Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the relevant oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following pertinent facts are found: Respondent Charles Shane was formerly employed by IREC, Inc. (International Real Estate Consultants). His assigned duties were administrative in nature and included the performance of research and field work pertaining to appraisals. It was not one of his assigned duties to procure appraisals and his salary was not contingent upon the appraisals performed by IREC, Inc. By application dated January 22, 1973, respondent Shane applied to the Florida Real Estate Commission for registration as a real estate salesman. By certificate number 0117007, Shane was registered as a real estate salesman effective December 20, 1973. He is presently registered as a non-active salesman. By letter dated January 9, 1973, on IREC stationary, respondent Shane, signing as Vice President, wrote a letter to John R. Vereen stating that, upon acceptance by Vereen, IREC would conduct a market value appraisal of certain property for a compensation of $2,500.00. This letter bears the handwritten notation "cancelled with no liability 3/5/73." On March 5, 1973, respondent Shane, again signing as Vice President of IREC on IREC stationary, wrote a letter to Mr. Vereen stating "I will conduct a market value appraisal. . ." of the same property as that described in the January 9th letter for a compensation of $2,500.00. The checks in payment of this amount were made payable to respondent Shane individually and not to IREC, Inc. As indicated by Exhibits 6,7,10,11,12 and 13, appraisal reports were submitted to various entities on dates ranging from December 29, 1971, through March 20, 1973. The cover letters are each signed by respondent Shane as Vice- President and by one other person as "M.A.I. Consultant." These reports contain several pages concerning the qualifications of the appraiser. Respondent Shane's qualifications are included. Mr. Edward Waronker, who co-signed five of the six reports listed above, did not write or prepare the reports. It was Waronker's duty as an independent appraiser for IREC to inspect the property and review the appraisal reports prepared. A letter on IREC stationary dated July 23, 1974, from respondent Shane makes reference to a June 19, 1973, appraisal report. In such letter, Mr. Shane states "I have reviewed the referenced appraisal, which was conducted under my direction as of June 19, 1973." As noted above, respondent Shane did not appear at the hearing and therefore no evidence was offered in his behalf. A "petition for mitigation" was filed with the Real Estate Commission stating that respondent did not sign the appraisal reports with any intention of holding himself out as an appraiser or salesman. In summary, said petition states that respondent Shane signed these documents as the person of the corporation and not as a real estate appraiser or broker and that, had he been fully informed of the Florida real estate law, "he would not have continued in the manner that he did." Respondent Richard W. King has been registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission since 1957 and, prior to the instant complaint, has never been cited for a violation of the statutes, rules or regulations governing brokers or salesmen. Respondent King was employed with IREC, Inc. in June of 1973. According to the testimony, the registration of IREC and King was not approved by the Real Estate Commission until October of 1973. From the time that respondent King went to work with IREC, he had effective control and supervision of all appraisals performed by IREC. To King's knowledge, respondent Shane was never involved in the decision-making process surrounding appraisal work, and did not sign appraisal reports after June of 1973.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recite above, it is recommended that: the registration of respondent Charles Shane be suspended for a period of three (3) months; and the charges relating to respondent Richard King be dismissed. Respectfully submitted and entered this 10th day of September, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION THOMAS M. MURRAY, Petitioner, vs. PROGRESS DOCKET NO. 2709 DADE COUNTY CHARLES SHANE, IREC, INC., CASE NO. 76-844 and RICHARD W. KING, Respondents. /
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was at all material times registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission as a real estate broker, holding registration certificates numbered 001709, and 0141291. The Respondent served as the real estate broker for an entity known as "Rent-A-Home, Inc." Rent-A-Home had an office in St. Petersburg and an office in Clearwater. A Mr. Richard Gindin was the Respondent's partner in Rent-A-Home. Gindin was not at any material time registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission as either an active or non-active real estate broker or real estate salesman. During October, 1974, the Respondent took part in a real estate transaction between a Mr. and Mrs. Garrett, and a Mr. and Mrs. Churches. On October 7, 1974, the Churches signed an option to purchase certain property owned by the Garretts in Pasco County. The transaction was undertaken under the auspices of Rent-A-Home. Lena Biggan was the sales person who actually negotiated the contract. A copy of the option agreement was received into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 3. The Churches delivered a cashier's check in the amount of $1,500 to the Respondent as set out in the agreement. A copy of the cashier's check was received into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 5. Five Hundred dollars of the $1,500 was to be used as the real estate commission. The remainder was to be distributed to the Garretts. On the same day that the contract was executed, the Respondent deposited $1,400 of the $1,500 in his personal checking account at the Liberty National Bank of St. Petersburg (See: Petitioner's Exhibits 6,7). He retained $100. On the same day the Respondent issued checks from the same account in the amount of $1,000 to Cecil D. Garrett, in the amount of $166.63 to Lena Biggan, and in the amount of $166.63 to Richard Gindin. The check issued to Lena Biggan constituted her share of the $500 real estate commission. This check was received into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 9. The check issued to Gindin was received into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 8. There was no direct testimony that the check issued to Gindin constituted his share of the real estate commission. The circumstances of the check, however, clearly indicate that that was the intention. The check to Biggan bore No. 563. The check to Gindin was the very next check in the Respondent's checkbook, No. 564. The next check issued from the Respondent's checkbook, No. 565, was the $1,000 check to the Garretts. The check to Biggan, and the check to Gindin were in the same amount, approximately one third of $500. It is indicated on each check that it was for a "comm.". There was direct testimony from Ms. Biggan that her check was for her share of the commission on the Garrett/Churches transaction. It is evident that Gindin's check was for the same purpose. Prior to the Garrett/ Churches transaction, Gindin approached the Respondent with respect to forming "Rent-A-Home". Gindin told the Respondent that he would form a corporation, and he asked the Respondent to pay one third of the $500 legal fee which was required for forming a corporation. When the Respondent gave Gindin the check which has been received into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 9, the Respondent thought that he was paying one third of the necessary attorney's fee rather than giving a commission to Gindin in connection with the Garrett/Churches transaction. In fact Gindin never used the money to form a corporation, and he kept it as if it was a real estate commission. When the Respondent delivered the check to Gindin he did in fact share a real estate commission with Gindin, a person who was not registered as a real estate broker or salesman. The Respondent thought that the check was being delivered for a legitimate purpose; however, the circumstances of the transaction were such that the Respondent should have known that Gindin was regarding the check as his share of a real estate commission. In approximately January, 1975, the Respondent disassociated himself from Rent-A-Home. Gindin has apparently left the State of Florida, and has not been seen by the Respondent since January, 1975.
Findings Of Fact On November 29, 1983 Petitioner filed with Respondent an application for licensure as a real estate salesman. By letter dated February 28, 1984 Respondent denied Petitioner's application as follows: The reason for the Commission's action is based on your answer to Questions 6, 7, 14 and 15 of the licensing application and/or your criminal record and disciplinary actions, and on your having unlawfully acted as a real estate salesman or real estate broker in the State of Florida. Specifically, your denial is based upon your May 1975 arrests and convictions for five counts of the sale of unregistered securities five counts of fraudulent sale of securities, five counts of grand larceny, petty larceny, ten counts of conspiracy to commit a felony, and also on disciplinary actions involving your Insurance License, Mortgage Brokers License and Securities License. In 1970 or 1971 Petitioner started Summit Investments, a conpany engaged in selling contracts for deed for developers to investors at a discount. The State of Florida determined that these contracts were mortgages and not securities, and, therefore, all persons selling them must be licensed mortgage brokers. Petitioner accordingly obtained a mortgage broker's license. In 1972 eight mortgage brokers formed S.E.I., Inc., and Petitioner became the president. Everyone selling contracts for deed for that company was licensed under the Mortgage Brokerage Act. Clinton E. Taylor, an investigator for the State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities, as part of his regular job duties, frequented Petitioner's offices at S.E.I., Inc. to check the advertising and sales pitches being used by the persons selling what the State had classified as mortgages. Taylor monitored Petitioner's operation at Summit Investments and at S.E.I., Inc. for a number of years without receiving any consumer complaint and without finding any basis for any enforcement action against Petitioner. In 1974, a recession year, five persons to whom S.E.I. had made sales did not receive their interest income and therefore filed complaints with the State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance. In May 1975 state criminal charges were filed against Petitioner as president of S.E.I., against the developer, and against the selling broker, basically alleging that what had previously been classified as mortgages were in fact unregistered securities. After trial, Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of five counts of sale of unregistered securities; five counts of fraudulent sale of securities; five counts of petty larceny; five counts of conspiracy to commit a felony, to-wit: fraudulent sale of securities; and five counts of conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor, to-wit: petty larceny. Petitioner was initially sentenced to a total of ten years of incarceration, $20,000.00 in fines, and 15 years of probation. In 1976 Petitioner plead no contest to a federal charge of mail fraud in Tampa, Florida in order to obtain a sentence which would run concurrent with that arising out of his state conviction. In 1977 Petitioner plead no contest to a charge in Palm Beach County of selling unregistered securities. Both of these charges were related to the same incidents forming the basis for the 1975 criminal charges. Based upon the conviction of Petitioner in the 1975 state case, his mortgage broker's license, his securities license, and his insurance license were revoked. By the time of the final hearing in this cause Petitioner had served 16 months in the State prison system and had been released; restitution had been made to the five people who caused the criminal charges to be filed from payment by Petitioner of the fines assessed against him; Petitioner had finished serving his amended probation period; and Petitioner's civil rights had been restored by the State of Florida. From September 1980 to November 1983 Petitioner earned his livelihood selling businesses. Be applied for a real estate license in both 1982 and 1983 and was denied both times. Petitioner seeks a real estate license in order that he can return to selling businesses.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered approving Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesman, subject to successful completion of the licensure examination. RECOMMENDED and ORDERED this 6th day of November, 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of November, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. David R. Edstrom 5748 Northeast 16th Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33334 Lawrence S. Gendzier, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Suite 212 Orlando, Florida 32801
Findings Of Fact Respondent Pinkerton has been a registered real estate broker since May 19, 1976, before which he was a real estate salesman registered with Strout Realty, Inc. On October 29, 1975, respondent entered into an agreement with Transamerica Homes Company (Transamerica) to sell at auction five mobile homes belonging to Transamerica. On November 15, 1975, respondent acted as auctioneer at an auction at which all five mobile homes were sold. After receiving some of the proceeds of the sale, Transamerica's agents asked respondent to remit an additional seven thousand six hundred eighty dollars ($7,680.00). Respondent told Robert P. Wold, Transamerica's authorized representative in Florida, that he did not have that much money because he had borne expenses in connection with the auction that Transamerica should have paid. After telling Transamerica's agents that he did not have sufficient funds to cover such a check, respondent nonetheless drew and mailed a check in the amount of seven thousand six hundred eighty dollars ($7,680.00), in the belief that Mr. Wold wanted him to write the check even though the funds to cover it were not on deposit. When the check was presented to the American Bank of Lakeland, on which it was drawn, petitioner had four thousand nine hundred fifty-three dollars and fifty-three cents ($4,953.53) on deposit, and the bank dishonored the check. After the check was returned for insufficient funds, Mr. William S. Hagar telephoned respondent on behalf of Transamerica to discuss the matter. Respondent said he would send another check in the amount of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) within a week, which he did. Another week passed; another telephone call transpired between Mr. Hagar and respondent; and respondent sent a second check in the amount of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00). Both of the checks respondent had drawn for two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) were paid upon presentment. On March 13, 1976, respondent wrote Mr. Hagar a letter in which he stated: At this point, due to the many problems involved in the Auction of the Mobile Homes on the 15th of November, 1975 at Skyview Waters in Lakeland, I feel I am entitled to additional compensation. First of all, it is almost unheard of in an auction of this kind for less than 20 percent commission. I was assured [sic] by Mr. Robert Wold of his assistance in preparing the sale. He and Mr. Paul Harris were supposed to provide the arrangements for financing. They did absolutely nothing. They were supposed to assist prospects in locating lots and people to handle moving, setups, driveways and other improvements. By our agreement my only obligation was to be to supervise and provide auctioneer voice. I think you are quite aware that the entire operation was left for me to do at about 1/4 the commission I should have been paid plus the fact that I was forced to split the meager commission I earned with two other people. So, I ended up with less than $1000 gross commission on a sale that should have netted me at least $10,000. On March 16, 1976, Mr. Hagar replied, sending a copy of his letter to the Florida Real Estate Commission: This letter acknowledges receipt of your truly [sic] amazing letter of March 12, 1976. I have reviewed the Auction Agreement which you executed, a copy attached for your information and edification. The language is clear, unambiguous and the obligations of both parties are stated plainly. We have honored our obligations completely and we expect you to honor yours. Paragraph 2) stated you will be ". . . solely responsible in setting up and conducting the auction sale without interference from anyone. . ." Paragraph 3) states you ". . . shall retain Four percent of the bid price received, as commission . . ." for your services. Lastly, Paragraph 6) states there are ". . . no oral representations, agreements or understandings between either of the parties. . . ". * * * We have been patient and forbearing in allowing you the opportunity to make restitution without resorting to the full remedies available under the law to us . . . I assure you that unless we receive your certified check in the amount of $2,680 by March 24, 1976, we shall exercise each and every remedy so available. On March 26, 1976, Mr. Hagar, not having heard from respondent, engaged Florida counsel who eventually succeeded in obtaining a default judgment against respondent in the amount of two thousand six hundred eighty dollars ($2,680.00) plus costs. This judgment had not been satisfied at the time of the hearing in the present proceeding. The foregoing findings of fact should be read in conjunction with the statement required by Stuckey's of Eastman, Georgia v. Department of Transportation, 340 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), which is attached as an appendix to the recommended order.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the administrative complaint be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of April, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 904/488-9675 APPENDIX Paragraph one of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted, in substance, insofar as relevant, except that the evidence did not establish when respondent became associated with Strout Realty, Inc. Respondent's letter of March 12, 1976, to Mr. Hagar was written on Strout Realty, Inc. stationery, however. Paragraph two of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted, in substance, insofar as relevant, except that the check was for only a part of Transamerica's claimed share of the sale proceeds. Respondent did in fact know that he had insufficient funds to cover the check, a fact of which he made no secret. Paragraph three of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted, in substance, insofar as relevant. Paragraph four of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted, in substance, insofar as relevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth M. Meer, Esquire 400 West Robinson Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Mr. George W. Pinkerton 2833 East Highway 92 Lakeland, Florida 33801 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 77-2292 GEORGE W. PINKERTON, Respondent. /
The Issue The issue in Count I is whether Section 475.42(1)(j) absolutely prohibits a broker or salesman from filing a lien or other encumberance against real property to collect a commission. The issue in Count II is whether the Respondents violated a lawful order of the Commission by failing to remove the motion of lis pendens contrary to Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes.
Conclusions Section 475.42(1)(j), Florida Statutes, provides as follows: "No real estate broker or salesman shall place, or cause to be placed, upon the public records of any county, any contract, assignment, deed, will, mortgage, lien, affidavit, or other writing which purports to affect the title of, or encumber, any real property, if the same is known to him to be false, void, or not authorized to be placed of record, or not executed in the form entitling it to be recorded, or the execution of recording thereof has not been duly authorized by the owner of the property, maliciously or for the purpose of collecting a commission, or to coerce the payment of money to the broker or salesman or other person, or for any unlawful purpose." Clearly the Respondents placed or caused to be placed the notice of lis pendens in question. A notice of lis pendens is clearly an "other writing which purports to effect the title of, or encumber, any real property." The Florida Real Estate Commission argues that this provision is an absolute bar to the filing of any lien for the purpose of collecting a commission. The Respondents argue that this provision is not an absolute bar and there are circumstances when a broker may file a notice of lis pendens. They also assert that the notice of lis pendens falls within the exception because the Circuit Court refused to remove the notice of lis pendens upon motion of the property owner. Lastly, it is argued that the notice was filed by counsel for the Respondents in good faith on an action at law and that this mitigates their action even if there was a violation. The language of Section 475.42(1)(j) cannot be read to absolutely prohibit a broker from obtaining a lis pendens. When given this construction, it effectively denies brokers and salesmen access to the courts for redress of injury as provided in Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution. Section 475.42(1)(j) is a complex provision which is subject to two interpretations. One interpretation would prohibit a broker or salesman from filing an encumberance if the same were known to him to be false, void or not authorized by law; if not authorized to be upon the public records; if not executed in the form entitling it to be recorded; if the execution of recording thereof has not been duly authorized by the owner of the property; if maliciously (filed); if for the purpose of collecting a commission, if to coerce payment of money to the broker or salesman or other person; or if for any other unlawful purpose. This first interpretation would consider each clause a separate limitation on filing an encumberance. The facts analyzed under this interpretation do not show any knowledge by Respondents that the lis pendens was false, void or not authorized to be filed or not on a form entitling it to be recorded. The facts do not show that Respondents filed the lis pendens maliciously, for the purpose of collecting a commission, or for the purpose of coercing payment of money to the broker or salesman, or for any unlawful purpose. The nature of lis pendens would not require the owner's authorization of execution for recording. The facts show that the lis pendens was filed by Respondent's attorney in conjunction with a suit brought by the Respondents against Perrin. The record also shows that the circuit court determined that the lis pendens was recordable when it denied the motion to remove it. The notice of lis pendens was neither malicious, coercive or for the purpose of collecting the commission. The notice was for the purpose of perfecting the claim against the property for execution of the judgment if the Respondents prevailed in the suit. Executing on a judgment is different from collecting the commission or coercing payment. Under this interpretation the Respondents have not been shown to violate Section 475.42(1)(j). A second interpretation would read the clause, ". . . if the same is known to to him to be false, void, or not authorized to be placed of record, or not executed in the form entitling it to be recorded, or the execution of recording thereof has not been authorized by the owner of the property. . ." as the first of two criteria to be met to establish a violation. The second criteria would consist of proof that the encumberance was recorded maliciously or for the purpose of collecting a commission, or to coerce payment of money to the broker or salesman, or for any unlawful purpose. Again the facts do not show there was knowledge by the Respondents of the falsity, or impropriety of the notice of lis pendens, as stated above. Again the facts show that the lis pendens was filed in conjunction with a law suit pending between the Respondent and the property owner, and that the court before which the action was pending refused to remove it. The file of the notice by Respondent's counsel was a legitimate method of perfecting the Respondent's claim should they prevail and obtain judgment. The facts do not indicate that the filing of the notice was malicious, coercive or for the purpose of collecting a commission. Under either interpretation, Respondents did not violate the statute. COUNT II The Respondents are charged in Count II with violation of Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, which provides that the registration of a registrant may be suspended for up to two years for violation of a lawful order of the Commission. Clearly, the facts reveal that the Respondents had a substantial interest involved in the litigation with Perrin. The order, of the Florida Real Estate Commission to remove the notice of lis pendens substantially affected their rights in this litigation. Therefore, any final order directing Kay to remove the notice of lis pendens should have issued after an opportunity for hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. The evidence reveals that the Florida Real Estate Commission did not notice a hearing under Section 120.57, and therefore its order cannot be "lawful." The provisions of Section 475.25(1)(d) require that registrants not violate lawful orders. The Respondents have not violated Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, by not removing the notice of lis pendens as directed by the order of the Florida Real Estate Commission.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that no action be taken against the Respondent, Sam Kaye and Sam Kaye, Inc. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of September 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce I. Kamelhair, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 William E. Boyes, Esquire Cone, Owen, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson & McKeown, P.A. Post Office Box 3466 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Philip Marzo was a real estate broker licensed under the laws of the State of Florida, holding license No. 0217167; and Respondent All Cities Realty, Inc., was a real estate brokerage corporation licensed under the laws of the State of Florida, holding license No. 0217166. At all times material hereto, Respondent Marzo was the qualifying broker for Respondent All Cities Realty, Inc. On May 9, 1981, Gladstone Keith Russell entered into a Service Agreement with All Cities Realty, Inc. Pursuant to the terms of that Agreement, Russell paid $75 in cash to Respondent All Cities Realty, Inc., as an advance rental information fee in exchange for which All Cities Realty, Inc., agreed to provide Russell with listings of available rentals. On or about May 13, 1981, Respondents provided to Russell one listing, which listing was not suitable to Russell. No other listing information was ever provided by Respondents to Russell. Russell obtained his own rental within thirty days from the date of the Service Agreement. This rental was not obtained pursuant to any information supplied to him by Respondents. Within thirty days of the date that All Cities Realty, Inc., contracted to perform real estate services for Russell, Russell telephoned Respondent All Cities Realty, Inc., to demand a return of his $75 deposit. The salesman who took Russell's advance fee was no longer employed at All Cities Realty, Inc., and Russell spoke with Respondent Marzo. Although Russell demanded a refund of his money, Respondent Marzo did not make a refund to Russell. When Russell spoke with Marzo on the telephone, Marzo, instead of returning Russell's money, used delaying tactics and attempts to keep from making the refund. Since his telephone calls proved unsuccessful, Russell returned to the All Cities Realty, Inc., office to obtain a refund from Marzo. Upon arriving at the office, Russell found that All Cities Realty, Inc., had gone out of business, and he was unable to locate Respondent Marzo. Russell has never received a refund of his $75 advance fee paid to the Respondents.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED THAT: Default be entered against Respondents, Philip Marzo and All Cities Realty, Inc., and that a final order be entered finding Respondents, Philip Marzo and All Cities Realty, Inc., guilty of the violations charged in the Administrative Complaints and revoking their real estate licenses. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of August, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Philip Marzo 2920 Missionwood Avenue, West Miramar, Florida 33025 Mr. Samuel R. Shorstein Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Staff Attorney Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact Although the parties to this case stipulated that the contract between the LaPointes and the Crowes was a valid contract for the purchase and sale of real estate, a genuine dispute arose between the LaPointes and the Crowes in that regard. Respondents became involved in this matter by showing the Crowes' property to the LaPointes on or before May 9, 1983, and thereby becoming a "co-operating broker'. with Deltona's Marco Island Realty Co. under an Exclusive Right To Sell agreement between Deltona and the Crowes dated January 13, 1983. Under the Exclusive Right To Sell, the Crowes agreed to pay Deltona a fee of 6% of the sales price for brokerage services and agreed, if a buyer failed to close a sales contract and forfeited a deposit to the Crowes, that Deltona could retain one- half of the deposit, but not exceeding the total amount of Deltona's fee, as compensation. The Exclusive Right To Sell also provided that Deltona was responsible to promptly pay any cooperating broker who sells the property for his services as soon as possible after receipt by Deltona of its real estate broker fee as provided in the Exclusive Right To Sell. By May 10, 1983, the LaPointes had made an offer to buy the property and the Crowes, by May 10, 1983, telegram to Deltona, agreed to sell the property for "$165,000, $500 in escrow with balance of $15,500 additional deposit after acceptance with balance at closing . . . sales commission $8,650. On May 11, 1983, Respondent Mary S. Davey, signed the sales contract for the LaPointes' purchase of the Crowes' property as "Agent (authorized by Buyer)." The sales contract also recited: "Buyer acknowledges that Marco Beach Enterprises, Inc/Deltona Marco Island Realty is the procuring real estate broker(s) in this transaction, and that the Broker is the agent for the Seller, and is being paid by the Seller." Respondent. Davey notified the LaPointes of the requirement for a $500 initial deposit and submitted the signed sales contract for the Crowes' signature. By letter dated May 12, 1983, Respondents confirmed "that the total commission to be paid on the sale of the [Crowes'] property is $8,650.00." It also confirmed: said commission is to be split 50/50 between MARCO BEACH ENTERPRISES, INC. and Deltona's Marco Island Realty." Also on May 12, 1983, the LaPointes sent Respondents a check for the $500 initial deposit with a note asking for a complete inventory of the contents of the condominium the LaPointes had inspected and a list of renters. The Crowes signed the Sales Contract on May 16, 1983. By May 24, 1983, Respondents still had not complied with the request for a complete inventory of the condominium's furnishings and for a list of renters. On that date, Respondents sent the LaPointes a copy of the signed Sales Contract with a letter requesting them to sign the Sales Contract under Respondent Davey's signature. Before they arrived, the LaPointes' May 25, 1983, letter to Respondents crossed in the mail. It requested that Respondents put something in the contract concerning pro-ration of water bills and taxes and payment of a water damage bill by the Crowes. The LaPointes repeated their request for an accurate inventory of the furnishings of the condominium and stated that they were placing their trust in Respondents to represent the LaPointes' interests. Some time between the LaPointes' receipt of Respondents' May 24 letter with a copy of the Sales Contract and June 13, 1893, the LaPointes decided to ask for cancellation of the purchase. The LaPointes cited circumstances involving their financing and their disappointment that Respondents had not furnished an inventory of the furnishings. By June 16, 1983, Respondents had responded to the request for cancellation, vigorously contending that a valid and binding contract existed between the LaPointes and the Crowes. By June 24, 1983, the Crowes, through an attorney, echoed their agreement with the position taken by the Respondents that there was a valid and binding contract. By letter dated June 29, 1983, from the LaPointes attorney, the LaPointes questioned the validity of the contract, saying that Respondent Davey had no authority to sign the Sales Contract on behalf of the LaPointes, who never did sign. The Respondents got a copy of this June 29 letter. On July 11, 1983, the LaPointes, through a Florida attorney, demanded of Respondents that their deposit be, returned. Respondents tried to extricate themselves by referring the LaPointes to the Crowes' attorney. The Crowes and the LaPointes remained at a stalemate until after May 7, 1984, when the Crowes sold their property to another purchaser for $162,500. Thereafter, by about June 19, 1984, the LaPointes, the Crowes and Deltona had negotiated their proposed resolution of the matter by disbursement of $3,000.00 to the Crowes and $13,500.00, plus all accrued interest, to the LaPointes. Respondents had not been included in any of these negotiations, and they refused to sign the agreement. As stipulated by the parties to this case, the matter remains unresolved. The Florida Real Estate Commission Handbook states in pertinent part: "But, what are the rights of the seller and the broker? In the absence of a specific agreement or custom, when a purchaser refuses to sign a contract after the offer has been accepted, the broker is only entitled to the agreed or usual commission percentage of the deposit. Where the purchaser refuses to go through with a contract by which he is bound and which can be enforced against him by the seller, the broker may, in the absence of a contract or custom, appropriate the deposit up to the amount of the earned commission."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint that has been filed by Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, against Respondents, Mary S.·Davey and Marco Beach Enterprises, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 7 day of August, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7 day of August, 1986. APPENDIX The following are rulings on proposed findings of fact to the extent required by Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1985): Paragraphs 1 through 6 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as substantially factually accurate and are incorporated in the Findings Of Fact to the extent necessary. Paragraphs 8 and 10 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact would be included in paragraph 1 above except that they are unnecessary. Paragraph 7 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact is rejected as unsupported by the evidence. Paragraph 9 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and/or Findings Of Fact. It ignores the Exclusive Right To Sell which must be read together with the Sales Contract. Respondents submitted no proposed findings of fact designated as such or in a form which entitles them to specific rulings. However, their proposed findings of fact were carefully considered. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Hartmann, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Arthur V. Woodward, Esquire 940 North Collier Blvd. P. O. Box 1 Marco Island, Florida 33937 Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff Executive Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL
