to the fact that the Massachusetts property was a rental property, but NMB employees had known that from the start. However, the NMB employee assured Ms. Harrison that the file was complete and being forwarded to Miami for final approval. The following day, Ms. Harrison sent a certified letter withdrawing the application and asking for the appraisal and any other services for which she had already paid. NMB received the letter on March 26. On April 5, Ms. Harrison found in her mailbox an unstamped, uncancelled envelope that had evidently been hand- delivered by an NMB employee or agent. Inside was a rejection letter backdated to March 23, so as to look like the Harrison application had been rejected before it was withdrawn. Based on customer complaints, the Department financial examiner conducted an unannounced inspection of NMB from November 15-17, 1993. In addition to discovering a violation of the minimum net worth requirement imposed upon mortgage lenders, the examiner found several violations of requirements imposed upon mortgage brokers. At no time did NMB disclose in writing that it could not guarantee acceptance into a particular loan program and could not promise any specific loan conditions or terms. When taking applications, NMB failed to disclose the nature of the mortgage brokerage fee charged by NMB. The fee varied according to the terms of the loan, and NMB only disclosed a broad range of fees at the time of the application. NMB received monies from customers, but did not record check numbers for checks used to pay vendors on behalf of specific customers. NMB thereby failed to maintain an updated record of escrow account activity on an appropriate form. In fact, NMB had the Department-promulgated form, but, as discussed below, used it improperly to try to record mortgage brokerage transactions. NMB did not maintain supporting documentation for monies paid from its escrow account on behalf of customers. NMB often used courier prepayments to pay unrelated expenses. NMB did not record the dates and amounts paid out of escrow. NMB maintained a mortgage brokerage transaction journal, but it lacked the date the customer applied for the mortgage loan, the date of disposition of the application, the total amount of brokerage fees, and the name of the lender. NMB used the Department-promulgated form for escrow account activity and tried to adapt it for mortgage brokerage transactions, but failed to include the above-cited crucial items of information. Concerning NMB's application for a correspondent mortgage broker's license, there is evidence, in at least one case, of fraud or deceit. Ms. Harrison, who was very credible, described an act of fraud or dishonest dealing in the postdating and delivery of her rejection letter. The atmosphere of incompetence and neglect that prevailed at NMB might well have left a typed letter unmailed for days or even weeks. However, an employee or other agent committed a wilful act of deceit in driving the letter out to Ms. Harrison's home and leaving it in the mailbox, rather than simply dropping it in the mail.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order revoking the mortgage lender's license of National Mortgage Bankers, Inc. and denying its application for licensure as a correspondent mortgage lender. ENTERED on November 3, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on November 3, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Gerald Lewis Comptroller The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Plaza Level, Room 1302 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 Susan E. Steinberg Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller 1313 Tampa St., Suite 615 Tampa, FL 33602-3394 Sheldon Voron 775 Tamiami Tr. Port Charlotte, FL 33953
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations herein, the Petitioner, Department of Banking and Finance, (Department), was the state agency in Florida responsible for the regulation and licensing of mortgage brokers in this state, and Respondent, Harriet Ijames, was a licensed mortgage broker. On February 17, 1989, Respondent entered into a Stipulation, Consent Agreement and Final Order with the Department whereby she was placed on probation for 2 years for misconduct relating to the misappropriation of mortgage application fees, with the further requirement that she not act independently but under the supervision of a broker acceptable to the Department. On October 2, 1991, the Department filed a complaint against the Respondent alleging she had violated the terms of the prior Consent Order by conducting business as a mortgage broker without the requisite supervision. Thereafter, on April 29, 1992, Respondent entered into another Stipulation, Consent Agreement and Final Order with the Department regarding the October, 1991 complaint by which she was again placed on probation conditioned upon her operating only under the supervision of an approved broker. This latter Order provided that any violation thereof would be automatic grounds for immediate and summary revocation of her license and also imposed an administrative fine of $2,000.00. The Final Order incorporating that agreement was issued by the Department on July 13, 1992. In May, 1992, Respondent was contacted by Rhudine M. McGhee, a resident of Tampa, who had been referred to her by a mutual acquaintance. Mrs. McGhee indicated she was interested in purchasing another house. Somewhat later, Respondent contacted Mrs. McGhee and told her of a friend who had a house for sale. She also gave Mrs. McGhee the addresses of some other houses in the area which were for sale. Mrs. McGhee did not like any of them. Thereafter, Respondent advised Mrs. McGhee that she was a mortgage broker and not a real estate broker, and that she would have a real estate broker contact her. Respondent also offered to provide Mrs. McGhee with listings of Resolution Trust Corporation foreclosures in the desired price range. Some time later, the broker referred by Respondent showed Mrs. McGhee a house she liked and she signed a contract to buy it. In the interim, Respondent had taken a credit application from the McGhees over the phone and followed up with a visit to the McGhee home. On May 13, 1992, during the visit to the McGhee residence, Respondent had Mrs. McGhee sign a loan application. On that same visit, she solicited and received from Mrs. McGhee a check for $300.00, payable to the Respondent and subsequently endorsed and cashed by her, which reflected the check was the application fee for a loan. She specifically asked that the check be made to her, personally. When Mrs. McGhee asked Respondent about the check, she was told it would be credited to the purchase price at time of closing. This was not done and it was only later, after a complaint was filed with the Department, that Mr. Brigliadora, the mortgage broker with whom she was affiliated, repaid the fee from his company's funds. Though at hearing Respondent denied she took a loan application fee or that the check she received was for that purpose or bore any notation to that effect when received, Mrs. McGhee is quite certain she put that notation on the check at her husband's direction at the time she gave it to Respondent. Respondent claimed the check was for finding the house but Mr. McGhee specifically recalls Respondent indicating the check was to be an application fee to be credited against the purchase price. It is so found. On June 1, 1992, Respondent again returned to the McGhee home to have them sign a second loan application. This time Mr. McGhee was not at home and Respondent suggested to Mrs. McGhee that she sign her husband's name to the application. This was done. Respondent did not give the McGhees copies of the applications they signed but said she would bring them copies at a later date. This was never done. Though Respondent also denies soliciting the second application, her apparent signature appears on both application forms and it is found she did both solicit and sign the forms and the application fee check. The first application was for a loan of $80,000.00 at 8.5 percent. The second was for $36,000.00 at 8.625 percent. At the time of the solicitation, Respondent was employed by Frank Brigliadora, a licensed mortgage broker and owner of the Money Tree Mortgage Co. However, neither Respondent nor Mr. Brigliadora had notified the Department of their arrangement or obtained Departmental approval of the supervisory relationship. Clearly, Respondent knew the taking of an application fee, as the evidence indicates she did here, was inappropriate. Sometime in mid 1992, Respondent approached George Banks, a licensed mortgage broker in Tampa and owner of his own brokerage company, with a view toward working for him. In their conversation about that, they discussed the practice of application fees. Respondent indicated she wanted to take a fee of $200.00 to $300.00 up front, but Banks felt this was not proper, advised her so, and declined to accept her as a broker. Even when she claimed that other brokers took fees of this nature, he demurred, claiming he did not endorse the practice. Respondent worked for Mr. Brigliadora, a licensed mortgage broker, at his firm, Money Street Mortgage, for approximately 3 months during 1992. At the time she went to work for him, Respondent did not tell him she was under sanctions by the Department to have strict supervision and at no time did he agree to the Departmental supervision program. Mr. Brigliadora did not receive the $300.00 check Respondent obtained from the McGhees nor did he ever get the money it represented from the Respondent. It was only just before or at the closing on the property that he first became aware of the deposit. When he refunded the money to the McGhees, Respondent agreed to reimburse him but she never did. Normally, Money Street Mortgage does not take application fees on residential loans, and Mr. Brigliadora denies he ever approved or suggested to Respondent that she solicit them. When Respondent gave him the documentation on the McGhee loan application it did not include the required good faith estimate found in the brokerage agreement nor did the application form or any other document make the required disclosures. The application he got from Respondent does not constitute a brokerage agreement and Mr. Brigliadora never got one from the Respondent on this loan. What he received is no more than an application for a loan. Mr. James, the Department's Area Financial Manager, whose job includes the assignment of examiners and the review of investigations by examiners, knows Respondent as a licensed mortgage broker under Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. He is aware of prior complaints received by the Department about the Respondent in the past. Two of them relate to the Final Orders previously mentioned herein. In the instant case, he recalls receiving a telephone call regarding a deposit of $300.00 given to Respondent and commenced an investigation into the incident. The current Administrative Complaint which resulted in this hearing was the outcome of that investigation. Based on his evaluation of the matters discovered in the investigation, he concluded that Respondent took a fee from a client without having a brokerage agreement with that client; failed to make the required full disclosure to a client; and misappropriated a fee which she received from a client; all of which are violations of various provisions of Chapter 494. In his official capacity with the Department, Mr. James had the duty to approve a supervisory mortgage broker for the Respondent as called for in the two prior Final Orders referred to previously herein. Neither Money Street Mortgage nor Mr. Brigliadora were submitted by Respondent for approval by the Department even though Respondent knew she was required to do so. Respondent claims she made it very clear to Mrs. McGhee that she was a mortgage broker and not a real estate broker. Nonetheless, Mrs. McGhee, she claims, insisted Respondent help her and offered to pay her for her efforts. Respondent claims that all Petitioner's witnesses lied about her and forged documents relating to her alleged activities. She denies she would ever cheat or disobey the rules because she knows she would lose her license if she did. Claiming she is well respected in the community, she asserts the Department did not thoroughly investigate the allegations against her and is, therefore, destroying her reputation over something which did not happen as alleged. Her assertions are not accepted, however.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: Recommended that a Final Order be entered in this case finding her guilty of the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein; revoking Harriett Ijames' license as a mortgage broker in Florida; and imposing an administrative fine of $5,000.00. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of May, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Lisa L. Elwell, Esquire Office of the Comptroller 1313 Tampa Street, Suite 615 Tampa, Florida 33602-3394 Harriett Ijames 8341 Paddlewheel Street Tampa, Florida 33617 Gerald Lewis Comptroller State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Room 1302 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was first licensed as a real estate salesperson in Florida in 1997. She has been licensed continuously since that time, although she did not reside or work in Florida for one year in 1998 and 1999. Her license has never been disciplined. Having entered into a contract to purchase, as her personal residence, a townhouse in Palm Beach Gardens for $85,000, Respondent contacted a licensed mortgage broker, Gary Carlson. Respondent and Mr. Carlson had previously worked together, in their respective professions, while employed by a large residential real estate business. Respondent asked Mr. Carlson to find her a mortgage lender, and Mr. Carlson agreed to do so. Mr. Carlson obtained a mortgage loan application from Respondent and submitted it to an institutional mortgage lender that Mr. Carlson represented. At all times in this transaction, Mr. Carlson served as the agent of the mortgage lender, not Respondent. After examining the application and related information on the proposed mortgage loan, the lender directed Mr. Carlson to obtain additional information, including an affidavit to the effect that Respondent had never been known as Lea Taylor Nola and that she had never been married. Respondent disclosed to Mr. Carlson that she had been known as Lea Taylor Nola and she had been married, although she was now divorced. Mr. Carlson assured her that the requirements were unimportant and advised her to sign statements that she did not know Lea Taylor Nola and that she had never been married. Respondent did so. Upon examination of the closing documents, including the unattested statements described in this paragraph, the lender funded the mortgage loan, and Respondent purchased the townhouse. The mortgage loan remains in good standing two years later.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Jauna Watkins, Acting Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Suite 802, North Orlando, Florida 32801 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 James P. Harwood Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Suite 802, North Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Richard L. Robbins Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, LLP 999 Peachtree Street, Northeast Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3996
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint and Notice of Rights dated June 16, 2009, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The OFR is the state agency responsible for regulating mortgage brokerage and mortgage lending in the State of Florida and for licensing and regulating mortgage brokers. §§ 494.0011(1); 494.0033(2), Fla. Stat. At the time of the final hearing, Mr. Razor held an inactive mortgage broker's license. The license was inactive because Mr. Razor did not apply for a renewal of his license when it expired on August 31, 2009. His license could be reactivated should he submit an application for renewal. Mr. Razor was a member of the Florida Bar and a practicing attorney in Florida until, in an opinion issued September 11, 2007, the Florida Supreme Court ordered Mr. Razor suspended from the practice of law for a period of 18 months. See Florida Bar v. Razor, 973 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 2007). In its opinion, the court approved the findings of fact contained in the Report of the Referee; approved the Referee's findings that Mr. Razor had violated Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 3-4.2, 3-4.3, 4-5.3(b), and 4-8.4(a); and approved the Referee's recommendation that Mr. Razor's license to practice law be suspended for a period of 18 months. Pertinent to this proceeding, Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 3.4-3 provides: The standards of professional conduct to be observed by members of the bar are not limited to the observance of rules and avoidance of prohibited acts, and the enumeration herein of certain categories of misconduct as constituting grounds for discipline shall not be deemed to be all- inclusive nor shall the failure to specify any particular act of misconduct be construed as tolerance thereof. The commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice, whether the act is committed in the course of the attorney's relations as an attorney or otherwise, whether committed within or outside the state of Florida, and whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor, may constitute a cause for discipline. The Referee based his recommendation that Mr. Razor's license to practice law be suspended for 18 months on "Respondent's [Mr. Razor's] conduct in allowing his collaborator (a suspended attorney) to practice law in an attempt to extort money; his ratification of the misconduct by failing to take immediate remedial action; his attempts to cover for the suspended attorney by defending the letter during the Bar investigation; and his inconsistent defense (lack of knowledge) at the live and final hearings." These acts constitute dishonest dealing. Mr. Razor's license to practice law was suspended 30 days after September 11, 2007, or on October 11, 2007. Mr. Razor did not report the suspension to the OFR because he did not believe it to be a reportable offense.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Office of Financial Regulation enter a final order finding that Arthur Nathan Razor violated Section 494.0041(2)(i) and (p), Florida Statutes, and revoking his Florida mortgage broker's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 2010.
