Findings Of Fact The Respondent Karen Kay Colucci, whose license No. is 0062107,is a registered real estate salesman in the State of Florida. The Respondent is employed by Magnolia Homes, Inc., 300 Embassy Boulevard, Port Richey, Florida. The owner of the business is David Lukacher. On May 20, 1976, Harvey Thompson and his wife Mary Thompson looked at model homes built by Magnolia Homes, Inc. They were assisted by a registered real estate salesman for Magnolia Homes, Inc., Patrick D. DePianto. Mr. and Mrs. Thompson told the real estate salesman that they wanted to build a house but wanted to sell their own house first. Mr. and Mrs. Thompson found a lot and model home they desired and then proceeded to Mr. DePianto's office to make a deposit. The office in which the transaction took place is a large room in which several people worked for the builder including the Respondent Karen Kay Colucci who is the sales manager. Mr. DePianto's desk and work area was in rather close proximity to Mrs. Colucci's desk and work area. Mrs. Colucci was not involved in the assistance to the Thompsons in locating a lot and model home and was not directly involved with Mr. DePianto and Mr. and Mrs. Thompson at the time the transaction under consideration took place. At the time of making the deposit Mr. and Mrs. Thompson asked Mr. DePianto if they could get their deposit back if they did not sell their home. Mr. DePianto called over to Mrs. Colucci and asked if a refund could be made if the Thompsons could not sell their house and, satisfied with the answer, assured the purchasers that there would be no problem. A check was written out for five hundred ($500) dollars and handed to Mr. DePianto and a receipt was written out by Mr. DePianto and handed to the Thompsons. There was no representation on the receipt written by Mr. DePianto concerning the refundability of the deposit. The Thompsons did not request that the representation be included on the receipt. Mr. and Mrs. Thompson left the office feeling that there would be no problem obtaining a refund of the deposit if they could not sell their home , although they were confident that the sale of their home was imminent. Thereafter the expected sale of Mr. and Mrs. Thompson's home was not consummated and the Thompsons asked Mr. DePianto for a refund of the deposit. Mr. DePianto asked for the request to be in letter form and Mr. Thompson complied. Thereafter he was advised by Mr. DePianto that the builder, Mr. David Lukacher, would not return the deposit but would hold the $500 until they were able to buy one of their homes and credit that amount to the purchaser. Mr. Thompson requested Mr. DePianto to put the discussion in letter form which Mr. DePianto did. Mr. Thompson wrote Mr. Lukacher a letter and called him on the telephone requesting that the deposit be refunded but no refund was forthcoming. Approximately six months later Mr. DePianto sent Mr. and Mrs. Thompson a check for $250, half of the deposit, plus 7 months of interest at 6 per cent per annum. The remainder of the deposit has not been returned to Mr. and Mrs. Thompson and Mr. Lukacher retains the $250, having previously sent $250 of the $500 deposit to Mr. DePianto. Petitioner Florida Real Estate Commission contends: that the Respondent Karen Kay Colucci knowingly misrepresented to the Thompson's that there would be no problem obtaining a refund of the $500 deposit if the Thompson's could not sell their home; that such representation means the Respondent is guilty of misrepresentation, false promises, false pretences, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in a business transaction and that therefore her license should be suspended. Respondent contends that she was doing other work at the time the subject transaction took place and that she had no involvement with the transaction between Mr. DePianto and the Thompsons. Respondent further contends that in reply to the question posed to her by Mr. DePianto in the busy office that a refund could be made providing Mr. Lukacher, the builder, approved it. The hearing Officer further finds: There is no consistent testimony by the witnesses as to exactly what was said in reference to a refund at the time Mr. and Mrs. Thompson were seated at the desk of Mr. DePianto. There is no consistent testimony as to what exactly Mr. DePianto asked the Respondent or what her answer was. Mr. and Mrs. Thompson failed to request that the receipt reflect that the deposit was conditional and would be returned if the Thompson's could not sell their home. Mr. DePianto did not make the receipt a conditional receipt. Mr. David Lukacher, the builder, refused to refund the deposit to the Thompsons, kept $250 of it, and sent Mr. DePianto the salesman, $250. Mr. DePianto refunded his share of the deposit plus interest to the Thompsons.
Recommendation Dismiss the complaint. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of May, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth A. Meer, Esquire Staff Counsel Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Karen Kay Colucci Magnolia Homes, Inc. 300 Embassy Boulevard Port Richey, Florida 33568
Recommendation Based on the foregoing facts and conclusions of law, I recommend that the information filed herein be dismissed in it's entirety. Done and Entered this 24th day of August, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Walsh and Associates By Gerald M. Walsh, Esquire 404 Courthouse Square Building 200 Southeast Sixth Street Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Milton I. Markowitz, was a licensed real estate broker doing business in the State of Florida. Respondent acted as the individual broker for Ford Realty, Inc. At some time, apparently in 1979, Respondent and Jack Arias discussed the possibility of forming a corporation to be known as Miltjack Investments, Inc., for the purpose of acquiring a piece of property (the property) in Pompano Beach, Florida, owned by Richard F. Brohamer. By Deposit Receipt dated December 10, 1979, an offer to purchase the property was submitted by Miltjack Investments, Inc. to the seller through Cronan Realty, another real estate broker. Respondent signed the Deposit Receipt as president of Miltjack Investments, Inc. The Deposit Receipt, by its terms, indicated that the sum of $10,000 had been placed in escrow with Ford Realty, Inc. as a deposit on the purchase price of $567,000. In fact, Respondent knew when he signed the Deposit Receipt and forwarded it to the seller that Miltjack Investments, Inc. was a non-existent corporation. In addition, Respondent also knew that he had been given a $10,000 check by Jack Arias, his coinvestor, with the knowledge that the check could not be covered by sufficient funds, and that it would not be placed in escrow by Ford Realty, Inc. At no time during the negotiations involved in this proceeding did Respondent ever communicate to the seller, or Cronan Realty, that the $10,000 deposit was not being held in escrow or that Miltjack Investments, Inc. was not an existing corporation. After the aforementioned Deposit Receipt was forwarded to the seller, the seller made a counter offer by Deposit Receipt Contract dated January 11, 1980. This instrument contained several changes, but was, in fact, at some point signed on behalf of Miltjack Investments, Inc. by Jack Arias, as secretary-treasurer, and Mr. Arias' signature was witnessed by Respondent. Like the initial Deposit Receipt, this latter agreement also recited that the $10,000 deposit was in escrow with Ford Realty, Inc. Unlike the initial agreement, however, the agreement of January 11, 1980, indicated that Cronan Realty, Inc. was to act as escrow agent. Pursuant to this agreement, Cronan Realty, Inc. made demand upon Ford Realty, Inc. for the $10,000 deposit, so that it could fulfill its obligation under the last mentioned agreement. Upon receipt of this demand, Jack Arias made demand upon Respondent to return the $10,000 check to him, which Respondent did, and apparently Mr. Arias destroyed the check some time thereafter. For reasons not clear from the record in this cause, the transaction involving the sale of the property never closed.
The Issue Whether the real estate license of Loran V. Carlton should be suspended or revoked.
Findings Of Fact Loran V. Carlton is a registered real estate broker who holds License No. 0013194. Mr. Carlton was employed as a registered real estate salesman in the employ of broker George H. Inman doing business as Inman Realty Company in the years 1973 and 1974 and at the time the subject business transaction took place. On September 11, 1972, Respondent Loran V. Carlton entered into an agreement to lease certain property owned by R. Vance Barden, located in Jefferson County, Florida, which is the property involved in subject real estate transaction. The lease contained an option to purchase property which is the subject of this hearing. Mr. Joseph F. Carrin, a real estate appraiser, appraised the subject property at the request of Respondent Carlton for the Barden estate and submitted an appraisal report dated May 22, 1973. August 10, 1973 Carlton drafted a contract receipt between Virgil R. Norris and Brian T. Hayes, trustee to purchase the subject property for $135,000. It was executed September 1973. A contract was entered into by Carlton dated the 14th day of August, 1973, to purchase said property from Henry Henriquez, as executor of the estate of R. Vance Barden, deceased, for a total cash price of $55,000. On or about August 15, 1973, the executor of the estate of R. Vance Barden petitioned the Court for an. Order of Sale of the subject property based on the exercise of the option contained in the contract between the testator Barden and Respondent Carlton dated September 11, 1972. Carlton purchased said property on August 20, 1973 from Henry Henriquez, as executor of the estate of R. Vance Barden, deceased, for a total cash price of $55,000. By an instrument dated August 1973, Carlton and his wife mortgaged subject property to the Farmer's and Merchant's Bank of Monticello. On or about September 12th or 13th, 1973, Loran V. Carlton and Lucille V. Carlton entered a trust agreement to convey the said property to Brian T. Hayes as trustee. By deed dated September 12, 1973, Carlton and his wife conveyed subject property to Brian T. Hayes, trustee. A title binder on the subject property was sent to Virgil R. Norris on February 12, 1974, which referred to the mortgage of August 1973 between the Carltons and the bank. A Purchase Agreement Extension and Receipt between Mr. Norris and Thomas G. Ellis and Mr. Hayes was executed April 12, 1974. Inman Realty Company was paid a commission of $6,750.00 on April 12, 1975, a portion of which commission was paid Respondent Carlton as salesman for Inman Realty Company. On May 1, 1974 the trustee sent the satisfaction of the mortgage to Mr. Norris. In August or September of 1973 Carlton and Ellis had discussed the purchase of subject property. There has not been a final closing of the transaction as of the date of this hearing. Mr. Virgil R. Norris died November 16, 1975. On April 1, 1976 the Florida Real Estate Commission filed an Administrative Complaint seeking to "revoke or suspend or otherwise discipline" the Respondent Loran V. Carlton for the reason that the Respondent "failed to disclose to Virgil R. Norris or Thomas G. Ellis, Jr. the facts concerning Carlton's personal interest in the subject property," and further charging "that by reason of the foregoing, the Respondent, Loran V. Carlton, is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false pretenses, dishonest dealing, trick, scheme or device, or breach of trust in a business transaction in this state in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes."
Recommendation Dismiss the complaint. DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of January, 1977 in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Room 530 Carlton Building Division of Administrative Hearings Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Louis B. Guttmann III, Esquire Staff Counsel Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Stanley Bruce Powell, Esquire 317 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Louis W. George has been registered as a real estate broker in Florida for seven years; he holds license No. 0030981. At all pertinent times, he has done business as Apollo Realty of Miami, and has been, in addition, co-owner with Allen Scherer of Karma Properties, Inc. In an effort to sell a house he owned at 1105 Sharazad Boulevard in Opa locka, Florida, John F. German placed a classified advertisement in a newspaper. Seeing the ad, respondent George telephoned Mr. German and offered his services as a real estate broker. As a result, Mr. German eventually signed an agreement listing the house with Apollo Realty of Miami for 90 days, which elapsed without a sale, in late 1978 or early 1979. In June of 1979, Mr. German again visited respondent, telling him he would let the property go for $25,000. The following day respondent telephoned Mr. German to say, "I'll take it," to which Mr. German replied, "That was yesterday." Later in the telephone conversation, however, Messrs. George and German agreed on a price of $25,000. On June 29, 1979, respondent presented Mr. German with a form "Deposit Receipt." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. Mr. German lined through $23,500, substituted $25,000, initialled the alteration, and signed the document. Respondent had already signed. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 recites: Receipt is hereby acknowledged of the sum of . . .$500.00. . .from KARMA PROPERTIES, INC. proceeds to be held in escrow by APOLLO REALTY OF MIAMI subject to the terms hereof. . . This offer is subject to obtaining an FHA commitment of not less than $35,000.00 if commitment is less than-the above $35,000.00 this offer will be null and void . . . [I]n case of default by the purchaser. . .the seller may at his option retain one-half of the deposit herein paid as consideration for the release of the purchaser. . . These written provisions notwithstanding, respondent told Mr. German that he would give the $500 deposit to his attorney, rather than place it in Apollo Realty's escrow account. The deal fell through. On November 19, 1979, Albert I. Caskill, Esquire, wrote Apollo Realty of Miami, on behalf of Mr. German: Demand is herewith made upon you for the $500 deposit being held in your escrow account in relation to the above-referenced transaction. We have been notified by the attorney for the purchasers, Lawrence M. Weiner, that his clients will not be going forward with the purchase, and, accordingly, their failure to complete the transaction pursuant to the contract constitutes a breach of the agreement. Please forward all deposit moneys to this office, same being made payable to the seller, John German. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. The house was off the market from June until the end of November. Mr. German never received any money on account of the transaction. (He did not even get the keys back.) Respondent never deposited any money anywhere on account of this transaction, nor did he pay Mr. German any money directly. He testified that he instructed Allen Scherer, the other principal in Karma Properties, Inc., to deposit $500 with Lawrence Weiner, Esquire; that he read Mr. Caskill's letter of November 19, 1979, and passed it on to Mr. Scherer with instructions to "correct" (T. 36) the situation; but only learned that there was no money in escrow when he received the administrative complaint with which these proceedings began. In these particulars, respondent's testimony has not been credited. The parties stipulated that Mr. Weiner would testify, under oath, that he "never held or received any money in connection with the subject transaction." Petitioner filed a proposed recommended order which has been reviewed and considered. The proposed findings of fact have been adopted in substance for the most part. Proposed findings of fact not adopted have been rejected as immaterial or as inconsistent with the weight of the evidence.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner reprimand respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Joel S. Fass, Esquire 626 Northeast 124 Street North Miami, Florida 33161 Adam Kurlander, Esquire 1820 Northeast 163 Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Board of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue At issue herein is whether respondents' real estate licenses should be disciplined for-the alleged violations set forth in the administrative complaint. Based upon all of the evidence, the following facts are determined:
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Juan Rios, was a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0155126 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate. Respondent, Victoria R. Rios, is a licensed real estate broker-salesman having been issued license number 0331183 by petitioner. The Rios are husband and wife and presently reside at 855 80th Street, #1, Miami Beach, Florida. On December 13, 1982, Juan Rios obtained a six-month multiple listing agreement to sell a house located in Hacienda Estates at 11451 S.W. 33rd Lane, Miami, Florida. The agreement was executed by Rios "As Realtor" and by the property owner, Mercedes Garcia. At Mercedes' request, the Rios placed an initial sales price of $145,000 on the home. On December 15, a similar agreement was executed by Rios and Garcia on condominium unit 9B, Laguna Club Condominium, 10710 N. W. 7th Street, Miami, Florida. That property was also owned by Garcia. Although the agreement introduced into evidence does not contain Rios' signature, at final hearing Juan Rios acknowledged that he had executed such an agreement. The listing agreements provided that if the properties were leased during the term of the agreements, the listing realtor would receive a brokerage fee of 10% for such leasing. The agreement also provided that the realtors were not responsible for vandalism, theft or damage of any nature to the property. Garcia is a native and resident of Venezuela, where she owns a radio station. The two properties in question were previously owned by her father. When the father died, apparently sometime in 1982, Mercedes inherited the house and condominium. The Rios were friends of the father, and agreed to list and manage the properties as a favor to the deceased. Mercedes left the country after the agreements were signed, and has apparently not returned. Although she is the complainant who initiated this matter, she did not appear at final hearing. The house at 11451 S. W. 33rd Lane had been vandalized prior to the listing agreement being signed. According to documents introduced into evidence, the property has also been the subject of subsequent vandalisms, the nature and extent of which are unknown. A tenant was eventually procured by Mercedes' aunt in February, 1983 at a monthly rate of $800. The tenant, a Mrs. Ramirez, paid some $4,800 in rents and deposits before she was killed at the home in June, 1983. The Rios spent some $2,644.36 of the $4,800 on repairs to the vandalism and for general maintenance. They also retained a 10% commission for their services, or $480. That left $1,675.64 owed to Mercedes. No lease was apparently ever signed by Ramirez, or at least none was given to the Rios by the relative who procured the tenant. The home was eventually sold to Mercedes' aunt for $85,000.1 None of the rental monies were placed in the Rios' trust account. The condominium unit was rented in June, 1983. The tenant, Oscar Ruiz, had answered an advertisement run by the Rios in a local newspaper. Although Ruiz executed a lease to rent the unit at a monthly rate of $500, the Rios did not have a copy of same, and claimed none was kept in their records. According to the Rios, Ruiz continued to rent the unit through April, 1984, or for eleven months. Total monies collected by the Rios from Ruiz, including a $500 security deposit, were $6,000, of which $3,364.86 was spent for maintenance, utilities, two mortgage payments, and a $500 payment to the owner (Mercedes). An additional $40.33 was spent on a plumbing bill, and $600 was retained as a commission by the Rios. This left $2,724.53 owed to Mercedes. None of the rental monies were placed in the Rios' trust account. In the spring of 1984, Mercedes retained the services of an attorney in Miami to seek her monies due from the Rios. Up to then, she had received no income or accounting on the two properties. The attorney wrote the Rios on several occasions beginning in April 1984, asking for a copy of the lease on the condominium unit, the security deposit, an accounting of the funds, and all other documents relating to the two, properties. He received his first reply from the Rios on May 3, 1984 who advised him that they had attempted to reach Mercedes by telephone on numerous occasions but that she would never return their calls. They explained that rental proceeds had been used to repair vandalism damage and structural defects. When the attorney did not receive the satisfaction that he desired, he filed a civil action against the Rios on October 10, 1984. On October 26, 1984 the Rios sent Mercedes a letter containing an accounting on the two properties reflecting that she was owed $4,400.17 by the Rios. To pay this, they sent a $140 "official check," and a promissory note for the balance to be paid off in 40 monthly installments at 10% interest. They explained that their real estate business had closed, and due to financial problems, they were unable to pay off the monies due any sooner. They also asked that she instruct her attorney to drop the suit. Mercedes rejected this offer and has continued to pursue the civil action. It is still pending in Dade County Circuit Court. At final hearing, the Rios characterized their involvement with Mercedes as a "professional mistake," and one undertaken out of friendship for Mercedes' father. They acknowledged they did not use a trust account on the transactions and that they had used the $4,400 in rental money due Mercedes for their own use. They considered the excess rent proceeds to be compensation for other "services" performed by them on behalf of Mercedes. However, there is no evidence of any such agreement between the parties reflecting that understanding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is Recommended that Juan and Victoria Rios be found guilty as charged in Counts II and III, and be found guilty of culpable negligence and breach of trust in Count I. It is further recommended that Juan Rios' license be suspended for one year and that Victoria Rios' license be suspended for three months. DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of January, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 1986
The Issue The Information filed by the Florida Real Estate Commission against the Respondent charged him with two separate counts of violations of Chapter 475, The first count charged that he had sold real estate within the state of Florida and held himself out as being entitled to operate as a real estate broker or salesman. The count further charges that the Respondent did not reveal this to the Florida Real Estate Commission when he filed his application to be licensed within the state. Therefore, the Commission states Respondent obtained his registration as a salesman by means of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment in violation of Section.475.25(2), F.S. Count Two alleges that the Respondent answered in the negative to Question 14 of said application "Have you filed any application for registration as a broker or salesman in this state which was not granted?" In fact, Count Two alleges that the Respondent had filed an application previously to the one which was eventually granted and had therefore not truthfully answered the above question.
Findings Of Fact The evidence in this case failed to sustain either of these charges. As to the first count, the main witness called by the Florida Real Estate Commission, Annette Frances Brewer, could not identify the Respondent as being an individual who showed her real property and attempted to sell her a condominium unit. As for Count Two, there was no showing that the Respondent's misstatement on said applications was intentional or done for purposes of deception.
Recommendation It is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission take no action against the Respondent, Frank David Camp. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of October, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. KENNETH G. OERTEL, Director Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Wilson, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Bruce A. Koebe, Esquire 2170 N.E. Dixie Highway Rick Carroll Building Jensen Beach, Florida 33457 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, An Agency of the State of Florida, Plaintiff, vs. PROGRESS DOCKET NO. 2566 MARTIN COUNTY FRANK DAVID CAMP, DOAH CASE NO. 76-1035 Defendant. /
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner resides in Riverwoods, Illinois. He has four children, and is married to Sharon Wheat-Hester. Petitioner received his undergraduate degree from Wake Forest University in North Carolina. Petitioner also received a master’s degree and doctorate degree in theology from Share-A- Prayer and Word Theological School in Whitewater, Wisconsin. Petitioner is currently employed as the director of a ministry called Marketplace Movement Network. The ministry provides advice to businesses on Chritian business ethics. In that regard, Petitioner has published one book on the subject of Christian ethics in business. Petitioner is also the President and shareholder of Hester International, Inc., a Florida Corporation that since 1995, provides mortgage brokerage services in the State of Illinois and several other states. The corporation’s principal office is located in Illinois. The business has an established client list and referral list. Additionally, Petitioner is currently licensed as a mortgage broker in the Illinois, California, North Carolina and Hawaii. He has not had any disciplinary action taken against him in those states. On January 25, 1996, prior to the present license application at issue here, Petitioner sought licensure as a mortgage broker in Florida with the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Respondent’s predecessor agency. On the 1996 application Petitioner answered “no” to a question that asked whether he had ever had a license revoked. Petitioner’s 1996 application was denied for a material misrepresentation or omission. Petitioner did not challenge the 1996 denial. On February 16, 2004, also prior to the present application, Petitioner again applied for a mortgage broker license. On this application, question number six asked: Have you had a license, or the equivalent, to practice any profession or occupation denied, revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against which involved fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude? Yes No A “Yes” answer to question six required the applicant to attach details, provide a copy of allegations, and also supply documentation of the final disposition of the case. In response to question number six, Petitioner appeared to have marked both the answers “yes” and “no”, but then circled “yes.” On the second page of the application, Petitioner explained his answer to question number six, stating that he had had a real estate license ten years ago and that he had been involved with a dispute for $2,500 and lost the case. The explanation further stated that Petitioner was moving to Illinois at the time, so he voluntarily surrendered his license. On April 1, 2004, without investigating the facts to refresh his memory, Petitioner provided the requested signed letter of explanation. Subsequently, he withdrew his February application because he did not have time to deal with the ongoing questions the agency had regarding his application. Around July 13, 2004, after discussing the February 2004 application with Respondent, Petitioner submitted a revised Application for Licensure as a Mortgage Broker in the State of Florida. In response to question six, Petitioner marked “no” based on his memory that his real estate agent’s license had been “voluntarily surrendered.” Petitioner also submitted character reference letters. Additionally, Petitioner discussed with Respondent any proof of rehabilitation since the “voluntary surrender” of his real estate license. On page two of the July application, Petitioner wrote that his “only blemish” was a voluntary surrender of a real estate license in 1992. Petitioner stated, “[t]his was ‘not’ an act of moral turpitude or fraud.” In a deficiency letter dated July 28, 2004, the Office requested additional information from the Petitioner, including a signed statement explaining his side of the occurrence. On September 30, 2004, the Office received the same statement the Petitioner had previously forwarded to the Office for his February 2004 application. Petitioner again did not avail himself of the opportunity to discover the true facts surrounding the claimed surrender of his license. In the second paragraph of this explanatory letter Petitioner stated that the disciplinary action that led to surrender of his real estate license arose out of a transaction involving one of his customers who rented property to a third- party renter. Petitioner stated that the rental transaction between his customer and the third-party renter occurred in the lobby of Petitioner’s office without his knowledge or help. According to Petitioner’s, somewhat confusing, explanatory letter, the customer did not have the right to rent the house, but collected $2,500 from the renter and then left the state. Later, Petitioner discovered that the customer had closed in escrow and gained temporary occupancy of the home, thereby enabling the customer to ostensibly rent the home. Petitioner further explained that the renter sued him for the $2,500 and prevailed because the transaction took place in Petitioner’s lobby. Petitioner stated he lost the case because his attorney, Scott Hester (also his brother), was unavailable to make the closing argument and Petitioner had to do his own summation. In fact, Petitioner’s brother never represented Petitioner in the renter’s case because he did not have time to undertake the case. Petitioner did not supply the names of the people referenced in the letter because he did not remember them. As will be seen, at the time of the explanatory letter, Petitioner’s memory of the facts surrounding his license surrender is, at best, faulty. On April 19, 2005, the Office issued its Denial Letter, denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker. As grounds for denial under Section 494.041(2)(c), (g), (i) and (q), Florida Statutes, the letter stated in relevant part: The Office’s background investigation and information you provided revealed the following: You answered Question #6 on your application as “no”, when it asks if you have had a license, or the equivalent, to practice any profession or occupation denied, revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against which involved fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude. On or about May 7, 1996, the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance, denied your application for a license as a mortgage broker for making a material misstatement of fact on their application. On or about December 8, 1992, after the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate conducted an investigation, you surrendered your license with that agency and entered into a written agreement stating that you agreed to have your license revoked. Accordingly, the Real Estate Commission did revoke your license in their meeting of January 19, 1993 effective December 8, 1992. The Investigative Report attached to the Final Order to revoke reveals that you were sued for dishonest conduct and subsequently, on March 25, 1992, ordered to pay Johannes Fruhwirt $7,800 plus post- judgment interest. This order was by the County Court of Broward County as a result of a Final Judgment, Case #9103333 CC53 and a Writ of Execution. The investigation revealed that Hester left the State of Florida without leaving word of his whereabouts. Apparently, that judgment was never satisfied. On May 14, 1991 you promised to pay $3000 to Leonard Schoenfeld when closing occurred on a home Mr. Schoenfeld was purchasing. Closing occurred shortly afterward, and you have never made that payment. On or about July 17, 1995, the State of Illinois received an Application Form to Operate as a Residential Mortgage Licensee in the name of Hester International, Inc. on which you were listed as 50% owner. You signed the “Verification” portion of that form and your signature was notarized on June 20, 1995 indicating that you verified as being true all data entered onto that form. However, you responded “N/A” to Part III, Question #10 which asks that you list all licenses which you or your firm have applied for and been denied and/or any and all licenses issued to you or your firm which were subsequently suspended or revoked. You therefore failed to disclose the revocation of your license with the Florida Division of Real Estate that occurred in 1992. On the same application filed with the State of Illinois, in response to Part III, question 19(m), you did not disclose that a judgment had been entered against you on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit. The renewal for Hester International Inc., with the State of Illinois, states under the section labeled, “Averment of License” in item “s” that the licensee will advise the Commissioner in writing of any changes to the information submitted on the most recent application for license within 30 days of said change. The State of Illinois reports that you never disclosed the denial of a mortgage broker license in 1996 with the State of Florida . (i) On November 18, 2004 in an electronic filing for corporation reinstatement for Hester International, Inc., you certified that as Registered Agent you maintained an office at 6278 N. Federal Highway, Suite #305 in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. In fact, that address is a mail drop leased to one Carl Thames, CPA. The signage required by Section 48.091(2), Florida Statutes, does not appear, and you and Hester International, Inc. are unknown at this location. In pre-hearing interrogatories, the Office asked Petitioner to provide more information about the transaction involving the transaction that had led to the revocation of his real estate license, including the identity of those individuals. Even though the importance of accuracy was apparent since Petitioner was now in litigation, Petitioner, again, without investigating the facts and relying solely on his improving memory answered the interrogatories posed to him. In his answers, Petitioner identified the “customer” who had collected the money as Leonard Schoenfeld and the “renter” as Johannes Fruhwirt. Petitioner went on, in his answers, to describe the transaction with Mr. Schoenfeld and Mr. Fruhwirt. This description is similar to the explanation offered in the explanatory letters supplied for his earlier applications. In his response to Requests for Admissions, Petitioner denied that in May of 1991 he acted as a real estate broker in the auction of a home located at 14884 Equestrian Way in Wellington, Palm Beach County, Florida, and that he had been unable to deliver a mortgage at an agreed interest rate. Petitioner also denied that he had agreed to pay $3,000 for closing costs as deferred interest payments. Despite these denials, Petitioner admitted that he had signed an agreement to pay $3,000 to Mr. Schoenfeld. Petitioner explained these denials by claiming that these funds were never due because the agreement to pay $3,000 was contingent on closing. Since the real estate deal never closed, the $3,000 was never due. At his July 15, 2005, deposition, Petitioner essentially reaffirmed the inaccurate account of events in his interrogatory answers. At the deposition, Petitioner was asked to review documents related to the Schoenfeld transaction. Those documents included: (1) a copy of the May 14, 1991, agreement wherein he agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000, (2) a handwritten letter wherein he agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld the money that he owed him, and (3) a warranty deed on property purchased by Mr. Schoenfeld. When he was shown the May 14, 1991, agreement, Respondent testified that he did not know why he would have agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000. Even when he was shown the deed on the property and even though he had notarized the signatures on that deed, Petitioner maintained that the deal never closed and he never owed the $3000. At hearing, Petitioner’s various and growing explanations during discovery significantly differ from his testimony. Petitioner testified that throughout his various explanations he had confused and combined several individuals into one transaction. Even though he knew that the true facts of these transactions were important to consideration of his application and in answering discovery in this case, Petitioner did not make any real attempt to refresh his memory of these transactions until shortly before the hearing. In fact, the Schoenfeld and Fruhwirt transactions involved different real estate deals and had nothing to do with each other. The Schoenfeld transaction occurred in 1991 and involved the sale of real property located at 14884 Equestrian Way in Wellington, Florida. Mr. Schoenfeld was Petitioner’s customer. As part of the transaction, Petitioner guaranteed he could get a mortgage at a certain rate. After failing to get Mr. Schoenfeld a mortgage at a certain rate, Petitioner agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000 upon closing. When Petitioner failed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld the $3,000 on closing, he asked Mr. Schoenfeld if he could make payments of $200 a month. In a letter to Mr.Schoenfeld, Petitioner confirmed that he would pay Mr. Schoenfeld the amount that was owed. Petitioner made two payments and then stopped making payments. In a letter dated July 1, 1991, Mr. Schoenfeld complained about his dealings with Petitioner to the Division of Real Estate. A few days before Mr. Schoenfeld’s deposition on July 25, 2005, Petitioner paid Mr. Schoenfeld $2,600. Mr. Schoenfeld accepted the payment since the money was still owed to him. However, the payment had been delayed for 14 years and did not include interest for those years. Petitioner testified that he made the payment because, once he remembered the details of the transaction, he felt morally obligated to pay Mr. Schoenfeld what he had promised. However, fulfillment of this obligation also occurred with this litigation pending and after denials that any money was due Mr. Schoenfeld. In short, Petitioner did not pay Mr. Schoenfeld the money that was due him for 14 years until Petitioner was forced to acknowledge the true facts of the Schoenfeld transaction in this litigation. The Fruhwirt transaction involved a man named Mark Ritter who was a client of Petitioner. Mr. Fruhwirt met with Mark Ritter at a house he wanted to rent. Eventually, Mr. Ritter sent him to Petitioner to complete a lease agreement. Mr. Ritter did not know about leases and said Petitioner was a friend whose real estate office could set up the lease contract. Mr. Fruhwirt met Petitioner at his real estate office. Since it was lunchtime, they went to a nearby Burger King to finalize the lease. While at Burger King, Mr. Fruhwirt paid Petitioner $2,850 on the lease. Petitioner’s testified that he did not receive any money from Mr. Fruhwirt and did not accompany Mr. Fruhwirt to Burger King. Petitioner testified that Mr. Ritter and Mr. Fruhwirt met in his lobby and both went to Burger King to finalize the lease arrangement. However, given Petitioner’s past faulty memory, Petitioner’s testimony is not credible. At some point, Mr. Fruhwirt moved into the house. Subsequently, Mr. Fruhwirt received a letter from an attorney representing the real owner demanding that he vacate the premises. Mr. Fruhwirt then discovered that Mr. Ritter was not the owner and had to hire an attorney to sort out his continued occupancy of the property. Eventually Mr. Fruwhirt bought this property. Mr. Fruhwirt sued Petitioner and the real estate office for the recovery of the $2,850 he had paid to rent the house. Petitioner was found liable, but the real estate office was found not liable because the transaction happened off its premises at Burger King. On March 25, 1992, the Broward County Court entered a judgment of $7,800 against Petitioner, finding that Petitioner had “breached his duty to disclose that Mark Ritter was not the owner of the involved property.” After Mr. Fruhwirt obtained the judgment, Petitioner declared bankruptcy. Mr. Fruhwirt pursued an adversary action in Petitioner’s bankruptcy proceedings. Subsequently, the Bankruptcy Court cited “11 U.S.C. 523 A(2) and 11 U.S.C. 523 A(4)” and refused to discharge the judgment debt. The Bankruptcy Court’s Order refusing to discharge the debt clearly conflicts with Dr. Hester’s repeated implications and statements that this debt was discharged in bankruptcy. Unable to collect from Petitioner, Mr. Fruhwirt filed with the Florida Real Estate Recovery Fund. The fund paid $2,850 to Mr. Fruhwirt and suspended Petitioner’s license. Mr. Fruhwirt used the money to defray some of his legal expenses. To date, Petitioner has not paid Mr. Fruhwirt any money on the judgment. The Fruwhirt transaction led to the revocation of Petitioner’s real estate license and, on January 19, 1993, the Florida Real Estate Commission entered a final order revoking Petitioner’s real estate license. Despite Petitioner’s testimony that he never received a copy of the documents, the certificate of service for the final order indicates it was sent to Petitioner at 1101 Hidden Cove, Salem, SC 29676, which was the address where Petitioner was living at that time. Again, Petitioner’s testimony is not credible. The Final Order referenced a December 8, 1992, agreement in which Petitioner agreed that his license would be revoked. In the December 8, 1992 agreement, entitled “Affidavit for the Voluntary Surrender of License, Registration, Certificate/Permit for Revocation,” signed by Petitioner, he agreed to the revocation of his license and to not apply for a new real estate license for ten years from the effective date of revocation. In particular, the December 8, 1992 agreement stated, “[t]he effective date of the revocation shall be upon signing this document.” Notwithstanding the clear language revoking the license, at the hearing, Petitioner maintained that because he had voluntarily surrendered his license, he did not believe his license had been revoked. In referring to the agreement he had signed, he testified that the agreement said, “that my license will be inactive, not revoked” and denied ever seeing the other documents revoking his license. This testimony is simply not credible and demonstrates Petitioner’s propensity to see or remember things in a way that is more flattering to him, irrespective of reality. The affidavit signed by Petitioner clearly stated that Petitioner’s license would be and was revoked upon signing. In 1995, Hester International applied to operate as a residential mortgage licensee in Illinois. The application identified Petitioner as the vice president and Sharon Hester as the president. Page one of the application indicated the application had to be executed “by two officers or all directors if the applicant/licensee is a corporation.” The application was signed by Petitioner and his wife. Petitioner did not disclose to Illinois that a judgment had been entered against him in Florida or that his real estate license had been revoked or suspended. Question 10 in Part III of the Application asked: “LIST ALL LICENSES WHICH YOU OR YOUR FIRM HAVE APPLIED FOR AND BEEN DENIED AND/OR ANY AND ALL LICENSES ISSUED TO YOU OR YOUR FIRM WHICH WERE SUBSEQUENTLY SUSPENDED OR REVOKED.” Petitioner responded “N/A.” (Id.). Question 19(m) in Part III of the Application asked: UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, I(WE) STATE THAT ALL OF THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY (OUR) KNOWLEDGE AND FURTHER STATE THAT AS THE APPLICANT/LICENSEE: . . . (m) Has not committed a crime against the law of this State, any other state or the United States, involving moral turpitude, fraudulent or dishonest dealing, and that no final judgment has been entered against it in a civil action upon grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or deceit which has not previously been reported to the Commissioner. The evidence did not demonstrate that the emphasized clauses in question 10 or the “I(WE)” in 19(m) direct such questions to individuals signing the application. One reasonable interpretation of the language is that the questions are directed to the business entity applying for the license. In short, the I(WE) language is simply language in a form meant to cover multiple types of business entities ranging from sale proprietorships to corporations. Therefore, Petitioner was not required by Illinois to disclose matters which involved him personally. To date, Illinois has not filed any disciplinary action against Petitioner or Hester International. Thus, the failure to disclose personal judgments or license actions to Illinois in a corporate application for licensure does not support a finding of dishonesty or denial of Respondent’s application at issue here. At some point, Hester International’s corporate status had to be reinstated in Florida. Petitioner reinstated the company’s corporate status in November of 2004. Petitioner filed as registered agent at 6278 North Federal Highway #305, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Petitioner had not lived at this address for some 15 years, but had lived there for seven years with his girlfriend. The evidence showed that Petitioner simply forgot to change the registered agent’s address and was not acting dishonestly. Once he discovered his mistake, Petitioner amended his filing to reflect the appropriate address. Again, these facts do not form a basis to deny Petitioner’s license application. Finally, Petitioner testified that until Spring 2005, he and his wife were 50/50 owners of Hester International, Inc., as reflected on the application and license renewals in Illinois. In September 2004, Ms. Hester submitted Hester International, Inc.’s application for Florida licensure as a mortgage broker business. The Hester International business application was submitted after the Office had denied Petitioner’s license application in 1996 and was scrutinizing his July 2004 application. In the application, Ms. Hester identified herself as 100 percent owner of the Hester International. Petitioner did review this application, but he intentionally did not take part in its filing. The purported change in ownership was not adequately explained at hearing and appears to have been done in order to forestall any problems with licensure of the corporation due to Petitioner’s participation in the corporation. While the change of ownership is troubling, given Petitioner’s history, and also adds to the evidence that Petitioner is less than forthright in his memory and past business dealings, the change of ownership for the corporation’s licensure application does not, by itself, support a denial of Petitioner’s application. On the other hand, too many inconsistencies exist between Petitioner’s hearing testimony and his earlier accounts to conclude that Respondent can be trusted to hold a mortgage brokerage license. At worst, the evidence shows that Petitioner is not truthful or acts with integrity. At best, the evidence shows that Respondent has the ability to convince himself of facts that do not quite fit the truth, but are more flattering to him. Under either scenario, Petitioner’s appreciation of honesty, truthfulness and integrity are suspect. Neither Petitioner’s letters supporting his good character, nor his success in his ministry demonstrates sufficient rehabilitation to overcome what appears to be long-time evasive behavior. Therefore, Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker should be denied.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: A Final Order be entered denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Scott Hester, Esquire 13843 Longs Landing Road East Jacksonville, Florida 32225 Robert H. Schott, Esquire Gregg Morton, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Fletcher Building, Suite 526 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0376 Carlos G. Muniz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Recommendation Based upon the resolution of all disputed issues of fact and law by the stipulation of the parties to this proceeding, which includes the agreed penalty as set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Real Estate (now Florida Real Estate Commission) adopt the stipulation of the parties, together with the agreed penalty, in its final order to be entered herein. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 26th day of May, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: James Gillis, Esquire 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Eric A. Lanigan, Esquire 1214 East Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Fred Wilsen, Esquire 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 WILLIAM B. THOMAS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of May, 1982. Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact. Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the state of Florida, in particular Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the state of Florida having been issued license number 0223671 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was as a broker, t/a Sunshine Express Realty, 300 S. Pine Road 262, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33324. On or about November 22, 1983, an information was filed in the Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida, charging Respondent with one count of insurance fraud by false or fraudulent claim in violation of Section 817.234, Florida Statutes; and two counts of grand theft in the first degree, in violation of Sections 812.014(1)(a), 812.014(1)(b), and 812.014(2)(a), Florida Statutes. On March 27, 1985, a verdict was rendered which found Respondent guilty of one count of insurance fraud by false or fraudulent claim, and two counts of grand theft in the first degree. The Court adjudged Respondent guilty of one count of insurance fraud by false or fraudulent claim in violation of Section 817.234, Florida Statutes, and two counts of grand theft in the first degree in violation of Section 812.014(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The Court thereupon sentenced Respondent to a prison term of eighteen months in state prison to be followed by a term of five years of probation. The Respondent does not appear to be possessed of the mental skills necessary to be the master-mind behind a complex fraud scheme, nor has he demonstrated a tendency to be devious, shrewd, calculating, or cunning. To the contrary, the Respondent appears to be gullible and vulnerable to being taken advantage of, which tendencies may account for the circumstances which led to his conviction. The Respondent enjoys an excellent reputation in spite of his criminal convictions and probably would not be a danger to the real estate community if he were allowed to keep his license. The quality of the Respondent's reputation is reflected by the fact that in spite of his convictions, he is currently employed in another broker's real estate company and holds the positions of vice president and head of the commercial department. With the exception of the incident which led to his convictions, the Respondent appears to have demonstrated a high degree of honesty and integrity in his personal and business dealings. The Respondent has excellent teaching skills in the field of real estate and is probably one of the better technicians in the field of real estate.
