The Issue The issue is whether the law enforcement officer's certification of the Respondent, Nicholas R. Small, should be revoked for failure to maintain good moral character as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, based on two incidents of misconduct. A third incident alleged in the second unnumbered paragraph of paragraph two of the Administrative Complaint was voluntarily dismissed at the beginning of the hearing.
Findings Of Fact Nicholas R. Small was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a law enforcement officer before the occurrence of the events alleged in the Administrative Complaint. The Administrative Complaint was filed after a letter of complaint was received from a citizen in April, 1985. This delay in bringing the matter to the attention of the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission staff accounts for the delay in the filing of the complaint. On June 13, 1978, Mr. Albert Lee Taylor, his wife and their three small children, were leaving Miami in the family car which was being driven by Mr. Taylor. They were on their way to visit a sick relative in Lake Placid, Florida. Due to Mr. Taylor's work schedule they were unable to begin their trip until after midnight. The Taylors are black. The Respondent, Mr. Small, was a police officer for the City of Hialeah Gardens. He observed the Taylor vehicle as it passed his police car at the corner of N.W. 81st Street and l03rd Avenue. Mr. Small pulled Mr. Taylor's vehicle over because he believed there were deficiencies in the tag light on the car. When Mr. Small left the patrol car and walked to Mr. Taylor's car, he told Mr. Taylor to get out of the car and walk to the back of Taylor's vehicle, which Mr. Taylor did. While using his flashlight, Mr. Small observed a handgun setting in an area between the bucket seats of Taylor's automobile. Mr. Small took possession of the gun. Mr. Taylor carried the gun for protection during the family's travel. Mr. Small arrested Mr. Taylor and while doing so required him to place his hands on the hood of the police car to conduct a pat- down search of Mr. Taylor. The police car engine was running. The hood of the police car was hot to the touch which made it difficult for Mr. Taylor to take the position which Mr. Small required him to assume. Small told Mr. Taylor to spread his legs so that he could be patted-down. Mr. Taylor had recently had hip surgery to replace the ball joint of his hip with an artificial joint. This restricted his range of motion and any attempt to move the leg beyond its range resulted in severe pain. Mr. Taylor spread his legs as far as his hip condition would permit without pain. Mr. Small became dissatisfied with Mr. Taylor's stance and told him to spread his legs more. Mr. Taylor told Mr. Small that he had already spread his legs as far apart as he could with a pin in his hip. Mr. Taylor's wife, who was near by, told Mr. Small that she was a nurse, that Mr. Taylor had a pin in his hip, and that he could spread his legs no further apart. Mr. Small told Mrs. Taylor to "shut up" and shouted that he did not care about that. Mr. Small took his leg and placed it between Mr. Taylor's feet and, by pushing outward, forced Mr. Taylor's legs further apart. Mr. Taylor lost his balance and, as a result of the action, fell on the hood of the car. This caused Mr. Taylor severe pain at the time and resulted in increased pain and tenderness in the leg for several weeks. Mr. Small took Mr. Taylor to jail. Mr. Taylor was never convicted of any crime as the result of that arrest. The next incident alleged in the Administrative Complaint took place on October 24, 1981, when Mr. Small was a uniformed officer for the City of Opa- Locka. Mr. Small had been sent to the scene of a disturbance near Rutland Street and 22nd Avenue. Rayfield Brown, Lloyd Johnson, and his two-year old daughter Fiona were there. Mr. Small and other officers arrived and Mr. Brown and Mr. Johnson were arrested and placed in Mr. Small's police car. After the arrest Mr. Small got into the police car to drive Mr. Johnson and Mr. Brown to the police station. On the way to the police station, Mr. Small turned onto Rutland Street. Mr. Brown looked at the sidewalk on the street corner and saw Mr. Johnson's child, Fiona, standing alone on the sidewalk and crying. Mr. Johnson saw his daughter as they passed the corner and asked Mr. Small to stop the car and pick the child up. Mr. Johnson pleaded with Mr. Small to pick up his daughter so that she would not be left alone on the street but Mr. Small did not stop to attend to the child or take any other action to assure that another officer would take care of the child, thus leaving her abandoned in a urban residential area.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the law enforcement officer certification of the Respondent, Nicholas R. Small, be REVOKED. DONE AND ORDERED this 5th day of February, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-2383 The following constitute my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1985), on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner The substance of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact have been accepted. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent No proposed findings of fact were submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Peter Kneski, Esquire Biscayne Building, Suite 626 19 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 Rod Caswell, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Robert R. Dempsey, Executive Director Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Case Number 91-8116EC: Whether the Respondent, Fred Peel, violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes: (1) by failing to have complaint review procedures in place in his office as required by Section 112.533(1), Florida Statutes; (2) by attempting to intimidate the complainant into leaving the Washington County Sheriff's offices without receiving a copy of his arrest report; and (3) by attempting to charge $5.00 for copy of the arrest report? Case Number 91-8323EC: Whether the Respondent, John Jenkins, violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by attempting to intimidate the complainant into leaving the Washington County Sheriff's offices without receiving a copy of his arrest report?
Findings Of Fact The Respondents. The Respondent, Fred Peel, is the Sheriff of Washington County, Florida. (Stipulated Fact). Sheriff Peel has continuously served as the Sheriff of Washington County for the past fifteen years. (Stipulated Fact). Sheriff Peel is an elected official. (Stipulated Fact). At all times relevant to this proceeding, Sheriff Peel served as a public officer subject to Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes. The Respondent, John Jenkins, is a captain with the Washington County Sheriff's Department. (Stipulated Fact). Captain Jenkins has continuously served with the Sheriff's Department for ten years. (Stipulated Fact). Captain Jenkins was appointed by Sheriff Peel pursuant to Chapter 30, Florida Statutes. (Stipulated Fact). At all times relevant to this proceeding, Captain Jenkins served as a public officer subject to Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes. The Arrest of the Complainant. The complainant, Timothy Hinson, was arrested by a deputy of the Washington County Sheriff's Office on November 26, 1990. Mr. Hinson was charged with driving under the influence, driving while license suspended or revoked and refusal to sign citation. (Stipulated Fact). At the time of his arrest, Mr. Hinson was intoxicated. Mr. Hinson's speech was slurred, his appearance was disheveled and his ability to understand verbal communication was poor. After being arrested and transported to the Washington County jail, Mr. Hinson made profane and abusive threats addressed to the arresting deputy and the "Sheriff". Mr. Hinson threatened to have the "Sheriff" removed. Mr. Hinson did not know who the Sheriff was at the time. Mr. Hinson's actions, failed to prove, as suggested by the Respondents, that Mr. Hinson had a vendetta against the Respondents or law enforcement personnel in general. This evidence merely proved that Mr. Hinson was drunk. The parties stipulated that, prior to his arrest on November 26, 1990, Mr. Hinson had been arrested six times since 1983. This evidence failed to prove, however, the Respondents' contention that Mr. Hinson had a grudge or vendetta against the Respondents or law enforcement personnel in general. This evidence suggests that Mr. Hinson has a drinking problem. Mr. Hinson's Effort to Obtain a Copy of His Arrest Record. Just prior to noon on December 28, 1990, Mr. Hinson went to the Washington County Sheriff's offices. Mr. Hinson went to the Sheriff's offices with the intent to obtain a copy of the records related to his arrest on November 26, 1990. (Stipulated Fact). Mr. Hinson was met in the lobby of the Sheriff's offices by Sharon Bellamy, an employee of Sheriff Peel. Mr. Hinson informed Ms. Bellamy that he wanted a copy of his arrest record. Mr. Hinson informed Ms. Bellamy that he needed a copy of the documents for his defense. Ms. Bellamy retrieved Mr. Hinson's file from the office where records were kept and brought it to the lobby to make the copies requested at a copy machine located in the lobby. There were two documents in the file that Mr. Hinson requested: the complaint and the arresting report. As Ms. Bellamy began to make a copy of the documents Mr. Hinson had requested, she found a copy of another document that had been mailed to Mr. Hinson that he had not requested. The document was a notice to Mr. Hinson that his Florida drivers' license had been suspended for refusing to take a breath test. Ms. Bellamy began quizzing Mr. Hinson about whether he had received the document. Although Mr. Hinson had in fact received the notice Ms. Bellamy asked him about, he told her he had not and requested a copy of it. Ms. Bellamy continued to ask Mr. Hinson about the notice. The conversation between Mr. Hinson and Ms. Bellamy became more agitated, although the evidence failed to prove why. Pam Miner, the Sheriff's secretary, was in an office next to the lobby. The door opening into the lobby was open and Ms. Miner overheard Ms. Bellamy and Mr. Hinson. Sheriff Peel was sitting in his office, which adjoined Ms. Miner's office. The door opening into Ms. Miner's office was also open and he could also hear the discussion. At some time after Ms. Bellamy began discussing the notice concerning Mr. Hinson's driver's license with him, Ms. Miner went to the door of Sheriff Peel's office and gave him a look which she described as intended to convey to Sheriff Peel that "you need to do something". After Ms. Miner looked into Sheriff Peel's office, he went out into the lobby. Sheriff Peel initially watched what was going on. At some point shortly after Sheriff Peel went into the lobby he asked Mr. Hinson some questions about Mr. Hinson's driver's license. Mr. Hinson informed Sheriff Peel that he had a Maryland driver's license. At some point during the discussion between Sheriff Peel and Mr. Hinson, Mr. Hinson indicated that he was seeking a copy of the documents in his file for his attorney. Sheriff Peel suggested that Mr. Hinson have his attorney get the copies. The discussion between Mr. Hinson and Sheriff Peel became more heated and argumentative. Eventually Sheriff Peel told Ms. Bellamy to "charge him $5.00" and started to leave. Mr. Hinson perceived this comment to mean that he was to be charged $5.00 per page or document. Prior to coming to the Sheriff's office to obtain copies of the documents in his file, Mr. Hinson had telephoned the Sheriff's office and had been told that there was a $2.00 copying charge. Two dollars is, in fact, what the Sheriff's office normally charges for copying documents. Mr. Hinson believed, therefore, that he would be charged $2.00 per document or a total of $4.00 for the documents he had requested. When Mr. Hinson heard the Sheriff indicate that he was to be charged $5.00, he became angry because he believed that Sheriff Peel was suggesting that he be charged $5.00 per copy or $5.00 per page. Such a charge was inconsistent with what he had been previously told about copying charges. Mr. Hinson incorrectly believed that Sheriff Peel was going to charge him the higher rate for copying because he had a Maryland drivers' license and was, therefore, apparently not from Washington County. Mr. Hinson confronted Sheriff Peel by stating that he had been told that the copying charge was only $2.00 a copy. Sheriff Peel, if he had meant to charge Mr. Hinson a total of $5.00 as suggested during the final hearing, did not clarify that he was only going to charge him a total of $5.00 instead of $5.00 per copy as Mr. Hinson apparently believed. The failure to clarify what he meant, and the fact that Sheriff Peel did not know how many documents were actually involved, support the conclusion that Sheriff Peel did not intend that Ms. Bellamy merely charge Mr. Hinson a total of $5.00. Of greater importance, these facts explain Mr. Hinson's confusion and anger. He reasonably believed he was going to be overcharged. Some time after Mr. Hinson confronted Sheriff Peel about the $5.00 charge, Sheriff Peel told Ms. Bellamy not to give Mr. Hinson anything. Mr. Hinson confronted Sheriff Peel, although he did not know at the time that he was the Sheriff, and asked him "what's the problem." Mr. Hinson also asked for the person in charge of "internal affairs", stating that he wanted to file a complaint against Sheriff Peel. Sheriff Peel informed Mr. Hinson that the Sheriff's Office did not have an "internal affairs" department, that he was the Sheriff, and that he would not take a complaint against himself. The Washington County Sheriff's Office has no written policy for handling complaints against personnel. The Washington County Sheriff's Office has an informal, unwritten policy for handling complaints. Sheriff Peel makes the final decision concerning complaints. At some time shortly after Sheriff Peel and Mr. Hinson began to argue, Captain Jenkins came to the door opening to the lobby from the room that he had been in. Initially, Captain Jenkins stood watching the discussion. Because of the smallness of the room, Captain Jenkins was relatively close to Mr. Hinson. After Sheriff Peel informed Mr. Hinson that there was no internal affairs department and that he would not take a complaint against himself, Captain Jenkins stated "I'm internal affairs this week. What's the problem?" or a statement to that effect. Although Captain Jenkins testified that he made the comment to try to diffuse the situation by injecting some humor into the situation, the weight of the evidence does not support this explanation. The weight of the evidence supports a conclusion that the comment was made in a snide and sarcastic manner. Mr. Hinson was being rude and confrontational. Sheriff Peel and Mr. Hinson were engaged in a somewhat heated argument. Mr. Hinson was obviously angry. To make such a statement to a person in this type situation evidenced a failure to exercise good judgement. The statement was intended to rebuke and insult Mr. Hinson. Mr. Hinson demanded that Captain Jenkins identify himself, which he did. Mr. Hinson told Captain Jenkins that he wanted to file a complaint against Sheriff Peel. Captain Jenkins told him that he would not take a complaint against the Sheriff. Captain Jenkins told Mr. Hinson that it would be better if he left the office. It was apparent to Mr. Hinson that nothing more could come of the confrontation with Sheriff Peel and Captain Jenkins. Sheriff Peel had ordered that nothing be given to Mr. Hinson. Sheriff Peel and Captain Jenkins had refused to take a complaint. It had been suggested that he leave. Mr. Hinson felt intimidated. Captain Jenkins is 6'1" and weighs approximately 225 pounds while Mr. Hinson is slightly built in comparison. There was nothing to be gained by continued argument and, therefore, Mr. Hinson left. Mr. Hinson was not intoxicated or taking medication at the time of his visit to the Sheriff's offices. Mr. Hinson's attitude and demeanor with Ms. Bellamy was defensive and confrontational. Mr. Hinson's displeasure over his arrest and his attitude were perceived as rudeness by Ms. Bellamy. Although Mr. Hinson did not yell or use profanity, as described by Ms. Bellamy, Mr. Hinson "had an attitude". These findings are based in large part upon the testimony of Ms. Bellamy, Pam Miner (the Sheriff's secretary) and David Corbin, the Director of Washington County Parks and Recreation. Mr. Corbin was in the lobby during the confrontation. Although Ms. Bellamy and Ms. Miner are employed by Sheriff Peel, and the fact that Ms. Bellamy was not totally candid in her testimony, the crucial elements of the testimony of the Respondents and these witnesses were consistent. It is difficult to categorize the degree of Mr. Hinson's rudeness. All of the witnesses agreed Mr. Hinson was rude and confrontational. His rudeness and attitude were not, however, so severe that Ms. Bellamy did not believe that she could handle Mr. Hinson. Nor did Ms. Bellamy ever feel threatened by Mr. Hinson. She did not request any assistance from Sheriff Peel or Captain Jenkins, both of whom were in adjoining offices. Nor was Mr. Hinson's attitude and treatment of Ms. Bellamy sufficiently troublesome to cause Captain Jenkins, who could hear the discussion between Ms. Bellamy and Mr. Hinson, to come out to assist Ms. Bellamy until after Sheriff Peel had intervened. Finally, Ms. Bellamy left the lobby during the confrontation to prepare to go to lunch, not something that would be expected of someone witnessing an overly serious confrontation. Sheriff Peel and Captain Jenkins did not yell at Mr. Hinson. Nor did they laugh at Mr. Hinson. Sheriff Peel did, however, become angry and argumentative with Mr. Hinson. The situation could have been ended by simply allowing Ms. Bellamy to provide the copies of the documents Mr. Hinson had requested, which had already been made. Captain Jenkins was sarcastic with Mr. Hinson and, to some degree, because of his size, intimidating to Mr. Hinson. Captain Jenkins' comment to Mr. Hinson, although sarcastic, was not threatening. Mr. Hinson, based upon 20-20 hindsight, was not a threat to anybody in the Sheriff's offices. This is not to say, however, that Mr. Hinson should have been taken lightly or that Mr. Hinson's conduct should have been totally accepted and tolerated by Sheriff Peel. Nor can it be concluded that Captain Jenkins should have totally ignored what was going on. Effort to Secure a Special Privilege, Benefit, or Exemption. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the failure to have a written complaint procedure in place in the Washington County Sheriff's Office was intended by Sheriff Peel to secure a special privilege, benefit or exemption. Mr. Hinson, after telephoning the Florida Sheriff's Association, was informed that he could pick up a copy of the documents he wanted at the Sheriff's offices. Mr. Hinson also could have obtained a copy of the documents he wanted by having someone else, including his attorney, pick them up or by requesting a copy of the documents from the clerk of court's office. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Sheriff Peel was attempting to intimidate Mr. Hinson into leaving the Sheriff's offices without obtaining a copy of the documents he had requested in order to secure a special privilege, benefit or exemption. Any funds collected for copying by the Sheriff's Office are funds of Washington County. Sheriff Peel has no control or direct use of those funds. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Sheriff Peel was attempting to charge $5.00 for the copies in an effort to secure a special privilege, benefit or exemption. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Captain Jenkins' actions were intended to intimidate Mr. Hinson into leaving the Sheriff's offices in order to secure a special privilege, benefit or exemption. At worst, the evidence proved that Sheriff Peel, arguably, could have exercised a little more patience and that Captain Jenkins made a smart remark at an inappropriate time. These actions, in light of Mr. Hinson's attitude and demeanor, do not support a conclusion that Sheriff Peel or Captain Jenkins were attempting to secure a special privilege, benefit or exemption for themselves or others. The actions of all those involved in this situation were emotional reactions to the situation and were not calculated to achieve any particular result.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics enter a Final Order and Public Report dismissing Complaint No. 91-42 and Complaint No. 91-43. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of May, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection A. 1 1-2. 2 3. 3 5. 4 6. 5 7. B. 1 9. 2 10. C. 1 23. Hereby accepted. Conclusion of law. D. 1 28-30. 2 29. 3 30. E. 1 13. 2 36. 3 14 and 23. 4 14-15. 5 14. 6 17 and hereby accepted. 7 See 37. 8 See 37-38 and 40. Ms. Bellamy's relationship to the Respondents has been considered. While it is true that Ms. Bellamy was not totally candid, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that Ms. Bellamy's testimony was materially flawed, especially in light of the testimony of other witnesses. 9-10 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 11 See 41. The evidence failed to prove that "no reasonable person could have perceived Mr. Hinson as posing such a danger." Such a conclusion can only be made with 20-20 hindsight. 11a-b 38. 11c 19. 11c 31 and 38. 12 20-21 13 21 and see 26. 14 27. 15 28. 16 Not relevant. 17 22. 18 22-24. 19 25. 20 See 31. 21-22 32. The last sentence of proposed finding of fact 22 is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 23 33. 24 34. 25 35. See 35. See 37-40. The last three sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 25. The Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 9. 2 See 11. 3 13-14. 4 15 and 17-19. 19, 21 and 37-38. The allegations concerning whether Mr. Hinson became "loud" are rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 27. The evidence failed to prove that Sheriff Peel "explained to Hinson that he had a small office" in an effort to explain why he did not have an internal affairs department. The Respondents' suggestion that Mr. Hinson was out of control is not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 31 and 33. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Captain Jenkins suggested that Mr. Hinson go to the State Attorney's office if he wanted to file a complaint. See 22. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Sheriff Peel was aware of how many pages were to be copied, that Mr. Hinson left after being told that the charge was $5.00 or that Mr. Hinson was not told to leave. 23 and hereby accepted. 10 16, 18 and 23. 11 45. 12 28-30. See 31. Hereby accepted. See 47. The last two sentences are not relevant. 16 See 24-25, 38-39 and 48. 17 42. 18 See 12. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 19-24 Although portions of these proposed findings of fact are true, the ultimate findings of fact suggested by these proposed facts are not supported by the weight of the evidence. For example, although it is true that Mr. Hinson admitted that he had a bad memory, the essential elements of his testimony were credible. 25 41-47. The last two sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 101 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 William E. Powers, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 12186 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-2186 Bonnie J. Williams Executive Director Commission On Ethics The Capitol Room 2105 Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006
The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether Respondent committed the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating persons certified as fire fighters and fire safety inspectors. Respondent is certified in the state as a fire fighter and fire safety inspector. She is currently employed by Volusia County Fire Services as an Emergency Medical Technician. On or about October 16, 1980, Respondent was charged in circuit court with vehicular manslaughter and driving under the influence of alcohol. Vehicular manslaughter is a felony under Sections 860.01(1)and (2), Florida Statutes. 1/ Driving under the influence of alcohol is a misdemeanor under Section 316.193. On or about April 15, 1981, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of "Manslaughter by Operation of a Motor Vehicle while Intoxicated or Deprived of Full Possession of Normal Faculties." The court withheld adjudication, placed Respondent on probation for two years, and restricted her driver's license to business purposes for the first three months of her probation. Respondent successfully completed her probation on April 15, 1983. On or about September 15, 1992, Respondent completed an application for certification as a fire fighter. The application asked, "Do you have a record of conviction of a felony or a misdemeanor?" Respondent answered, "No." Respondent did not answer the foregoing questions untruthfully. Respondent was advised by counsel that there had never been an adjudication of guilt and that she should state that she had never been convicted of the charges in 1981. On or about September 10, 1993, Respondent completed an application for certification as a fire safety inspector. The application asked, "Have you ever been convicted of a felony, or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude?" Respondent answered, "No." Respondent believed that she had never been convicted of such an offense because adjudication of guilt had been withheld, and she had successfully completed her probation. Petitioner certified Respondent as a fire fighter and as a fire safety inspector. Petitioner relied, in part, upon Respondent's answers to the questions quoted in the preceding paragraphs. Respondent did not intentionally misrepresent her criminal history to Petitioner on either application. Respondent relied on advice of counsel and a good faith belief in the truthfulness and correctness of her responses. Respondent is actively employed as a fire fighter. She is seeking certification as a fire safety inspector to further her career and to obtain employment closer to her residence.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of all of the charges in the Administrative Complaint except the charge of pleading nolo contendere to a felony within the meaning of Section 633.081(6)(d). It is further recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order authorizing the issuance of a written reprimand. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL S. MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 1995.
The Issue The issue presented here concerns the question of the entitlement of Petitioner to be granted certification as a law enforcement officer under the provisions of Section 943.13, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 11B-16, Florida Administrative Code. In particular, the matter to be determined deals with the propriety of the denial of certification in the face of an arrest and conviction of Petitioner for a felony offense, which allegedly would cause the Petitioner to be rejected as an applicant for certification. The denial of licensure is purportedly in keeping with the dictates of Subsection 943.13(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner had made application to be certified as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida, in keeping with the terms and conditions of Subsection 943.13, Florida Statutes. See Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. Petitioner has completed all administrative requirements for such licensure; however, he has been denied licensure based upon his arrest, a finding of guilt and judgment and sentence related to a charge of conspiracy to transport a stolen vehicle in Interstate Commerce and Foreign Commerce from New York, New York, to Miami, Florida, and from Miami, Florida, to Havana, Cuba, knowing that the motor vehicle had been stolen. This offense related to Title XVIII, Sections 2312 and 2371, U.S.C., in an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Case No. 8519-M-CR. For these matters the Petitioner was imprisoned for a period of two (2) years on two (2) counts of the indictment, Counts 3 and 6. The sentence in those counts was to run concurrently. See Respondent's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. Petitioner has had his civil rights restored in the State of Florida, together with his rights to own, possess and use a firearm. Federal firearms disability arising from the felony conviction have also been set aside. See Petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 1 through 3, respectively, admitted into evidence.
The Issue The issues presented concern the question of whether Petitioner, as a surviving spouse of Frederick A. McCall, is entitled to receive a pension, premised upon the fact that Officer McCall died in the line of duty, while employed with the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office.
Findings Of Fact On February 7, 1982, Frederick A. McCall, a uniformed patrol officer with the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office, Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida, died during the course of a routine arrest of a suspect for disorderly conduct and intoxication. Officer McCall is survived by his widow, Delores McCall, Petitioner in this action, who seeks the grant of a survivor's pension, in keeping with Subsection 121.091(7)(c)1., 2/ Florida Statutes, based upon the belief that her husband died in line of duty within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(14), 3/ Florida Statutes. The pension has been denied Petitioner by proposed action on the part of Respondent and that decision is contested by Petitioner in this Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing. The date of hearing de novo was October 22, 1982, and the Recommended Order is being entered as a part of the hearing process. Officer McCall had been employed by the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office for more than ten (10) years. Some of the duty assignments which Officer McCall had performed prior to assignment to the uniformed patrol division included "pawn shop" detail. In that position he surveyed pawn shops to determine if those businesses were receiving illegal or stolen property. He was transferred from that assignment to a burglary detail conducting investigations in burglary cases. Testimony of his supervisors indicated that he performed in a satisfactory manner in those assignments. The only evidence of any problem concerns a counseling session and written reprimand related to over-utilization of a departmental automobile. This disciplinary action report may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence, dating from August 20, 1981. In November, 1981, McCall was transferred to the uniformed patrol division. The basis for this transfer was not established in the course of the hearing. Nonetheless, the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office was satisfied that McCall could perform the duties of a uniformed patrol officer. In that position, McCall was assigned to several duty watches throughout the 24-hour duty cycle. These shifts were eight hours in length and McCall's duty watch would rotate on a monthly basis such that he would serve on each of the eight-hour duty shifts within the 24-hour duty cycle. Among the duty functions of a uniformed patrol officer within the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office are those functions of investigating disturbances "on the street," at business locations and residences. Testimony by various officers within the hearing established that the investigation of residential disturbance causes more apprehension on the part of an officer than those matters "on the street" or in business establishments. This is due to the familiarity of the suspect with his surroundings and the fact that the suspect might be more prone to act in a proprietary way in his home to impress family members or friends, at the expense of an arresting officer's safety. Officer McCall, in his duty shift of February 7, 1982, was dispatched to investigate a disturbance at 1139 North Laura Street, Jacksonville, Florida. This occurred at around 12:50 P.M. on that date. He was in the company of Officer Samuel Aldridge, in keeping with the custom of the Sheriff's Office to dispatch two (2) officers when dealing with residential disturbances. The officers had been informed that the nature of the complaint concerned a disturbance being caused by an intoxicated suspect. McCall was the primary responding officer. When the officers arrived, they went inside the residence and found the suspect Samuel Riley, standing on a stairway. Riley was reported as drinking and had broken out a window in the residence and turned over a can of paint. McCall asked Riley if he was the individual who had broken the window and the suspect informed McCall that he had broken out the window while he was "aggravated." McCall instructed Riley to stand against the wall. Riley complied and a "shake-down" check was made of his person to determine if he was carrying a weapon. Riley was not armed and McCall then took him by the belt in the back of Riley's trousers and began to escort Riley to the door of the residence. This procedure of supporting the suspected intoxicated person is pursuant to a policy of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office. The suspect informed McCall that he did not need to be held by the pants and McCall responded that he would "help the suspect along." During the course of these matters, Riley was advised by McCall that he was under arrest for disorderly intoxication. Before they exited the door, Riley indicated that his shoe was coming off. When they reached the sidewalk outside the residence, Riley again complained about his shoe coming off and turned toward Officer McCall. This movement on the part of the suspect was not aggressive. Aldridge reached to get Riley by the arm and before this could be accomplished, McCall and the suspect toppled to the ground. McCall fell as a result of heart failure, not actions by Riley. Riley got up from the ground and was handcuffed. A rescue unit was called at 12:59 P.M. and left for a local hospital at 1:25 P.M., arriving at 1:31 P.M. At 2:00 P.M. Officer McCall was pronounced dead as a result of a heart attack. Samuel Riley was twenty-four (24) years old at the time of the arrest. He was six (6) feet tall and 185 pounds, and known by the officers to have problems with intoxication. In the course of the incident, Riley had been verbally belligerent but had not been physically aggressive toward the officers and he was not charged with any form of resistance in the arrest process. McCall had gone on duty at 7:00 A.M. on the date of his death and the number of incident responses that he had made in his capacity as police officer prior to the incident with Riley was not established, other than one call occasioned by a burglary alarm which proved to be false. McCall had commented to Officer Aldridge prior to the Riley incident that McCall felt sleepy and that he had a sensation of indigestion. Nether Officer McCall nor the Department had any suspicion of a heart condition on the part of McCall, notwithstanding the fact that he was five (5) feet, nine (9) inches tall and 221 pounds at forty-five (45) years of age. It was only after an autopsy was performed that it was discovered that McCall suffered from a pre-existing heart condition. Testimony of Dr. Bonifacio T. Floro and his autopsy report which is found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 3, establish that the cause of death was heart disease. There was an 80 percent occlusion by atherosclerosis of the left anterior descending and the left circumflex coronary arteries. The right coronary artery had 95 percent occlusion by atherosclerosis at the ostium and the remaining portion of the artery had a 75 percent occlusion. McCall's heart was a Class IV, the most dramatic condition possible in describing the seriousness of the occlusion. Four centimeters away from the ostium of the right coronary artery, a dark reddish gray occlusive thrombus was found. When the heart was transversely sectioned, a transmural white discoloration in the lateral wall of the left ventricle surrounding a 0.5 centimeter subendocardial area of marked hyperemia was found. This latter item indicated that he had suffered a previous myocardial infarction approximately six (6) weeks before. McCall also suffered from arteriosclerosis and his heart was enlarged. McCall's heart was such that stress, when added to the pre-existing condition would affect the oxygen requirement and promote the heart failure. While it is impossible to tell how long Officer McCall would have lived in view of the pre-existing heart condition, and recognizing that he may have died while asleep or by some other sedentary activity, the arrest circumstances involving the suspect was the incident that brought on the fatal heart attack.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has, pursuant to section 435.07, Florida Statutes, demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that she should not be disqualified from employment in a position involving direct contact with children or developmentally disabled persons and, thus, whether the intended action to deny an exemption from disqualification from employment is an abuse of the agency’s discretion.
Findings Of Fact The Agency Action Petitioner seeks an exemption from disqualification to allow her to serve as a direct care service provider for One Mainstream, a direct services provider for developmentally disabled clients. APD is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating the employment of persons in positions of trust, and charged with serving and protecting children or adults with developmental disabilities. Vulnerable populations served by APD include individuals with developmental and intellectual disabilities, autism, cerebral palsy, spina bifida, Prader-Willi syndrome, and Down’s syndrome. Some of APD’s clients are incapable of expressing their needs, or unable to express whether something is wrong. As part of the application process for employment as a direct services provider with One Mainstream, Petitioner was subject to a routine pre-employment background screening pursuant to section 435.04. The screening revealed the existence of two disqualifying criminal incidents (resulting in three charged offenses) in Petitioner’s past. The offenses were described in the Joint Prehearing Stipulations as follows: In April 1998, Petitioner committed her first disqualifying offense, Domestic Violence Battery, a first degree misdemeanor. Petitioner failed to appear before the court and an arrest warrant was issued. Subsequently, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the offense and adjudication was withheld. Petitioner was approximately thirty-four years old at the time of this offense. Petitioner was ordered to pay various court costs/fines. In January 2002, Petitioner contemporaneously committed her second and third disqualifying offenses, two counts of Domestic Violence Battery, first degree misdemeanors. Petitioner failed to appear before the court and an arrest warrant was issued. Petitioner contends there was no physical violence involved in these offenses. Petitioner pled guilty to the offenses and was adjudicated guilty. Petitioner was approximately thirty-seven and nine months old at the time of this offense. Petitioner was ordered to serve thirty days in the county jail and pay various court costs/fines. As a result of the background screening results, Respondent determined that Petitioner was disqualified from further employment in a position of special trust with children or the developmentally disabled. On February 16, 2015, Petitioner filed her Request for Exemption. All such requests are made to the Department of Children and Families, which conducts the initial background investigation. The file was assigned to Beatriz Blanco, DCF’s central region background screening coordinator. By July 10, 2015, the request for exemption had been assigned to Respondent. Daniella Jones, APD’s state office exemption background screening coordinator, requested additional information regarding Petitioner’s drug counseling and anger management courses. The record is not clear as to which items contained in Respondent’s Exemption Review file, if any, were submitted in response to Ms. Jones’ request. Among the items submitted by Petitioner in support of her Request for Exemption were a completed employment history record; information related to her having obtained a certified nursing assistant license; and six letters of recommendation. The Exemption Review file also included Petitioner’s written explanation of the disqualifying offenses and subsequent non- disqualifying incident1/; and copies of law enforcement, prosecution, and court documents related to the disqualifying offenses, a subsequent non-disqualifying incident, and three prior non-disqualifying incidents. Petitioner responded to the best of her ability to each request for information. Among the factors identified by Mr. Lewis as bases for the recommendation of denial of the exemption by staff was the perception that Petitioner’s answers to questions about her past conduct were “immature,” that she did not take responsibility for some of the past incidents, and that she did not show sufficient remorse for those incidents. The exemption request was ultimately provided by APD staff to the director of APD, who entered the notice of denial on August 27, 2015. Petitioner’s Background Petitioner grew up in a tough neighborhood in Brooklyn, New York. Her parents were hard drinkers, and she was raised in an environment in which the use of alcohol was accepted. By the time she was 17 years of age, Petitioner was a drinker and a “brawler.” Over the years, Petitioner’s issues with alcohol led her into drunken choices that resulted in the brushes with law enforcement and the criminal justice system described herein. Petitioner readily acknowledged that she had been an alcoholic during the times when she committed the disqualifying offenses. The Disqualifying Offenses 1998 Disqualifying Offense On or about April 18, 1998, Petitioner was told by a friend that her husband was staying with a girlfriend at an apartment in a nearby town. Petitioner “had some drinks” and went to the apartment to confront her husband. She burst in on the husband and his girlfriend unannounced and became embroiled in a brawl. The police were called. By the time the police officer arrived, Petitioner was gone. The police report,2/ which was based on the statements of the husband and his girlfriend, indicated that Petitioner threw a conch shell at the husband, striking him in the head, whereupon she left the apartment, returning to throw a boot at the husband which missed and broke a clock. Since Petitioner was not on the scene, and based on Petitioner’s testimony described herein, an inference is drawn that the husband and girlfriend painted as exculpatory a picture as possible, omitting anything that could cast any blame on the husband for the incident. Petitioner testified that the altercation was not nearly as one-sided as portrayed in the hearsay police report, with the husband holding her down and choking her at one point. She denied throwing the conch shell, but admitted throwing the boot and breaking the clock. Although the evidence suggests that Petitioner may indeed have thrown the shell, the evidence also supports that the husband was more than a passive victim. Petitioner was arrested for “domestic violence (simple).” She pled nolo contendere to Battery (Domestic Violence), a first-degree misdemeanor. Adjudication of guilt was withheld, and Petitioner was ordered to pay $620 in court costs. 2002 Disqualifying Offense On or about January 23, 2002, Petitioner was involved in an altercation with her boyfriend, in which her sister was involved. Petitioner was, according to the police report, “intoxicated and [ ] belligerent.” Petitioner had earlier received an inheritance from her mother, which she used to buy a house in Tampa, Florida. Her boyfriend moved in with her. The money soon ran out. Nonetheless, the boyfriend would not get a job, would not contribute to expenses, and would not move out. Petitioner and the boyfriend got into an altercation when she tried to evict him, during which Petitioner hit him with a frozen porterhouse steak. Petitioner indicated that she selected that as her weapon of choice, since he was eating all of her steaks but not paying for them. Petitioner was unclear as to the involvement of her sister, Geraldine Dreviak née Schubert, who also lived in Petitioner’s house, but denied that her sister was injured during the fracas. Petitioner introduced a letter from Ms. Dreviak in which Ms. Dreviak confirmed the boyfriend’s indolence, described her participation in requests that he leave, and substantiated Petitioner’s testimony that Ms. Dreviak was not injured. No objection was raised as to the authenticity of the letter, though it was noted that the letter was hearsay. The letter was admitted, and is used in this proceeding “for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence.” § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Thus, the evidence supports a finding that Ms. Dreviak suffered no physical injury in the altercation between Petitioner and her boyfriend. As a result of the altercation, Petitioner was arrested for “simple battery.” She pled guilty to Battery (Domestic Violence), a first-degree misdemeanor. Petitioner was sentenced to 30 days in jail, with credit for time served, and assessed $678 in court costs and liens. Petitioner completed or was lawfully released from all nonmonetary sanctions imposed by the courts, and all fees and costs related to the two disqualifying offenses were paid. Other Non-Disqualifying Offenses Properly Considered Offense In September 2002, Petitioner was arrested in New York with several other persons for Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree, a misdemeanor. The controlled substance was cocaine. Petitioner contended she was wrongfully accused, but pled guilty to the offense and was adjudicated guilty. She testified that she just wanted to be done with the incident, and failed to appreciate the effect it would have in her later life. Petitioner was sentenced to time served and her license was suspended for six months. The incident was not only a singular and isolated event of its kind, but was Petitioner’s last involvement with law enforcement. Improperly Considered Offenses As set forth in the Joint Prehearing Stipulations, Petitioner was involved in the following non-disqualifying offenses: In September 1983, Petitioner committed the offense of Disorderly Conduct. Petitioner was convicted for this offense and adjudicated guilty. Court records concerning this offense were destroyed in compliance with the Criminal Court of New York City’s records retention policy. Petitioner was approximately nineteen years and five months old at the time of this offense. In October 1988, Petitioner committed the offense of Criminal Possession of Stolen Property. Petitioner contends she was wrongfully accused, but pled guilty to the offense and was adjudicated guilty. Court records concerning this offense were destroyed in compliance with the Criminal Court of New York City’s records retention policy. Petitioner was approximately twenty-four years and six months old at the time of this offense. In December 1994, Petitioner committed the offense of Criminal Mischief with Reckless Property Damage. Petitioner pled guilty to the offense and was adjudicated guilty. Court records concerning this offense were destroyed in compliance with the Criminal Court of New York City’s records retention policy. Petitioner was approximately thirty years and eight months old at the time of this offense. Respondent considered it to be significant that Petitioner was unable to provide information regarding non- disqualifying incidents3/ despite the fact that she had no control over New York City’s records retention policy. Mr. Lewis noted that it would have been to the benefit of Petitioner to have provided records of those non-disqualifying offenses since, without those records, Respondent could not fully review that information. In denying the exemption, Respondent considered the information in totality, including the non-disqualifying offenses committed from 1983 through 1994. Petitioner’s failure to provide a “detailed explanation” of those offenses was a factor in Respondent’s decision. Section 435.07(3)(b) plainly provides that: The agency may consider as part of its deliberations of the employee’s rehabilitation the fact that the employee has, subsequent to the conviction for the disqualifying offense for which the exemption is being sought, been arrested for or convicted of another crime, even if that crime is not a disqualifying offense. (emphasis added). Considering evidence of non-disqualifying crimes committed prior to the disqualifying offenses exceeded the powers and duties granted by the Legislature. Thus, Respondent’s consideration of non-disqualifying offenses that occurred prior to the conviction for the disqualifying offenses was error. Evidence of Rehabilitation Petitioner’s last disqualifying offense occurred on January 23, 2002. Petitioner’s last involvement with law enforcement of any kind occurred in September 2002. Petitioner has no arrests or involvement with law enforcement of any kind since then. At some point, the passage of time itself is evidence of rehabilitation. While by no means dispositive, the passage of almost 14 years since the last disqualifying offense is substantial evidence of Petitioner’s rehabilitation. Petitioner showed contrition and remorse for the disqualifying offenses. Petitioner has been married since 2008 to a man that she describes as supportive. Thus, the stresses of the abusive relationships that led to her disqualifying offenses have been alleviated. Petitioner initially provided letters from six persons who were acquainted with Petitioner, two of whom testified at the final hearing. The letters were sincere, left the impression that they were written by persons with knowledge of Petitioner’s present character, and were consistent with and corroborated by the testimony of witnesses at the hearing. When Petitioner filed her Request for Administrative Hearing, she provided letters of support from four additional persons who knew Petitioner, one of whom testified at the final hearing. As with the previous letters, the letters were sincere, and fully consistent with the witness testimony taken during the hearing. Petitioner has been licensed as a certified nursing assistant, though the date of her licensure was not specified. She has not been able to practice under her license due to the issues that are the subject of this proceeding. Petitioner testified convincingly that she has turned her life around, and is not the same person that she was when she was a drinker. Petitioner’s Work History The Employment History Record form that is part of the Request for Exemption requests “employment history for the last three years.” Petitioner provided an employment history that indicated employment from May 11, 2011, to the date of the filing of the Request for Exemption. During that period, Petitioner was employed to perform custodial duties at the First Baptist Church of Weeki Wachee Acres, and worked as a cook for functions held at the church. Her work ethic and performance was, and is, exemplary. In addition to the foregoing, Petitioner has attended to the needs of Billy Bowling on a volunteer basis for the past five or six years. Mr. Bowling, who is 49 years of age, is significantly developmentally disabled. At the hearing, he displayed obvious affection for Petitioner. Mr. Bowling’s mother, Patsy Bowling Anderson, testified that, at one time, the family employed a licensed direct service provider who was unacceptably rude, and upset Mr. Bowling. Since then, Petitioner is the only person outside of her family that Mrs. Anderson allows to care for Mr. Bowling. Mrs. Anderson testified that she had complete trust that Petitioner would do nothing that would result in harm to her son. Her testimony was substantiated by that of Major Anderson. The testimony of the Bowling/Anderson family was credible and compelling, and is accepted as convincing evidence of Petitioner’s rehabilitation. In addition to her care for Billy Bowling, Major Anderson and Mrs. Anderson testified that Petitioner, on her own time and without compensation, provides care and assistance to elderly neighbors, and to children at their church, all without incident. Their testimony is credited, and is accepted as further evidence of Petitioner’s rehabilitation. Additional Clear and Convincing Evidence of Rehabilitation Mr. Lewis testified that when disqualifying offenses involve violence, Respondent looks for evidence of anger management counseling. The information provided to the APD director suggested that Petitioner had undergone no anger management courses that would mitigate the possibility of a recurrence of the incidents that occurred in 1998 and 2002. The lack of such evidence was, in this case, a significant factor in the recommendation of denial to the director. Although the evidence of counseling in the Exemption Review file was spotty, the evidence adduced at hearing from Petitioner and Mrs. Anderson was convincing that Petitioner is an active, and successful, participant in Alcoholics Anonymous. Petitioner acts as a sponsor for others and on occasion, has taken it on herself to conduct meetings when group leaders have failed to appear. She has been sober for more than ten years. Since both of Petitioner’s disqualifying offenses were largely fueled by alcohol, ongoing participation in Alcoholics Anonymous is a more appropriate and effective means of rehabilitation than a class in “anger management.” Petitioner has been fortunate to find herself in what, by all accounts, is an embracing and supportive community. The individuals testifying on her behalf expressed their firm conviction that Petitioner had turned her life around, with Mrs. Anderson, who has known Petitioner for 14 years, characterizing the change as “remarkable.” None of the witnesses could identify any reason to suggest that Petitioner would not be able to provide capable and safe services to children and developmentally disabled persons. Ultimate Findings of Fact Petitioner meets the objective criteria for an exemption from disqualification established in section 435.07(1). When the decision was made to deny the exemption, it appears that APD staff provided the director with information as to non-disqualifying offenses that occurred prior to the disqualifying offenses. It is not known how, or whether, that impermissible information may have colored the director’s decision. Nonetheless, an evaluation of Petitioner’s suitability for an exemption should be made without consideration of those earlier events. The credible testimony and evidence in this case established, clearly and convincingly, that Petitioner has been rehabilitated from her disqualifying offenses, and that she currently presents no danger to the vulnerable population served by Respondent if she is allowed to be employed as a direct service provider. The concerns expressed by Respondent in formulating its intended action, without the benefit of the hearing testimony, particularly those regarding her lack of “anger management” classes and her lack of remorse for her actions, were effectively refuted by the credible testimony at hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities approving Petitioner, Catherine Schubert Rivera’s, request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2015.
The Issue Whether Petitioner violated Rules and Regulations of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office, 3-1.1(002), 3-1.3(066), and 3-1.3(067), and, if so, whether Petitioner should be terminated from his position with the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office.
Findings Of Fact Based on a review of the case file, the Transcript of the final hearing, and the exhibits entered into evidence, the following Findings of Fact are found. On July 13, 2001, Dominguez was assigned to foot patrol at the K-Mart store in South Pasadena, Florida, as a community police officer. At that time he had been employed by the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office for approximately sixteen and one-half years. On the evening of July 13, 2001, Dominguez was standing outside K-Mart talking to an employee of K-Mart, Renee Herrington (Herrington). While talking to Herrington, Dominguez observed a white van and a black sport utility vehicle (SUV) parked in front of K-Mart next to a yellow curb. The area in which the vehicles were parked was marked by a faded “no Dominguez observed the vehicles for a time and when no one moved the vehicles, he decided to cite both vehicles for parking violations. He issued a citation to the white van and then proceeded to the black SUV. The SUV had been parked in front of K-Mart by Maryellen Ruvolo (Ruvolo) while she and her niece went into K-Mart to make a purchase. Ruvolo left the vehicle running, and her sister and two nephews remained in the vehicle. Dominguez went to the rear of the SUV and began writing the ticket. Ruvolo’s sister, Eugenia Quinn (Quinn), got out of the SUV and asked Dominguez to not issue the ticket and allow her to move the vehicle. Dominguez refused her requests and gave the ticket to Quinn. Dominguez started walking in the direction of Herrington, who was sitting on a bench approximately 30 yards away from the vehicles. When Ruvolo returned to the vehicle, Quinn gave her the ticket and told her that Dominguez would not let her move the SUV. Ruvolo turned in the direction of Dominguez and shouted, “Have a nice day, you fucking fat bastard.” Dominguez turned around and went back to where Ruvolo was standing. He wanted to confront her about her comment. Ruvulo started to yell after Dominguez went up to her. He arrested her, handcuffed her, and put her in his patrol car. The charge was disorderly conduct. During the confrontation between Dominguez and Ruvolo, none of the members of the public became involved in the dispute and Ruvolo did not incite any members of the public to participate in the dispute. She never physically or verbally threatened Dominguez. Ruvolo’s actions did not invade the right of others to pursue their lawful activities. Herrington went back inside K-Mart and other members of the public were not disrupted in their entering and leaving K-Mart. Quinn asked Dominquez why he was arresting her sister and he told her that he did not get paid enough to put up with what Ruvolo had said. While he was arresting Ruvolo, Dominguez had requested assistance from another deputy sheriff, Kelvin Franklin. When Deputy Franklin arrived on the scene the confrontation was over. Dominguez asked Franklin to go inside K-Mart and get the address of Herrington, who had witnessed the incident. Dominguez did not request Franklin to take a statement from Herrington. On the way to the jail, Ruvolo apologized to Dominguez, and he told her to shut up. Prior to reaching the jail, Ruvolo stopped for a few minutes in a parking lot and met with his supervisor to get some in-service papers. When they reached the jail, Dominguez was advised that there were six persons to be processed ahead of Ruvolo. Dominguez got out of the patrol car and turned off the ignition. He did some paperwork on the trunk of his patrol car while waiting. He left Ruvolo in the patrol car without air conditioning and the windows rolled up for approximately six or seven minutes. He returned to the vehicle and turned on the ignition and waited to be called to take Ruvolo inside the jailhouse. They waited approximately 20 minutes from the time they got to the jail until they entered it. Ruvolo spent approximately five hours in jail and was required to post bail before she could be released. After arresting Ruvolo, Dominguez prepared his incident/offense report and complaint/arrest affidavit. Dominguez admitted during his testimony that neither the arrest report nor the arrest affidavit set forth facts to establish the elements for the offense of disorderly conduct, the crime for which he arrested Ruvolo. Dominguez told the Administrative Review Board (ARB) that he felt that Herrington’s peace had been disturbed. Dominguez did not talk with Herrington between the time he heard Ruvolo make her remarks to him and the time he arrested Ruvolo. When asked why he had not included any statements from Herrington in his report, he replied, “Laziness.” During the ARB hearing, Dominguez stated that he had no excuse for not completing a thorough report and detailing the elements of the crime. He acknowledged the position that he placed the Sheriff's Office in when he did not do a complete and thorough report. Ruvolo and Quinn made complaints to the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office about Dominguez’s actions. The complaints alleged that Dominguez was rude, intimidating, and unprofessional in his behavior during the July 13, 2001, incident. Ruvolo also alleged her arrest to be false. As a result of the complaints, Sergeant Tim Pelella (Pelella) of the Administrative Investigations Division of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office conducted preliminary interviews of Ruvolo and Quinn. During the course of the interview, Ruvolo recognized that she would have to pursue her false arrest claim through the courts. Pellella referred the matter to the commander of the road patrol division for investigation of the non-arrest components of the complaints. The complaints were referred to Sergeant Jay Morey (Morey), Dominguez’s immediate supervisor. Sergeant Morey talked to Dominguez and Herrington, but did not talk to either Ruvolo or Quinn. Morey concluded that he would not sustain the complaint, but his conclusion was never finalized or reduced to writing. The arrest for disorderly conduct was referred to the State Attorney’s Office for prosecution. The arrest report and arrest affidavit were reviewed by Assistant State Attorney Lydia Wardell, who concluded that neither the report nor the affidavit set forth sufficient facts to prosecute the case. As a result, a No Information was filed by the State Attorney’s Office disposing of the charges against Ruvolo, stating: “The facts and circumstances revealed do not warrant prosecution at this time.” As a result of the decision not to prosecute, the Administrative Investigation Division of the Sheriff’s Office retrieved the complaints from Morey and began its investigation of the false arrest complaint. It is the policy of the Sheriff’s Office not to investigate allegations of false arrest until such time as the State Attorney’s Office makes a decision on whether to prosecute. Dominguez was notified that an investigation was being initiated. Dominguez gave a sworn statement to the investigators assigned to the case. Ruvolo and other witnesses also gave sworn statements. After the investigation was completed, Dominguez was given an ARB hearing. In accord with General Order 10-2 of the Sheriff’s Office, at least one member of Dominguez’s chain of command sat on his ARB hearing. Prior to the hearing, the ARB members are given a copy of the investigation conducted by the Administrative Investigation Division. At the hearing Dominguez was permitted to offer a statement, to respond to questions, and to present additional evidence. The ARB made the following determination: On July 13, 2001, Manuel Dominguez, #52303, while on duty in Pinellas County, Florida; did violate the Pinellas County Sheriff's Civil Service Act Laws of Florida, 89-404 as amended by Laws of Florida 90-395, Section 6, Subsection 4, by violations of the provisions of law or the rules, regulations and operating procedures of the Office of the Sheriff. Violate Rule and Regulation of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, 3-1.1 (Level Five Violation), 002, relating to Loyalty, to wit: Members shall maintain their loyalty to the Sheriff's Office and it's [sic] members as is consistent with law and professional ethics as established in General Order 3-2. Synopsis: On July 13, 2001, you failed to abide by the PCSO Code of Ethics, to wit: You acted officiously or permitted personal feelings, prejudices, animosities or friendships to influence your decisions while in the performance of duty as a deputy sheriff. Violate Rule and Regulation of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, 3-1.3 (Level Three Violation), 066, relating to Performance of Duty, to wit: All members will be efficient in their assigned duties. Synopsis: On July 13, 2001, you failed to accurately document an incident that resulted in the arrest of a citizen of this county. Violate Rule and Regulation of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, 3-1.3 (Level Three Violation), 067, relating to Performance of Duty, to wit: All members will be effective in their assigned duties. Synopsis: On July 13, 2001, you effected an arrest which the State Attorney's Office could not prosecute because you were ineffective in your assigned duties. The violations resulted in a cumulative point total of 75 points. A Level Five violation is given a point value of 50 points. A Level Three violation is given a point value of 15 points. The ARB assigned a total of 25 points for the two Level Three violations and 50 points for the Level 5 violation. There were no previous discipline points added. The discipline range for 75 points is from a ten-day suspension to termination. The ARB recommended the maximum penalty of termination. General Order 10-2 of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office deals with disciplinary procedures. It provides that the termination procedure to be followed is the same as that of a member who is suspended without pay with certain additional procedures. Only the sheriff has the authority to terminate a member of the Sheriff’s Office. A member can only be terminated “subsequent to an Administrative Investigation Division investigation supported by findings and disciplinary action recommended by a Administrative Review Board, and at the instruction of the Sheriff” that the member be terminated. At the time that the ARB made its recommendation that Dominguez be terminated, Rice, the Pinellas County Sheriff, was out of the state. He had discussed Dominguez’s disciplinary case with Chief Deputy Coats (Coats) prior to leaving the state. Rice had specifically authorized Coats to impose discipline, including termination, upon Dominguez that was consistent with the ARB’s recommendations. Coats advised Rice of the findings and recommendations of the ARB. Rice told Coats that he had no problem with terminating Dominguez. Coats signed the inter- office memoranda for Rice, advising Dominquez of the findings and recommendations of the ARB and advising of the decision to terminate Dominguez from employment with the Sheriff's Office. Coats was instructed by Rice to terminate Dominguez. In his deposition, Rice stated that Dominguez should have been terminated and that it was his decision to approve Dominguez's termination. Dominguez did not know the elements of the offense of disorderly conduct when he arrested Ruvolo. He felt that he could arrest her for her inappropriate comments to him. At the final hearing, Dominguez admitted that based on his long career in law enforcement that he should have known what constituted disorderly conduct. Dominguez was insulted by Ruvolo's name-calling and felt that her words were a challenge to the uniform of a deputy sheriff. Dominguez allowed his personal feelings to influence his decision to arrest Ruvolo.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Civil Service Board of Pinellas County Sheriff's Office enter a Final Order finding Manuel R. Dominguez guilty of violating the Rules and Regulations of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office as set forth in September 27, 2001, inter-office memorandum and upholding the termination of Manuel R. Dominguez from his employment as a deputy sheriff with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: William M. Laubach, Esquire Pinellas County Police Benevolent Association 14450 46th Street, North Suite 115 Clearwater, Florida 33762 B. Norris Rickey, Esquire Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 34756 Keith C. Tischler, Esquire Powers, Quaschnick, et al. 1669 Mahan Center Boulevard Post Office Box 12186 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-2186
Findings Of Fact On July 17, 1986, a Probable Cause Panel of the Board of Medicine met to review the investigative report which resulted from a complaint filed against Petitioner by the mother of a deceased patient. Prior to the meeting of the Probable Cause Panel, Robert N. Baskin, M.D., had reviewed Petitioner's office records, the medical examiner's report, the emergency room records and a letter from the patient's mother concerning Petitioner's care and treatment of that patient. Dr. Baskin had concluded that, if subsequently proven, the facts would constitute negligent or incompetent practice of medicine. The panel discussed the information which had been previously provided to it and determined that additional information was necessary before making a final determination of probable cause or no probable cause. The matter was returned to the Department of Professional Regulation for additional investigation. On September 25, 1986, a Probable Cause Panel of the Board of Medicine met to review the investigative report, including the supplemental report containing the additional information requested by the prior Probable Cause Panel. Based on the Investigative report which included Petitioner's office records, a summary of an interview with Petitioner, summaries of interviews with the patient's mother, a summary of an interview with and records of the medical examiner, and a summary of an interview with and the report of consultant Robert Baskin, M.D., the panel found that probable cause existed that Petitioner's activities had violated: Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, by gross or repeated malpractice or by failing to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances; Section 458.331(1)(i), Florida Statutes, now Section 458.331(1)(h), by making or filing a report which the licensee knows to be false, intentionally or negligently failing to file a report or record required by state or federal law, willfully impeding or obstructing such filing or inducing another person to do so; and Section 458.331(1)(1), Florida Statutes, now Section 458.331(1)(k), by making deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations in the practice of medicine or employing a trick or scheme in the practice of medicine. The Probable Cause Panel expressed concern regarding several aspects of Petitioner's treatment of the deceased patient. The panel noted its basis for a finding of probable cause in Count One, the malpractice count: Diabetic ketone acidosis was consistent with the patient's history, and there was "sort of a lack of attention paid about some of [the patient's] complaints"; and One of the two panel members opined that Petitioner "did misdiagnose the symptoms that this patient had", and described Petitioner's practice in this case as "a little sloppy". Further, the consultant's report questioned whether Petitioner recognized the seriousness of the patient's condition at the time of his examination of the patient. This question focused on whether Petitioner had recommended that the patient be hospitalized, but the patient's mother had refused to hospitalize her son. Counts Two and Three of the Administrative Complaint were based solely on whether Petitioner had recommended hospitalization as his records reflected or if, in fact, the mother's contrary version of what had happened was correct. One of the two panel members opined that "Somebody's lying." This was a credibility question to be determined. The Probable Cause Panel found that there was probable cause to believe that Petitioner may have falsified his records, if the Hearing Officer found that Petitioner was the one not telling the truth in this matter. Petitioner's records showed that an addendum was written, stating that Petitioner recommended that the patient be hospitalized. A memorandum to the medical records file by Registered Nurse Betty J. Launius, written after the patient died, explained why Petitioner did not immediately respond to telephone calls regarding the patient's condition. These documents lent some credibility to the possibility that they were done after the fact to protect Petitioner from subsequent litigation alleging malpractice in this case. The Probable Cause Panel recognized that the questions raised by the investigation should be answered or resolved one way or another at an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner disputed the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint and requested a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The case was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to issue a Recommended Order based upon the evidence presented. Division of Administrative Hearings Case No. 87-0276 was assigned. On July 16, 1987, DOAH Case No. 87-0276 was heard in Venice, Florida. A Recommended Order was issued on October 22, 1987, recommending that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained within the Administrative Complaint and dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against Petitioner. The Board of Medicine adopted the Recommended Order and dismissed the Administrative Complaint against Respondent on February 18, 1988. The parties have agreed that the costs and attorney's fees set forth in the Amended Petition for Attorney's Fees filed June 20, 1988 are the amounts in question in this proceeding. Petitioner is a "small business party" as that term is defined in Section 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes. The underlying administrative proceeding was initiated by the Respondent, a state agency. Petitioner was the prevailing party in the administrative proceeding material to this matter. There is no evidence that the transcript of the Probable Cause Panel meeting of July 17, 1986, was provided to or considered by the Probable Cause Panel which met on September 25, 1986. Petitioner incurred attorney's fees in the amount of $6,780.00 to defend himself in the underlying administrative proceeding and also incurred costs in the amount of $3,089.55. The amount of attorney's fees and costs are reasonable.
