The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, a licensed Florida real estate sales associate, violated provisions of Subsections 475.25(1)(b), 475.25(1)(d)1., 475.25(1)(e), 475.42(1)(b), and 475.42(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2007),1 and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (the Department), is the state agency responsible for licensing and monitoring real estate sales associates within the state. It is charged also with the duty to prosecute administrative complaints for violations of the law by real estate sales associates. Respondent, Caroline Mohan (Ms. Mohan), is a licensed real estate sales associate who holds License No. 3087231. She was registered as a sales associate with Coral Shores Realty (Coral Shores) in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, from September 12, 2005, to March 28, 2008. At all times relevant to the charges against her, Ms. Mohan was the Coral Shores sales associate who was the listing agent for Anthony Mannarino, the seller of property located at 10530 Versailles Boulevard, Wellington, Florida (the "subject property"). At closing, Coral Shores was to have received at 2.5 percent commission and pay a portion of the commission to Ms. Mohan. Dawn Campbell and Garth Smith (the buyers) entered into a Residential Sale and Purchase Contract (the Contract) to purchase the subject property from Mr. Mannarino. Pursuant to the contract, the buyers were to deposit $10,000 in an escrow account in two $5,000 installments. The Contract was signed on or about March 12, 2007. The transactions took place electronically and Mr. Smith sent Ms. Mohan a photocopy of a $5,000 check that he was supposed to have deposited, under the terms of the contract, in the account of Closings Unlimited Title Company (Closings Unlimited), but he never sent the check to Closings Unlimited. The seller asked Ms. Mohan to have the buyer use a different escrow agent, Southeast Land Title (Southeast), and so the buyer wired $5,000.00 to Southeast, but the Contract was not amended to reflect the name of the new escrow agent. A $5,000 deposit was sent to Southeast by the buyers, but they never paid the $5,000 balance due on the deposit. Mr. Smith testified the he could not make the second payment because he gave $5,000 in cash to an employee to deposit in his account so that he could make a wire transfer, but the employee took the money. On April 3, 2007, Southeast faxed a notice to Coral Shores, with an attached letter to the buyers, informing them of its intention to respond to a demand (presumably by the seller) to release the $5,000 held in escrow related to the subject property. As a result of a complaint filed by Dorothy Hoyt, a representative of Southeast, the matter was investigated and an Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent. The Administrative Complaint alleges that Ms. Mohan personally received funds, fraudulently failed to account for those funds, and acted, without the proper license, as a broker by accepting the deposit. The Department's investigator testified that he was never able to determine if the escrow deposit was deposited at any bank, lending institution or with Dorothy Hoyt of Southeast Land Title of Boca Raton. He "believe[s] there was a wire for one deposit made, but [he] did not receive confirmation of that." Regarding his conversations with Ms. Hoyt, the investigator reported "she did state that . . . she had received - eventually received $5,000.00 and was still waiting [for] another $5,000.00 in order to have the full $10,000.00 deposit." In his report, the Department's investigator claimed that Respondent was terminated from employment by her Coral Shores broker, Ronald Cika, as a result of her misconduct in handling transactions related to the subject property. That claim was contradicted by Mr. Cika and by Ms. Mohan. Their testimony was supported by the contents of e-mails between his office and Respondent that show that she became inactive as a realtor while traveling overseas with an offer to reactivate with the same broker upon her return. Mr. Cika testified that he is aware of a lawsuit filed by Dawn Campbell related to a different address on the same street, 10526 Versailles Boulevard, but that he is not aware of any issues related to 10530 Versailles Boulevard, the subject property. Jannet Rodriguez, owner of Closings Unlimited, testified that she was never contacted and never opened a file to serve as either an escrow or closing agent for the subject property at 10530 Versailles Boulevard. She, too, is involved only in issues related to 10526 Versailles Boulevard.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, dismissing the complaint against Respondent, Caroline Mohan. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Ralph De Ponte, Jr., is a licensed real estate salesman, license number 0110328, in the State of Florida. Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating real estate licensees. On or about August 25, 1993, Respondent, while licensed as a real estate salesperson, solicited and obtained a joint venture agreement between Eugenio R. Martinez and Johnco Management, Inc. The purpose of the joint venture was to purchase and sell real estate lots for profit. Lot Center Real Estate, the brokerage company for whom Respondent was employed at the time, was to act as the exclusive agent for the purchase and resale of all properties purchased by the joint venture. Mr. Martinez entrusted $15,000 with Respondent in accordance with the joint venture agreement. Mr. Martinez, based upon the representations from Respondent, believed the money would be invested in the purchase of real estate. Instead, Respondent used the $15,000 to pay off his personal debts. Johnco Management, Inc. was administratively dissolved by the Secretary of State on August 26, 1994, for failure to file its annual report as required by law. Mr. Martinez made repeated demands on Respondent for the return of the $15,000 because no effort was being made to purchase real estate and sell it for profit. Respondent is unable to return Mr. Martinez' investment and claims that the lack of additional funds caused the joint venture to prove unsuccessful. Respondent considered the $15,000 from Mr. Martinez a personal loan. Mr. Martinez' version of the incident, which is also supported by the written joint venture agreement drafted by Respondent, has been deemed more credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission, enter a final order revoking Respondent's real estate license. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 96-0661 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 10 are accepted. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent: None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry M. Solares Division Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Daniel Villazon Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Ralph De Ponte, Jr. Post Office Box 7751 Port St. Lucie, Florida 34985
Findings Of Fact State Project No. 46090-3511 (the project) is for construction of the West Bay Bridge on State Road 79 in Bay County, Florida. Competitive bids on the project were solicited in February, 1990. The bid letting on the project was held in March, 1990. The Petitioner, Fairchild, the Hardaway Company and ten other contractors bid on the project. The Hardaway Company submitted the lowest bid on the project in the amount of $9,487,258.17. Fairchild submitted the next lowest bid in the amount of $9,835,279.34. Divergent Unit Prices and Imbalances. The part of the Hardaway Company's bid relating to construction of the foundation for the approaches to the bridge (the "structural bid") is obviously below reasonable cost in several respects. The contract specifications require the use of sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid (biaxial type 2), and Class III (seal) concrete. The Hardaway Company's unit prices for these items were, respectively, one dollar per cubic yard for the sand fill, fifty cents per cubic yard for the shell fill, twenty-five cents per square yard for the reinforcement grid, and ten cents per cubic yard for the Class III seal concrete. As a result, the Hardaway Company's bid for these items is obviously significantly below reasonable cost and approximately $95,500 below what Fairchild bid for the same portion of the contract. In contrast to the sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid and Class III concrete, the Hardaway Company's bid on some of the other parts of the structural bid were relatively high. The reinforcing steel for the substructure (Item 415-1-5) was bid at approximately twice reasonable cost (80 a pound versus, e.g., 42 in Fairchild's bid), resulting in $609,936.80 attributable to that part of the bid versus, e.g., $320,216.82 for Fairchild. The statistical average (the DOT's so-called "average 2") for the other serious bidders under this item also was 42 a pound. The Hardaway Company also bid obviously in excess of reasonable cost for the lump sum item of mobilization for pile installation--$600,000 versus $125,000 in Fairchild's bid and less in the bids of several of the others bidders. (The statistical average for the other serious bidders under this item was $225,000.) But the Hardaway Company bid only $60,000 for the lump sum item for removal of existing structures (versus $160,000 in Fairchild's bid) and only $30,000 for the lump sum item for removal and disposal of fender system (versus $110,000 in Fairchild's bid). The portion of the Hardaway Company's bid attributable to mobilization for the roadway work is significantly less than the Fairchild bid under this item ($200,000 versus $375,000) and partially counterbalances the excess in the part of the Hardaway bid for mobilization for the pile installation. The portion of the Hardaway Company's bid attributable to clearing and grubbing also was high, at $20,000 an acre versus a statistical average of $4,200 an acre for the other serious bidders, resulting in $216,000 for the Hardaway Company bid versus, e.g., $32,400 for the Fairchild bid and the $45,360 statistical average. DOT Review Procedures. Section 2-6 of the DOT's Standard Specifications applicable to the project provides: 2-6 Rejection of Irregular Proposals. A proposal will be subject to being considered irregular and may be rejected if it shows omissions, alterations of form, additions not called for, conditioinal or unauthorized alternate bids, or irregularities of any kind; also if the unit prices are obviously unbalanced, either in excess of or below the reasonable cost analysis values. The DOT is in the process of formulating a policy on the use of the Technical Review Committee in the bidding process. A proposed procedure has been developed, which has not yet been made final and has not yet been signed by the Secretary of the DOT, under which the Technical Review Committee would review the low bid on each contract, among other things not applicable to this case, for "any significant irregularities in unit bid prices" and for "unbalanced bidding." The DOT has not yet defined "any significant irregularities in unit bid prices" or "unbalanced bidding" for purposes of defining the event that triggers review by the Technical Review Committee. The DOT Director of the Office of Construction, Robert Buser, is of the opinion that the unit prices the Hardaway Company bid for the sand fill, the shell fill, the reinforcement grid and the Class III seal concrete are "significant irregularities in unit bid prices." On the other hand, the DOT's Preliminary Estimates Engineer, Robert Griner, who, unlike Buser, is a member of both the Technical Review Committee and its Preliminary Technical Subcommittee, and is of the opinion that the Hardaway bid for the sand fill, the shell fill, the reinforcement grid and the Class III (seal) concrete are "mathematical imbalances," not "significant irregularities in unit bid prices," which he would define as bids that omit a unit price, whose numerical values do not match words used to express the values, or that are not signed. Under Griner's approach, which was followed in this case, the Preliminary Technical Subcommittee looks at "mathematical imbalances" to see if they are "material imbalances." If the Preliminary Technical Subcommittee decides that it is not a "material imbalance," it simply reports this finding at the outset of the meeting of the Technical Review Committee, which accepts the finding and does not itself consider the matter any further. Only if the Preliminary Technical Subcommittee reports a "material imbalance" does the Technical Review Committee further consider the question. Front-end Bidding. Under the DOT contract for the project, like other items in the specifications, mobilization and land clearing and grubbing are paid in installments as the work proceeds. But, unlike the other items, all of the portion of the contract attributable to mobilization and land clearing and grubbing is paid by the time the entire project is half completed. Similarly, a contractor is paid for reinforcement steel (substructure) when it is delivered to the site. As a result, by shifting dollars in a bid to these "front-end," lump sum items, a contractor can manipulate the bid process and contract to reasonably insure himself of early payment of these inflated items regardless what may happen to the project later. In analyzing these front-end, lump sum items, Griner treated them (along with the unreasonably low bids on the sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grids and C III seal concrete) as "mathematical imbalances." Following the guidance of a Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) memorandum, dated May 16, 1988, on the subject of "Bid Analysis and Unbalanced Bids," Griner analyzed the Hardaway bid to be sure it would not be susceptible to cost overruns (it was not) and to be sure the quantities were correctly estimated (they were). He also analyzed the additional cost to the DOT of paying the Hardaway Company early (by the half way point of the project) for the inflated front-end items to determine whether the "mathematical" imbalance was "material," i.e., whether "the mathematically imbalanced bid will result in the lowest ultimate cost to the Government." Based on a twelve percent interest rate, Griner calculated that the inflated front-end items would cost the DOT approximately an additional $98,000, 1/ still much less than the difference between the low Hardaway bid and any other bid. Based on this calculation, Griner concluded that the "mathematical imbalance" in the Hardaway bid was not a "material imbalance" and did not require the award of the bid to Fairchild or one of the other bidders. Griner overlooked and did not apply another portion of the method of analysis in the FHWA memorandum on "Bid Analysis and Unbalanced Bids" that states: There are numerous reasons why a bidder may want to unbalance his/her bid on a contract. One reason is to get more money at the beginning of the project. The bidder does this by overpricing the work done early in the project. This is called "front loading" the contract. The leading case in the "front loading" area is Matter of: Riverport Industries, 64 Comp. Gen. 441 (1985). Here the Comptroller General held that if the bid is front loaded, regardless if it is the lowest bid, it "should be viewed as materially unbalanced since acceptance of the bid would result in the same evils as an advance payment. An advance payment is prohibited by law." The "front loading" may also be materially unbalanced due to the cost of money that must be paid out early versus over the normal construction fo the project. Under the Hardaway Company bid, the pile mobilization, the land clearing and grubbing, and the reinforcement steel (substructure) parts of the bid are "front-ended." 2/ Under the method of analysis suggested by the FHWA memorandum, the Hardaway Company would be paid approximately $428,000 in "advance payments" under these two items if it is awarded the contract. Approximately $375,000 in pile mobilization, $183,600 in land clearing and grubbing, and $289,700 in the reinforcement steel were shifted to these front- end items from the unbalanced sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid, and Class III (seal) concrete items. These dollars The shifted dollars are estimated by taking the difference between the statistical average for these items and the Hardaway bid on them. Since roiughly half of the shifted dollars would be paid earlier than they would be paid if they were bid under the sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid and Class III (seal) concrete items, the amount of "advance payment," under the FHWA analysis would be approximately $428,000. Griner did not explain why he only followed part, but not all, of the method of analysis suggested by the FHWA memorandum, other than to say he overlooked it. But he also testified that it is common practice for contractors to submit mathematically unbalanced bids, and the DOT always analyzes them the way he did in this case. Indeed, in the March, 1990, bid letting, Griner found "mathematical imbalances" in 21 of the 29 low bids but no "material imbalances." The Fairchild bid also contains "mathematical imbalances." It also "front-ends" several items. The total dollar value of the "front-ending" in the Fairchild bid (including roadway mobilization) closely approximates that found in the Hardaway bid and, under the FHWA analysis, would result in approximately the same amount of advance payment. Under Section 101-2.2 of the DOT's Standard Specifications for this project, contractors are limited to a maximum of ten percent of the total contract for mobilization. The Hardaway Company's total mobilization bid is within the maximum under the specifications. Notwithstanding the imbalances in the Hardaway bid, and the so-called "advance payments" that would result from the "front-ending" in the Hardaway bid, the Hardaway bid remains the lowest and best bid on the project, and it is the best interest of the DOT and the public to award the contract to the Hardaway Company. Even if the Hardaway Company had bid the sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid, and Class III (seal) concrete items exactly as Fairchild did, Hardaway still would be low bidder. "Value Engineering" and Alleged Alternative or Contingent Bidding. Inferences reasonably could be drawn from the evidence that the Hardaway Company may intend to propose to the DOT that the approach to the bridge be re-engineered so as to eliminate the need for the sand fill, the shell fill, the reinforcement grid and the C III (seal) concrete. If the DOT accepts such a proposal, the contract between the DOT and the Hardaway Company would have to be modified. If the re-engineered project were to allow the Hardaway Company to do the job for less than its bid price, half (or, if the proposal is innovative or unique, up to 80%) of the savings would be paid to the Hardaway Company under what the DOT calls "value engineering." Under DOT procedures, "value engineering" proposals are not made or evaluated until after the original contract is signed with the successful bidder. It is not an alternative bid or a contingent bid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent, the Department of Transportation, enter a final order dismissing the bid protest filed by W. R. Fairchild Construction Company, Ltd., and awarding State Project No. 46090-3511 to the Hardaway Company. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1990.
The Issue Whether the Department of Financial Services (the “Department”) correctly denied the unclaimed property claim submitted by Choice Plus, LLC (“Choice Plus” or “Petitioner”), on behalf of Louis Nardi as attorney-in-fact for Felicia Leggiero (“Leggiero”).
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, and the record as a whole, the undersigned makes the following findings of relevant and material fact: Choice Plus is registered with the Department as a “claimant’s representative” pursuant to section 717.1400, Florida Statutes (2020). In Florida, a claimant’s representative may file claims with the Department on behalf of owners of unclaimed property for a fee. See Joint Ex. 1, Bates Nos. 0001-17. The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering and processing claims, pursuant to the provisions of chapter 717, the Florida Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (“Act”). See Joint Ex. 4, Bates No. 0045. Between 2005 and 2018, the Department received unclaimed stock shares and dividends reported in the names of John R. Leggiero and Felicia R. Leggiero, from various holders. The Department currently maintains the funds, totaling $116,322.10, in 24 unclaimed property accounts. See Joint Ex. 1, Bates Nos. 0001-3. The Claim by Choice Plus On or about May 26, 2020, Choice Plus filed a written claim, No. C8610372, on behalf of Louis Nardi, as attorney-in-fact for Felicia R. Leggiero, for 24 unclaimed property accounts. In support of the claim, Choice Plus provided the Department a copy of a Limited Power of Attorney (“LPOA”) and full disclosure statement, pursuant to section 717.135, executed by Louis Nardi; a copy of Louis Nardi’s driver’s license; a copy of Leggiero’s driver’s license; a Florida Certificate of Death for John R. Leggiero, indicating that he predeceased Felicia R. Leggiero; a copy of a durable power of attorney where Leggiero designated her brother, Louis Nardi, as her attorney-in-fact; and the results of a TLO.com search.1 See Joint Ex. 1, Bates Nos. 0001-17. The LPOA and full disclosure statement, executed on May 4, 2020, authorized Choice Plus to file a claim on behalf of Louis Nardi as attorney-in- fact for Felicia R. Leggiero, for a fee of $11,632.21. § 717.135, Fla. Stat. The LPOA included the following language: CP offers to advance its expertise and financial resources, including legal expenses, on Claimant’s behalf, to prove entitlement and secure release of property from any person or entity in possession of property. In exchange for CP’s resources Claimant irrevocably assigns Claimant’s right, title and interest in property up to the amount and/or percentage reference above as Compensation. If CP 1 A people and business location system that searches public and proprietary databases. fails to document Claimant’s entitlement, nothing will be owed to CP. See Joint Ex. 1, Bates Nos. 0004-5. As a part of the Department’s statutorily mandated review of the claim submitted by Choice Plus, it conducted a Driver and Vehicle Information Database (“DAVID”) search for Leggiero on June 17, 2020. The search indicated that she died on May 27, 2020. See Joint Ex. 4, ¶ 3; and Joint Ex. 5, Bates No. 0042. In part, because of her death, the Department issued a Request for Information (“RFI”) on June 18, 2020, to Choice Plus. The RFI noted that Felicia R. Leggiero was deceased, and requested probate documentation for her estate. See Joint Ex. 2, Bates No. 0018. As it turns out, this is a common request when the Department has questions or concerns about a claim that is filed, or needs additional documentation as it sorts through and evaluates the merits of a claim. On July 13, 2020, the Department received Choice Plus’s response to the RFI. The response consisted of a four-page memorandum which extensively outlined the law and the position of Choice Plus on the claim. In the memorandum, Choice Plus took the position that the claim was complete when filed, and that the claim determination was retroactive to the date of filing the claim. See Joint Ex. 3. Choice Plus further argued that the Department should not consider subsequent events, i.e., the death of the claimant, when determining entitlement to the unclaimed property. Interestingly, however, it took the position that the Department must pay the claim to the “estate” of the deceased claimant. Id. However, and of particular note, Choice Plus provided no documentation to show that (1) Felicia R. Leggiero’s estate had been submitted to probate court for administration; (2) that Choice Plus represented Felicia Leggiero’s estate; or (3) represented the personal representative of her estate. See Joint Ex. 3, Bates Nos. 0019-24. After its review of the claim file and the memorandum submitted by Choice Plus, the Department issued a Notice of Intent (“NOI”) on October 20, 2020, stating that it would enter a final order denying the claim filed by Choice Plus on behalf of Louis Nardi as attorney-in-fact for Felicia R. Leggiero. The Department took the position, essentially, that at the time it began its review of the claim, Leggiero had already died and that, therefore, as a matter of law, Leggiero no longer had any legal or beneficial entitlement to the unclaimed funds, as entitlement had already vested in her estate. See Joint Ex. 4, Bates Nos. 0045-49, ¶¶ 11-13. Director Graham also testified that the Department’s treatment of this particular claim was consistent with the Department’s treatment of similarly situated claims where the claimant or person entitled to the property dies after submitting a claim to the Department, but before the Department has the opportunity to review and evaluate the claim.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order affirming the denial of Petitioner’s claim. However, it is recommended that the Department should accept and consider the submission of a supplemental claim by any lawful beneficiaries or heirs of Felicia Leggiero to determine entitlement pursuant to the provisions of chapter 717 and other provisions of law. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael A. Alao, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Diane Wint, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services Room 612.14, Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2021. Michael J. Farrar, Esquire Michael J. Farrar, P.A. 18851 Northeast 29th Avenue, Suite 700 Aventura, Florida 33180
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint? him? If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is a Florida-licensed real estate salesperson. He holds license number 0186760. From October 1, 1991, through September 30, 1993, Respondent's license was inactive. His address of record during this period was 290 174th Street L11, North Miami Beach, Florida 33160. On October 1, 1993, Respondent's license became involuntarily inactive due to non-renewal, and it remained in involuntary inactive status through August 11, 1996. Respondent's address of record during this period remained 290 174th Street L11, North Miami Beach, Florida 33160. On June 1, 1995, after having successfully completed a license reactivation course at the Gold Coast School of Real Estate,1 Respondent went to The Keyes Company to apply for a position as a sales associate. The Keyes Company is now, and was at all times material to the instant case, a corporation registered in Florida as a real estate broker. During his visit to The Keyes Company, Respondent completed (with the assistance of a Keyes Company secretary) and signed various forms, including a Department-issued "Request for License or Change of Status" form (400.5 Form). The 400.5 Form contained three sections: Section A, the "action requested" section; Section B, which was to be "completed by [the] licensee applying for [the] change"; and Section C, which was to be "completed by [the] broker/employer if the applicant [was] requesting active salesperson or broker-salesperson status." On the reverse side of the 400.5 Form were instructions, which indicated, among other things, that if the licensee was seeking to renew his or her license, the 400.5 Form had to "be accompanied by the required fee." In Sections A and B of the 400.5 Form, Respondent indicated, among other things, that he was seeking to renew his license and gain active status and that his "residence address" was 2182 Northeast 186th Terrace, North Miami Beach, Florida 33179. Although there was a box on the top of the form that he could have checked to reflect that this was a "change [of] residence address," he failed to do so. After completing Sections A and B, Respondent signed and dated the partially completed 400.5 Form. The secretary who assisted Respondent in filling out the 400.5 Form (Secretary) told Respondent that The Keyes Company would complete Section C of the form and then mail it to the Department for processing. She further advised Respondent that she would let him know in a few days "exactly how much [he] would have to pay" the Department to obtain the "[c]hange of [s]tatus" he was requesting. Three or four days later, the Secretary contacted Respondent and informed him that he had to pay a $90.00 fee to the Department. Respondent relied upon the information that the Secretary had given him regarding the amount of the fee he had to pay. He made no effort to contact the Department to verify the accuracy of the information. On June 5, 1995, Respondent wrote a $90.00 check, payable to the Department, and left it with the Secretary for her to mail, along with the completed 400.5 Form, to the Department. The Keyes Company's payroll clerk, Rosa Miguelena, thereafter contacted the Department by telephone to confirm that $90.00 was the amount that Respondent had to pay. The person with whom she spoke told her that the total fee for late renewing a license was $90.00 ($65.00 for the renewal and a $25.00 late fee). The completed 400.5 Form (Section C of which had been filled in and signed on June 9, 1995, by Ray Shaw, a Vice President of The Keyes Company) and the $90.00 check, as well a copy of Respondent's reactivation course completion certificate, were subsequently sent to the Department. The check was deposited by the Department on June 19, 1995. The $90.00 was insufficient to cover the amount necessary to renew and activate Respondent's license for the upcoming two-year renewal cycle commencing October 1, 1995.2 Accordingly, on or about June 23, 1995, the Department sent, by United States Mail, a letter to Respondent, which read as follows: We are returning the attached for the following reasons: (X) Request not accompanied by the total fee of $153.00. You need to send additional $63.00 in order for us to process your renewal. (X) To be credited for the fee accepted, THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE. PLEASE RETURN ALL OF THE ATTACHED, ALONG WITH A COPY OF THIS LETTER. The letter was mailed to the address (2182 Northeast 186th Terrace, North Miami Beach, Florida 33179) that Respondent had indicated, on the 400.5 Form, was his "residence address." At the time the letter was mailed, Respondent still resided at this address. Nonetheless, Respondent never received the letter in the mail. This is not the only time that mail addressed to Respondent at 2182 Northeast 186th Terrace, North Miami Beach, Florida 33179 has not been delivered to him by the United States Postal Service. It has been a recurring problem. Had Respondent received the letter, he would have taken the additional steps needed to renew and activate his license. Not having heard anything from either the Department or The Keyes Company regarding the matter, he erroneously assumed that his license had been renewed and activated, and he acted accordingly. On or about January 18, 1996, Respondent, acting in his capacity as a Keyes Company sales associate, procured Vito Verzura as a buyer for real property located in Dade County, Florida that was owned by Jack Poulas (Property). On or about February 1, 1996, The Keyes Company issued to Respondent a check in the amount of $676.00 as commission for his role in the Vito Verzura/Jack Pulos transaction. On or about June 25, 1996, Respondent, acting in his capacity as a Keyes Company sales associate, procured listing agreements with Vito Verzura regarding the Property. The listing agreements provided that the listing agent(s) would be paid 10% of the sales price. In late June or early July of 1996, after speaking with a Keyes Company secretary who questioned whether he was associated with the company, Respondent telephoned the Department to inquire whether his license was active. The Department representative with whom he spoke advised him that the Department's records revealed that his license had never been activated. Respondent then contacted The Keyes Company to discuss the matter. He expressed his desire to have his license activated as soon as possible. The Keyes Company told Respondent that he needed to pay the Department an additional $125.00. On or about July 9, 1996, Respondent wrote a check in the amount of $125.00, payable to the Department, which he gave to The Keyes Company to deliver to the Department. On that same date, he also signed (but did not date) another Department-issued "Request for License or Change of Status Form." The check, along with the signed form (Section C of which was left blank), were subsequently sent to the Department. The Department received these items on or about August 12, 1996. It deposited the check on August 14, 1996. Because Section C of the "Request for License or Change of Status Form" was left blank, the Department changed the status of Respondent's licensure, effective August 12, 1996, to voluntary inactive rather than to active. The Department sent Respondent a letter informing him of the change. The letter contained the following "explanation": The Division of Real Estate computer records do not reflect you to be in the employ of a licensed real estate broker, a registered broker corporation or broker partnership, or an unlicensed owner developer at this time. Please have the attached form 400.5 completed by both you and your employer and returned in the enclosed envelope if your license status should be shown as active. On February 27, 1997, the Department received from Respondent a completed "Request for License or Change of Status Form," which reflected that he was employed by Gerard International Realty, a duly registered broker. After receiving this form, the Department activated Respondent's license. At no time prior to February 27, 1997, did Respondent hold a valid and current active real estate salesperson license.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order finding Respondent guilty of the misconduct alleged in the Administrative Complaint and disciplining him therefor by reprimanding him and fining him $750.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 1999.
The Issue The issue for determination in this case is whether the Respondent Wayne E. Belton violated Section s. 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), by inserting an option provision into a lease agreement without the specific authorization of the tenants and subsequent to the tenants signing the original agreement. At the hearing, Petitioner's Exhibits 1-10 were offered and admitted into evidence. Leslie and Glenn Strickland, the tenants and complainants, testified on behalf of the Petitioner. Wayne Belton testified on his own behalf. Proposed Recommended Orders have been submitted by the parties. Those findings not incorporated in this Recommended Order were not considered relevant to the issues, were not supported by competent and substantial evidence or were considered immaterial to the results reached.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Wayne E. Belton is a licensed real estate broker with his principal place of business at 337 Northeast Second Avenue, Delray Beach, Florida. On or about November 23, 1979, the Respondent prepared a one-year rental agreement or lease for property located at 2717 Southwest Sixth Street, Delray Beach, Florida, which was owned by Mrs. Margaret Finlay. Mr. and Mrs. Glenn Strickland executed the agreement as the tenants. The lease was prepared pursuant to an open listing by the owner for either sale or lease. When the Stricklands signed the original agreement it did not contain any provision concerning purchasing the property in the future through an option agreement. Although the Stricklands had discussed an option agreement with the Respondent, they did not specifically agree to an option agreement which required the deposit of additional monies in escrow which would not be refunded if the option were not exercised. The owner of the property, Mrs. Finlay, was primarily interested in selling the property and demanded that Respondent obtain a binding option from the Stricklands. When faced with the conflicting demands of the tenants and the owner, the Respondent inserted an option provision in the lease agreement after the Stricklands had signed the original lease which did not contain such a provision. When the Stricklands failed to deliver the $1,500 option money required by the option provision, Mrs. Finlay, through her attorney, threatened to take legal action against the Respondent. In response to the owner's demand, the Respondent through his attorney, demanded that the Stricklands pay $1,500 for the option pursuant to the lease agreement. When the Stricklands received the demand letter from Respondent's counsel, they contacted an attorney who eventually settled the matter. The Stricklands were required to expend $138.00 in attorney's fees to correct the problem caused by the Respondent. The Respondent admitted inserting the option provision into the lease agreement after the Stricklands executed it, but denied acting with any intent to alter the agreement contrary to what he believed the parties intended. Rather, the Respondent believed that he was remedying his original omission to conform to what he believed the parties had orally agreed to.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent Wayne E. Belton violated Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979) and imposing a reprimand and an administrative fine. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire Suite 101 2715 East Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Stephen G. Melcer, Esquire Suite 500 First Bank Building 551 Southeast Eighth Street Delray Beach, Florida 33444 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Samuel R. Shorstein Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Weston Professional Title Group, Inc. (Respondent) committed the violations alleged in Counts I, II, III, V, VI, and VII of the Amended Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times, Petitioner has been the entity of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility to regulate title insurance agencies. At all times relevant to this proceeding Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as a title insurance agent in the State of Florida. As of the formal hearing, Respondent had ceased its operations due to the lack of business. Petitioner's investigation of Respondent was initiated by a complaint from a man named Robert Anderson. Mr. Anderson represented to Petitioner that he discovered that his name and address had been used as the buyer of the two residences discussed above. Respondent was the title and settlement agent for both transactions. The Collonade Drive transaction settled on November 14, 2006, with disbursement of the funds on November 16, 2006. The Vignon Place transaction settled and the funds were disbursed on December 15, 2006. Mr. Anderson reported to Petitioner his belief that his identity had been stolen by a person named Pamela Higgins. Mr. Anderson reported to Petitioner that he had not participated in either transaction, and asserted that he did not sign any of the documents that purport to contain his signature as the buyer. Respondent was required to comply with the provisions of RESPA in completing the HUD-1 for the Collonade Drive closing and the Vignon Place closing. RESPA required that disbursements at closing be consistent with the HUD-1 as approved by the parties to the transaction and by the lender. COLLONADE DRIVE CLOSING On September 15, 2006, Robert Anderson (or someone impersonating Mr. Anderson) signed a "Contract for Sale and Purchase" (Collonade contract), agreeing to buy the Collonade Drive property from Mark Mariani and Kathy Mariani, for the purchase price of $1,375,000.00. The Collonade contract reflected that a deposit had been made to "FLORIDA TITLE & ESC." in the amount of $5,000 with an additional deposit of $5,000 to be made within ten days. Two loans with separate mortgages constituted the financing for the purchase of the Collonade Drive property. The first mortgage was $962,500.00. The second mortgage, as reflected on the HUD-1 Settlement Statement with the disbursement date of November 14, 2006, was $263,430.08.3/ First Magnus Financial Corporation, an Arizona corporation, was the lender for both loans. Agents of America Mortgage Corp. served as the mortgage broker for the transaction. Juan Carlos Rodriguez, an employee of Agents of America Mortgages, signed Mr. Anderson's loan application as the "interviewer." The following was a special clause of the Collonade contract: "BUYER AGREES TO PAY FOR TITLE INSUANCE [sic] FEE ONLY (LINE 1108 OF SELLERS' SETTLEMENT STATEMENT), ONLY [SIC] IF SELLERS AGREE TO USE BUYER'S TITLE COMPANY OF CHOICE. BUYER IS A LICENSED FLORIDA REAL ESTATE AGENT." Petitioner established that Robert Anderson was not a licensed Florida real estate agent. The Collonade contract represented that there were no real estate brokers representing either party. On or about November 1, 2006, Respondent received a "Request for Title Commitment" from Claudit Casanova, a mortgage broker with Agents of America Mortgage Corp., for the Collonade Drive transaction. This was a revised request. The first request had been sent to Respondent on or about October 3, 2006. A copy of the Collonade contract had been forwarded to Respondent with the first request. In connection with the Collonade Drive transaction, Respondent prepared two HUD-1s,4/ each of which was approved by the parties and the lender.5/ The first HUD-1 had an anticipated closing date of November 14, 2006. That HUD-1 was revised in response to the lender's instruction to move the disbursement date from November 14, 2006, to November 16, 2006. The revision of the HUD-1 slightly reduced the amount of cash the buyer needed to close as a result of interest beginning to run on the loans as of November 16 instead of November 14. This was a mail-away closing, in that a packet of the documents the buyer was to sign was sent to someone named Laurie Martin at a title agency in Glendale, Arizona. Ms. Marrero testified she mailed the packet pursuant to instructions without specifying who gave her those instructions. The packet of documents was returned to Respondent, with signatures purporting to be Mr. Anderson's. Laurie Martin appears to have served as the notary public when the documents were signed. The transaction closed pursuant to the revised HUD-1 with the disbursement date of November 16, 2006, which, as approved by the parties and the lender, reflected that the sellers were to receive $477,884.93 upon closing. Upon closing, Respondent drafted a check in the amount of $477,884.93 made payable to the sellers. The sellers voided the check and based on instructions from the sellers, Ms. Marrero redistributed the sellers' proceeds by wire transfer as follows: $116,112.85 to sellers; $170,250.00 to Pamela Higgins; and $191,508.08 to Unlimited Advertising USA. Fourteen dollars were spent on wire transfer charges. The actual disbursement of the seller's proceeds was inconsistent with the HUD-1 and unknown to the buyer and the lender. Respondent violated the provisions of RESPA by disbursing the proceeds of the sale in a manner that was inconsistent with the HUD-1. $195,000 DEPOSIT The Collonade contract reflected that a $5,000 deposit had been made to "Fla. Title & Esc." required for the buyer to pay an additional deposit of $5,000 within ten days. There was no evidence establishing any relationship between Respondent and "Fla. Title & Esc." Both HUD-1s for the Collonade Drive transaction reflected that the buyer had provided to the sellers a deposit in the amount of $195,000. These HUD-1s, reflecting that the sellers were holding a deposit in the amount of $195,000, were approved by the parties and the lender. Ms. Marrero testified that she was instructed to include the $195,000 deposit on the HUD-1s without specifying who gave her those instructions. Ms. Marrero did not attempt to verify that the $195,000 deposit was actually being held by the sellers. FRAUD Petitioner alleged that the Collonade Drive transaction was fraudulent. Mr. Wenger's testimony, based in part on reports of mortgage fraud prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, supported that allegation. Other evidence supporting that allegation included the following facts The first mortgage quickly went into foreclosure; A mailing address given for Robert Anderson did not (as of April 19, 2011) exist. The address of Unlimited Advertising USA was also the address of Claudia Rodriguez, a former Florida title agent whose license had been suspended by Petitioner for failing to disburse in accordance with HUD statements and disbursing on uncollected funds; The address of Unlimited Advertising USA was also the address of Juan Carlos Rodriguez (the person who supposedly took the credit application from Robert Anderson); The address of Unlimited Advertising USA was also the address of Agents of America Mortgage Corporation (the mortgage broker for the Collonade closing. Juan Carlos Rodriguez supposedly notarized the document authorizing disbursement of part of the sellers' proceeds to Pamela Higgins. Mr. Anderson's purported signatures on different documents are inconsistent. The address for Mr. Anderson as it appears on the HUD- 1 Settlement Statements is 14233 W. Jenan Drive, Surprise, Arizona. Prior to the closing Ms. Marrero sent by Federal Express a copy of the unexecuted closing documents to "Pam Higgins c/o Robert S. Anderson" 12211 N. 85th Street, Scottsdale, Arizona. Following the closing, Ms. Marrero sent a copy of the closing documents by Federal Express to Robert S. Anderson, at the address 12211 N. 85th Street, Scottsdale, Arizona. Ms. Marrero testified that she acted on instructions in sending the two packages, without identifying who gave her those instructions. There was no evidence that anyone employed by Respondent knew anyone connected to this transaction prior to being asked to provide a title commitment. There was insufficient evidence to establish that Respondent had anything to do with the buy-sell agreement between the buyer and the sellers or the efforts by Mr. Anderson (or the person or persons impersonating Mr. Anderson) to obtain financing for the purchase. While there was significant evidence that the Colonnade Closing was a fraudulent transaction, there was insufficient evidence to establish that Respondent was complicit in that fraud. VIGNON COURT CLOSING On a date prior to November 6, 2006, Maribel and Timothy Graves signed a "Contract for Sale and Purchase" offering to sell their Vignon Court residence to Robert Anderson for the purchase price of $1,975,000.00. Mr. and Mrs. Graves were represented by counsel during this transaction. The copy of the contract admitted into evidence had not been signed by Mr. Anderson and did not bear a legible date. The contract provided an acceptance date of November 6, 2006. The fully executed contract was not admitted into evidence. On October 4, 2006, Claudit Casanova of Agents of America Mortgage requested Respondent to provide a title commitment for the Vignon Court transaction. In that request, the sales price was stated as being $1,975,000; the loan amount was $1,481,250 and the mortgagee was American Brokers Conduit. Preferred Properties, Int., Inc., was listed as being the real estate broker for the transaction. Respondent prepared a HUD-1 for the Vignon Court transaction that reflected a closing and disbursement date of December 15, 2006. DEPOSIT The unexecuted (by the buyer) and undated copy Purchase Agreement required a deposit of $100,000 at the time of acceptance with an additional $50,000 being due within ten days thereafter. There was no evidence as to the terms of the completely executed Purchase Agreement. Line 201 of the HUD-1 reflected a deposit of $250,000 paid on behalf of the buyer. Respondent did not verify that deposit had been made. The HUD-1 specified that the deposit was being held by the sellers. The buyer, sellers, and lender approved the HUD-1, which reflected the existence of a deposit of $250,000, prior to closing. GASPARE VALENTINO On December 6, 2006, Mr. and Mrs. Graves entered into a "Joint Venture and Property Resale Agreement" (Resale Agreement) pertaining to the sale of the Vignon Court residence with Gaspare Valentino. On February 5, 2002, Gaspare Rino Valentino was issued a license by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation of the type "Real Estate Broker or Sales" and of the rank "Sales Associate." That license was valid at the times relevant to this proceeding. Paragraph 2 of the Resale Agreement provides as follows: (2) SALE EFFORTS: CONTRACT PROCEEDS. Valentino agrees to use reasonable efforts to obtain a third party purchaser (a "Purchaser") for the Property. Valentino is not required to advertise the Property or list the Property for sale, but shall have such right to do so. Valentino does not guaranty [sic] the procurement of a Purchaser. The parties agree that the intention is for Valentino to secure a Purchaser who will pay a purchase price sufficient in order to (i) satisfy the existing debt upon the Property, (ii) pay ordinary and reasonable closing costs of the transaction, (iii) generate a net proceeds [illegible] to Owner not less than ONE HUNDERED THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($100,000); and (iv) generate such further sums beyond the foregoing in order to pay Valentino a fee for services rendered as set forth in this Agreement. In accordance with such understanding, Owner agrees to enter into and fully execute a Contract for Purchase and Sale with a Purchaser procured by Valentino which is consistent with the terms set forth in this Agreement, including without limitation, a designated sales price which enables Owner to receive at closing a net proceeds sum equal to ONE HUNDERED THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($100,000) (the "Owner's Sale Proceeds") after payment of the Property Sale Expenses, hereinafter defined as set forth in Paragraph 3. Owner agrees that any net sales proceeds in excess of the Owner's Sale Proceeds shall be payable to Valentino (the "Excess Proceeds Fee), as Valentino's fee for the efforts of Valentino as set forth herein. Paragraph 3 (i) of the Resale Agreement reiterates that after the payment of the "Property Sale Expenses" as follows: Owner shall receive the Owner Sale Proceeds consisting of exactly ONE HUNDERED THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($100,000) from the net sales proceeds . . . Paragraph 3 (ii) of the Resale Agreement reiterates that after the payment of the "Property Sale Expenses" and the "Owner Sale Proceeds": Valentino shall receive the Excess Proceeds Fees, constituting all remaining net sales proceeds in excess of the Owner Sale Proceeds, as a fee for services rendered by Valentino pursuant to this Agreement. Paragraph 7 of the Resale Agreement is as follows: 7. Licensed Agent: Valentino represents and discloses that Valentino is a licensed real estate agent in the State of Florida. Notwithstanding such, Valentino is individually entering into this Agreement using his own resources to assist Owner in the improvement and sale of the Property, and as such is a principal in this transaction earning the Excess Proceeds Fee. The parties acknowledge that Valentino is an investor in this transaction and as such at closing is entitled to and shall receive the Excess Proceeds Fee as set forth in Section [Paragraph] 3(ii) of this Agreement. Under RESPA, Section 700 of a HUD-1 is appropriately used for reporting the payments for commissions to real estate salesmen and/or brokers as part of the "Settlement Charges." Such payments can also be reported under Section 1300 ("Additional Settlement Charges"), if the payments are appropriately labeled. Respondent reflected the payment of $527,656.92 as "Payoff" to Gaspare Valentino at line 1307 of Section 1300." Prior to closing the buyer, sellers, and lender had approved the HUD-1 for the Vignon Court transaction. The lender was aware of the Resale Agreement. Mr. Marrero is an attorney licensed to practice law in Florida. Mr. Marrero construed the payments to Mr. Valentino to be other than a real estate commission. Although it is clear that Petitioner considers that payment to Mr. Valentino to be a real estate commission, the terms of the Resale Agreement entitled Mr. Marrero to treat that payment as being to an investor. Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent erroneously stated the payment to Mr. Valentino on the HUD-1. SURETY BOND As a condition of licensure, a title agency is required to provide to Petitioner a $35,000 security deposit or a $35,000 surety bond. In connection with its application for licensure on August 29, 2002, Respondent filed the required surety bond with Petitioner. The bond was issued by Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland with bond number 133046577. On July 14, 2004, Petitioner received from Respondent a surety bond issued by Western Surety Company in the amount of $35,000, effective as of August 29, 2004. The bond number was 69728435. On May 28, 2010, Petitioner received a letter from his surety dated May 24, 2010, which advised that bond number 69728435 would be voided or cancelled as of August 29, 2010. That letter of cancellation showed a copy being furnished to Respondent at the address "1820 North. Corporate Lakes Boulevard, Suite 105, Weston, Florida 33326." On June 11, 2010, Petitioner advised Respondent by letter sent to "1820 North Corporate Lakes Boulevard, Suite. 105, Weston, Florida 33326" that it had received the cancellation letter. The letter stated, in part, as follows: If we do not receive a replacement bond within 30 days of the dated letter, we will forward your file to the appropriate division for disciplinary action. If you do not plan to continue transacting business and wish to terminate your license, you must submit a request to us immediately. Prior to May 24, 2010, Respondent moved its offices from 1802 North Corporate Lakes Boulevard, Suite 105, Weston, Florida, to Suite 304 of the same building. Mr. Marrero testified that he had no recollection of receiving the letters cancelling the surety bond or the letter from Petitioner dated June 11, 2010. Respondent was without a surety bond between August 29, 2010, and November 18, 2010. Petitioner did not establish that Respondent's failure to maintain it surety bond during that period was willful within the meaning of section 626.8437(9). No prior disciplinary action has been brought against Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating the provisions of subsections 626.8473(2) and (4) as alleged in Count I of the Amended AC; and guilty of failing to maintain a surety bond as required by section 626.8418(2) in violation of section 626.8437(1), as alleged in Count III of the Amended AC. It is further recommended that the final order find Respondent not guilty of all other violations alleged in the Amended AC. For the violations found as to Count I, it is recommended that Respondent's licensure be suspended for a period of six months. For the violations found in Count III, it is recommended that Respondent's licensure be suspended for a period of three months. It is further recommended that the periods of suspension run concurrently. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 2012
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Respondent, the Department of Insurance, acted illegally, arbitrarily, fraudulently, or dishonestly in rejecting all bids for lease #460:0119 and not awarding subject lease to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Insurance established a requirement to lease 5371 square feet of office space in Daytona Beach, Florida, and a "Request for Space Need" was approved by the Department of Management Services on February 11, 1998. The Department of Insurance subsequently issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for lease #460:0119 (Respondent's Exhibit 1). A non-mandatory pre-bid conference was held on June 1, 1998, in Daytona Beach and two prospective bidders, Petitioner and Nova Village Market partnership attended. The RFP provided that proposals which did not meet all mandatory requirements of the RFP would be rejected as non- responsive. The RFP provided for evaluation criteria are awards factors. The awards factors totaled 100 points with no minimum point total required. Ten of the points were allotted for moving costs defined as the costs of relocating communications, networks, furniture and other equipment. This factor gave the current landlord an automatic 10-point advantage since there would be no relocation costs. Moving costs provisions tend to discourage the presentation of bids because the bidders have to overcome an automatic 10-point advantage provided the current landlord. The RFP also provided that all proposals could be rejected, however, such "rejection shall not be arbitrary, but be based on strong justification." None of the conditions of the RFP were questioned or challenged by interested parties. Two responses were received by the Department of Insurance in response to the RFP and these were opened in Respondent's Tallahassee office on July 8, 1998, by Mr. Kip Wells of the Department. One was received from the current landlord, Nova Village Partnership, hereafter Nova, and the other from the Petitioner. The Nova proposal was deemed non-responsive. Neither Nova nor Petitioner contested the determination that Nova's proposal was non-responsive. Only one responsive proposal, the Petitioner's proposal, remained. On July 9, 1998, the Department representative, Mr. Kip Wells, called Petitioner to schedule an appointment for 9:00 a.m., on July 10, 1998, to visit and evaluate the proposed facility. No persons from the Department appeared at the scheduled appointment. At 10:45 a.m., on July 10, 1998, Kip Wells called Petitioner to say that since Petitioner's proposal was the only responsive proposal received, and that "all bids" were being rejected. Mr. Wells testified at hearing. His reason for rejecting the remaining bid was: When I saw that it was obvious the current landlord was not going to be very cooperative, I decided that one choice was not enough. If we were going to have to make a move, we needed more than one thing to choose from. So, I immediately - - since I had already set up with local people in Daytona to tell them that I was coming down to evaluate the bids, I sent them an E-mail and told them that I would not be meeting the following day to evaluate the bids. Mr. Wells decided to reissue the RFP without any moving costs criteria, and redistribute those 10 points among the other award factors. Petitioner filed a Notice of Intent to Protest and then a Formal Protest, both in a timely fashion. There is no state policy prohibiting the award of a lease to a sole bidder on a RFP. The "Leasing Policy" of the Department of Insurance states that "The Lease Administrator, with assistance from the Division employees, will establish bid or quote specifications. These specifications will include special needs for the Division(s) as well as the evaluation criteria upon which to evaluate the proposals." Neither the Department's Lease Policy (Petitioner Exhibit 3) nor the State's Real Property Leasing Manual (Petitioner's Exhibit 4) give the Lease Administrator the authority to reject or evaluate bid responses. Neither does he have a vote in the bid evaluation process. His responsibility is to coordinate the process. Randall Baker, Manager of Private Sector Leasing of the Bureau of Property Management of the Department of Management Services (hereinafter DMS), testified. The DMS prepares a manual as a guideline for user agencies to assist in the leasing of property. The DMS manual is not binding on agencies and DMS has no review oversight; however, their comments on agencies' leases are reviewed by the state auditing authorities and failure to follow the guidelines can result in audit criticism. Baker confirmed that the agency's written procedures as outlined in the RFP were consistent with the DMS guidelines. The DMS manual states as follows regarding the receipt of only one responsive proposal: When only one responsive proposal is received it may be considered and accepted providing the following conditions are documented: Adequate competition was solicited. The rate is within established rental rate guidelines. The proposal meets stated requirements. The proposal was processed as though other proposals were received. The Petitioner's bid was responsive to the RFP and the lease rate bid by the Petitioner was less than the average rate for state leases in the Daytona area and less than the amount budgeted by the Department for this lease. The lease rate by the Petitioner was reasonably priced and competitive. Although the agency failed to complete the process as envisioned, see paragraph 20 below, this was in no way the fault of Petitioner. The Department's leasing policy requires that the lowest and best response to an RFP be determined through cost analysis and evaluation by an evaluation committee. Mr. Wells did not forward Petitioner's bid to or discuss with the evaluation committee Petitioner's bid, but unilaterally rejected it. It was clear from Mr. Wells' testimony that this was his individual decision and was based upon his personal belief that it was the best thing to do.1 At hearing, the stated justification for rejecting "all bids" was that it gave the Department the opportunity to delete the requirement of moving costs from the awards factors; however, the evidence does not indicate that the moving cost provision result in non-competitive bids. The sole responsive bidder was within the local lease price range and within budget. Neither the Respondent nor DMS has established a policy prohibiting the acceptance of a sole responsive bid if there is competition solicited. The Department of Insurance has accepted a sole bid on at least one project in the past. There was no evidence that the RFP was not an open and fair competition. The evidence shows that it was properly advertised, that all conditions were known, and that all interested parties had an equal opportunity to participate. In sum, there was adequate competition in submitting the bids. Mr. Baker testified regarding the policy of DMS. The DMS policy is that if there is one responsive bidder, there has been competitive bidding. The RFP provides that the Respondent may reject all bids if it has strong justification. See paragraph 5 above. Mr. Baker also provided examples of "strong justification for rejecting proposals." His examples include facilities which are proposed outside the required geographic area, prices considerably in excess of state guidelines and agency budgets, specification changes due to modification of the agency's program requirements, and "intervening external forces." No evidence establishing a strong justification for rejecting the Petitioner's bid was presented. Without completing the process and evaluating the Petitioner's bid, the agency never considered whether the bid was in the state's best interest. However, this was not the fault of the Respondent, and the agency's failure to follow its procedures should not inure to its benefits. Further, Because there was no minimum score required on the evaluation criteria of the RFP, there is no need to evaluate Petitioner's proposal because it is the only responsive proposal. For all the reasons stated above, the rejection of Petitioner's bid was contrary to the terms of the RFP, contrary to state policy, and arbitrary.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which finds that: Respondent's actions in rejecting Petitioner's responsive bid were arbitrary; The Respondent did not follow the requirements set forth in the Department of Insurance Leasing Policy, nor the Department of Management Services Real Property Leasing Manual, or the Request for Proposal itself; That no adverse interest to the State or the Department would have occurred had Petitioner's responsive bid been accepted; and therefore, Petitioner's claim shall be upheld as the lowest cost and best proposal for RFP #460:0119, and that the Department of Insurance shall award Petitioner Lease #460:0119. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 1998.
