The Issue The issue as drawn by the letter of denial was whether Petitioner had lost his effectiveness as a teacher and was a moral person. The facts showed that there was substantial delay in the Respondents' decision on Petitioner's application. The real issue is whether said delay certified Petitioner by operation of law.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Fred Priester, made application for a teacher's certificate on August 8, 1979, to the Department of Education. On this application, Petitioner did not reveal any of his arrests or his conviction. See Respondents' Exhibit #2. Subsequently, the Duval County School Board and Florida's Department of Education became aware of Petitioner's arrests from record checks based on Petitioner's fingerprints and from Petitioner's correspondence to the Department of Education and the Governor's office. See Petitioner's Exhibit #3, Gary Simmons' (Duval County School Board) memorandum of August 2, 1979; Respondents' Exhibit #3, Petitioner's letter to Simmons of November 26, 1979; Respondents' Exhibit #4, Petitioner's letter to Governor Bob Graham of August 18, 1980; and Petitioner's Exhibit #4, Petitioner's letter to Donald Griesheimer of October 13, 1980. No official action was ever taken on this first application for certification. Petitioner made a second application for teacher's certification on June 16, 1981, which was received by the Department of Education on June 22, 1981. See Respondents' Exhibits #5A and 5B. Petitioner revealed on this application his several arrests, but not his conviction. Petitioner's uncontroverted testimony was that he was asked by Griesheimer to refile and respond to those arrests which were the subject of Simmons' memorandum, which Petitioner did. Petitioner's arrest for which he was convicted was not part of that FBI record reported in Simmons' memorandum, and Petitioner did not respond to it. Petitioner referenced his early release in his letter of August 18, 1980, to Governor Graham. The Petitioner was not trying to conceal anything on his second application, but was following the directions he received in responding to the question about his arrests. The Department of Education did not take any action regarding Petitioner's second application until January 6, 1982. See Respondents' Exhibit #6. There is no record of any interim inquiry from the Department of Education for additional information from the Petitioner or for correction of any errors or omissions. The Department of Education did not take action on Petitioner's second application until well after 90 days of the date the Department received Petitioner's application. The parties submitted proposed findings of fact and memoranda of law. To the extent the proposed findings have not been included in the factual findings in this order, they are specifically rejected as being irrelevant, not being based upon the most credible evidence, or not being a finding of fact.
Recommendation The Petitioner's application having been approved by operation of law, the Department of Education should follow the provisions of Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes, and issue the Petitioner's certificate. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Fred M. Priester 1657 West 30th Street Jacksonville, Florida 32209 George L. Waas, Esquire 1114 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald L. Griesheimer, Director Education Practices Commission 125 Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable Ralph D. Turlington Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Respondent has committed the acts alleged in the Stop Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure workers' compensation insurance for the benefit of their employees. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. On August 11, 2006, Robert Lambert, the Jacksonville District Supervisor for the Division of Workers' Compensation, Bureau of Compliance, was contacted by Katina Johnson, an investigator for the Division.1/ Based on the information provided to him by Ms. Johnson, Mr. Lambert approved the issuance of a Stop Work Order against Capella Ventures, Inc. The investigator served a Stop Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, both by posting at the worksite and by hand delivery, on Capella Ventures. The Department investigator also issued a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment, requesting records for a period of three years, from July 31, 2003. These records were requested in order to calculate the penalty required pursuant to Section 440.107, Florida Statutes, for not having workers' compensation insurance. The records were to be used in conjunction with the classification codes contained in the Basic Manual (Scopes Manual) published by the National Council on Compensation Insurance. Records were provided by Capella Ventures' counsel. Based on the records provided, an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was prepared, assessing a penalty of $8,769.16. Mr. Peter King was, at all times material to this case, an officer of Capella Ventures, along with his father. His father is now deceased. Mr. King admitted that workers from Capella Ventures were assisting his father with a construction project on a home next to the home where they lived. He did not dispute that the workers were performing construction work and that the company had no workers' compensation coverage for them at the time. Nor did he dispute the amount of the penalty reflected in the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. He contended that while his father performed the framing on the property, one of the two other employees did not have the skill to actually perform framing. The class code used by the Department to determine the appropriate penalty was 5645, which is used for carpentry operations on residential structures. Use of this code was appropriate. Capella Ventures filed for an address change in August of 2006, and voluntarily dissolved in January of 2008. No evidence was presented regarding what actions were taken by Capella Ventures with respect to the dissolution of the corporation. No evidence was presented regarding what, if any, distribution of assets was undertaken at the time of dissolution. No evidence was presented to indicate that any successor corporation or entity was formed upon the dissolution of Capella Ventures.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding that Respondent, Capella Ventures, Inc., violated Section 440.107, Florida Statutes, by failing to secure workers' compensation for its employees, and assessing a penalty of $8,769.16. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of September, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 2008.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that Petitioner, Gary N. Piccirillo, was afforded a presumptive parole release date interview on May 14, 1982. Thereafter, on June 9, 1982, Respondent, Florida Parole and Probation Commission (FPPC), considered Petitioner's presumptive parole release date (PPRD) and set it for September 30, 1986. On June 28, 1982, Petitioner sought review of his established PPRD pursuant to Rule 23-21.12, Florida Administrative Code, and Section 947.173, Florida Statutes. In November 1983, a special parole interview was granted Petitioner, but the Commission at that hearing declined to change or modify Petitioner's PPRD. Petitioner's next biennial interview for review of his PPRD is scheduled for September 1984. However, Petitioner is currently scheduled to be released from confinement in either September or October 1984, if he is given credit for all earned gain time. Petitioner questions that portion of the rule which provides for only one review of the Commission action establishing or changing the PPRD, but apparently fails to recognize that portion which also provides for subsequent (biennial, special, or effective) establishments of PPRD, which tend to ensure at least periodic reviews of the PPRD. Petitioner attacks the validity of the rule, as amended on October 1, 1982, as it pertains to Sections (1)(e) and (2). He contends that (1)(e), which calls for verification of written or printed evidence provided directly by the inmate and notification to the proper state attorney if any of this evidence is invalid because it constitutes a threat of a penalty, which tends to inhibit the average inmate from presenting evidence he might otherwise present. Petitioner does not question the propriety of reporting false information, only the inclusion of a basis for doing so within the rule. Petitioner also contends that that portion of Paragraph (2) of the rule which provides that the Respondent will not address matters within certain categories, unless new factual information came into existence after the initial interview, is unfair, unduly restrictive, and places an unreasonable burden on prisoners who would be unprepared psychologically to present all their information at the initial interview in its best light. Petitioner contends that after the newness of incarceration wears off and the individual is more comfortable with the system, he would be better prepared to present this information again.
Findings Of Fact On December 3, 1991, the Petitioner, Douglas Adams, filed a Petition to Determine the Invalidity of an Existing Rule. In the Petition, the Petitioner challenged Rule 33-22.012, Florida Administrative Code, pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the Challenged Rule. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent, an agency of the State of Florida, adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. Chapter 33-22, Florida Administrative Code, contains rules governing "inmate discipline." Those rules provide the general policy of the Respondent concerning inmate discipline (Rule 33-22.001), terminology and definitions (Rule 33-22.002), the procedures for taking disciplinary action against inmates (Rules 33-22.003-33-22.010), and the "Rules of Prohibited Conduct and Penalties for Infractions (the Challenged Rule). Rule 33-22.012, Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part, the following: 33-22.012 Rules of Prohibited Conduct and Penalties for Infractions. The following table shows established maximum penalties for the indicated offenses. As used in the table, "DC" means the maximum number of days of disciplinary confinement that may be imposed and "GT" means the maximum number of days of gain time that may be taken. Any portion of either penalty may be applied. "All GT" includes both earned and unearned gain time. In addition to the penalties listed below, inmates may be required to pay for damaged, destroyed or misappropriated property under the provisions of rule 33-22.008(2)(b)13. . . . . Rule 33-22.012, Florida Administrative Code, includes a table listing of various offenses for which disciplinary action may be taken and the maximum penalty for such offenses. The Petitioner has alleged, in part, that the Challenged Rule is invalid because it: provides maximum penalties for major violations, but fails to designate, or define minor infractions, or provide sufficient guidelines to guide the agency in exercise of its discretion to designate minor infractions as opposed to major infraction listed by the rule. More particularly, the rule provides in part that "any portion of either penalty may be applied." Applying either penalty listed in this rule, which provides for loss of gaintime or disciplinary confinement, is definitionally a major violation. . . . The Petition and the Amended Petition do not included any alleged facts supporting the Petitioner's assertion that the Challenged Rules are "arbitrary and capricious."
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent should deny Petitioner's application to be licensed as a resident personal lines insurance agent.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing insurance agents in the state pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2004). On October 29, 2004, Respondent received Petitioner's application to be licensed as a resident personal lines insurance agent (insurance agent). On October 13, 2005, Respondent issued a Notice of Denial to Petitioner. Respondent based the denial on several grounds that fall into three categories. The first category is based on Petitioner's prior criminal history. In relevant part, the Notice of Denial denies the application because Petitioner pled nolo contendere to a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more. The Notice of Denial further states that the crime was one of moral turpitude and that Subsection 626.611(14), Florida Statutes (2004), makes denial of the application compulsory. Even if the crime were not one of moral turpitude, the Notice of Denial states that the plea of nolo contendere provides a discretionary ground to deny the application pursuant to Subsection 626.621(8), Florida Statutes (2004). The Notice of Denial states a second category of grounds that are also compulsory. The second category of grounds may be fairly summarized as alleging a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance. The second category of grounds generally relates to turpitude inherent in the criminal offense and an inaccurate application answer stating that Petitioner had no prior criminal record. The Notice of Denial states that Petitioner lacks one or more qualifications for the license, that Petitioner committed a material misstatement or misrepresentation on her application, and that Petitioner demonstrated a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance as provided in Subsections 626.611(1), 626.611(2), and 626.611(7), Florida Statutes (2004). The third category of grounds relates to waiting periods. The Notice of Denial states that Petitioner must wait 17 years from the date she pled nolo contendere before applying for a license as an insurance agent. The waiting period is based on agency rules in Florida Administrative Code Rules 69B-211.042(4)(b) and 69B-211.042(8) that are promulgated pursuant to Subsection 626.207(1), Florida Statutes (2004). The remaining Findings of Fact address the factual sufficiency of the second category of grounds for denial. The conclusions of law, in relevant part, address the legal sufficiency of the remaining grounds for denial. The criminal record of Petitioner is not disputed. On October 4, 2004, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to a third degree felony of grand theft in the Circuit Court in and for Pasco County, Florida, Case No. CRCO4-1177-CFAES. The court withheld adjudication of guilt and imposed fines and costs of $395. Petitioner served 30 days in the Pasco County jail. The court placed Petitioner on supervised probation for 18 months, which Petitioner successfully terminated early on September 27, 2005. Petitioner contests neither the inaccuracy of the application answer stating she had no prior criminal record nor the materiality of the inaccuracy. However, Petitioner does contest the agency's assertion that Petitioner possessed the culpable knowledge or scienter required to misstate, misrepresent, or commit fraud in attempting to obtain a license within the meaning of Subsection 626.611(2), Florida Statutes (2004). Petitioner also contests the assertions that she lacks one or more qualifications for licensure and that she lacks fitness or trustworthiness within the meaning of Subsections 626.611(1), 626.611(2), and 626.611(7), Florida Statutes (2004). Petitioner testified that her employer submitted her application electronically. Petitioner testified that she gave her employer accurate information concerning her application, but she did not review the application before transmission. The trier of fact finds the testimony concerning Petitioner's lack of culpable knowledge to be credible and persuasive. Petitioner testified with extraordinary candor. Her demeanor was frank and unguarded. Her denial of culpable intent to mislead the agency is consistent with the totality of evidence in this proceeding and with Petitioner's demonstrated fitness and trustworthiness after November 2002. After Petitioner gave birth to a son on March 20, 2002, her treating physician advised her to undergo a tubal ligation, and the subsequent surgery was successful. The resulting inability to bear more children, however, led Petitioner into a mental state that was subsequently diagnosed as severe clinical depression. Petitioner returned to work approximately 12 weeks after surgery. From August 2002 through November 2002, Petitioner engaged in an episode of compulsive spending in which she incurred approximately $70,000 in credit card debt that she charged to personal and business credit cards. In order to pay the debt, Petitioner began taking money from her employer. Petitioner describes her hedonistic offense in her own words: [T]his incident occurred when I was suffering from severe depression that was [subsequently] diagnosed by a physician. I have been under the treatment of a psychiatrist and also a psychologist. I still see my psychiatrist quarterly to make sure that all is well with my medications . . . . The psychologist released me from her care because she felt that I can now deal with everyday stress. . . . So in order to fill that void [of no more children] I started shopping. And I would - I would go to the mall in a day and I would spend several thousand dollars on absolute garbage, you know, when you look. I mean. I started buying clothes; I bought furniture. I just was a shopaholic. I would go every Saturday and Sunday and spend time at the mall and just shop like crazy. [M]y husband had no idea of our finances. He just gave the paycheck and said: You do what you need to do. As long as he could have cash he didn't care. So he had no idea. He didn't even know how much money I made; he didn't know how much our mortgage was; he didn't know anything about our finances. And then once I started having all these credit card bills then I was, you know, robbing Peter to pay Paul . . . . And then it just got where I snapped . . . . And . . . unfortunately it looked like the easy way out. It was an answer to my problems and I could continue doing what I needed to do. [T]he attorney [employer] pretty much left me to do what I needed to do. I wrote all of his court motions, and I wrote all of his pleadings, and accountings, and inventories, and he didn't even look at them. He would just sign them. He didn't review them at all. And so when I would give him checks to sign . . . I would just take him the check and say, "I need you to sign a check," and he would sign the check and wouldn't even look to see . . . it was [to me]. Transcript (TR), pages 15 and 24-26. After November 2002, Petitioner voluntarily disclosed her offense to her employer. Petitioner's effort to reclaim her integrity and trustworthiness was both epiphanic and Herculean. The effort is best described in her own words: I started contemplating suicide and said: Oh, well, this will take care of all the problems. But then I had read up and didn't want my kids to grow up without a parent or think that for some reason they caused me to do it. So at that point in time I was just - I didn't know what to do or where to turn. I was just completely lost. And so I hadn't been to church in like a year. For whatever reason the Sunday before the Monday that I went to [an] attorney I went to church and they told a story. And I said: You know, I'm willing to confess to what I've done at whatever cost because I can't - I can't keep going like this, and I can't keep pretending like nothing is wrong, and laying in bed and the couch all day. So I went to [an] attorney the very next day. Q. Do you need a moment? A. I'm okay. * * * In January 2003, I'm sorry. This is hard reliving it. THE COURT: That's okay. Take your time and if you need a recess just let me know. A. This is the first time that I just really said it out loud. THE COURT: Yes. A. In January of 2003, I contacted [an attorney]. I informed him . . . that I had done something wrong and I didn't know where to turn to or who to turn to. At this point in time I hadn't told my family and nobody knew. All they knew is that something was wrong with me. I wasn't myself. I was withdrawn and I stayed in bed . . . all day. The attorney immediately contacted my former employer to advise that there was a problem with his accounting system. Up until this time he had no knowledge of any . . . problems. My attorney also contacted a doctor for me to see immediately because he could tell that something was not right with me. At this time that my attorney contacted my former employer I offered to make immediate restitution, which I did [over time]. At this point in time my employer said that he did not want to contact any authorities because he didn't want the publicity in a small town. And as far as I knew, the situation was taken care of. I was making restitution and I thought it was over. At some point in time my former employer contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). After meeting with the FBI, I agreed to assist them because my former employer was billing my time as the attorney's time in guardianship cases. This would cause clients to run out of money and become eligible for Medicaid and other state governmental services. The federal government ended up dropping the charge against me and I . . . agreed to assist them in any cases against my employer. When things were not moving along in the federal case my former employer also contacted the local authorities. I was arrested on May 1 of 2004. And this was almost - this was almost a year-and-a-half after I had first come forward. And then in September 2004, my attorney was ready to go to trial. At the last minute the State Attorney offered a plea deal. I was told that I could finally put this nightmare behind me by pleading no contest and I would have no criminal record because the court would withhold adjudication. [T]he judge made a point to mention that adjudication was being withheld so I would have no felony criminal record. And also at this time there was no restitution ordered because I had already paid it all back. TR at 15-18. Petitioner paid approximately $85,000 in restitution. Restitution was a Sisyphean effort, as Petitioner explains: I paid back cash. I had taken - I had calculated $40,000. He said that I calculated - that I had taken $60,000 and then he raised it to $80,000 for his time. But I - I paid back $45,000 in cash. The credit card companies, he contacted every credit card company that I paid and they all reversed all of their [charges]. So I ended up owing, you know, another $45,000 back in credit cards that he had . . . all the payments reversed. . . . So I paid a total - it was $85,000. * * * [W]e sold everything we had. . . . We sold our home. I had bought my husband a third vehicle. We sold that. We had a motorcycle that sold. We had a lot of toys. TR at 27-28. The trier of fact is not persuaded that Petitioner would have lied on her license application in October 2005 after voluntarily disclosing her offense in January 2003. When Petitioner exercised a conscious choice to confess her offense, she knew with certainty that shame would follow her exposure to her husband and children. Petitioner also knew that her choice would subject her family to the financial hardship and social upheaval inherent in selling everything they owned to make restitution to her former employer. Petitioner learned a new occupation, contributed to her family's recovery, and testified candidly and frankly about her offense. When the court sentenced Petitioner to 30 days in jail, Petitioner requested that she be allowed to serve the sentence every other weekend. Petitioner worked during the week and did not want to be away from her children all week and every weekend. The judge granted the request. The trier of fact finds that Petitioner neither misstated nor misrepresented her criminal record on her license application. Nor did Petitioner commit fraud in answering the questions on the application within the meaning of Subsection 626.611(2), Florida Statutes (2004). The trier of fact finds that Petitioner does not lack one or more of the qualifications for licensure required in Subsection 626.611(1), Florida Statutes (2004).1 Nor does Petitioner demonstrate a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance within the meaning of Subsection 626.611(7), Florida Statutes (2004).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order determining that Petitioner's license application has been granted by operation of law. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2006.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Florida Parole and Probation Commission, adopted revised rules of practice and procedure which became effective on September 10, 1981. Among these is Rule 23-21.09, Florida Administrative Code, which establishes "matrix time ranges" that are used in determining presumptive parole release dates for persons who are serving prison terms. In determining presumptive parole release dates, the Respondent's rules require that a "salient factor score" be determined based upon such factors as the number of prior criminal convictions, the number of prior incarcerations, total time served in prisons, the inmate's age at the time of the offense which led to the first incarceration, the number of probation or parole revocations, the number of prior escape convictions, and whether burglary or breaking and entering is the present offense of conviction. The degree or severity of the present offense of conviction is then determined. The Respondent's Rule 23-21.09 sets guidelines for time ranges for presumptive parole release dates depending upon the severity of the present offense of conviction and the salient factor score. The more severe the present offense of conviction, the longer will be the period before the presumptive parole release date. Similarly, given the severity of the offense, the higher the salient factor score the longer will be the period before the presumptive parole release date. The rule replaced a rule which set different matrix time ranges. The new rule generally sets longer time ranges, but this is not uniformly true. The Petitioner, Seimore Keith, is an inmate presently incarcerated at Polk Correctional Institution, Polk City, Florida. Polk Correctional Institution is a facility maintained by the Florida Department of Corrections. Petitioner Keith was convicted of grand theft in July, 1980, and was sentenced to serve five years in prison. The conviction was the result of a guilty plea which was entered in accordance with a plea bargain. During plea negotiations, Petitioner Keith was advised that his presumptive parole release date under Florida Parole and Probation Commission rules would require that he serve no more than 25 months in prison. At the time that Petitioner Keith's presumptive parole release date was set by the Respondent, the new Rule 23-21.09 had come into effect, and the Petitioner's presumptive parole release date was set to require that he serve 32 months in prison. The Petitioner, Ronnie McKane, is presently incarcerated at Polk Correctional Institution. He was convicted of the offense of armed robbery in February, 1981. Under rules in effect when he was sentenced, which was prior to the adoption of Rule 23-21.09, Petitioner McKane's presumptive parole release date would, if the guidelines were followed, have been set sooner than under Rule 23-21.09. The new rule was applied by Respondent in setting McKane's presumptive parole release date. The Petitioner, Daniel P. Hull, is presently incarcerated at Polk Correctional Institution. He was convicted in September, 1971, of the offense of robbery and sentenced to serve ten years in prison. He was paroled in 1974, but was reincarcerated as a result of a parole violation in 1976. In 1977 he escaped, and was recaptured in January, 1981. On June 1, 1961, Petitioner Hull was convicted of the offense of escape and sentenced to serve nine months. Under the rules in effect when he was sentenced, which was prior to the adoption of Rule 23-21.09, Hull's presumptive parole release date would, if the guidelines were followed, have been set sooner than under Rule 23-21.09. The new rules were applied by Respondent in setting Hull's presumptive parole release date, and it has been set subsequent to the expiration of his sentence. Hull will therefore be released when his sentence expires in March, 1982. The Petitioner, Douglas L. Adams, was convicted of the offenses of possession of marijuana and uttering a forged instrument, and sentenced in February, 1981, to two consecutive five-year sentences. Under the rules in effect when Adams was sentenced, which was prior to the adoption of Rule 23- 21.09, Adams' presumptive parole release date would, if the guidelines were followed, have been set sooner than under Rule 23-21.09. The new rule was applied by the Respondent in setting Adams' presumptive parole release date. During 1980, the Respondent directed its staff to begin considering proposed changes to its rules of practice and procedure. Various proposals were considered, and by September, 1980, a proposed rule package had been developed. The Respondent directed its staff to submit the proposed rule package to the Governor and members of the Cabinet, various pertinent legislators, county and circuit judges, prosecutors and public defenders, superintendents of each prison in the State, and to members of the Supreme Court and the district courts. The Commission opted to conduct various workshops throughout the State, and to invite all interested persons to share their input. Notices of the workshops were published in the Florida Administrative Weekly. The workshops were conducted, and the Commission commenced formal rule-making proceedings. Notice of rulemaking was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, and hearings were scheduled. Notice of the formal rulemaking proceedings was also published in the St. Petersburg Times, the Pensacola Journal, the Tallahassee Democrat, the Orlando Sentinel-Star, and the Florida Times-Union. Persons who had requested specific notification were provided it. In response to this notice, the Respondent received considerable written input, and oral presentations were made at hearings that were conducted. The final hearing in the rule-making proceeding was conducted on June 19, 1981, and the rules, including Rule 23- 21.09, were thereafter adopted effective September 10, 1981. Notice of the proposed rule changes and of the formal rulemaking proceeding was not specifically disseminated to inmates at Florida's prisons. The proposed rules were for- warded to the superintendent of each facility. At some of the institutions the proposed rules were apparently posted. All persons who requested copies of the proposed rules from the Florida Parole and Probation Commission were provided them. Numerous prisoners and organizations that represent prisoners made input during the various states of the rulemaking proceeding. None of the Petitioners in this matter were specifically noticed of the rulemaking proceeding. One of the Petitioners had heard that rules were being proposed, and requested copies of them from members of the Legislature or from Department of Corrections personnel. None of the Petitioners requested copies of the proposed rules from the Respondent or anyone connected with the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was first employed by the. Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee, Florida in 1968 and since March, 1971 has been evaluated by his supervisors as conditional or unsatisfactory in dependability. These low marks in dependability stem directly from his absenteeism rather than from his calibre of work when on duty. Petitioner is employed as a psychiatric aide. On October 31, 1972 Petitioner received his first written reprimand for excessive absenteeism. On March 22, 1973 a second written reprimand was received by Petitioner for excessive absenteeism. From August 1974 to May 1975 Petitioner was granted leave of absence to attend a vocational school. Upon his return to work at the hospital he was assigned to the 3:00 P.M. to 11:30 P.M. shift. In August 1975 Petitioner was assigned to night duty at his own request and over the objection of the night duty supervisor whose objections were based solely on Petitioner's prior record of absenteeism. Between the months of September 1975 to August 1976 Petitioner was absent a total of 64 1/2 days of the days he was required to be on duty. On July 13, 1976 Petitioner was given a third written reprimand for excessive absenteeism. On each of the occasions Petitioner was absent he would call in one or two hours prior to the time he was scheduled to report for duty to advise that he or a member of his family was sick. At this time of night it was often impossible for the hospital to get a replacement for him, and, as a result, the ward was short of attendants. Following the July 13, 1976 written reprimand Petitioner called in sick on July 25, July 31, and August 1, 1976. In approximately 95 percent of the cases Petitioner's absences occurred the day prior or subsequent to his scheduled off-duty days. During the six months period prior to his suspension from duty for three days without pay the ward to which Petitioner was assigned was a surgical ward where most patients required more intensive care than on non-surgical wards. While on duty Petitioner is an effective and capable employee and his efficiency reports so indicate. HRS Employee Handbook (Exhibit 1) provides penalties for various offenses. For the first offense of excessive absenteeism oral to written reprimand is recommended. For a second such offense penalty of written reprimand to three days suspension is recommended. For a third such offense three days suspension to dismissal is recommended. For a fourth such offense dismissal is recommended. Testifying in his own behalf Petitioner acknowledged excessive absenteeism and gave as a reason that he was subject to headaches, and, that when he didn't feel good he would stay home rather than come to work and have to listen to the complaints of his fellow workers. During the past year Petitioner has been employed by Gadsden County School Board as a bus driver. While so employed he missed only one day due to sickness.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner should be exempted from employment disqualification, thereby allowing him to work in a position of special trust or responsibility with the Department of Juvenile Justice (Department).
Findings Of Fact On September 23, 1994, the Petitioner was arrested by the Broward County Sheriff's Office and was charged with the crimes of aggravated assault with a firearm and carrying a concealed weapon. On November 8, 1994, on the advice of counsel, the Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of aggravated assault with a firearm. On August 22, 1995, the Petitioner was sentenced to a five-year period of probation, and as a special condition of his probation was ordered to pay $250.00. The charge of carrying a concealed weapon was not processed. In April of 1999, the Petitioner applied for the position of coordinator with Atlantic Coast Marine Institute (ACMI). This position would have brought the Petitioner into direct contact with juveniles. On April 28, 1999, ACMI submitted to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) a Request for Preliminary FCIC/NCIC and DHSMV Screening on the Petitioner. As a result of his criminal history, on May 2, 1999, the Petitioner was rated "Unfavorable/Disqualifying" on his preliminary screening. By letter dated July 22, 1999, the Petitioner was advised of the results of the preliminary screening, and was also advised of the procedure for requesting an exemption from employment disqualification. The Petitioner thereafter filed a timely request for exemption with supporting documents. By letter dated August 26, 1999, the Petitioner was advised that his request for exemption from employment disqualification pursuant to Section 435.07, Florida Statutes, was denied. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a timely request for a hearing to challenge the denial of his request for exemption. The disqualification of the Petitioner is based solely on his entry of a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of aggravated assault with a firearm, and the court sentence based on that plea. The Petitioner's plea of nolo contendere, which was based on the advice of legal counsel, was a plea of convenience to bring about a prompt resolution of the criminal charges and to avoid the possibility of a prison sentence. The Petitioner did not enter that plea because he believed he was guilty of the offense of aggravated assault with a firearm. To the contrary, the Petitioner has at all times believed, and continues to believe, that he is innocent of the criminal offense to which he pled nolo contendere. The Petitioner's belief in this regard is well-founded, because at the time of the incident which led to the filing of criminal charges against the Petitioner, he did not have a firearm in his possession and, therefore, could not have assaulted anyone with a firearm. 2/ Following his sentence on the criminal charge, the Petitioner made good faith efforts to timely comply with all conditions of his probation. He had occasional difficulties making the financial payments required by his sentence due to difficulties in obtaining steady employment. Ultimately, the Petitioner fulfilled all conditions of his probation and, as of September 13, 1999, the Petitioner's probation was terminated early by court order. Both before and after the incident that led to the Petitioner's arrest, he has worked in positions involving the care and supervision of young people. The Petitioner enjoys working with young people and appears to be quite good at such work. 3/ The Petitioner was raised in a military family. He also served for four years in the military. He is a self- disciplined person who takes his personal and professional responsibilities seriously. He is active in his community and does his best to be an upstanding citizen. In sum, the Petitioner is a decent and honorable person who enjoys working with youth, is good at working with youth, and should not be disqualified from employment positions working with youth.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a final order granting Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification for employment in a position of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 2000.
The Issue Whether the petitioner is entitled to an award under section 57.111, Florida Statutes, of attorney’s fees and costs incurred in the appellate matter Witmer v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 631 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), and, if so, the amount of such award.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, is the state agency responsible for issuing occupational licenses to veterinarians with access to the backside of a racetrack and for regulating such licensees. Sections 550.10(1)(b) and .105(2)(d)2, Florida Statutes. Dr. Witmer has been licensed to practice veterinary medicine in Florida since January 1, 1993, and, as of October 19, 1993, he was authorized to practice veterinary medicine at Florida racetracks by virtue of a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license (“license”) issued by the Department. He has been domiciled in Florida at all times material to this matter. On October 19, 1993, Dr. Witmer was a partner in a professional practice in veterinary medicine with its principal office at 1450 Southwest Third Street, Pompano Park, Broward County, Florida. His professional practice had three full-time employees and a net worth, including both personal and business investments, of less than $2 million. In the Administrative Complaint and Emergency Order of Suspension dated October 19, 1993, the Department took two actions with respect to Dr. Witmer’s license.1 First, in the administrative complaint, it put Dr. Witmer on notice that the Department had initiated a disciplinary action against him, charging him with violations of a statute and a rule governing his license which, if proven, would justify the imposition of penalties, including revocation or suspension of his license. Secondly, in the emergency order of suspension, it summarily suspended Dr. Witmer’s license. Dr. Witmer requested a formal administrative hearing pursuant to section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, to challenge the truth of the allegations contained in the administrative complaint. The request was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned DOAH Case Number 93-6638. That action was pending at the time Dr. Witmer filed the application for attorney’s fees and costs at issue in this proceeding. Underlying proceeding On the basis of the allegations contained in the administrative complaint and its determination that Dr. Witmer’s interest in his license was “far outweighed by the immediate danger to the public health and safety and to the integrity of harness racing in the State of Florida,” the Department suspended Dr. Witmer’s pari-mutuel wagering occupational license as of October 19, 1993, ordered him to cease and desist from all activities authorized by the license, and barred him from entering any pari-mutuel establishment as a patron for the duration of the emergency suspension. Dr. Witmer chose to seek immediate judicial review of the emergency order pursuant to sections 120.60(8) and 120.54(9)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1993). It is this appellate proceeding which is the proceeding underlying Dr. Witmer’s application for attorney’s fees and costs at issue herein. State agencies are authorized by section 120.60(8), Florida Statutes (1995) to immediately suspend a license under the following circumstances and subject to the following conditions: If the agency finds that immediate serious danger to the public health, safety, or welfare requires emergency suspension, restriction, or limitation of a license, it shall show compliance in its order with the requirements imposed by s. 120.54(9) on agencies making emergency rules. Summary suspension, restriction, or limitation may be ordered, but a formal suspension or revocation proceeding under this section shall also be promptly instituted and acted upon. Section 120.54(9)(a), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: If an agency finds that an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare requires emergency action, the agency may adopt any rule necessitated by the immediate danger by any procedure which is fair under the circumstances and necessary to protect the public interest, provided that: * * * 3. The agency publishes in writing at the time of, or prior to, its action the specific facts and reasons for finding an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare and its reasons for concluding that the procedure used is fair under the circumstances. . . . The agency’s findings of immediate danger, necessity, and procedural fairness shall be judicially reviewable. On February 2, 1994, the District Court of Appeal for the Fourth District of Florida issued its opinion in Witmer v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Case Number 93-3232, reported at 631 So. 2d 338. The court quashed the Emergency Order of Suspension, concluding that the order was “facially inadequate,” and ruling that “the Department’s findings of immediate danger to the public welfare are not supported by specific facts and reasons as required by 120.54(9)(a)3, Florida Statutes.” Id. at 340, 343. The district court in Witmer observed that its review was limited to a determination of whether the order complied with the requirements of section 120.54(9)(a)3 and based its analysis upon the following rules of law: If the facts alleged in the complaint and [emergency] order are sufficient to demonstrate immediacy, necessity and fairness, no hearing is required prior to the emergency suspension. . . . The factual allegations contained in the emergency order must sufficiently identify particularized facts which demonstrate an immediate danger to the public. (Citation omitted.) Where, as here, no hearing was held prior to the entry of the emergency order, every element necessary to its validity must appear on the face of the order. (Citation omitted.) The order must be “factually explicit and persuasive concerning the existence of a genuine emergency.” (Citation omitted.) Witmer, 631 So. 2d at 341. In reaching its conclusion that the emergency order was facially inadequate, the court in Witmer held that the Department failed to allege facts in the complaint and order to establish the essential elements of the violations upon which the emergency suspension was based. Firstly, the court found that the charge in the emergency order that Dr. Witmer had failed to report gratuities was not supported by any allegations of fact in the complaint and order. Id. at 341. Secondly, the court found that the Department failed to allege that Dr. Witmer’s actions related to horse racing or to race horses, an essential element of a violation of section 550.235(2), Florida Statutes, and of rule 61D-1.002(10), Florida Administrative Code. Id. at 342. Thirdly, the court found that the Department failed to allege that Dr. Witmer reached an agreement with a second person to commit the violation, an essential element of any conspiracy, including one to violate section 550.235(2) and rule 61D-1.002(10). Id. Finally, the court concluded that the public harm alleged by the Department in the order was too attenuated to support the emergency suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license. Id. at 343. The district court issued its mandate to the Department on February 18, 1994, directing it to act in accordance with the opinion quashing the Emergency Order of Suspension. The Department did not seek review of the decision of the district court in the Florida Supreme Court. Consequently, the decision of the district court had the effect of nullifying the emergency suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license. Summary Dr. Witmer was a small business party, as that term is defined for purposes of section 57.111, at the time the Department entered the emergency order.2 The evidence is sufficient to establish that the Department initiated an action against Dr. Witmer when it entered an Emergency Order of Suspension. This order was issued under the authority granted state agencies in section 120.60(8), Florida Statutes. The order had the effect of immediately and summarily suspending Dr. Witmer’s pari-mutuel wagering occupational license. Dr. Witmer had the right to seek immediate judicial review of the emergency order pursuant to section 120.54(9)(a)3. The appellate court quashed the emergency order because it was legally insufficient to support the suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license under the standards of section 120.54(9)(a)3. The Department did not appeal or seek further review of the appellate court’s decision. Dr. Witmer, therefore, prevailed in the administrative proceeding initiated by the Department. The Department presented no evidence to establish that its action in ordering the emergency suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license had a reasonable basis in law and fact or that any special circumstances exist which would make an award of attorney’s fees and costs in this case unjust.3 The monetary value of the attorney’s fees rendered in connection with the appellate proceeding culminating in the decision quashing the Emergency Order of Suspension is $9,715.00, and the costs incurred total $250. These fees and costs are reasonable and were necessary to prosecute the appellate proceeding.4
