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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. RICHARD C. LIGHTNER, III, 87-003668 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-003668 Latest Update: Jul. 29, 1988

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Richard C. Lightner, was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0408120. The last license issued to Respondent was as a broker, with a home address of 1221 Duval Street, Key West, Florida 32040. Respondent, or a representative on his behalf, did not appear at the hearing to refute or otherwise contest the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: The Department enter a Final Order revoking Respondent's Real Estate brokers license. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 29th day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of August, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Raymond O. Bodiford, Esquire 515 Whitehead Street Key West, Florida 33040 Darlene F. Keller, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 William O'Neil General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= FLORIDA STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION REAL ESTATE COMMISSION DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE Petitioner vs. Case No. 0154510 DOAH No. 87-3668 RICHARD C. LIGHTNER III Respondent /

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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DAVID R. EDSTROM vs. FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 84-000789 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-000789 Latest Update: Dec. 14, 1984

Findings Of Fact On November 29, 1983 Petitioner filed with Respondent an application for licensure as a real estate salesman. By letter dated February 28, 1984 Respondent denied Petitioner's application as follows: The reason for the Commission's action is based on your answer to Questions 6, 7, 14 and 15 of the licensing application and/or your criminal record and disciplinary actions, and on your having unlawfully acted as a real estate salesman or real estate broker in the State of Florida. Specifically, your denial is based upon your May 1975 arrests and convictions for five counts of the sale of unregistered securities five counts of fraudulent sale of securities, five counts of grand larceny, petty larceny, ten counts of conspiracy to commit a felony, and also on disciplinary actions involving your Insurance License, Mortgage Brokers License and Securities License. In 1970 or 1971 Petitioner started Summit Investments, a conpany engaged in selling contracts for deed for developers to investors at a discount. The State of Florida determined that these contracts were mortgages and not securities, and, therefore, all persons selling them must be licensed mortgage brokers. Petitioner accordingly obtained a mortgage broker's license. In 1972 eight mortgage brokers formed S.E.I., Inc., and Petitioner became the president. Everyone selling contracts for deed for that company was licensed under the Mortgage Brokerage Act. Clinton E. Taylor, an investigator for the State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities, as part of his regular job duties, frequented Petitioner's offices at S.E.I., Inc. to check the advertising and sales pitches being used by the persons selling what the State had classified as mortgages. Taylor monitored Petitioner's operation at Summit Investments and at S.E.I., Inc. for a number of years without receiving any consumer complaint and without finding any basis for any enforcement action against Petitioner. In 1974, a recession year, five persons to whom S.E.I. had made sales did not receive their interest income and therefore filed complaints with the State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance. In May 1975 state criminal charges were filed against Petitioner as president of S.E.I., against the developer, and against the selling broker, basically alleging that what had previously been classified as mortgages were in fact unregistered securities. After trial, Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of five counts of sale of unregistered securities; five counts of fraudulent sale of securities; five counts of petty larceny; five counts of conspiracy to commit a felony, to-wit: fraudulent sale of securities; and five counts of conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor, to-wit: petty larceny. Petitioner was initially sentenced to a total of ten years of incarceration, $20,000.00 in fines, and 15 years of probation. In 1976 Petitioner plead no contest to a federal charge of mail fraud in Tampa, Florida in order to obtain a sentence which would run concurrent with that arising out of his state conviction. In 1977 Petitioner plead no contest to a charge in Palm Beach County of selling unregistered securities. Both of these charges were related to the same incidents forming the basis for the 1975 criminal charges. Based upon the conviction of Petitioner in the 1975 state case, his mortgage broker's license, his securities license, and his insurance license were revoked. By the time of the final hearing in this cause Petitioner had served 16 months in the State prison system and had been released; restitution had been made to the five people who caused the criminal charges to be filed from payment by Petitioner of the fines assessed against him; Petitioner had finished serving his amended probation period; and Petitioner's civil rights had been restored by the State of Florida. From September 1980 to November 1983 Petitioner earned his livelihood selling businesses. Be applied for a real estate license in both 1982 and 1983 and was denied both times. Petitioner seeks a real estate license in order that he can return to selling businesses.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered approving Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesman, subject to successful completion of the licensure examination. RECOMMENDED and ORDERED this 6th day of November, 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of November, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. David R. Edstrom 5748 Northeast 16th Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33334 Lawrence S. Gendzier, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Suite 212 Orlando, Florida 32801

Florida Laws (6) 120.57475.01475.011475.17475.175475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. GEORGE A. HEYEN, 75-002052 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-002052 Latest Update: Mar. 22, 1977

Findings Of Fact George A. Heyen is a duly registered real estate salesman with the Florida Real Estate Commission, and was so registered and has been so registered continuously since October 1, 1972, as evidenced by Petitioner's Exhibit number 1. While serving in the capacity as a real estate salesman, the Respondent entered into a listing agreement with one Thomas S. Bowers and Brenda L. Bowers, his wife. This agreement was drawn on December 11, 1973 and is Petitioner's Exhibit number 4. On February 6, 1974, a purchase and sell agreement was drawn up by the Respondent and entered into between Maria A. Hindes and the Bowers. This purchase and sell agreement is Petitioner's Exhibit number 3. This contract of February 6, 1974 was submitted to Molton, Allen and Williams, Mortgage Brokers, 5111 66th Street, St. Petersburg, Florida. The contract, as drawn, was rejected as being unacceptable for mortgage financing, because it failed, to contain the mandatory FHA clause. When the Respondent discovered that the February 6, 1974 contract had been rejected, a second contract of February 8, 1974 was prepared. A copy of this contract is Petitioner's Exhibit number 5. The form of the contract, drawn on February 8, 1974, was one provided by Molton, Allen and Williams. When, the Respondent received that form he prepared it and forged the signature of Mr. and Mrs. Bowers. The explanation for forging the signatures as stated in the course of the hearing, was to the effect that it was a matter of expediency. The expediency referred to the fact that the parties were anxious to have a closing and to have the transaction completed, particularly the sellers, Mr. and Mrs. Bowers. Therefore, in the name of expediency the signatures were forged. Testimony was also given that pointed out the Bowers were very hard to contact in and around the month of February, 1974, and some testimony was given to the effect that the Bowers made frequent trips to Ohio, but it was not clear whether these trips would have been made in the first part of February, 1974. The Bowers discovered that their name had been forged when they went to a closing on April 11, 1974. They refused to close the loan at that time. On April 24, 1974, a new sales contract was followed by a closing which was held on April 26, 1974 and a copy of the closing statement is Petitioner's Exhibit number 6. The Respondent has received no fees or commissions for his services in the transaction and there have been no further complaints about the transaction. Prior to this incident, the Respondent, George A. Heyen, was not shown to have had any disciplinary involvement with the Florida Real Estate Commission and has demonstrated that he has been a trustworthy individual in his business dealings as a real estate salesman.

Recommendation It is recommended that the registration of the registrant, George A. Heyen, be suspended for a period not to exceed 30 days. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of April, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. R. Parkinson, Esquire Associate Counsel Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 George A. Heyen c/o Gregoire-Gibbons, Inc. 6439 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, Florida 33710

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. SAM KAYE AND SAM KAYE, INC., 77-000047 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-000047 Latest Update: Nov. 02, 1977

The Issue The issue in Count I is whether Section 475.42(1)(j) absolutely prohibits a broker or salesman from filing a lien or other encumberance against real property to collect a commission. The issue in Count II is whether the Respondents violated a lawful order of the Commission by failing to remove the motion of lis pendens contrary to Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes.

Conclusions Section 475.42(1)(j), Florida Statutes, provides as follows: "No real estate broker or salesman shall place, or cause to be placed, upon the public records of any county, any contract, assignment, deed, will, mortgage, lien, affidavit, or other writing which purports to affect the title of, or encumber, any real property, if the same is known to him to be false, void, or not authorized to be placed of record, or not executed in the form entitling it to be recorded, or the execution of recording thereof has not been duly authorized by the owner of the property, maliciously or for the purpose of collecting a commission, or to coerce the payment of money to the broker or salesman or other person, or for any unlawful purpose." Clearly the Respondents placed or caused to be placed the notice of lis pendens in question. A notice of lis pendens is clearly an "other writing which purports to effect the title of, or encumber, any real property." The Florida Real Estate Commission argues that this provision is an absolute bar to the filing of any lien for the purpose of collecting a commission. The Respondents argue that this provision is not an absolute bar and there are circumstances when a broker may file a notice of lis pendens. They also assert that the notice of lis pendens falls within the exception because the Circuit Court refused to remove the notice of lis pendens upon motion of the property owner. Lastly, it is argued that the notice was filed by counsel for the Respondents in good faith on an action at law and that this mitigates their action even if there was a violation. The language of Section 475.42(1)(j) cannot be read to absolutely prohibit a broker from obtaining a lis pendens. When given this construction, it effectively denies brokers and salesmen access to the courts for redress of injury as provided in Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution. Section 475.42(1)(j) is a complex provision which is subject to two interpretations. One interpretation would prohibit a broker or salesman from filing an encumberance if the same were known to him to be false, void or not authorized by law; if not authorized to be upon the public records; if not executed in the form entitling it to be recorded; if the execution of recording thereof has not been duly authorized by the owner of the property; if maliciously (filed); if for the purpose of collecting a commission, if to coerce payment of money to the broker or salesman or other person; or if for any other unlawful purpose. This first interpretation would consider each clause a separate limitation on filing an encumberance. The facts analyzed under this interpretation do not show any knowledge by Respondents that the lis pendens was false, void or not authorized to be filed or not on a form entitling it to be recorded. The facts do not show that Respondents filed the lis pendens maliciously, for the purpose of collecting a commission, or for the purpose of coercing payment of money to the broker or salesman, or for any unlawful purpose. The nature of lis pendens would not require the owner's authorization of execution for recording. The facts show that the lis pendens was filed by Respondent's attorney in conjunction with a suit brought by the Respondents against Perrin. The record also shows that the circuit court determined that the lis pendens was recordable when it denied the motion to remove it. The notice of lis pendens was neither malicious, coercive or for the purpose of collecting the commission. The notice was for the purpose of perfecting the claim against the property for execution of the judgment if the Respondents prevailed in the suit. Executing on a judgment is different from collecting the commission or coercing payment. Under this interpretation the Respondents have not been shown to violate Section 475.42(1)(j). A second interpretation would read the clause, ". . . if the same is known to to him to be false, void, or not authorized to be placed of record, or not executed in the form entitling it to be recorded, or the execution of recording thereof has not been authorized by the owner of the property. . ." as the first of two criteria to be met to establish a violation. The second criteria would consist of proof that the encumberance was recorded maliciously or for the purpose of collecting a commission, or to coerce payment of money to the broker or salesman, or for any unlawful purpose. Again the facts do not show there was knowledge by the Respondents of the falsity, or impropriety of the notice of lis pendens, as stated above. Again the facts show that the lis pendens was filed in conjunction with a law suit pending between the Respondent and the property owner, and that the court before which the action was pending refused to remove it. The file of the notice by Respondent's counsel was a legitimate method of perfecting the Respondent's claim should they prevail and obtain judgment. The facts do not indicate that the filing of the notice was malicious, coercive or for the purpose of collecting a commission. Under either interpretation, Respondents did not violate the statute. COUNT II The Respondents are charged in Count II with violation of Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, which provides that the registration of a registrant may be suspended for up to two years for violation of a lawful order of the Commission. Clearly, the facts reveal that the Respondents had a substantial interest involved in the litigation with Perrin. The order, of the Florida Real Estate Commission to remove the notice of lis pendens substantially affected their rights in this litigation. Therefore, any final order directing Kay to remove the notice of lis pendens should have issued after an opportunity for hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. The evidence reveals that the Florida Real Estate Commission did not notice a hearing under Section 120.57, and therefore its order cannot be "lawful." The provisions of Section 475.25(1)(d) require that registrants not violate lawful orders. The Respondents have not violated Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, by not removing the notice of lis pendens as directed by the order of the Florida Real Estate Commission.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that no action be taken against the Respondent, Sam Kaye and Sam Kaye, Inc. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of September 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce I. Kamelhair, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 William E. Boyes, Esquire Cone, Owen, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson & McKeown, P.A. Post Office Box 3466 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.25475.42
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. GREENE F. ISAACS, 81-003121 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-003121 Latest Update: Oct. 04, 1982

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: According to the files and records of the Florida Real Estate Commission, respondent Greene F. Isaacs received his initial salesman license on April 12, 1979 and his initial broker license on April 29, 1980. He is currently a licensed broker holding license number 0308665. By an Order dated June 25, 1980, the Kentucky Real Estate Commission revoked the real estate broker's license of respondent Green F. Isaacs.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(g), Florida Statutes, and that respondent's real estate broker's license number 0308665 be suspended for a period of one (1) year. Respectfully submitted and entered this 22nd day of July, 1982 in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Julie Gallagher, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David F. Kern, Esquire 516 Lakeview Road, Villa III Clearwater, Florida 33516 Mr. C. H. Stafford Fred Wilsen, Esquire Executive Director Real Estate Commission Real Estate Commission State Office Building P. O. Box 1900 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Orlando, Florida 32801

Florida Laws (2) 475.2590.803
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. CAROLYN STEED, 81-002527 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002527 Latest Update: Nov. 01, 1982

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At the hearing, counsel for the petitioner attempted to introduce into evidence as an exhibit a computer printout showing respondent's license status. This document could not be identified by any witness called to testify in the proceeding and was not otherwise properly authenticated. The following colloquy between counsel for the petitioner, the Hearing Officer and the respondent occurred prior to the time respondent was placed under oath during the hearing: MR. JORDAN: Finally, Your Honor, we'd like to introduce as our next exhibit a computer printout showing Mrs. Steed's license status which reflects that her broker's license was effective 4/1/81. That would be Exhibit 23. MRS. STEED: Where are they located at? MR. JORDAN: That came out of Tallahassee, I believe. That's just a printout on your license. MRS. STEED: Do they show I'm inactive? MR. JORDAN: Let me see. This simply shows that as of 8/28/81 and you were licensed and your broker's license became effective 4/1/81 and your home address is 10164 Southwest 64th Street. MRS. STEED: None of that is true. THE HEARING OFFICER: She obviously cannot identify that document if it's something that came out of Tallahassee and she's never seen it before. MRS. STEED: It's inactive. THE HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Since Mrs. Steed is not represented by an attorney, I feel obliged to tell her it's the Board's responsibility to prove that she either was licensed at the time of the allegations in the complaint or something -- MRS. STEED: I am not a licensed real estate broker at the present time and I haven't been, but I just don't know the date that it changed. MR. JORDAN: The material time I think is back in `80 and `81 when this was going on. I can call your associate. MRS. STEED: I possibly was licensed then. I'm not saying I wasn't. I don't really know. I would say I was. THE HEARING OFFICER: As I said, it's the Board's responsibility to prove that up. MR. JORDAN: I think she's saying you still have it. It's just that it's inactive. MRS. STEED: I'm inactive. MR. JORDAN: You haven't given up your license; correct? MRS. STEED: No THE HEARING OFFICER: You're not offering that? MR. JORDAN: I'm not offering that. I think she agrees that she was licensed back in '80 and '81 when these transactions were going on. (TR. pp 59 and 60) No other evidence was offered during the hearing as to respondent's status as a licensed real estate broker in Florida.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint against the respondent filed on September 2, 1981, as amended on December 1, 1981, be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 28th day of July, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28 day of July, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert F. Jordan, Esquire Mr. C. B. Stafford Conrad, Scherer & James Executive Director Post Office Box 14723 Florida Real Estate Commission Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Carolyn Steed 5951 S. W. 67th Ave. Fred Wilsen, Esquire Davie, Florida 33314 Florida Real Estate Commission 400 W. Robinson Orlando, Florida 32801

Florida Laws (2) 475.183475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. YOLANDA JEAN RAMSEY, D/B/A RAMSEY REALTY, 88-002407 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-002407 Latest Update: Dec. 14, 1989

The Issue The issue is whether respondent's license as a real estate broker should be disciplined for the reasons stated in the amended administrative complaint.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Yolanda Jean Ramsey, was a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0012364 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). When the events herein occurred, respondent operated a real estate firm under the name of Ramsey Realty located at 19940 Gulf Boulevard, Indian Shores, Florida. Her husband, Drew Ramsey, was a condominium developer but he was not a licensed realtor. Sandra A. Hawley (Hawley) was a licensed salesperson for Ramsey Realty from April 1981 until she was terminated by respondent on January 6, 1982. She was employed by respondent pursuant to an oral agreement and was to receive a 3% commission on all closed sales. This description of Hawley's compensation arrangement was not contradicted by respondent. Drew Ramsey was then developing several condominium projects in Pinellas County, and Hawley's sales activities were focused on the sale of those condominiums through Ramsey Realty. Hawley was described by respondent as being the best salesperson in the firm. From April 1981 through December 1981, Hawley recalled that her W-2 statement reflected $76,000 in commissions actually received. By the time she was terminated, Hawley represented that she had either closed on units or had firm contracts on other units to earn an additional $279,000 in commissions. Although respondent did not agree she owed Hawley any money due to various setoffs, the $279,000 figure was not credibly contradicted, particularly since respondent's records relating to those sales were allegedly destroyed or lost by respondent at about the time certain civil litigation was begun by Hawley. On January 6, 1982, respondent was terminated by respondent for cause. According to respondent, Hawley was delinquent in making payments to her husband for several condominium units Hawley had bought for investment purposes, and on one occasion, Hawley had not turned over to Ramsey Realty a deposit on a resale of a unit. She was also accused of bouncing checks. After she left Ramsey Realty, Hawley made demand for commissions still owed. Between January and June 1982 she was paid approximately $40,000 by respondent but received nothing after that. She eventually sued respondent in circuit court for the unpaid commissions and obtained a final judgment against respondent on December 10, 1987 for $76,000 plus interest, or a total of $118,618.88. To date, Hawley has been unable to obtain payment of the judgment. At hearing respondent acknowledged that a judgment pertaining to Hawley's unpaid commissions was entered against her and that no appeal of that judgment was taken. According to Ramsey, she has refused to pay Hawley based upon her attorney's advice. Respondent's principal defense against paying the commissions is that Hawley allegedly owes her and her husband substantial amounts of money which offset the earned commissions. Testimony at hearing revealed that these matters have been the subject of extensive and lengthy civil litigation between Hawley and the Ramseys. Hawley represented that she has prevailed in all court actions, and this was not contradicted by respondent. However, none of the judgments and mandates (if an appeal was taken) were made a part of this record. The principal offset relates to a lease-purchase agreement entered into by Hawley and her son, James Monette, Jr., and Drew Ramsey in June 1981 whereby Hawley and her son agreed to lease, with an option to purchase, a restaurant/bar known as The End Zone located on Dale Mabry Avenue in Tampa, Florida. On June 18, 1981 Hawley and her son executed a promissory note in the amount of $170,000 payable to Drew Ramsey and to be secured "by an assignment of commissions of even date herewith". The note also provided that "certain commissions earned by Sandra A. Hawley as a real estate salesperson for Ramsey Realty ... shall be applied as prepayments on account hereof." This was confirmed in a letter sent by Hawley to respondent on June 18, 1981. The letter authorized Ramsey to "pay one-half of all commissions which I have earned or will earn from working as a real estate person for Ramsey Realty to Drew Ramsey on account of the indebtedness under the Note until it is paid in full." The letter further provided that if Drew felt "insecure" about the note, Yolanda was authorized to "assign such greater percentage of (her) commissions to Drew Ramsey on account of the indebtedness until it is paid in full." Hawley admitted signing the promissory note but pointed out that she had earned enough commissions to easily pay off the note. She contended that the transaction was a ploy to allow Ramsey to retain all of her commissions and thereby deprive her of adequate capital to successfully operate the restaurant. Hawley further asserted that the transaction was later declared null and void in one of the civil actions between the parties because of certain fraudulent representations made by Drew in inducing her to enter into the agreement. However, the final judgment, which is the best evidence of the outcome of the suit, is not of record. On October 1, 1981, an agreement and promissory note was executed by Hawley wherein she promised to pay Drew Ramsey and his partner, George Karpay, $58,162.90 plus 18% interest for monthly payments owed Ramsey and Karpay on five condominium units Hawley had previously purchased from them. The note was secured by Hawley's commissions earned at Ramsey Realty. Hawley acknowledged that the signature on the documents was her own but contended that the documents had been altered after she signed them. On October 1, 1981, Hawley also executed an assignment of commissions whereby she agreed to authorize Ramsey Realty to disburse all commissions earned to Drew Ramsey and Karpay until the promissory note described in finding of fact 9 was satisfied. Again, Hawley acknowledged that the signature appeared to be her own but she contended the document was altered after it was signed. According to respondent, the commissions earned by Hawley were not held in the firm's escrow account. Instead, while Hawley was still an employee, such moneys were disbursed by the title company at closing directly to Ramsey Realty, and then Ramsey wrote a check to Hawley as commission compensation. After Hawley was terminated, the manner in which Ramsey received Hawley's earned commissions and their subsequent disposition are not of record. However, respondent represented, without contradiction, that they were not held in the firm's escrow account.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating subsection 475.25(1)(d) and that her broker's license be suspended for three years. The other charge should be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 14th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 1989.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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