The Issue The issue is whether, as provided by the relevant statutes, Respondents owe Petitioner money for the sale of agricultural products.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Petitioner, which is located in Homestead, Florida, has been a producer of agricultural products. At all material times, Respondent Small Indian Corporation (Respondent) has been a dealer in agricultural products. Respondent Cumberland Casualty and Surety Company, as surety (Surety), issued a bond to Respondent, as principal, in the amount of $27,600 for the period, November 26, 1999, through November 25, 2000. Surety also issued a bond to Respondent in the same amount for the following bond year. During the periods covered by this case, Petitioner sold to Respondent numerous avocados, limes, and papayas. The shipments were timely and conformed in quality and quantity to the orders. Petitioner timely issued invoices to Respondent for the sales of these agricultural products, but Respondent never paid any portion of these invoices. On May 25, 2001, Petitioner filed a complaint with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department) for the period from November 22, 2000, through February 5, 2001. The Department required Petitioner to file separate complaints by bond year. Thus, Petitioner filed an amended complaint for $1190 for the bond year ending November 25, 2000, and an amended complaint for $54,591.25 for the bond year ending November 25, 2001. The date of the lone invoice within the bond year ending November 25, 2000, was November 22, 2000. The amended complaint concerning the bond year ending November 25, 2000, commenced DOAH Case No. 01-3320, and the amended complaint concerning the bond year ending November 25, 2001, commenced DOAH Case No. 01-3321. The allegations as to dates and amounts of invoices are all correct.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order dismissing the amended complaint in DOAH Case No. 01-3320 and finding Respondent liable to Petitioner in DOAH Case No. 01-3321 for the sum of $54,591.25. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Charles H. Bronson Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda D. Hyatt Bureau Chief Bureau of License and Bond Department of Agriculture 514 East Tennessee Street India Building Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Carolann Swanson General Counsel Brooks Tropical, Inc. Post Office Box 900160 Homestead, Florida 33090 W. Sam Holland Hinshaw and Culbertson 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Suite 800 First Union Financial Center Miami, Florida 33131 Deborah A. Meek Cumberland Casualty and Surety Company 4311 West Waters Avenue, Suite 401 Tampa, Florida 33614
The Issue Should the Department of Insurance (now known as the Department of Financial Services, Office of Insurance Regulation) (Department) approve three insurance endorsement forms that State Farm Florida Insurance Company (State Farm) filed on November 15, 2001?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: State Farm is a domestic insurance company that the Department has licensed to transact property and casualty insurance in the State of Florida. The Department is the state agency charged with the duty to regulate insurers doing business in the State of Florida. State Farm offers five types of homeowners' policies that have been approved for use in Florida, an FP-7921 (HO1), FP-7923 (HO3), FP-7924 (HO4), FP-7925 ( HO5-Extra), and FP-2926 (HO6). The HO1 is a "named perils" policy and provides coverage only for those perils specifically named in the policy. This policy is not offered in other states, and in Florida accounts for less than one percent of all of all policies in force. The HO3, HO5, and HO6 policies are known as "open perils" policies providing coverage for all risks unless specifically excluded by the policy. Although similar to HO3, the HO5 policy provides somewhat broader coverage with respect to settlement provisions. The HO6 policy is specifically geared toward condominium owners and the HO4 policy is the policy form that applies to renters. Of all the policies offered in Florida, the HO3 is the most widely used policy form and will be quoted from and used as the exemplar in this Recommended Order. The HO3 policy contains introductory provisions entitled "Declarations" and "Definitions," and is then divided into two coverage sections, Sections I and II. Section I refers to property coverage and with Section II referring to liability coverage. Section I is divided into a number of subcategories including the following: Coverage A (Dwelling), Coverage B (Personal Property), Section C (Loss of Use), Additional Coverage, Losses Insured, Losses Not Insured, and Conditions. Following the Section II provisions there are additional sections entitled "Section I and II-Conditions" and a section entitled "Optional Provisions." The HO3 policy provides coverage under Coverage A (Dwelling) for all risks of loss unless it is a "loss not insured." As stated in the policy: "We insure for accidental direct physical loss to the property described in Coverage A, except as provided in SECTION I - LOSSES NOT INSURED." (Emphasis in the original.) However, coverage for personal property (Coverage B) does not provide such "open perils" coverage. Rather, it provides coverage only for 16 named perils, contains a number of limitations on personal property that it does cover, and reflects a number of personal property items that it does not cover. All of State Farm's homeowners' policies currently provide some limited coverage relating to mold. Although the policies exclude mold as a covered peril, they provide some limited coverage for mold-related losses resulting from covered perils, such as a covered water loss that causes mold-related damage. Historically, there have been exclusions in property insurance for ordinance of law, earth movement, flood, war, the neglect of the insured, and nuclear hazard. Mold that resulted from a covered peril has historically not been excluded. On November 15, 2001, State Farm filed three proposed endorsement forms (Fungus (Including Mold) Exclusion Endorsement): (1) FE-5397 for use with HO1 policies; (2) FE- 5398, for use with HO3, HO5, and HO6 policies; and (3) FE-5399 for use with HO4 policies. The homeowners' policies, which the endorsements were to apply, had been previously approved by, and were on file with the Department, in accordance with Section 627.410, Florida Statutes. The goal of the endorsements was to eliminate mold coverage from State Farm's existing homeowners policies in Florida. State Farm's current rates do not include the cost of providing the mold coverage that the endorsements seek to exclude. However, there is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that State Farm would need to substantially raise its rates to include those costs. Before filing the mold-exclusion endorsements, State Farm entered into discussions with the Department about giving policyholders the choice of buying back some of the to-be- excluded mold coverage through buy-back endorsements (buy- backs). State Farm filed its buy-backs in June 2002, after failing to work out a solution with the Department that would have allowed for their approval. Although the Department disapproved the buy-backs in December 2002, State Farm has committed itself to provide policyholders with the optional buy-backs, if the exclusions are approved. If the exclusion endorsements are approved along with the buy-back provisions, any cost increase would be restricted to those policyholders who choose to purchase mold coverage through a buy-back. State Farm's filings of mold-exclusion endorsements are consistent with a nationwide effort by State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, an affiliate of State Farm to eliminate mold coverage in homeowners policies. In Florida, State Farm's endorsements accomplish the complete elimination of mold coverage chiefly through the addition of a new exclusion for fungus, including mold, within "SECTION I - LOSSES NOT INSURED." (Emphasis in the original.) The endorsements, when coupled with the underlying policy, state in relevant part as follows: 2. We do not insure under any coverage for any loss which would not have occurred in the absence of one or more of the following excluded events. We do not insure for such loss regardless of: (a) the cause of the excluded event; or (b) other causes of the loss; or (c) whether other causes acted concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded event to produce the loss; or (d) whether the event occurs suddenly or gradually, involves isolated or widespread damage, arises from natural or external forces, or occurs as result of any combination of these: * * * g. Fungus. (Emphasis in the original.) (The text of the endorsement is underlined.) The endorsements delete all references to the term mold found in SECTION 1 - LOSSES INSURED. (Emphasis in the original.) The endorsements define fungus as follows: "fungus" means any type or form of fungus, including mold, mildew, mycotoxins, spores, scents or byproducts produced or released by fungi. (Emphasis furnished.) This total exclusion of mold coverage, using language clearly encompassing all manner of causation and occurrence, replaces the mold exclusions in the existing policies that do not use such broad language. The difference between the post- and pre-endorsement policies can be seen from comparing the above-quoted endorsement as incorporated into HO3 policy on the one hand, with the mold exclusions as they currently exist in the HO3 policy on the other hand. While the endorsements totally exclude coverage for fungus (mold), and deny payment for mold damage historically provided to insureds, the endorsements are not ambiguous, notwithstanding the testimony offered by the Department to the contrary, which lacks credibility. The endorsements do not add coverage. Instead, the endorsements eliminate coverage for mold that currently exists. However, this fact alone does not render the endorsements inconsistent, misleading, or deceptive when the endorsements are read in their entirety along with the remaining provisions of the policies. State Farm's endorsements were initially deemed approved pursuant to Section 627.410, Florida Statutes, which provides that an endorsement filed with the Department is deemed approved if it is not approved or disapproved within 30 days, or 45 days if there has been an extension, of its filing.. By letter dated June 28, 2002, the Department withdrew its deemed approval of the three endorsements and notified State Farm of its basis for disapproval. The Department's original disapproval letter cites three bases for disapproval. The Department asserts that State Farm's endorsements: (1) contain ambiguities in violation of Section 627.411(1)(b), Florida Statutes; (2) deceptively affect the risk purported to be assumed in the general coverage of the contract, also in violation of Section 627.411(1)(b), Florida Statutes; and (3) deny policyholders the right to obtain "comprehensive coverage" as that term is used in Section 626.9641(1)(b), Florida Statutes, which is part of the policyholders' bill of rights. On December 4, 2002, the Department moved for leave to amend its original disapproval letter. The motion was granted. The Department's amended disapproval letter, which the Department back-dated to June 28, 2002, reiterates the previously alleged bases for disapproval and cites two additional bases for disapproval: (1) the alleged violation of Section 626.9641(1)(b), Florida Statutes, itself constitutes a violation of Section 627.411(1)(a), Florida Statutes; and (2) the endorsements, because they exclude coverage that "through custom and usage has become a standard or uniform provision" in Florida, violate Section 627.412(2), Florida Statutes. There is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that the provision for mold coverage has, through custom and usage, become a standard or uniform provision. Likewise, there is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that there is a "natural association between mold and water." In the fall of 2001, the Department began receiving a large influx of filings seeking to exclude or severely limit coverage for mold. Including State Farm's filing, the Department received between 400 and 450 filings representing between 200 and 250 insurers primarily between October 1, 2001, through the end of 2002. In the face of the inordinate number of filings, the Department sought input from all sectors of the public. The Department met with insurers and other interested persons and held four public forums around the state to determine the impact the filings would have on insurance contracts, the industry, and the market place. In the mean time, the Department routinely sought waivers from the insurers of the statutory review period set forth in Section 627.410(2), Florida Statutes, and additionally requested that insurers withdraw their filings. Insurers were advised by the Department that failure to waive the statutory review period or to withdraw their filings would result in the filing being disapproved. The Department initially approved the endorsements to limit or exclude mold coverage of three insurers: USAA, Maryland Casualty, and American Strategic. However, the Department withdrew its approval for each of these companies in letters dated September 18, 2002. The Department asserts that it does not have a policy to disapprove filings simply because they discuss mold or seek to limit or exclude coverage for claims involving mold damage. The Department admits that it is required to examine all filings based upon the statutory scheme. However, the Department has not approved a single one of the over 450 filings, regardless of the language or structure of the endorsements. The simple fact is that the Department had a policy from the fall of 2001 through December 16, 2002, imposing a moratorium on the exclusion or limitation of mold coverage. The Department altered that policy on December 17, 2002, when it entered into a settlement with Florida Farm Bureau General Insurance Company (Farm Bureau), wherein Farm Bureau's endorsement was approved allowing a reduction in mold coverage from policy limits to a sub-limit of $10,000.00 per occurrence, $20,000.00 annual aggregate. The Department's previous position that policies offered to Florida's consumers should not be significantly reduced was abandoned at that time. There was insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that the $10,000.00 coverage was a reasonable amount of coverage for the vast majority of claims for mold damage. The endorsements seek to limit or exclude coverage for mold that has existed for decades. There is scant Florida experience to support the need for limitations or exclusions on mold coverage. Even so, the Department cannot disapprove endorsement forms without authority to do so. There is no statutory authority mandating mold coverage to the extent of policy limits or otherwise in order for policyholders to have comprehensive coverage. Beginning September 15, 2001, the Department did not approve a single mold endorsement seeking to exclude or limit coverage for mold as a resulting loss from a covered peril until December 17, 2002, when it approved a filing by Farm Bureau as a part of a settlement of an administrative proceeding in which the parties were awaiting ruling after a final hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order approving the endorsements filed with the Department by State Farm on November 15, 2001. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of June, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Marc Herskovitz, Esquire Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services Office of Insurance Regulation 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Anthony B. Miller, Esquire Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services Office of Insurance Regulation 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 C. Ryan Reetz, Esquire Jim Toplin, Esquire Amie Riggle, Esquire Greenberg Traurig, P.A. 1221 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 Vincent J. Rio, III, Esquire State Farm Florida Insurance Company 315 South Calhoun Street, Suite 344 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue is whether the proposed disqualification of Petitioner’s bid is contrary to the agency's governing statutes, rules, or policies or contrary to the bid solicitation specifications within the meaning of Subsection 120.57(3)(f), Florida Statutes (2007).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a closely held Florida corporation licensed in the state as a general contractor. Mr. Milton “Mitt” Fulmer is the owner, sole director, and only stockholder. Respondent is a state agency. Respondent regularly solicits bids for construction services to build and maintain its facilities. On August 3, 2007, Respondent issued an invitation to bid identified in the record as Bid No. 03-07/08 (the ITB). The ITB solicited bids to construct a new headquarters for the Apalachicola National Estuarine Research Reserve, commonly referred to in the record as ANERR. Four companies responded to the ITB. Petitioner submitted the lowest bid. Intervenor submitted the next lowest bid. Intervenor is a Florida corporation licensed in the state as a general contractor. The ITB required bidders to submit a bid bond in an amount equal to five percent of the amount of the bid, plus alternates. A bid bond is not a performance bond. A bid bond is customarily provided for gratis or a nominal charge, and variations in bid bonds do not result in a competitive advantage among bidders. A bid bond merely insures the successful bidder will enter into the contract and provide whatever payment and performance bonds (performance bond) the ITB requires. The Instructions to Bidders for the ITB required all bonds to be issued by a surety company that “shall have at least the following minimum rating in the latest issue of Best’s Key Rating Guide (Best's): 'A'” (the bond rating requirement). The bond rating requirement was a bid solicitation specification required for a bond to be acceptable to Respondent. Petitioner submitted a bid bond issued by a surety identified in the record as International Fidelity Insurance Company (IFIC). IFIC has Best's rating of "A-." Respondent proposes to reject Petitioner's bid for failure to satisfy the bond rating requirement and to award the bid to Intervenor as the second lowest bidder. The bond rating for the surety company that issued the bid bond for Intervenor is not in evidence. For reasons stated in the Conclusions of Law, Petitioner has the burden of proof. The parties provided the trier of fact with a wealth of evidence during the final hearing. However, judicial decisions discussed in the Conclusions of Law confine the purpose of this proceeding to a review of the proposed disqualification of Petitioner's bid at the time Respondent exercised that agency discretion. This proceeding is not conducted to formulate final agency action that determines which bidder should receive the contract or whether all of the bids should be rejected. The review of proposed agency action is limited to a determination of whether the proposed action violates a statute, rule, or specification. If a violation occurred, the review must then determine whether the violation occurred because Respondent exercised agency discretion that was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, or an abuse of discretion. A preponderance of evidence does not show that the proposed agency action violates a statute, rule, or specification. That finding ends the statutorily authorized inquiry. In the interest of completeness and judicial economy, however, the trier of fact also finds that the exercise of agency discretion that led to the proposed agency action is not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, or an abuse of discretion. It is undisputed that the proposed agency action does not violate a statute or rule. Petitioner implicitly argues that the proposed agency action violates the bond rating requirement in the bid specifications because an "A-" rating is equivalent to an "A" rating. The Best's ratings of surety companies are not equivalent. Before discussing the differences, however, it is important to note that Respondent did not base its proposed rejection of Petitioner's bid on an independent evaluation of the data used to distinguish the two ratings. The failure to conduct an independent evaluation of the differences in Best's ratings criteria was neither clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, nor an abuse of discretion. The differences in Best's ratings criteria are complex and proprietary. Respondent lacks sufficient staff and expertise to evaluate the data underlying the Best's ratings or the quality of surety companies. Respondent relied on its own experience, custom and practice in the surety industry, and advice of counsel. Respondent also took into account the unusual size and complexity of the ANERR project, time constraints, and the added risk aversion to any delay in starting the project. The proposed rejection of Petitioner's bid is consistent with Respondent's past practice. Respondent has consistently required compliance with bond rating requirements for bid bonds in previous projects. In the course of bidding 500 to 600 projects over approximately an eight-year period, only one of the apparent low bidders offered Respondent a bid bond from an "A-" rated surety when an "A" was required by the bid specifications. Respondent disqualified that bid, which was for a project of approximately four million dollars; the only previous project that approaches the $5-$6 million cost of the ANERR project. All other low bidders complied with the specification as written. Respondent reasonably inferred that the surety company for the bid bond would be the same for the performance bond. Respondent's experience with industry practice in the 500 to 600 previous projects suggests the surety company that writes the bid bond will also write the performance bond. It is also customary for a surety company to provide the bid bond for gratis or for a nominal charge because the surety company collects its premium upon writing the subsequent payment and performance bonds. Respondent's experience also shows that contractors must qualify for their surety bonds, and not all contractors succeed in qualifying for surety bonds. Moreover, not all contractors can succeed in procuring surety bonds from an A-rated company. The temporal exigencies between the award of the bid and the provision of a performance bond also supported Respondent's inference that the surety company for the bid bond would be the surety company for the performance bond. The General Conditions of the contract required Petitioner to submit evidence of its ability to provide the requisite performance bond within two working days of being notified of a successful bid. Petitioner had ten days to actually furnish the bond. Establishing a surety is not perfunctory but entails a prequalification process. Petitioner had to supply its bonding agent with information including project history, credit references, reviewed financial statements, personal financials, and details on its assets. Any delay in the ANERR project, in contrast to its previous projects, for reasons of contractor default or otherwise, would expose Respondent to greater risk and greater expense. Respondent reasonably experienced a heightened risk aversion for the ANERR project than the risk aversion Respondent experienced during previous projects. The $5 or $6 million price tag for the ANERR project is about 400 percent greater than all but one previous project in Respondent's experience. Unusual aspects of the project, including its design elements and its environmentally sensitive location, could be irreparably harmed in the event of default or delay. The nature of the project's funding, part of which is a federal construction grant that expires on a date certain and part of which involved taxes paid by Floridians, contributes to the unique qualities of the project that support Respondent's greater risk aversion in connection with the ANERR project. At the time Respondent had to make a decision to reject or accept Petitioner's bid, Respondent believed in good faith a distinction existed between Best's "A" and "A-" ratings. The Best's ratings publication is a summary based on data, much of which is proprietary. It would be pointless for Respondent to "cross examine" a summary before rejecting Petitioner's bid if significant portions of the data underlying the summary are proprietary and unavailable to the cross-examiner. If Respondent were to have sufficient staff and expertise to independently evaluate the data underlying the Best's ratings, if some of the data were not proprietary, and if such an evaluation were the basis for the proposed rejection of Petitioner's bid, the outcome would not alter the proposed rejection of Petitioner's bid. The Best's ratings are based, in relevant part, on Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio, commonly referred to in the record as BCAR. The BCAR score estimates the ability of a surety company to pay claims. The minimum BCAR score for an "A" rating is 145, meaning the value of a surety company's assets exceed its estimated claims by a minimum of 45 percent. The minimum BCAR score for a surety with an "A-" rating is 130, meaning the value of its assets exceed its estimated claims by 35 percent. Although a 15-percent differential may appear small, Best's states the differentials by reference to a range of scores. The actual differential between individual sureties with an "A" rating and an "A-" rating may be as little as one percent or as great as 29 percent. An independent evaluation by Respondent would have revealed a margin of error as large as 29 percent in the standard used to evaluate a surety company's ability to pay claims. If the proposed rejection of Petitioner's bid were based on an independent evaluation of the data underlying the Best's rating summaries, it would have been reasonable for Respondent to reject Petitioner's bid. It would have been reasonable for Respondent to reject a 29-percent margin of error for a surety company in a project that is 400 percent larger than the typical project and for which Respondent reasonably has a greater risk aversion due to the temporal limit on the availability of funds, the complexity of the project, and its environmental sensitivity. Much of the data underlying Best’s published ratings is proprietary information. However, the available evidence shows that Best's adjusts BCAR values based on qualitative factors such as: business plan, management quality, liquidity of assets, liabilities, and other operational aspects of the surety company. A qualitative analysis shows that ratings of "A" and "A-" are not the “functional equivalent” of each other. Petitioner submitted evidence that Best's "bands" surety companies with ratings of "A" and "A-" together in the Best's rating guide. However, the relevant specification in the ITB did not express the bond rating requirement in terms of a band or category. Rather, Respondent requested an "A" or better rating according to Best’s Key Rating Guide. An independent evaluation by Respondent would have provided a reasonable basis for an inference that the surety company for the bid bond and performance bond would be the same company. Petitioner has used IFIC for more than one year. During that time, IFIC has issued all of Petitioner’s bid bonds. IFIC issued Petitioner two payment and performance bonds. Petitioner was unable to identify any other surety company that had issued its payment and performance bonds within the time period during which Petitioner has used IFIC. Petitioner did not ask its insurance broker to obtain a bid bond from a company other than IFIC. When Petitioner sent a bid bond order form to its broker, Petitioner provided information to the broker about the project and the amount of the bid and Respondent’s surety requirements. The Bid Bond Order Form does not indicate the minimum bond rating requirement specified in the ITB. Mr. Fulmer had a conversation with his broker about Respondent’s bid security requirements, but it is unclear whether the relevant specifications were faxed to the broker or whether Mr. Fulmer saw the Bid Bond Order Form before it was provided to the broker. In response to the Bid Bond Order Form, the broker generated a bid bond and sent the bond to Petitioner for signature. At the time Petitioner received the bid bond, Petitioner did not consult Best’s Key Rating Guide to confirm that its surety met the minimum bond rating requirement in the ITB. It is unnecessary to determine whether the bond rating requirement was a material or immaterial requirement. If it were material, Respondent had no discretion to waive it. If it were non-material, within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 60D-5.002(9)(Rule), evidence discussed in previous Findings in this Order shows that the exercise of agency discretion underlying the refusal to waive the bond rating requirement was reasonable and was not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Petitioner's bid protest is not, in substance, a challenge to the bid solicitation specification identified in this Order as the bond rating requirement. If the substance of the bid protest were deemed to be a challenge to a bid specification requirement, the challenge is untimely. On October 30, 2007, Respondent opened the bids, identified Petitioner as the apparent low bidder, consulted Best's for information on the "A-" rating, consulted with counsel, and disqualified Petitioner's bid. Petitioner filed a Notice of Intent to Protest on November 8, 2007, and a Petition to Protest on November 13, 2007. A deemed challenge to the specification for the minimum bond rating requirement was untimely within the meaning of Subsection 120.57(3)(b).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a final order dismissing the protest. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2008.
Findings Of Fact C & W Sales, Inc., was licensed as a dealer in agricultural products under license No. 1367 and was so licensed at all times here relevant. At the time of the incorporation of C & W Sales, Inc., Henry T. Watson was listed as an officer (President) and director of the company. The company was run by Philip A. Roberts, the brother-in-law of Watson. Roberts applied on behalf of C & W Sales, Inc., to FFB for an agriculture bond in the amount of $20,000 for the period 5/19/79 until 5/19/80 (Exhibit 1) . As a condition for issuing this bond FFB required and obtained a general agreement of indemnity from Roberts and Watson and their wives (Exhibit 2) which was executed on 2 May 1979. In addition to agreeing to save Florida Farm Bureau harmless from all claims arising out of the bond paragraph 14 provided: That this indemnity is continuing and will apply to any and all bonds, as provided in the opening paragraph of this Agreement which the Company may have executed or procured the execution of from time to time, and over an indefinite period of years; however, any Indemnitor may by written notice to the Company at its Home Office, Gainesville, Florida disavow his liability as to bond(s) which may be executed by the Company subsequent to fifteen days after receipt by the Company of such notice. Agriculture bond (Exhibit 4) was issued on 5/19/79 for one year and upon expiration on 5/19/80 the bond was renewed for an additional period of one year (Exhibit 5). Subsequent to the expiration of the 1979-80 bond (Exhibit 4) and reissuance of the 1980-81 bond (Exhibit 5) but within the prescribed time for submitting a claim against the agriculture dealer and his bond, John T. Brantley, Jr., filed a claim against C & W Sales in the amount of $8,317.05 for payment owed on a transaction which occurred during the 1979-80 period. When C & W Sales failed to pay or respond to the Commissioner of Agriculture's demands for payment, claim was made on the 1979-80 bond and FFB remitted to the Commissioner of Agriculture a check for the Brantley claim (Exhibit 6). Around February 1980 Watson became disenchanted with Roberts' running of C & W Sales, Inc. and wanted out. He told Roberts to get someone to buy his (Watson) stock and to get his name out of the company. Roberts said he would. Watson never advised FFB that he would no longer be an indemnitor under the bond. During the period covered by the bond year beginning 5/19/80 claims against C & W Sales, Inc., were submitted to the Commissioner of Agriculture by Henry L. Watson in the amount of $32,326.50; Hugh D. Martin in the amount of $1,932.80; Jesse J. Wilson in the amount of $1,490.00; John T. Brantley, Jr., in the amount of $15,024.40; and Philip Dean and Willie Bass in the amount of $4,919.13, for a total of $55,692.83. The Commissioner of Agriculture notified C & W Sales of these claims and advised them of the opportunity to contest the validity of the claims. No response was received from C & W Sales and Roberts appears to have departed the area to parts unknown. An order demanding payment was submitted to C & W Sales and when payment of these claims was not made, FFB, as surety on the bond, was notified by the department of its surety on the bond, was notified by the department of its obligation under the bond and a demand for payment of $20,000 to the department was made. There is no dispute regarding the accuracy or validly of the claims against C & W Sales contained in Finding 7 above. Nor does FFB contest its liability under the agriculture bond it issued for the 1980-81 bond year. However, FFB claimed an equitable setoff for the percentage of the $20,000 that would go to Watson. This setoff is claimed by virtue of Watson's indemnity agreement. By the stipulation the parties have agreed that the FFB is entitled to the pro rata share of the $20,000 to Watson.
The Issue Whether the Respondent is indebted to Petitioner as alleged in the Complaint filed with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services.
Findings Of Fact Robert Sepos is the comptroller for Ben-Bud Growers, Inc. As such Mr. Sepos maintains the company records which document amounts owed to it by others. As to this case, Mr. Sepos presented the invoices and statements due and owing from the Respondent. Based upon the unpaid invoices, Respondent owes Petitioner the sum of $10,471.80. Respondent acknowledged that the sum of $10,471.80 is owed to Petitioner but claimed that such amount was not for the purchase of agricultural products as contemplated by Chapter 604, Florida Statutes. According to Mr. Towell the bulk of the debt owed to Petitioner is for packaging and shipping fees for produce from growers represented by Fantastic Produce. Mr. Towell maintains that packing and shipping fees are not encompassed within Chapter 604, Florida Statutes. Mr. Sepos could not verify what sum, if any, of the total amount claimed was for agricultural products (versus packing or shipping). Based upon the admissions made by Mr. Towell, Respondent owes the Petitioner for agricultural products the sum of $775.00 in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order approving Petitioner's claim in the amount of $775.00 and disallowing the remainder. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of November, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of November, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Brenda D. Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Ben Litowich, President Ben-Bud Growers, Inc. 6261 West Atlantic Boulevard Margate, Florida 33063 George Towell, President George Towell Distributors, Inc. d/b/a Fantastic Produce Post Office Box 159 Belle Glade, Florida 33430 American Southern Insurance Company Legal Department 3715 Northside Parkway, 8th Floor Atlanta, Georgia 30327
The Issue Whether Respondent has violated provisions of the Florida Statutes or the Florida Administrative Code which relate to his licensure as a limited surety agent (a bail bondsman) as charged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what is the appropriate discipline? PRELIIMINARY STATEMENT On August 28, 1996, the Division of Administrative Hearings received a letter from the Department of Insurance signed by Dick Kessler, Esquire, of the Department’s Division of Legal Services. The letter was in regard to “CARL ALBERT THOMPSON, Case No. 14413-95-A.” In addition to requesting assignment of a Hearing Officer (Administrative Law Judge) to conduct a proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, the letter referred to an enclosed Administrative Complaint and a request for formal hearing. The Administrative Complaint alleged that Respondent, Bondsman Carl Albert Thompson, had committed numerous violations of the Florida Insurance Code and the Florida Administrative Code related to his licensure as a limited surety agent or bail bondsman in two counts. The first count alleged generally that he wrote bail bonds in the case of Jose Zamora in the amount of $10,000 and, notwithstanding that all obligations of the bond had been released, refused to refund the bond less the premium claimed. The second count alleged that Thompson failed to have on file with the Department of Insurance an accurate business address. Also attached to the letter of August 21, 1996, were both an answer to the Administrative Complaint submitted by Respondent’s attorney, Ms. Germann, in which he denied pertinent parts of the complaint, and an Election of Rights Form in which he disputed factual allegations in the complaint and requested a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. The case proceeded to hearing on December 16, 1996, in Arcadia, Florida. The Respondent was not present. Through Ms. Germann, he filed a motion to bifurcate the hearing to allow the Department’s case-in-chief to proceed as scheduled while allowing him to appear at a later date, since he alleged he was unable to attend due to a last-minute illness. The motion was granted on the condition that Respondent would provide physician documentation of the illness. Such documentation was never filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Following the granting of the motion, Petitioner proceeded with its case, offering into evidence 13 exhibits all of which were admitted. Petitioner also presented nine witnesses, including six members of the Villafuerte family: Hilario Villafuerte, Consuela Ylda Villafuerte, Martin Villafuerte, Jose Isidro Zamora, Ylda Patricia Villafuerte, and Juana Ramirez. The second phase of the proceeding was scheduled for February 19, 1997. It was canceled because of an accident which befell Ms. Germann. Pursuant to agreement of the parties, the hearing was rescheduled for April 18, 1997. Three days prior to commencement of the re-scheduled second phase of the proceeding, Mr. Migneault served a notice of appearance. He also filed a motion for continuance on the basis of inadequate time for him to prepare and conflicts with scheduled criminal jury trials. The motion was denied, not because it did not on its face allege good cause for a continuance, but because good cause was not shown in light of all the circumstances of the case: Mr. Thompson’s failure to appear at the originally noticed hearing, Mr. Thompson’s failure to provide physician documentation of his December 1996 illness, the seriousness of the case, the lengthy delay which had already ensued and the Department’s objection to further delay. At the April 18 hearing, Mr. Migneault did not appear. Ms. Germann, however, was present in order to petition for withdrawal as counsel for Respondent. Prior to presenting her withdrawal, Ms. Germann on Mr. Migneault’s behalf, announced that Respondent was in jail in Charlotte County and, on that basis, moved ore tenus for a continuance. Ms. Germann was permitted to withdraw. In response, the Department presented testimony of its law enforcement investigator, Antonio Davis, who reported that he had been informed by Charlotte County law enforcement personnel that Respondent, indeed, was in jail. Investigator Davis further reported, however, that he had been informed by the same personnel that Respondent turned himself into Charlotte County authorities under an outstanding warrant for his arrest issued months earlier and that he had done so at 9:30 that morning, one- half hour prior to noticed commencement of the hearing. The ore tenus motion for continuance was denied. Because Respondent was not present and was represented solely by Mr. Migneault, who also was not present, no defense was presented in a case continued twice and delayed for over four months for the very purpose of allowing presentation of Respondent’s case. The hearing was concluded and the record closed without any evidence from Respondent in defense of very serious charges against him.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Carl Albert Thompson, at all times relevant to these proceedings, has been licensed by the Department of Insurance as a limited surety agent, known colloquially as a bail bondsman. His agent number, according to records of the department, is 265683823. Records with the Department show this address of the agency for whom he wrote bonds: Sechrest Bail Bonds Inc 128 Herald Ct Punta Gorda FL Petitioner’s Ex. No. 1. The Department of Insurance is the agency for the State of Florida responsible for licensing limited surety agents and, upon sufficient grounds, disciplining them for violation of the Florida Insurance Code or Florida Administrative Code relating to the licensing and conduct of licensed bail bondsmen. The Arrest of Jose Zamora Jose Zamora is the nephew of Consuelo Villafuerte; he is the son of one of her sisters. In February of 1995, Jose lived with his aunt and her husband, Hilario Villafuerte in the area of Arcadia, Florida, where Mr. Villafuerte works as the leader of a crew of orange pickers. The Villafuertes have a close, extended family which includes their son Martin. Like his father, Martin is the leader of a crew of orange pickers. Martin Villafuerte attended schools in the Arcadia area. He speaks English fluently. Hilario and Consuela Villafuerte came to the United States from Mexico as adults. They speak English, but not as well as their son. Both were more comfortable at final hearing testifying in Spanish with the assistance of an interpreter than in English which Mr. Villafuerte termed “broken.” Shortly before February 13, 1995, Jose Zamora, was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Bail was set at $10,000. It was not the first time Mr. Zamora had been arrested. “[Y]ears back . . . [he] had had a similar case . . . .” (Tr. 73.) In this first case of Jose’s, however, bail was half as much: $5,000. The Villafuerte family had dealt with Jose’s bail in this first case through Hilario Villafuerte. Mr. Villafuerte deposited the $5,000 in cash at the sheriff’s office at the jail. The experience was a successful one succinctly described by Hilario Villafuerte at final hearing: “When [Jose’s] court was over I went with my nephew and they gave me the $5,000 without missing five cents.” (Tr.73.) The first of the Villafuertes to learn of Jose’s second arrest, the February 1995 arrest, was Martin. About to leave for church, he received a phone call from a friend that his cousin had been in an accident. He went to the scene immediately. After Jose was taken to jail, Martin inquired about his release and learned that bail was set at $10,000. It was important to Martin that Jose be bailed out. Not only was he a member of the family, but Jose was also a member of Martin’s orange picking crew, for which Martin shoulders a heavy responsibility. In the several years that he has led the crew, the only day of work Martin has ever missed was the first day of hearing in this case so that he could testify. Martin had to work the weekend of Jose's February 1995 arrest. He asked his father to go to the jail to deliver the bail money. First, though, Martin had to raise the ten thousand dollars, not a simple matter. The Villafuerte Family Pitches In Jose Zamora had been giving his aunt some of the money he earned at work for her to save for him. In February of 1995, it amounted to $1,200, not nearly enough to meet the amount of his bail. Martin canvassed family members. Martin and his wife, Ylda, had $4,000 in the bank, while Martin’s sister, Juana Ramirez, was able to contribute the remainder needed: $4,800. The family was able to amass the $10,000 needed to make bail for Jose. The money was withdrawn from bank accounts in, or converted into, $100 denominations. On February 13, 1995, Hilario and Consuela Villafuerte with the $10,000 in cash, all in $100 bills nestled safely inside Consuela Villafuerte’s purse, set out for the county jail. Mix-up at the Jail In the interim between Jose Zamora’s first case and the February 1995 case, the jail had been remodeled. When they arrived at the sheriff’s office in the jail, Hilario Villafuerte noticed the result of the remodeling; the physical arrangement was different from when he had been there before. There was no interpreter at the jail through whom Mr. Villafuerte could explain the purpose of his visit in Spanish. Instead, Mr. Villafuerte told the receptionist at the front desk in English as best he could, why he had come to the jail. The receptionist asked whether he had the $10,000 in cash. When Mr. Villafuerte responded in the affirmative, the receptionist did not seem to know what to do. She asked Mr. Villafuerte the same question three or four times. Each time he responded in the affirmative. She called over a uniformed member of the sheriff’s department. Mr. Villafuerte could not hear what he said but he observed him shake his head “no.” The receptionist then told Mr. Villafuerte to take the money to any of three places across the street. An Unlucky Choice The three places to which Mr. Villafuerte was directed were bail bond establishments, one of them Fowler Bail Bonds where Mr. Thompson was employed. Mr. Villafuerte thought, however, because the sheriff’s office had been renovated that he was being directed to a new branch office of the sheriff’s department where bail money could be received. Mr. and Mrs. Villafuerte crossed the street and knocked on the door of Fowler Bail Bonds. Carl Albert Thompson answered. Mr. Villafuerte told him, “that they had sent me from the Sheriff’s Department to give him that money for the bond for Jose Isidro Zamora.” (Tr. 69.) Mr. Thomspon indicated he would accept the ten thousand dollars. The only legitimate purpose for taking more than a 10% premium, in this case one thousand dollars, was as additional collateral. Mrs. Villafuerte removed the money from her purse and gave it to her husband. In the presence of Mrs. Villafuerte, Mr. Villafuerte counted out the $10,000 for Thompson to see in thousand dollar piles: ten piles of ten $100 bills. Thompson wrote the Villafuertes a receipt for $10,000, the amount they entrusted to his care. The receipt was not pre-numbered. It did not indicate on its face the purpose for which the money was received, the number of the Power of Attorney form attached to the bond, or the penal sum of the bond. Posting of the Bonds On the same day as the Villafuerte’s visit to Mr. Thompson’s office, February 13, 1995, two General Surety Appearance Bonds, each in the sum of $5,000, for a total of $10,000, were filed with the Clerk of Courts for DeSoto County for two charges in the case of State of Florida vs. Jose Zamora: “DUI w/ personal injury,” and “DUI w/ property damage.” Petitioner’s Composite Ex. No. 7. The premium for each of the two bonds was $500 for a total of $1,000. The bonds are signed by both Jose Zamora and, for Accredited Surety & Casualty Company, Inc., as surety, by Carl Thompson, “attorney-in-fact.” Id. The Remaining Nine Thousand Dollars The additional $9,000 the Villafuerte’s gave to Mr. Thompson was not deposited or paid to a surety company; nor did Thompson place the money with the DeSoto County sheriff’s department for the bail of Jose Zamora. On February 14, 1997, there was deposited in an account at the First State Bank of Arcadia, named the “Carl Thompson DBA/Fowler Bail Bonds Escrow Account,” (Petitioner’s Exhibit No. 11), $9,000, all in one-hundred dollar bills, bills that had composed nine of the ten stacks counted out to Carl Albert Thompson by Hilario Villafuerte the day before. Obligations of the Bond Fulfilled In the interim between the posting of the bond and the deposit of the $9,000 in Mr. Thompson’s escrow account, Jose Zamora was released from jail. The case then reached disposition; the obligations of the bond were fulfilled. Attempts to Retrieve the Money After finalization of Jose Zamora’s case, he and Hilario and Martin Villafuerte went together to Mr. Thompson’s office two or three times. Thompson was not there. Martin persisted. Eventually he contacted Mr. Thompson. Thompson told him that it would take two months for paperwork to be completed before the money could be returned. His suspicion not aroused, Martin told Thompson that he would be checking with him from time to time during the two-month period. True to his word, Martin continued to visit Mr. Thompson’s office. In the two months following his initial contact with Thompson after disposition of Jose Zamora’s case, he went by the office approximately 15 times. Whenever he saw Mr. Thompson, Martin was given slightly different details as to why the money was not yet available. Finally, because the family needed the money, Martin visited the courthouse and made an inquiry. He was told that everything was cleared and that he was entitled to receive any cash bond money owed by Mr. Thompson for the Zamora case. More visits and conversations ensued with Mr. Thompson until the Villafuerte family realized that it was not likely that Thompson would return the ten thousand dollars or any part of it. (Thompson had told the Villafuertes that they were entitled to only an amount slightly less than $9,000 because 10% of the money was the premium for the two bonds posted and because there was a slight charge for paperwork.) The Villafuertes hired an attorney in an attempt to regain their ten thousand dollars. On November 17, 1995, the attorney wrote a letter to the Department of Insurance to inquire as to steps that might be taken toward filing a complaint or pursuing the return of the money entrusted to Mr. Thompson. The letter led to investigation and the administrative complaint in this case. The Administrative Complaint The Administrative Complaint is in two counts. Because of his misappropriation of the Villafuerte's money, refusal to refund it, and issuance of an improper receipt, the first count charges Thompson with having violated or being accountable under the following provisions of law: Sections 648.295(1) and (3), 648.33, 648.36, 648.442(1), (4) and (8), 648.45(2), (2)(d), (2)(e), (2)(f), (2)(g), (2)(h), (2)(j), and (2)(l), 648.45(3), (3)(b) and (3)(d), Florida Statutes; and, Rules 4-221.105, 221.115 and 120, Florida Administrative Code. The second count charges Thompson with violating Section 648.421, Florida Statutes, and Rule 4-221.060, Florida Administrative Code for failure to notify in writing the Department of a change in name, address or telephone number of the agency or firm for which he writes bonds. Change of Agency The name and address of the agency for which Mr. Thompson’s was writing bonds listed in Department records at the times material to this case were not correct. Thompson left the Sechrest office in Sarasota to work for Fowler Bail Bonds as a subagent in its Arcadia office where he met the Villafuertes. When he did so, he did not notify the Department of Insurance of the change of name, business address and telephone address of the agency for which he was then writing bonds, Fowler Bail Bonds. Thompson no longer works for Fowler. He left in November of 1995 for another company after Fowler put pressure on him because of poor performance generally.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED That the Department of Insurance revoke the “limited surety agent” license of Carl Albert Thompson. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, LL-26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dickson E. Kessler, Esquire Division of Legal Services Department of Insurance 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite N-321 Miami, Florida 33128 David J. Migneault, Esquire 201 West Marion Avenue, Suite 205 Punta Gorda, Florida 33950
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent, Above All Lawn Care & Landscaping, Inc. (Above All), should be required to pay the sum of $7,129.05 to the Petitioner for landscape plants and materials allegedly purchased by the Respondent from the Petitioner, and, with regard to the Hartford Fire Insurance Company, whether it should be obligated for the payment of the plants and materials in question to the extent of its surety bond number 2 1BSBBU 6765 (the Bond), in the bonded amount of $4,999.00.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Skinner Nurseries, Inc. (Skinner), is a corporation whose address is 2970 Hartley Road, Suite 302, Jacksonville, Florida. The Respondent Above All is a corporation whose address is Post Office Box 2772, Ocala, Florida. The Respondent was licensed as a dealer in agriculture products at times pertinent hereto and was supported by surety bond number 2 1BSBBU 6765, in the amount of $4,999.00. The surety bond was issued by the co- Respondent, Hardford Fire Insurance Company, as surety. The conditions and provisions of the bond were to assure proper accounting and payment to producers, their agents or representatives for agricultural products purchased by the Respondent, Above All. On July 23, 2003 through August 1, 2003, Skinner Nurseries, Inc. sold the Respondent certain nursery plants as an agent for Florida producers, totaling $7,129.05. That amount remains unpaid to Skinner. The subject complaint was filed with the Department within six months of the dates of sale. The only response to the complaint by the Respondent was that to the effect that it agreed that amounts were owed to Skinner, but it disagreed with the amounts Skinner was claiming. The testimony of Chris Diaz establishes that invoices in the amount of $7,129.05 represent the number of trees, shrubs, and various nursery stock or materials sold and shipped to the Respondent. The Petitioner sent statements on a monthly basis, as well as certified letters, to the Respondent and received no payment at all in return, not even as to an undisputed amount. The amount of $7,079.05 referenced in the Administrative Complaint does not include freight charges. The goods and materials in question were shipped from the Bunnell nursery site of Skinner to the Respondent's location in Ocala, Florida. The Respondent did not appear at either hearing scheduled and presented no testimony or evidence. The facts that are established by the Petitioner are thus undisputed. The Respondent has never paid any of the amounts represented by the subject invoices contained in Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1 in evidence.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witness, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services requiring that Above All Law Care & Landscaping, Inc., pay the complainant Skinner Nurseries, Inc., the amount of $7,129.05, to be paid within fifteen days from the date of entry of a final order in this matter. In the event that the Respondent does not comply with that order then the surety, Hartford Fire Insurance Company, should be ordered to provide payment under the conditions and provisions of the applicable bond. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Charles H. Bronson Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda D. Hyatt, Bureau Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Bureau of License and Bond 407 South Calhoun Street, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Daniel I. Lawrence, President Above All Landscaping Post Office Box 2772 Ocala, Florida 34471 Chris Diaz Skinner Nurseries, Inc. 2970 Hartley Road, Suite 302 Jacksonville, Florida 32257 Scott Cochrane Hartford Insurance Company Hartford Plaza, T-4 Hartford, Connecticut 06115
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Wallace Moorehand, was an employee of Respondent, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, as defined by the Florida Civil Rights of 1992, at the time alleged discriminatory employment practice(s) took place.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Wallace Bruce Moorehand, is an African- American male residing in Ft. Walton Beach, Florida. Petitioner holds Florida insurance agent license A183690, which was issued on February 27, 1991. Petitioner studied extensively and was subject to a formal examination in order to obtain his license. Respondent, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm),1/ is a private entity headquartered in Bloomington, Illinois, engaged in the business of selling and servicing various types of insurance products including auto, health, and fire insurance for personal and business customers. Petitioner maintains that he is an employee of State Farm, rather than an independent contractor therefore, allowing him to bring a claim of unlawful employment discrimination under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Between March 1991 and February 1993, Petitioner worked as a Trainee Agent with State Farm. It is undisputed that Petitioner was a State Farm employee during his tenure as a Trainee Agent. On March 1, 1993, Petitioner executed a State Farm Agent’s Agreement. Among the relevant contractual provisions are the following: The purpose of this Agreement is to reduce to writing the objectives, obligations, and responsibilities essential to the relationship between the Agent, operating as an independent contractor, and State Farm. [State Farm] believe[s] that agents operating as independent contractors are best able to provide the creative selling, professional counseling, and prompt and skillful service essential to the creation and maintenance of successful multiple-line companies and agencies. We do not seek, and will not assert, control of your daily activities, but expect you to exercise your own judgment as to the time, place, and manner of soliciting insurance, servicing policyholders, and otherwise carrying out the provisions of this Agreement. You have chosen this independent contractor relationship, with its opportunities for financial reward and personal satisfaction, in preference to one which would place you in an employee status. * * * Section 1 – MUTUAL CONDITIONS AND DUTIES * * * You are an independent contractor for all purposes. As such you have full control of your daily activities, with the right to exercise independent judgment as to time, place, and manner of soliciting insurance, servicing policyholders, and otherwise carrying out the provisions of this Agreement. State Farm will furnish you, without charge, manuals, forms, records, and such other materials and supplies as we may deem advisable to provide. All such property furnished by us shall remain the property of [State Farm]. * * * Information regarding names, addresses, and age of policyholders of [State Farm]; the description and locations of insured property; and expiration or renewal dates of State Farm policies acquired or coming into your possession during the effective period of this Agreement, or any prior Agreement, except information and records of policyholders insured by [State Farm] pursuant to any governmental or insurance industry plan or facility, are trade secrets wholly owned by [State Farm]. All forms and other materials, whether furnished by State Farm or purchased by you, upon which this information is recorded, shall be the sole and exclusive property of [State Farm]. The expense of any office, including rental, furniture, and equipment; signs; supplies not furnished by us; the salaries of your employees; telegraph; telephone; postage; advertising; and all other charges or expense incurred by you in the performance of this Agreement shall be incurred at your discretion and paid by you. * * * L. We retain the right to prescribe all policy forms and provisions; premiums, fees, and charges for insurance; and rules governing the binding, acceptance, renewal, rejection, or cancellation of risks, and adjustment and payment of losses. Petitioner testified that it was his intent to enter into an independent contractor relationship with State Farm. On January 1, 1997, Petitioner entered into a second State Farm Agent’s Agreement, containing similar, if not identical, provisions. The record was not clear why Petitioner entered into a second Agent’s Agreement in 1997. Petitioner testified that State Farm eliminated some retirement benefits in 1997, requiring all agents to execute a new Agreement. However, on cross-examination, Petitioner testified, “I misspoke”2/ and admitted that the original Agent’s Agreement does not refer to a pension or other retirement benefit. Petitioner has conducted business as an agent of State Farm at the same location in Mary Esther, Florida, for 21 years. State Farm compensates Petitioner through commission on sales of insurance policies and other products. According to the Agent’s Agreement, State Farm also offers a sales incentive of five percent of production earnings in the prior year. State Farm has never paid Petitioner a salary. Pursuant to the Agent’s Agreement, State Farm also compensates Petitioner by providing a life insurance policy of $100,000 payable to his designated beneficiary upon his death, provided that Petitioner has not obtained age 70 or terminated the Agent’s Agreement. Petitioner has his own Federal employer tax ID number. Petitioner owns the building in which his State Farm office is located. Petitioner pays all the expenses of his office, including telephone, electricity, water, furniture, office supplies, and office equipment. Petitioner currently has two employees, but has previously employed up to nine people at his State Farm office. Petitioner pays his employees a salary, rather than on an hourly basis, at his choosing. Petitioner sets his employees’ work schedules. Petitioner pays his employees’ payroll taxes, decides whether they will receive commissions, and, if so, the amount of said commissions. Petitioner offers his employees paid holidays, vacation time, and sick leave. Petitioner does not receive either vacation time or sick leave from State Farm. Petitioner has elected to secure health insurance through State Farm for himself and his family. Petitioner offers his employees the opportunity to participate in the same health insurance plan he has elected to purchase. State Farm reports Petitioner’s earnings to the Federal Government on IRS Form 1099, not Form W-2. State Farm does not withhold social security, Medicare, or federal income taxes, from Petitioner’s commission checks. Despite overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s independent contractor relationship with State Farm, Petitioner maintains that State Farm exercises a degree of control over Petitioner’s livelihood that renders the independent contractor status a sham. Petitioner testified that State Farm controlled Petitioner’s business, not only by contract, but also “by innuendo, by assertion, by intimidation.”3/ First, Petitioner testified that there was no difference between the way State Farm managed Petitioner’s business as a Trainee Agent and as an independent contractor. However, Petitioner admitted that only as a Trainee Agent was he required to submit daily time logs and weekly accountings of his activities. Petitioner offered into evidence a letter in which a State Farm Agency Manager criticized Petitioner’s priorities, time utilization, attitude, and required him to attend a series of training meetings. However, the letter was clearly written when Petitioner was a Trainee Agent. Next, Petitioner argues that State Farm controls whom he hires at his agency, as well as the hours his agency must be open to the public. Any employee of Petitioner who will be licensed to sell State Farm products on behalf of Petitioner is required to undergo background screening and enter into an Agent’s Licensed Staff Agreement. The Agreement defines the nature of the employment as with the Agent, rather than State Farm; defines the scope of the employee’s authority, i.e., the Agent may delegate to employees in-office binding authority on motor vehicle, residential risks, and personal property-casualty insurance coverage. Petitioner’s clerical staff, and any other non- licensed staff, is not required to undergo background screening or enter into an Agent’s Licensed Staff Agreement. Petitioner’s office is open 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. each weekday. Petitioner testified that he chose those hours because those are the ones “clients most wanted.” State Farm does not dictate the particular hours Petitioner works. State Farm provides an after-hours call center from 5:00 p.m. to 9:00 a.m. on weekdays to take calls from clients and potential clients when Petitioner’s office is closed. Petitioner maintains that because the call center is only available after 5:00 p.m., State Farm dictates that his office remains open until 5:00 p.m. daily. If Petitioner chose to close his office before 5:00 p.m. on weekdays, the only consequence would be missed business opportunities. Next, Petitioner argues that State Farm controls his business by requiring Petitioner to sell “multiple lines” of insurance, rather than selling only automobile or homeowners’ policies. Petitioner testified that State Farm pressures him to sell life and health insurance policies, as well as banking products more recently-available through State Farm. State Farm does not set quotas for any product line. Agents are free to choose which products they will sell as part of their overall business decisions. State Farm encourages its Agents to sell all products offered by the company in order to service the needs of clients. Some State Farm products require special licenses, such as a securities license to sell mutual funds offered by State Farm. State Farm does not require agents to obtain any specialty license. Petitioner voluntarily obtained a securities license to offer mutual funds to his clients. Next, Petitioner argues that State Farm does not allow him to operate his agency in a truly independent manner. Rather, Petitioner maintains that he is required to submit a business plan for approval by State Farm and attend extensive trainings which interfere with the independent nature of his relationship with State Farm. State Farm requires agents to attend one training session per year. The training is on compliance with State Farm customer service guidelines. Agents may access the training online and do not need to travel to take the training. State Farm provides a number of incentives to encourage agents to maximize their performance. For example, if an agent submits a business plan, laying out the goals and direction for his or her agency, the agent is eligible to receive leads on prospective clients that are received through the State Farm website. However, there are no negative consequences to those agents who choose not to submit a business plan. Finally, Petitioner argues that State Farm restricts Petitioner from writing policies for other insurer’s products. The parties offered a great deal of testimony regarding Petitioner’s authority to write policies for “take-out companies” assuming coverage previously provided by Citizens’ Insurance, and flood insurance policies through the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The undersigned finds this testimony irrelevant to the issue at hand. Petitioner is an agent of State Farm insurance company. He chose that relationship. He could have chosen to work with an independent insurance agency which writes policies for any number of companies. Petitioner did not.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss Complaint of Discrimination No. 2014-00242 filed by Wallace B. Moorehand on August 14, 2014. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 2015.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Charles W. Crowell, a State Farm agent under the terms of an agency agreement declaring him an independent contractor, has never employed 15 or more employees at any one time. During the 20 weeks next before petitioner Donna Clark left his employ, he had no more than three full-time and two part- time employees. As a State Farm agent, Mr. Crowell is contractually bound not to represent other insurance companies. State Farm, which has employed more than 15 persons at all pertinent times, prescribes policy forms, premiums, fees and charges for insurance, and prescribes underwriting rules its agents (and so their employees) must follow. Most premiums reach State Farm in the form of checks drawn by insured persons. But, as required by state law and his agreement with State Farm alike, Mr. Crowell maintains a separate premium fund account, into which customers' cash premium payments are deposited. Moneys are disbursed directly from this account to State Farm, which has the right to audit the account. State Farm determines Crowell's compensation based on the amount of premiums it receives on policies he has written, and writes him checks accordingly. At year's end, State Farm reports these payments to the IRS on a form 1099, not on a W-2 form. Mr. Crowell receives no compensation directly from the premium fund account. When an agent retires and in certain other instances, State Farm allocates policies among remaining agents, while honoring preferences policyholders express for particular agents. But it does not restrict agents to a particular territory or otherwise dictate where its agents conduct business. State Farm reserves the right to approve any advertising by an agency using State Farm's name or logo. But certain business cards bearing the logo are "pre-approved," except for the name of the agent or other employee in the agent's office which is to appear on the card. Mr. Crowell sets his own hours and it was he who decided the office would open at nine and close at five. Some days he does not open his office for business, even though State Farm offices are open. If he closes his office on days State Farm is closed, it may well be because he cannot do business with State Farm. But he is free to keep office hours on such days if he chooses. His compensation does not depend directly on the amount of time his office is open, or on the amount of time he spends at work. Mr. Crowell, not State Farm, decides whom to employ in his office, and sets hours, salaries and benefits for these employees. He, not State Farm, personally pays wages and benefits (if any), along with employment taxes for which employers are liable on account of their employees. But, on unemployment compensation tax forms, gives as the employer's name "CHARLES W. CROWELL STATE FARM INSURANCE COS" and signs as Charles W. Crowell Agent." Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. Mr. Crowell drew salary checks in favor of Ms. Clark and other employees in his office on his own business checking account, which is not subject to audit by State Farm. These salary checks did not bear State Farm's name or logo. The parties have stipulated, as follows: "5. Crowell's office is located at 908 Michigan Avenue in Pensacola, Florida, and he personally owns the property and building where his office is located. State Farm has no interest or property rights in this facility. The only forms, manuals, and other documents located in Crowell's office which are the property of State Farm are insurance product information, including names of policyholders. The equipment, furniture and other supplies located at or used in Crowell's office are owned or leased by Crowell, and not State Farm. Crowell personally hired Donna M. Clark, and State Farm took no part in, exercised no control over, and had no input regarding Crowell's decision to hire Ms. Clark. Crowell sets the work hours, wages and benefits of his employees, including the number of employees employed by his business, without consultation with or the approval of State Farm. Crowell personally pays the salaries or wages and employment taxes, including Florida Workers' Compensation, Unemployment Compensation, Social Security (FICA) and federal tax withholding, on all of his employees, including Ms. Clark, and State Farm pays no salaries to or taxes on behalf of any of Crowell's employees. State Farm provides no benefits to the employees of its State Farm agents, and Crowell decides whether employment benefits such as health or life insurance are provided to Crowell's employees, including whether there is any cost to the employee. Such policies can be purchased by the State Farm Agent from State Farm, if he chooses to do so. Crowell, not State Farm, maintains all personnel records on his employees, including Ms. Clark. State Farm does not have any personnel records as to petitioner Donna Clark. Crowell's business is to sell State Farm policies and service State Farm policyholders. State Farm prescribes policy forms, premiums, fees and charges for insurance, and prescribes underwriting rules pertaining to writing State Farm insurance. Employees of State Farm Agents such as Mr. Crowell are not required to attend State Farm meetings or training sessions. State Farm offers training on topics selected by State Farm Agents, to which the State Farm Agents, such as Mr. Crowell, may choose to send their employees, for a fee payable to State Farm. State Farm requires Crowell to maintain a premium fund account, which is a trust account for the deposit of insurance premiums which are the property of State Farm. All cash premiums from policyholders are deposited to the premium fund account, and premium funds are promptly forwarded to State Farm. Premiums paid by check are sent directly to State Farm, and the large majority of premiums received by Crowell are by check. The premium fund account is subject to auditing by State Farm. As part of the audit of the premium fund account, State Farm develops a profit and loss statement which compares the claims experience of policies serviced by the Agent to the premiums generated by those policies and thus reflects the profit or loss to State Farm. Such profit and loss statement is for State Farm's own use in determining its own profitability and does not show or indicate the success of Mr. Crowell in his personal business as an insurance agent. Crowell maintains separate accounts for his personal and business funds which are not subject to any auditing by State Farm. Crowell is not paid for his sales activities out of the premium fund account, but is paid on a commission basis after all premium funds have been deposited with State Farm. Crowell personally directed Clark to attend certain training courses conducted by the local district manager of State Farm on underwriting insurance and product knowledge only. State farm does not require State Farm Agents to send their employees to training courses conducted by State Farm. State Farm does not allow employees of State Farm Agents to attend training courses concerning financial management or conduct of the agency, and Clark did not attend any such courses." Although not stipulated by the parties, evidence showed that, at one of the training courses Ms. Clark attended, a speaker told employees in attendance that they comprised State Farm's "front line." State Farm decides, with input from its agents, which courses and seminars to offer, but it is up to individual agents to decide who, if anybody, attends from their offices. State Farm employees known as agency managers coordinate operations of agents in their assigned area. When the agency manager decides another agent is needed, he recruits a trainee, who works for State Farm for two years or so (unless discharged earlier.) After this period of training, State Farm offers most trainees the opportunity to terminate employment and become agents. With State Farm's permission, an agent may incorporate. Even as independent contractors, agents receive contributions from State Farm toward personal insurance premiums, which are treated as part of the agents' income. The State Farm manager for the Pensacola area while Ms. Clark worked in Mr. Crowell's office offered bonuses to agents' employees who won contests, although this violated company policy. Ms. Clark did not, however, participate in any contest or receive a bonus. A number of unlicensed people in Mr. Crowell's office sign policies when he is unavailable. Because this practice is widespread, Insurance Commissioner Gallagher has insisted that insurance agents see that more office staff are licensed. Accordingly, State Farm's agency manager has asked State Farm agents to identify office personnel for licensure. Employees of a State Farm agency must be approved by State Farm, in order to obtain licenses. After an agent identifies an employee and the employee sits for an examination, State Farm does a background check and makes its decision about sponsorship. Ms. Clark did not seek licensure as an insurance agent, although she was among those who signed policies. In the course or her work, she spoke directly with underwriting personnel in Jacksonville, on Mr. Crowell's behalf or with his acquiescance.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the petition. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Realtions 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Karen Lessard, Esquire 15 West LaRua Street Pensacola, FL 32501 Kathryn Errington, Esquire HARRELL, WILTSHIRE, SWEARINGEN, WILSON & HARRELL, P.A. 201 East Government Street P.O. Drawer 1832 Pensacola, FL 32501 Mary Jarrett, Esquire 2065 Herschel Street P.O. Box 40089 Jacksonville, FL 32203
