Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent repay $216 in grant funds expended in a manner inconsistent with Department regulations. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Sonja P. Mathews, Esquire Suite 117-Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Agnes Miramontes 301 North Oklahoma Street Bonifay, Florida 32425
The Issue The issues in this matter are whether Respondent violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (2013),1/ by obtaining funds from Orange County in the form of a severance payment while remaining employed as General Counsel for the Orange County Clerk of Courts; and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Stephan Carter, served as General Counsel for the Orange County Clerk of Courts (the “Clerk’s Office”) from June 2003 through April 1, 2014. Respondent was a public employee at all times material to this action. Respondent was personally hired by Lydia Gardner, the Orange County Clerk of Courts. In January 2005, Respondent and Ms. Gardner executed an employment contract (the “Employment Agreement”). The Employment Agreement was signed by Respondent and Ms. Gardner, in her capacity as the Clerk of Courts, on January 10, 2005, and January 13, 2005, respectively. The Employment Agreement, paragraph 6, entitled “Termination of Employment,” established that the Clerk would pay Respondent a fee should the Clerk terminate the Employment Agreement prior to its expiration date (the “Severance Payment”). Paragraph 6 specifically provided: The Clerk may declare this agreement terminated at any time. . . . The Clerk shall promptly pay to the General Counsel a sum equal to i) the salary and deferred compensation that is accrued but unpaid as of the date of the termination, plus ii) an amount equal to the pro rata portion of his salary for all accrued but unused leave time, plus, iii) an amount equal to the salary and deferred compensation that the General Counsel would have received during the 180 days immediately following the date such termination takes effect, as if this agreement had not been terminated. At the final hearing, Respondent explained that when he accepted the position of General Counsel (then titled “Legal Counsel”) with the Clerk’s Office in June 2003, he informed Ms. Gardner that he would only agree to work for the Clerk’s Office if he could be protected from losing his position. Therefore, Respondent sought and obtained the Severance Payment provision should he be terminated for any reason other than his voluntary resignation. The Employment Agreement provided that Respondent’s term of employment continued until January 6, 2009. On January 7, 2009, Respondent and Ms. Gardner entered a signed agreement wherein the Employment Agreement was “extended indefinitely.” On February 5, 2013, Respondent and Ms. Gardner signed a second amendment to the Employment Agreement.2/ This “clarification of terms” stated: [A]s to the definition of termination in paragraph 6, for the purposes of the contract, termination by the Clerk includes the ending of the employment relationship for any reason other than General Counsel’s voluntary resignation. The amendment also provided that an $11,000 annual payment into Respondent’s deferred compensation plan contained in the original Employment Agreement be considered compensation under Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-6.001(15)(relating to pensions) and not a fringe benefit. In February 2013, Ms. Gardner became gravely ill. Ms. Gardner’s illness caused her to be absent from the Clerk’s Office. In Ms. Gardner’s absence, Colleen Reilly, the Chief Administrative Officer for the Clerk’s Office, assumed Ms. Gardner’s responsibilities. Ms. Reilly was hired in 2009. At that time, Respondent prepared an employment contract for Ms. Reilly modelled on his own Employment Agreement. In April 2013, Ms. Reilly approached Respondent to talk about their future employment with the Clerk’s Office. Ms. Gardner’s health was deteriorating. Respondent and Ms. Reilly discussed the impact of Ms. Gardner’s death on their positions. Ms. Reilly was also concerned whether the new Clerk of Courts would honor their Employment Agreements. Respondent and Ms. Reilly’s conversation led to a discussion regarding how they could protect the Severance Payments under their respective Employment Agreements. Respondent and Ms. Reilly considered several possibilities. One position was that their Employment Agreements would remain in effect upon Ms. Gardner's death, and they could ask the new Clerk of Courts to honor the payout terms. Respondent, however, determined that the Employment Agreements were not clear on whether he and Ms. Reilly were entitled to the Severance Payments following a change of administration. Therefore, they became concerned whether the new Clerk of Courts would be legally bound to honor the Severance Payments should he or she decide not to retain their services. Respondent, without seeking legal guidance or consulting with outside counsel for the Clerk’s Office, concluded that the Employment Agreements would terminate upon Ms. Gardner’s death. At the final hearing, Respondent explained that he considered his employment to be tied specifically to Ms. Gardner and not the Clerk's Office. Therefore, Respondent reasoned that because both he and Ms. Reilly were hired by and worked directly for Ms. Gardner, her death would terminate their contracts. This termination, of course, would also entitle Respondent (and Ms. Reilly) to the Severance Payment because his employment would have ended for a reason other than his voluntary resignation. Respondent and Ms. Reilly also discussed their plans once their Employment Agreements were terminated. Respondent informed Ms. Reilly that he believed that after the Employment Agreement was terminated, they could continue to work for the Clerk’s Office as “at-will” employees without employment contracts. Respondent encouraged Ms. Reilly to take her Severance Payment then stay in her position with the Clerk’s Office. He intended to do the same. Late in April 2013, Ms. Reilly informed Respondent that she was planning to visit Ms. Gardner, who was on convalescent leave at her home, to ask her to formally terminate the Employment Agreements and make them at-will employees of the Clerk’s Office. Respondent encouraged Ms. Reilly’s endeavor. Respondent then drafted two versions of a memorandum Ms. Gardner could sign to effectuate the termination of their contracts. Ms. Gardner, however, did not agree to terminate the Employment Agreements or sign the paperwork Respondent had prepared. Consequently, the Employment Agreements remained in effect. When Ms. Reilly was not able to obtain Ms. Gardner’s consent to terminate the Employment Agreements, Respondent began to consider Ms. Reilly’s authority to terminate his Employment Agreement. Respondent determined that Ms. Reilly could terminate his contract under section 28.09, Florida Statutes, and they could still receive the Severance Payments. Section 28.09 describes the appointment of a clerk ad interim in the case of a vacancy occurring in the office of a clerk by death. Section 28.09 states that the clerk ad interim “shall assume all the responsibilities [and] perform all the duties” of the clerk. Therefore, because Ms. Reilly would assume all the powers of Ms. Gardner, she would be authorized the terminate his Employment Agreement. Ms. Gardner passed away on May 8, 2013. On May 9, 2013, Ms. Reilly was officially appointed as Clerk Ad Interim for the Clerk’s Office. Also on May 9, 2013, Respondent and Ms. Reilly immediately took steps to obtain their respective Severance Payments. To effectuate their plan, Ms. Reilly promptly terminated both their Employment Agreements using her newfound authority as the interim Clerk. Respondent hoped that this step would remove any questions of their entitlement to the Severance Payment that might be raised by the new Clerk of Courts. Respondent then went directly to the Clerk’s Payroll office. There, he approached Tracy Gasinski, the payroll administrator for the Clerk’s Office. Respondent informed her that Ms. Reilly had approved him to receive a payout. Respondent declared that his payout was authorized because his Employment Agreement was terminated. Respondent also instructed Ms. Gasinski to pay Ms. Reilly’s payout under her Employment Agreement. Respondent stressed that he wanted both payouts processed immediately. Finally, Respondent advised Ms. Gasinski that nobody needed to know about the payout. Ms. Gasinski felt pressured by Respondent. However, based on his representation that Ms. Reilly had approved the payout, she immediately processed a final paycheck for Respondent (and Ms. Reilly), which included the Severance Payment provided in his Employment Agreement. Ms. Gasinski calculated a payout for Respondent in the gross amount of $110,290.61. This figure included a Severance Payment of $76,844.00. In addition, per his request, Respondent was also paid $27,822.10 for all his unused vacation leave (405.57 hours times a rate of $68.60), as well as $5,624.51 for his unused sick leave (327.96 hours times a rate of $17.15). Ms. Gasinski paid 25 percent of Respondent’s sick leave per Clerk’s Office policy. The next day, on May 10, 2013, Ms. Gasinski issued Respondent a check in the amount of $58,400.00 which was deposited directly into Respondent's personal bank account. Ms. Gasinski also deposited a final paycheck into Ms. Reilly's bank account. On or about May 20, 2013, however, Respondent returned to see Ms. Gasinski. He was not happy with his payout. Respondent told Ms. Gasinski that the amount she deposited was incorrect, and he was due more money. Respondent demanded several adjustments which would maximize his Severance Payment. First, referencing the February 5, 2013, amendment to his Employment Agreement, Respondent wanted the $11,000 he received as deferred compensation to be incorporated into his base salary thereby increasing his rate of pay. Second, Ms. Gasinski, in calculating Respondent’s Severance Payment, computed the final payout based on six month’s salary in accordance with the standard practice of the Clerk's Office. Respondent, however, insisted that his Severance Payment be calculated based on “180 days” as specifically stated in his Employment Agreement at paragraph 6. This mathematical adjustment increased Respondent's payout by including payment for all Saturdays and Sundays.3/ Third, Respondent demanded that he receive 100 percent payout for his remaining sick leave instead of just 25 percent as was the Clerk’s Office policy. Fourth, Respondent requested that 56 hours (7 days) be reserved in his vacation leave account and not paid out.4/ Following their meeting, Ms. Gasinski voided the initial payout check. However, she was not comfortable with Respondent’s request based on her understanding of employment contracts. Respondent's and Ms. Reilly's transactions were out of the ordinary course of business for the Clerk's Office. In her experience, final paychecks to Clerk’s Office employees were always accompanied by paperwork from the Clerk’s Office’s Talent Management division. This paperwork came in the form of an Employee Change Notice (“ECN”). However, Respondent did not produce, nor had Ms. Gasinski received, an ECN supporting Respondent’s payout. In Clerk’s Office accounting practices, Talent Management and the Payroll office act as a check and balance for each other. Typically, Talent Management initiates the paperwork, and then Payroll issues the checks. The normal process for a payout when a Clerk's Office employee leaves employment is for Talent Management to notify Ms. Gasinski who then processes the final payout. Respondent did not have the authority to direct Ms. Gasinski to issue the checks. Similarly, Ms. Gasinski did not have the authority to write checks to either Respondent or Ms. Reilly. Furthermore, a final payout upon termination is always via a paper check. Direct deposit to a personal bank account is never an option. The terminated employee picks up the paper check from Talent Management who verifies that the employee's garage pass and badge have been returned. Because of her discomfort with issuing Respondent’s payout check, Ms. Gasinski sought advice from her supervisor, Mike Murphy, the Chief Financial Officer for the Clerk’s Office. Mr. Murphy suggested that Ms. Gasinski contact Talent Management. On May 21, 2013, Ms. Gasinski spoke to Joann Gammichia, the Director of Talent Management, about Respondent’s request for a payout. When Ms. Gammichia learned of the situation, she had immediate concerns. First, Ms. Gammichia wondered why Payroll was issuing a check without any documentation from Talent Management such as an ECN. Ms. Gammichia testified that each employment activity requires completion of an ECN which acts as a recordkeeping system for the Clerk's Office. Because Respondent approached Ms. Gasinski in the Payroll office directly, no ECN or other written record was generated explaining why the Clerk’s Office was issuing the payout to Respondent. Ms. Gammichia explained that the policy of the Clerk’s Office is that payouts, severance checks, termination, or any kind of position change should only occur with an ECN in order to maintain and track the complete history of an employee's tenure with the Clerk's office. Ms. Gammichia also wondered why Respondent went directly to Ms. Gasinski with his demands. The normal starting point for employee changes begins with Talent Management, and the end of the line is financial services and Payroll. The fact that Respondent was attempting to verbally change his employment status in the Payroll office was “highly irregular.” Ms. Gammichia was also puzzled why the Clerk’s Office was issuing a severance payout on an employment contract when the employment was not ending. Consequently, Ms. Gammichia told Ms. Gasinski not to issue the adjusted payout check. Ms. Gasinski then notified Respondent via e-mail dated May 21, 2013, that she could not process the final payout until she received the proper documentation from Ms. Gammichia in Talent Management. Shortly thereafter, Respondent visited Ms. Gammichia’s office to inquire why she was involved in his payout matter. According to Ms. Gammichia, Respondent became “pretty aggressive.” Respondent told Ms. Gammichia that she had no authority or business being involved. It was a personal matter. Respondent warned Ms. Gammichia that she was directly violating an order from Ms. Reilly to make the Severance Payments. Ms. Gammichia informed Respondent that not only was she involved, but she was not authorizing the payout check to go through. Ms. Gammichia further advised Respondent not to contact Ms. Gasinski regarding the payout. Later that day, Ms. Gammichia contacted her supervisor, Cathi Balboa, the Director of Administrative Services for the Clerk’s Office, to discuss Respondent’s payout request. Ms. Gammichia relayed to Ms. Balboa that Ms. Gasinski was upset because she was being asked to prepare a large payout based only on verbal instructions without any supporting paperwork. At the final hearing, Ms. Balboa recalled that Respondent’s urgent request for a payout was highly irregular. Ms. Balboa relayed that the Clerk’s Office should not issue a final payout unless an employee was truly terminated from his or her position. Based on their concerns, Ms. Gammichia and Ms. Balboa called Ms. Reilly, who was sick at home, to confirm whether Ms. Reilly was aware of the payouts that Respondent said she had authorized. Ms. Gammichia also wanted to report the fact that Ms. Gasinski felt that she was being coerced and harassed by Respondent. Ms. Gammichia described Ms. Reilly’s reaction as hostile and negative. Ms. Reilly did not seem happy that others were involved. Ms. Reilly asked Ms. Balboa, “How did you get involved in this?" The next morning, on May 22, 2013, Ms. Reilly returned to the Clerk’s Office and called a meeting with Mr. Murphy, Ms. Balboa, and Respondent. Ms. Reilly opened the meeting by asking Mr. Murphy and Ms. Balboa "what do you think your role is in this organization," and "where do your loyalties lay?" Ms. Reilly then announced that “it was a private matter, it was their personal business, [and] to stay out of it." Ms. Balboa testified at the final hearing that Ms. Reilly intimidated her in their meeting. Mr. Murphy conveyed that he understood that they were not to get involved in the severance payout matter. After the meeting, Ms. Gasinski was told to proceed with the payouts for Respondent and Ms. Reilly. On May 23, 2013, Ms. Gasinski processed a second severance payout check for Respondent and Ms. Reilly. Ms. Gasinski prepared for Respondent a revised final paycheck in the total amount of $156,443.11. This amount included a Severance Payment of $106,387.20. Respondent was also paid $25,826.23 for his vacation leave (349.57 hours times a rate of $73.88), as well as $24,229.68 for all his unused sick leave (327.96 hours times a rate of $73.88). A check in the net amount of $99,125.45 was deposited in Respondent’s personal bank account. On May 23, 2013, Respondent repaid the initial payout of $58,400.00 to the Clerk’s Office by personal check. After Ms. Reilly terminated his Employment Agreement on May 9, 2013, Respondent never left his position with the Clerk’s Office. Respondent considered himself an at-will employee and continued to report to work as General Counsel. There was never any break in his employment. At no time did Respondent (or the Clerk’s Office) initiate or complete any paperwork to rehire Respondent after either Ms. Gardner’s death or Ms. Reilly terminated his Employment Agreement. No documentation was prepared transitioning Respondent from a contract employee to an at-will employee. Respondent continued to perform the same duties under the same terms, conditions, and compensation contained in the Employment Agreement as if he never left office.5/ At the final hearing, Respondent testified why his interpretation of his Employment Agreement justified his actions and motives. Respondent first remarked that his Employment Agreement was not typical for a Clerk’s Office employee. It contained certain provisions which were not to be “exposed generally,” such as the termination clause and the contact termination fee. Therefore, he desired to keep his employment terms quiet. Respondent further disclosed that he did not initiate an ECN because his Severance Payment was not a human resources issue, it was a matter of contract. Respondent also explained that at the end of 2008, when his Employment Agreement was nearing its initial termination date, Respondent became concerned with his future at the Clerk’s Office. He began to wonder what would happen if Ms. Gardner left her position as Clerk. Therefore, he prepared, then executed, the 2009 amendment to the Employment Agreement extending it “indefinitely.” In 2013, Respondent prepared, then executed, the second amendment clarifying the term “termination.” Regarding collecting his Severance Payment without leaving his position with the Clerk’s Office, Respondent contended that just because his Employment Agreement was terminated (thus, entitling him to the Severance Payment) did not mean he had to leave employment with the Clerk’s Office. Respondent characterized the payment as a “contract termination fee.” Therefore, he asserted that the Clerk could terminate his Employment Agreement without actually terminating him from his position as General Counsel. Consequently, nothing prevented him from becoming an at-will employee. Accordingly, when Ms. Reilly terminated the Employment Agreements on May 9, 2013, by exercising her prerogative as the interim Clerk, she also decided that both Respondent and she would stay on with the Clerk’s Office as at-will employees until the new Clerk of Courts determined what to do with them. In February 2014, the new Clerk of Courts, Eddie Fernandez, determined to initiate an investigation to review the propriety of the 2013 Severance Payments to Respondent and Ms. Reilly. On March 28, 2014, Respondent was placed on administrative leave with pay. On April 1, 2014, after the investigation recommended that Respondent’s employment be terminated, Respondent resigned from his position with the Clerk’s Office. As a condition of his resignation, Respondent was not eligible for rehire by the Clerk’s Office. Respondent reimbursed the full amount of the money that he received as the Severance Payment from the Clerk’s Office. Commenting on the circumstances of his resignation and restitution, at the final hearing, Respondent urged that he did not act dishonestly, but, maybe he exercised bad judgment. Respondent also proclaimed that he received his Severance Payment because the interim Clerk ordered it, not by reason of his actions or conduct. Therefore, he personally never violated any duty of his office. Based on the evidence and testimony presented during the final hearing, the competent substantial evidence in the record establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent acted corruptly, with a wrongful intent, in seeking and obtaining the Severance Payment when he never intended to leave his public employment with the Clerk’s Office. Accordingly, the Advocate proved that Respondent violated section 112.313(6).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent, Steven Carter, violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes; and that Respondent be subject to public censure and reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2017.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner has been retaliated against by the Respondent in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Leigh A. Bain, filed a Complaint with the Commission on May 16, 1997, alleging retaliation under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. The matter was investigated by the Commission and on November 24, 1999, the Commission issued a Notice of Determination of "no-cause." On January 3, 2000, the Petitioner mailed and faxed a Petition for Relief from an unlawful employment practice to the Commission. The Petition was served by mail on ECUA on January 3, 2000. ECUA filed an Answer and a Motion to Dismiss on January 24, 2000. Thereafter, on January 31, 2000, the Commission issued a Notice of Dismissal stating that the Petitioner had failed to file a timely petition, pursuant to Rule 60Y-5.008, Florida Administrative Code, and that the Petitioner had taken more than thirty-five days from the date of service of the Notice of Determination to file a petition. The Notice of Dismissal was filed with the Clerk of the Commission on January 31, 2000. On February 28, 2000, the Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the Commission. The Notice stated that it was being filed in accordance with Rule 9.110(d) and Rule 9.130(c), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, to appeal the Notice of Dismissal of the Petition. On June 28, 2000, the Commission rescinded its previous dismissal, re-opened the Complaint and transmitted the Petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings. In the rescission order the Commission stated that it had previously dismissed the Complaint because the Petition had not been filed within thirty-five days of service of the Notice of Determination. The Commission then found that the Petition had been timely filed on January 3, 2000, using the date of the post-mark of the Petition and adding three days to the thirty- five day time limit for mailing. The Notice of Appeal had been filed with the Commission but not with the Appellate Court. Moreover, the Commission failed to transmit the record to the Appellate Court. In the Petition for Relief Ms. Bain alleges that she was a victim of sexual discrimination or harassment by her supervisor, Steve Burgess. She reported the alleged discrimination to her personnel director on October 4, 1996. She contends that her supervisor retaliated against her on November 11, 1996, by giving her a poor performance rating. Petitioner began employment with ECUA in January 1987, as Executive Secretary to Chuck Wigley, then Executive Director of ECUA. She worked in that position until 1989 and then began working for Steve Burgess who was then the Manager of Customer Relations. She worked for Mr. Burgess until she was transferred to the Engineering Department in June 1997. She was currently employed as an Office Assistant IV in the ECUA Engineering Department. Steve Burgess is the current ECUA Field Services Administrator. He is in charge of the ECUA division that deals with the public. That division has two departments, the Regional Services Department and the Customer Service department. It has approximately 225 employees. Mr. Burgess reports to Van Van Dever, the current ECUA Executive Director. Mr. Burgess has worked for the Respondent for fourteen years. On October 1, 1992, the Petitioner's job title was changed from "Executive Secretary" to "Administrative Secretary." Her salary remained the same and the grade was changed from X10-6 to C18. This was part of a re-classification effort for ECUA positions and pay grades when the ECUA became part of Escambia County's Civil Service System. The re- classifications of ECUA positions, within the county Civil Service System, was approved by the county's Civil Service Board and the ECUA Board. On October 1, 1996, the Petitioner's job title was changed to "Office Assistant IV." Her salary remained the same as it had been when she was an Administrative Secretary and her grade was changed from C18 to C20. This change was made in accordance with a wage and re-classification study and was approved by the county Civil Service Board. The Petitioner describes her re-classification to Administrative Secretary as bringing her and all department secretaries to the same level so there was no longer a distinction between what she had been and the other secretaries. She viewed this action as a demotion for her or a promotion for the other secretaries, with the result that they were all at the same level after the re-classification. These re- classifications, however, were not demotions for any disciplinary or performance reasons. The re-classifications of Ms. Bain's position in 1992 and 1996 occurred prior to the October 4, 1996, allegation of sexual harassment. The last re-classification to Office Assistant IV was effective on October 1, 1996, three days before the Petitioner decided to submit the October 4, 1996, memorandum concerning the harassment allegation. The Petitioner was upset over the re-classification decisions made as to her. In a May 2, 1996, memorandum to Mr. Burgess, the Petitioner stated in reference to the re-classification of her position to Administrative Secretary: . . . However, all positions previously classified as Secretary, Range 8, were also upgraded to Administrative Secretary, Pay Grade 18, which provided a substantial salary increase for those applicable employees. I was not pleased with the inequity of this situation. Through no fault or control of my own, my position was now considered to be equivalent with one that, for the previous five years, had been two pay grades lower. My qualifications had not changed; neither had those of the other employees, and yet somehow we were all considered to be equally qualified for the same position. When I raised this issue, I was told I had no reason to be upset as I had been placed in the highest level secretarial position that existed in the Civil Service System. . . . Ms. Bain continued to be concerned about the re- classification of her position and requested that it be upgraded to an Administrative Assistant position. She also filed an appeal of her Civil Service position allocation and formally requested that the Civil Service Board upgrade her position to Administrative Assistant. The Petitioner wanted Mr. Burgess, her supervisor, to support the upgrade of her position but he would not do so. She was dissatisfied with Mr. Burgess because he did not support a higher classification for her. She felt that if Mr. Burgess supported the upgrade she would have received it. Mr. Burgess and Ms. Bain discussed her concerns and her request for a position upgrade on April 22, 1996. Mr. Burgess explained to the Petitioner at that time why he could not support the upgrade. On one of her visits to see Mr. Van Dever, the Petitioner advised him that the relationship between her and Mr. Burgess had been tense over the re-classification issue. That matter was an issue all during 1996, between the Petitioner and Mr. Burgess. The Petitioner wrote in her comments on her 1996 evaluation that she believed that she was marked-down in attitude because of her classification appeal. She did not go to the committee that was conducting position audits, however, to speak with the committee about the re-classification of her position, even though this committee was to make recommendations on subjects such as the upgrade of Ms. Bain's position. There was an analogous Office Assistant IV position in the STR Division. Like Mr. Burgess, however, Bernie Dahl, the STR Director, did not support a position upgrade for his own Office Assistant IV either. Ms. Bain went to Mr. Van Dever to complain about three incidents involving Mr. Burgess. The first incident occurred in February 1993. She met with Mr. Van Dever and he seemed supportive. He said that he would speak with Mr. Burgess about the matter. He met with Mr. Burgess and Ms. Bain felt that things seemed to improve. The next incident with Mr. Burgess occurred a year later on January 20, 1994, when Mr. Burgess allegedly became upset when he discovered that a letter had gone out with a handwritten invoice attached to it. When Ms. Bain called Mr. Burgess' attention to the fact that he had signed the letter with the handwritten invoice attached he allegedly became agitated and angry. She went to see Mr. Van Dever about this incident. She felt that things improved once again after Mr. Van Dever met with Mr. Burgess about this incident. In September 1996, a third incident occurred about which Ms. Bain complained to Mr. Van Dever. This incident arose when Mr. Burgess asked Ms. Bain to forward his and her phone lines when they had to be away from their desks to someone other than Quanita Stallworth, who handled the ECUA switchboard. He did this because he was concerned that Ms. Stallworth had too many calls to handle when all the phone lines were transferred to her at lunch and when employees were away from their desks. Ms. Bain was initially told to forward the phones to Linda Sutherland. When she objected to forwarding her phone to Ms. Sutherland, Mr. Burgess told her that she could forward it to Linda Iverson or to someone other than Linda Sutherland " . . . as long as its not going to Quanita " After the Petitioner had been directed not to forward the phones to Quanita Stallworth, Mr. Burgess discovered that she had disregarded his instructions and forwarded her phone to Ms. Stallworth. When he reiterated to the Petitioner that they were not going to forward the phones to Ms. Stallworth, the Petitioner told Mr. Burgess that " . . . then I'm going to go see Van." Mr. Burgess told her to go ahead and see Mr. Van Dever. The result of this incident was that Mr. Van Dever allowed Ms. Bain to continue to forward her phone to Quanita Stallworth. Mr. Burgess and Ms. Bain had a meeting with Mr. Van Dever after the phone forwarding incident. They were both told that they needed to try to work together in a professional way and they agreed that they would do so. There was discussion during that meeting about attempting to locate another position for Ms. Bain but there were no openings at the time. When the Petitioner went to Mr. Van Dever about the incident concerning the phone on September 25, 1996, her Complaint involved that particular incident, the switching of the phones. She did not claim gender-bias discrimination in her conversation with Mr. Van Dever. The Petitioner does not recall mentioning, in any conversation that she had with Mr. Van Dever, that she had filed a sexual harassment complaint against Mr. Burgess. In her conversations with either Mr. Van Dever or Mr. Burgess, the Petitioner did not tell either Mr. Burgess or Mr. Van Dever of filing any sexual harassment complaint against Mr. Burgess. She did not give Mr. Burgess or Mr. Van Dever a copy of her October 4, 1996, memorandum which contained her allegations of sexual harassment against Mr. Burgess. The issue she had taken to Mr. Van Dever in September 1996, was to the effect that she felt Mr. Burgess was a tyrant and that he mistreated employees. When she went to Mr. Van Dever to complain about him she raised a morale problem or a problem among several employees whom Mr. Burgess supervised. The morale issue due to Mr. Burgess was her whole reason for complaining at that time. The morale issue is what the Petitioner wanted Mr. Van Dever to look into and she identified male and female employees for him to talk to in order to confirm her complaint that Mr. Burgess mistreated employees. The Petitioner has at various time, identified several employees she believes have had significant problems with Mr. Burgess, including males, such as Bob Kintz, Gabe Brown, and Glenn Johansen. Mr. Van Dever told the Petitioner that he had talked to everyone of the employees that she had identified and that none of them agreed with her. Nettie Williams, the ECUA customer Service and Collections Manager, has worked for Mr. Burgess, her immediate supervisor, since 1989. Mr. Van Dever questioned Ms. Williams about an alleged morale problem in the customer service area in the fall of 1996. He asked her whether she had had any problems with Mr. Burgess and she told him that she did not and that any issue she and Mr. Burgess had they would be able to sit down and work out. Kathy Gaut, the ECUA Internal Programs Coordinator, directs training and other employee-related programs, internal communications, the newsletter and any kind of employee activities. She has been employed with ECUA for about seven years. It is the nature of her job to be in touch with and interact with a lot of employees. Mr. Van Dever often asked Ms. Gaut about general employee issues because of her contact with ECUA employees. In October 1996 Mr. Van Dever asked Ms. Gaut whether she was aware of any problems that employees might be having with Mr. Burgess. She told Mr. Van Dever that she did not know any problems employees were having with Mr. Burgess and that she was not having any problems with him. Mr. Van Dever asked her how she felt employees regarded Mr. Burgess and if he intimidated people. She responded that some people believed that he was abrupt or even rude at times. She advised that his personality was such that he could be very pleasant and convivial but when he had a problem or a particular situation to address, he could come across as being abrupt because he wanted to get right to the point and get the job done and go on to the next subject. She told Mr. Van Dever that she felt that some people may have a problem with Mr. Burgess being abrupt with them because he was so focused on getting his job done. Ms. Gaut is aware of Mr. Burgess' management style and his manner of dealing with people because she has been around him in numerous director and staff meetings. She has observed his interaction with employees at all levels of the company. Mr. Burgess' management style is to get to the point and not string out conversations about an issue when he is ready to get a problem resolved. Ms. Gaut has observed Mr. Burgess and Ms. Bain interacting approximately 10 to 15 times over a five-year period. Ms. Gaut never witnessed Mr. Burgess treating females unfairly as opposed to males and has never herself experienced gender bias from Mr. Burgess. Ms. Nettie Williams was present when Mr. Burgess directed the Petitioner not to forward her phone to Quanita Stallworth. Ms. Williams has never witnessed what she felt was gender bias on the part of Mr. Burgess and has never been treated differently by Mr. Burgess because she was female. On October 4, 1996, the Petitioner met with ECUA Human Resources Director Grant Holmes and submitted a memorandum dated that day in which she complained about Mr. Burgess' conduct toward her. In that memorandum she recites three incidents which allegedly involved inappropriate behavior by Mr. Burgess: the February 1993 incident, when Mr. Burgess had interrupted an attorney in an interview of the Petitioner to tell her to take care of the mail; the January 1994 incident over the handwritten invoice and the September 24, 1996 incident over the forwarding of the phones. In the October 4, 1996 memorandum, Ms. Bain states that she believed Mr. Burgess' conduct towards her was a form of sexual harassment in that Mr. Burgess allegedly engaged in intimidation of her and tended to view a certain type of behavior by males as acceptable, while the same type of conduct by a female he viewed as unacceptable. The basis for her belief that Mr. Burgess treated males differently from her was an incident involving Gabe Brown. Mr. Burgess had an incident with Gabe Brown when an ECUA board member reported that a male customer service representative had been rude to a customer. The board member told Mr. Burgess that he needed to investigate it right away. Mr. Burgess went to the customer service department and called the only two male customer service representatives out of the office and talked with them in the hallway to find out which one had talked with a customer who had complained to the ECUA board member. Mr. Brown was not the one who had the conversation with the complaining customer. Upset, Mr. Brown later came to Mr. Burgess and complained to him that he was embarrassed because Mr. Burgess had singled him out in front of all the other employees as if he had done something wrong. Mr. Burgess thought about the incident and felt that Mr. Brown was right about his handling of the situation. Mr. Burgess therefore apologized to Mr. Brown. Mr. Burgess has apologized to the Petitioner as well. Once when he called a meeting with the Petitioner and the meeting deteriorated, he apologized to her because he felt he was responsible for the conduct of the meeting as the supervisor. He also apologized after the February 1993 incident when he interrupted the Petitioner and called her out of a meeting with an attorney. On that occasion, Mr. Van Dever instructed him to apologize. However, Mr. Burgess accepted the responsibility for his conduct and was sincere in his apology. Mr. Holmes asked the Petitioner, during the meeting with her on October 4, 1996, whether she was claiming that Mr. Burgess had engaged in unprofessional and sexual conduct toward her and she told Mr. Holmes that Mr. Burgess had not done so. The substance of the claim that the Petitioner made was gender bias, although she called it sexual harassment. In the October 4, 1996 memorandum the Petitioner stated that she could only assume that her Civil Service appeal in May of 1996 had something to do with the way Mr. Burgess treated her. In an October 8, 1996, meeting with Mr. Holmes and Mr. Van Dever, the Petitioner requested that she be removed from Mr. Burgess' supervision. This was also discussed at a later meeting on that same day with Mr. Burgess and Mr. Van Dever. Shortly after the October 8, 1996, meeting, Mr. Holmes discussed with Ms. Bain his efforts in attempting to relocate her in another Office Assistant IV position. Mr. Holmes had asked the other employees in the same classification if they would agree to be moved from their current positions and exchange work assignments and locations with Ms. Bain. All elected not to do so. Mr. Holmes also sent Ms. Bain information on other open positions county- wide. Ms. Bain met with Mr. Holmes and Linda Walen. Mr. Holmes met with Ms. Bain again in January 1997 to discuss the job search for the Petitioner and to tell her that he had been unable to find anything for her. After she filed her retaliation complaint with the Commission, Ms. Bain was transferred to the Engineering Department in the same position. She has the option to apply for position openings throughout the ECUA organization and is not restricted only to promotions within the Engineering Department. ECUA employees, including those in the same position as Ms. Bain, can be promoted to positions anywhere within the ECUA organization. Employees in the Petitioner's position, Office Assistant IV, have gone from the ECUA STR Department to the Purchasing Department and from an Office Assistant IV position to a Purchasing Agent position. Ms. Bain's assignment to the Engineering Department does not preclude her from promotional opportunities that may open up anywhere in the ECUA organization. The Petitioner has had no problems with perceived bias or other difficulties in her employment in the Engineering Department. Mr. Burgess, as Ms. Bain's supervisor, did her performance evaluation in 1996. He gave what he thought was an overall good evaluation. In the ECUA ratings scale a "good" rating is not an "average" rating but is a rating that can be from 70% to 95% out of a possible 100%. For those areas where Mr. Burgess marked her evaluation "good," he felt that Ms. Bain was in that range and that she had indeed done a good job in those areas. Her performance rating in 1996, which she signed on November 12, 1996, was a total weighted score of 3.4 with a "good" rating in the following five categories: "Attitude," "Communication," "Human Relation Skills," "Initiative/ Creativity" and "Safety." The Petitioner received an "Excellent" rating in the areas of "Quality," "Productivity" and "Care of Facilities & Equipment." There were no negative ratings in any category. The 3.4 score was almost half-way between a "good" and an "excellent" overall rating. As shown by Mr. Burgess' rating comments on the 1996 evaluation, depicted in Petitioner's Exhibit 2, he felt that, due to the problems Ms. Bain had with the Civil Service re-classification of her position, she did not go the "extra mile" during 1996. She did her job and did what was asked of her but did not take the initiative to do anything other than what was asked of her. Mr. Burgess felt that the re-classification issue affected her output at work and her overall attitude on the job so that he could not give her a higher evaluation like he had done in 1995 when he rated her as "Excellent." Ms. Bain submitted a memorandum dated November 12, 1996, in response to the 1996 evaluation. Ms. Bain states, in that memorandum, that she and Mr. Burgess were "beyond the point of talking about this (see my memorandum to Grant Holmes dated October 4, 1996) . . .." While the Petitioner references her October 4, 1996 memorandum in the November 12, 1996 memorandum in response to her evaluation, she does not reference sexual harassment or the fact that she had filed a discrimination complaint against Mr. Burgess. Mr. Burgess did not counsel Ms. Bain during 1996 about a deterioration in her attitude because overall he rated her as having a good attitude. He did not feel that her attitude warranted counseling. He felt that Ms. Bain was doing her job and did not feel that she was doing bad things. Further, Ms. Bain was not happy with the re-classification situation and Mr. Burgess did not want to "stir anything up." The 1996 rating did not indicate a significant deterioration in the Petitioner's attitude. Her attitude was not excellent in terms of the rating scale, so Mr. Burgess did not feel that he could give her a 4 rating as he had done in 1995. In the previous year, 1995, Mr. Burgess had given her Superior ratings in four categories because he felt that she had gone out of her way to do extra things and to take on extra tasks. In 1995, he evaluated Ms. Bain, giving her a total weighted score of 4.1 with a "Excellent" rating in all categories except for a "Superior" in a category of "Care of Facilities & Equipment." He made comments on her 1995 evaluation to the effect that Ms. Bain continued to do excellent high-quality work. In 1992, the Petitioner received a total weighted score of 3.6 with a "good" rating in "Attitude," "Communication," and "Human Relation Skills." She received an "Excellent" in "Quality," "Productivity," "Initiative/ Creativity," "Safety," and "Care of Facilities & Equipment." In 1993 she received a total weighted score of 3.7 with good or excellent ratings in all categories. In 1994, Mr. Burgess rated her with a total weighted score of 4.0 with an "Excellent" rating in all categories. In 1997, Bill Johnson, the Director of the Engineering Department, gave Ms. Bain a total weighted score of 3.2, a lower rating than Mr. Burgess had given Ms. Bain in 1996, the evaluation which she alleges is retaliatory. Mr. Johnson gave her a "good" in all categories. There is no evidence that she has had any friction since transferring to the Engineering Department. In 1998 Mr. Johnson gave her again a total weighted score of 3.2 and a "good" rating in all categories except for "Quality" for which she was given a "Superior" rating. In 1999, Mr. Johnson gave her a total weighted score of 3.5 and gave her a "good" in all categories except for "Communications," "Quality," and "Productivity" for which she was given "Superior" ratings. In the year 2000, Mr. Johnson gave her a total weighted score of 3.5 with a "good" in all categories except for "Communication," "Quality" and "Productivity" for which she was again given "Superior" ratings. Mr. Johnson's ratings of Ms. Bain were not adverse actions or discriminatory and such has not been claimed by her. Since 1992, the Petitioner has received a "good" rating in "Attitude" on all evaluations except for the 1994 and 1995 evaluations when she received "Excellent" ratings in that category by Mr. Burgess. Her current supervisor, Bill Johnson, has never rated her higher than "good" in the "Attitude" category. Thus, in the nine-year period, she has received a "good" rating in "Attitude" on seven out of nine ratings. Mr. Burgess was not aware that Ms. Bain had filed a sexual harassment complaint or any kind of discrimination complaint against him at the time he completed the 1996 evaluation. Although he knew that Ms. Bain had gone to Mr. Van Dever concerning his directive to her that she should not forward her phone to Quanita Stallworth at the switchboard, and although he was later told that Mr. Van Dever was investigating whether there was a morale problem in his division, he did not actually know that a sexual harassment complaint had been filed regarding him. He learned of it when the Petitioner filed her retaliation complaint with the Commission and referenced a previous "sexual harassment" complaint that she had filed on October 4, 1996, with the ECUA. Mr. Burgess found that she had submitted the October 4, 1996, memorandum when she made reference to it in a November 12, 1996, memorandum which she wrote in response to the November 11, 1996, performance evaluation. However, he did not learn that she claimed to have filed a sexual harassment complaint against him until the ECUA was notified of her retaliation charge by the Human Relations Commission. Mr. Holmes never told Mr. Burgess that the Petitioner had called her complaint a sexual harassment complaint or gender-based discrimination complaint. Neither Mr. Holmes or Mr. Van Dever told Mr. Burgess about the contents of the October 4, 1996, memorandum. Mr. Burgess did not know until early June 1997 that the Petitioner had alleged that he had sexually harassed her because when he found out about the sexual harassment complaint, he had just been nominated to be president of the local Chapter of the American Cancer Society, in late May 1997. When he received notification that Ms. Bain was claiming sexual harassment, he went to the leaders of the American Cancer Society and offered to resign or have them not name him as president so as not to cause the Society any embarrassment.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations finding that the Petitioner failed to establish that she was the victim of discriminatory retaliation and dismissing the Petition in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: R. John Westberry, Esquire Holt & Westberry 1108-A North 12th Avenue Pensacola, Florida 32501 Rosa Carson, Esquire Carson & Adkins 2958 Wellington Circle, North, Suite 2000 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-6885 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Azizi Coleman, Acting Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondent is guilty of the violation alleged in the administrative complaint dated August 7, 1989; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency authorized to regulate and discipline licensees pursuant to Chapters 455 and 473, Florida Statutes. The Respondent is a licensed certified public accountant, license number AC 3214 (election of rights submitted by Respondent). In connection with an investigation of another licensee (not at issue herein), the Respondent submitted to the Department a financial report that Respondent had performed for the entity identified as Moreil Interiors, Inc. (Moreil). That document (Department's exhibit 1) consisted of four pages and represented financial information related to Moreil for a 6 month period ending December 31, 1984. Certified public accounts are required to utilize specific guidelines in the performance of accounting services. Those guidelines are codified in the Statements on standards for Accounting and Review Services (SSARS). The failure to abide by the SSARS guidelines constitutes performance below acceptable accounting standards. The financial report identified in paragraph 3 failed to comply with the SSARS in at least four material ways. The level of service indicated by the Respondent's report is not accepted practice for certified public accountants and has been rejected by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. The type and number of the deficiencies in that report constitute negligence on Respondent's part and establish a failure to exercise professional competence and due professional care in the performance of accounting services.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Accountancy enter a final order requiring the Respondent to complete 24 hours of continuing education regarding compliance with the SSARS guidelines, and placing the Respondent on probation with his work to be reviewed, at his expense, by a consultant or certified public accountant approved by the Board, for a period of one year following completion of the continuing education. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Tobi Pam Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Frank Berman P.O. Box 14156 North Palm Beach, Florida 33408 Martha Willis Executive Director Board of Accountancy Suite 16 4001 Northwest 43rd Street Gainesville, Florida 32606 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following factual findings. Respondent, at times material hereto, was actively licensed to practice public accounting in the State of Florida, such license issued by the Petitioner, Board of Accountancy, Department of Professional Regulation. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) Respondent has been issued license number AC 5470. After becoming licensed as a certified public accountant, Respondent met Ronald Demon, another CPA, while both were employed with a national "Big 8" public accounting firm in Miami--Pete, Marwick and Mitchell. Thereafter, they became social friends and worked for each other at various times performing per diem work for each other. (TR 165, 167) Respondent's first contact with the Housing Authority for the City of Dania was in 1981 when he performed the two-year audit for the Authority on behalf of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), thereafter becoming the fee accountant for that Authority on a monthly retainer. For the succeeding two years as fee accountant, Respondent provided the Authority's monthly accounting information, posting to the general ledger, cash disbursements, bank reconciliations and filing the required reports to HUD. Respondent had limited involvement with classifying bank checks for purposes of posting to the general ledger. In 1983, another two-year audit of the Dania Housing Authority was required to be performed and Respondent submitted a proposal to the Housing Authority to perform same. That proposal was rejected by HUD on the basis of contract and rule provisions that the contracting CPA not have provided accounting or bookkeeping services for the Housing Authority during the period covered by the audit. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1, pages 8, 10) Upon HUD' s rejection of his engagement proposal on behalf of the Housing Authority, Respondent contacted another CPA, Bernard Koon, seeking his submission of an engagement proposal to HUD. Koon's proposal was rejected by HUD based upon the high price quoted for his audit services. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1, pages 8-11) Koon and Respondent had agreed to an arrangement whereby Koon would sign the accountant's report and financial statements of the audit in question, after performance of the work by Respondent and his staff for an agreed fee of $1000. (TR 60; Petitioner's Exhibit 2, pages 11-12) When Koon's engagement proposal was rejected, Respondent contacted Ronald Demon concerning the audit engagement for the Dania Housing Authority. Ronald Demon was then working as a full-time accountant with the City of Miami. At the time, Demon was performing 4 other audit engagements other than his full- time position with the City of Miami, a practice which appears to be fairly common among accountants. Demon was asked by Respondent to contact the Executive Director of the Housing Authority, Frank W. Peterman. Respondent also related to Demon his availability to assist him (Demon) in performing the audit engagement, if Demon needed, which offer was based upon the fact that Respondent knew that Demon was working in a full-time employment relationship. Respondent told Demon that the contract amount would be approximately $4500 which was $500 less than the amount Respondent had proposed, and which proposal had been rejected by HUD. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1, pages 7, 10-15) Respondent advised Demon that to earn a stated portion of that fee, $500 of the $4500, he would merely have to sign the audit report. Respondent would be in charge of conducting all field work, preparation of the audit report and all other related work with Demon having no day to day involvement concerning preparation of the accountant's report and related financial statements. After Demon contacted the Authority's Executive Director, Respondent prepared for his (Demon's) signature, the engagement proposal which was signed in the parking lot of a Denny's Restaurant at 36th Street and Biscayne Boulevard in North Miami and Respondent later either mailed or hand-delivered the engagement proposal to the Housing Authority offices. Respondent admits that he informed the Executive Director of the Authority of Demon's availability, the fact that he was a CPA and that he was black. Unknown to Respondent, Demon was an inactive licensee at that time. Shortly after Demon's contract proposal was submitted to the Authority, it was awarded to him and, at that time, Demon and Respondent had reached an agreement wherein, as stated earlier, the field work in preparation of the audit report and related finances would be prepared by Respondent and his staff for subsequent signature by Demon. Respondent characterized their agreement as one whereby he was the "orchestrator" of the engagement for financial review and approval of the reports by Demon. (TR 170; Petitioner's Exhibit 1, pages 22-24) Respondent's accounting firm employed two accountants, who were not CPAs, to perform the field work for the subject audit report. Respondent's involvement consisted initially of planning the audit with the staffers and providing them a copy of HUD's Audit Guide. These employees of Respondent were not known by Demon nor did he (Demon) engage in any of the initial planning of the field work; provided no written instructions, audit programming or scheduling of the work plans for completion of the field work. Respondent's supervision of his staff for the subject audit was limited, consisting primarily of being available to answer specific questions they had, a visit to the job site and performed the initial review of work papers that were generated by the staff. After his initial review of the work papers, Respondent submitted the work papers and a draft of the financial statements and accountant report to Demon for his approval and signature. After at least a two-week period, Respondent contacted Demon to ask if there were any problems with his submittal to him whereupon Demon signed and returned the papers to Miller with only grammatical changes in the management letter which accompanied the report and finances, and the submittal was typed in final form on Demon's letterhead by Respondent's office staff. Respondent was unaware that Demon did not review the accountant's report or related financial statements. Demon considered that his agreement for the fee with Miller did not entail that duty and he relied upon Respondent's prior knowledge and experience, supervision and review of the work performed to correct any problems with the report. Upon submission of the audit report to HUD, a check was sent payable to Ronald Demon for $2250 or half of the $4500 engagement fee, with the remainder of the fee to be remitted when the audit report was approved by the client. That fee was first obtained by Miller who called Demon and arranged to meet him at Respondent's bank for negotiation of the check. Respondent had already stamped the check payable to Demon with his deposit stamp and Demon signed above the stamp and Respondent thereafter deposited that check into his (Respondent's) account. Respondent then gave Demon a check for $250 which represented half of the agreed fee. (Deposition testimony of Ronald Demon) HUD rejected the audit report signed by Demon and engaged the services of a public accounting firm--Deloitte, Haskins and Sells to perform another audit. Upon rejection of the audit report, but prior to the employment of Deloitte, Haskins and Sells, Respondent, Demon and Executive Director Peterman met to confer on the matter to seek a resolution of the situation. Neither Respondent nor Demon corrected the deficiency cited in the HUD report requiring HUD to employ another public accounting firm to complete the audit. Respondent did not return to HUD the monies received by him. Demon remitted to HUD all the monies paid to either him or Respondent. (TR 49, 51) Marlyn Felsing, CPA, was received as an expert in these proceedings in the areas of public accounting with specific emphasis on audited financial statements and related accountant's reports and work papers. Felsing has had extensive experience in auditing and has been engaged on behalf of the Petitioner and others in numerous peer reviews of accounting firms. Without regard to the arrangement between Respondent and Demon, both individuals, as certified public accountants, are responsible for practicing public accounting in accordance with generally accepted and prevailing standards of accounting. Respondent was required to comply with generally accepted accounting principles and generally accepted accounting standards in preparation of the audit report for Dania Housing Authority. Rules 21A-20.07; 20.08 and 21A-21.02 and 21A-21.03, Florida Administrative Code. (TR 88, 92, and 94) As an assistant to the auditor (Demon), Respondent, as required by the standards on auditing services, was responsible for the work performed. Respondent acknowledged his accountability under published standards and generally accepted and prevailing standards of accounting practice. (TR 204- 206) Felsing completed an investigative report and analysis of the field audit conducted by Respondent's staff and noted specific departures from generally accepted accounting principles and auditing standards and generally accepted and prevailing standards of accounting practice within the questioned audit report. They are, in summary, as follows: Violation of the "independence" requirements; Failure to exercise professional care respecting his review of staff work; Failure to adequately plan and assist staff in completion of field work and the supervision thereof; Failure to maintain safety of the work papers (the work papers have disappeared); Failure to refer to prior years' audit reports demonstrating a lack of consistency; and Failure to delineate footnote disclosures, improper labeling of financial statements, failure to disclose conflicts between the re- quirements of the HUD Audit Guide and generally accepted and prevailing standards of account- ing practice including the published generally accepted accounting principles and auditing standards. Felsing found it especially troublesome and a violation of the HUD requirements on independence based on Respondent's conduct based on his engagement with Demon in performing the auditing services in violation of generally accepted and prevailing standards of accounting and auditing practice. Rule 21A-22.01, Florida Administrative Code. Finally, Felsing noted that the deficiencies and departures from generally accepted and prevailing standards were not simply matters of professional judgment but were deficiencies which were objective and clear-cut in nature. (TR 143, 147, 148, 154, 156, and 158) Respondent's major contention was that his level of responsibility was limited inasmuch as Demon, as signatory of the audit report, owed a greater duty and responsibility for the statements and the report in question. As found herein, and as pointed out by Mr. Felsing, as licensees sharing in the performance of the accounting engagement, both were liable for the deficiencies found in the statement and the audit report for the Dania Housing Authority.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended that the Respondent's licensure as a certified public accountant be suspended for a period of six (6) months, with reinstatement under such probationary terms and conditions as shall be established by the Board of Accountancy, including continuing professional education in the areas of accounting and auditing in monitoring of his professional practice under such terms and conditions as shall be established by the Board. RECOMMENDED this 17th day of July, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 1985.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner, and if so, what corrective action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a forty-one-year-old black male. He is a 1977 graduate of the University of Florida with a bachelor's degree in Business Administration. His undergraduate major was Finance. Petitioner has approximately 30 credit hours in Accounting from the University of North Florida, which he earned between 1983 and 1988. Petitioner is currently enrolled in the University of North Florida's Masters of Public Administration program. He has completed 30 of the 39 required credit hours in that program. From November of 1979 to March of 1991, Petitioner worked for Occidental Chemical Company as an accountant. After leaving this job, Petitioner was self-employed from April of 1991 to December of 1991. Respondent's District Two office in Lake City, Florida, hired Petitioner on March 6, 1992, as a Purchasing Agent I. Respondent hired Petitioner under administrative rules pertaining to career service employees as promulgated by the Department of Management Services. Petitioner received a copy of Respondent's disciplinary and conduct standards when he was hired. Petitioner worked as a Purchasing Agent I until September of 1992. His salary during that time was $609.00 bi-weekly. In September of 1992, Respondent promoted Petitioner to the position of Accountant II in Respondent's Office of Financial Services. His bi-weekly salary was $752.91, a 23.5 percent increase. As soon as Petitioner became a member of the fiscal section, he received five weeks of intensive training relative to vouchers. This training was necessary because Respondent's central office was beginning to relinquish many functions to its district financial offices, including the vouchering process. Petitioner's direct supervisor in the fiscal section was Faye McClellan. She occupied the position of Accounting Services Supervisor I. Petitioner was indirectly supervised by David Sheffield, District Financial Administrator. On March 1, 1993, David Sheffield hired Karin Davis Charron, a white female, as an Accountant I in Respondent's Office of Financial Services. Her salary was $674.14 bi-weekly, or ten percent above the minimum for an Accountant I. Prior to her employment with Respondent, Ms. Charron had 15 credit hours in Business Administration and Accounting, which she earned at Lake City Community College. Her prior work experience included the following: (a) head cashier at a food store, October of 1983 to June of 1984; (b) accountant/bookkeeper in private business, July of 1984 to September of 1985; (c) Fiscal Assistant I, Department of Corrections, November of 1985 to April of 1987; (d) Secretary Specialist/Cashier, Department of Corrections, April of 1987 to May of 1988; and (e) Fiscal Assistant II, Department of Corrections, May of 1988 to March of 1993. In March of 1993, Petitioner completed his probationary period as an Accountant II. On March 27, 1993, Faye McClellan and David Sheffield gave Petitioner an overall performance rating of "exceeds." On June 1, 1993, Petitioner was promoted to the position of Accountant III. At this time, Petitioner's salary was increased by 10 percent to $828.20 bi-weekly. On August 20, 1993, Respondent hired Ricky Haddock, a black male, as a Fiscal Assistant II at a bi-weekly salary of $549.90. Ricky Haddock testified that soon after he was employed, Ms. Charron told him that "we can make your life a living hell." This statement is not credible due to Mr. Haddock's poor memory concerning the circumstances under which Ms. Charron allegedly made this statement. On or about March 11, 1994, Respondent promoted Ms. Charron to Accountant II with a bi-weekly salary of $766.94, a ten percent increase. Subsequently, Dave Sheffield received a promotion and vacated his position as District Financial Administrator. Linda Green, a white female, took his place. Ms. Green had over ten years of managerial experience when she accepted this position. As manager of the fiscal section, Linda Green became responsible for the direct supervision of Faye McClellan. She was Petitioner's and Ms. Charron's indirect supervisor. On or about March 17, 1994, Faye McClellan gave Petitioner a special performance appraisal. The appraisal form indicates that Petitioner, as an Accountant III, had attended voucher quarterly meetings, SAMAS contract training, payroll training, ADA training, and conduct standards training. The appraisal form described Petitioner as a team player. Of special note was his participation in the Youth Motivator Program in the Columbia County School System. Petitioner received a overall performance rating of "exceeds." Linda Green concurred in Ms. McClellan's assessment of Petitioner's job performance. On September 9, 1994, Respondent promoted Petitioner to the position of Accountant IV. The promotion increased Petitioner's salary by ten percent to $938.36 bi-weekly. Linda Green, as manager of the financial office, recommended Petitioner for this promotion. As an Accountant IV, Petitioner's duties primarily consisted of auditing consultant contracts. These contracts are the most complicated contracts that the financial office processes. Petitioner was also responsible for the payroll and for the supervision of other contract auditors. About two months after Petitioner became an Accountant IV, his immediate supervisor, Faye McClellan, requested and received a position reassignment in Respondent's purchasing office. Petitioner filed an employment application to fill the vacancy created by Ms. McClellan's reassignment. On November 21, 1994, Respondent promoted Petitioner to the position of Accounting Services Supervisor I. The promotion increased Petitioner's salary by 19 percent to $1,161.31 bi- weekly. Linda Green recommended Petitioner for the Accounting Services Supervisor I promotion. She became his direct supervisor. As Accounting Services Supervisor I, Petitioner was responsible for the direct supervision of several subordinate Fiscal Assistants and Accountants, including Ms. Charron. Petitioner was the only black supervisor in Respondent's second district. Historically, the financial section is one of the more racially diverse offices in District Two. From November of 1994 through June of 1995, there were approximately ten people working in the fiscal section. Three of these employees were black. At least two employees were members of other minorities. Petitioner, Ricky Haddock, and two other minority employees were the only employees in the financial office with a college education. On December 23, 1994, Respondent promoted Ms. Charron to Accountant IV. Her bi-weekly salary became $928.50 which was equivalent to the minimum of the pay grade for that position. Linda Green recommended Ms. Charron for the promotion to Accountant IV. Petitioner participated on the panel that selected Ms. Charron as the most qualified candidate to fill Petitioner's former position. In so doing, he reviewed her application and interviewed her for the job. There is no credible evidence to support Petitioner's current allegation that Linda Green allowed Ms. Charron to misrepresent her qualifications for the position of Accountant IV. Ms. Charron's application in February of 1994 for the position of Accountant II, and her application in November of 1994 for the position of Accountant IV, accurately describe all duties and responsibilities that she performed at Stafford's Fire Extinguisher Service in 1984-1985. In 1994, an applicant for the position of Accountant IV was required to have a bachelor's degree in accounting, or a certificate as a Certified Public Accountant, or equivalent work experience in accounting. Neither the Petitioner nor Ms. Charron possessed a bachelor's degree in accounting or a certificate as a Certified Public Accountant when Respondent promoted them to their respective Accountant IV positions. Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that they were well qualified for the position of Accountant IV, at the time of their respective appointments, based on a combination of their education and work experience. Petitioner had a bachelor's degree in Finance, over eleven years of accounting experience in private industry, and more than four years of experience in state governmental accounting. Ms. Charron, on the other hand, had less then one year of formal education in business administration/accounting, over one year of accounting experience in private industry, and more than eleven years of experience in state governmental accounting. State employees have to comply with numerous statutes and rules which do not apply to private enterprise. In this case, Ms. Charron's experience in working for the state more than compensated for her lack of formal education. As Accounting Services Supervisor I, Petitioner's supervisory responsibilities increased. In February of 1995, he directly supervised Rick Haddock and three other Fiscal Assistant II positions, two of which were vacant. He also had direct supervision over Ms. Charron. Ms. Charron, in turn, was responsible for the direct supervision of four other Accountant positions. On February 13, 1995, Petitioner signed a Review and Performance Planning (RAPP) form. This was a new form which Respondent began using just prior to implementing a major career service reform within the agency. The form states that from February 1, 1995, through January 31, 1996, Petitioner would be evaluated based on his performance of the following duties: Supervise district vouchering section. Active participation/supervision vouchering section. Coordinate workloads. Provide liaison with personnel, DOT and State Comptroller. Assist in Legislative budget request. Assist with budget preparation for various programs. Assist in formulating budget information into the different entities LBR's. Manage contract section. Manages all contracts. Verifying information and all supporting documentation for payments to vendors. Audit district disbursements. Audit disbursement for accuracy in accordance with GAP and pertinent federal/state/department rules/ regulations/statutes. The RAPP form lists the following as Petitioner's departmental responsibilities: 1. Coaching; 2. Delegation; 3. Management control; 4. Leadership/Influence; 5. EEO/Affirmative Action; 6. Performance goals; 7. Planning and organization; 8. Judgment; Resources; and 10. Safety practices. Linda Green wanted to increase the cross-training of all employees so that work would not become back-logged when one of them took leave. She also wanted to give Petitioner an opportunity to broaden his experience in other functions of the financial office. In order to accomplish her goals, Ms. Green gave Petitioner additional budget responsibility and deleted his property administration duties in February of 1995. Linda Green gave Petitioner's property administration duties to Ms. Charron. From February 1995, through May 1995, Ms. Charron spent a portion of her time working on the inventory. Ms. Charron continued to work on several special projects to supervise other accountants. As Accounting Services Supervisor I, Petitioner's desk was located in a glass enclosed area within a larger office. Petitioner was supposed to be a "working" supervisor. However, Petitioner spent an inordinate amount of time in his office with the door closed. During these times, Petitioner had long social visits with an employee from another office in the building. He discussed personal matters with an auditor from the central office on the phone for extended periods of time. At times Petitioner's door was locked, so staff could not use the computer which was located in his office. Petitioner's subordinates were reluctant to disturb Petitioner during these times even if they had a question they needed to ask him. They began to complain to Linda Green about Petitioner's unavailability. Linda Green observed Petitioner sleeping during meetings. At first she ignored the situation. However, employees from other offices began to complain about Petitioner's sleeping during meetings. Linda Green also received complaints from other employees that Petitioner was misusing state property. They claimed that he was receiving facsimile transmissions not related to department business. Linda Green began taking notes about these complaints on her computer. She did not share these notes with Petitioner. Linda Green discussed the prohibitions against misuse of state property in staff meetings. She also discussed her concerns about Petitioner's sleeping in meetings, talking on the telephone, and entertaining visitors with Petitioner personally. In February of 1995, Respondent initiated a new job classification and pay plan. The 1994 Legislature mandated this new system, which is distinct from the career service rules promulgated by the Department of Management Services. The new system is unique to Respondent as an agency. Under the new system, Respondent's employees retain career service status and benefits. However, Respondent changed position descriptions, job classifications, employment qualifications, and pay scale ranges to create more flexibility in hiring, promoting, and reassigning duties of employees within the department. The new system concentrates on the knowledge, skills, and abilities required for each position rather than a minimum qualification for each class specification. Formal education remains important, but it is not the paramount consideration in deciding whether to hire or promote employees. The focus of the new system is to ensure that employees can perform the required functions and duties of the specific positions which they occupy or for which they apply. Under the new system, Respondent can reward employees for productivity by increasing their salary without having to promote them to a new position or reclassify their existing positions. Respondent can increase or decrease salaries within a new classification, depending upon the actual duties assigned and performed by the employees. The new plan reduced the number of career service job classes from over 52 occupational groups with 1700 job classifications to 16 occupational groups divided into six levels. Respondent uses the fourth and fifth levels within an occupational group to recognize the distinctive, but equivalent, value of technical and managerial expertise. For example, each occupational group embraces a Level IV and Level V which corresponds to technical and managerial expertise respectively. A reassignment from a Level V managerial position to a Level IV technical position, or vice versa, is not a demotion or promotion, respectively. The new Level IV and Level V positions allow Respondent to reassign employees to different duties to meet the demands of the changing work load and work force without adversely affecting their work status, employment records, or incomes. Thus, Respondent can shift employees from obsolete duties to new and viable tasks where they are more productive. When Respondent initiated the new system, and for one year thereafter, Respondent's central office had to approve every reassignment from an old career service position "title" to the corresponding new title. In performing this duty, Respondent's central office verified the salary for each position to ensure that the salary corresponded to the duties assigned to that position. The initial reassignments in the new system were effective February 24, 1995. At that time, Linda Green, Ms. Charron, and Petitioner were reassigned to the new Accounting, Audit, and Tax occupational group with no change in their respective salaries. Linda Green was assigned to Level VI, as District Financial Services Manager. Petitioner was assigned Level V, Accounting Services Supervisor I, which required that Petitioner spend over 51 percent of his time supervising other employees. Ms. Charron was assigned to Level III as an Accountant IV. Petitioner continued to be Ms. Charron's direct supervisor. A personality conflict developed between Petitioner and Ms. Charron after she became an Accountant IV in December of 1994. Ms. Charron did not want the employees that she supervised to seek or receive assistance from Petitioner, even though he was her supervisor. If Ms. Charron disagreed with Petitioner, she would go over Petitioner's head to Linda Green to resolve the conflict. Petitioner resented not having total control over all of the employees under his direct and indirect supervision. His attitude became confrontational with other employees when they asked a question or made a comment that he perceived as undermining his authority. At times he was overly assertive in an effort to prove that he was right on one point or another. Linda Green did nothing to open lines of communication between Petitioner, as supervisor, and Ms. Charron, as his subordinate. Petitioner did not seek Ms. Green's assistance in resolving the conflict with Ms. Charron. As the power struggle between Petitioner and Ms. Charron ensued, dissension and poor morale became a problem in the fiscal section. On one occasion, Debbie Williams and Laura Kennon were working with the central office to correct an invoice error on one of Petitioner's consultant contracts. Petitioner questioned the method they were using to correct the problem. He wanted them to correct the error without involving the central office or the State Comptroller's office. Ms. Williams wanted to leave a proper audit trail. Before the situation was resolved, all three employees became angry and confrontational. Around the end of February 1995, a member of the financial services staff requested a meeting to discuss the problems the office was having as a result of the dissension between Petitioner and Ms. Charron. Jean Jones, District Two's Director of Administration attended the meeting. Linda Green and Jean Jones advised the staff that they could go to either Petitioner or Ms. Charron for answers to any questions about their work. Linda Green did not tell her staff in this meeting, or any other meeting, that education did not mean anything in Respondent's financial section. After the meeting was over, Jean Jones told Linda Green that some changes had to be made to better define the lines of communication within the office. Ms. Jones instructed Ms. Green to do some research and develop a solution to the problem. A large part of Ms. Charron's duties included working on special projects. These projects necessitated frequent consultations between Linda Green and Ms. Charron. There is no persuasive evidence that Linda Green showed favoritism to Ms. Charron by conspiring with her against Petitioner in private meetings and conversations. To the contrary, the dissension that existed in the office was the result of a personality conflict between Petitioner and Ms. Charron. Ms. Green's inability to establish a clear chain of command aggravated the situation. Prior to November of 1994, Respondent provided Petitioner with an abundance of training in technical and management subject areas. Some of the technical seminars included consultant procedures and negotiation, contract fund approval and encumbrance, and contractual services training. Other training programs included office staff skills enhancement, employee selection, conduct standards and discipline, district budget development, supervisory decision making, employee performance appraisal, fundamental skills of communication, fundamental skills of management, and Certified Public Management Level I. After November of 1994, Petitioner continued to receive training to enhance his career. Some of the programs he attended included review and performance planning, how to supervise people, managing change, presentation skills, budget and budget orientation, federal aid training, records retention, and management problems of the technical person in a leadership role. Linda Green encouraged Petitioner to participate in the training programs. She gave him the opportunity to develop the skills necessary to enhance his career. In the spring of 1995, Linda Green worked on training plans for all personnel in the fiscal section including Petitioner. On April 7, 1995, Ms. Green discussed Petitioner's training plan with him. On April 25, 1995, a copy of Petitioner's training plan was discovered on his desk with the word "bullshit" written across the bottom. Petitioner admits that he wrote this expletive on his training plan in the presence of Ms. Charron. In April of 1995, the State Comptroller's office rejected and returned a great number of invoices to the financial office. Linda Green responded by assigning Petitioner the responsibility of handling the returns and correcting the errors. In order to stay apprised of the situation, Ms. Green required that all mail relating to returns be directed to her before being delivered to Petitioner. She did not review Petitioner's mail unrelated to the returns. In April of 1995, Linda Green became aware that certain work assigned to Petitioner and/or Petitioner's subordinates was not being performed in a timely manner. Ms. Green had to enlist the help of other personnel to complete the work. In April of 1995, Linda Green initiated the procedure to issue reprimands to Petitioner concerning his continued misuse of the office telephones and facsimile machines, his sleeping on duty, and his social visits that wasted time. However, this procedure was delayed because Petitioner was hospitalized for surgery. Petitioner was out of work on sick leave from April 27, 1995, to May 30, 1995. During his illness, Linda Green extended Petitioner's probationary period for his Accounting Services Supervisor I position. In the 1992-93 fiscal year, the financial services office had approximately 12 primary responsibilities. The financial office gained 10 additional duties in the 1993-94 fiscal year and 18 new duties in the 1994-95 fiscal year. During this time, the number of positions in the financial office doubled. In May of 1995, Linda Green began to plan the reorganization of the financial section. She discussed the reorganization with her supervisor, Jean Jones. They made a decision to divide the responsibilities in the financial services office between Petitioner and Ms. Charron, the two established supervisors. They based the decision in part on a need to accommodate the increased work load. They also decided to split the supervision duties in an effort to improve the lines of communication within the office and to eliminate dissension. Officials in Respondent's central and district offices approved the reorganization. Under the reorganization plan, Ms. Green decided to give Petitioner responsibility for the following: supervising the concentration account; processing purchase orders, local purchase orders, local charge accounts, and utility invoice transmittals; processing travel and individual reimbursements; handling deposits; supervising warrant distribution; and processing mail. Ms. Green deleted Petitioner's duties relative to payroll and contracts. Ms. Charron's duties under the reorganization included supervision of the following: contracts, reconciliations, compliance reports, interest payments, and journal transfers. She assumed supervision of the payroll at the express request of Jean Jones. Additionally, Ms. Charron was assigned numerous special projects. When Petitioner returned to work from sick leave on June 1, 1995, Linda Green discussed the reorganization with Petitioner and Ms. Charron. She advised them that Ms. Charron would supervise four Level Two positions, one of which was vacant. Petitioner would supervise five Level One positions, all of which were occupied. Petitioner and Ms. Charron would report directly to Linda Green. Linda Green decided to have Petitioner supervise the Level One positions because they needed more supervision than the Level Two positions. Petitioner was better qualified than Ms. Charron to supervise the five entry level positions occupied by minority and non-minority employees. On June 15, 1995, Linda Green promoted Ms. Charron to Accounting, Audit, Tax Level V. Her salary was increased by 20 percent to $1,114.20 bi-monthly. The promotion was effective before the expiration of Ms. Charron's probationary period as an Accountant IV. The decisions to reorganize the section and promote Ms. Charron were made while Petitioner was absent on sick leave. Linda Green did not deliberately choose to promote Ms. Charron without consulting Petitioner as her supervisor. Moreover, Ms. Green, as manager, had no duty to consult with Petitioner before reorganizing the office. On June 16, 1995, Linda Green issued two official written reprimands against Petitioner. The first written reprimand involved a violation of Respondent's Conduct Standard 14-17.012(4)(a)6., Florida Administrative Code, for sleeping on duty. The reprimand documented the following occasions that Petitioner violated this conduct standard: November 30, 1994; December 1, 1994; January 5, 1995; March 13, 1995; March 20, 1995; March 21, 1995; March 30, 1995; June 5, 1995; and June 7, 1995. Prior to June of 1995, numerous employees were observed sleeping in meetings. The record contains no evidence that any of them were given written reprimands for sleeping on duty. Except for one of these employees, there is no evidence that their respective supervisors were aware that they were sleeping on duty. One employee, Jim Spencer, was observed sleeping on duty by his direct supervisor, Jean Jones. He was not on permanent career status at the time. Jean Jones decided to extend Mr. Spencer's probationary status rather than issue him a written reprimand. Ms. Jones made a conscious decision to give Mr. Spencer an opportunity to correct his behavior before dismissing him from employment. The second official written reprimand charged Petitioner with violating Respondent's Conduct Standard 14-17.012(4)(a)25., Florida Administrative Code, for unauthorized use or misuse of state property, services, equipment or personnel, and Respondent's Conduct Standard 14-17.012(4)(a)7., Florida Administrative Code, for loafing. This reprimand was the result of Petitioner's continued abuse of telephone privileges from January through June of 1995, misuse of the facsimile machines from February through May of 1995, and extended social visits with an employee from another office from January through March of 1995. Petitioner's alleged misuse of Respondent's facsimile machine was due to his involvement with the Safe and Drug-free Schools Advisory Council sponsored by the Columbia County School Board. Petitioner was cautioned in staff meetings on February 13, 1995, and February 21, 1995, against using state property for personal reasons. After those meetings, he received announcements of advisory council meetings on February 27, 1995, and April 26, 1995. He received a third fax transmission from the school board on May 16, 1995, while he was on sick leave. The school board solicited Petitioner's participation in the advisory council during one of Respondent's staff meetings. Respondent's employees did not have to request leave to attend the meeting. Nevertheless, Respondent did not give its employees permission to use its facsimile machines to receive notices about advisory council meetings or other volunteer work. Petitioner contacted the school board staff to tell them not to send him notices using Respondent's facsimile machines. The record is not clear as to when Petitioner made this request. Petitioner did not receive facsimile transmissions from the school board after he received the reprimand in June of 1995. The record contains evidence of four written reprimands for employee misuse of state property from December 1994, through May 1995. From February 1996, through June 1996, six employees were given written reprimands for misuse of state property. The reprimands of other employees included misuse of telephone privileges, computers, and agency stamps and stationary. These reprimands, together with competent evidence that Petitioner abused his long-distance telephone privileges as set forth below, eliminate any concern that Petitioner received disparate treatment regarding his reprimand for misuse or unauthorized use of state property. There is no evidence that Respondent has ever cited anyone but Petitioner for loafing. Nevertheless, the record supports this charge against Petitioner. Juanita Aiken works in Respondent's central office as an Disbursement Services Analyst. She testified that she often discussed personal matters with Respondent's employees in long- distance telephone conversations before she addressed the business purpose of her call. Linda Green personally informed Petitioner in January of 1995 that he needed to confine his long-distance telephone conversations with Ms. Aiken to department business. Petitioner did not heed her verbal warning. Ms. Aiken's personal telephone conversations with Petitioner did not cease until Linda Green and Jean Jones contacted her supervisor in Tallahassee. In the spring of 1995, Linda Green solicited Debra Williams' help in monitoring Petitioner's personal telephone calls. Ms. Williams declined to become involved and requested that her desk be relocated to another area. Linda Green assigned Ms. Charron a desk in Petitioner's private office in April of 1995. Ms. Charron complained to Ms. Green that Petitioner was talking on the phone for 30 to 45 minutes everyday and sometimes twice a day. The personal nature of the calls made Ms. Charron feel uncomfortable. Olu Olyewole worked for Respondent as a Distributor Computer Systems Analyst. He was responsible for connecting personal computer terminals to the networking system. He visited Petitioner regularly for extended periods of time until Ms. Green complained to his supervisor. When Mr. Olyewole visited Petitioner, the door to Petitioner's private office would often be closed. Early in 1995, Wanda Jean Hills desk was located in the glass-enclosed office with Petitioner's desk. On one occasion she could not get to her desk because she believed Petitioner and Mr. Olyewole were having a private conversation. The long social visits with Mr. Olyewole wasted time in an office that was overburdened with work. The visits interfered the performance of work by Petitioner and his subordinates. Petitioner was unavailable to his subordinates during these visits because they were reluctant to disturb his conversations, even when they needed his assistance. Linda Green did not reprimand any of her subordinates except Petitioner for misuse of state property, sleeping on duty, or loafing. However, there is no evidence that other employees under her authority violated the same conduct standards that Petitioner violated. There is evidence that Linda Green sold Amway products to employees on Respondent's property over a two-month time span. The record does not reflect the exact period of time in which Ms. Green engaged in this activity. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Linda Green passed out Amway brochures and delivered merchandise before work in the mornings. At times, her co-workers would place an order with Ms. Green during work hours because they were familiar with Amway products and knew that she was an Amway representative. Occasionally, Respondent's employees would hand Ms. Green a check or leave one in her desk during work hours. Linda Green did not aggressively pursue her private enterprise during work hours. There is no evidence that Ms. Green's private business activities interfered with her duties or usurped a significant portion of her time as manager of the financial section. Respondent did not give Linda Green a written reprimand for conducting private business on Respondent's property. The record does not reflect whether Ms. Green was verbally reprimanded. It does not appear that her supervisor, Jean Jones, was aware that Ms. Green was involved in selling Amway products on department property. The record does not contain evidence of any written reprimand based solely on unauthorized solicitation on state property. It does contain evidence that Respondent issued a written reprimand to an employee for conducting personal business while using a state vehicle. The employee's actions, like Ms. Green's, were incidental to the performance of his duties. The employee's supervisor did not require the employee to reimburse the agency for any cost. On June 16, 1995, Linda Green gave Petitioner a special performance appraisal to evaluate his performance as a supervisor since November 21, 1994. To conduct this evaluation, Ms. Green used the performance appraisal form for supervisors and managers that was in effect when Petitioner was promoted to Accounting Services Supervisor I in November of 1994. Linda Green admits that she did not conduct the required initial review of the relevant performance standards with Petitioner within two weeks of his promotion. Nevertheless, Petitioner's claims that he was not familiar with the performance standards used by Ms. Green to evaluate his performance is not persuasive. Petitioner attended at least two seminars in performance appraisal and performance planning. Petitioner was familiar with the performance standards for a supervisor, which became effective after Respondent initiated its career service reform in February of 1995. He signed the RAPP form on February 13, 1995. The standards contained on the new appraisal form are substantially similar to the performance standards listed on the older appraisal form. Linda Green gave Petitioner an overall performance rating of "below" standards. The record supports her determination that Petitioner's work performance began to fall short of expectations after he assumed the position as an accounting supervisor. Linda Green determined that Petitioner's performance in two categories deserved the highest rating of "achieves." These two categories were EEO/AFFIRMATIVE ACTION and SAFETY PRACTICES. Linda Green determined that Petitioner's performance was substantially below expectations in at least one area of each of the remaining six categories for the following reasons: PLANNING, CONTROLLING AND ORGANIZING WORK Petitioner failed to operate his work areas efficiently. He did not notify his supervisor of job related problems. Petitioner did not take necessary and appropriate action on performance and shortcomings of subordinate employees. SUPERVISION/LEADERSHIP OF PEOPLE Petitioner failed to delegate effectively. Petitioner demonstrated dissension toward other staff members. PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS Petitioner did not take necessary and appropriate action on performance shortcomings of subordinate employees. PROBLEM ANALYSIS/DECISION MAKING Petitioner failed to inform and/or consult with necessary persons during the decision- making process. SELF DIRECTION/PERSONAL SKILLS Petitioner failed to use his work time effectively. He abused his telephone privileges. He wasted time visiting with an other employee. JOB PERFORMANCE Petitioner failed to perform specific job assignments as outlined on his position description or as assigned by appropriate management. A job applicant claimed that he earned 2400 credit hours in a U.S. Army finance school within a two-month period. Petitioner offered the applicant a job without verifying this information. Linda Green subsequently determined that the applicant had misrepresented his qualifications and withdrew the job offer. Based on this incident alone, Petitioner did not meet the standard for job performance in general. In December of 1995, Rick Haddock received a promotion to a Level II accountant. His salary increased by 20 percent to $715.27 bi-monthly. In March of 1996, Petitioner had a confrontation with Mary Caldwell, a white female accountant. Petitioner's voice was loud; he sounded very angry and threatening. The disturbance alarmed several employees who were in the vicinity. Ms. Caldwell and Petitioner went into a private office where the argument continued. Petitioner's behavior toward Ms. Caldwell was totally inappropriate. On March 22, 1996, Linda Green gave Petitioner a written reprimand for violation of Respondent's Conduct Standard 14-17.012(4)(a)16., Florida Administrative Code, involving rudeness, display of uncooperative or antagonistic attitude, actions or behavior. That same day, Ms. Green gave Petitioner a mandatory Employee Assistance Program Referral. In June of 1996, Linda Green deleted Petitioner's duties involving the budget and supervision of the vouchering section. Linda Green gave Patsy Green, a white female, Petitioner's budget responsibilities. Linda Green took this initiative because of the increased work load resulting from continued decentralization. The central office initiated a process in 1996 to conduct a periodic formal Quality Assurance Review (QAR) in each district office. The purpose of the QAR was to ensure that all vouchers were correct before they were sent to the billing office of the State Controller. Ms. Green wanted Petitioner to focus his energy on making sure that District Two's vouchers were in compliance with all state regulations. In June, 1996, Linda Green gave Petitioner additional duties including financial audits and investigations, quality assurance reports, reconciliations, comptroller returns, and liaison with the State Comptroller's office. His new duties were in-depth auditing and accounting responsibilities involving job cost reporting and making sure that the accounting system stayed in balance. Petitioner's salary was not decreased when his job description changed. At the same time, Linda Green gave Ms. Charron additional duties including contract funds management, joint participation agreements, settlement agreements, management reports, training, and numerous special projects. Ms. Green deleted Ms. Charron's supervisory responsibilities over the contract section. Linda Green received information in June 1996, that the central office intended to audit the supervisory positions in District Two. The central office wanted to make sure that all Level V positions in the Accounting, Audit, and Tax occupational group were held by employees spending at least 51 percent of their time in supervision. Petitioner and Ms. Charron were not spending 51 percent of their time in supervising the work of other employees. Accordingly, both of them were reassigned on June 14, 1996, to Level IV of the Accounting, Audit, and Tax occupational group. The working title for each of them became Accounting Services Administrator. This change was not a demotion and did not effect their respective salaries. Instead, the reassignments accurately reflected the actual duties of their positions. After Petitioner filed his Charge of Discrimination, Michael Klump, from Respondent's Minority Program Office in Tallahassee, Florida, was assigned to furnish all information requested by FCHR and to prepare the agency's response to the complaint. Mr. Klump's duties did not involve investigating the alleged charges on behalf of FCHR. Respondent's Minority Program Office prepared a letter dated September 11, 1995, addressed to Petitioner. The purpose of the letter was to advise Petitioner that the agency had received the complaint. It states that Petitioner should contact Mr. Klump if Petitioner had any additional information or questions regarding this matter. There is no competent evidence to indicate whether Petitioner received the letter from the Minority Program Office. Mr. Klump visited Respondent's District Two Office in Lake City to gather the information requested by FCHR. He did not interview Petitioner while he was there. Respondent's Minority Program Office does not routinely interview complainants who file a charge of employment discrimination with FCHR unless the complainant responds to a letter similar to the one addressed to Petitioner. There is no credible evidence that Respondent prepared its response and/or position statement to FCHR with the intention of misrepresenting material facts. Linda Green gave Petitioner a copy of her computer notes relative to dissension in the office when he first requested them. However, she edited the notes to delete the names of employees that had complained about Petitioner. At the hearing, Ms. Green produced an unedited copy of the notes which had been updated beyond the time relevant here. There is no persuasive evidence that Respondent intentionally discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his race or gender or retaliated against him for filing his Charge of Discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's claims of racial and gender discrimination and retaliation. Recommended this 15th day of October, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 1997.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is Barbara Clark and Company, a CPA firm. Barbara Clark owns and operates the company. The Respondent issued a Request for Proposal, RFP Number 7112, for CPA audit services. The Petitioner responded to the RFP along with four other proposers. The award for RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, was to be made to the two (2) companies who received the highest number of points based on individual evaluations by four (4) people selected for the RFP review committee. The evaluation criteria to be used by the review committee members was specified in Section 1.16 of the RFP and involved review of the management and technical aspects of a given proposal. The committee members for the RFP were instructed by the FAMU Purchasing Director to use the criteria as outlined in Section 1.16 in the process of evaluating the management and technical plans of the respective proposals and that each member should evaluate and score each proposal independent from the other committee members. The evaluations by each member were placed in a sealed envelope. The proposals submitted in response to RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, were reviewed by the evaluation committee members. After the members completed their review, they met as a group with the Purchasing Director. The sealed envelopes which contained the individual committee members' evaluation sheets for each proposal were opened and the points for each proposer were determined by adding the points for each respective proposal. The evaluation of RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, occurred pursuant to the evaluation criteria in RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services. No committee member testified. There was absolutely no evidence submitted by Petitioner which demonstrated that the committee members did not follow the specifications of the RFP. Likewise, there was a lack of evidence that the evaluation process established in the RFP was arbitrary or capricious. The two (2) proposers that received the highest number of points were recommended for the award of RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services. Petitioner's proposal was not evaluated as having either of the highest point totals for RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services and therefore did not receive an award of the contract. The FAMU Purchasing Director, Oscar Martinez, sent to each proposer by certified letter, return receipt, notification of the intended award of RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, to the two proposers with the highest number of points. The FAMU Purchasing Director, Oscar Martinez, discussed the results of RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, with Barbara Clark after he mailed the intended award notification to the proposers. A mathematical error in the calculation of points for one of the proposers was discovered and corrected. The error had no effect on the rankings of the proposers and was therefore an immaterial discrepancy in the award of the RFP. Petitioner utterly failed to establish that the intended award pursuant to RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, was not in good faith and not the result of a fair, full and honest exercise of the agency's discretion in making such an award. Likewise Petitioner utterly failed to establish that Respondent acted arbitrarily or capriciously in its intended award of RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services. After a review of the evidence Petitioner's protest of the intended award of RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, was clearly without merit and lacked factual or legal support and was therefore frivolous and improper. Indeed the barest attempt was made by Petitioner to prepare or pursue evidence for the hearing in this matter. Although Respondent consulted with Petitioner and provided Petitioner information regarding RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, Petitioner persisted in pursuing its protest of the intended award of the RFP. Petitioner continued its protest of RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, long after it was or should have been aware that it had no factual or legal grounds for such a protest causing Respondent's attorney to spend 13 hours in preparation for this case. However, Respondent did not submit an affidavit from another attorney who reviewed the file and number of hours spent by Respondent's attorney and attested to the reasonableness of the hours spent or the fee charged. Therefore, Respondent's motion for attorney's fees is denied.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the protest be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANNE CLEAVINGER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 1996. APPENDIX CASE NO. 96-1371 1. The facts contained in paragraphs 1-28 of Respondent's proposed findings of fact are adopted, in substance, in so far as material. COPIES FURNISHED: George W. Butler, Esquire Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University Office of the General Counsel 300 Lee Hall Tallahassee, Florida 32307 Barbara A. Clark Barbara A. Clark and Company 270 First Avenue South, Suite 101 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Frank T. Brogan, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael Olenick, Esquire Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Bishop Holifield, Esquire Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University 300 Lee Hall Tallahassee, Florida 32307-3100
