The Issue Whether Respondent's license should be revoked as set forth in the Notice of Intent to Revoke License.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating yacht salesmen and brokers. Such authority includes the discipline of yacht salesman as set forth in Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent has been licensed as a yacht salesman in the State of Florida. Respondent first applied for licensure in June of 1994. This license request was granted and Respondent was issued a license for the two-year period 1994-1996. In June of 1996, Respondent applied to renew the license. This license request was also granted and Respondent was issued a yacht salesman's license for the period 1996-1998. On or about April 28, 1997, Respondent was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, a federal violation, and a felony. As a result, Respondent was sentenced and incarcerated. In July of 1998, Respondent applied to the Department to renew the yacht salesman's license. Based upon the information submitted to Petitioner at the time he sought renewal, the Department had no direct information of the felony conviction. In telephone conversations with the Department staff, Respondent did not disclose he had been incarcerated, was living in a halfway house as part of his sentence, and was a convicted felon. In August of 1998, a third party advised the Department that Respondent had the felony conviction. Thereafter, upon such notice, Petitioner took action to seek revocation of Respondent's license. The license renewal for 1998 filed by Respondent was executed on July 7, 1998. Technically, his license expired on June 14, 1998, but he was afforded a grace period within which to process the renewal. To this end the Department attempted to accommodate the renewal applicant. On the license renewal card Respondent submitted conflicting answers. To question (3) which read: Have you been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendere, since initial licensure? Respondent answered "Y." To question (4) which read: Has any judgment or decree of a court been entered against you or is there now pending any case in this or any other state, in which you were charged with any fraudulent or dishonest dealing? Respondent answered "N." An undated letter from Respondent accompanied the renewal card which referred to a prior correspondence with the Department of June 6, 1996, as the explanation for question (4). As to question (3), the letter stated: "a conviction was made on 4/28/98 in the U.S. District Court Southern Florida." Respondent's answer to question (4) was false. Moreover, the manner in which Respondent answered the two questions did not disclose that Respondent had been convicted of a felony or conspiracy to commit wire fraud. More telling of Respondent's attempt to mislead the Department, however, is his failure to disclose any of the foregoing circumstances during telephone conversations with staff seeking to assist him to renew the license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order revoking Respondent's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip Nowick, Director Florida Land Sales, Condos, Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Scott K. Edmonds, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Tracy J. Sumner, Esquire Tracy J. Sumner, P.A. 1330 Thomasville Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings are fact are determined: In this examination for licensure challenge, petitioner, Mason L. Flint, contends that he is entitled to a higher score on the March 1994 deputy pilot examination for the Port of Jacksonville. The examination is administered by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR) on behalf of respondent, Board of Pilot Commissioners (Board). Although the original petition challenged the grade in twelve respects, petitioner now contends that only two items are in issue, item 21 relating to the local knowledge part of the examination, and item 270 relating to the aids to navigation part of the examination. Both are true-false questions. Unlike the more than fifty other professional licensure examinations administered by the DBPR, the seven-part pilot examination requires a candidate to achieve a minimum passing grade on each part, but candidates doing so then compete with each other for vacant positions. In other words, if only one position at a particular port is open, the candidate achieving the highest score above the minimum passing grade is the only candidate receiving a license. In this case, three deputy pilot positions were available at the Port of Jacksonville, and thus the candidates having the three highest scores among those exceeding the minimum passing grade would be given a license. Petitioner finished sixth on the original grading, but after having his examination regraded by the Board prior to hearing, he was ranked number four. By this challenge, he seeks to have his grade changed on items 21 and 270 so as to raise his ranking to number three. In order to preserve the confidentiality of Item 21 for future examinations, it is suffice to say that the item required a response of true or false concerning limitations on vessels leaving the Talleyrand Docks in Jacksonville, Florida. The examination answer key shows true as the correct response. In preparing all questions pertaining to local knowledge, including item 21, the Board's consultant used the U. S. Coast Pilot, a compilation of operational guidelines governing the movement of vessels in the St. Johns River (and Port of Jacksonville). The specific source of authority for item 21 was paragraph (16) on page 153 of the 1993 edition of the U. S. Coast Pilot. That paragraph reads in pertinent part as follows: (16) Outbound vessels: Vessels with a draft of over 23 (sic) feet sailing between Main Street Bridge to, and including, U. S. Gypsum Co. Pier, shall get underway after 1-1/2 hours after flood current with a cut off time at the beginning of ebb current . . . Because Talleyrand Docks lies between the Main Street Bridge and the U. S. Gypsum Company Pier, this paragraph has application to vessels leaving those docks. The 1993 version of the U. S. Coast Pilot contained a typographical error. Rather than "23" feet, the guidelines should have read "32" feet. To correct this error, paragraph (16) was revised in mid-March 1994, or the same month the examination was given, to provide that any vessel drawing more than 32 feet would be subject to the above movement restrictions. However, candidates were advised that only revisions to the U. S. Coast Pilot through January 1, 1994, would be included in the March 1994 examination. Besides the limitation described in paragraph (16), two other paragraphs on the same page of the U. S. Coast Pilot made reference to the correct 32 foot limitation. In addition, the Guidelines of Vessel Movements on St. Johns River, which form the basis for the data in the U. S. Coast Pilot, used the correct 32 foot limitation. Candidates familiar with those provisions should have been on notice that a typographical error existed in paragraph (16). Although the Board's suggested response is arguably correct, the more persuasive evidence shows that the statement in item 21 was confusing and unclear due to the typographical error in the U. S. Coast Pilot and the conflicting provisions on the same page of the source material. Thus, item 21 does not reliably measure the specified area of competency. Under these circumstances, a candidate should be given credit for either a true or false response, or alternatively, the question should be discarded in calculating a candidate's final score. Accordingly, petitioner's grade should be adjusted in this respect. Petitioner has also contended that only a false response is correct since the question implies that a restriction exists because of its use of the words "up to the beginning of ebb current." The evidence shows, however, that a candidate could reasonably reject that suggested implication and properly make a true response. Item 270 requires a true or false response to a statement regarding identifying marks or buoys marking a channel. The item identifies a set of conditions and then states that such a marking "could" properly be made. The examination answer key shows true as the correct response. The primary source of authority for item 270 is 33 CFR 62.43. According to that federal regulation, buoys marking the side of a channel (lateral aids) are always a solid color, and all solid color buoys marking a channel are numbered. The regulation goes on to provide that, in addition to a number, all solid color numbered buoys may also carry a letter suffix to aid in their identification, or to indicate their purpose. They cannot, however, be identified by letter only, but only by number and letter. Because the more credible and persuasive evidence shows that the question, as stated on the examination, clearly suggests that only a letter could be used for identification of a sidemark buoy, the correct response should be false. Therefore, petitioner should be given credit for his answer. The record is not altogether clear as to how changing petitioner's overall grade will impact his ranking. According to the DBPR psychometrician who is in charge of the pilot examination development, both petitioner and the third ranked candidate gave the same response on one of the challenged questions. On the other item, the two gave different responses, but if either response is deemed to be a correct response, it would have no bearing on their overall ranking. The pychometrician added that if an item is challenged and credit given to the protesting candidate, the answer key is changed and all candidates' scores are adjusted to reflect the change in the answer key.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Board regrading petitioner's examination consistent with the above findings and conclusions. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-5327 Petitioner: 1-2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 4-5. Rejected as being unnecessary. 6-8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 14-27. Partially accepted in findings of fact 3-8. 28-39. Partially accepted in findings of fact 9-11. Respondent: 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 9-11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 12. Rejected. See finding of fact 11. Note: Where a proposed findings has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejcted as being unnecessary, irrelevant, subordiante, not supported by the evidence, or cumulative. COPIES FURNISHED: Mason L. Flint 1605 Brookside Circle East Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Wellington H. Meffert, II, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack L. McRay, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Susan J. Foster, Executive Director Board of Pilot Commissioners 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0773
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Swiss national, who resides in Jamaica. His business in Jamaica involves water sports and vacation tours, primarily for European tourists. Petitioner attended a boat show in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, in order to locate a suitable boat for entertainment and tour purposes for use by his business in Jamaica. There, he saw The Lady, a vessel being brokered by Anchorline Yacht and Ship Brokerage, Inc., of St. Petersburg, Florida. On February 28, 1980, Petitioner purchased The Lady from Anchorline for $120,000. Prior to that date, a survey was conducted by Wilkinson Company, marine surveyors, and repairs indicated by that survey were completed at South Pasadena Marina, Inc. At the time that Petitioner purchased The Lady from Anchorline, he advised the broker that he was taking the vessel out of the country. Accordingly, the broker required Petitioner to sign an affidavit that Petitioner had read the provisions of Section 212.05, Florida Statutes, and no tax was collected on the sale and purchase of The Lady. As The Lady was journeying from St. Petersburg across the State of Florida to West Palm Beach in order to reach Jamaica, she started taking on water. She was taken to Lantana Boatyard, where another marine survey was conducted. That survey concluded that The Lady was not seaworthy and, therefore, could not be taken to Jamaica at that time. As one of the required repairs, her engines needed to be overhauled by Cummins in Miami. Accordingly, after the repairs to be made at the Lantana Boatyard were completed, The Lady was taken to the Keystone Point Marina in North Miami, Florida, so that the work on her Cummins engines could be undertaken. During this time, Petitioner attempted to register The Lady in Jamaica; however, the Jamaican Government refused to license or register the vessel since she was not in Jamaica but was still physically located within the State of Florida. As a result of discussion between Petitioner and a Mr. Mathews at Anchorline, on September 18, 1980, the Petitioner made application for a Florida boat Certificate of Title at a tag agency. He reported the purchase price as ten dollars and, accordingly, paid forty cents tax on the transaction. Cummins started the repair work necessary on The Lady's engines while she had been docked at the Keystone Point Marina. On occasion, Petitioner has stayed overnight on The Lady for security purposes. He has had a telephone attached to the vessel for his personal use while on board. On January 7, 1981, Respondent Department of Revenue issued a Warrant for Collection of Delinquent Sales and Use Tax against the Petitioner in the total amount of $9,967.37, representing the follows: Tax $4,799.60 Penalty 4,799.60 Interest 350.17 Filing Fee 18.00 $9,967.37 On January 19, 1981, Petitioner made payment to Respondent Department of Revenue in the amount of $5,167.77, which payment was made under protest and which payment represents the amount of tax, interest, and filing fees, but does not include the amount of penalty. Pursuant to its warrant, the Department of Revenue has chained The Lady to the dock at the Keystone Point Marina. Accordingly, the work being performed by Cummins on her engines has not been completed, and no sea trial can be conducted. As stipulated by the parties, since the Petitioner purchased The Lady, she has been under repair and has never left Florida waters.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED THAT: A final order be entered denying Petitioner's claim for a refund, finding the Petitioner liable for a sales tax equal to four percent of the purchase price, together with interest and filing fees, but finding the penalty assessed against Petitioner to be erroneous and therefore invalid. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October 1981 in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Lechtman, Esquire 801 N.E. 167th Street, Suite 301 North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 John Browdy, III, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Randy Miller Executive Director Department of Revenue 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Gerald A. Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The tug TUSKER is a 120-foot LOA, 396 DWT riveted and steel hull motor vessel, single screw, single deck design with two Polar Atlas diesel engines each rated at 800 BP at 375 RPM. The TUSKER was built in Scotland in 1956, is registered in Canada and was designed and equipped for ocean towing. On February 6, 1981, her draft was 14'6". The propeller is 11'4" in diameter with an 11'3" pitch righthand and turns in a fixed Kort nozzle. The Kort nozzle can be described as an open-end cylinder or ring around the propeller one of whose functions is to keep towlines from becoming fouled in the propeller. The nozzle increases the propeller's thrust but reduces somewhat the effectiveness of the rudder. The TUSKER is equipped with a single rudder, conventional type, mounted on centerline, aft of propeller and Kort nozzle. She is also equipped with a Donkin steering engine on which is superimposed a Sperry automatic pilot and remote controlled steering mechanism. The steering system is hydraulic and can be actuated electrically or mechanically. Normal mechanical operation is effected using the steering wheel on the bridge. Electric power is used to actuate the hydraulic system (which moves the rams which in turn move the rudder right or left) in the three other systems by which the vessel may be steered. One is automatic pilot. Another works off the automatic pilot system with the automatic pilot disengaged and the hydraulic system actuated by a remote control dial attached to a flexible cable. With this system the helmsman can move around the bridge carrying his steering mechanism in one hand. This mode operates on a self-synchronous follow-up system where the operator moves the dial on the remote control and a self-synchronous motor causes the hydraulic system to actuate the rudder to follow the dial. This is the system that was in operation at all times here relevant. The third system of steering, which is also electrically actuated, is a toggle switch, or joy stick, near the wheel which the helmsman moves left or right as he wants the rudder to go. When the lever is held to the right, that hydraulic system is actuated to move the rudder to the right until the lever is returned to neutral or a stop is reached. To move the rudder back to midships the lever is held left (if the rudder is right) until the rudder angle indicator shows the rudder to be back where desired. The barge LIQUILASSIE is a converted tanker 307 feet long with a 60- foot beam and a cargo capacity of 5000 tons. This tank barge can be towed or pushed and is equipped with a notch in her stern to facilitate pushing. Upon entering Tampa Bay on the evening of 5 February 1981 the LIQUILASSIE was in ballast and was drawing six feet forward and nine feet aft. Saltwater was used for ballast. The tug TUSKER and the tank barge LIQUILASSIE had departed Halifax, Nova Scotia, for Tampa and the trip was uneventful until arrival off Tampa on the evening of 5 February 1981. Shortly before reaching the sea buoy the tug changed position from towing the LIQUILASSIE on a 1200-foot line to the pushing mode with the tug's bow secured in the notch in the stern of the LIQUILASSIE. Warwick G. Cahill, Respondent, a licensed Tampa Bay deputy pilot, boarded the TUSKER in Egmont Channel around 10:00 p.m. the evening of 5 February 1981 to pilot the tug and barge to Misener's Marine, a shipyard immediately south of Gandy Bridge on the east side of Tampa Bay. At this time the weather was clear, the tide was rising, winds were southerly at ten knots or less and the seas were light. No significant change occurred in the weather from the time the pilot boarded the TUSKER until the LIQUILASSIE made contact with Gandy Bridge. Pilot Cahill assumed the conn of the TUSKER with Captain Sanderson, the master of the tug, steering using the remote control hand-held dial. The engines were controlled directly from the bridge telegraphs. General discussion with Captain Sanderson revealed that the tug was single screw and that the flotilla combination TUSKER-LIQUILASSIE was slow to turn. At this time the rudder angle indicator was inoperative due to a burned out coil and no spare coil was on board. As a result the pilot could not look at the rudder angle indicator to ascertain the position of the rudder at any given moment. The pilot requested a steering light be installed on the bow of the barge so its rate of movement in a turn could be seen against the background lighting ashore. This was done. Respondent was born in Australia and sailed on foreign flag ships from 1966 until 1970 when he came ashore in the United States and subsequently acquired American citizenship. He resumed maritime employment in 1976 sailing as an ordinary seaman on tugs operated by Gulf Coast Transit Company. He worked his way up from ordinary seaman to master, acquiring his master's license 25 June 1979. From this time until he was appointed a deputy pilot in Tampa Bay in November 1980, he served as master on five tugs operated by Gulf Coast Transit Company. All of these tugs are twin screw vessels varying from 175 gross tons to 435 gross tons. Respondent's master's license authorizes him to sail as master on U.S. vessels up to 1000 gross tons. When he was appointed deputy pilot Respondent was required, as were all other such appointees, to sail as an apprentice with a certified pilot for at least thirty days and thereafter be approved by the Tampa Bay Pilots Association to pilot vessels of not more than 23 feet draft and 500 feet length. After sixty days of piloting this class vessel, a deputy pilot, after approval by the Tampa Bay Pilots Association, is authorized to pilot vessels of not more than 23 feet draft and of unlimited length. Respondent was at this stage as a deputy pilot on 6 February 1981. During the transit of the lower half of Tampa Bay the tug with 14 feet 6 inch draft and barge with the maximum draft of nine feet were navigated outside the channel and did not enter a cut channel until they reached Cut E channel. From the time the pilot came aboard, the tug was running at full speed with shaft RPM at about 110. At this propeller speed and draft of LIQUILASSIE, Captain Sanderson estimated the speed through the water at eight knots. Because of the stiff and slow handling of the tug and barge combination Captain Sanderson suggested to Pilot Cahill before reaching Cut F that at the sharp turns in the channels ahead it might be necessary to slow the tug in order to negotiate these turns. Respondent replied that there was plenty of water outside the channel going into Cut G from Cut F and that they would try that turn without slowing. The turn from Cut F to Cut G is a left turn slightly less than 90 degrees. As he passed between buoys 5F and 6F the pilot directed the helmsman into a left turn which was negotiated without difficulty. The tug and barge settled on Cut G range. The turn into Cut J from Cut G is a turn to the right of about 90 degrees. Here, the depth of the water outside the channel is sufficiently shallow that the TUSKER could ground if she got too far out of the channel. Upon approaching this turn Respondent had someone proceed to the bow of the LIQUILASSIE to stand by the anchors. He reduced speed to slow ahead approximately 1400 yards before reaching turn buoys 5G and 6G (Tr. p. 449) and ordered the helmsman to bring the flotilla to the right. The turn started a little too soon or the flotilla turned too fast, and the helmsman was ordered to slow the rate of turn. As the flotilla straightened the pilot directed more right rudder as the barge and tug were moving into buoy 9J. The flotilla did not respond to the right rudder and the engines were kicked ahead to increase the turning moment. Buoy 9J passed down the side of the flotilla (or was run over by the tug) before the flotilla finally was straightened out in Cut J channel (Tr. p. 451). While proceeding up Cut J channel at slow speed immediately following this incident, the captain directed the steering gear be checked to see if the rudder was answering the commands given through the remote control steering dial. This was the second time since the tug had assumed the pushing position off Tampa Bay that the steering was checked. The first time was shortly after the tug entered the notch when the captain directed the chief engineer to observe the rams on the rudder stock to see if the rudder was moving right and left as directed. On both occasions the rudder was observed by the chief engineer to move from full left to full right to amidships without apparent difficulty. On both occasions the chief engineer so reported to the captain. After straightening out in Cut J the flotilla resumed full speed. At this time, and during most of the transit of Tampa Bay, the current was flooding, i.e., was pushing the vessel northward in the general direction of travel. Misener's Marine is located north of Port Tampa on the east side of Tampa Bay and immediately south of the Causeway approach to Gandy Bridge. To enter Misener's Marine from the south, the preferred course, according to the unrebutted testimony of Respondent, is to continue past Cut K on the same course until the vessel is aligned with the draw span of Gandy Bridge, at which point course is changed to head for the draw span. Before reaching the draw span, course is changed to the right approximately 70 degrees to parallel the bridge as the channel into Misener's Marine is entered. The intended course, after making this turn, as indicated by Respondent on Exhibit 7, is parallel to and 200 yards south of Gandy Bridge. As the flotilla passed Port Tampa the captain remarked that they were moving at a lively clip. Respondent responded that he would slow down before starting the turn. No effort was made to ensure a crew member was standing by to let go the anchors as had been done when approaching Cut J. When one-half mile from the bridge, as observed on the radar screen, the pilot ordered speed reduced to slow and the captain moved the telegraphs to dead slow. At this time the flotilla was moving through the water at eight knots and over the ground at approximately 8.5 knots. The current in this part of the bay was setting northerly towards the bridge about 0.5 knots and it was approximately 40 minutes before high tide and slack water. High tide at Gandy Bridge on 6 February 1981 occurred at 3:07 a.m. (Exhibit 13). When the radar range to the bridge was just over one-quarter mile Respondent directed the helmsman to bring the flotilla to the right. When the response to this command appeared slow and the flotilla was one-quarter mile from the bridge Respondent ordered hard right rudder. Although Respondent testified that at one-quarter mile distance from the' bridge he didn't believe the flotilla would make the turn without hitting the bridge, he ordered the engines ahead full to increase the turning force (Tr. p. 459). When the captain exclaimed they were going to hit the bridge the pilot ordered engines stopped, then full astern. The captain moved the engine controls as directed. As the engines were ordered reversed the pilot left the rudder right full until most of the way had been taken off the flotilla. During this time the bow of the barge continued to move right slowly. As the barge closed on the bridge the pilot shifted the rudder to left full shortly before the bow of the LIQUILASSIE made contact with the third and fourth bridge supports to the east of the center span. At the time of contact at approximately 2:25 a.m., February 6, 1981, the flotilla was making an estimated speed over the ground of approximately one knot. The bow of the barge went under the road span and fetched up on the third and fourth bridge supports to the east of the center span. Continued backing for a few minutes failed to free the barge from the bridge supports. Respondent's witness, Captain John Graham, predicated his opinion that Respondent committed no error on the assumption that he commenced the turn into Misener's Marine at a distance of one-half mile from Gandy Bridge. His testimony (Tr. p. 337) was that "He [Respondent] ran out of options at a quarter-mile except for what he did: full astern. He was already hard starboard. There was no time--his other option was drop the anchor. That's too late." This assumption of distances from the bridge at which certain events occurred is not supported by the evidence and is in conflict with the findings made above, that the tug reduced speed when one-half mile from Gandy Bridge and the command to change course to the right was given to him just over one-quarter mile from the bridge. This finding is consistent with Respondent's testimony that he started the commencement of the turn approaching Gandy Bridge just before he reached the one-quarter mile point and increased to right full rudder at one-quarter mile. In his report of the accident, CG-2692 (Exhibit 15), Respondent also says that rudder was ordered hard right at a distance of one- quarter mile from the bridge. Had Respondent ordered the engine full astern one-quarter mile from the bridge when he realized collision with the bridge was likely, the flotilla would have been stopped before hitting the bridge. Instead of ordering the engines full astern Respondent first ordered full ahead to increase the turning force. Only after he realized this added force would not turn the barge fast enough did he order the engines stopped, then full astern. Local authorities were notified of the collision and ultimately the Highway Patrol regulated vehicular traffic over the damaged bridge. The damage to the bridge supports and barge was stipulated to be approximately $250,000. Shortly after the collision, high tide at Gandy Bridge occurred and thereafter the tide began falling. The bow of the LIQUILASSIE was caught on the piling and it was feared that additional damage to the piling would result as the tide receded and more of the weight of the barge was placed on the piling. The LIQUILASSIE collided with the bridge on a course approximately 30 degrees to the right of normal to the bridge and remained in that position until freed with the assistance of a passing tug at 5:15 a.m. After being freed from the bridge the tug was put on the port bow of the barge to help turn the LIQUILASSIE to the right some 90 degrees to enter Misener's Marine where the flotilla was moored. Immediately after mooring, Coast Guard investigators, in company with the chief engineer and Respondent, checked the steering gear and found the rudder responded fully to the right and left in response to electrically generated commands from the bridge. The time to go from full left to full right was measured and found to be 25 seconds (Exhibit l) On February 12, 1981, while moored at Misener's Marine, the steering gear was again checked for operation from full right to full left and vise versa (approximately 35 degrees rudder angle) for four cycles and the average time from full right to full left was 24.25 seconds (Exhibit 3). The radar on the TUSKER is mounted directly over the wheelhouse. While in the notch of the LIQUILASSIE the distance from the radar to the bow of the LIQUILASSIE would be approximately 110 yards. (307 feet, length of the LIQUILASSIE, plus the distance from the bow of the TUSKER to the radar. No evidence of this latter distance was presented.) Accordingly, when hard right rudder was ordered at a radar range from the bridge of one-quarter mile (500 yards) the bow of the LIQUILASSIE was less than 400 yards from the bridge. If the speed of the flotilla was six knots over the ground and the flotilla remained on course towards the bridge at this speed, 400 yards would be traversed in two minutes. For the bow of the flotilla to reach the intended tract 200 yards south of Gandy Bridge at this same speed over the ground would take just under one minute. Respondent presented an expert witness who testified generally regarding hydraulic steering systems. He had never been aboard the TUSKER to observe the steering mechanism but opined that a leak between the high pressure and low pressure lines could cause what he termed hydraulic stall. This could occur if debris under the valve seat prevented a valve from seating properly and allowed some of the pressure to bleed off from high pressure to low pressure lines. This could reduce the pressure in the high pressure lines, reducing the pressure being applied to the ram to turn the rudder and thereby decrease the force available to turn the rudder. This could result in a rudder not reaching the full right position while the tug was underway when maximum force opposing a rudder turn exists, but allow the rudder to turn to full right or left when dockside in still water. Other witnesses had testified to movement of the large wheel in the wheelhouse while the ship was being steered with the portable steering dial. The expert opined that this movement of the wheel was indicative that oil was leaking from the high pressure lines through the wheel and could cause hydraulic stall. The chief engineer by deposition (Exhibit 16a) testified that in his experience a hydraulic steering system either worked or it didn't and he was unaware of any such system that would one time allow the rudder to go full right or left position and the next time, under the same command, the rudder would go only part way. In the instructions for the Donkin steering mechanism attached to Chief Engineer Michael Ingham's deposition, which was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 16a-e, the Donkin manual, listed as Exhibit 13 to Ingham's deposition, states in part as follows: Under the heading STARTING: 2. Put the change-over cock "B" on the bridge in power position. (When moving gear by local power control the change-over cock should always be in power otherwise the bridge hand wheel will be driven round by the power pump as soon as the control valve is moved.) Under the list of possible faults which may develop in the steering gear and How to locate them and their remedy, the same Exhibit 13 states: Steering gear will not work in either Power, Hand or Local Control. Shortage of oil causing air locks. (See Charging Instructions) Non-return valves (shuttle valves) on the telemotor side of the bridge unit not operating through being fouled with foreign matter or faulty. Drain oil out of bridge unit and examine valve. Steering Gear works in power but not in hand. Non return valves on hand pump side of bridge not seating through foreign matter or otherwise faulty. Remove oil from bridge unit, dismantle and clean thoroughly. Steering gear working erratically. Some- times going hardover, sometimes stopping short and sometimes moving on its own without the hand wheel being moved. 1. Buffer spring connecting the tiller to the hunting gear levers seized or wrongly adjusted. Dismantle spring, clean the stays and make sure they are free to work in the guide plates, assemble and adjust so that all the nuts just come up to the plates as the shoulders on the stays touch the plates. These instructions for the Donkin steering mechanism tend to support the testimony of the chief engineer that the steering mechanism doesn't work fully on one rudder change and only partly on another. No evidence was presented that the change-over cock on the bridge was in power position. On the other hand, no evidence was presented that someone had moved this lever from the position in which it was supposed to be set when the steering was placed in the power mode. Prior to departure from Halifax the Canadian Coast Guard inspected the steering system, particularly the emergency steering, and found it working properly. For the purpose of determining if the Respondent exercised prudence in piloting the TUSKER as the flotilla approached the Gandy Bridge, it is not essential that the steering be found to be operating correctly or erratically. If the latter, the Respondent was, or should have been, made aware of possible difficulties in making a sharp turn to the right as he had recently experienced that very problem while, making the turn from Cut G into Cut J.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto George H. McDonald was licensed as a Tampa Bay pilot by the State of Florida and issued license number 0000074. On October 29, 1986, Respondent boarded the vessel, Kalliope II, at berth 223, GATX dock, to undock the vessel and pilot it out of Tampa Bay. Kalliope II is a Liberian registered vessel of some 17,000 gross tons, 584 feet in length, and at the time of departure from berth 223, had a maximum draft of 34 feet, six inches. The Kalliope II was moored starboard side to berth 223, and two tugs were available to assist in the undocking. Prior to undocking, the steering gear was tested and performed satisfactorily. A physical check of the steering engine room was not conducted. The bow of the Kalliope was swung out in a pivot test to insure the bow was not aground. This was accomplished by slacking the bow lines and taking in on the stern lines. A similar pivot to ensure the stern was not aground was not accomplished. In undocking the Kalliope II, Respondent had the tug Tampa on the stern on a hawser and the tug Orange on the port bow. As the vessel cleared the slip, the Orange was cast off and stood by with the Tampa towing the Kalliope II into Cut D Channel. Because of the deep draft of the Kalliope II, Respondent did not use the vessel's engines in this maneuver. The Kalliope II as noted above, is 584 feet long and Cut D Channel is 400 feet wide. In order to keep the stern from striking the west bank of the channel while backing out of berth 223, it is necessary to pivot the vessel to move the stern northward while keeping the bow clear of the docks. While backing away from berth 223, the only control of the movement used was that supplied by the tug Tampa. Twice the captain of the Tampa advised Respondent that the stern of the Kalliope II appeared to be getting too close to the Davis Island seawall just west of Cut D Channel. The first time this information was passed to Respondent, he directed the tug to come ahead slow, and the second time the tug was directed to come ahead full. Thereafter, the Kalliope II was aligned in cut D channel. At this time, Respondent ordered the engines ahead slow and had the Tampa cast off. The weather was not a contributing factor at this time. At no time between 2200 hours, the time the Kalliope II left berth 223, until the Kalliope II was finally aligned with Cut D Channel, did Respondent feel the Kalliope II touch bottom. While proceeding down Tampa Bay, Respondent noticed the helmsman was using 200 rudder to keep the vessel in the channel, and directed one of the ship's crew to check the steering engine room. When this was done, it was discovered that the steering mechanism had suffered considerable damage, and the vessel could no longer be controlled with the steering gear. Tugs were again called, and the Kalliope II was returned to a dock. Underwater divers surveyed the damage to the rudder, and other surveyors checked the damage to the gear in the steering engine room. Examination of the rudder showed heavy damage with the trailing edge of the bottom of the rudder bent some 25 degrees from the top of the rudder. Build up of streaks of clay on the port side of the rudder, with the rudder damage sustained, is indicative of the rudder striking the bank while the ship was backing down. (Exhibit 5) Examination of the steering gear inside the steering engine room revealed the steering equipment had been seriously damaged and was inoperable. The damage was consistent with damage to be expected if a ship struck the edge of the channel with the rudder while backing down. Divers searched the west bank of Cut D Channel in the vicinity of berth 223 and found an impact area opposite and just north of berth 223. The impact area was approximately 40 feet long parallel to the channel with clay substrata welled upwards through the sand and mud giving the appearance of the embankment having been struck by a large heavy force. (Exhibit 6) Damage to the Kalliope II's steering equipment was in excess $100,000. Respondent has been a licensed deputy pilot and pilot in Tampa Bay since 1980, has an excellent record, and this is the first time that charges have been brought against him.
The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in the activities of a yacht broker without a license in violation of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Department is charged with licensing and regulating yacht and ship brokers and salespersons pursuant to Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. In May 1993, the Department issued a yacht and ship salesman's license to Davis. In 1995, after a formal hearing, the Department revoked Davis' license for misrepresentation in entering false answers on his license application. Davis had been a licensed stock broker with the Securities and Exchange Commission between 1971 and 1991. He failed to tell the Department on his application that the National Association of Securities Dealers had censured him, imposed a fine of $20,000, and suspended his license for two years. Davis attended a Department workshop on yacht and ship brokerage laws during the time he held a license. The workshop covered Chapter 326, Florida Statutes, brokerage activities, and administrative rules. In June 1997, Davis approached Don Gilman of Gilman Yachts with an offer to co-broker the purchase of the Princessa del Mar by his client, William Bond Elliott (Elliott). Davis suggested that Gilman split the commission on the purchase with him on a 50/50 basis. Gilman is a licensed yacht and ship broker. Gilman, who knew Davis personally and knew that Davis had been licensed by the Department, agreed to co-broker the transaction. Gilman was unaware that Davis' license had been revoked. Davis had an office in Palm Beach, Florida, with a local telephone and facsimile machine number. Diana Harvey, an employee of Gilman Yachts who handled the closing and paperwork associated with the sale of the Princessa del Mar, thought that Davis had represented himself to her as a licensed broker. The Princessa del Mar is a 105-foot Broward yacht built in 1984. Throughout the negotiations for Elliott's purchase, the Princessa del Mar was moored at docks in West Palm Beach, Florida. The listing broker for the Princessa del Mar was Richard Betram Yachts, Inc. Gary Fisette (Fisette) was the licensed broker handling the listing. Davis requested that Fisette send him the listing specifications on the Princessa del Mar. Fisette sent the specifications to Davis by facsimile transmission and by mail to Davis' Palm Beach office. Davis and Gilman met with Elliott onboard the Princessa del Mar in June 1997 for Elliott to view the yacht. The two discussed the yacht, including the purchase of the yacht, with Elliott. Davis also discussed placing the yacht into charter service to cover some of the costs of the purchase, operation and maintenance of the yacht. Davis met with both the buyer and seller alone and with Gilman and Fisette. On July 3, 1997, Elliott signed an initial purchase contract, offering $1.5 million for the Princessa del Mar on the condition of a sea trial and survey satisfactory to him. Davis signed the contract on the witness line. On July 16, 1997, Fisette sent a letter by facsimile transmission to Davis at his Palm Beach office with information on the engine rebuild on the Princessa del Mar that Davis had discussed with him. Fisette also wrote that the owner would sign and return the agreement by facsimile transmission. Davis arranged for William Seger to conduct the survey. Davis also arranged for the sea trial, which was conducted along the Intracoastal Waterway in Florida. Davis, Gilman, and Elliott attended the sea trial. Captain John Lloyd piloted the yacht. Davis arranged for some engine repair to the yacht. On August 5, 1997, Diana Harvey sent the executed purchase agreement and addendum to Davis at his Palm Beach office. On the same day, Gilman advised Elliott by facsimile transmission with a copy to Davis at his Palm Beach office that the yacht should be hauled for an inspection of the bottom. Gilman and Elliott met to negotiate the final offer. The closing was scheduled in the Bahamas. On September 3, 1997, Gilman confirmed his conversation with Davis about their agreement to reduce their commission by $4,000 toward the seller's request of an additional $12,000 to close the transaction. At the conclusion of the transaction, Gilman received a commission check from the attorney handling the closing. Davis directed Gilman and Harvey to pay his share of the commission, $19,500, in five separate checks: $5,000 to himself as his commission, $1,000 to Foley Law Office for legal fees for the yacht, $1,000 to A. Stokes and $9,500 to Peter Gollsby for reimbursement for expenses for the yacht, and $3,000 to Bill Seger for the survey. A check for $2,850 was also given to Davis for repairs to the yacht. Davis picked up the checks in person from Ms. Harvey at Gilman Yachts. Davis claims that any brokering activities that he may have done were not done in the State of Florida. He claimed that calls to his Palm Beach office were forwarded to Rhode Island, and that only conversations between him and Elliott concerning chartering services and assisting with Elliott's due diligence activities took place in Florida. Davis' claims are rejected as not credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED That a final order be entered requiring Thomas I. Davis to cease and desist from engaging in yacht and ship brokerage activities in Florida and imposing a civil penalty of $5,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Susan B. Kirkland Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Janis Sue Richardson, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Ashley R. Pollow, Esquire Atrium Financial Center 1515 North Federal Highway, Suite 300 Boca Raton, Florida 33432-1994 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Ross Fleetwood, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: On March 5, 1981, at approximately 6:00 or 7:00 p.m., Captain Thomas A. Baggett, a licensed Tampa Bay pilot, boarded the tug SHIELA MORAN, for the purpose of piloting it and the barge CARIBBEAN from the Big Bend Electric Power Plant, where it had discharged its load of coal, to the Eastern Associated Terminal, where it was to pick up a load of phosphate. The SHIELA MORAN is a 126 foot long, 4800 horse-power offshore tug boat. The barge CARIBBEAN is 480 feet long and 75 feet wide. At the time of the transit, the barge was light and had a freeboard of approximately 12 feet. Both vessels were federally enrolled. After respondent introduced himself to the Master, Captain Andrea Bicchiera, and the First Mate, Ronald DeMello, a discussion ensued between the Master and the respondent as to the appropriate method of pilotage. Bicchiera inquired as to whether respondent would be piloting the vessels from the barge. Respondent told Bicchiera that he would not be going on the barge and would pilot the vessels from the wheelhouse of the tug. A heated debate on this issue followed and respondent refused to pilot the vessels from the barge. The Master thereafter instructed First Mate DeMello to go up on the barge. Because the barge was unloaded and light, visibility to the port side of the barge was obstructed. The deck of the barge was four to five feet above eye level from the wheelhouse. It was the Master's opinion that proper navigation could only be accomplished by respondent from the barge. From the wheelhouse of the tug, respondent was able to see forward, aft and to the right. He could also see the ranges in the channel at three miles forward and less than a half mile aft. He felt that he had no real problem with visibility and that he needed to stay in the wheelhouse near the controls to properly navigate the vessels. He therefore remained on the tug SHIELA MORAN during the voyage between the two ports. It is not the custom in Tampa Bay for a harbor pilot to leave the wheelhouse or pilot house of the tug and go up on the barge, since the pilot would have no control of the vessels from the barge. It is common practice for Tampa Bay pilots to remain on the tug even when their vision is restricted on one side. Another tug (the A.P. ST. PHILLIP) was assisting at the bow of the barge. Near the turning basin, respondent instructed First Mate DeMello and a deckhand to release the stern line of the tugs so that they could swing around. As they attempted to release the stern line, the line fell over and got caught in the propeller of the assist tug. This rendered the assist tug inoperable. Respondent was required to reduce the speed of his tug in order to allow the assist tug time to get out of the way. The loss of the use of the assist tug, the reduced speed of the SHIELA MORAN and the current (ebb tide) caused the barge to set to the port (South) side of the channel. Three or four minutes after the assist tug became inoperable, the vessels went outside the channel and the tug bumped or touched the bottom. Shortly after this episode, the barge scraped a buoy. While the First Mate observed that a buoy went under the barge, no further evidence of a damaged buoy or a damaged barge was presented. It is not unusual for a tug boat to touch bottom during a transit through Tampa Bay. No report of the tug grounding or buoy incident was made. There was no evidence that the SHIELA MORAN was damaged in any manner from the grounding incident. While the respondent's tug and the barge were in "C" Cut, another vessel piloted by Captain O'Connell overtook them on the starboard side. Prior to the overtaking, Captain O'Connell called the wheelhouse of the tug SHIELA MORAN to arrange for the passage. Respondent answered the call and instructed O'Connell, in very clear and distinct words, to pass him very slowly because the tug and the barge were not made up too well. Further on the passage to the Eastern Associated Terminal, and at the time of final docking, there was some dispute between the respondent and the Master as to the proper method of maneuvering the tug, a new assist tug and the barge. The barge was docked without incident. After docking, respondent disembarked by climbing over the barge and crawling down through small hand holes from the barge to the dock. Captain O'Connell, who shared transportation with respondent back to their vehicles, observed nothing abnormal about respondent's behavior or speech during this ride. First Mate DeMello believed that respondent "smelled of alcohol" when he first boarded the SHIELA MORAN, and felt that respondent slurred his speech, was argumentative and was not cooperative. Respondent has been working on tugboats since 1945 or 1946, and has been a Tampa Bay harbor pilot since 1969. It was respondent's testimony that he had had no alcoholic beverages on March 5, 1981, prior to boarding the SHIELA MORAN. The First Mate never told the Master or the respondent that respondent should not be piloting the vessels because of intoxication or incapacitation. At the conclusion of the voyage, the Master signed respondent's pilotage slip.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed against the respondent on November 9, 1981, be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 3rd day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: W. B. Ewers, Esquire Post Office Drawer 9008 Coral Springs, Florida 33075 C. Steven Yerrid, Esquire Holland & Knight Post Office Box 1288 Tampa, Florida 33601 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jane Raker, Executive Director Board of Pilot Commissioners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Respondent Robert F. Park has been a licensed Tampa Bay pilot for some 26 years. All his piloting experience has been in the Tampa Bay area where he has piloted over 9,000 vessels in and out. He has piloted some fifty vessels in and out of the Florida Power Corporation Terminal at Weedon Island. The Florida Power docking facilities at Weedon Island consist of a north and a south pier. The south pier is approximately 1,100 feet long, the north pier is about 700 feet long and the channel or slip in between is approximately 250 feet wide. On August 5, 1982, at 1230 hours, respondent boarded the M/T ZAMORA for the purpose of docking it at the Weedon Island facility. The ZAMORA is a large tanker approximately 590 feet long, and, at the time, was carrying 155,000 barrels of oil. Upon boarding the vessel, respondent reviewed posted documents concerning the vessel in the wheelhouse and observed the condition of the vessel and its crew. He does not recall asking the captain whether the vessel had any particular maneuvering problems or characteristics. The ZAMORA, with two tugs assisting, was to enter the turning basin of the Weedon Island facility and moor, port side to, at the south pier. The A.P. ST. PHILLIP was positioned on the stern and the YVONNE ST. PHILLIP was placed on the starboard bow. The A.P. ST. PHILLIP, having 2800 horsepower, was made up with one headline to the center chock aft, or the Panama chock, so that it could work either the port or starboard quarter of the ZAMORA. The forward tug, the YVONNE ST. PHILLIP, having 3300 horsepower, was made up to push the bow toward the south pier for docking. The placement of the two tugs in this manner is appropriate and is an effective means of maintaining a vessel's approach in a docking maneuver. The YVONNE ST. PHILLIP and the A.P. ST. PHILLIP are among the most powerful harbor tugs in the Tampa Bay area. Two employees of the Weedon Island facility, both of whom had seen over a hundred vessels enter that facility for docking purposes, observed the ZAMORA make its entrance into the slip area between the north and south piers. One of these eye witnesses felt that the arrival of the ZAMORA was unusual because of the speed with which it was approaching the dock, and the angle of the vessel gave the appearance that it was a little out of control. The other witness observed that the ZAMORA, as it entered the slip, "was coming faster than what I normally see for a tanker." (TR 47). Neither of these witnesses were able to estimate, in knots or miles per hour, the actual speed of the vessel. According to the respondent and the captain of the YVONNE ST. PHILLIP, the speed of the ZAMORA upon entering the dock area was between one and two knots. This is not an excessive speed when approaching a dock. Respondent maintained constant radio contact with both tug captains whom he had worked with previously over a long period of time. The initial entry into the Weedon Island facility was without incident. Tidal and weather conditions were good. Respondent intended to head the ZAMORA toward the south dock on a slight angle. It is typical for a vessel's stern to veer to port during a backing maneuver, thus causing the bow to move to the right. The first time respondent backed the ZAMORA was during the entrance to the slip area. When he did so, the vessel backed very strongly to port. At that time, he instructed the A.P. ST. PHILLIP (the aft tug) to swing around and come ahead on the port. At all times, the YVONNE ST. PHILLIP was applying momentum to the starboard bow of the ZAMORA, which had the effect of slowing down the bow's swing to the right. The A.P. ST. PHILLIP was coming ahead and applying force to the stern of the ZAMORA. At some point after the vessel's bow began veering to the right, the line parted on the aft tug A.P. ST PHILLIP. The captain of the YVONNE ST. PHILLIP noticed no difference in the movement or rate of swing of the ZAMORA after the aft tug's line was parted. The ZAMORA's bow continued to veer to the right and ultimately, at approximately 1530 hours, struck the north pier of the Weedon Island facility, causing extensive damage to the pier and damage to the ZAMORA. The annunciator tape or telegraph on the ZAMORA reveals that respondent gave the following engine commands: 1520.5 half speed 1521 slow ahead 1525 stop 1526 dead slow ahead 1526.5 stop 1528 slow astern 1529 stop 1529.5 full astern 1530 full astern 1531.5 stop The second "full astern" command at 1530 constitutes a "jingle" and signifies an emergency situation. Respondent was attempting to get enough sternway on the vessel to swing clear of the north pier and to give the stern tug time to get another line up and proceed onto the dock. This did not occur. It was the opinion of Captain Park that the cause of striking the north pier was the loss of the assistance of the aft tug. It was the opinion of the petitioner's expert witness, based upon his review of the investigative file and the testimony of the forward tug captain, that the casualty would have occurred whether or not the aft tug's line had parted. There was also testimony that, depending upon the actual positioning and movement of the A.P. ST. PHILLIP, the parting of its line could have been beneficial to the ZAMORA in counteracting the vessel's veer to the right. A Marine Casualty Report was filled out by the respondent on August 5, 1982, the same day as the incident. It was received by the Department of Professional Regulation on August 16, 1982. The form provided for such reports advises that the law requires the reporting of a casualty within seven days of the casualty and that failure to fully and accurately complete the report will result in disciplinary action against the licensed State pilot. The form also provides that responses to any question of "not available" are not acceptable responses. The form requires the attachment of a copy of the bell book or ship's log entries covering the casualty and an additional page containing remarks or additional comments concerning the casualty. To the bottom of the form, respondent printed the words "NOTE -- Additional report will follow." It was respondent's intent to obtain a translation of the log book entries written in Spanish. An investigator with the Department of Professional Regulation interviewed respondent concerning this incident on September 9, 1982. Counsel for the respondent informed the investigator that he was making efforts to obtain and supply a translated version of the log book, and that once respondent had that information and the results of an underwater survey, respondent would be fully apprised of the facts and would supplement the Marine Casualty Report. The evidence in this proceeding does not reveal that an additional or supplemental report was ever filed with the petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of negligence in the performance of piloting duties and failure to file a complete written report of the casualty within seven days in violation of Sections 310.101(4) and (5), 310.111, Florida Statutes, and Rules 21SS-8.01(4) and (5) and 21SS-8.07(1)(n) (currently numbered (1)(l), Florida Administrative Code. For such violations, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board impose an administrative fine against respondent in the amount of $1,000.00. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 30th day of March, 1984. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: W. B. Ewers, Esquire Post Office Drawer 9008 Coral Springs, Florida 33075 David G. Hanlon, Esquire Post Office Box 3324 Tampa, Florida 33601 C. Steven Yerrid, Esquire Julia S. Chapman, Esquire Holland & Knight Post Office Box 1288 Tampa, Florida 33601 Joe W. Lawrence, II Director Division of Regulation Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jane Raker Executive Director Board of Pilot Commissioners Deapartment of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the application of the Fort Pierce Pilots Association for an increase in the pilotage rates for the Port of Fort Pierce should be granted in whole or in part, or denied.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and documentary evidence presented at the hearings on April 26- 28 and August 23, 2011, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Parties Petitioner ACL is the largest user of the Port of Fort Pierce (the Port). ACL operates three vessels on a regular "liner" schedule operating six days per week from the Port to a few foreign ports. Approximately 95 percent of the vessel traffic at the Port is generated by these three vessels. ACL is affected by the rates of pilotage set for the Port since it is required by chapter 310, Florida Statutes, to utilize and compensate a state-licensed pilot each time one of its vessels enters or departs the Port. The rates that must be paid by ACL are established by Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Pilotage Rate Review Committee. Accordingly, ACL is substantially affected by and has standing to maintain this challenge to the former Board's preliminary decision set forth in the Notice of Intent. Petitioner IRT owns the terminal at the Port, as well as warehouses, offices and equipment at the Port. The pilotage rate increase preliminarily approved by the Board in the Notice of Intent will make the pilotage rates at the Port higher for the small vessels which can utilize the Port than the rates these same size vessels would pay at the Port of Palm Beach, Port Canaveral and/or Port Everglades. This is significant because IRT competes to attract new business from vessel owners and/or operators whose vessels call on South Florida. Accordingly, IRT is substantially affected by and has standing to maintain this challenge to the Board's preliminary decision set forth in the Notice of Intent. The Pilotage Rate Review Committee (formerly the Pilotage Rate Review Board), Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR), is a state agency created by section 310.151, Florida Statutes. It is established as part of the Board of Pilot Commissioners, and consists of seven members. With regard to an application for a change in pilotage rates, the Committee must investigate and determine whether a rate change will result in fair, just and reasonable rates of pilotage pursuant to chapter 310, Florida Statutes, and rules implementing those provisions. The decisions of the Committee however, are made independent of the Board of Pilot Commissioners, and are not appealable to the Board of Pilot Commissioners. Intervenor Fort Pierce Pilots Association (FPPA) is an association of harbor pilots with one member, William Wetzel, LLC. Captain William Wetzel is, in turn, the sole member of William Wetzel, LLC and is the state-licensed pilot for the Port. The FPPA, through Captain Wetzel and occasionally a cross-licensed pilot from the Port of Palm Beach, perform the pilotage services at the Port. The Florida State Pilots Association, Inc. (FSPA) has a business address in Tallahassee, Florida. FSPA is a voluntary organization representing the interests of Florida’s 97 state- licensed harbor pilots, who participate in the FSPA through the 11 local pilot associations that serve Florida’s deepwater ports. The Piloting Profession Chapter 310, Florida Statutes, sets forth a comprehensive body of regulation addressing the practice of piloting in this state. The purpose of such regulation, as elsewhere in the country, is to ensure the efficient movement of maritime commerce while guarding against vessel incidents that could injure persons and property, as well as the state’s economy and environment. From this standpoint, the most dangerous part of any sea voyage for the ship and for the public at large is when the ship is moving into or out of port. In the maritime industry, the crew of a vessel, which is employed by the ship’s owner or operator, is under significant pressure to bring that vessel into and out of port efficiently and without delays. In light of the risks posed if those economic interests were to override public safety, Florida, and every other state with a significant maritime industry, requires vessels to utilize the services of an independent state-licensed pilot. The pilot is a mariner with many years of experience who is thoroughly familiar with every facet of a particular port and who has the skills necessary to maneuver a wide variety of ships. Because the pilot is not employed by the vessel owner, the pilot can exercise independent judgment, free from the pressures normally associated with the ship’s business operations. The value added by the pilot in terms of safety is widely recognized throughout the maritime industry, as evidenced by the fact that even ships calling on U.S. ports for which a pilot is not required by state law, i.e., U.S.-flagged vessels, routinely use the services of the port’s state-licensed pilots. The risks faced by pilots are unique. Pilots are transferred from their pilot boat out at sea onto and off of large moving vessels. Once the pilot boat maneuvers alongside the vessel, the pilot typically boards the ship by stepping from the pilot boat onto a ladder hanging from the ship’s side. Unfortunately, pilots are frequently injured and sometimes killed in the course of this dangerous transfer, particularly in bad weather. One expert in the piloting profession testified that over the course of a 30-year career, a pilot has a one-in-20 chance of being killed in a boarding accident. Once on board, the pilot must familiarize himself or herself with the ship’s navigational equipment, performance characteristics, and mechanical condition. The pilot conducts a conference with the ship’s master, during which the two exchange technical information on the ship, as well as details of the planned passage. If the vessel is fit for the transit, the pilot then “takes the conn,” assuming navigational control of the vessel and directing the ship’s movements by giving verbal commands on steering and engine power to the ship’s crew. The crew will have varying levels of maritime experience and often speak little or no English. The pilot must deal with a wide variety of ships and equipment. The vast majority of ocean-going vessels are flagged in foreign countries rather than the U.S., thus avoiding a great deal of regulation, as well as taxation. Piloting Selection and Training A mariner wanting to become a state pilot in Florida must await an opening declared by the state’s Board of Pilot Commissioners in one or more ports where he or she has an interest in serving. If the mariner is determined to have sufficient experience and qualifications, the next step in the process of deputy pilot selection is successful completion of a very difficult written examination, designed and administered by the State of Florida. This comprehensive two-day examination encompasses International & Inland Rules of the Road, Seamanship & Shiphandling, Federal & State Pilotage Laws, and port-specific Chart Work & Local Knowledge, and requires the candidate to reproduce from memory a complete and accurate chart of the port and its channels. These examinations are extremely difficult, and candidates will have typically spent several months and hundreds of hours in preparation. Only about 20 percent of those who sit for the exam will pass. The examination, however, is not one where the applicant is only required to achieve a minimum score to demonstrate basic competency. Rather, in Florida, the goal of the deputy pilot candidate is to achieve the top score among all candidates taking the exam. This is because the DBPR Secretary will be presented with a list of the top five scores on the exam and will typically appoint as the deputy pilot the person scoring highest. Once the DBPR Secretary has selected a deputy pilot to fill an opening at a Florida port, the deputy is issued a 12-month temporary certificate. The temporary certificate becomes permanent when the deputy has proven suitable in all respects for continued training as a state pilot. Once in receipt of the temporary certificate, the deputy pilot then begins a minimum two-year training program at the port, as approved and monitored by the Board of Pilot Commissioners. Under the supervision of the fully licensed pilots of the port, this training program allows the deputy pilot to initially handle smaller vessels of limited size and tonnage, with gradual increases in size and tonnage over time. While in training, the deputy earns only a portion of what a full pilot would earn. The Board of Pilot Commissioners approves each deputy pilot’s advancement to a higher level in the training program, after thorough review of the records and the recommendations of the local pilots in the port. Some deputy pilots “wash out” of training and fail to complete the program, never becoming pilots. Upon completion of all training, the deputy pilot must pass yet another rigorous exam administered by the state before he or she can be appointed and licensed by DBPR as a full state pilot for the specific port in which the deputy pilot has trained. The Rate Application and Review Process On or about March 30, 2009, the FPPA submitted an application (the Application) to the former Board, requesting an increase in pilotage rates at the Port. The Application sought an increase in the rates of pilotage at the Port over a four- year period, as follows: 157% in year one, 13.9% in year two, 16.7% in year three and 18.7% in year four. The total requested increase from year one to year five was 206%, from a $150.00 minimum fee before the Application, to a $608.00 minimum fee after the final requested year four rate increase. As prescribed by statute and the Committee’s rules, two contract consultants were assigned to be the Investigative Committee. One consultant, Richard Law, is a CPA, and has served as an investigative consultant on pilotage rate proceedings for DBPR for 16 years. The other consultant, Galen Dunton, is a retired Coast Guard commander with 18 years of experience as an investigative consultant for DBPR in pilotage matters. The Investigative Committee made its initial visit to the Port on July 10, 2009. During this process of investigation, several interested persons provided comments in opposition to the requested rate increase. Following the investigation, the Investigative Committee submitted its findings to the former Board on September 8, 2009. The FPPA requested the following pilotage rate increases in its application: Draft Charge $12.50 Year 1 $26.60 Year 2 $30.25 Year 3 $35.20 Year 4 $41.20 (min. of 10 feet) Tonnage $.015 (min. of 1667 GT) $.060 $.0685 $.080 $.098 Total Min. Fee $150.00 $386.00 $439.50 $512.00 $608.00 % Increase 157% 13.9% 16.7% 18.7% On December 11, 2009, at a Board public meeting, a number of interested persons provided comments and testimony in opposition to and in support of, the requested change in rates. Captain Wetzel, as well as representatives of both Petitioners, addressed the Board. The Investigative Committee included in its Report findings and comments relating to each of the criteria enumerated in section 310.151(5), Florida Statutes (2009). The Board reviewed the Investigative Committee’s findings and the statutory criteria and approved the requested rate increase for Year 1 only. The increases requested for Years 2, 3 and 4 were denied. The statutory criteria reviewed by both the Investigative Committee and the Board (now Committee) consisted of the following: (5)(a) In determining whether the requested rate change will result in fair, just, and reasonable rates, the board shall give primary consideration to the public interest in promoting and maintaining efficient, reliable, and safe piloting services. The board shall also give consideration to the following factors: The public interest in having qualified pilots available to respond promptly to vessels needing their service. A determination of the average net income of pilots in the port, including the value of all benefits derived from service as a pilot. For the purposes of this subparagraph, "net income of pilots" refers to total pilotage fees collected in the port, minus reasonable operating expenses, divided by the number of licensed and active state pilots within the ports. Reasonable operating expenses of pilots. Pilotage rates in other ports. The amount of time each pilot spends on actual piloting duty and the amount of time spent on other essential support services. The prevailing compensation available to individuals in other maritime services of comparable professional skill and standing as that sought in pilots, it being recognized that in order to attract to the profession of piloting, and to hold the best and most qualified individuals as pilots, the overall compensation accorded pilots should be equal to or greater than that available to such individuals in comparable maritime employment. The impact rate change may have in individual pilot compensation and whether such change will lead to a shortage of licensed state pilots, certificated deputy pilots, or qualified pilot applicants. Projected changes in vessel traffic. Cost of retirement and medical plans. Physical risks inherent in piloting. Special characteristics, dangers, and risks of the particular port. Any other factors the board deems relevant in determining a just and reasonable rate. The board may take into consideration the consumer price index or any other comparable economic indicator when fixing rates of pilotage; however, because the consumer price index or such other comparable economic indicator is primarily related to net income rather than rates, the board shall not use it as the sole factor in fixing rates of pilotage. § 310.151(5), Fla. Stat. On March 31, 2010, the Board issued a Notice of Intent to approve in part and deny in part the application by FPPA to increase the pilotage rates at the Port. In its decision, the Board determined findings of fact with respect to each of the criteria listed in section 310.151(5), Florida Statutes. In granting the FPPA’s requested rate increase for the first year the Board approved the following charges at the Port, effective May 1, 2010: A draft charge of $26.60 per draft foot, measured up to the next 1/10th foot, with a minimum charge for ten (10) feet; i.e., $266.00; A tonnage charge of $.0600 per Gross Registered Ton (GRT) with a minimum charge for 2000 GRT, i.e., $120.00; Docking/undocking fees are eliminated; Shifting rates are increased as follows: Same Slip - $250.00 Different Slip - $386.00 A towed barge charge of .0300 per GRT with no minimum charge. Pursuant to section 310.151(5)(a), the Committee “shall give primary consideration to the public interest in promoting and maintaining efficient, reliable, and safe piloting services” when dealing with a requested pilotage rate change. However, the Board is also required to consider additional specific factors in determining whether to approve or deny a requested rate change. Statutory Pilotage Rate Review Criteria The public interest in having qualified pilots available to respond promptly to vessels needing their service. (section 310.151(5)(b)1, Florida Statutes) In its Notice of Intent, the Board accepted the findings of the Investigative Committee as reflected on page C-1 of the Investigative Committee Report. Among other things, the Investigative Committee observed with respect to this criterion: The pilots are essential to the safe movement of vessels within the pilotage waters of the State. In addition to their navigation and supervisory skills, they must be knowledgeable of local weather, hazards, silting, speed and direction of currents, and timing and direction of tidal movements. They provide development of safety and operational guidelines for the port operation and participate in the process of port and professional regulations. Petitioners assert that this record does not support a finding that the use of a state-licensed pilot at the Port is "essential" to safety at the port. Petitioners argue that the captains of ACL's three small vessels have more experience entering and exiting the Port than does Captain Wetzel, and that the use of a state-licensed pilot, although mandated by law, does not increase safety for ACL's vessels, the Port, or the public at large. Petitioner's contention in this regard is rejected. As noted above, harbor pilots must not only possess excellent navigational skills, they must also be knowledgeable of a host of constantly-changing variables that affect the safe transit of vessels within their home port. Moreover, even if the current captains of ACL's three vessels have more experience entering and exiting the Port than does Captain Wetzel, there is no assurance that those same captains will continue in the employ of ACL in the future. The record of the hearing held before DOAH does not contain any evidence to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Notice of Intent with respect to this criterion. A determination of the average net income of pilots in the port, including the value of all benefits derived from service as a pilot. For the purposes of this subparagraph, “net income of pilots” refers to total pilotage fees collected in the port, minus reasonable operating expenses, divided by the number of licensed and active state pilots within the ports. (section 310.151(5)(b)2, Florida Statutes) There are approximately 1,200 state-licensed harbor pilots in the United States. The average compensation for a state-licensed pilot nationally is about $400,000.00 per year. However, state regulatory boards do not set pilot compensation, they set pilotage rates. Thus, a pilot’s compensation depends upon how much revenue is generated by the vessel traffic in that port, net of operating expenses. The pilot in a small port like Ft. Pierce would not be expected to make the same amount as a pilot in a larger port, such as Miami or Tampa. In these larger ports, large draft and tonnage vessels generate higher pilotage fees and this revenue supplements the cost of bringing in smaller vessels. In Ft. Pierce, that is not possible because of the physical limitations of the Port, which will not accommodate large vessels. Higher minimum rates therefore have to be set in Ft. Pierce because of the small size of the vessels, and to compensate a Palm Beach pilot (cross-licensed for Ft. Pierce) for making the two-hour plus drive to Ft. Pierce to handle a vessel if the Ft. Pierce pilot is unavailable for some reason. In its Notice of Intent, the Board accepted the findings of the Investigative Committee, as reflected on page C-2 of the Investigative Committee Report, as corrected at the public hearing, which set the pilot’s net income for years 2007 and 2008 at $112,800.00 and $92,700.00 respectively. In the "Analysis and Decision" section of the Notice of Intent, the Board also stated: Further, the pilots are charged with maintaining or securing adequate pilot boats, office facilities and equipment, and other equipment and support services necessary for a modern, dependable piloting operation. Although the Pilot currently has an arrangement with the Port’s largest user regarding the use of a converted crew boat, the evidence presented to the Board shows that in some aspects this assignment has been less than satisfactory. The Board opines that an increase in pilotage rates sufficient to permit the Pilot to procure an adequate pilot boat and/or secure such services is warranted. (Notice of Intent, p. 10, 11) Compared to the typical piloting operation in which the pilots in a port provide their own pilot boat to ferry them to and from transiting ships, the Investigative Committee determined that Captain Wetzel’s operating expenses were very low, since ACL had been providing the pilot boat in Ft. Pierce. In its Notice of Intent, the Board approved the first year schedule of rate increases only, specifically noting that the increase was intended in part to address the unsatisfactory pilot boat arrangement between FPPA and ACL: Based upon these findings, the Board determines that the proposed three-year schedule of rate increases sought by the Pilot should not be granted in its entirety at this time. The Board finds that a more modest increase to account for the progressively higher operating costs, inflation, and to permit the Pilot to obtain or secure pilot boat services, will provide fair, just and reasonable rates, and will continue to ensure that sufficient back-up pilots will be available to serve Fort Pierce. Accordingly, the Board approves the requested first-year schedule of increase only. (Notice of Intent, p. 12) The FPPA application projected the pilot boat as an expense of $325,000.00, with annual depreciation of $32,500.00. After the issuance of the Board’s decision in March 2010, granting only the first year of the FPPA’s requested rate increase, circumstances dictated that the FPPA purchase a less expensive pilot boat than the one anticipated in the FPPA rate application.2/ Specifically, when Captain Wetzel began to look for a suitable pilot boat, he was significantly hindered by the pending challenge to the Board’s decision. Pursuant to section 310.151(4)(b), the difference between the old rate and the new rate for each vessel movement was being deposited into an escrow account pending resolution of the Petitioners’ challenge, so the increased cash flow could not be relied upon by a lender to secure the loan necessary to obtain the desired $325,000.00 boat. Captain Wetzel and the Petitioners discussed the possibility of continuing to use the Kacey Lynn (owned by I.R.T) as a pilot boat, but negotiations were unsuccessful. Captain Wetzel then had to obtain his own pilot boat and settle on getting a much less expensive one that will not be as durable or long-lived as necessary. Ultimately, FPPA purchased a temporary pilot boat from Ameracat for about $92,000.00 and it was delivered to Captain Wetzel in mid-May 2010. As noted, the evidence established that the type of pilot boat purchased by Captain Wetzel will have a shorter lifespan than a typical pilot boat, because it will not be able to withstand the banging and pounding that occurs when a pilot boat comes alongside a commercial vessel. In order to purchase the Ameracat pilot boat, Captain Wetzel had to withdraw money from his retirement account so he could pay cash for the boat. Petitioners do not take issue with the Board’s decision that an increase in pilotage rates in Ft. Pierce is warranted so that Captain Wetzel can procure an adequate pilot boat. However, they contend that Captain Wetzel’s decision to purchase a pilot boat that cost significantly less than the one contemplated in the Application results in undue income to Captain Wetzel, which should result in the rates being decreased to reflect reduced expenses, including the boat’s purchase price, maintenance costs and interest expense. As will be discussed in greater detail infra, FPPA’s projected costs as set forth in the Application were accurate at the time submitted. The evidence of record does not support a finding that Captain Wetzel intended to mislead the Board in the projected cost of $325,000.00 for a pilot boat, or that he does not intend to purchase a more durable replacement once the escrowed funds from the approved rate increase are released. Rather, given the circumstances of the administrative challenge to the rate increase, Captain Wetzel acted reasonably and of necessity in purchasing a less expensive, temporary pilot boat. Petitioners' contention that Captain Wetzel’s purchase of a pilot boat costing less than the one projected in his rate application will result in undue income to Captain Wetzel (justifying elimination or reduction in the approved rates) is not supported by the greater weight of evidence in this record, and is rejected. The record of the hearing held before DOAH does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Notice of Intent with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the preceding paragraphs. Reasonable Operating Expenses of Pilots (section 310.151(5)(b)3, Florida Statutes) In its Notice of Intent, the Board accepted the findings of the Investigative Committee shown on pages C-2 and C-3 of the Report. The record of the hearing held before DOAH does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. Prior to the rate increase under challenge in this proceeding, the pilotage rates in effect at the Port were unchanged since their initial adoption in 1980 -– a minimum draft and tonnage charge of $150.00 plus a docking/undocking fee of $60.00, for a total minimum pilotage fee of $210.00. In late 2007, ACL stopped having the pilot perform docking and undocking of ACL’s vessels and discontinued payment of the corresponding $60.00 fee to the pilot, reducing the effective minimum pilotage fee for ACL and most other vessels to $150.00. A rate increase application in 2003 filed by the previous Ft. Pierce pilot was withdrawn, based upon an informal, unwritten agreement that Petitioners would provide an old crew boat formerly used on the Great Lakes (the Kacey Lynn) to ferry the pilot to and from vessels at no cost, dropping the $75.00 fee previously charged to the pilot for each use of the crew boat. At that time, the Port was primarily being served by cross-licensed pilots from other ports, as the permanent pilot in Ft. Pierce was injured and unable to continue working. In light of the circumstances, the cross-licensed pilots were not eager to invest in a pilot boat and other infrastructure, so use of the Kacey Lynn, while not ideally suited for safely transferring the pilot to or from a transiting ship, was a useful accommodation while a new permanent pilot was sought for Ft. Pierce. For non-ACL vessels, IRT billed the owners of some of those vessels from $75.00 up to $150.00 for the use of the Kacey Lynn to ferry the pilot to or from a ship. In the only other Florida port in which the pilots do not provide their own pilot boats, Pensacola, the pilot is ferried to and from transiting ships by a tug company that charges $400.00 per trip. As set forth in its application, FPPA’s projected pilot boat cost of $325,000.00 with $32,500.00 per year depreciation is reasonable, especially when compared to the costs of pilot boats serving other ports. Credible testimony established that a pilot boat in a major port would cost $1.2 million to $2 million, with annual maintenance costs typically at 5% of the purchase price. The pilot association in Jacksonville, Florida, recently spent $1.2 million on a pilot boat, while pilots in Miami purchased a pilot boat several years ago for approximately $600,000.00. More recently, the Miami pilots association rebuilt two of their pilot boats at a cost of approximately $350,000.00. In comparison to the cost of pilot boats in other ports, FPPA’s projected operating costs as set forth in its application are relatively conservative. As noted above, Captain Wetzel's purchase of a temporary pilot boat (with correspondingly lower operating expenses) for use during the pendency of this administrative challenge does not render the projected operating expenses in the application unreasonable. Pilotage Rates in Other Ports (section 310.151(5)(b)4, Florida Statutes In the Notice of Intent, the Board accepted the findings of the Investigative Committee as reflected on pages C- 4 through C-7 of the Investigative Committee Report. The record of the hearing held before DOAH does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Notice of Intent with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. Petitioners assert that Table 4 on page C-6 of the Investigative Committee Report understates the FPPA's revenue per handle hour by overstating the FPPA's average "handle time." "Handle time" is generally defined as the time "that the pilot takes the conn to the time he relinquishes it", i.e., the time that the pilot is actually directing the guidance of the navigation of a vessel. According to Petitioners, the average handle time for pilots operating in the Port is closer to 30 minutes per handle than the 1.5 hours per handle used by the Investigative Committee. When a handle time of 30 minutes per handle is applied, Petitioners argue, the FPPA is currently earning $370.00 per handle hour, rather than the $123.00 per handle hour shown in the Investigative Committee Report.3/ There is evidence in this record that until recently, there has not been a statewide standard for measuring handle times. Although the Board of the Florida State Pilots Association recently adopted a definition, the data appearing in Table 4 of the Investigative Committee Report relies upon older historical data (2007 and 2008), which in some cases may be outdated due to the change in the size of ships using various ports.4/ As such, it would be inappropriate to compare the Ft. Pierce revenue per handle hour using a handle time of 30 minutes without also updating the handle times of the other ports used in the comparison. Approval of the Year 1 rate increase would not create a competitive disadvantage at the Port. The pilotage fee is a very small and relatively insignificant factor in the overall decision on whether to bring a ship into a particular port. In light of the considerable operating costs of a commercial vessel, the $175.00 difference between the new minimum pilotage fee in Ft. Pierce and the lower minimum pilotage fee in Palm Beach (the closest competing port) would not be significant enough to warrant shifting a subject vessel from Ft. Pierce to Palm Beach. The amount of time each pilot spends on actual piloting duty and the amount of time spent on other essential support services. (section 310.151(5)(b)5, Florida Statutes In the Notice of Intent the Board accepted the findings of the Investigative Committee as reflected on pages C7 and C8 of the Investigative Committee Report. The record of the hearing held before DOAH does not contain any evidence to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or as a supplement to, the facts relied on by the Board in its decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. Time spent on actual piloting duty includes handle time, transit time to and from the vessel, and administrative time related to that handle. Time spent on other essential support services generally involve matters pertaining to the port in question, e.g., dealing with the Coast Guard on port security or safety issues, dealing with the Army Corp of Engineers regarding the ship channel, etc. In its Report, the Investigative Committee considered "handle time' to be the time the pilot is actually engaged in traveling to a ship, piloting the ship, and returning to home port, i.e., dock to dock. The Investigative Committee did not attempt to verify the historical data regarding handle time but did utilize a shorter figure of 1.5 hours per handle.5/ No compelling evidence was presented that indicates that this 1.5 hour handle time figure was grossly incorrect. While ACL operates a “liner service” with a published schedule that its ships adhere to most of the time, actual arrival and departure times for ACL ships frequently vary from this schedule. Moreover, the pilot must be available to respond to vessels requiring his assistance 24-hours a day, seven days a week. Although the Petitioners argue that actual handle time might make a part-time job for the Ft. Pierce pilot, it does not matter if it is an hour or two hours, it is still a huge time commitment throughout each week to be available and on call to serve the needs of the port. The Investigative Committee also observed: The schedule varies for each day of the week. On Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays he must “mobilize” early in the mornings to meet vessels arriving at 7:00 A.M. and then re-mobilize later in the afternoon to handle the 5:00 P.M. departures. Consequently, the two-step mobilizations increase his daily time requirements by an amount greater than the average handle times. The schedule also requires additional standby time between some of the back-to-back handles. (Investigative Committee Report, P. C-7) The prevailing compensation available to individuals in other maritime services of comparable professional skill and standing. (section 310.151(5)(b)5, Florida Statutes) In its Notice of Intent, the Board accepted the findings of the Investigative Committee, reflected on page C-8 of the Investigative Committee Report, supplemented as follows: As was discussed in the Port Everglades Order, supra, the Board accepts the proposition that the pre-pilot career path is the same for persons who remain as senior bridge officers on American-flagged ships and for those who become pilots. As was noted in the Port Everglades Order, however, pilots are not employees but are rather professional consultants and self-employed business persons who take the risks and accept the benefits of such status. In addition, section 310.151(5)(b)6, F.S., sets the wage rate of “comparable professions” as the floor for pilot income – not the ceiling. As was also noted in the Port Everglades and Tampa Orders, the Board has accepted that the wage rate of senior masters on American-flagged ships varies greatly and, thus, the Board can find no specific number to use as the only acceptable “floor” for pilot compensation. The Board, thus, uses the range of masters’ salaries as a range of “floors” on pilots’ income to be applied depending on the amount of vessel traffic at a port, the characteristics of a port, and the need for pilotage services at a port. Thus, a pilot’s berth at the major ports, such as the Port of Tampa Bay, Port Everglades, Miami, Jacksonville or Palm Beach would be considered as akin to the most prestigious, responsible, and highly paid masters’ berths (Master, Mates and Pilots scale – c. $220,000.00 - $230,000.00 per year) while lesser ports, with correspondingly lesser amounts of traffic and need for pilotage services would have a lower “floor” for income. Nonetheless, the Board also finds that the pilotage rates need to be sufficient to ensure that licensed pilots remain willing and financially able to serve the ports of this State. As reflected in the Report of the Investigative Committee, the current Pilot’s schedule has grown to a full-time position, with no backup pilot available. Thus, the Pilot must rely on cross-licensed pilots from Palm Beach for backup, who currently earn substantially more at their home port. Accordingly, the Board finds that the rates must be increased sufficiently to continue to attract cross-licensed pilots to serve as back up at Fort Pierce, and eventually, if traffic warrants, candidates for a deputy pilot position. (Notice of Intent, pages 7, 8) The record of the hearing held before DOAH does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Notice of Intent with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. While background as a master or mate is useful, a pilot must possess superior close-quarter ship handling skills and the ability to handle a wide variety of vessels. Foreign licensed mariners are not allowed to become a pilot in Florida. There was contradictory evidence on the prevailing annual compensation for masters serving on US-flagged ships of comparable skill and standing to Florida state-licensed pilots, ranging from $143,000.00 - $181,000.00 (inclusive of wages and benefits) to $300,000.00 for union personnel. However, it is significant that these are salaried positions that do not require the employee to invest in infrastructure or training, or to directly participate in the economic risks of the business. Petitioners argue that there are other maritime industry positions, in addition to master of a U.S.-flagged vessel, which are comparable in professional skill and standing as that of a Florida state-licensed pilot. Specifically, Petitioners assert that masters and deck officers of inland vessels and U.S.-flagged integrated tug and barge units (ITBs) require a comparable level of professional skill and standing. Petitioners' witness on this issue opined that the master of an "upper end" inland vessel (e.g., jumbo barge) would make a salary ranging from $116,000.00 to $131,000.00, while a deck officer would make less than $100,000.00. Similarly, the annual salary for the master of a "premier" ITB would range from $106,000.00 to $132,000.00, while senior mates would have total compensation of less than $100,000.00. Generally, pilots receive about 50% more in total compensation than masters on US-flagged ships. This disparity is necessary in order to motivate the most desirable professional mariners (a master or chief mate with 10-12 years of experience) to leave their current maritime employment, including giving up valuable pension benefits, to take on the risks of self-employment as a pilot. This career change entails significant physical risks, civil and criminal liability risks in the event of accidents, investment in infrastructure, management of a business, etc. While Petitioner may be correct that masters and deck officers in other maritime industries are generally compensated less than state-licensed pilots, those employees bear none of the risks of self-employment. The pool of professional U.S. mariners qualified to move into the pilot career path is relatively small -– a little over 2,000, and ports across the U.S. compete against each other to attract the best individuals to piloting. Indeed, ports within Florida compete with each other for the best qualified candidates. While large Florida ports historically would have had 20-30 applicants for a pilot opening, the number of applicants for even large ports like Miami and Jacksonville has decreased in the last 4-5 years. Most recently there were only 11 mariners testing for two openings at Jacksonville and eight mariners testing for three openings in Miami. The pilot in a small port like Ft. Pierce would not be expected to receive the same compensation as the master of a large container ship (or a pilot in a large Florida port like Tampa or Miami), but the compensation must still be high enough to attract and retain a qualified pilot and to pay for cross- licensed pilots as back-up. Pilots in the port of Palm Beach, where each of the five pilots recently worked about 600 handles per year (similar to the number of pilot handles in Ft. Pierce), netted annual income of approximately $150,000.00. Even in a best case scenario, Captain Wetzel’s net income would only match those of Palm Beach pilots, and it is more likely that, due to increased expenses, it will still fall below that level even with the approved rate increase. The impact rate change may have in individual pilot compensation and whether such change will lead to a shortage of licensed state pilots, certificated deputy pilots, or qualified pilot applicants. (section 310.151(5)(b)7, Florida Statutes) In the Notice of Intent, the Board accepted the findings of the Investigative Committee as reflected on page C-9 of the Investigative Committee Report. The record of the hearing held before DOAH does not contain any evidence to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Notice of Intent with respect to this criterion. At the hearing before the former Board, Petitioners disputed the need for any pilotage rate increase to enable the FPPA to purchase and operate its own pilot boat. As of the time of the administrative hearing, the pilot had already purchased a temporary pilot boat, and Petitioners assert that the increase approved by the former Board should be reduced to cover the expenses relating to the pilot boat actually purchased, and operating such boat, but not provide for an increase in net revenue (compensation) to the pilot. For the reasons stated in paragraphs 34-40 above, the Petitioners' contention in this regard is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. In addition, the undersigned notes that the operating expense projections contained in the Application were merely that. . . projections. Moreover, the expense projections, including the $325,000.00 expenditure for a pilot boat, were expressly predicated upon approval of the rate increases requested in the application.6/ Although an applicant must certify that the statements contained in a pilotage rate change application are true and correct when made, expense projections set forth in an application are not binding on the applicant, and the Board (now Committee) has no authority to compel the expenditure of specific funds identified in an application. Given the Board's denial of the requested rate increases (with the exception of Year 1) it was not unreasonable for Captain Wetzel to refrain from making the specific expenditures projected in the application, particularly for a $325,000.00 pilot boat. As noted above, the projections when made were reasonable, but changed circumstances necessitated adjustment of those expenditures. In the Notice of Intent, the Board did not "earmark" a specific portion of the revenue increase for the purchase of a pilot boat, but rather recognized the need for "a modest increase to account for the progressively higher operating costs, inflation, and to permit the Pilot to obtain or secure pilot boat services . . ." (Notice of Intent, p. 12) Projected changes in vessel traffic. (section 310.151(5)(b)8, Florida Statutes) Cost of retirement and medical plans. (section 310.151(5)(b)9, Florida Statutes) Physical risks inherent in piloting. (section 310.151(5)(b)10, Florida Statutes) Special characteristics, dangers, and risks of the particular port. (section 310.151(5)(b)11, Florida Statutes) Any other factors the board deems relevant in determining a just and reasonable rate. (section 310.151(5)(b)12, Florida Statutes) The board may take into consideration the consumer price index or any other comparable economic indicator when fixing rates of pilotage; however, because the consumer price index or such other comparable economic indicator is primarily related to net income rather than rates, the board shall not use it as the sole factor in fixing rates of pilotage. (section 310.151(5)(c), Florida Statutes) The record of the hearing held before DOAH does not contain any evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Notice of Intent with respect to the criteria set forth in 310.151(5)(b)8-12, and 310.151(5)(c), above. Taken in its entirety, the evidence presented by the Petitioners, Respondent and Intervenors in this proceeding with respect to the statutory factors set forth in section 310.151(5)(b) and (c), yielded findings of fact in addition to those found by the Board in its Notice of Intent. There was not sufficient credible and persuasive evidence presented by the Petitioners to support any findings of fact materially contrary to the findings of the Board in its Notice of Intent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Pilotage Rate Review Committee consider the additional facts established by the evidence presented at the hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings in determining, in accordance with its interpretation of its statutory mandate, its expertise, and the appropriate policy considerations, whether the decision on the PFFA Pilotage Rate Increase Application in the Port of Ft. Pierce, filed March 30, 2009, will result in fair, just, and reasonable pilotage rates at the Port of Ft. Pierce. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2012.
