The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner is entitled to attorney?s fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2011), and if so, what constitutes a reasonable fee?
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the licensing and regulation of veterinarians in the State of Florida pursuant to section 20.165 and chapters 455 and 474, Florida Statutes. At all times material to these proceedings, Petitioner has been a licensed veterinarian in Florida, having been issued license number VM 5290. Petitioner was the treating veterinarian for a dog named, Awesomer, owned by Sheri Lawhun. On April 28, 2009, Ms. Lawhun brought Awesomer to Petitioner for examination and treatment. Details of the treatment provided to Awesomer are related in the Findings of Fact in the Merits Case. For the purposes of this Final Order, it is sufficient to state that Respondent treated Awesomer from April 28-30, 2009, and that on April 30, Awesomer died. Ms. Lawhun filed a complaint with the Department of Business and Professional Regulation regarding the care and treatment Respondent provided to Awesomer. Just prior to his provision of care for Awesomer, Dr. Langford?s office switched to a “paperless” system, which involved switching to electronic medical records, bookkeeping, etc. Petitioner testified in the Merits Case that the medical record itself is stored on the computer software and that there are a wide variety of “print screen” options available. Dr. Langford demonstrated the complicated nature of the software and the ability to “hide” different parts of the medical records from the print screen, as well as to copy and paste entries to the “top” or most recent page, of the medical record. The software does not allow the user to delete record entries, but does allow a user to hide them, change the dates for them, or make them unavailable to print. There are also entries on screens called “snatch screens” that do not print. As a result, there are three different sets of medical records for the same period of time for Awesomer that were admitted into evidence in the underlying case: 1) Petitioner?s Exhibit A, which was printed on May 16, 2009, at the request of Ms. Lawhun; 2) Petitioner?s Exhibit B, which is the copy of the records printed on July 15, 2009, in response to the complaint filed with the Department; and 3) Petitioner?s Exhibit C, which was printed August 2, 2011, and provided to Petitioner?s counsel during the litigation of this case. The three sets of medical records are not identical. Dr. Langford attributed these differences to entries that he ordered “declined” or hidden, so that the client did not see them, or because information was on the “snatch screen” in the program, which does not print. For example, the information related to Awesomer?s final visit to the clinic, according to Dr. Langford, was moved to the top of the record on May 16, 2009, so that Ms. Lawhun could see what happened on the day the dog died. He claimed that the entry was originally recorded soon after the dog?s death, but that it was moved when providing the records to Ms. Lawhun. Similarly, the date of the dog?s death is recorded in Petitioner?s Exhibits A and B as May 1, 2009, the first business day following the dog?s after-hours? visit. It is changed to April 30, 2009, in Petitioner?s Exhibit C. After the initial investigation of this case, counsel for the Department prepared a draft closing order and presented it to the probable cause panel for the Board of Veterinary Medicine at its meeting April 21, 2010. However, after some concerns expressed by the panel members, the Department?s recommendation was changed from closing the case to obtaining an expert review of the file. The Department had the file reviewed by two veterinary experts, Dr. Jerry Green and Dr. Melanie Donofro. Dr. Donofro is a former member of the Board of Veterinary Medicine. Both experts opined that there were problems with the care and treatment of Awesomer, as well as problems with the medical records for Awesomer. As a result of the expert witness reviews, a four-count Administrative Complaint was drafted and filed, charging Respondent with violating subsections 474.213(1)(r)(violation of the relevant standard of care); 474.213(1)(ee)(failure to keep contemporaneously written medical records as required by rule of the board); 474.214(1)(w) (practicing at a location without a valid premises permit); and 474.214(1)(m)(failure to notify Board of a change of address). The case was not taken back to probable cause prior to the drafting of the Administrative Complaint because of a computer data entry error that resulted in a computer record indicating probable cause had already been found. As is recounted below, the case eventually was presented to the probable cause panel a second time on the issue of medical records. Because the Fees Motion is directed to the medical records count, the failure to take the case back to the probable cause panel before the filing of the original Administrative Complaint has no real significance at this point. Petitioner?s assertion that counsel for the Department had a personal vendetta against him and had to remember that probable cause was not found at the April 2010, meeting is specifically rejected. As stated by Ms. Henderson at hearing, Dr. Langford?s case was one of many presented for consideration. While it is unfortunate that an error occurred, it is not indicative of any “personal” interest in prosecuting Petitioner. The Department and Dr. Langford agreed to a settlement that would have dismissed three of the four counts in the Administrative Complaint, and imposed a minimal penalty for Count III. However, when the stipulation was presented to the Board for approval, it was rejected. Board members voiced serious concerns regarding both the standard of care given to Awesomer and the adequacy of the medical records. The prosecutor told the Board that the Department entered into the settlement stipulation “in the interest of getting the case wrapped up,” and that the Department believed that the case would be a “battle of the experts” with respect to the standard of care issue. Ultimately, the Board voted to reject the stipulation offered and offered a counter proposal that would have resulted in dismissal of all of the charges except the medical records count, with a penalty consisting of a $1,500 fine, 30 days probation, and costs. Dr. Langford rejected the counter- proposal. An Amended Administrative Complaint was prepared and, along with the expert reports received, was submitted to the probable cause panel for review and approval. Also included in the materials was Dr. Langford?s response to the Amended Administrative Complaint. While counsel for Dr. Langford offered to “walk them through” his response to the allegations contained in the Amended Administrative Complaint, counsel acknowledged that she did not have anything to add that was not in his written response. The probable cause panel voted to approve amendment of the Administrative Complaint to a single charge of violating section 474.213(1)(ee). The panel also directed counsel for the Department to consult one of its experts, Dr. Green, to make sure the allegations in the Amended Administrative Complaint were consistent with his opinion. She did so. Contrary to Petitioner?s assertions, the panel did not simply “rubber stamp” the actions of the Department. Dr. Jones indicated her agreement with Dr. Green?s expert opinion, and there is lengthy discussion of the case. See Petitioner?s Exhibit P, pages 13-21, and 23-26. Respondent disputed the allegations in the Amended Administrative Complaint and on June 24, 2011, the case was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a section 120.57(1) hearing. Discovery and motion practice was active and, at times, acrimonious.1/ See, for example, the Order on Pending Motions, dated August 24, 2012. On August 29, 2012, Respondent filed the Fees Motion giving rise to this proceeding. The Fees Motion contains a certification that it was served on Petitioner on August 4, 2012. Ironically, much of the Fees Motion has nothing to do with the allegations contained in the Amended Administrative Complaint. The first four pages of the Fees Motion present Dr. Langford?s version of what happened in the final days of Awesomer?s life, and include facts not found anywhere in the pleadings. The next sections deal with accusations of the dog owner involving a psychic, and “public untrue statements about Respondent,” by Ms. Lawhun, which are also accusations not finding their way into the Department?s charging document. It is not until page 16 of the Fees Motion that the actual allegations that would give rise to the motion are identified and discussed. Ultimately, a Recommended Order was submitted that recommended dismissal of the Second Amended Administrative Complaint. The Recommended Order was issued after a section 120.57(1) hearing, and after consideration of all of the evidence presented at that hearing. The Board of Veterinary Medicine issued a Final Order on June 25, 2012, adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in the Recommended Order. At the time Petitioner filed the Fees Motion, the case was proceeding on the Amended Administrative Complaint. There was pending at that time a Motion to Amend the Amended Administrative Complaint, which was granted, and the case went to hearing on the Second Amended Administrative Complaint. At pages 16-17 of the Fees Motion,2/ Petitioner asserts that the Department alleges that he failed to properly document the dog?s heart rate and did not record any recommendations for diagnostic tests or follow-up examinations to determine the cause of the heart rate.3/ The basis for Petitioner?s challenge is an attack on the sources used by and the opinion of Dr. Donofro, one of the Department?s experts. The fact that Petitioner ultimately prevailed on this issue does not negate the fact that the Department obtained and relied upon an expert in veterinary medicine with respect to the allegations regarding Awesomer?s heart rate. The Department had a reasonable basis upon which to file the allegations in the Second Amended Administrative Complaint, and to proceed with those allegations. Petitioner cites to the Department?s allegations regarding his failure to record a fecal test. It was found in the Recommended Order that Respondent did not perform a fecal test (hence no record for one). While the Recommended Order concluded that the Department did not prove a medical records violation on this ground by clear and convincing evidence, the medical records indicate that the pet owner had reported that Awesomer had suffered from diarrhea the night before, and noted that his stool was “near normal” at the clinic. A notation of “near normal” stool could be interpreted, as it was in light of testimony presented at hearing, that no fecal test was performed and that the notation was based upon observation alone, or that fecal tests resulted in findings that were close to normal but that were not expressly recorded. Petitioner?s record is ambiguous enough to support either interpretation, and the Department relied on the interpretation of its experts. The fact that Petitioner ultimately prevailed on this issue does not negate the fact that the Department obtained and relied upon an expert in veterinary medicine with respect to the allegations regarding the tests, or lack thereof, of Awesomer?s stool, and the Department had a reasonable basis to include the allegation in the Second Amended Administrative Complaint and to proceed with prosecution. Respondent takes issue with the allegations regarding low-urine gravity and other serum values. The specific allegations, found at paragraphs 12-13 of the Second Amended Administrative Complaint, state: Respondent performed a urinalysis for Awesomer. Respondent recorded in the medical records that he found a “low urine gravity,” but failed to address the elevated serum creatinine, serum albumin, serum sodium, and urine pH in Awesomer?s medical records. Dr. Donofro found the failure to address these values to be a problem. Ultimately, Dr. Langford?s testimony that he documented the values in the record but did not record any follow-up based on his belief that the identified values were not abnormal was credited at hearing. However, the fact that Petitioner ultimately prevailed on this issue does not negate the fact that the Department obtained and relied upon an expert in veterinary medicine with respect to the allegations regarding the evaluation of serum creatinine, serum albumin, serum sodium, and urine pH. The Department had a reasonable basis on which to include the allegations in the Second Amended Administrative Complaint and to proceed with the prosecution of these allegations. At page 16 of the Fees Motion, Petitioner takes issue with paragraphs 14-15 of the Second Amended Administrative Complaint, which allege that Respondent failed to record any indication that Awesomer drank excessively, beyond the tentative diagnosis of polydipsia. Dr. Donofro?s report specifically addresses the failure to indicate excessive fluid consumption in that one would expect to see a notation regarding the level of consumption, in light of Respondent?s tentative diagnosis for Awesomer. Once again, however, the inclusion of this item in the Second Amended Administrative Complaint was based upon expert reports received by the Department prior to filing the Amended Administrative Complaint and the Department had a reasonable basis for including it and for prosecuting it. At page 19 of the Fees Motion, Petitioner takes issue with the allegation that he failed to include anything in the medical records for April 28, 2009, to support the administration of Phenylpropanolamine. This allegation is discussed by Dr. Donofro in her report, upon which the Department relied. At hearing, the issue was decided in Dr. Langford?s favor based upon his testimony and that of his expert witness, Dr. Vega (who is also a former member of the Board of Veterinary Medicine). However, the Department had a reasonable basis for including this factual allegation in the Second Amended Administrative Complaint and for prosecuting it. At pages 19-20 of the Fees Motion, Petitioner takes issue with the inclusion of allegations related to the documentation of a modified water-deprivation test. He is especially critical because he testified that he performed a modified water-deprivation test as opposed to a water- deprivation test, and states that the medical records clearly delineate that a modified water-deprivation test was performed. While the April 28, 2009, entry indicates that a modified water- deprivation test will be performed, there are other entries in the records for Awesomer that refer to scheduling and conducting a water-deprivation test. Based on the records, Dr. Donofro addressed this issue in her report.4/ While Petitioner ultimately prevailed on this issue, there was a legitimate basis for the Department to include the allegations in the Second Amended Administrative Complaint and to proceed with these allegations. On page 21 of the Fees Motion, Petitioner alleges that “Amended administrative complaint lines 25-26 allege Respondent failed to record in Awesomer?s medical record for April 29, 2009, anything regarding this visit, including the lactated- ringers solution administration. It is there in the record for that date, clear as day, that it was administered, as it was, on April 30, 2009, not on April 29, 2009.” Petitioner?s allegation is not consistent with the actual allegations in the Second Amended Administrative Complaint. That document states: Respondent?s written response from July 7, 2009, states that he examined Awesomer after 9:30 PM on April 29, 2009 and “found nothing abnormal in the examination of the dog, but considered the possibility of the lingering effects from the water deprivation study.” Respondent failed to record in Awesomer?s medical records for April 29, 2009, anything regarding this visit or examination. Respondent?s written response from July 7, 2009, also states that he examined Awesomer after 9:30 PM on April 29, 2009, and “placed a catheter in [Awesomer?s] arm, and administered 1000 cc of [Lactated Ringers Solution].” Respondent failed to record in Awesomer?s medical records for April 29, 2009, that he placed a catheter or administered the Lactated Ringers Solution (LRS). The Fees Motion does not mention the July 7, 2009, response by Dr. Langford. It was not admitted into evidence in this proceeding or in the disciplinary proceeding. It is, however, mentioned in Dr. Donofro?s report, and she comments on the discrepancy between Dr. Langford?s account of the events and Ms. Lawhun?s. Dr. Donofro also discusses at length what she viewed as some ambiguities in the recording of the amount of LRS, and opined that the amount provided under either interpretation she could reach was inappropriate. There was a basis upon which the Department could rely for including these allegations in the Second Amended Administrative Complaint and proceeding with those allegations. At page 21 of the Fees Motion, Petitioner claims that the Department alleges “in administrative complaint line 35 that Respondent should have included a „discussion? of electrolytes and white blood count,” and claims that there are no facts to support a records violation for line 35. Paragraph 35 of the Second Amended Administrative Complaint simply states that “the CBC results indicated that Awesomer?s white blood count was elevated.” A review of both the original and the Amended Administrative Complaint confirm that neither of those documents have the allegation of which Petitioner complains, at paragraph 35. Paragraph 36 of the Second Amended Administrative Complaint alleges that “Respondent failed to record any explanation or discussion of the results of the CBC or General Health Profile with Electrolytes in the April 30, 2009, medical records for Awesomer.” Dr. Langford?s criticism that “this is a medical record, not a dissertation,” is flippant at best, and ignores the requirement in Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G18-18.002(1) that the records “contain sufficient information to justify the diagnosis or determination of health status and warrant any treatment recommended or administered.” Concerns about issues revealed in the CBC were discussed in Dr. Donofro?s report, and the lack of follow-up or discussion led her to believe that certain possibilities in treatment were overlooked. The Department?s belief, that some reference other than the test result itself was necessary, was reasonable given the need for records to justify a diagnosis, and the Department had a basis to proceed with this allegation. Finally, at page 22 of the Fees Motion, Dr. Langford takes issue with the Department?s allegations that medical records were not contemporaneously recorded for events taking place April 30, 2009. Yet, there is no dispute that there are three separate versions of the medical records in this case, and one of the issues presented was the discrepancy in dates for certain services. The Department had a reasonable basis to proceed with the allegations with respect to the May 16, 2009, entries.
The Issue Whether Petitioner has demonstrated that Respondent’s employment with Petitioner should be suspended or terminated.
Findings Of Fact Based on the representations, submissions, and agreement of the parties, the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are entered: The relevant facts are essentially those set forth in the investigative report of Petitioner, Miami-Dade County School Board (Petitioner). (BS 154-156, and attached Exhibits).1 According to the report, Respondent was referred to Dr. William McCoggle during the summer of 2002 by Mr. Tim Dawson, a principal employed by Petitioner. As of that time, Respondent needed two courses to meet certification requirements. She took one course at Miami-Dade College (which is not at issue here) and arranged to take the second course through Otterbein College with Dr. McCoggle, who was operating his business under the name of Moving on Toward Education and Training, or MOTET. (BS 147). She called Dr. McCoggle to schedule an appointment for registration. The meeting took place at his home. Dr. McCoggle gave her information about the program and informed her that the credits would be through Otterbein College. He gave her an enrollment packet and information regarding the fee. After the Respondent confirmed that Otterbein College was an accredited school, Respondent made a second appointment with Dr. McCoggle at his home, where she submitted the completed enrollment packet and paid the fee (between $600 and $800). Dr. McCoggle told her that the course was an internet-based/correspondence course and that a Dr. Cannon would be her instructor. The course would consist of writing essays, completing reports and taking examinations and that she would be contacted via the internet with a complete outline of the assignments. After several weeks passed without any information coming to her, Respondent attempted to contact Dr. McCoggle approximately 15 times, leaving telephone messages. She never heard back from Dr. McCoggle. Several months later she received a letter from Otterbein stamped “Official Transcript,” which reflected a grade of “B,” and a date of August 8, 2002. (BS 85). Respondent placed the Otterbein transcript in her files along with transcripts from other institutions. She later inadvertently submitted a copy of the Otterbein transcript, along with transcripts from other institutions, to the certification office operated by Petitioner for the purpose of renewing her certificate. It is undisputed that Respondent never performed any actual academic work in the course for which she received a transcript from Otterbein. The only potential disputed fact issue regarding this matter concerns Respondent’s intentions with respect to the Otterbein transcript, which she acknowledges receiving. Respondent acknowledges that a photocopy of the Otterbein transcript made its way into a collection of transcripts from other institutions and that the whole group of documents, including the photocopy of the Otterbein transcript, was given to Petitioner’s certification office. Respondent contends, however, that the photocopy of the Otterbein transcript was included with the others inadvertently and not for the purpose of obtaining credit. By the time the materials were presented, Respondent had more than enough credits for certification from other institutions without using the Otterbein course. Respondent’s view of the matter is supported by the questionnaire that she presented to Petitioner’s investigators prior to the meeting which produced the investigative summary. At the time of the apparently inadvertent submission of the Otterbein transcript to Petitioner, Respondent was not employed by Petitioner. Her answers to the questionnaire, which were submitted to Respondent in advance of her interview with its investigators, show that Respondent was not teaching for Petitioner at the time she applied for the Otterbein course through MOTET. Respondent also stated that she delivered all of her credits from each institution to Petitioner but noted that she “had more than enough credits to obtain teacher certification without MOTET.” (BS 218). Her questionnaire answers further establish that she took graduate courses at Florida International University, Miami-Dade Community College (MDCC), and St. Martins University that would replace or substitute credits obtained through MOTET. The investigative file in her case reflects that the transcripts were submitted prior to Respondent’s subsequent reemployment with Petitioner and before the present disciplinary proceeding was initiated against her. Respondent’s explanation is also entirely consistent with her certification file, which was made part of the investigative report before the disciplinary action against her was taken. Thus, a summary by Petitioner’s certification office states that the “records indicate that an Otterbein transcript was submitted for certification purposes but [there is] no evidence that transcript was utilized for issuance of a certificate. (BS 168). (Emphasis added). Respondent’s teaching certificate was not issued by the State of Florida, Department of Education (DOE) until April 21, 2004, almost two years after she applied for the Otterbein course through MOTET. There is no evidence that the MOTET course work was ever applied toward or used to obtain certification credit. (BS 170). Moreover, Petitioner’s Certificate Conversation Log, prepared by Petitioner’s agents, reflects an entry dated May 21, 2003, which relates to a telephone conversation with Respondent. The entry states “she had sent me a packet of material on Friday—Official MDCC Transcript, which I copied for file and sent orig. to DOE. Also sent a copy (not orig.) of Otterbein transcript. I informed her that she needs an official Otterbein transcript for DOE.” (BS 174-175). There is nothing in the investigative file to indicate that Respondent ever followed up on this conversation by submitting an original Otterbein transcript pursuant to the instructions from the Petitioner’s certification agent. Nor is there any evidence in the file that the School Board’s certification office ever transmitted any request to DOE that Respondent be given credit for the Otterbein course work. The information in Petitioner’s investigative file is further fleshed out by evidence adduced during discovery. Petitioner’s witnesses, including its official in charge of certification, have acknowledged in depositions that there is no evidence that any certification or other credit was issued to Respondent based on the Otterbein transcript, that there is no evidence that Respondent ever delivered an original Otterbein transcript to the School Board in response to the suggestion of Petitioner’s certification office, nor that she ever obtained credit of any kind based on the Otterbein transcript. Moreover, Petitioner’s certification official, Charlene Burks, confirmed that it is the ordinary practice to transmit, by Petitioner’s special overnight delivery service, any original transcripts immediately to the DOE certification officials (who have sole authority to issue certification credit). There is no evidence that any original Otterbein transcript or credits claimed thereunder, were transmitted from Petitioner to the DOE on behalf of Respondent, nor that any such documentation was received by the DOE from any source, nor that any credits were issued to Respondent based on the Otterbein transcript. Respondent’s account of events is further supported by the official who conducted Petitioner’s investigation of Respondent, Bloniva Julie Aristede. At her deposition, she produced her handwritten notes, taken during the investigation interview with Respondent, which state: “Approx. 2 years later she subm. all transc. to cert. in order to recert. not realizing the Otterbein transc. was included.” Respondent still has the original Otterbein transcript that was mailed to her home.2 Thus, the relevant evidence shows that the only Otterbein transcript Respondent ever gave to Petitioner was a photocopy. The evidence further shows that the Otterbein transcript was given inadvertently. The evidence further shows that the Otterbein transcript was not acceptable for issuance of academic credit, and that Petitioner told Respondent that the copy of the Otterbein transcript was not acceptable for issuance of academic credit. The Respondent took no further action to obtain credit through the Otterbein transcript, nor did she receive any credit. See also Paragraphs 2, 5, 6 of Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s First Request for Admissions. Finally, it is undisputed that Respondent was not employed by Petitioner when she enrolled in the Otterbein course, or when she inadvertently submitted the photocopy of the transcript to Petitioner. The Otterbein transcript had no bearing on her eventual receipt of a teaching certificate and her subsequent reemployment by Petitioner. Alternatively, to resolve any apparent disputed issue of fact concerning Respondent’s reasons for delivering a photocopy of her Otterbein transcript to Petitioner’s certification office, the parties agree that whether Respondent’s action was deliberate or inadvertent is not material to the disposition of this case, as Petitioner’s agents had clearly advised Respondent that she could obtain credit only by providing an original transcript. Respondent, therefore, knew that the photocopy of the Otterbein transcript, which she gave to Petitioner, whether deliberately or inadvertently, was useless for obtaining academic credit toward certification. When provided a clear opportunity to manifest her intent to deliver a fraudulent original transcript for certification purposes, Respondent took no action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board enter a final order dismissing the allegations against Respondent and reinstating her with back pay and all full benefits to which she is entitled. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 2007.
Findings Of Fact On December 11, 1974 Rule 12A-1.32 F.A.C. became effective following notice (Exhibit 6) that numerous sections of the Revenue Code were being revised and that a public hearing on the revisions was being held by the Governor and Cabinet. At the time this rule became effective, rulemaking was governed by 120.041 F.S. and the procedure required in that section (which was replaced by 120.54 F.S. on January 1, 1975) was followed. Section 120.011 F.S., also repealed on January 1, 1975, provided that no rule enacted pursuant to Chapter 120 could be retroactive unless expressly so stated. Assessments against Petitioner resulting from the audit taken in 1975 covered the period January 1, 1973 to November 30, 1975. Petitioner's and Intervenor's business is "data conversion contracts and projects" by way of keypunching, key verifying, typing, key tape, key disk, and direct computer entry, or a combination depending on relative efficiencies and machine availability, with or without computer printed reports. More specifically, Petitioner's business of data conversion is the conversion of data from the written or spoken word or symbol into a communication medium (card, tape, disk, paper tape, paper, and direct to computer) through personal services. In connection therewith from time to time Petitioner purchases custom computer systems and programs. In essence, Petitioner converts data received from his customers into a form that can be placed in a computer and thereafter retrieved for such purposes as the customer may desire. In performing this function Petitioner uses paper tape, punch cards, magnetic tape, key tapes, keypunch, typewritten sheets, telephone lines, and other means of transmitting the information or data direct to the computer. The latter methods have been referred to as third generation computer software as the data is transmitted through a cathode ray tube by the operator direct to the computer rather than by means of cards, tape, or other tangible property on which the data is placed for transmission into the computer. The computer program in its operating environment is a product of human intelligence reduced to binary pulses, which are interpreted by the computer machinery to cause human knowledge to be transposed into desired and meaningful output. The basic issue to be resolved is the nature of computer software. Computer hardware refers to the tangible parts of the computer itself while software denotes the information loaded into the computer and the directions given to the computer as to what to do and upon what command. In its assessment Respondent has demanded payment for sales tax involving software processed and sold by Petitioner and Intervenors transmitted on punched cards, paper tape, and typed sheets. Respondent abated the assessment involving magnetic tapes because the tape was owned by Respondent and returned to him when the data superimposed thereon had been stored in the computer. Respondent does not assess sales taxes for computer information supplied to the customer unless tangible property on which the data is superimposed is used and which tangible property is not reusable because of the changes to the tangible property produced when the information or data was placed thereon. Since the magnetic tape was returned to Petitioner in a reusable state and title was never transferred to the customer, Respondent abated the assessment for sales taxes resulting in sale of software via magnetic tape. Similarly Respondent does not claim sales taxes are due when data is fed direct to the computer as no tangible property is transferred. However, when the identical data is transmitted to the computer by means of punched cards, paper tape or other tangible property which is physically changed by the addition of the intelligible data, sales taxes are collected pursuant to Rule 12A-1.32(4) and (7) F.A.C. The tangible property on which the data is superimposed has a value of less than five percent of the total sales price charged for the services. The same type of service is performed by Petitioner whether the data is ultimately entered into the computer by punched cards, magnetic tape, or direct.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Craig Louis Schuette, committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaints in these cases, and if so what is the appropriate penalty to be imposed by the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding Respondent has been a licensed hearing aid specialist in the state of Florida, having been issued license No. AS 2553 on June 9, 1994. Case No. 02-0520 On November 5, 1998, hearing impaired patient R.G., a resident of New York and part-time resident of Florida, visited Audiometric Hearing Center (Audiometric), a hearing aid establishment located on Fifth Avenue, North, in St. Petersburg, Florida. R.G. visited Audiometric after being contacted by postcard and telephone about a free hearing test offer. While at the Center on November 5, 1998, R.G. received a hearing test and signed an agreement to purchase a pair of hearing aids for $3,500.00. Respondent signed the sales receipt on behalf of Audiometric as the selling agent. R.G. paid the entire purchase price to Audiometric on November 5, 1998, by charging the entire amount on his Visa credit card. On November 20, 1998, R.G. returned to Audiometric to be fitted with the new hearing aids. At that time, R.G. noticed that the hearing aids he had purchased, as described in his contract, were a different model and smaller than the devices with which he was being fitted. Respondent persuaded R.G. to test the hearing aids, and R.G. took possession of the devices on that date. Twelve days later, on December 2, 1998, upon being dissatisfied with the hearing aids, R.G. returned to Audiometric with the devices and requested a refund. Audiometric accepted the hearing aids back and R.G. was advised for the first time that he would receive a refund within 90 to 120 days. Although R.G. was promised a refund of $3,125.00, on December 2, 1998, he never received it. R.G. made numerous attempts to obtain a refund but never received one. During an investigation of this matter by the Agency for Health Care Administration, Respondent did not accept responsibility for the refund. While Respondent agreed to assist the patient and provide a free refitting, he maintained that Audiometric was responsible for any and all refunds. Case No. 02-0522 Hearing impaired patient E.T., a resident of Canada who also resided in Florida part of the year, visited the Audiometric Hearing Center, a hearing aid establishment located on Walsingham Road, in Largo, Florida, on February 6, 1998. E.T. went to Audiometric for a free hearing test after being called and offered one by a telephone solicitor. E.T. received a hearing test on that date. On February 6, 1998, E.T. purchased a hearing aid for her right ear at Audiometric for $1,980.00. Respondent signed the sales agreement on behalf of Audiometric as the selling agent. He told E.T. she needed a hearing aid and showed E.T. three hearing aids. E.T. paid the entire purchase price on February 6, 1998, by charging it on her Visa credit card. On February 13, 1998, the patient accepted delivery of the hearing aid at Audiometric from someone other than Respondent. Upon experiencing an itching problem, E.T. returned the hearing aid to Audiometric on February 18, 1998, for a refund, stating that she was not satisfied with it. Someone at Audiometric, other than Respondent, accepted the returned hearing aid from E.T. and promised her a refund of $1,980.00. E.T. made numerous attempts to obtain the refund but never received any portion of it. In fact, she even filed a lawsuit and obtained a default judgment against Audiometric, but could not collect any of it. During an investigation of the matter by the Agency for Health Care Administration, Respondent denied responsibility for the matter, and indicated that Audiometric was culpable.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists enter a final order: Dismissing DOAH Case No. 02-0521 (DOH Case No. 98- 19487). Finding Respondent guilty as charged in the Administrative Complaints in DOAH Case Nos. 02-0520 (DOH Case No. 99-03437) and 02-0522 (DOH Case No. 98-20376). Imposing a letter of reprimand. Imposing a total fine of $1,000.00. Assessing costs of the investigation and prosecution not to exceed $500.00, and ordering Respondent to pay as corrective action $3,125.00 to patient R.G. and $1,731.00 to patient E.T., with all monetary payments to be paid within 90 days of entry of a final order. As to the corrective action, the Respondent should be ordered to provide proof thereof to the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists, Department of Health Compliance Unit within 90 days of the date of the final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary L. Asbell, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Mail Stop 39 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig Schuete 12300 Park Boulevard, Unit 220 Seminole, Florida 33772 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Susan Foster, Executive Director Board of Hearing Aid Specialists Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Gary L. Asbell, Esquire Post Office Box 326 Lloyd, Florida 32337
The Issue Should Petitioner discipline Respondent's hearing aid specialist license for reasons alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint?
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding Respondent William D. Williston has been a licensed hearing aid specialist in Florida, having been issued license no. 1439 by the Florida Board of Hearing Aid Specialist, commencing April 1, 1983. At all times relevant to the inquiry Respondent operated a business known as the Sumter Hearing Center in Wildwood, Florida, from which hearing aids were sold and dispensed. At times relevant to the inquiry Respondent sponsored Darleen L. Sherman as a trainee at his business. Respondent also served as the designated hearing aid specialist to assist in the training of Ms. Sherman. Respondent served in the capacity of direct supervisor to Ms. Sherman in her attempt to learn the necessary skills to become a licensed hearing aid specialist. Respondent's initial sponsorship and supervision of Ms. Sherman's training, wherein Respondent had been designated to serve, was for the training period June 24, 1997 through December 23, 1997. Ms. Sherman completed that training program. Following the completion of her training she took the hearing aid specialist examination. She failed the written theory portion of the examination taken May 1, 1998 through May 3, 1998. Ms. Sherman and Respondent were made aware of those results by notice mailed to the candidate for licensure on June 4, 1998. On June 6, 1998, Ms. Sherman reapplied to participate in a training program sponsored and supervised by Respondent. This was a request to repeat the training. Ms. Sherman's application form submitted to Petitioner was accompanied by a form completed by Respondent as sponsor, also dated June 6, 1998. On June 8, 1998, a check was written by Ms. Sherman to Petitioner in the amount of $105 for the stated purpose of participation in the "second training program." On June 13, 1998, Ms. Sherman was officially registered for the repeat training program with Respondent serving as sponsor and a prospective examination date to gain her license as hearing aid specialist was provided. That date for examination was sometime in January 1999. The training program registration identified the repeat training program period as running from June 12, 1998 through December 11, 1998. Stage I to that training program was June 12, 1998 through July 11, 1998; Stage II July 12, 1998 through September 11, 1998, and Stage III September 12, 1998 through December 11, 1998. During the hiatus between being notified that Ms. Sherman had failed the May 1998 examination and the beginning date for the repeat training program, Ms. Sherman, with Respondent's knowledge, acted in behalf of Respondent's hearing aid specialist business in Wildwood, Florida. This took place on June 9, 1998, involving the patient C.D., outside Respondent's presence. On that date Ms. Sherman performed hearing aid testing on C.D. and sold C.D. new hearing aids manufactured by Rexton for a total price of $4,000. The first $2,000 to purchase was paid on that date. The sales receipt provided C.D. was signed by Ms. Sherman indicating that she was a hearing aid specialist, which she was not. C.D. also signed the receipt form. The receipt provided C.D. on June 9, 1998, indicated that the hearing aids were guaranteed by Rexton for a period of one year with a loss and damage provision available with a 25% deductible. C.D. was provided another document which he signed and dated June 9, 1998. That document was entitled "30-day trial agreement." By its terms it said: I agree to wear my new hearing aid for the full 30-day trial period, and will come in at least once a week for consultation and any adjustments that may be needed. If the hearing aids are returned to the laboratory for any modification, my trial period will resume upon refitting of the hearing aids. I realize that hearing aid fittings are individual in nature and that it is normal to expect adjustments to be made. It has taken a long time for my hearing loss to develop, and will take some time to once again begin to enjoy the sound of life. Respondent was aware of the use of this type form in his business and the type of sales receipt form utilized in the transaction with C.D. Contrary to Respondent's testimony it is not found that C.D. was provided a form with information entitled "30-day trial agreement terms and conditions" as of the purchase date June 9, 1998, or upon any other date. C.D. in his testimony disclaimed being presented the form "30-day trial agreement terms and conditions." His testimony is supported by his wife, V.D. Ms. Sherman does not recall whether the form "30-day trial agreement terms and conditions" was provided to C.D. The "30-day trial agreement terms and conditions" was used on occasion by Respondent and Ms. Sherman but not here. The form is similar to the notice requirements set forth in Section 484.0512, Florida Statutes, dealing with the statutory requirement for a 30-day trial period and money back guarantee, together with the opportunity to return the hearing aids or mail written notice of cancellation to the seller and Rule 64B-6.001, Florida Administrative Code, which further describes written notice requirements. On June 19, 1998, Ms. Sherman received from the factory the hearing aids purchased by C.D. They had the wrong circuitry. As a consequence Ms. Sherman returned the hearing aids for correction. On June 29, 1998, Ms. Sherman received the hearing aids a second time. On June 30, 1998, C.D. returned to Respondent's business and was provided the hearing aids and paid the $2,000 balance for the purchase. Respondent was in attendance on this occasion. No further documentation was provided C.D. concerning his purchase when he took delivery of the hearing aids. Shortly after receiving the hearing aids C.D. and his wife took a vacation in north Georgia. On July 14, 1998, C.D. wrote Ms. Sherman concerning the hearing aids in question. In that correspondence he said "Sorry, but these hearing aids just don't meet my needs. Please refund my $4,000." On that same date by registered delivery, return receipt requested, C.D. sent the hearing aids back to Respondent's Wildwood, Florida, business address. The hearing aids were received at that address on July 20, 1998. The hearing aids were eventually returned to the manufacturer for credit on Respondent's account with Rexton. This disposition occurred around August 10, 1998. On July 20, 1998, the same day that the hearing aids were received by Respondent's business, Ms. Sherman wrote C.D. at his Florida address in Lake Panasoffkee, Florida. In that correspondence she identified herself as being a hearing aid specialist and an office manager for Respondent's Sumter Hearing Centers, one of which was at the Wildwood, Florida, address. In this correspondence she stated: We are in receipt of your hearing aid. As we agreed when you purchased the hearing aid you would give the hearing aid a 30-day trial basis, therefore I would suggest that we delay canceling this order. My suggestion is again a 30-day trial basis effective upon your return. It is important that I know what kind of problems, 'not loud enough, too much background noise, whistling, fit uncomfortable or etc.' you are having so that I can make adjustments and have you try them again. I am confident that we can get you to hear better. Please contact me at 352-793-4422 regarding the above matter. On August 6, 1998, C.D. responded to the July 20, 1998 letter from Ms. Sherman by writing to her and saying: In reference to your letter of July 20th; be advised that I have purchased another hearing aid and I am happy with them [sic]. Please return the $4,000 I paid for the Rexton aids. In fact, C.D. had not purchased another hearing aid. He made this false statement as a further attempt to be reimbursed the purchase price for the Rexton hearing aids. C.D. made numerous attempts to obtain a refund for the hearing aids purchased, to no avail. Respondent was aware of these attempts. Among the efforts was contact by Randall M. Thornton, Esquire, C.D.'s attorney, who wrote to the Respondent's business address at Wildwood, Florida, and another business address in Bushnell, Florida, requesting a refund in the amount of $4,000. This correspondence from the attorney was dated October 9, 1998. Respondent's uncorroborated testimony that he refunded the $4,000 to C.D. is not credible.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which imposes an administrative fine of $2,000, assesses costs of investigation and prosecution, orders Respondent to refund $4,000 to C.D., and otherwise dismisses the Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary L. Asbell, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building Three, Mail Station 39 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William D. Williston 3131 Southwest College Road Suite 302 Ocala, Florida 34474 William D. Williston 1072 Southeast 155th Street Summerfield, Florida 34491 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Susan Foster, Executive Director Board of Hearing Aid Specialists Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
Findings Of Fact The parties have resolved the factual issues through a stipulation. A copy of the stipulation is appended to this Final Order, and constitutes findings of fact for the purposes of this proceeding. In summary, the facts are that the Respondent refers requests for formal administrative hearings that are submitted to it to the Division of Administrative Hearings. Formal hearings are conducted by the Division of Administrative Hearings, culminating in entry of recommended orders directed to the Secretary of the Department. The Department records the hearings on tape recording equipment. Tapes of the hearings are routinely made available to the parties. The Department has a policy of rejecting any exceptions to the findings of fact set out in a recommended order unless the objecting party submits a complete transcript of the hearing at that party's expense. The Respondent's practice is to allow parties to utilize tapes of the final hearing so that the party can prepare a transcript from the tapes. The Department accepts any notarized transcript prepared from the tapes as a transcript of the hearing.
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent, Sport Clips, Inc., is Petitioner’s “employer” under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, chapter 760, Florida Statutes (“FCRA”).
Findings Of Fact Based upon the credibility of the witnesses and evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: SCI is a Texas corporation, whose sole office is located at 110 Sport Clips Way, Georgetown, Texas, 78628. SCI’s Chief Executive Officer at the time of the alleged discriminatory events was Gordon B. Logan. SCI is the owner of the “Sport Clips” trademarks and business system. It licenses the Sport Clips trademarks and business system to independent business people. Each Sport Clips franchisee signs a franchise agreement under which SCI licenses its trademarks and the franchisee agrees to abide by certain operating rules that protect the Sport Clips trademarks and brand. In addition, each franchisee pays to SCI a royalty and advertising fee, as well as other fees. Sport Clips is a sports-themed hair-cutting salon which provides customers with haircuts, shampoo, and beard trims. There are approximately 1,800 Sport Clips franchise stores and an additional 75 Sport Clips stores owned and operated by SCI. SCI provides operating rules to its franchisees in a confidential operating manual.2 The operating manual does not cover employment policies, employee compensation, or employee benefits. These employment matters are determined by the individual franchisee. Instead, the operating manual focuses on business operations. According to Gordon Logan, CEO of SCI, the company trademark “[is] the essence of the business. You have to have a trademark and protect that trademark in order to have a viable system, one that franchisees can present in a consistent manner and the public knows what to expect when they come into a franchise business using that trademark.” The purpose of the procedures and specifications in the operating manual is to protect the Sport Clips trademark and brand. If SCI failed to enforce its trademark and brand standards, it could lose the right to use the trademark. Further, it ensures that the public’s expectations are met 2 Neither party introduced a copy of the confidential operating manual into evidence at the hearing and therefore it is not part of the record of this case. no matter which store they visit in the country, and protects the franchisees’ investments in the franchise. The procedures and specifications set forth in SCI’s franchise agreement and operating manual, including requiring franchisees to participate in specific training, use Sport Clips uniforms, and use a particular point of sales system, are typical of the franchise industry. JV-SC is a Florida Limited Liability Company managed by Drew C. Hopper. JV-SC’s sole corporate office is located at 708 Main Street, Houston, Texas. No SCI officer, employee, or representative holds any position with JV-SC, nor does any JV-SC officer, employee, or representative hold any position with SCI. Likewise, SCI has no ownership interest in any of Mr. Hopper’s Sport Clips stores or business entities, and Mr. Hopper and his business entities have no ownership interest in SCI. Over the last 21 years, Mr. Hopper has been involved in approximately 30 Sport Clips stores as a franchisee. Through JV-SC, Mr. Hopper operates eight Sport Clips franchise stores for profit in North Central Florida, including two locations in Gainesville. Mr. Hopper hired Ms. Kelley to manage the day-to-day operations of the Gainesville stores, and Ms. Kelley hired Ms. Turner, with Mr. Hopper’s approval, to manage and cut hair at one of JV-SC’s Gainesville stores. JV-SC has a franchise agreement with SCI with regard to the Gainesville location managed by Ms. Turner (“Franchise Agreement”). Under the Franchise Agreement, SCI granted JV-SC “a non-exclusive and personal license to operate one unit of the Franchised Business in strict conformity with the Franchisor’s standards and specifications” at 2231 Northwest 13th Street, Suite 20, Gainesville, Florida 32608 (“13th Street Location”). Ms. Kelley and Ms. Turner were responsible for recruiting and hiring hair stylists at the 13th Street Location. Ms. Turner was responsible for supervising the stylists at the 13th Street Location. Employees in JV-SC’s corporate office in Houston also handled human resources functions for JV-SC. Mr. Hopper ultimately decided what to pay stylists on behalf of JV-SC. JV-SC set employee expectations and Ms. Kelley and Ms. Turner were responsible for handling employee misconduct and firing decisions at the 13th Street Location. Ms. Kelley and Ms. Turner were also responsible for ensuring that the 13th Street Location was properly equipped with necessary tools and inventory. Mr. Boyd was a hair stylist at the 13th Street Location. He was hired by Ms. Turner on August 30, 2017, and his rate of pay was set by JV-SC at $10 per hour. When he was hired, he completed a new hire form which states in bold print at the top: “JV-SC Investments LLC DBA Sport Clips FL901.” Mr. Boyd’s employment was terminated less than three months after he was hired by Ms. Turner for a violation of JV-SC policy related to a customer complaint. SCI had no involvement in Mr. Boyd’s hiring or termination of employment. During his employment, Mr. Boyd’s work schedule was established by Ms. Turner and his benefits, including holidays, vacation pay, and health insurance, were determined by JV-SC. If Mr. Boyd was going to be late or absent from work, he needed to contact Ms. Turner. Ms. Turner supervised Mr. Boyd’s appearance and conduct while on duty at the 13th Street Location and she conducted his performance reviews. SCI has never exercised control over Mr. Boyd, including his working hours, pay, and vacation benefits. Mr. Boyd’s personnel records were created and maintained by JV-SC and the records repeatedly identify JV-SC as Mr. Boyd’s employer. Mr. Boyd’s paychecks and W-2 were issued by JV-SC and make no reference to SCI. Likewise, Ms. Turner and Ms. Kelley were hired and paid by JV-SC and JV-SC created and maintained their personnel records. SCI has no employment records indicating that Mr. Boyd, Ms. Turner, or Ms. Kelley were ever employed by SCI. JV-SC had an employee handbook based on a template it received from SCI. The handbook was modified by JV-SC and could be modified by JV-SC at any time. Indeed, SCI expressly advised JV-SC to modify the form handbook to ensure it complied with local laws and to reflect the business practices of JV-SC. The employee handbook identifies JV-SC in bold red print on the front cover and provides “Sport Clips stores are independently owned and operated franchises. Team Members working in franchised stores are employed by the franchisee (Team Leader) and are not employed by Sport Clips, Inc.” JV-SC’s employee handbook was provided to its employees, including Mr. Boyd. JV-SC’s employee handbook required Mr. Boyd to report complaints of discrimination to his manager, Ms. Turner, or if he had a complaint concerning her, to Mr. Hopper at JV-SC. Under section XVI of the Franchise Agreement, JV-SC “acknowledges and agrees that [JV-SC] is an independent business person and independent contractor.” Further, this section provides in relevant part: Nothing in the Agreement is intended to make either party an agent, legal representative, subsidiary, joint venturer, partner, employee or servant of the other for any purpose whatsoever. During the term of this Agreement, [JV-SC] shall hold itself out to the public as an independent contractor operating the Franchised Business pursuant to a license from [SCI] and as an authorized user of the System and the Proprietary marks which are owned by [SCI]. [JV-SC] agrees to take such affirmative action as may be necessary to do so, including exhibiting to customers a sign provided by [SCI] in a conspicuous place on the premises of the Franchised Business. In compliance with this section of the Franchise Agreement, JV-SC posted at its 13th Street Location a sign in the front of the store which states: “This Sport Clips store is owned and operated by JV-SC Investments, LLC an independent Sport Clips franchisee.” With regard to JV-SC’s employees, the Franchise Agreement provides that “[SCI] shall not have the power to hire, manage, compensate or fire [JV-SC’s] employees and it is expressly agreed that [SCI] has no employment relationship with [JV-SC’s] employees.” The Franchise Agreement further provides: Franchisees are responsible for hiring, managing and compensating their employees within the laws of any jurisdiction in which they operate and are encouraged to consult their own legal counsel to ensure their compliance with all applicable laws. Franchisee and Franchisor recognize that Franchisor neither dictates nor controls labor and employment matters for the Franchisee or the Franchisee’s employees. Over the last 21 years, SCI has never told Mr. Hopper “who to hire, how to hire, how much [he] should hire them for, how much [he] should pay [employees]. It’s always been up to [him].” With regard to JV-SC’s funds and store premises, the Franchise Agreement provides “[e]xcept as herein expressly provided, [SCI] may not control or have access to [JV-SC’s] funds or the premises of the Franchised Business, or in any other way exercise dominion or control over the Franchised Business.” SCI has no control or ownership interest over JV-SC’s bank accounts, set up by Mr. Hopper; SCI is only authorized to withdraw from the accounts the specific royalties and fees set forth in the Franchise Agreement. Proceeds from the sales at the 13th Street Location are deposited into JV-SC’s bank account. SCI does not lease or own the property at the 13th Street Location or any of the 23 locations Mr. Hopper franchises from SCI. JV-SC leases the property from a third party. SCI does not own any real estate in common with or lease any property to Mr. Hopper or his related business entities.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Petitioner failed to prove that Sport Clips, Inc. is an “employer” pursuant to section 760.02(7), Florida Statute, and dismissing the Petitions for Relief filed in these consolidated cases. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of August, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of August, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Robert W. Bauer, Esquire Bauer Law Group, P.A. Suite B 3721 Northwest 40th Terrace Gainesville, Florida 32606 (eServed) Deborah L. Taylor, Esquire SportsClips, Inc. Suite 1200 3730 Kirby Drive Houston, Texas 77098 Stephanie M. Marchman, Esquire GrayRobinson, P.A. Suite 106 720 Southwest 2nd Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601-6250 (eServed) Maria Perez Youngblood, Esquire Law Office of Robert W. Bauer, P.A. Suite B 3721 Northwest 40th Terrace Gainesville, Florida 32606 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
