The Issue The issues are whether proposed and existing Florida Administrative Code rules, both numbered 59G-6.030, are valid exercises of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners are 120 hospitals--some not-for-profit, some for-profit, and some governmental--that are licensed under chapter 395, Florida Statutes, provide both inpatient and outpatient services, and participate in the Medicaid program. AHCA is the state agency authorized to make payments for services rendered to Medicaid patients. Before 2013, all Medicaid outpatient services were provided and paid fee-for-service. Under the fee-for-service model, hospitals submit claims to AHCA, and AHCA reimburses the hospitals based on the established rate. For many years, AHCA has set prospective Medicaid fee- for-service reimbursement rates for outpatient hospital services, either semi-annually or annually, based on the most recent complete and accurate cost reports submitted by each hospital; has re-published the Florida Title XIX Hospital Outpatient Reimbursement Plan (Outpatient Plan) that explained how the rates were determined; and has adopted the current Outpatient Plan by reference in rule 59G-6.030. In 2005, the Florida Legislature’s General Appropriations Act (GAA) stated that the funds appropriated for Medicaid outpatient hospital services reflected a cost savings of $16,796,807 “as a result of modifying the reimbursement methodology for outpatient hospital rates.” It instructed AHCA to “implement a recurring methodology in the Title XIX Outpatient Hospital Reimbursement Plan that may include, but is not limited to, the inflation factor, variable cost target, county rate ceiling or county ceiling target rate to achieve the cost savings.” AHCA responded by amending the Outpatient Plan to provide: “Effective July 1, 2005, a recurring rate reduction shall be established until an aggregate total estimated savings of $16,796,807 is achieved each year. This reduction is the Medicaid Trend Adjustment.” The amended Outpatient Plan was then adopted by reference in rule 59G-6.030, effective July 1, 2005. AHCA collaborated with the hospitals to determine how to accomplish the legislatively mandated reduction in a manner that would be fair to all the hospitals. It was decided to take the hospitals’ unaudited cost reports from the most recent complete fiscal year and the number of Medicaid occasions of service from the monthly report of AHCA’s Medicaid fiscal agent that corresponded to the hospitals’ fiscal years, and use an Excel spreadsheet program with a function called Goal Seek to calculate proportionate rate adjustments for each hospital to achieve the legislatively mandated aggregate savings. The resulting rate adjustments were incorporated in the hospital reimbursement rates, effective July 1, 2005. In 2006, there was no further Medicaid Trend Adjustment (MTA) reduction. However, in accordance with the instructions in the 2005 GAA, the 2005 MTA reduction of $16,796,807 was treated as a recurring reduction and was applied again in the 2006 Outpatient Plan, which again stated: “Effective July 1, 2005, a recurring rate reduction shall be established until an aggregate total estimated savings of $16,796,807 is achieved each year. This reduction is the Medicaid Trend Adjustment.” The 2006 Outpatient Plan also stated: “This recurring reduction, called the Medicaid Trend Adjustment, shall be applied proportionally to all rates on an annual basis.” It also came to be known as the first cut or cut 1. It again was applied by taking the hospitals’ most current unaudited cost reports and the corresponding occasions of service from the appropriate monthly report of the fiscal agent, and using the Excel spreadsheets and the Goal Seek function to calculate rate adjustments for each hospital. The cut 1 rate adjustments were incorporated in the hospital reimbursement rates, effective July 1, 2006. In 2007, the GAA stated that the funds appropriated for Medicaid outpatient hospital services were reduced by $17,211,796 “as a result of modifying the reimbursement for outpatient hospital rates, effective July 1, 2008.” This has been referred to as the second cut or cut 2. It instructed AHCA to “implement a recurring methodology in the Title XIX Outpatient Hospital Reimbursement Plan to achieve this reduction.” The 2008 Outpatient Plan again applied the first cut as a recurring reduction and stated that it was to be “applied proportionally to all rates on an annual basis.” It then made the second cut, which was to be “applied to achieve a recurring annual reduction of $17,211,796.” These cuts were again applied by taking the hospitals’ most current unaudited cost reports and the corresponding occasions of service from the appropriate monthly report of the fiscal agent, and using the Excel spreadsheets and the Goal Seek function to calculate rate adjustments for each hospital. The resulting rate adjustments were incorporated in the hospital reimbursement rates, effective July 1, 2008. This process was repeated in subsequent years. The third cut (cut 3) was in 2008; it was a $36,403,451 reduction. The fourth cut (cut 4) was in 2009, during a special session; it was a $19,384,437 reduction; however, per the GAA that made the fourth cut, it was not applied to the rates of certain children’s specialty hospitals, which were excluded from the reduction. In addition, using language similar to what AHCA had been using in the Outpatient Plans, the 2009 GAA stated: “The agency shall reduce individual hospital rates proportionately until the required savings are achieved.” The Legislature enacted cut 5 and cut 6 in 2009 and 2010. However, the GAAs stated that AHCA should not take these cuts if the unit costs before the cuts were equal to or less than the unit costs used in establishing the budget. AHCA determined that cuts 5 and 6 should not be taken. However, cuts 1 through 4 continued to be applied as recurring reductions, and rates were adjusted for cuts 1 through 4 in 2009 and 2010 in the same manner as before. In 2011, the GAA enacted cut 7; it was for $99,045,233 and was added to the previous cuts for all but certain children’s specialty and rural hospitals, which were excluded from the additional reduction. In setting the individual hospitals’ reimbursement rates, AHCA first applied cut 7 in the same manner as cuts 1 through 4. The result was a 16.5 percent rate adjustment for cut 7, which was much higher than for previous cuts. Some of the hospitals pointed this out to AHCA and to the Legislature and its staff. There was lots of discussion, and it was determined that the rate adjustment from cut 7 would be more like what the Legislature was expecting (about 12 percent), if budgeted occasions of service were used, instead of the number from the fiscal agent’s monthly report that corresponded to the most recent cost reports. AHCA agreed to change to budgeted fee-for- service occasions of service for cut 7, with the concurrence of the hospitals and the Legislature and its staff. The year 2011 was also the year the Legislature instituted what became known as the “unit cost cap.” In that year, the Legislature amended section 409.908, Florida Statutes, to provide: “The agency shall establish rates at a level that ensures no increase in statewide expenditures resulting from a change in unit costs effective July 1, 2011. Reimbursement rates shall be as provided in the General Appropriations Act.” § 409.908(23)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011). This part of the statute has not changed. The GAA that year elaborated: In establishing rates through the normal process, prior to including this reduction [cut 7], if the unit cost is equal to or less than the unit cost used in establishing the budget, then no additional reduction in rates is necessary. In establishing rates through the normal process, if the unit cost is greater than the unit cost used in establishing the budget, then rates shall be reduced by an amount required to achieve this reduction, but shall not be reduced below the unit cost used in establishing the budget. “Unit cost” was not defined by statute or GAA. To calculate what it was in 2011, AHCA divided the total dollar amount of Medicaid payments made to hospitals by AHCA by the number of Medicaid occasions of service for all hospitals. The result was $141.51. Since 2011, AHCA has applied the unit cost cap with reference to the 2011 unit cost of $141.51. Since then, AHCA has compared the 2011 unit cost to the current cost, calculated by dividing the total dollar amount of Medicaid payments made to all hospitals by AHCA by the number of Medicaid occasions of service for all hospitals, except in children’s and rural hospitals, to determine whether the unit cost cap would require a further rate reduction, after applying the MTA cuts. Using this comparison, the unit cost cap never has been exceeded, and no further rate adjustments ever have been required. It is not clear why AHCA excluded Medicaid occasions of service for children’s and rural hospitals from the unit cost calculations made after 2011. It could have been because those hospitals were excluded from cut 7 and cut 8. Cut 8 was enacted in 2012; it was for $49,078,485 and was added to the previous cuts for all but certain children’s specialty and rural hospitals, which were excluded from the additional reduction. In 2012, the Legislature specified in the GAA that budgeted occasions of service should be used in calculating the MTA reduction for inpatient hospitals. AHCA always treated inpatient and outpatient MTAs the same, and it viewed the specific legislative direction for the inpatient MTA as guidance and indicative of legislative intent that it should continue to use budgeted occasions of service for the outpatient cut 7 and should also use them for the outpatient cut 8. Again, the hospitals did not object since the result was a higher reimbursement rate. In 2014, the Florida Medicaid program began to transition Medicaid recipients from a fee-for-service model to a managed care model. Under the managed care model, AHCA pays a managed care organization (MCO) a capitation rate per patient. The MCOs negotiate contracts with hospitals to provide outpatient care at an agreed reimbursement rate per occasion of service. Since August 2014, the majority of Medicaid recipients has been receiving services through MCOs, rather than through fee-for-service. Currently, about 75 to 80 percent of Medicaid outpatient hospital occasions of service are provided through managed care In recognition of the shift to MCOs, the Legislature began to divide the Medicaid outpatient hospital reimbursement appropriation in the GAA between what AHCA reimburses directly to hospitals under the fee-for-service model and what it pays MCOs to provide those services under the MCO delivery system. This allocation of the budgets between fee-for-service and managed care necessarily accomplished a corresponding division of the recurring MTA reductions between the two delivery systems. The Legislature did not enact any statutes or GAAs requiring AHCA to change how it applies MTA reductions to determine fee-for-service outpatient reimbursement rate adjustments, or make any other changes in response to the transition to MCOs. There were no additional MTA reductions in 2015. The 2015 Outpatient Plan, which is incorporated in existing rule 59G- 6.030, applied the previous cuts as recurring reductions. The evidence was confusing as to whether cuts 7 and 8 were applied using the occasions of service in the fiscal agent’s monthly report corresponding to the hospitals’ most current unaudited cost reports, or using budgeted occasions of service. If the former, the numbers did not yet reflect much of the shift to the managed care model because of a time lag in producing cost reports, and the evidence suggested that the numbers were approximately the same as the budgeted occasions of service used previously. Whichever numbers were used, the resulting rate adjustments were incorporated in the hospitals’ reimbursement rates, effective July 1, 2015. Leading up to the 2016 legislative session, there was a legislative proposal to determine prospective Medicaid outpatient reimbursement rates using a completely new method called Enhanced Ambulatory Patient Groups (EAPGs). EAPGs would eliminate the need to depend on hospital cost reports and complicated calculations to determine the effects of MTA reductions on prospective hospital outpatient reimbursement rates, effective July 1, following the end of the legislative session each year. Hospitals, including some if not all of the Petitioners, asked the Legislature not to proceed with the proposed EAPG legislation until they had an opportunity to study it and provide input, and EAPGs were not enacted in 2016. However, section 409.905(6)(b) was amended, effective July 1, 2017, to require the switch to EAPGs. See note to § 409.905, Fla. Stat.; and ch. 2016-65, § 9, Laws of Fla. (2016). When it became apparent that EAPGs would not be in use for prospective reimbursement rates for fiscal year 2016/2017, AHCA basically repeated the 2015/2016 process, but adjusted the occasions of service used for calculating the hospitals’ rate reductions for cuts 7 and 8 by adding 14,000 occasions of service. At the end of July, AHCA published new rates effective July 1, 2016. When the new rates were published, they were challenged by some of the Petitioners under section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Citing section 409.908(1)(f)1., AHCA took the position that there was no jurisdiction and dismissed the petitions. That decision is on appeal to the First District Court of Appeal. The Petitioners also challenged the methodology used to calculate the new prospective reimbursement rates as a rule that was not adopted as required, and challenged the validity of existing rule 59G-6.030, which incorporated the 2015 Outpatient Plan by reference. These challenges became DOAH cases 16-6398RX through 16-6414RX. In response to DOAH cases 16-6398RX through 16-6414RX, AHCA adopted the 2016 Outpatient Plan by reference in proposed rule 59G-6.030. The 2016 Outpatient Plan provides more detail than the 2015 version. AHCA’s position is that the additional detail was provided to clarify the 2015 version. However, it changed the occasions of service used for calculating the hospitals’ rate reductions for cuts 7 and 8, as indicated in Finding 22, as well as some other substantive changes. The 2015 Outpatient Plan addressed the unit cost cap by stating: “Effective July 1, 2011, AHCA shall establish rates at a level that ensures no increase in statewide expenditures resulting from a change in unit costs.” The 2016 Outpatient Plan elaborates and specifies the calculation AHCA has been using, as stated in Finding 14. The 2015 Outpatient Plan provided that an individual hospital’s prospective reimbursement rate may be adjusted under certain circumstances, such as when AHCA makes an error in the calculation of the hospital’s unaudited rate. It also stated: “Any rate adjustment or denial of a rate adjustment by AHCA may be appealed by the provider in accordance with Rule 28-106, F.A.C., and section 120.57(1), F.S.” The 2016 Outpatient Plan deleted the appeal rights language from the existing rule. The effect of the existing and proposed rules on the Petitioners through their effect on managed care contract rates is debatable. Those rates do not have to be the same as the fee- for-service outpatient reimbursement rates, although they are influenced by the fee-for-service rates, and it is not uncommon for them to be stated as a percentage of the fee-for-service rates. By law, managed care contract rates cannot exceed 120 percent of the fee-for-service rates unless the MCO gets permission from AHCA, as provided in section 409.975(6). Currently, rates paid by MCOs for Medicaid hospital outpatient services average about 105 percent of the fee-for-service reimbursement rates. AHCA has indicated that it would not expect or like to see the contract rates much higher than that. It is not clear whether that still is AHCA’s position. If higher rates were negotiated, the impact of fee-for-services rate adjustments on managed care rates could be reduced or even eliminated. The effect of the existing and proposed rules on the Petitioners through their effect on how fee-for-service reimbursement rates are calculated is not disputed. With the transition to managed care, the effect is greater and clearly substantial. The recurring MTA reductions enacted by the Legislature through 2014, which total $224,015,229 (after taking into account $10,656,238 that was reinstated, and $4,068,064 that was added in consideration of trauma centers), are being spread over fewer fee-for-service occasions of service, especially for cuts 7 and 8, which significantly lowers the fee-for-service outpatient reimbursement rates calculated under the proposed rule. The Petitioners’ objections to the validity of the proposed and existing rules can be summarized as follows: a lack of legislative authority for recurring (i.e., cumulative) MTA reductions; a failure to adopt a fixed methodology to calculate individual hospital outpatient reimbursement rate adjustments resulting from MTA reductions; specifically, a failure to derive the number of fee-for-service occasions of service used in calculating individual hospital outpatient reimbursement rate adjustments in the same manner every year; conversely, a failure to increase the occasions of service used to calculate individual hospital outpatient reimbursement rate adjustments resulting from cuts 1 through 4; a failure of the unit cost cap in the existing rule to specify how it is applied; a failure of the unit cost cap in the proposed rule to compare the 2011 unit cost to the current cost, calculated by dividing the total dollar amount of Medicaid payments made to all hospitals by AHCA by the number of Medicaid occasions of service for all hospitals, including in children’s and rural hospitals; and proposed rule’s deletion of the language in the existing rule stating that a rate adjustment or denial can be appealed in accordance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106 and section 120.57.
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner, United Health, Inc. (United), is the owner and operator of approximately one hundred and twenty-three nursing homes in thirteen states. In the State of Florida, it owns and operates sixteen nursing homes and one intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded that are licensed by respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). At issue in this proceeding are the cost reports and supplemental schedules filed by thirteen nursing home facilities.1 In accordance with Medicaid guidelines, petitioner was required to annually submit cost reports to HRS reflecting its allowable costs in providing Medicaid services to its patients. HRS is designated as the state agency responsible for the administration of Medicaid funds under Title XIX of the Social Security Act. In order to be reimbursed for said costs, the facility was required to show that the costs were in conformity with Federal and State Medicaid reimbursement principles. Those principles are embodied in the Long Term Care Reimbursement Plan (Plan) adopted by the State.2 This document contains the reimbursement methodology to be used for nursing homes who provide Medicaid services. In addition, providers must comply with Health Insurance Manual 15 (HIM-15), a compendium of federal cost reimbursement guidelines utilized by HRS, and generally accepted accounting principles. By letter dated September 9, 1985 petitioner requested that HRS adjust its July 1, 1985 reimbursement rates for the thirteen facilities to reflect certain annualized costs incurred during the preceding fiscal year ending December 31, 1984. According to the letter, the adjustment was appropriate under Section V.B.I.b. of the September 1, 1984 Plan. On October 21, 1985, an HRS Medicaid cost reimbursement analyst issued a letter denying the request on the following grounds: Our review of the information submitted with the fiscal year end 12/31/84 cost reports revealed that the annualized operating and patient care costs were not documented to be new and expanded services or related to licensure and certification requirements. The annualized property cost appeared to be 1 2 various purchases, repairs and maintenance and was not documented to be capital improvements. The denial prompted the instant proceeding. B. Reimbursement Principles In General Under the Medicaid reimbursement plan adopted for use in Florida, nursing homes are reimbursed by HRS on a prospective basis for their allowable costs incurred in providing Medicaid services. This method is commonly referred to as the prospective plan, and has been in use since 1977. Under this concept, a nursing home files with HRS, within ninety days after the close of its fiscal year, a cost report reflecting its actual costs for the immediate preceding fiscal year. Within the next ninety days, the nursing home is given a per diem reimbursement rate (or ceiling) to be used during the following twelve months.3 For example, if a provider's fiscal year ended December 31, 1984, its cost report would be due by March 31, 1985. HRS would then provide estimated reimbursement rates to be used during the period from July 1, 1985 through June 30, 1986. As can be seen, there is a time lag between the end of a cost reporting year and the provider's receiving the new rate. The new reimbursement rate is based upon the provider's actual costs in the preceding fiscal year (reporting period) adjusted upward by an inflation factor that is intended to compensate the provider for cost increases caused by inflation. The prospective plan enables a provider to know in advance what rates it will be paid for Medicaid services during that year rather than being repaid on a retroactive basis. If a provider operates efficiently at a level below the ceiling, it is "rewarded" being allowed to keep a portion of the difference. Conversely, if it exceeds the caps, it is penalized to the extent that it receives only the rates previously authorized by HRS, and must absorb the shortfall. At the same time, it should be noted that the reimbursement rate is not intended to cover all costs incurred by a provider, but only those that are reasonable and necessary in an efficiently operated facility. These unreimbursed costs are covered through other provider resources, or by a future cut in services. When the events herein occurred, there were two types of adjustments allowed under the prospective plan. The first adjustment is the inflation factor, and as noted above, it 3 authorizes the provider to adjust certain reported costs by the projected rate of inflation to offset anticipated cost increases due to inflation. However, because the prospective plan (and the inflation factor) ignores other cost increases that occur during the given year, HRS devised a second type of adjustment for providers to use. This adjustment is known as the gross-up provision, and allows the annualization of certain costs incurred by a provider during a portion of the reporting period. The concept itself .s embodied in subparagraph B.1.b. of Part V of the September 1, 1984 Plan. Its use may be illustrated with the following example. A provider constructs an addition to its facility with an in-service date at the end of the sixth month of the reporting period. By reflecting only the depreciation associated with the addition during the last six months of the reporting period, the facility understates its actual costs, and is reimbursed for only one-half of the facility's depreciation during the following year. Under the gross-up provision the provider grosses up, or annualizes, the reported cost to give it a full year's effect, thereby ensuring that the next year's rates will be more realistic. Although the provision has application to this proceeding, over objection by the nursing home industry it was eliminated from the Plan on October 1, 1985 and is no longer available to providers. At hearing HRS contended the provision should have been eliminated in 1984, but through oversight remained in effect until 1985. However this contention is rejected as not being credible, and is contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Finally, neither party could recall if a request under this provision had ever been filed. They do acknowledge that HRS has never approved such a request during the more than two years when the provision was operative. In addition to the gross-up and inflation provisions, there exists an alternative means for additional rate reimbursement through what is known as the interim rate provision. Under this provision, a provider can request an interim rate increase from HRS during the period when its prospective rates are in effect to cover major unexpected costs. Assuming a request is valid and substantiated, a provider is eligible for immediate cash relief dating back to the date of the actual expense. However, because of HRS' concern that this provision was being "abused", only those costs which exceed $5,000 and cause a change of 1% or more in the total prospective per diem rate are now eligible for reimbursement. These monetary thresholds on interim rate requests became effective September 1, 1984. When these higher thresholds were imposed, HRS made representations to the nursing home industry that a provider could still utilize the gross-up provision to cover other unexpected costs. Finally, it is noted that unlike the prospective rate, an interim rate is cost settled. This means the provider's cost reports are later audited, and excess reimbursements must be repaid to HRS. This differs from the prospective plan where any "overpayments" are not subject to recoupment by HRS. Even so, a provider is limited by the reasonableness and prudent buyer concepts which serve as a check on potential abuse by a provider. The Gross-Up Feature In its relevant form, the gross-up provision was first adopted for use by HRS in its April 1, 1983 Plan.4 It required HRS to: Review and adjust each provider's cost report referred to in A. (1.) as follows: * * * b. to compensate for new and expanded or discontinued services, licensure and certification requirements, and capital improvements which occurred during the reporting year but were not included or totally accounted for in the cost report. This language was incorporated with only minor changes into the September 1, 1984 Plan and is applicable to the cost reports in issue. In its 1984 form, the provision required HRS to review and adjust each provider's cost report as follows: b. To compensate for new and expanded or discontinued services, licensure and certification requirements, and capital improvements not included or totally accounted for in the reporting year. For additional costs to be provided, the provider must furnish adequate supporting documentation. 4 Accordingly, if a cost fits within one of the three categories, HRS is required to adjust a provider's report to compensate it for the expenditure. The April 1, 1983 Plan was negotiated by the nursing home industry and HRS representatives at a meeting in Gainesville, Florida. For this reason, it is commonly referred to as the Gainesville Plan. Through testimony of negotiators who participated at the meeting, it was established that the Plan had three objectives: to give proper payment to nursing homes; to meet state and federal regulations; and to help upgrade care in the nursing homes. At the same time, the negotiators recognized that a prospective plan based on inFla.ion alone overlooked other cost increases that occurred during a given year. Therefore, the gross-up provision was added to the Plan to ensure that providers could estimate (and recoup) their future costs in as accurate a manner as possible, and to bring the plan into compliance with federal guidelines. It was also designed to ensure that a provider did not have to wait an extraordinarily long time for expenses to be recognized. In addition, HRS was hopeful that the gross-up provision would minimize the providers' reliance upon the interim rate feature (which was intended to cover only major items) thereby reducing the agency's overall workload. Indeed, the interim and gross-up features were intended to complement each other, in that one provided immediate relief on major unexpected items while the other provided a means to adjust partial year costs incurred during the reporting period. The implementation of thresholds on the interim rate provision in September, 1984 increased the importance of the gross-up provision to handle smaller items. Therefore, HRS' contention that the interim and gross-up provisions are in conflict is hereby rejected. In order for a cost to be eligible for annualization, it must fall within one of three categories: new or expanded service, a capital improvement, or a cost to meet HRS' licensure and certification requirements. The parties have stipulated that HRS' denial of United's request was based solely upon HRS' perception that the costs did not fall within any of the three categories. The three types of costs within the feature are not defined in the Plan. Testimony from the Plan's negotiators established that the language in the gross-up feature was meant to be construed broadly and to encompass many costs. For this reason, no limitations were written into the Plan. Even so, the provision was not intended to give carte blanche authority to the providers to annualize every partial cost. There is conflicting testimony regarding the meaning of the term "capital improvement" and what expenditures are included within this category. However, Sections 108.1 and 108.2 of HIM-15, of which the undersigned has taken official notice, define a capital item as follows: If a depreciable asset has, at the time of its acquisition, an estimated useful life of at least 2 years and a historical cost of at least $500, its cost must be capitalized, and written off ratably over the estimated useful life of the asset. . . * * * Betterments and improvements extend the life or increase the productivity of an asset as opposed to repairs and maintenance which either restore the asset to, or maintain it at, its normal or expected service life. Repairs and maintenance costs are always allowed in the current accounting period. With respect to the costs of betterments and improvements, the guidelines established in Section 108.1 must be followed, i.e., if the cost of a betterment or improvement to an asset is $500 or more and the estimated useful life of the asset is extended beyond its original estimated life by at least 2 years, or if the productivity of the asset is increased significantly over its original productivity, then the cost must be capitalized. The above guidelines are more credible and persuasive than the limited definition of capital item enunciated at final hearing by HRS personnel. Therefore, it is found that the HIM-15 definition is applicable to the gross-up feature and will be used to determine the validity of petitioner's claim to gross up certain expenditures. There is also conflicting testimony as to what the term "new and expanded or discontinued services" includes. Petitioner construes this item to include any costs that increase the volume of services to a resident. Therefore, petitioner posits that an increase in staffing which likewise increases services to residents is subject to annualization. Conversely, HRS construes the term to cover any costs for new or expanded services that enable a facility to provide patients with services not previously provided or to expand an existing service to more patients in the facility. The latter definition is more credible and persuasive and will be used by the undersigned in evaluating petitioner's request. Finally, petitioner interprets the term "licensure and certification requirements" to cover any costs incurred to meet staffing requirements that are required by HRS rules. According to petitioner, the category would include expenditures that are made for so-called preventive maintenance purposes and to avoid HRS sanctions. On the other hand, HRS construes the language to cover costs incurred by a provider to either meet a new licensure and certification requirement, or to correct a cited deficiency. It also points out that salary increases were intended to be covered by the inflation factor rather than through this feature of the plan. This construction of the term is more reasonable, and is hereby accepted as being the more credible and persuasive. Petitioner's Request Petitioner's fiscal year ends on December 31. According to HRS requirements its cost reports must be filed by the following March 31. In accordance with that requirement petitioner timely filed its December 31, 1984 cost reports for the thirteen facilities on or before March 31, 1985. The reports have been received into evidence as petitioner's composite exhibit 3. Attached to the reports were schedules supporting a request for gross-up of certain capital items, additions and deletions of various personnel, and union salary increases that exceeded the inflation rate. The parties have not identified the actual dollar value of the items since only the concepts are in issue. In preparing the supporting schedules, United's assistant director of research reviewed all so-called capital items purchased by the thirteen facilities during the fiscal year, and determined which were purchased after the beginning of the year.5 He then calculated the depreciation on those 5 expenditures made after the beginning of the year and has included those amounts on the supporting schedules to be annualized. Consistent with the definition contained in Sections 108.1 and 108.2 of HIM-15, those items that are in excess of $500 (after annualization), that extend the useful life of the asset for two years or more, or that increase or extend the productivity of the asset are subject to annualization. It should be noted that repairs and maintenance items, as defined in Sections 108.1 and 108.2, are excluded from this category. Petitioner next seeks to adjust its rates by grossing up the net increase in costs associated with additions and deletions of various staff during the reporting period. Any net staffing additions that provide patients with services not previously provided or that expand an existing service to more patients in a given facility are properly subject to the gross- up provision. All others should be denied. Petitioner also contends that these costs should be considered as a licensure and certification requirement since they satisfy staffing requirements under HRS rules. To the extent the filling of old positions occurred, such expenditures are appropriately covered by the gross-up provision. The remainder do not fall within the purview of the provision. Finally, petitioner seeks to adjust its rates to cover all salary increases over and above the inflation factor that were awarded to union employees pursuant to its union contract. Under petitioner's theory, if such costs were not paid, United stood to lose staff through a strike which in turn could result in licensure and certification problems. But these concerns are speculative in nature, and such an interpretation would result in automatic approval of any salary increase called for by a union contract, no matter how unreasonable it might be. Since the expenditures do not meet the previously cited criteria, they must be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner's request to have its July 1, 1985 reimbursement rates adjusted for thirteen facilities to reflect annualized costs as submitted on supplemental schedules with its 1984 cost reports be approved in part, as set forth in the conclusions of law portion of this order. The remaining part of its request should be DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED this 31st day of October, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1986.
The Issue The issue is whether the methodology employed by respondent in calculating petitioners' budget letter gross revenues per adjusted admission is a rule, not duly promulgated, and thus is an illegal exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: A. Parties Petitioners, Easte Point Hospital, Inc. and others, are fourteen hospitals in the State of Florida who are subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of respondent, Health Care Cost Containment Board (Board). Petitioner, Florida League of Hospitals, Inc., is a nonprofit organization which is organized and maintained for the benefit of the proprietary hospitals which comprise its membership. The Board is a state agency charged with the responsibility of annually reviewing hospital budgets to insure that a hospital's charges do not exceed certain established thresholds. Intervenor, Citizens of the State of Florida, is represented by the Office of the Public Counsel. That office has the duty of representing citizens in all proceedings before the Board. Events Leading to the Filing of the Rule Challenges Petitioners are required to annually file their projected budgets with the Board for its review and approval. This controversy pertains to the filing of budgets for fiscal year 1992. There are two types of budget filings authorized by law. First, a hospital may file what is known as a budget letter, which is a one- page submission on a form provided by the Board. In preparing such a letter, the hospitals are required to provide information regarding their gross revenues per adjusted admission (GRAA) and maximum allowable rate of increase (MARI), two financial indicators that are used by the Board in measuring the reasonableness of a hospital's charges. A budget letter is to be filed whenever a hospital does not intend to increase its charges (GRAA) in the next fiscal year by more than the percentage amount specified in its approved MARI. Secondly, a hospital may file a detailed budget which is much more complicated than the budget letter and requires the completion of a twenty-seven page form. The preparation of a detailed budget is obviously more time- consuming and expensive than a budget letter and requires the hospital to justify its entire budget. The detailed budget is to be filed whenever a hospital intends to increase its charges (GRAA) from one fiscal year to the next by a greater percentage amount than is specified in the MARI. These cases deal with the legitimacy of a methodology used by the Board in determining whether a hospital is eligible to file a budget letter. In this proceeding, each of the fourteen hospitals filed budget letters with the Board in May 1991. After the budget documents were reviewed by the Board's staff, on June 21, 1991, the Board issued virtually identical proposed agency action to each hospital advising the hospital that its budget letter was "nonconforming for the following reason: The hospital's maximum GRAA should be $ , instead of $ , ", with the appropriate dollar amounts inserted in the blanks. The letter went on to advise each hospital that it should resubmit a corrected budget document and until it did so, its submission would be considered incomplete. The effect of the Board's action was to reduce each hospital's budget letter GRAA and the amount of revenues (charges) it could receive in the next fiscal year unless it agreed to file a detailed budget. The hospitals are accordingly affected by the proposed agency action and thus have standing to being this action. Likewise, since the methodology employed by the Board in rejecting the budget letters affects all members of the Florida League of Hospitals, Inc. who file budget letters, that organization also has standing to participate. The parties have further stipulated to the standing of intervenor, Citizens of the State of Florida. Although the proposed agency action does not show the methodology used by the Board in reaching its conclusion that the "maximum GRAA" was overstated, the record reveals that the Board utilized a certain methodology to calculate the "base GRAA", the first calculation in the budget letter review process. /2 This methodology is described in the second sentence of Subsection 407.50(3), Florida Statutes (1989) as follows: In determining the base, the hospital's prior year audited actual experience shall be used unless the hospital's prior year audited experience exceeded the applicable rate of increase in which case the base shall be the gross revenue per adjusted admission from the year before the prior year, and then inflated by the applicable rate of increase for the current year. Petitioners concede that the methodology used by the Board tracks the language in the above statute verbatim. However, they contend that, when the language in subsection 407.50(2)(a) is considered, it becomes apparent that the use of this methodology is the review of budget letters is not clearly called for, and thus the methodology is a policy having all of the attributes of a rule which has not been adopted pursuant to chapter 120. Conversely, respondent and intervenor claim the methodology is not a policy but simply an interpretation of the controlling statute. Is the Methodology a Rule? By virtue of rather extensive amendments to the law in 1988, budget letters were first authorized for use by hospitals beginning with budget years 1990 and 1991. Prior to that time, all hospitals filed detailed budgets. There was no quarrel over the manner in which hospitals performed their calculations in the first two budget letter filings since subsection 407.50(1) clearly specified the methodology for making all calculations during the first two years. This controversy arises because all subsequent filings of budget letters are controlled by language found in other portions of section 407.50. The relevant portions of that statute read as follows: (a) Except for hospitals filing a budget pursuant to subsection (3), each hospital, at least 90 days prior to the commencement of its next fiscal year, shall file with he board a certified statement, hereafter known as the "budget letter", acknowledging its applicable maximum allowable rate of increase in gross revenue per adjusted admission from the previous fiscal year as calculated pursuant to s. 407.002(17) and its maximum projected gross revenue per adjusted admission for the next fiscal year, and shall affirm that the hospital shall not exceed such applicable maximum allowable rate of increase. . . * * * At least 90 days prior to the beginning of its fiscal year, each hospital requesting a rate of increase in gross revenue per adjusted admission in excess of the maximum allowable rate of increase for the hospital's next fiscal year, shall be subject to detailed budget review and shall file its projected budget with the board for approval. In determining the base, the hospital's prior year audited actual experience shall be used unless the hospital's prior year audited actual experience exceeded the applicable rate of increase in which case the base shall be the gross revenue per adjusted admission from the year before the prior year, increased by the then applicable rate of increase for the current year. * * * A reading of the above statute indicates that subsection 407.50(2) (a) prescribes the form and manner for a budget letter submission. The submission consists primarily of a certified statement by the hospital acknowledging "its applicable maximum allowable rate of increase in gross revenue per adjusted admission from the previous fiscal year as calculated pursuant to s. 407.0C2(17) and its maximum projected gross revenue per adjusted admission for tie next fiscal year, and shall affirm that the hospital shall not exceed such applicable maximum allowable rate of increase. At the same time, subsection 407.50(2) (a) provides that its provisions shall apply to all hospitals "except those filing a (detailed) budget pursuant to subsection (3)". However, the subsection does not prescribe the manner in which the budget letter's base GRAA should be calculated. On the other hand, subsection 407.50(3) appears, at least facially, to impose certain requirements upon detailed budget filings, including the time requirements for filing a detailed budget, who must file one, and the manner in which to calculate the "base". Thus, a literal reading of the statute could lead the reader to reasonably conclude that, while subsection 407.50(2) (a) does not prescribe the manner in which the base GRAA should be calculated for purposes of a budget letter submission, the same judgment can be reached with respect to subsection 407.50(3). In other words, an affected person would not necessarily know from a reading of the law that the base GRAA for a budget letter submission filed under subsection (2) (a) would be calculated using a methodology found in subsection (3). Accordingly, it is found that the methodology used by the Board in calculating the budget letter GPAA is not a statutory interpretation but instead is a policy. While respondent and intervenor presented evidence to justify and explain the rationale for calculating the budget letter base GRAA in this manner, this evidence is more relevant in the companion section 120.57(1) cases. The methodology employed by the Board is one of general applicability since it applies to all hospitals who file budget letters in fiscal year 1992 and beyond. It is applied uniformly without discretion by agency personnel to all hospitals, requires compliance and has the direct and consistent effect of law. The policy has not been adopted as a rule.
Findings Of Fact In its 1969 legislative session, the Florida Legislature enacted Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, entitled "Medical Assistance for the Needy," providing the original state legislative basis and authority for Florida's entry into the Medicaid program. Section 409.266(2), Florida Statutes, as enacted, authorized the Florida Department of Social Services or any other department that the Governor might designate to: Enter into such agreement with other state agencies or any agency of the federal government and accept such duties with respect to social welfare or public aid as may be necessary to implement the provisions of subsection (1) and to qualify for federal aid including compliance with provisions of Public Law 86-778 and the "Social Security Amendments of 1965" [estab- lishing Title XIX of the Social Security Act] Section 409.266(3), Florida Statutes, as enacted, stated that: The Department is authorized and directed to prepare and operate a program and budget in order to implement and comply with the provisions of public law 86-778 and the "Social Security Amendments of 1965." No provisions of Florida law other than Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, as enacted, authorized any agency to perform any function specifically to implement the Medicaid program. The State of Florida formally commenced participation in the Medicaid program effective January 1, 1970. At all times pertinent to this controversy, respondent, Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services or its predecessor agencies (referred to as "HRS"), has been and continues to be the "State Agency" identified in 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a(a)(5), and charged under Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, as amended, with the formulation of a State Plan for Medical Assistance ("State Plan"), 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a, and with the ongoing responsibility for the administration of the Medicaid program in the State of Florida. Since Florida's entry into the Medicaid program in 1970, HRS has been authorized essentially to "[e]nter into such agreements with appropriate agents, other State agencies, or any agency of the Federal Government and accept such duties in respect to social welfare or public aid as may be necessary or needed to implement the provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act pertaining to medical assistance." Section 409.266(2)(a), Fla. Stat., as amended. HRS has never been authorized to enter into any agreements, accept any duties, or perform any functions with respect to the Medicaid program that are in contravention of or not authorized by Title XIX of the Social Security Act and implementing federal regulations and requirements. As a prerequisite for Florida's entry into the Medicaid program, HRS prepared and filed with the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") a State Plan, pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security Act, and pursuant to its delegated legislative authority set forth in Section 409.266(2)(a), Florida Statutes. (In May, 1980, HEW was redesignated the United States Department of Health and Human Services, but for purposes of this action both shall be referred to as HEW.) C.W. Hollingsworth was the HRS official who had the responsibility for supervising the preparation, the filing, and for obtaining the approval of HEW of Florida's initial State Plan. Florida's initial State Plan was approved by HEW effective January 1, 1970. At the time that Florida received approval of its initial State Plan, Title XIX of the Social Security Act required state plans to provide for the payment of the reasonable cost of inpatient hospital services. At the time that Florida received approval of its initial State Plan, HEW regulations governing reimbursement for inpatient hospital services under Medicaid required the State Plan to provide for reimbursement of Medicaid inpatient hospital services furnished by those hospitals also participating in the Medicare program, applying the same standards, cost reimbursement principles, and methods of cost apportionment used in computing reimbursement to such hospitals under Medicare. 45 C.F.R. Section 250.30(a), and (b), 34 Fed. Reg. 1244 (January 25, 1969). At the time that Florida entered the Medicaid program, Medicare cost reimbursement principles in effect governing reimbursement for the cost of inpatient hospital services required payment of a participating hospital's actual and reasonable costs of providing such services to Medicare beneficiaries, and, moreover, that such payment be made on the basis of the hospital's current costs rather than upon the costs of a prior period or upon a fixed negotiated rate. 42 U.S.C. Section 1395x(v)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. Sections 405.451(c)(2), 405.402(a) [later renumbered 42 C.F.R. Section 405.451(c)(2) and Section 405.402(a)]. Such Medicare principles and standards also provided for interim payments to be made to the hospital during its fiscal year. At the conclusions of the subject fiscal year, the hospital was required to file a cost report wherein the hospital included all of its costs of providing covered inpatient services to Medicare beneficiaries. A settlement or "retroactive adjustment" process then was required to reconcile the amount of interim payments received by the hospital during the fiscal period with its allowable costs incurred during that period. If the hospital had been overpaid during the year, it was required to refund the amount of that overpayment to the Medicare program. Conversely, if the hospital had been underpaid during the year, the Medicare program was required to make an additional payment to the hospital, retroactively, in the amount of the underpayment. 20 C.F.R. Sections 405.402(b)(2), 405.451(b)(2). Essentially the same Medicare principles and standards governing reimbursement of inpatient hospital services described in the two preceding paragraphs have been in effect at all times pertinent to this controversy. 42 C.F.R. Section 405.401, et seq. Florida's approved State Plan as of January 1, 1970, governing reimbursement of inpatient hospital services under the Medicaid program, committed HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. The only versions of Florida's State Plan provisions that have been approved by HEW and that have governed HRS's reimbursement of inpatient hospital services prior to July 1, 1981, each commit HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. Attached as an appendix to the recommended order is the form agreement drafted with the supervision of C.W. Hollingsworth, which has been in use from January 1, 1970, until July 1, 1981. From the inception of the Florida Medicaid program, and as a prerequisite for participation therein, a hospital has been required to execute a copy of the form agreement. A hospital may not participate in the Medicaid program without having executed such an agreement, nor may it propose any amendments thereto. The intent and effect of the form agreement is to require HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. The form agreement requires HRS to compute a percentage allowance in lieu of the retroactive adjustments ("percentage allowances") in determining the rates that hospitals will be paid for providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients. The form agreement requires HRS to compute a new percentage allowance each year based on hospital cost trends. The meanings of the terms "allowance in lieu of retroactive adjustments" in all pertinent state plans and "percentage allowance for the year in lieu of retroactive payment adjustment" contained in the form agreement are identical. In drafting the form agreement HRS intended that the "percentage allowance for the year in lieu of retroactive payment adjustment" be set at a level sufficient to ensure that hospitals participating in the Medicaid program would be reimbursed their "reasonable costs" of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. At all times pertinent to this controversy, participating hospitals, like petitioner, have been reimbursed by HRS for inpatient hospital services provided to Medicaid patients in the following manner: Within ninety (90) days following the close of its fiscal year, the partici- pating hospital files a Form 2551 or 2552 Annual Statement of Reimbursable Costs, as applicable, with both Blue Cross of Florida, Inc., the major fiscal intermediary respon- sible for the administration of Part A of the federal Medicare program in the State of Florida, and with HRS. This document, also referred to as a "cost report" details various hospital and financial statistical data relating to the patient care activities engaged in by the hospital during the sub- ject fiscal period. Upon receipt of the participating hospital's cost report for a fiscal period, HRS makes an initial determination based upon Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards of the hospital's total allow- able inpatient costs, charges, and total patient days during the subject fiscal period, and then determines an inpatient per diem reimbursement rate for the period. To the inpatient per diem reimburse- ment rate is then added a percentage allow- ance in lieu of making any further retroactive corrective adjustments in reimbursement which might have been due the hospital applicable to the reporting period. The adjusted inpa- tient per diem reimbursement rate is applied prospectively, and remains in effect until further adjustments in the rate are required. If HRS determines that total inpa- tient Medicaid reimbursement to a partici- pating hospital during a fiscal period exceeds the hospital's allowable and rea- sonable costs of rendering such covered inpatient services applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards, then the hospital is required to remit to HRS the amount of such overpayment. If, however, HRS determines that the total inpatient Medicaid reimbursement received by a participating hospital is less than the hospital's actual and reason- able costs of rendering such covered inpa- tient services to Medicaid patients during the period applying Medicare cost reimburse- ment principles and standards, no further retroactive corrective adjustments are made; provided, however, that should an overpayment occur in a fiscal period, it may be offset and applied retroactively against an under- payment to the participating hospital which occurred during the next preceding fiscal period only. HRS has used the following "percentage allowances" in determining Medicaid reimbursement rates for inpatient hospital services: a. January 1, 1970 - June 30, 1972 . . . 12 percent July 1, 1972 - approximately March 30, 1976 . . . . . . . . . . 9 percent Approximately March 31, 1976 - June 30, 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . 6 percent Since at least January 1, 1976, HRS has not recomputed the "percentage allowance" on an annual basis. Since at least January 1, 1976, HRS has not based the "percentage allowance" that it has applied in determining Medicaid inpatient hospital reimbursement rates upon hospital cost trends. HRS has used no technical methodology based upon hospital cost trends to develop any of the "percentage allowances." At least since January 1, 1974, HRS's "percentage allowances" have been less than the corresponding average annual increases in the costs incurred by Florida hospitals of providing inpatient hospital services. Prior to March 30, 1976, all of HRS's published regulations addressing reimbursement of participating hospitals for their costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients required HRS to reimburse such hospitals in accordance with Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. In certain internal documents, Petitioner's Exhibits P-44 and P-12, HRS states that the average costs of providing inpatient hospital services in the State of Florida rose at least 18 percent during calendar year 1975. In November, 1975, the Secretary of HRS was informed by HRS officials that HRS faced a projected budgetary deficit for its fiscal year ended June 30, 1976. A decision memorandum presented options to the HRS Secretary for reducing the projected deficit. Among such options presented to and approved by the HRS Secretary was to reduce the "percentage allowance" from 9 percent to 6 percent. The reduction of the "percentage allowance" by HRS from 9 percent to 6 percent was effected in response to HRS's projected deficit, and was not based upon an analysis of hospital cost trends. HRS incorporated the 6 percent "percentage allowance" into its administrative rules which were published on March 30, 1976. In response to objections raised by the Florida Hospital Association to the reduction in the percentage allowance by HRS from 9 percent to 6 percent, HRS officials reexamined that reduction. During HRS's reexamination of its previous "percentage allowance" reduction, HRS was aware of and acknowledged the fact that Florida hospital costs were increasing at an average annual rate in excess of both the earlier 9 percent and the resulting 6 percent "percentage allowance." In a memorandum dated September 13, 1976, from HRS official Charles Hall to the Secretary of HRS, Petitioner's Exhibit P-45, Charles Hall informed the Secretary that the methods and standards then used by HRS to reimburse participating hospitals for their costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients was out of compliance with federal requirements. Charles Hall further informed the Secretary that the reason HRS had not theretofore been cited by HEW for noncompliance was the manner in which the Florida State Plan had been drafted, i.e., that the State Plan required HRS to reimburse hospitals under Medicaid for the reasonable costs that they would have been reimbursed applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. In a letter dated September 20, 1976, Petitioner's Exhibit P-31, HEW informed HRS that HEW had received a complaint from the Florida Hospital Association that the methods HRS was actually using to reimburse hospitals for the costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients were in violation of Federal Regulation 45 C.F.R. Section 250.30(a). A proposed amendment to Florida's State Plan submitted by HRS to HEW in November, 1976, Petitioner's Exhibit P-49, if approved, would have allowed HRS to reimburse hospitals for the cost of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients under methods differing from Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards (an "alternative plan"). "Alternative plans" have been permitted under applicable federal regulations since October 21, 1974. A state participating in the Medicaid program may elect to establish an "alternative plan, but may not implement such "alternative plan" without the prior written approval of HEW. Florida has not had in effect an "alternative plan" of reimbursing participating hospitals for their costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients that was formally approved by HEW at any time prior to July 1, 1981. By letter dated January 7, 1977, Petitioner's Exhibit P-32, HEW notified HRS that it had formally cited HRS for noncompliance with federal regulations governing reimbursement of inpatient hospital services under Medicaid. HRS acknowledged their noncompliance and between November, 1976, and October 30, 1977, HRS attempted to revise its proposed "alternative plan" on at least two occasions in an attempt to obtain HEW approval. In October, 1977, HRS withdrew its proposed "alternative plan" then pending with HEW. HRS then contracted with an outside consultant, Alexander Grant & Company, to assist in the formulation of a new "alternative plan" proposal. In January, 1978, Alexander Grant & Company delivered its draft of an "alternative plan" to HRS. In October, 1978, HRS submitted a draft "alternative plan" to HEW for review and comment, and HEW expected HRS to submit a formal "alternative plan" proposal to HEW for its approval by November 1, 1978. HRS did not submit the formal "alternative plan" proposal to HEW until August 12, 1980. In a letter dated February 21, 1979, from Richard Morris, HEW Regional Medicaid Director, Region IV, to United States Senator Richard Stone of Florida, Mr. Morris advised Senator Stone: For more than two years the Florida Medicaid Program has not met Federal Requirements for inpatient hospital services reimbursement. Their payment methodology under-reimburses certain hospitals year after year. The pros- pective interim per diem rate paid by Florida to hospitals includes a percentage allowance to cover increased costs during the forthcom- ing year that is consistently less than increased costs in some hospitals. If the payments are less than costs, the difference is not reimbursed. This results in underpay- ments. We have worked closely with Florida to develop an acceptable alternative system that would meet Federal requirements. To date, Florida has not implemented such a system despite having received informal HEW agreement on a draft plan developed more than a year ago. It is our understanding that this alternative plan is not a high priority item at this time. We will continue to work with HRS staff to secure Florida compliance re- garding this requirement. Petitioner's Exhibit P-46. Since August 12, 1980, HRS has submitted to HEW for its approval at least four more versions of an "alternative plan." Petitioner's Exhibits P-120, P-121, P-123, and P-152. Each of these versions was approved by the Secretary of HRS, and HRS believes each to comply with applicable Florida law. Mr. Erwin Bodo, Ph.D., was and is the HRS official responsible for the development and drafting of Exhibits P-120, P-121, P-123, and P-152. In June, 1981, HEW approved an "alternative plan" for the State of Florida (Exhibit P-152), and such "alternative plan" was implemented effective July 1, 1981. Until July 1, 1981, HRS continued to use the 6 percent "percentage allowance" to compute inpatient hospital reimbursement under Medicaid. Even after its repeal, Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, is applied by respondent in calculating reimbursement for Medicaid services provided between March 30, 1976, and July 1, 1981. From November 20, 1976, until July 1, 1981--the period in which HRS was attempting to secure HEW approval for an alternative plan--HRS was aware that the costs of inpatient hospital se vices were increasing at an average annual rate in excess of the 6 percent "percentage allowance." From September 1, 1976, through July 1, 1981, HRS has been out of compliance with its a proved State Plan provisions, and HEW regulations governing reimbursement for inpatient hospital services under Medicaid because HRS's methods for reimbursing hospitals for the cost of providing those services to Medicaid patients have resulted in a substantial number of hospitals-- including petitioner--being reimbursed at a lower rate than the hospitals would have been reimbursed applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. Since the quarter ending December 31, 1976, until July 1, 1981, HEW has formally cited HRS as being in contravention of its approved State Plan provisions, and HEW (now HHS) regulations, governing reimbursement for inpatient hospital services under Medicaid because HRS's methods for reimbursing hospitals for the cost of providing those services to Medicaid patients have resulted in a substantial number of hospitals--including petitioner--being reimbursed at a lower rate than the hospitals would have been reimbursed applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. PAN AMERICAN HOSPITAL CORPORATION Petitioner, Pan American Hospital Corporation, is a not-for-profit corporation, duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida. Petitioner is a tax-exempt organization as determined by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. At all times pertinent to this controversy, petitioner has operated and continues to operate a duly licensed 146-bed, short-term acute care general hospital, located at 5959 Northwest Seventh Street, Miami, Florida 33126. At all times pertinent to this controversy, petitioner has been and continues to be a duly certified provider of inpatient hospital services, eligible to participate in the Florida Medicaid program since January 27, 1974. The appendix to this recommended order is a true and correct copy of the "Participation Agreement" entered into between petitioner and HRS, whereunder, inter alia, petitioner became eligible to receive payment from HRS for covered inpatient hospital services provided to Medicaid patients. At all times pertinent to this controversy, petitioner has been a certified "provider of services" participating in the Medicare program. During the fiscal periods in dispute in this action, petitioner did provide covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and became eligible for payment by HRS of its reasonable costs of providing such services, determined in accordance with Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. With respect to each of the fiscal periods in dispute in this action, petitioner timely filed all cost reports and other financial data with HRS or its contracting agents, including Blue Cross of Florida, Inc., to enable HRS to determine petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients. During each of the fiscal periods in dispute in this action, to reimburse petitioner for its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, determined in accordance with applicable Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. Such costs incurred by petitioner were reasonable, necessary, related to patient care, and less than customary charges within the meaning of those Medicare principles and standards. With respect to each of the fiscal periods in dispute, HRS and/or its contracting agent, Blue Cross of Florida, Inc., reviewed and audited the cost reports filed by petitioner, and as a result of such review and audits set or adjusted, as applicable, the Medicaid inpatient per diem reimbursement rate at which petitioner would be paid during the next succeeding fiscal period or until that rate was again adjusted. On May 3, 1976, a Notice of Program Reimbursement was issued to petitioner applicable to its fiscal year ended March 31, 1975, and setting forth the audited amount of petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients during such period and the amount of interim Medicaid payments made to petitioner by HRS during the period in respect to those services. During its fiscal year ended March 31, 1975, petitioner received $86,469 less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and no retroactive corrective adjustment has been made in connection with such underpayment. On February 14, 1979, a Notice of Program Reimbursement was issued to petitioner applicable to its fiscal year ended March 31, 1976, and setting forth the audited amount of petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients during such period and the amount of interim Medicaid payments made to petitioner by HRS during the period with respect to those services. During its fiscal year ended March 31, 1976, petitioner received $199,328 less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and no retroactive corrective adjustment has been made in connection with such underpayment. On September 29, 1978, a Notice of Program Reimbursement was issued to petitioner applicable to its fiscal year ended March 31, 1977, and setting forth the audited amount of petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients during such period and the amount of interim Medicaid payments made to petitioner by HRS during the period with respect to those services. During its fiscal year ended March 31, 1977, petitioner received $6,083 less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and no retroactive corrective adjustment has been made in connection with such underpayment. On March 13, 1980, a Notice of Program Reimbursement was issued to petitioner applicable to its fiscal year ended March 31, 1978, and setting forth the audited amount of petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients during such period and the amount of interim Medicaid payments made to petitioner by HRS during the period with respect to those services. During its fiscal year ended March 31, 1978, petitioner received $178,506 less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and no retroactive corrective adjustment has been made in connection with such underpayment. On June 30, 1981, a Notice of Program Reimbursement was issued to petitioner applicable to its fiscal year ended March 31, 1979, and setting forth the audited amount of petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients during such period and the amount of interim Medicaid payments made to petitioner by HRS during the period with respect to those services. During its fiscal year ended March 31, 1979, petitioner received $302,347 less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and no retroactive corrective adjustment has been made in connection with such underpayment. On or about June 30, 1981, the audit of petitioner's Medicaid cost report for the period ending March 31, 1980, was concluded. A formal Notice of Program Reimbursement had not been issued at the time of the hearing. MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED Respondent contends that these proceedings should be summarily concluded "for failure to join an indispensable party," viz., the Federal Government, because it "is Respondent's intention, should any liability result from this action, to make a claim for federal financial participation as to approximately fifty-nine percent of such liability . . . [See generally] 42 U.S.C. Section 1320b-2(a)(2)." Motion to Dismiss, p. 2. This contention must fail for several reasons. Neither the Division of Administrative Hearings nor the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has the power or means to bring an unwilling party into a proceeding instituted pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1979). At most, "the presiding officer may, upon motion of a party, or upon his own initiative enter an order requiring that the absent person be notified of the proceeding and be given an opportunity to be joined as a party of record." Rule 28-5.107, Florida Administrative Code. There exists no administrative writ for joining a non-petitioning party in a substantial interest proceeding in the way judicial process can join a party within a court's jurisdiction in a pending judicial proceeding. The two cases respondent cites in support of its motion, Bannon v. Trammell, 118 So. 167 (Fla. 1928), and Heisler v. Florida Mortgage Title and Bonding Co., 142 So.2d 242 (Fla. 1932), are inapposite, because both cases involve judicial, not administrative proceedings. HRS does not really seek joinder of the United States Department of Health and Human Services; instead, HRS argues that the petition should be dismissed and the controversy relegated to federal court because it "believes that the Secretary [of the United States Department of Health and Human Services] will not succumb voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the Division of Administrative Hearings." 2/ Motion to Dismiss, p. 3. Participation by the Department of Health and Human Services in the present proceedings would have been welcomed, as the Hearing Officer indicated at the prehearing conference, but neither the Department itself nor either of the parties requested such participation. In any event, petitioner is seeking additional reimbursement from respondent HRS, not from any federal agency. Medicaid providers like petitioner do not receive any funds directly from the Department of Health and Human Services. Since "[t]he contracts involved are clearly between the hospitals and [H]RS [, n]o third party requirement appears," Montana Deaconess Hospital v. Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, 538 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Mont. 1975), and the Department of Health and Human Services is not an indispensable party to administrative proceedings arising out of contracts between HRS and Medicaid providers. HRS protests that it might find itself making additional reimbursement to petitioner, yet be deprived of the federal component of such expenditures. See 42 U.S.C. Section 1396b. This prospect is an unlikely one in view of the fact that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has repeatedly cited HRS for noncompliance because of under-reimbursements to Medicaid providers. If the Federal Government fails to contribute to any additional reimbursement, it would not be for want of a forum in which HRS could present its claim. There are administrative mechanisms within the Department of Health and Human Services, including its Grant Appeals Board. See 42 U.S.C. Section 1116(d). After exhaustion of administrative remedies, HRS would have access to the courts, if necessary. See Georgia v. Califano, 446 F. Supp. 404 (N.D. Ga. 1977). There is no danger that HRS will be deprived of an opportunity to litigate any question about federal contribution because the United States Department of Health and Human Services is not a party to the present proceedings. MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Petitioner's motion for partial summary judgment was amended ore tenus at the final hearing to delete "and FYE March 31, 1981," on page 1 of the motion, after leave to amend was granted, without objection by respondent. As a technical matter, the motion is a misnomer, since substantial interest proceedings before the Division of Administrative Hearings eventuate in recommended orders, not judgments. But, petitioner's contention that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact is well founded. The parties have so stipulated. (T. 70; Mr. Weiss's letter of November 12, 1981.) At the time the petition was filed, the parties contemplated numerous factual disputes which, however, had all been resolved by the time of final hearing through the commendable efforts of counsel. In the absence of a disputed issue of material fact, the Administrative Procedure Act provides for informal proceedings pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes (1979), "[u]nless otherwise agreed." Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1979). On December 7, 1981, the parties filed their Stipulation and Agreement to proceed pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1979), notwithstanding the absence of any factual dispute. DISPUTE COGNIZABLE In the present case, as in Graham Contracting, Inc. v. Department of General Services, 363 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), there "can be no doubt that the Department's contract . . . calls for agency action which potentially affects . . . substantial interests," 363 So.2d at 812, of the petitioning contractor. Cf. Solar Energy Control, Inc. v. State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 377 So.2d 746 (Fla 1st DCA 1979) (reh. den. 1980) (disappointed bidder substantially affected). See Section 120.52(10)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). In Graham Contracting, Inc. v. Department of General Services, 363 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), the petitioner sought "additional money and construction time under its contract," 363 So.2d at 813, with a state agency. The court found "no difficulty . . . with sovereign immunity," 363 So.2d at 813, and held that a contractor with a state agency could invoke the Administrative Procedure Act in order to enforce its contract, even though the contract purported to establish another method for settling the contract dispute. A clause in the contract at issue in the Graham Contracting case contemplated agency action outside the parameters of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, in resolving certain disputes under the contract. In contrast, each of the successive contracts on which petitioner predicates its claim in the present case contains the following provision: "The hospital agrees to comply with the rules, policies, and procedures required by [HRS's] Division of Family Services for this program." Among the rules thus incorporated by reference into the contracts between petitioner and respondent is Rule 10C-7.35, Florida Administrative Code, which provides: An official representative of a facility participating in Medicaid, . . . or . . . representative, may appeal Medicaid Program policy, procedure, or administrative rulings whenever the provider feels there has been an unfair, illegal or inappropriate action by the Department affecting them or their facility. (1) Provider Appeals The Administrative Procedures [sic] Act, Chapter 120 F.S., provides for provider appeals and hearings, which are conducted by the Division of Administrative Hearings in the Department of Administration. The spe- cific rule relative to the appeal and hearing process is Chapter 28-3 [sic] of the Florida Administrative Rules. . . Since, by reference to Rule 10C-7.35, Florida Administrative Code, the contract in the present case incorporates Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act is even clearer here than in the Graham Contracting case. THE MERITS The parties have stipulated that petitioner has been reimbursed by respondent less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services over the time period in question. Under-reimbursement of this kind is not authorized by Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, which incorporates the federal statutory requirement that hospitals which, like petitioner, provide Medicaid services be reimbursed by respondent for reasonable costs incurred, in accordance with an approved State Plan, and not some lesser amount. 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a(a)(13)(B), Pub. L. 89-97, Section 121(a) redesignated 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a(a)(13)(D), Pub. L. 90-248, Section 224(a). All Florida "State Plan provisions . . . approved by HEW and . . . govern[ing] HRS's reimbursement of inpatient hospital services prior to July 1, 1981, commit HRS to reimburse hospitals [like petitioner] that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards." Prehearing Stipulation, Paragraph 19. The record is clear. Respondent consistently reimbursed petitioner less than its reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services in order to cut its own expenses and in doing so jeopardized the entire Medicaid program. This cannot be condoned, even though respondent acted under color of law, viz., Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code [now repealed and declared invalid; see Pan American Hospital Corporation v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, No. 81-1480R (DOAH; December 4, 1981)], and even though a lack of money or, at least, an apparent shortage was the reason for respondent's parsimony. The question remains, however, whether this dereliction on respondent's part should inure to the benefit of petitioner; and the answer turns on the construction of the agreement between the parties attached as an appendix to this order. Petitioner argues cogently that public policy has clearly been enunciated by statute to be full reimbursement for costs reasonably incurred by Medicaid providers in furnishing covered services. There can be no clearer expression of public policy than a statute duly enacted; and the reasons behind the full reimbursement policy are themselves compelling: to deal fairly with the providers, not only for fairness sake, but also to assure their participation in the program, and to remove any temptation to give indigent patients substandard care, inter alia. But, there is surely an overriding public policy requiring that a contractor with state government who voluntarily agrees to forego a claim against the public fisc be held to that agreement in administrative proceedings like these. The form agreement between petitioner and respondent, which they renewed annually, states: "It is understood that reimbursement will be made on the basis of an interim payment plan in the form of a per diem cost rate, plus a percentage allowance for the year in lieu of retroactive payment adjustment. However, . . . in the event the hospital did not receive its audited reasonable costs in the year prior to the current year then the hospital may deduct from the refund the prior year deficiency." (Emphasis supplied.) The agreement thus contemplated under-reimbursement and specified the method for recoupment, if there was to be any. Any "retroactive payment adjustment," as the result of administrative proceedings or otherwise, is specifically ruled out. Elsewhere in the parties' agreement is found this language: [T]he fiscal responsibility of [respondent's] Division of Family Services is subjected [sic] to the appropriation and availability of funds to the Medicaid program . . . by the state legislature every year." The terms of the agreement make clear that under-reimbursement is not in itself a breach. Respondent's failure to compute annually a "new percentage . . . based on hospital cost trends" was attributable to a shortage of funds; and the agreement provided that respondent's "fiscal responsibility" was subject to just such a shortage. In sum, provisions of the agreement petitioner voluntarily entered into with respondent operate in much the same way as a liquidated damages clause and preclude the relief petitioner seeks. Petitioner's invocation of the parol evidence rule is unavailing. Even if the stipulated facts outside the four corners of the form agreement are looked to, the course of dealing between these parties buttresses the construction outlined above. The fact that respondent may have settled a case it litigated against another hospital in some other way, as asserted by petitioner, is technically irrelevant.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent deny the prayer of the petitioner for additional reimbursement. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of December, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 1981.
The Issue Whether Florida Hospital Medical Center is entitled to reimbursement in the amount preliminarily determined by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, in a reimbursement dispute regarding bills submitted by Florida Hospital Medical Center to Macy’s Claims Services and Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company for medical services provided to two individuals involved in work-related accidents; and Whether Macy’s Claims Services and Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company properly adjusted those bills of Florida Hospital Medical Center in accordance with the requirements of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation law and applicable rules.
Findings Of Fact Florida Hospital is a full-service, not-for-profit hospital system located in Orlando, Florida, that operates a smaller satellite hospital in Winter Park, Florida. Florida Hospital is a “health care provider” within the meaning of Section 440.13(1)(h), Florida Statutes. Macy’s and Amerisure are “carriers” within the meaning of Sections 440.02(4) and 440.02(38), Florida Statutes. The Department has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes between carriers and health care providers regarding payments for services rendered to injured workers, pursuant to Sections 440.13(7) and 440.13(11)(c), Florida Statutes. Qmedtrix is a medical bill review company.3/ Case No. 09-6871 R. P., an employee of Macy’s, slipped and fell at work on May 20, 2009, and presented to Florida Hospital Winter Park for evaluation and treatment where medical personnel documented vomiting, brain attack, and brain trauma. After evaluation and treatment, patient R. P. was diagnosed with a bruise to the head and released the same day. On September 16, 2009, Florida Hospital submitted its bill for services provided to R. P. totaling $5,547.20 to Macy’s for payment, utilizing Form DFS-F5-DWC-90, also known as UB-04 CMS-1450, identifying the charges billed for each line item by revenue code and HCPS or CPT codes. Macy’s forwarded the bill to its workers’ compensation medical bill review agent, Qmedtrix. Qmedtrix reviewed the bill by comparing the procedure codes and diagnosis codes reported by Florida Hospital with examples in the CPT book for billing of emergency department services. Florida Hospital reported ICD diagnosis code 920, which reads “contusion of face, scalp, or neck.” Use of this code means R. P. presented with a bruise or hematoma, but not a concussion. Florida Hospital also reported ICD diagnosis code 959.01 (“head injury, unspecified”) which also means that R. P. did not present with a concussion, loss of consciousness, or intracranial injuries. Florida Hospital’s bill included a charge of $2,417 with CPT code 99285 for emergency department services. The bill also included separate charges for a head CT, and various lab tests, drugs, and IV solutions. According to Mr. von Sydow, the bill was sent through Qmedtrix’s computer program for review, and was flagged for review by a physician. Mr. von Sydow further testified that one of Qmedtrix’s medical director’s suggested that the CPT code of 99285 be reduced. The medical director, who Mr. von Sydow said reviewed the bill, however, did not testify and no documentation of his recommendation was submitted at the final hearing. Qmedtrix determined that Florida Hospital should have used CPT code 99284 when billing for the emergency services rendered instead of CPT code 99285. Qmedtrix found that, while the hospital billed $2,417 with CPT code 99285, its usual charge for an emergency department visit billed with CPT code 99284 is $1,354. Macy’s paid Florida Hospital a total of $2,683.55, which amount included $1,010.24 for the emergency department visit based on [approximately] 75 percent of Florida Hospital’s usual charge for CPT code 99284. The payment was accompanied by an EOBR. The EOBR Macy’s (or its designated entity)4/ issued to Florida Hospital for services rendered to R. P. identifies the amount billed by Florida Hospital as to each line item in a column designated “Billed,” and has columns designated as “BR Red,” “PPO Red,” “Other Red,” and “Allowance,” each containing an amount for each line item in the “Billed” column. There is also a column entitled “Reason Code” which sets forth codes, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602(5)(o)3., that are supposed to explain the reason for adjustment of any line item.5/ The “reason code” set forth adjacent to the $2,417.00 billed by Florida Hospital for emergency department services is “82,” which means “Payment adjusted: payment modified pursuant to carrier charge analysis.” There is also another code, “P506” listed in the “Reason Code” column adjacent to the same line item, which, according to the key provided on the EOBR, means “[a]ny questions regarding this Qmedtrix review, please call (800)-833-1993.” “P506,” however, is not a “reason code” listed in Florida Administrative Code Rule 68L- 7.602(5)(o)3. The EOBR does not advise that the bill was adjusted because of a determination that Florida Hospital should have used CPT code 99284 when billing for the emergency services rendered instead of CPT code 99285 as originally billed. Upon receipt of the payment and the EOBR, Florida Hospital timely filed a Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute with the Department pursuant to Section 440.13(7)(a), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Rule 69L-31, contending that payment should be at 75 percent of its total charges, and citing the Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition (Hospital Manual). Qmedtrix timely filed a response to Florida Hospital’s petition on behalf of Macy’s pursuant to Section 440.13(7)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-31, asserting that correct payment should be determined based on, first, whether the hospital in fact billed its usual charge for the services and, second, whether the hospital’s charges are in line with the charges of other hospitals in the same community, citing One Beacon Insurance v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 958 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) for the proposition that “SB-50 amended section 440.13 . . . [revealing] legislative intent to eliminate calculation of a “usual and customary charge” based on the fees of any one provider in favor of a calculation based on average fees of all providers in a given geographic area.” Qmedtrix’s response on behalf of Macy’s also contended that “upcoding” and “unbundling” were additional grounds for adjustment or disallowance that were not identified on the EOBR. The response explained that “upcoding” refers to billing with a procedure code that exaggerates the complexity of the service actually provided; that CPT codes 99281 through 99285 describe emergency department services; that the CPT book includes examples of proper billing with these codes; that the hospital billed $2,417 with CPT code 99285; and that the CPT book describes an “emergency department visit for a healthy, young adult patient who sustained a blunt head injury with local swelling and bruising without subsequent confusion, loss of consciousness or memory deficit” as an example of proper billing with CPT code 99283. The response requested a determination by the Department that Macy’s payment equaled or exceeded the amount usual and customary for CPT code 99283. On November 13, 2009, the Department, through its Office of Medical Services (OMS) issued a determination (Determination in 09-6871) which found, in pertinent part: The petitioner asserts that services provided by Florida Hospital Medical Center to the above-referenced injured employee on May 20, 2009, were incorrectly reimbursed. Florida Hospital Medical Center billed $5,547.20 and the carrier reimbursed $2,683.55. The petition does not address a contract and does not reflect a contract discount in the calculation of requested reimbursement. The Carrier Response to Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute disputes the reasonableness of the hospital’s “usual and customary charges”, maintains the petitioners’ charges should be based on the average fee of other hospitals in the same geographic area, references a manual not incorporated by rule, and provides CPT codes that the respondent alleges are correct. There are no rules or regulations within Florida’s Workers’ Compensation program prohibiting a provider from separately billing for individual revenue codes. The carrier did not dispute that the charges listed on the Form DFS-F5-DWC-90 (UB-92) or the charges listed on the itemized statement did not conform to the hospital’s Charge Master. Nor did the carrier submit the hospital’s Charge Master in the response or assert that the carrier performed an audit of the Charge Master to verify the accuracy of the billed charges. Therefore, since no evidence was presented to dispute the accuracy of the Form DFS-F5-DWC-90 or the itemized statement as not being representative of the Charge Master, the OMS finds that the charges billed by the hospital are the hospital’s usual and customary charges. Rule 69L-7.602, F.A.C., stipulates the appropriate EOBR codes that must be utilized when explaining to the provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment. The EOBR submitted with the petition conforms to the EOBR code requirements of Rule 69L-7.602(5)(q), F.A.C. Only through an EOBR is the carrier to communicate to the health care provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment of the provider’s bill. Pursuant to s. 440.13(12), F.S., a three member panel was established to determine statewide reimbursement allowances for treatment and care of injured workers. Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., incorporates, by reference, the applicable reimbursement schedule created by the panel. Section 440.13(7)(c), F.S., requires the OMS to utilize this schedule in rendering its determination for this reimbursement dispute. No established authority exists to permit alternative schedules or other methodologies to be utilized for hospital reimbursement other than those adopted by Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., unless the provider and the carrier have entered into a mutually agreeable contract. Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., incorporates, by reference, the Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition (Hospital Manual). Since the carrier failed to indicate any of the services are not medically necessary, the OMS determined proper reimbursement applying the above referenced reimbursement guidelines. Therefore, the OMS has determined that the carrier improperly adjusted reimbursement to Florida Medical Center for services rendered to the above- referenced injured employee on May 20, 2009. Based on the above analysis, the OMS has determined that correct reimbursement equals $4,160.40 ($5,547.20 x 75% [Hospital Manual]=$4,160.40). The carrier shall reimburse Florida Hospital Medical Center $4,160.40 for services rendered to the above-referenced employee; and submit proof of reimbursement of the amount determined by the OMS within thirty days of the date the Determination is received. . . . The difference between what Petitioner Macy’s paid Florida Hospital for services rendered to R. P., and the amount the Department determined that Petitioner Macy’s is required to pay for such services, equals $1,476.85. The Determination in 09-6871 did not directly address Macy’s allegation of the alleged billing error of “upcoding.” The Determination in 09-6871 provided a 21-day notice for request of an administrative hearing and, as noted in the Preliminary Statement above, Macy’s timely requested a hearing. Case No. 09-6872 J. L., an employee of Major League Aluminum, was injured in a work-related accident on the evening of May 3, 2009, and visited the emergency department of Florida Hospital Orlando. After evaluation and treatment, J. L. was diagnosed with a bruise to the knee and released the next morning. On September 23, 2009, Florida Hospital submitted its bill for services provided to J. L. totaling $2,851 to Amerisure, Major League Aluminum’s workers’ compensation insurer, for payment, utilizing Form DFS-F5-DWC-90, also known as UB-04 CMS-1450, identifying the charges billed for each line item by revenue code and HCPS or CPT codes. Amerisure forwarded the hospital bill to its medical bill review agent, Qmedtrix for review. Qmedtrix’s medical bill review in this case, as in the companion case, entailed comparing the procedure codes and diagnosis codes reported by the hospital with examples in the CPT book. The hospital reported ICD diagnosis code 924.11, which reads “contusion of . . . knee.” The hospital also reported ICD diagnosis codes 724.2 (“lumbago”), E888.1 (“fall on or from ladders or scaffolding”) and 959.7 (“injury, other and unspecified . . . knee, leg, ankle, and foot.”). Florida Hospital billed $1,354 with CPT code 9924 for emergency department services and also billed for X-rays and various drugs and IV solutions. Comparing procedure codes and diagnosis codes reported by the hospital with examples in the CPT book, Qmedtrix concluded that billing with CPT code 99284 was not appropriate, but that billing with CPT code 99282 was. Qmedtrix also found that, while the hospital billed $1,354 with CPT code 99284, the average charge in the community for a visit to the emergency department billed with CPT code 99282 is $721. Qmedtrix determined the “usual and customary charge” in the community from its own database compiled by entering all of particular hospital bills into Qmedtrix’s database, along with data from the American Hospital Directory. Qmedtrix derives the average charge in the community based upon zip codes of the hospitals. Amerisure paid Florida Hospital a total of $1,257.15, which amount included $524.70 for the emergency department visit codes based on 75 percent of what Qmedtrix determined to be the average charge in the community for CPT code 99282. The payment was accompanied by an EOBR. The EOBR Petitioner Amerisure (or its designated entity)6/ issued to Florida Hospital for services rendered to J. L. identifies the amount billed by Florida Hospital as to each line item in a column designated “Billed Charges,” and has columns designated as “FS/UCR Reductions,” “Audit Reductions,” “Network Reductions,” and “Allowance,” each containing an amount for each line item in the “Billed Charges” column. There is also a column entitled “Qualify Code” which sets forth reason codes that are supposed to explain the reason for adjustment of any line item.7/ The code set forth adjacent to the $1,354.00 billed by Florida Hospital for emergency department services is “82,” which means “Payment adjusted: payment modified pursuant to carrier charge analysis.” The EOBR does not advise that the bill was adjusted because of a determination that Florida Hospital should have used CPT code 99282 when billing for the emergency services rendered instead of CPT code 99284 as originally billed. Upon receipt of the payment and the EOBR, Florida Hospital timely filed a Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute with the Department pursuant to Section 440.13(7)(a), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-31, contending that payment should be at 75 percent of its total charges, and citing the Hospital Manual. Qmedtrix timely filed a response to Florida Hospital’s petition on behalf of Amerisure pursuant to Section 440.13(7)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-31, asserting that correct payment should be determined based on, first, whether the hospital, in fact, billed its usual charge for the services and, second, whether the hospital’s charges are in line with the charges of other hospitals in the same community, citing One Beacon, supra. Qmedtrix’s response on behalf of Amerisure contended “upcoding” as an additional ground for adjustment or disallowance that was not identified on the EOBR. As in the companion case, the response explained “upcoding,” that CPT codes 99281 through 99285 describe emergency department services, and that the CPT book includes examples of proper billing with these codes. The response further stated that the hospital billed $1,354 with CPT code 99284, and that the CPT book describes an “emergency department visit for a patient with a minor traumatic injury of an extremity with localized pain, swelling, and bruising” as an example of proper billing with CPT code 99282. The response requested a determination by the Department that Amerisure’s payment equaled or exceeded the usual and customary charge for CPT code 99282. On October 20, 2009, the Department’s OMS issued a determination (Determination in 09-6872) which found, in pertinent part: The petitioner asserts that services provided by Florida Hospital Medical Center to the above-referenced injured employee on May 3, 2009, and May 4, 2009, were incorrectly reimbursed. Florida Hospital Medical Center billed $2,851.00 and the carrier reimbursed $1,257.15. The petition does not address a contract and does not reflect a contract discount in the calculation of requested reimbursement. The Carrier Response to Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute disputes the reasonableness of the hospital’s “usual and customary charges”, maintains the petitioners’ charges should be based on the average fee of other hospitals in the same geographic area, and references a manual not incorporated by rule. There are no rules or regulations within Florida’s Workers’ Compensation program prohibiting a provider from separately billing for individual revenue codes. Therefore, the charges, as billed by the hospital, did not constitute billing errors. The carrier did not dispute that the charges listed on the Form DFS-F5- DWC-90 (UB-92) or the charges listed on the itemized statement did not conform to the hospital’s Charge Master. Nor did the carrier submit the hospital’s Charge Master in the response or assert that the carrier performed an audit of the Charge Master to verify the accuracy of the billed charges. Therefore, since no evidence was presented to dispute the accuracy of the Form DFS-F5- DWC-90 or the itemized statement as not being representative of the Charge Master, the OMS finds that the charges billed by the hospital are the hospital’s usual and customary charges. Rule 69L-7.602, F.A.C., stipulates the appropriate EOBR codes that must be utilized when explaining to the provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment. The EOBR submitted with the petition conforms to the EOBR code requirements of Rule 69L-7.602(5)(q), F.A.C. Only through an EOBR is the carrier to communicate to the health care provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment of the provider’s bill. Pursuant to s. 440.13(12), F.S., a three member panel was established to determine statewide reimbursement allowances for treatment and care of injured workers. Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., incorporates, by reference, the applicable reimbursement schedule created by the panel. Section 440.13(7)(c), F.S., requires the OMS to utilize this schedule in rendering its determination for this reimbursement dispute. No established authority exists to permit alternative schedules or other methodologies to be utilized for hospital reimbursement other than those adopted by Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., unless the provider and the carrier have entered into a mutually agreeable contract. Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., incorporates, by reference, the Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition (Hospital Manual). Since the carrier failed to indicate any of the services are not medically necessary, the OMS determined proper reimbursement applying the above referenced reimbursement guidelines. Therefore, the OMS has determined that the carrier improperly adjusted reimbursement to Florida Medical Center for services rendered to the above- referenced injured employee on May 3, 2009, and May 4, 2009. Based on the above analysis, the OMS has determined that correct reimbursement equals $2,138.25 ($2,851.00 x 75% [Hospital Manual]=$2,138.25). The carrier shall reimburse Florida Hospital Medical Center $2,138.25 for services rendered to the above-referenced employee; and submit proof of reimbursement of the amount determined by the OMS within thirty days of the date the Determination is received. . . . The difference between what Petitioner Amerisure paid Florida Hospital for services rendered to J. L. and the amount the Department determined that Petitioner Amerisure is required to pay for such services equals $881.10. The Determination in 09-6872 did not directly address Amerisure’s allegation of the alleged billing error of “upcoding.” The Determination in 09-6872 provided a 21-day notice for request of an administrative hearing and, as noted in the Preliminary Statement above, Amerisure timely requested a hearing. Alleged “Upcoding” for Emergency Department Services The Petitioners’ responses in both cases allege that Florida Hospital “upcoded” its bill for emergency department evaluation and management services. Neither EOBR submitted to Florida Hospital, however, reported alleged “upcoding” as an explanation for the Petitioners’ adjustment or disallowance of reimbursement. While the Dispute Determinations by the Department do not directly address the carrier’s allegation of the alleged billing error of “upcoding” raised in the Petitioners’ responses, they found that “Rule 69L-7.602, F.A.C., stipulates the appropriate EOBR codes that must be utilized when explaining to the provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment[, and that] [o]nly through an EOBR is the carrier to communicate to the health care provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment of the provider’s bill.” According to Mr. von Sydow, who was offered by Petitioners as an expert in billing, coding, reimbursement, and payment issues,8/ the “reason codes” that workers’ compensation carriers are to use pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602, do not mention “upcoding,” and therefore an EOBR could not be generated with a reason code explaining reduction or disallowance based on “upcoding.” The following reason codes, however, are included in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602: 23 – Payment disallowed: medical necessity: diagnosis does not support the services rendered. – Payment disallowed: insufficient documentation: documentation does not substantiate the service billed was rendered. – Payment disallowed: insufficient documentation: level of evaluation and management service not supported by documentation. Neither EOBR submitted to Florida Hospital includes reason code 23, 40, or 41. And neither EOBR explains or otherwise suggests that that Florida Hospital’s level of billing was not supported by medical necessity, services rendered, or sufficient documentation. In fact, Petitioners did not disallow reimbursement and do not contend that reimbursement should be denied for any services rendered by Florida Hospital to R. P. and J. L. on the grounds that the billed services were not medically necessary for the injured employees’ compensable injuries. In addition, Petitioners did not adjust or disallow payment for any of the billed procedures on the grounds that the procedures were not provided. In sum, the EOBR’s did not give Florida Hospital notice that alleged “upcoding” was an issue. Even if Petitioner’s EOBR’s gave Florida Hospital notice that it was asserting “upcoding” as a reason to reduce or adjust the hospital’s bill, the evidence does not support a finding that Florida Hospital utilized the wrong code in its billing for emergency department evaluation and management services. The CPT® 2009 Current Procedural Terminology Professional Edition, (Copyright 2008), (CPT book), is adopted by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602(3)(d) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-7.020(2). The CPT book sets forth the procedure codes for billing and reporting by hospitals and physicians. The CPT book sets forth CPT codes ranging from 99281 through 99285 used to report evaluation and management services provided in a hospital’s emergency department, described as follows: 99281: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: A problem focused history; A problem focused examination; and Straightforward medical decision making. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are self limited or minor. 99282: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: An expanded problem focused history; An expanded problem focused examination; and Medical decision making of low complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of low to moderate severity. 99283: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: An expanded problem focused history; An expanded problem focused examination; and Medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate severity. 99284: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: A detailed history; A detailed examination; and Medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of high severity, and require urgent evaluation by the physician but do not pose an immediate significant threat to life or physiologic function. 99285: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: A comprehensive history; A comprehensive examination; and Medical decision making of high complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of high severity and pose an immediate significant threat to life or physiologic function. Mr. von Sydow testified that a Qmedtrix “medical director,” reviewed Florida Hospital’s bill for services rendered to R. P., but not the medical records, and recommended that the hospital’s charge for emergency department services under CPT 99285 be “re-priced” to Qmedtrix’s determination of the “usual and customary charge” for CPT 99284. Mr. von Sydow acknowledged the need for physician review for some cases (as opposed to review by non-physician coders) by testifying, “The more complicated the medicine, the more likely it is that he [a medical director at Qmedtrix] wants to see it.” Despite Qmedtrix’s original determination to “reprice” the bill from CPT code 99285 to CPT code 99284 (reflected in the reduced payment but not explained in the EOBR), Mr. von Sydow opined that the correct CPT code for emergency department services provided to patient R. P. was 99283, as opposed to 99285 billed by the hospital. Mr. von Sydow testified that his opinion was based upon his own review of the medical records, without the assistance of a medical director or medical expert, and review of examples for the CPT codes for emergency department services from the CPT book, and various provisions of ICD-9 and CPT book coding resources. Aside from the fact that Mr. von Sydow’s opinion differed from the purported recommendation of a Qmedtrix “medical director,” Mr. von Sydow is not a physician. Moreover, Qmedtrix failed to provide the testimony of the medical director, or anyone else with medical expertise to evaluate the medical records and services provided or to validate either the opinion of Mr. von Sydow or the original recommendation to “re- price” Florida Hospital’s use of CPT Code 99285 in its bill for emergency department services rendered to patient R. P. Mr. von Sydow offered similar testimony and examples to explain Qmedtrix’s “re-pricing” of Florida Hospital’s bill from CPT code 99284 to CPT code 99282 for emergency services rendered to patient J. L. on behalf of Amerisure. According to Mr. von Sydow, an internal Qmedtrix coder (not a medical director) reviewed the bill for emergency services rendered to J. L. and determined it should be re-priced to the usual and customary charge, as determined by Qmedtrix, using that CPT code 99282. While knowledgeable of the various codes and their uses, given the manner in which preliminary diagnostics under emergency circumstances drives Florida Hospital’s determination of the appropriate CPT code for billing emergency department services, without the testimony of a medical expert familiar with the medical records generated in these cases in light of the facts and circumstances surrounding the emergency care rendered to patients R. P. and J. L., Mr. von Sydow’s testimony was unpersuasive. Ross Edmundson, M.D., an employee, vice-president, and medical manager for Florida Hospital, explained that, unlike other settings, hospitals generally do not have the medical histories of patients presenting for emergency hospital services. When a patient comes to Florida Hospital for emergency services, they are triaged by a nurse to determine the level of urgency, then a doctor sees the patient, conducts a differential diagnosis to rule out possible causes, obtains the patient’s history, and then performs a physical examination. While emergency room physicians at Florida Hospital do not decide which CPT code is utilized for the evaluation and management services provided by its emergency department, the various tests and procedures they undertake to evaluate and treat emergency department patients do. James English, the director of revenue management for Florida Hospital explained the process through his deposition testimony. Florida Hospital, like over 400 other hospitals, uses the “Lynx System” – a proprietary system for creating and maintaining medical records electronically. The program captures each medical service, supply, and physician order that is inputted into the electronic medical record. The hospital’s emergency evaluation and management CPT code is generated from the electronic record. A “point collection system” in the Lynx System translates physician-ordered services, supplies it to a point system, and then assigns the CPT code that is billed based upon the total number of “points” that are in the system at the time the patient is discharged from the emergency department. The level of the evaluation and management CPT code (99281 to 99285) that is reported on Florida Hospital’s bill is a direct reflection of the number and types of medical services that a patient receives from his or her arrival through discharge. In light of evidence showing the manner in which emergency services are provided and the importance of medical records in generating the appropriate billing code for emergency evaluation and management services, it is found that Petitioners failed to provide an adequate analysis of the medical records of either R. P. or J. L. to show that the appropriate CPT codes were not utilized by Florida Hospital in billing for those services. On the other hand, both Petitions for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute filed by Florida Hospital with the Department attached appropriately itemized bills utilizing Form DFS-F5-DWC-90, also known as UB-04 CMS-1450, identifying the charges billed for each line item by revenue code and HCPS or CPT codes. In addition, medical records for the evaluation and treatment provided by Florida Hospital for both patients R. B. and J. L. supporting the itemized bills were submitted to the Department. These documents were also received into evidence at the final hearing. Florida Hospital’s bills at issue correctly identified the hospital’s usual charges for each individual and separately chargeable item, service or supply, with the corresponding code assigned to such billable items as maintained in Florida Hospital’s “charge master.” In addition, Petitioners concede the compensability of both patients’ work-related injuries and do not dispute whether any service or supply rendered and billed by Florida Hospital for these two cases were “medically necessary.”9/ Unbundling As noted above, in Case No. 09-6871, Qmedtrix’s response to Florida Hospital’s petition for resolution of reimbursement dispute contended “unbundling” as a ground for adjustment or disallowance of reimbursement. At the final hearing, Arlene Cotton, the nurse who issued the Dispute Determinations, explained that reason code 63 regarding “unbundling” is inapplicable to hospital billing, as there is no rule that requires hospitals to bundle bill for its services. Mr. von Sydow agreed that reason code 63 was inapplicable. In addition, footnote 2 of Petitioners’ Proposed Recommended Order states, “they did not pursue the allegations of unbundling.” Therefore, it is found that Petitioners did not prove and otherwise abandoned their claim of “unbundling” as a ground to adjust or disallow reimbursement to Florida Hospital. Usual and Customary Charges The Dispute Determinations issued by the Department found that correct payment in both cases equaled 75% of billed charges, citing “Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., [which] incorporates, by reference, the Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition (Hospital Manual). Both Section 440.13(12)(a), Florida Statutes, and the Hospital Manual provide that hospital services provided to patients under the workers’ compensation law “shall be reimbursed at 75 percent of usual and customary charges.” The Department interprets the term “usual and customary charges” as set forth in the Hospital Manual and Section 440.13(12)(a), Florida Statutes, quoted above, to mean a hospital’s usual charges of the hospital, whereas Petitioners contend that “usual and customary charges” means the average fee of all providers in a given geographical area. While apparently not contending that Petitioners failed to raise the issue of “usual and customary” charges in their EOBR’s,10/ at the final hearing, the Department argued that “nowhere in [either Macy’s or Amerisure’s] response is the issue of customary charges raised.” A review of the responses filed by Qmedtrix to Florida Hospital’s reimbursement dispute petitions filed with the Department reveal that both raise the issue of “usual and customary charges.” Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Mr. von Sydow’s letter attached to both responses state: As you may know, the proposed adoption of Medicare’s Outpatient Prospective Payment System as a methodology for reimbursing hospitals 60% and 75% of “usual and customary charges” follows from the decision of the First District Court of Appeals in One Beacon Insurance v. Agency for Health Care Administration, No. 1D05-5459 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (SB-50 amended section 440.13 to remove all reference to the charges of any individual service provider; this amendment reveals the legislative intent to eliminate calculation of a “usual and customary charge” based on the fees of any one provider in favor of a calculation based on average fees of all providers in a given geographical area). This court decision requires DFS to define payment rates for out patient service that are uniformly applicable to all hospitals in a given geographic area. In addition, at the final hearing, the Department argued that the petitions for administrative hearing did “not raise as a disputed issue of fact or law whether or not usual and customary charges should apply in this case.” Indeed, a review of the request for relief set forth in the petitions for administrative hearings filed by Petitioners do not mention the issue of “usual and customary charges.” Rather, the relief requested by both petitions for administrative review of the Dispute Determinations, as summarized in the Joint Prehearing Stipulation, is: Petitioner[s] seeks reversal of OMS’ Determination(s) and the matters remanded for the Department to: direct payment based upon the actual treatment required/provided and pursuant to the correct CPT code; find that the hospital upcoded and that Petitioner properly reimbursed (or exceeded amount due); and determine that the hospital has the burden of proof to substantiate its billing and the use of the chosen CPT code. Contrary to the Department’s argument, however, both petitions for administrative hearing raise the issue of “usual and customary charges.” Page 9 of Macy’s petition, in pertinent part states: Petitioner submits that in issuing the above findings OMS failed to consider the holding in One Beacon Insurance v. Agency for Health Care Administration (wherein the Court determined that reimbursement should not be based solely upon a mathematical equation [as found within the Reimbursement Manual] and applying it to the fee charged by a particular provider; and that by eliminating the reference to any one facility’s charges, the legislature intended that the charges be based on average fees of all providers in a geographical area as opposed to the fees of the particular provider in question). Likewise, review of Amerisure’s petition for administrative hearing reveals that the issue of “usual and customary charges” was raised. Pages 7 and 8 of Amerisure’s petition state, in pertinent part: Further, if the Hospital is permitted to utilize incorrect revenue codes it would be impossible to determine whether the charges are consistent with the Hospital’s own [usual and customary] charges for the service, procedure or supplies in question and, further, whether such charges are consistent with charges by other like facilities (in the same geographical area) for the same services, procedures, or supplies. See One Beacon Insurance, supra. In addition, Amerisure’s petition on page 12 states with regard to the Department’s determination: Such finding was issued without consideration of . . . the amounts charged for the same services in the Orlando area where this hospital is located. Petitioners further preserved the issue of “usual and customary charges” in the first paragraph of their statement of position on page 3 of the Joint Prehearing Statement, as follows: Petitioners, Macy’s and Amerisure, take the position that the Determinations must be reversed as the Department has the duty to scrutinize the bills in question in order to determine, first, whether the hospital, in fact, charged its usual charge for the services provided, and second, whether the billed charges are in line with the customary charges of other facilities in the same community (for the same or similar services) and that the Department failed to do so. As such, Petitioners contend that payment for services provided by Florida Hospital should have been based upon 75% of usual and customary charges, not 75% of billed charges. Therefore, it is found that Petitioners have preserved the issue of “usual and customary charges” for consideration in this administrative proceeding. Although preserved, Petitioners failed to demonstrate that their interpretation of “usual and customary charges” should prevail. The Department has consistently interpreted the term “usual and customary charges” as used in the Hospital Manual, Section 440.13(12)(a), Florida Statutes, and rules related to hospital reimbursement under the workers’ compensation law as the “usual and customary charges” of the hospital reflected on the hospital’s “charge master.” The Hospital Manual requires each hospital to maintain a charge master and to produce it “when requested for the purpose of verifying its usual charges. . . .” (Emphasis added). Petitioners did not conduct or request to conduct an audit to verify whether the charges billed by Florida Hospital corresponded with the Florida Hospital’s charge master. In fact, Mr. von Sydow conceded at the final hearing that Florida Hospital’s bills at issue were charged in accordance with Florida Hospital’s charge master. Nor did Petitioners institute rule challenge proceedings against the Department regarding the Hospital Manual, incorporated by reference into Florida Administrative Code Rule 38F-7.501. Instead, Petitioners assert that they should be able to reduce Florida Hospital bills based upon a different interpretation of the phrase “usual and customary charges” to mean the average charge in the community as determined by Qmedtrix. Qmedtrix is not registered with the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, and does not employ any Florida-licensed insurance adjuster, physician, or registered nurse. Qmedtrix earns 12 to 15 percent of “savings” realized by carriers utilizing their bill review services. For example, if a bill is reduced by $100, Qmedtrix is paid $12.11/ Qmedtrix uses a proprietary bill review system called “BillChek.” According to Qmedtrix’s website: BillChek reviews out-of-network medical charges for all bill types in all lines of coverage, including group health, auto, medical, and workers’ compensation. BillChek is a unique specialty cost- containment service that determines an accurate and reasonable reimbursement amount for non-network facility and ancillary medical charges. BillChek incorporates historical data to help determine reasonable payment recommendations across all sectors of the health care industry. All BillCheck recommendations are backed by extensive medical and legal expertise, and supported by Qmedtrix’s experienced Provider Relations and Dispute Resolution teams. According to the testimony of Mr. von Sydow, Qmedtrix collects and maintains data from various sources, including Florida’s Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), the American Hospital Directory (AHD.com), and HCFA 2552’s (data reported to the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services on HCFA 2522) in order to construct a database of health care providers’ usual charges. Mr. von Sydow advised that AHD.com data was a principle source for constructing the database. He also advised that AHCA data was included in the database even though Qmedtrix found the AHCA data defective. Examples of data downloaded from AHD.com for Florida Hospital showing a profile of the facility was received into evidence as P-5. The data did not, however, show usual charges for the CPT codes for emergency department services at issue in this case. Petitioners also introduced into evidence Exhibits P-6 and P-7, which contained AHD.com data showing average charges for Florida Regional Medical Center and Florida Hospital, respectively, for Level 1 through Level 5 emergency room visits (corresponding to CPT codes 99281 through 99285). Mr. von Sydow explained that the data was part of the information Qmedtrix used to construct the average charge in the community. Petitioners failed to provide similar AHD.com data for other hospitals in the area Qmedtrix determined to be the “community.” In addition, Petitioners introduced AHCA’s Florida Health Finder Web-site, as Exhibit P-8, which ostensibly included average charges for all hospitals in Florida for the subject emergency department CPT codes (99281 through 99285). Mr. von Sydow explained, however, “[w]e find that [the AHCA data] is not refreshed very often, unfortunately, and some other defects in the scrubbing of the data by the agency, which they know, I will say. But this is incorporated in our database to a large extent.” The exhibit was received into evidence for the purpose of helping to explain how Qmedtrix constructed its database, with the recognition that it was largely composed of hearsay. In sum, while Petitioners showed their methodology of constructing the database, other than the AHD.com data for Orlando Regional Medical Center and Florida Hospital, Petitioners failed to introduce reliable evidence sufficient to show the “usual and customary charge” of all providers in a given geographical area as determined by Qmedtrix. In addition, the AHCA data, though characterized by Mr. von Sydow as unreliable, indicates that there is a wide range of differences in emergency room charges between hospitals in Florida. Petitioners’ interpretation of “usual and customary charge” to mean the average fee of all providers in a given geographical area does not take into account an individual hospital’s indigent care, cost of labor, overhead, number of beds, size, age, or various other differences between facilities that could affect amounts each hospital charges for emergency department and other services; the Department’s interpretation does.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, enter a Final Order consistent with this Recommended Order that: Directs Macy’s Claims Services to reimburse Florida Hospital Medical Center $4,160.40 for services rendered to patient R. P., and to submit proof of reimbursement of that amount within 30 days from the date the Final Order is received; Directs Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company to reimburse Florida Hospital Medical Center $2,138.25 for services rendered to patient J. L., and submit proof of reimbursement of that amount to the Department within 30 days from the date the Final Order is received. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 2010.
Findings Of Fact The rule at issue has been variously codified, but will be referred to for purposes of the present case as Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code. The pertinent language, which was first adopted as part of Rule 10C- 7.03(5), Florida Administrative Code, on March 30, 1976, and which was repealed on July 28, 1981, provides: Reimbursement for services provided is in accord with the standards and principles of reasonable cost as defined and applied under the Social Security Act, Title XVIII, Medicare Program. In lieu of retroactive adjustment, 6 percent shall be added to a participating hospital's costs to determine a current reimbursement rate. Respondent adopted this rule on the claimed authority of Section 409.266, Florida Statutes. In its 1969 legislative session, the Florida Legislature enacted Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, entitled "Medical Assistance for the Needy," providing the original State legislative basis and authority for Florida's entry into the Medicaid program. Section 409.266(2), Florida Statutes, as enacted, authorized the Florida Department of Social Services or any other department that the Governor might designate to: Enter into such agreement with other state agencies or any agency of the federal government and accept such duties with respect to social welfare or public aid as may be necessary to implement the provisions of subsection (1) and to qualify for federal aid including compliance with provisions of Public Law 86-778 and the "Social Security Amendments of 1965" [estab- lishing Title XIX of the Social Security Act.] Section 409.266(3), Florida Statutes, as enacted, stated that: The department of social services is authorized and directed to prepare and operate a program and budget in order to implement and comply with the provisions of public law 86-778 and the "Social Secu- rity Amendments of 1965." Chapter 69-265, Laws of Florida (1969). No provisions of Florida law other than Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, as enacted, authorized any agency to perform any function specifically to implement the Medicaid program. The State of Florida formally commenced participation in the Medicaid program effective January 1, 1970. At all times pertinent to this controversy, respondent, Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services or its predecessor agencies (referred to as "HRS") , has been and continues to be the "State Agency" identified in 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a (a) (5), and charged under Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, as amended, with the formulation of a State Plan for Medical Assistance ("State Plan"), 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a, and with the ongoing responsibility for the administration of the Medicaid program in the State of Florida. Since Florida's entry into the Medicaid program in 1970, HRS has been authorized essentially to "[e]nter into such agreements with appropriate agents, other State agencies, or any agency of the Federal Government and accept such duties in respect to social welfare or public aid as may be necessary or needed to implement the provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act pertaining to medical assistance." Section 409.266(2)(a), Fla. Stat., as amended. HRS has never been authorized to enter into any agreements, accept any duties, or perform any functions with respect to the Medicaid program that are in contravention of or not authorized by Title XIX of the Social Security Act and implementing Federal regulations and requirements. As a prerequisite for Florida's entry into the Medicaid program, HRS prepared and filed with the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") a State Plan, pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security Act, and pursuant to its delegated legislative authority set forth in Section 409.266(2)(a), Florida Statutes. (In May, 1980, HEW was redesignated the United States Department of Health and Human Services, but for purposes of this action both shall be referred to as HEW.) C.W. Hollingsworth was the HRS official who had the responsibility for supervising the preparation, the filing, and for obtaining the approval of HEW of Florida's initial State Plan Florida's initial State Plan was approved by HEW effective January 1, 1970. At the time that Florida received approval of its initial State Plan, Title XIX of the Social Security Act required state plans to provide for the payment of the reasonable cost of inpatient hospital services. At the time that Florida received approval of its initial State Plan, HEW regulations governing reimbursement for inpatient hospital services under Medicaid required the State Plan to provide for reimbursement of Medicaid inpatient hospital services furnished by those hospitals also participating in the Medicare program, applying the same standards, cost reimbursement principles, and methods of cost apportionment used in computing reimbursement to such hospitals under Medicare. 45 C.F.R. Section 250.30(a) and (b), 34 Fed. Reg. 1244 (January 25, 1969). At the time that Florida entered the Medicaid program, Medicare cost reimbursement principles in effect governing reimbursement for the cost of inpatient hospital services required payment of a participating hospital's actual and reasonable costs of providing such services to Medicare beneficiaries, and, moreover, that such payment be made on the basis of the hospital's current costs rather than upon the costs of a prior period or upon a fixed negotiated rate. 42 U.S.C. Section 1395x (v) (1)(A) 20 C.F.R. Section 405.451(c) (2), 405.402(a) [later renumbered 42 C.F.R. Section 405.451(c)(2) and Section 405.402(a)]. Such Medicare principles and standards also provided for interim payments to be made to the hospital during its fiscal year. At the conclusion of the subject fiscal year, the hospital was required to file a cost report wherein the hospital included all of its costs of providing covered inpatient services to Medicare beneficiaries. A settlement or "retroactive adjustment" process then was required to reconcile the amount of interim payments received by the hospital during the fiscal period with its allowable costs incurred during that period. If the hospital had been overpaid during the year, it was required to refund the amount of that overpayment to the Medicare program. Conversely, if the hospital had been underpaid during the year, the Medicare program was required to make an additional payment to the hospital, retroactively, in the amount of the underpayment. 20 C.F.R. Section 405.402(b)(2), 405.451(b)(2). Essentially the same Medicare principles and standards governing reimbursement of inpatient hospital services described in the two preceding paragraphs have been in effect at all times pertinent to this controversy. 42 C.F.R. Section 405.401, et seq. Florida's approved State Plan as of January 1, 1970, governing reimbursement of inpatient hospital services under the Medicaid program, committed HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. The only versions of Florida's State Plan provisions that have been approved by HEW and that have governed HRS's reimbursement of inpatient hospital services prior to July 1, 1981, each commit HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. Attached as an appendix to the final order is the form agreement drafted under the supervision of C.W. Hollingsworth, which has been in use from January 1, 1970, until July 1, 1981. From the inception of the Florida Medicaid program, and as a prerequisite for participation therein, a hospital has been required to execute a copy of the form agreement. A hospital may not participate in the Medicaid program without having executed such an agreement, nor may it propose any amendments thereto. The intent and effect of the form agreement is to require HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. The form agreement requires HRS to compute a percentage " allowance in lieu of the retroactive adjustments ("percentage allowances") in determining the rates that hospitals will be paid for providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients. The form agreement requires HRS to compute a new percentage allowance each year based on hospital cost trends. The meanings of the terms "allowance in lieu of retroactive adjustments" in all pertinent state plans and "percentage allowance for the year in lieu of retroactive payment adjustment" contained in the form agreement are identical. In drafting the form agreement, HRS intended that the "percentage allowance for the year in lieu of retroactive payment adjustment" be set at a level sufficient to ensure that hospitals participating in the Medicaid program would be reimbursed their "reasonable costs" of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. At all times pertinent to this controversy, participating hospitals, like petitioner, have been reimbursed by HRS for inpatient hospital services provided to Medicaid patients in the following manner: Within ninety (90) days following the close of its fiscal year, the partici- pating hospital files a Form 2551 or 2552 Annual Statement of Reimbursable Costs, as applicable, with both Blue Cross of Florida, Inc., the major fiscal intermediary respon- sible for the administration of Part A of the federal Medicare program in the State of Florida, and with HRS. This document, also referred to as a "cost report" details various hospital and financial statistical data relating to the patient care activities engaged in by the hospital during the sub- ject fiscal period. Upon receipt of the participating hospital's cost report for a fiscal period, HRS makes an initial determination based upon Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards of the hospital's total allow- able inpatient costs, charges, and total patient days during the subject fiscal period, and then determines an inpatient per diem reimbursement rate for the period. To the inpatient per diem reimburse- ment rate is then added a percentage allow- ance in lieu of making any further retroactive corrective adjustments in reimbursement which. might have been due the hospital applicable to the reporting period. The adjusted in- patient per diem reimbursement rate is applied prospectively, and remains in effect until further adjustments in the rate are required. If HRS determines that total inpa- tient Medicaid reimbursement to a partici- pating hospital during a fiscal period exceeds the hospital's allowable and rea- sonable costs of rendering such covered inpatient services applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards, then the hospital is required to remit to HRS the amount of such overpayment. If, however, HRS determines that the total inpatient Medicaid reimbursement received by a participating hospital is less than the hospital's actual and reason- able costs of rendering such covered inpa- tient services to Medicaid patients during the period applying Medicare cost reimburse- ment principles and standards, no further retroactive corrective adjustments are made; provided, however, that should an overpayment occur in a fiscal period, it may be offset and applied retroactively against an under- payment to the participating hospital which occurred during the next preceding fiscal period only. HRS has used the following "percentage allowances" in determining Medicaid reimbursement rates for inpatient hospital services: January 1, 1970-June 30, 1972 ...12 percent July 1, 1972-approximately March 30, 1976 ... 9 percent Approximately March 31, 1976-June 30, 1981... 6 percent Since at least January 1, 1976, HRS has not recomputed the "percentage allowance" on an annual basis. Since at least January 1, 1976, HRS has not based the "percentage allowance" that it has applied in determining Medicaid inpatient hospital reimbursement rates upon hospital cost trends. HRS has used no technical methodology based upon hospital cost trends to develop any of the "percentage allowances." At least since January 1, 1974, HRS's "percentage allowances" have been less than the corresponding average annual increases in the costs incurred by Florida hospitals of providing inpatient hospital services. Prior to March 30, 1976, all of HRS's published regulations addressing reimbursement of participating hospitals for their costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients required HRS to reimburse such hospitals in accordance with Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. In certain internal documents, Petitioner's Exhibits P-44 and P-12, HRS states that the average costs of providing inpatient hospital services in the State of Florida rose at least 18 percent during calendar year 1975. In November, 1975, the Secretary of HRS was informed by HRS officials that HRS faced a projected budgetary deficit for its fiscal year ended June 30, 1976. A decision memorandum presented options to the HRS Secretary for reducing the projected deficit. Among such options presented to and approved by the HRS Secretary was to reduce the "percentage allowance" from 9 percent to 6 percent. The reduction of the "percentage allowance" by HRS from 9 percent to 6 percent was effected in response to HRS's projected deficit, and was not based upon an analysis of hospital cost trends. HRS incorporated the 6 percent "percentage allowance" into its administrative rules which were published on March 30, 1976. In response to objections raised by the Florida Hospital Association to the reduction in the percentage allowance by HRS from 9 percent to 6 percent, HRS officials reexamined that reduction. During HRS's reexamination of its previous "percentage allowance" reduction, HRS was aware of and acknowledged the fact that Florida hospital costs were increasing at an average annual rate in excess of both the earlier 9 percent and the resulting 6 percent "percentage allowance." In a memorandum dated September 13, 1976, from HRS official Charles Hall to the Secretary of HRS, Petitioner's Exhibit P-45, Charles Hall informed the Secretary that the methods and standards then used by HRS to reimburse participating hospitals for their costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients was out of compliance with federal requirements. Charles Hall further informed the Secretary that the reason HRS had not theretofore been cited by HEW for noncompliance was the manner in which the Florida State Plan had been drafted, i.e., that the State Plan required HRS to reimburse hospitals under Medicaid for the reasonable costs that they would have been reimbursed applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. In a letter dated September 20, 1976, Petitioner's Exhibit P-31, HEW informed HRS that HEW had received a complaint from the Florida Hospital Association that the methods HRS was actually using to reimburse hospitals for the costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients were in violation of federal regulation 45 C.F.R. Section 250.30(a). A proposed amendment to Florida's State Plan submitted by HRS to HEW in November, 1976, Petitioner's Exhibit P-49, if approved, would have allowed HRS to reimburse hospitals for the cost of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients under methods differing from Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards (an "alternative plan"). "Alternative plans" have been permitted under applicable federal regulations since October 21, 1974. A state participating in the Medicaid program may elect to establish an "alternative plan," but may not implement such "alternative plan" without the prior written approval of HEW. Florida has not had in effect an "alternative plan" of reimbursing participating hospitals for their costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients that was formally approved by HEW at any time prior to July 1, 1981. By letter dated January 7, 1977, Petitioner's Exhibit P-32, HEW notified HRS that it had formally cited HRS for noncompliance with federal regulations governing reimbursement of inpatient hospital services under Medicaid. HRS acknowledged their noncompliance and between November, 1976, and October 30, 1977, HRS attempted to revise its proposed "alternative plan" on at least two occasions in an attempt to obtain HEW approval. In October, 1977, HRS withdrew its proposed "alternative plan" then pending with HEW. HRS then contracted with an outside consultant, Alexander Grant & Company, to assist in the formulation of a new "alternative plan" proposal. In January, 1978, Alexander Grant & Company delivered its draft of an "alternative plan" to HRS. In October, 1978, HRS submitted a draft "alternative plan" to HEW for review and comment, and HEW expected HRS to submit a formal "alternative plan" proposal to HEW for its approval by November 1, 1978. HRS did not submit the formal "alternative plan" proposal to HEW until August 12, 1980. In a letter dated February 21, 1979, from Richard Morris, HEW Regional Medicaid Director, Region IV, to United States Senator Richard Stone of Florida, Mr. Morris advised Senator Stone: For more than two years the Florida Medicaid Program has not met Federal Requirements for inpatient hospital services reimbursement. Their payment methodology under-reimburses certain hospitals year after year. The pros- pective interim per diem rate paid by Florida to hospitals includes a percentage allowance to cover increased costs during the forthcom- ing year that is consistently less than increased costs in some hospitals. If the payments are less than costs, the difference is not reimbursed. This results in underpay- ments. We have worked closely with Florida to develop an acceptable alternative system that would meet Federal requirements. To date, Florida has not implemented such a system despite having received informal HEW agreement on a draft plan developed more than a year ago. It is our understanding that this alternative plan is not a high priority item at this time. We will con- tinue to work with HRS staff to secure Florida compliance regarding this require- ment. Petitioner's Exhibit P-46. Since August 12, 1980, HRS has submitted to HEW for its approval at least four more versions of an "alternative plan." Petitioner's Exhibits P-120, P-121, P-123, and P-152. Each of these versions were approved by the Secretary of HRS, and HRS believes each to comply with applicable Florida law. Mr. Erwin Bodo, Ph.D., was and is the HRS official responsible for the development and drafting of Exhibits P-120, P-121, P-123, and P-152. In June, 1981, HEW approved an "alternative plan" for the State of Florida (Exhibit P-152) , and such "alternative plan" was implemented effective July 1, 1981. Until July 1, 1981, HRS continued to use the 6 percent percentage allowance" to compute inpatient hospital reimbursement under Medicaid. Even after its repeal, Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, is applied by respondent in calculating reimbursement for Medicaid services provided between March 30, 1976, and July 1, 1981. From November 20, 1976, until July 1, 1981 the period in which HRS was attempting to secure HEW approval for an alternative plan--HRS was aware that the costs of inpatient hospital services were increasing at an average annual rate in excess of the 6 percent "percentage allowance." From September 1, 1976, through July 1, 1981, HRS has been out of compliance with its approved State Plan provisions, and HEW regulations governing reimbursement for inpatient hospital services under Medicaid because HRS's methods for reimbursing hospitals for the cost of providing those services to Medicaid patients have resulted in a substantial number of hospitals including petitioner--being reimbursed at a lower rate than the hospitals would have been reimbursed applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. Since the quarter ending December 31, 1976, until July 1, 1981, HEW has formally cited HRS as being in contravention of its approved State Plan provisions, and HEW (now HHS) regulations, governing reimbursement for inpatient hospital services under Medicaid because HRS's methods for reimbursing hospitals for the cost of providing those services to Medicaid patients have resulted in a substantial number of hospitals--including petitioner--being reimbursed at a lower rate than the hospitals would have been reimbursed applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. PAN AMERICAN HOSPITAL CORPORATION Petitioner, Pan American Hospital Corporation, is a not-for-profit corporation, duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida. Petitioner is a tax-exempt organization as determined by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. At all times pertinent to this controversy, petitioner has operated and continues to operate a duly licensed 146-bed, short-term acute care general hospital, located at 5959 Northwest Seventh Street, Miami, Florida 33126. At all times pertinent to this controversy, petitioner has been and continues to be a duly certified provider of inpatient hospital services, eligible to participate in the Florida Medicaid program since January 27, 1974. The Appendix to this Final Order is a true and correct copy of the "Participation Agreement" entered into between petitioner and HRS, whereunder, inter alia, petitioner became eligible to receive payment from HRS for covered inpatient hospital services provided to Medicaid patients. At all times pertinent to this controversy, petitioner has been a certified "provider of services" participating in the Medicare program. During the fiscal periods in dispute in this action, petitioner did provide covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and became eligible for payment by HRS of its reasonable costs of providing such services, determined in accor- dance with Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. With respect to each of the fiscal periods in dispute in this action, petitioner timely filed all cost reports and other financial data with HRS or its contracting agents, including Blue Cross of Florida, Inc., to enable HRS to determine petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients. During each of the fiscal periods in dispute in this action, HRS failed to reimburse petitioner for its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, determined in accordance with applicable Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. Such costs incurred by petitioner were reasonable, necessary, related to patient care, and less than customary charges within the meaning of those Medicare principles and standards. With respect to each of the fiscal periods in dispute, HRS and/or its contracting agent, Blue Cross of Florida, Inc. , reviewed and audited the cost reports filed by petitioner, and as a result of such review and audits set or adjusted, as applicable, the Medicaid inpatient per diem reimbursement rate at which petitioner would be paid during the next succeeding fiscal period or until that rate was again adjusted. MOTION TO DISMISS RULE CHALLENGE DENIED Respondent sought dismissal of petitioner's challenge to Rule 10C- 7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, on grounds that the challenged rule provision has now been repealed (effective July 28, 1981). By this motion, respondent raises the question whether petitioner remains "substantially affected" notwithstanding the repeal. The parties are in agreement that respondent still applies Rule 10C-7.39(6) , Florida Administrative Code, in calculating reimbursement for providers like petitioner who furnished Medicaid services during the time between adoption of the rule and its repeal. The present case resembles State Department of Transportation v. Pan American Construction Company, 338 So.2d 1291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), app. dism. 345 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1977). The rule challenged in that case had been promulgated pursuant to a statute that was later amended by legislation which took effect after the Section 120.56 hearing, but before entry of a final order invalidating the rule. In response to the statutory amendment, moreover, the agency whose rule was under challenge adopted an emergency rule superseding the challenged rule. On appeal, the agency argued that the rule challenge was moot. The court ruled: While normally the law as it exists at the time of review will be applied to a pending case, in this proceeding, begun under the old law and rules adopted pursuant to it, we consider that respondents are entitled to construction of such law and rules. Their rights under contracts with peti- tioner which were in existence during the life of the former statute and rules may be affected by the construction of that statute and the rules adopted pursuant to it. State Department of Transportation v. Pan American Construction Co., 338 So.2d 1291, 1294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) In the present case there has been no statutory amendment, but here as in State Department of Transportation v. Pan American Construction Co., the proceedings pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, began before the repeal of the challenged rule; and the parties' "rights under contracts . . . which were in existence during the life of the former . . . [rule] may be affected by the construction of that . . . [rule]." 338 So.2d at 1294. Simultaneously with the present proceedings, petitioner and respondent are litigating the question of what moneys, if any, respondent owes petitioner as reimbursement for Medicaid services furnished during periods which include the entire time that Rule 10C- 7.39(6) was in effect. No. 80-112. Even though Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, stands repealed, petitioner remains "substantially affected by" the rule, within the meaning of Section 120.56(1), Florida Statutes (1979). MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED Respondent contends that these proceedings are defective "for failure to join an indispensable party," viz., the federal government, because it "is Respondent's intention, should any liability result from this action, to make a claim for federal financial participation as to approximately fifty-nine percent of such liability [See generally] 42 U.S.C. Section 1320b-2(a)(2)." Motion to Dismiss, p. 2. This motion is also addressed to the petition in the companion substantial interest case, No. 80-112, and discussed in the recommended order in that case. For present purposes, it suffices to state the self-evident: No agency can avoid an administrative challenge to a rule it alone has promulgated on grounds that some other party's interest may be adversely affected by invalidation of the rule. CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS Among other things, petitioner contends that Rule 10C-7.39 (6), Florida Administrative Code, should be invalidated as violative of state and federal constitutional prohibitions against impairment of contractual obligations. Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Florida proscribes "law[s] impairing the obligation of contracts," and the federal constitution also forbids any "State . . . [to] pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts." Article I, Section 10. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 975 (1977). Challenges to administrative rules brought pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1979), cannot, however, be predicated on constitutional grounds. State Department of Administration, Division of Personnel v. State Department of Administration, Division of Administrative Hearings, 326 So.2d 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). See Department of Environmental Regulation v. Leon County, 344 So.2d 290, 295 n. 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). INVALID EXERCISE OF DELEGATED LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY The main thrust of petitioner's challenge to Rule 10C-7.39 (6), Florida Administrative Code, is its contention that respondent adopted the challenged rule not to implement Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, but in an attempt to avoid obligations imposed by Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, and the provisions of federal law incorporated by reference in that State statute. The challenged rule pertains to agreements made between respondent and providers of medical services in accordance with the provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act. The statute authorizes respondent to "[e]nter into . . . agreements as may be necessary or needed to implement the provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act pertaining to medical assistance." Section 409.266(2)(a) , Florida Statutes (1979). No party suggests that any other State statutory provision furnishes substantive authority for promulgation of Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, and the parties have stipulated that "HRS has never been authorized to . . . perform any functions with respect to the Medicaid program that are in contravention of or not authorized by Title XIX of the Social Security Act and implementing Federal regulations and requirements." Agency rules must conform to enabling statutes and may not repeal, amend, or modify any statute. State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. McTigue, 387 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Psychiatric Society, 382 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); State Department of Transportation v. Pan American Construction Co., 338 So.2d 1291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) app. dism. 345 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1977) Incorporated by reference into Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, was the federal statutory requirement that hospitals providing Medicaid services be reimbursed by respondent for reasonable costs incurred in accordance with an approved State Plan. 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a (a)(13)(B) , Pub. L. 89-97, Section 121(a), redesiquated 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a (a) (13)(D), Pub. L. 90- 248, Section 224(a). At the time of its incorporation into State law, this federal statute had been definitively explicated by federal regulations requiring that reasonable cost for Medicaid purposes be calculated in accordance with applicable Medicare principles for purposes of reimbursing hospitals like petitioner that furnished both Medicaid and Medicare services. 2/ 42 C.F.R. Section 50.30(b), 34 Fed. Reg. 1244 et seq. (January 25, 1969). In addition, all Florida "State Plan provisions . . . approved by HEW and. . govern[ing] HRS's reimbursement of inpatient hospital services prior to July 1, 1981, . . . commit HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards." Pre-hearing Stipulation, 19. Even before adopting Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida had begun setting Medicaid reimbursement rates by adjusting the previous year's rates upward to reflect inflation, as a matter of policy. As the parties have stipulated, in November of 1975, a budgetary deficit was projected for HRS; and, even though HRS was aware that inflation was substantially higher than 6 percent, HRS eventually decided to promulgate the rule now under challenge, setting the adjustment at 6 percent. HRS promulgated Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, not in furtherance of its statutory charge to reimburse Medicaid providers for costs reasonably incurred, but in order expediently to cut its own costs by disregarding the statutory scheme and reimbursing Medicaid providers less than the costs they had reasonably incurred. Cf. Patricia Godboldt v. David Pingree, Secretary, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, State of Florida, No. 81-2862 (2d Cir.; Prelim. Inqy., Nov. 25, 1981). UNCODIFIED POLICY CHALLENGED AS RULE Petitioner challenges not only Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, but also, as "an illicit rule," HRS's prior practice of setting reimbursement rates by adjusting the previous year's rates. The percentage allowances under preexisting practice were higher (9 and 12 3/ percent) but the methodology was the same as that codified in Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code. The parties stipulated to the existence of a practice that reflected a policy that changed over time, see McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) , but did not stipulate that this practice reflected a hard and fast "rule." The parties stipulated that "HRS used [12 percent from January 1, 1970, to June 30, 1972, and 9 percent from July 1, 1972, to approximately March 30, 1976] . . . in determining Medicaid reimbursement rates for inpatient hospital services," but did not prove or stipulate to the existence of any formal document or other written statement "issued by the agency head for implementation by subordinates with little or no room for discretionary modification." State Department of Administration v. Stevens, 344 So.2d 290, 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). In the absence of such a stipulation or proof, the agency's practice of requiring a 9 percent "percentage allowance, has not been shown to amount in itself to an illicit rule. Department of Corrections v. McCain Sales of Florida, Inc., 400 So.2d 1301 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). ATTACHMENT 4.19A Petitioner's challenge to Attachment 4.19A of the Florida State Plan for Medical Assistance was conditioned by the words "to the extent that Attachment 4.19A . . . Is interpreted in a manner different than that set forth in Paragraph 15" of the petition. Since the parties stipulated, in substance, to the allegations of paragraph 15 of the petition, the condition for the challenge never occurred. In any event, it is very clear that Attachment 4.19A did not have the force of a rule, inasmuch as its key pronouncement, viz., that "retroactive adjustments are prohibited by skate statute" was completely disregarded by respondent. Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, the policies which preceded that rule, and every contract respondent entered into with providers of Medicaid services contemplated retroactive adjustments. It is, accordingly, ORDERED: The final sentence of respondent's Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, is hereby declared to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioner's challenge to the percentage allowance policies that preexisted Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, is dismissed. Petitioner's challenge to Attachment 4.19A of the Florida State Plan for Medical Assistance is dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 1981.
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner 1/ owns and operates a licensed nursing facility certified to participate in the Florida Medicaid Program. The facility, which is located at 490 South Old Wire Road, Wildwood, Florida, first became a Medicaid provider on January 27, 1987. Expanded from 120 beds to 180 beds prior to March, 1988, the average occupancy of WeCare is 175-176 residents. The Medicaid patient census is usually over 140 residents. Petitioner operates the only nursing facility in Sumter County providing skilled nursing services. By letter dated December 13, 1990, Petitioner requested an interim rate increase. The letter covers the 12-month period commencing October 1, 1990, which is the effective date of the federal Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA). Petitioner requested an interim rate hike of $2.53 per patient day based on a total increase in expenses, due largely to OBRA requirements, of $161,815.32. By letter dated February 15, 1991, Respondent denied the request. The letter fails to address $114,415.32 in anticipated costs, mostly in the areas of nursing and new- resident assessment. These items were inadvertently omitted from Petitioner's December 13 letter. The February 15 response divides projected expenses into two categories: patient care costs and operating costs. The letter treats as patient care costs projected expenditures for food and employee wages to expand evening programs for residents, added consultant expenses for pharmaceutical advice, added consultant expenses for assistance with overall OBRA compliance and preparation for the state survey, new costs due to quality assurance committee meetings with department heads and outside consultants, and additional wages resulting from an increase in the federal minimum-wage standard. The February 15 letter treats as operating costs projected expenditures for the disposal of hazardous waste and maintenance requested by WeCare's resident council. Florida's Hedicaid Reimbursement Plan The Florida Title XIX Long-Term Care Reimbursement Plan , Version III, dated December 17, 1990 (Plan) 2/ is intended to provide reimbursement for reasonable costs incurred by economically and efficiently operated facilities. The Medicaid program pays a single per diem rate for all levels of nursing care. After a facility's first year of operation, a cost- settling process results in a final cost report, which serves as a baseline for the following years. Following the first year's operation, facilities file cost reports annually. In the absence of a special rate freeze, Respondent adjusts a facility's reimbursement rate twice annually based upon the factors discussed below. There are four components of a facility's total per diem rate for Medicaid patients. These cost components make up the total Medicaid patient per diem cost. The return on equity component 3/ is not involved in this case. The property cost component plays a minor role in this case. In a facility such as WeCare, which is owned rather than leased, property costs include depreciation, mortgage interest, equipment rent, ad valorem taxes, and property insurance. The two key reimbursement components in this case are "operating costs" and "patient care costs." The Plan defines these terms as follows: Patient care costs include those costs directly attributable to nursing services, dietary costs, activity costs, social service costs, and all medically ordered therapies. All other costs, exclusive of property cost and return on equity or use allowance costs are considered operating costs. Plan, pages 40-41. In general, the reimbursement program sets rates prospectively followed by a cost-settling process. In other words, a rate is set for the coming period in the manner described below. At the end of the period, a cost-settlement takes place. There are limited exceptions to the prospective orientation of the rate-setting process: the prospectively determined individual nursing home's rate will be adjusted. retroactively to the effective date of the affected rate under the following circumstances: an error was made by [Respondent] in the calculation of the provider's rate. A provider submits an amended cost report used to determine the rate in effect. An adjustment due to the submission of an amended cost report shall not be granted unless the increase in documented costs shall cause a change of 1 percent in the reimbursement rate. The amended cost report shall be filed by the filing date of the subsequent cost report or the date of the first field audit exit conference for the period being amended or the date a desk audit letter is received by the provider for the period being amended, whichever is earlier. Further desk or on-site audits of cost reports disclose a change in allowable costs in those reports. Plan, pages 31-33. In this case, Petitioner seeks "interim changes in [its] component reimbursement rates, other than through the routine semi-annual rate setting process." Plan, page 33. Like normal reimbursement rates, interim rates are set prospectively and then cost-settled at the end of the interim rate period. Plan, page 2. Accounting for property costs under the Fair Rental Value System (FRVS), Petitioner is ineligible for an interim change in Medicaid reimbursement rate under the Plan. Petitioner's sole means to obtain rate relief for property costs is to file for a rate adjustment as of January 1 and July 1 of any year. Plan, page 33-34. On January 1 and July 1, Petitioner may obtain an adjustment to the FRVS rate if "expenditures for capital additions and improvements totalling, $100 per licensed bed accrue in the 6-month periods ending April 15 or October 15 prior to rate semesters beginning July 1 and January 1, respectively." Plan, page 72. Because Petitioner has 180 beds, the threshold for the FRVS property cost adjustment is thus $18,000. The Plan does not require that the acquired property for which the rate adjustment is sought be purchased to comply with a new legal requirement. The reimbursement process is quite different for patient care and operating costs. Addressing interim rate hikes for these components of the reimbursement rate, the Plan provides: Interim rate changes reflecting increased costs occurring as a result of patient care or operating changes shall be considered only if such changes were made to comply with existing State or Federal rules, laws, or standards, and if the change in cost to the provider is at least $5000 and would cause a change of 1 percent or more in the providers current total per diem rate. If new State or Federal laws, rules, regulations, licensure and certification requirements, or new interpretations of existing laws, rules, regulations, or licensure and certification requirements require providers to make changes that result in increased or decreased patient care, operating, or capital costs, requests for component interim rates shall be considered for each provider based on the budget submitted by the provider. All providers' budgets submitted shall be reviewed by [Respondent] and shall be the basis for establishing reasonable cost parameters. In cases where new State or Federal requirements are imposed that affect all providers, appropriate adjustments s1hall be made to the class ceilings to account for changes in costs caused by new requirements effective as of the date of the new requirements or implementation of the new requirements, whichever is later. Interim rate requests resulting from 1. [devoted to property component interim rate hikes sought by non-FRVS providers] and 2. above must be submitted within 60 days after the costs are incurred, and shall be accompanied by a 12-month budget which reflects changes in services and costs. . . . An interim reimbursement rate, if approved, shall be established for estimated additional costs retroactive to the time of the change in services or the time the costs are incurred, but not to exceed 60 days before the date [Respondent] receives the interim rate request. The interim per diem rate shall reflect only the estimated additional costs, and the total reimbursement rate paid to the provider shall be the sum of the previously established prospective rates plus the interim rate. . . Interim Rate Settlement. Overpayment as a result of the difference between the approved budgeted interim rate and actual costs of the budgeted item shall be refunded to [Respondent]. Underpayment as a result of the difference between the budgeted interim rate and actual costs shall be paid to the provider. Interim rates shall not be granted for fiscal periods that have ended. The determination of interim reimbursement rates is best illustrated by following the Plan through the typical rate-calculation process. A facility must first "calculate per diems for each of these four cost components [patient care, operating, property, and return on equity] by dividing the components' costs by the total number of Medicaid patient days from the latest cost report." Plan, page 41. The facility adjusts its "operating and patient care per diem costs that resulted from [the calculation set forth in the preceding paragraph] for the effects of inflation . Plan, page 41. This is done by "multiplying both of these per diem costs" by the rate of increase of the Florida Nursing Home Cost Inflation Index at the midpoint of the cost reporting period. Plan, page 41. This step takes the facility's per diem rates then in effect for the patient care cost and operating cost components and increases them by the applicable inflation rate. The facility calculates the adjustment for a low occupancy factor. In all cases, the operating, patient care, and return on equity components are calculated separately. Otherwise, this step is irrelevant to the present case. Plan, pages 41 et seq. The next step is to calculate the statewide ceilings for, among other components,, the patient care cost and operating cost. These ceilings are determined separately, as evidenced by the use of different standard deviations in the calculation of the respective ceilings. Plan, page 47. These ceilings are otherwise irrelevant to the present cases The Plan next requires the facility to "[e] stablish the target reimbursement for operating and patient care cost per diems for each provided." The target per diems limit the respective per diem rates of these two components even if the applicable ceilings and inflation adjustments otherwise warrant a rate increase. In other words, a facility's per diem rate for patient care may be below the ceiling and warrant an increase for inflation; however, the increased rate may not exceed the target rate. The "target" more frequently than the "ceiling" serves to limit rate increases for the operating cost per diem rate and patient care cost per diem rate. For each of the two per diem rates, the target limits the increase of the provider's then-current per diem rate, without regard to incentives, to the rate of increase of the Florida Nursing Home Cost Inflation Index multiplied by 1.786. Plan, pages 48 -49. The Plan requires each facility to calculate separately its operating cost per diem and patient care cost per diem. For each component, the Plan "requires that the facility receive the lowest of the rates--then-current plus inflation, target, or ceiling. Plan, pages 49-50. Thus, for instance, the patient care component could be limited by its target but the operating component could receive a full inflation increase. The importance of interim rate changes is that they increase the reimbursement rate against which the targets are calculated for operating and patient care cost per diem rates. In this manner, the interim rate hike raises the applicable targets. As noted above, if the new federal or state requirements affect all providers, the ceilings can also be raised, although this issue has not been addressed in this case. Cost Reports Three of Petitioner's cost reports were admitted into evidence. Two cover one-year periods ending June 30, 1989, and June 30, 1990. One covers a six-month period ending December 31, 1990. The most recent cost report includes a request by Petitioner to obtain a FRVS property cost rate adjustment for computer and software hardware purchased in the last six months of 1990. The report classifies these items as property for cost reimbursement purposes. The cost report is relevant as evidence of the proper classification of computer hardware and software and the proper means by which an FRVS provider may obtain an adjustment for additional property costs. 4/ The parties disagree as to which of the two earlier cost reports should be used to supply the threshold for Petitioner's request for an interim rate hike with respect to operating and patient care costs. Respondent insists that the source of Petitioner's "current total per diem rate," against which the 1% threshold is applied to determine eligibility for the interim rate hike, is the cost report for the year ending June 30, 1989. However, on or about October 30, 1990, Petitioner filed a cost report for the year ending June 30, 1990 (1990 cost report). This was about six weeks before applying for an interim change in the reimbursement rate. Respondent ignores the later cost report because it was filed late. However, there is no authority prohibiting the use of the more current cost report simply because it is filed late, at least when, as here, it is filed before the interim rate request is filed. 5/ For calculating the thresholds in this case, there is no difference in which cost report is used. Both parties used $38,000 as the threshold, which is sufficiently accurate under the facts of this case. The possible thresholds are $36,071 under the 1990 cost report 6/, which is hereby adopted, and $34,350 under the cost report for the prior year. 7/ New Cost Items Although the original request for an interim rate hike identifies more than $160,000 of new expenses necessitated by changes in the law, Petitioner refined its earlier estimate based on actual experience prior to the hearing. The new figure is $126,598.32, as identified at the hearing and in Petitioner Exhibit 42. 8/ Petitioner claims that changes in the law necessitated the following costs, which are stated, where applicable, as increases in expenses preexisting changes in the relevant law: PATIENT CARE PLANNING/RESTRAINT FREE ENVIRONMENT--SALARY NURSING 30,027.52 NURSING ASSISTANTS 19,762.73 DIETARY 4,073.23 TOTAL WAGES 53,863.48 TOTAL BENEFITS 10,234.06 TOTAL WAGES AND BENEFITS 64,097.54 ADMINISTRATIVE NURSING WARD CLERK 3,500.00 DATA ENTRY 513.00 IN-SERVICE EDUCATION 6,403.21 TOTAL WAGES 10,416.21 TOTAL BENEFITS 1,979.08 TOTAL WAGES AND BENEFITS 12,395.29 CONSULTANTS TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH OBRA PHARMACY 440.00 SOCIAL SERVICE 250.00 DIETARY 1,093.75 TOTAL 1,783.75 AUTOMATION OF MDS AND RESIDENT TRUST FUND ACCOUNTING OUTSIDE DATA PROCESSING SERVICE 3,033.75 COMPUTER SOFTWARE 2,495.00 COMPUTER HARDWARE 1,540.00 TOTAL 7,068.75 MISCELLANEOUS OBRA MATTERS PRINT RESIDENTS' RIGHTS MATERIALS 401.05 B. GERIATRICS SURVEY AND TRAINING 500.00 C. ABUSE REGISTRY 285.00 D. WAGE AND HOUR FOR MAINTENANCE 11,178.00 E. MAINTENANCE BENEFITS 2,123.81 TOTAL 14,487.86 VI. OTHER REGULATORY CHANGES A. MINIMUM WAGE 13,827.84 B. MINIMUM WAGE BENEFITS 2,627.29 C. CHANGES IN OBRA/NFPA 9/ STANDARD 7,412.99 D. REMOVAL OF INFECTIOUS WASTES 2897.01 10/ TOTAL 26,765.13 GRAND TOTAL $126,598.32 Classification of New Cost Items Cost items IV.B, IV.C, and VI.C. are property costs representing $2495 and $1540 for computer software and hardware and $7412.99 for privacy curtains around residents' beds. Petitioner has failed to prove that these items, whose costs appear suitable for depreciation or cost-recovery, constitute patient care costs or operating costs. As property costs, Cost Items IV.B, IV.C, and VI.C are ineligible for an interim rate adjustment. Even if Petitioner had requested a FRVS property cost adjustment and thus raised the issue in this case, these items total only $11,447.99, which is below the $18,000 threshold for FRVS property cost rate adjustments. Because of the failure of these items to satisfy the threshold, as well as the fact that changing legal requirements are irrelevant to an adjustment in the property cost reimbursement rate, the remainder of the recommended order does not address Cost Items IV.B, IV.C, and VI.C. Cost Item VI.D, which is $2897.01 for infectious- waste removal, is an operating cost that is not a patient care cost. Cost Items VI.A and B, which are for $16,455.13 in wages and benefits due to an increase in the minimum-wage law, are operating costs that are partly patient care costs. Based partly on the testimony of Petitioner's accountant, one-half of the minimum wage and benefits, such as in the laundry and housekeeping departments, is an operating cost that is not a patient care cost. The remainder of the minimum wage and benefits is a patient care cost. Thus, $8227.57 of Cost Items VI.A and B is an operating cost that is not a patient care cost, and $8227.56 of Cost Items VI.A and B is a patient care cost. Cost Items V.D and E, which are for $13,301.81 in maintenance wages and benefits, are also operating costs that are partly patient care costs. These items represent an incremental increase over typical maintenance costs previously incurred by the facility. Petitioner has proved that two-thirds of the additional maintenance costs are patient care costs expended to address better the needs of the residents, such as by providing immediate repairs to wheelchairs or making their rooms more homelike by, for example, hanging bulletin boards in the rooms, installing personal television sets, and installing locks on cabinet drawers. Thus, $8867.88 of Cost Items V.D and E are patient care costs. The evidence as to the remaining $4433.93 of Cost Items V.D and E is sufficient to establish these expenditures as operating costs, but insufficiently descriptive to prove that these maintenance expenses are properly classified as patient care costs. Cost Item VI.D, one-half of Cost Items VI.A and B, and one-third of Cost Items V.D and E total $15,558.51 in operating costs that are not patient care costs. This is below the $34,350 threshold required for an interim rate hike for operating costs. Due to the possibility that Respondent may reject the Conclusion of Law that the patient care costs and operating costs must separately satisfy the threshold, the remainder of the recommended order discusses Cost Item VI.D. Description of Cost Items Background Prior to making any changes at the WeCare nursing facility following the effective date of OBRA, Petitioner was in full compliance with all applicable law and had earned and maintained a superior rating. None of the cost items was expended to eliminate pre-OBRA substandard conditions. In addition, patient needs were generally unchanged during the year preceding the effective date of OBRA and the following year. In other words, there were no significant changes in patient mix with respect to activity, levels of admissions and discharges, or other matters affecting costs. The largest portion of Petitioner's claim is Cost Item I, which comprises $64,097.54 in wages and benefits for nurses, nurse assistants, and dietary services. The nursing item is for 1.43 fulltime equivalents, the nursing assistant item is for 1.9 fulltime equivalents, and the dietary item is for 0.35 fulltime equivalents. Following the implementation of OBRA, WeCare changed its resident assessment forms. Previously, the facility had used primarily a standard admission record and nursing history and assessment to assess initially the new resident. These forms required about one-half hour per patient to complete. The new standardized assessment form has become known as the Minimum Data Set (MDS). The 11-page MDS is a highly sophisticated instrument that requires comprehensive data collection far more elaborate than that previously undertaken. These data must be obtained from the resident and, in many cases, other sources. The MDS also contains an intricate analytic section. In general, the MDS standardizes the resident- assessment process by which nursing staff collect and analyze data, form conclusions, and recommend interventions. The MDS is also a major step toward assembling a national database on the burgeoning population of nursing-facility residents. Even without regard to the analytic features of the MDS, the old resident assessment forms are different by kind, not degree, from the MDS. The new form requires that the facility's personnel invest considerably greater time and effort assessing each resident's functional abilities. The MDS elicits a richly detailed description of an individual and his needs and abilities, and many questions in the MDS require careful and thoughtful observation of the resident. For instance, the first page of the MDS requires important information concerning the resident's legal status. The array of options include legal guardian, durable power of attorney/health care proxy, health care surrogate, and family member. The same page also demands that the facility personnel determine if the resident has effectuated a living will, do-not- resuscitate code, organ donation, feeding or medication restriction, or autopsy request. Encouraging the resident's involvement with the outside community, the first page concludes by asking if the resident is registered to vote. The second page deals with cognitive patterns. This section also places demands on facility personnel considerably greater than those required by the old resident assessment forms. Personnel must check the resident's short- term and long-term memory and his ability to recall the current season, location of his own room, faces of staff, and his presence in a nursing facility. Personnel must assess the resident's ability to make decisions; the four options range from independent to severely impaired. Personnel must also assess the resident's tendency toward disordered thinking or delirium with five optional specific descriptions, such as "cognitive ability varies over course of day." Twenty-five options are contained in the section of the MDS covering the resident's ability to communicate. These data range from whether he wears a hearing aid or uses another receptive communicative technique such as lip reading to very detailed descriptions of the extent to which he can make himself understood and, in a separate set of questions, understand others. The level of detail is intense throughout the MDS. Other areas covered include physical functioning and structural problems (with 12 options to describe the resident's body control problems ranging from loss of balance to loss of limbs); continence; psychosocial wellbeing (including his level of identification with past roles and life status); mood and behavior patterns; activity pursuit patterns; disease diagnoses (32 options); health conditions (22 options); oral/nutritional status; skin condition; medication,' use; and special treatment and procedures. The analytic aspect of the MDS is contained in the Resident Assessment Protocol (RAP). The RAP references by letter and number nearly all of the answers," supplied on the MDS. The RAP legend supplies a matrix by which these answers are analyzed to determine if they require (trigger) an identified intervention. The RAP even quantifies the extent to which an intervention is likely necessary. These triggers are very detailed and quantify a decision-making process that gas subjective and necessarily more variable prior to the introduction of the MDS. The MDS takes at least one hour more to complete per resident than did the old forms. Petitioner's personnel have tried to avoid duplication. However, Respondent cited Petitioner for a deficiency involving their elimination of one of the pre- OBRA forms in WeCare's first audit following implementation of OBRA. Moreover, quarterly updates of the MDS take additional time, although only selected information is required at such times. Recognizing the increased importance of the initial resident assessment, Petitioner assigned the primary responsibility for the task to the three nurses who serve as coordinators of the three 60-bed units at WeCare. While working on the MDS forms, the unit coordinators' responsibilities are assumed by licensed nurses. The additional work presented by the MDS over the old form requires 1.43 licensed nurse fulltime equivalents. The cost of this is reflected in Cost Item I.A, which is $30,027.52, exclusive of benefits. Benefits were calculated in Petitioner Exhibit 8 at 19% of wages, so the benefits attributable to Cost Item I.A equal $5705.23. Petitioner has failed to establish that the nursing assistants, reflected as cost Item I.B, were required by to complete the new MDS form or any-other new OBRA requirement. The substance of Petitioner's evidence in this regard amounts to proving that: a) no other variables (e.g., change in patient mix or number) could account for the increased hours and b) nursing assistant hours increased after OBRA became effective. Without specific proof of the activities performed by the nursing assistants, it is impossible to determine if their efforts were necessitated by OBRA, such as in the MDS-assessment process, or were merely associated with nonrecurring activities by which facilities such as WeCare digested OBRA and tried to determine the extent to which they had to change prior practices. It is doubtful that Petitioner could have established the requisite relationship between the nursing assistant work and the MDS duties. Cost Item I.A is a reasonable allowance for the new work required of nurses by the MDS forms. Exclusive of benefits, $30,027.52 represents 1.43 fulltime nursing equivalents or about 2980 hours annually of nursing service. There is no evidence in the record linking the expenditure of additional nursing hours to the preparation of the MDS forms, even after consideration of the more limited quarterly reassessments. Petitioner likewise failed to establish that any new OBRA requirement, including the preparation of the MDS, was associated with the dietary cost of $4073.23, which is Cost Item I.C. Petitioner proved that Cost Items II.A and B, totalling $4013 of wages and $762.47 of benefits, were associated with the processing of the data collected in the process of preparing the MDS. The data-processing duties of these individuals are a necessary part of processing the RAPs and triggers in the MDS and determining if an intervention is indicated or required. The ward clerk and data entry person relieved the Director of Nursing of data-processing duties that, unlike the data-collection part of the MDS, do not require nursing expertise to perform. The processing of the RAPs and triggers, although important and time-consuming, is largely mechanical task. Petitioner proved that Cost Item IV.A, which is $3033.75 for outside data processing services, was also associated with the processing of the data collected in the process of preparing the MDS. These services ran from October, 1990, through April, 1991, when the ward clerk and data entry person assumed these duties. The outside data processing, as well as the ward clerk and data entry person, also included trust fund and asset accounting on behalf of residents. Petitioner failed to establish that the services of the in-service coordinator, as reflected in Cost Item II.C, were required by OBRA. Prior to OBRA, the Director of Nursing performed nearly all of the in-service activities. When OBRA was implemented, the Director of Nursing, could not perform these tasks because she was, at first, intensely involved with all aspects of ensuring that WeCare attained or maintained compliance with the new law. A nursing facility and its personnel must remain familiar with federal and state laws governing nursing facilities and their professions. However, nothing in OBRA required new levels of in-service education of nursing facility staff. By contrast, Petitioner proved that the promotion of residents' rights and welfare necessitated Cost Item V.B, which is $500 for a geriatrics survey and training. Petitioner showed that the services of Myra Carpenter, which are Cost Item V.B, were narrowly focused to assist Petitioner's personnel in promoting the rights and welfare of geriatric residents. Cost Items I.A and V.B are sufficient to allow for whatever training was necessary of the unit coordinators in charge of completing the MDS forms and general facility personnel as to the promotion of the rights of residents, especially geriatric residents. Petitioner failed to prove that Cost Items III.A, and C, which are $440 for pharmacy and $1093.7.5 for dietary consultants, were associated with army new OBRA requirement. As discussed in the Conclusions of Law, prior state requirements in these areas were rigorous. For the same reason, Petitioner failed to prove that OBRA necessitated Cost Item V.A, which is $401.05 for printing residents' rights manuals. Petitioner proved that the promotion of residents' rights and welfare was directly responsible for Cost Item III.B, which is $250 for a social service consultant. He increased his hours after OBRA to meet the demands of the residents and the residents' council for operational and structural changes at WeCare. Petitioner proved that the promotion of residents' rights and welfare was also associated with the two-thirds of Cost Items V.D and E previously determined to constitute patient care costs. 11/ The portion of these maintenance wages and benefits assigned to patient care costs constitute part of Petitioner's effort to promote the rights and welfare of the residents. Many of WeCare's residents are young persons who, often afflicted with multiple sclerosis, still possess considerable mental acuity. Adjustment to the environment of a nursing facility can be difficult for such persons, as well as for other residents. Empowering the residents to demand and obtain changes in their living environment is one useful means of promoting the residents' rights and, especially, welfare. The evidence was unconvincing that all of Cost Items V.D and E were devoted to the type of patient-care maintenance described in the preceding paragraph. Petitioner thus failed to establish the nature of the remaining one-third of Cost Items V.D and E. In the absence of proof to the contrary, these expenditures are characterized merely as operating expenses unassociated with any aspect of OBRA. Respondent has emphasized OBRA's promotion of residents' rights and welfare in seminars devoted to OBRA and post-OBRA facility surveys. As to the latter, the surveys of WeCare prior to OBRA typically took a couple of hours. Following OBRA, the surveys take four hours with much of the additional time devoted to resident interviews to ensure that the facility is promoting residents' rights and, especially, welfare. The OBRA mandates, as properly construed by Respondent, increasingly emphasize results or outcome's, not merely processes or procedures. Although OBRA largely leaves to the nursing facility the decision of how specifically to promote residents' rights and welfare, the new requirements of OBRA, as discussed in the Conclusions of Law, remain clear, ambitious, and enforceable. Cost Items III.B, V.B, and two-thirds of V.D and E, although not explicitly dictated by OBRA, were reasonably expended by Petitioner to promote residents' rights and, especially, welfare. Petitioner has proved that Cost Item VC, which is $285 for checking the names of employees on the abuse registry, was associated with a new OBRA requirement. The minimum-wage hike and benefits, which are Cost Item VI.A and B totalling $16,455.13, were mandated by a change in law and exclude any "ripple-effect" in other wages Petitioner proved that one-half of the minimum.-wage hike and benefits or $8227.56, are patient care costs. The remaining $8227.57 of minimum-wage hike and benefits, which obviously were also mandated by law, are operating costs that are not patient care costs. The only other operating cost that is not a patient care cost is Cost Item VI.D, which is $2897.01 for the removal of infectious wastes. Petitioner has proved that the additional costs in connection with the disposal of infectious wastes were associated with a change in state law. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner has proved that $61,672.41 of its expenditures are patient care costs associated with new OBRA requirements and a change in the minimum-wage laws. Petitioner failed to prove that the remaining $37,919.41 of its patient-care costs were associated with any change in law. Petitioner has proved that $11,124.58 of its expenditures are operating costs, other than patient care costs, that were associated with new infectious waste regulations and minimum-wage laws. Petitioner failed to prove that tie remaining $4433.93 of operating costs, which are one-third of the maintenance wages and benefits, were,' associated with any change in law. The remaining $11,447.99 of Petitioner's expenditures are property costs. For the reasons set forth above, the necessity of these costs is irrelevant to this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order determining that Petitioner is entitled to an interim rate adjustment of $0.96 per diem. ENTERED this 20 day of March, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20 day of March, 1992.
Conclusions THIS CAUSE came on for consideration of and final agency action on the Written Report and Recommended Order entered on May 25, 2010, attached hereto as Exhibit A. . Pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes an informal hearing was conducted via written submissions, before Hearing Officer, Donald A. Dowdell. After review of the record, including testimony and admitted exhibits, and being otherwise fully apprised in all material premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the underlined introductory heading to paragraph 42 of the Written Report and Recommended Order is rejected, and the following substituted therefore: The holding in the case of One Beacon Insurance v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 958 So.2d 1127 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) does not dictate the result in this case, in part, because it dealt with reimbursements for services rendered by ambulatory surgical centers rather than, as here, hospital outpatient care. At the time One Beacon was decided, the two statutory sections governing reimbursements for hospital outpatient surgical services and ambulatory surgical centers treated the respective Filed September 29, 2010 10:08 AM Division of Administrative Hearings. reimbursements differently, so that different results would appropriately be obtained from the application of those statutory provisions. (The One Beacon Court held that by deleting all reference to individual providers, the Legislature intended to base an ambulatory surgical center's reimbursement upon the usual and customary charges for that geographic location.) Hence, the holding in One Beacon could logically be limited to ambulatory surgical center reimbursements on that basis. However, in the interim, the statutory section governing hospital outpatient care has been amended and no longer references an individual hospital’s fees by referencing the individual hospital or utilizing the terms “each” or ‘their’. Section 440.13(12), Fla. Stat. presently provides that: . “All compensable charges for hospital outpatient care shall be reimbursed at 75 percent of usual and customary charges, except as otherwise provided by this subsection.” Thus, the rationale underlying the One Beacon holding would now appear to be applicable to hospital outpatient care. However, as the Hearing Officer correctly states in his introduction to Paragraph 39, “Unless and until the Department adopts a rule -setting forth a different method for determining hospital reimbursement, it must act in accordance with its currently adopted rule”. See Gessier v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 627 So.2d 501 (Fla. 4" DCA 1993); University Community Hospital v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 610 So.2d 1432 (Fla. 1# DCA 1991). Moreover, it is well established that until and unless an agency rule is successfully challenged in a Section 120.56 proceeding, the rule is presumptively valid and must be given legal effect by the agency. Board of Optometry v. Florida Society of Ophthalmology, 532 So.2d 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), rev. den. 542 So.2d 1333. In that regard, it should be noted that the Department has, indeed, initiated rule-making proceedings to modify the current rule (and the attendant manual), to utilize a methodology for reimbursing hospital outpatient care that is not based upon a hospital's individual charges. Although the Hearing Officer's recommendation remains unchanged, the Department is rejecting paragraphs 16, 32, the introductory heading to paragraph 42, and 48 of the Recommended Order to the extent, if any, these paragraphs were intended to preclude an application of the rationale of the One Beacon case to the present statute governing hospital outpatient care. This substitution more clearly and correctly states the current law governing reimbursement for hospital outpatient care, and is as or more reasonable than the paragraphs it replaces. ITIs HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the Recommendation made by the Hearing Officer is adopted by the Department, and that the Department's Determination requiring Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company to pay additional reimbursements of $13,234.53 to Southwest Florida Regional Medical Center is hereby affirmed. DONE and ORDERED this obey of August, 2010. Deputy Chief Financial Officer
