Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Richard M. Woodley has two inactive contracting licenses numbered CB CA 17970 and CB CO 17970, and was so licensed in 1986. The Respondent's license CB CA 17970 qualified "Woodley Builders, Inc." with the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. At the time of the hearing, the Respondent was no longer in the construction contracting business as a licensed contractor. With respect to case number 87-2809, on December 15, 1985, the Respondent, on behalf of Woodley Builders, Inc., entered into a contract with Catherine M. Richardson and Jonathan P. Richardson to build a residence in or near Orlando, Florida. The contract price was $90,000, with $20,000 attributable to the land. The contract specified that payments would be made to Woodley Builders, Inc. "in accordance with the disbursement schedule set forth by the construction lender." P. Ex. 1, paragraph 7. Woodley Builders, Inc. also agreed in the contract to furnish to the Richardsons lien waivers as required by the construction lender for disbursements. The construction lender disbursed the following amounts on the indicated dates: $10,200 March 17, 1986 $10,200 March 19, 1986 $17,000 March 27, 1986 $17,000 April 24, 1986 To induce these disbursements, a total of $54,400, the Respondent signed lien waivers stating that all bills for labor and materials used had been paid in full. P. Ex. 5. At the time of signing, the Respondent told the construction lender that he had paid all bills due to that time, but had not paid bills not yet presented. T. 89. Thus, the lien waivers were intended to be a certification of the partial completion and payment for the work billed to the date of the waiver, and a promise to pay other bills for work already completed as such bills were presented. Six claims of liens were filed by subcontractors. The Richardsons hired a lawyer, and the lawyer was able to defend against two of the liens for failure to properly comply with procedures for mechanic's liens. Four liens for the following amounts and for work beginning on the dates indicated ultimately had to be satisfied by the Richardsons: $ 2,851.45 March 19, 1986 $13,462.34 March 7, 1986 $ 1,944.57 April 8, 1986 $ 785.01 April 9, 1986 These liens were for work commenced before the last lien waiver was signed on April 24, 1986. Thus, the Respondent failed to comply with the oral representations he made at the time of signing the lien waivers. The Richardsons were forced to execute a second mortgage in excess of $17,000 to pay off the unpaid liens. The Richardsons terminated the contract with Woodley Builders, Inc. when subcontractors quit working for lack of payment by Woodley Builders, Inc. Some money was obtained from family loans. It cost the Richardsons about $30,000 to have the house finished, which has added about $325 per month to their mortgage obligations. The Respondent and Woodley Builders, Inc. have not paid anything on these liens. Woodley Builders, Inc. filed bankruptcy. The Richardsons sued the Respondent as trustee for Woodley Builders, Inc. and obtained a default judgment for $149,839, which was a judgment of $32,380 in compensatory damages, trebled, plus costs, interest, and attorney's fees. With respect to case number 87-2810, on June 11, 1986, Woodley Builders, Inc. entered into a contract with Tom Jamieson to construct an addition to his residence in Orlando, Florida. The price of the work was $18,500. The contract specified that the price was a cash price, and that draws were to be made according to a schedule stated in the contract. Mr. Jamieson paid to Woodley Builders, Inc. about $11,700 of the contract price. At some time before completion of the addition, the owner, Mr. Jamieson, evidently became dissatisfied with the Respondent's work. Mr. Jamieson was given the Respondent's copy of the contract and refused to return it to the Respondent. Mr. Jamieson then owed the Respondent a draw of $3500, but refused to give it to him, and refused to have it put in escrow for the payment of subcontractors. The date that this occurred is not in evidence. T. 35-36, 39. Since Mr. Jamieson had taken back the contract, the Respondent thought that he (the Respondent) no longer had any legal proof of the contract (either scope of work or amount due), and thus had no contract to complete the work. He also did not receive the draw that was due. The Respondent thus ceased work on the addition for fear that he would not be paid without a copy of his contract. T. 36-37. The Respondent offered to complete the work. T. 51. The drywall contractor, Rick's Drywall, Inc., filed a lien for $465 for work done from August 12, 1986 and August 20, 1986. The Respondent would have paid this lien had Mr. Jamieson not terminated the contract and refused to give the Respondent a draw still due of $3500. T. 49-50. There may be a claim for unpaid electrical work in July, 1986, see P. Ex. 15, but it is impossible to tell if this occurred before or after Mr. Jamieson terminated the contract, or whether the Respondent had received draw money that should have paid this claim. The only evidence is that the Respondent had an agreement with the electrical subcontractor to pay that subcontractor at the time of the final draw, a draw never received as discussed above. T. 53. P. Ex. 11 is insufficient evidence that there were unpaid claims for roof trusses. Moreover, it cannot be determined whether the Respondent received a draw before contract termination which should have been used to pay for roof trusses. The Respondent had been a contractor for eight years before he began to have financial difficulties resulting in the problems with the Richardson's residence. There is no evidence of any prior discipline.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter its final order finding in case number 87-2809 that the Respondent, Richard M. Woodley, violated sections 489.129(1)(m), 489.129(1)(j), and 489.119, Fla. Stat. (1986), misconduct in contracting by diversion of funds, and failure to supervise as a qualifying agent, and in case number 87-2810, dismissing the administrative complaint for failure of proof by clear and convincing evidence. It is further recommended for the violation set forth above that the license of the Respondent be suspended for one year. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of July, 1988. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard M. Woodley 2521 Tuscaloosa Trail Maitland, Florida 32751 David Bryant, Esquire 1107 East Jackson, Suite 104 Tampa, Florida 33602 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Nonroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Fred Seely, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201
Findings Of Fact The findings of fact stipulated to by the parties are as follows: The Respondent's license was suspended for a period of three years by Final Order of the Board of Medical Examiners filed on or about June 25, 1985. The Respondent filed a timely Notice of Appeal of the foregoing Final Order. The Respondent filed a Motion to Stay the Final Order with the Board of Medical Examiners, through appellate counsel, but said motion was not ruled upon by the Board of Medical Examiners at any time pertinent to the dates related to the Administrative Complaint. No petition for stay was filed by the Respondent until August 6, 1985, with the appellate court having jurisdiction of the direct appeal, when said motion was filed by appellate counsel. The District Court of Appeal, First District, entered a temporary stay of the Final Order of the Board of Medical Examiners on August 6, 1985, but dissolved the stay on August 9, 1995, upon written response from the Department of Professional Regulation. No other stay was in effect at any time pertinent to the times material to the matters raised in the Administrative Complaint filed herein. The Respondent continued to practice medicine subsequent to the filing of the Motion to Stay filed with the Board of Medical Examiners until contacted in person by investigators of the Department of Professional Regulation who informed the Respondent, on August 12, 1985, that no stay of the Final Order was in effect. At that point, the Respondent immediately surrendered his medical license to the investigators of the Department of Professional Regulation and informed said investigators that the investigators should contact his appellate Counsel because of the "Confusion." The Respondent believed, and was specifically advised by appellate Counsel, that the Final Order of the Board of Medical Examiners filed June 25, 1985, was stayed automatically by the District Court of Appeal, First District, notwithstanding the fact that the only stay entered by the District Court of Appeal, First District, was from August 6 to August 9, 1985. Not only was the Respondent advised by appellate counsel orally that such a stay was automatically effected by the filing of the Notice of Appeal with the District Court of Appeal, First District, but appellate counsel provided written confirmation of the alleged existence of such a stay to Jacksonville hospitals providing medical privileges to the Respondent. An example of such written confirmation is a letter dated July 30, 1985, to the President, Board of Trustees of St. Vincent's Medical Center advising St. Vincent's Medical Center that the Final Order of the Board of Medical Examiners was automatically stayed by operation of Section 120.68(3), Florida Statutes. In that letter, appellate counsel not only advised St. Vincent's Medical Center of the existence of an alleged automatic stay, but copied the Respondent with said advice, confirming to the Respondent that the Final Order of the Board of Medical Examiners had in fact been stayed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Rafael Daman, is an optician, having been issued License No. 0001712. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) Respondent filed an apprentice application with the Board of Opticianry. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) As part of that application, a form entitled "Apprentice Application to be Completed by Employer" was submitted to the Board of Opticianry. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) This form is signed and sworn to by Ramon del Busto, M.D., as supervisor of Respondent. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) Dr. del Busto acknowledged his signature on this document. (Deposition 7) Additionally, Ramon del Busto, M.D., submitted an Affidavit By Sponsor, and swore that he was the sponsor of the Respondent. (petitioner's Exhibit 1, Deposition 5) Respondent was not employed by Ramon del Busto, M.D. (Transcript - 22, Deposition 7, 8, 9) However, Respondent worked as an unpaid employee or student of Dr. del Busto (Transcript -48, Deposition 8, 9) The Apprentice Application to be Completed by Employer was actually completed by the Respondent and a secretary employed by G&B Optical. (Transcript - 36, 38) Ramon del Busto, M.D., signed the Apprentice Application to be Completed by Employer, but had no personal knowledge of the accuracy of the information contained therein. (Transcript - 24, 36, 38; Deposition - 7, 8, 9) Ramon del Busto, M.D., supervised the Respondent when they were both at G&B Optical, but Dr. del Busto was present at G&B Optical only on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and others times as necessary. Transcript - 22, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41; Deposition - 5, 9) However, Respondent was always present when Dr. del Busto was in this office. (Deposition - 9) Dr. del Busto did not remain on the premises while all the work of Respondent was being accomplished. (Transcript - 46)
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of procuring an optician's license by misrepresentation in violation of Subsection 484.015(1)(a) , F.S., and placing Respondent on probation under the supervision of another optician as provided by Subsection 484.015(2)(e), F.S., until Respondent demonstrates compliance with Section 484.007, F.S. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of August, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of August, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Diane K. Kiesling, Esquire Davis, Kiesling & McCall 517 East College Avenue Tallahassee. Florida 32302 Mr. Rafael Daman 5426 N.W. 169th Street Mr. Samuel R. Shorstein Miami, Florida Secretary Department of Professional Mr. Fred Varn, Executive Director Regulation Board of Dispensing Opticians 130 North Monroe Street 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, BOARD OF OPTICIANRY, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 82-337 LIC. NO. 0001712 RAFAEL DAMAN, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Dyer Kemp Garvin, Jr., has never completed a course of study at a recognized school of opticianry. On April 2, 1957, however, he began working and training under Ralph C. Cronbaugh, a licensed optician, at Daytona Optical Center in Daytona Beach, Florida. He learned how to read a lensometer, interpret prescriptions for eyeglasses, figure base curves, measure the seg height and various physiognomic features, cut and edge lenses, fit lenses to the frame and so forth. Petitioner worked under Mr. Cronbaugh's supervision an average of 48 or 50 hours a week continuously until June of 1961, even though the training program as such ended after three years. Some time before June of 1961, petitioner registered as an apprentice with and paid a fee to the Florida Association of Dispensing Opticians. On June 3, 1961, petitioner became a member of the Florida Association of Dispensing Opticians. Some 15 years later the Florida Board of Opticianry instituted its own apprenticeship program for the first time. From June of 1961 until at least June of 1963, petitioner remained at the Daytona Optical Center under the supervision of Steve Stevenson, a licensed optician. For nine months or a year longer, he worked under a third licensed optician at the Daytona Optical Center, Andrew H. Hollaway. Petitioner moved to Alabama from Daytona Beach. There he managed an office for Bausch-Lomb in Birmingham, then went into business for himself under the name Jasper Optical Center in Jasper, Alabama. He actively practiced as a dispensing optician in Jasper for more than three years immediately preceding his application for licensure in Florida. Petitioner is a past vice-president of the Alabama Society of Dispensing Opticians and a former member of the board of directors of the International Society of Dispensing Opticians. He is now licensed as a dispensing optician in Alabama and has been for the last 18 years. Petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 3 and 4. Although the licensing scheme in Alabama is different from Florida's, petitioner's uncontroverted testimony was that he holds and has held a state occupational license in Alabama. This is corroborated by the affidavit of an Alabama judge, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4, and a copy of petitioner's 1981-1982 license. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. For the past six years, petitioner and other dispensing opticians have worked to establish a state board to regulate opticianry in Alabama, but these efforts have been stymied by optometrists who have successfully opposed the legislation. As a matter of policy, respondent refuses to let dispensing opticians licensed in Alabama and other states with similar regulatory arrangements take the Florida dispensing opticianry examination. In preparing the foregoing findings of fact, the hearing officer has had the benefit of petitioner's post-hearing correspondence and respondent's proposed recommended order. Proposed fact findings that have not been adopted have been rejected as irrelevant or unsupported by the evidence.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent admit petitioner to the dispensing opiticanry examination and license petitioner as a dispensing optician if he successfully completes the examination. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Dyer Kemp Garvin, Jr. Post Office Box 1127 Destin, Florida 32541 Chris D. Rolle, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Suite 1602 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 H. Fred Varn, Executive Director Board of Opticianry 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION DYER KEMP GARVIN, JR. Petitioner, vs. DOAH CASE NO. 82-484 STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, BOARD OF OPTICIANRY, Respondent. /
The Issue The issues are as follows: (a) whether a proposed amendment to Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B14-3.001(12) constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority in violation of Sections 120.52(8)(b) and/or 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes (2005); and (b) whether Petitioners are entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes (2005).
Findings Of Fact This matter arises from Respondent's proposed amendment (the proposed rule) to Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B14- 3.001(12), which defines the term "direct supervision" for purposes of Part XIV, Chapter 468, Florida Statutes (the O&P practice act.) Respondent advertised the text of the proposed rule in Volume 31, Number 35, September 2, 2005, of the Florida Administrative Weekly. The proposed rule states as follows in relevant part: (12) Direct Supervision means: supervision while the qualified supervisor is on the premises. The licensed orthotist, prosthetist, orthotist/prosthetist, or pedorthist will provide a physical evaluation of each patient's orthotic and or prosthetic needs and may delegate appropriate duties to support personnel. However, the licensed practitioner shall physically evaluate the effectiveness, appropriateness and fit of all devices within the scope of the licensed practitioner's licensure practice requirements, including those repaired devices in which the repairs affect the fit, physical structure or biomechanical function of the device, on every patient, prior to patient use of the device; For the purpose of replacement of worn or broken components which do not in any way alter the fit, physical structure or biomechanical functioning of the existing device, direct supervision of support personnel providing repairs to orthoses or prostheses means the aforementioned repair must be approved by the appropriately licensed practitioner prior to beginning of repairs. The responsible licensed practitioner must at all times be accessible by two way communication, enabling the supervisor to respond to questions relating to the repair. * * * Specific Authority 468.802, F.S. Law Implemented 468.802, 468.803, 468.807, 468.808, 468.809, F.S. History--New 10-21- 99, Amended 2-19-04, 5-5-04. Respondent conducted a final public hearing regarding the proposed rule on November 18, 2005. Petitioners filed a petition challenging the proposed rule within 10 days after the final public hearing. Petitioners would be substantially affected by the proposed rule. The parties stipulate to the citation of official notices and other matters published in Florida Administrative Weekly.
Findings Of Fact On May 5, 1953 Petitioner issued barbershop license number BS0007761 to Respondent for the operation of Mr. S. Haircuttery, a barbershop located at 17846 South Dixie Highway, Miami, Florida. Petitioner's letter to Respondent dated May 5, 1983 states, "All persons employed as barbers or barber assistants are required to have a current and valid license." Respondent has maintained his license and operated Mr. S. Haircuttery, as owner, at all times material hereto. On October 16, 1984 Bettye C. Rogers, an inspector employed by Petitioner, entered Mr. S. Haircuttery to inspect the premises. The barbershop was very clean and sanitary, and had all required equipment. Ms. Rogers observed a person, later identified as Marietta Thompson, cutting a customer's hair. Upon inquiry it was determined that Marietta Thompson was not licensed at the time by the Barbers' Board or the Board of Cosmetology. Respondent admits that Marietta Thompson was not licensed at the time of the inspection. He points out, however, that her employment of four days was immediately terminated, and that she had been referred to him by a cosmetology school as a person who had passed her cosmetology exam and was just waiting to receive her license. Respondent has been licensed as a barber in Florida for approximately twenty years and as a cosmetologist for approximately seven years. During that time he has owned and operated four licensed shops and employed approximately fifteen licensed employees at his shops. The evidence establishes that the incident involving Marietta Thompson is Petitioner's only violation of the applicable licensing laws during the time he has been licensed. Marietta Thompson was employed by Respondent from October 13 to October 16, 1984. In making the above findings of fact, proposed findings submitted by Petitioner pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)4, F.S., have been considered. A ruling on each proposed finding of fact has been made either directly or indirectly in this Recommended Order, except where such proposed findings have been rejected as subordinate, cumulative, immaterial or unnecessary.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that petitioner issue a Final Order which imposes a reprimand against Respondent's barber shop license number BS0007761. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 1985 at Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 1985
The Issue The central issue in this case is Petitioner's challenge to part III of the licensure examination as set forth in his letter dated September 8, 1994.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Robert E. Rosser, is a candidate for licensure as a general contractor. Petitioner has taken the examination to become a licensed general contractor consecutively over the last four years. As a result of the twelve attempts at the examination, Petitioner has passed parts I and II on two separate test dates. In his attempts to pass the examination Petitioner has enrolled in and studied for the examination with two approved construction schools. Petitioner scored a 68 on part III of the general contractor's examination for the June 16, 1994 test date. Petitioner timely challenged questions related to part III (Project Management) of the general contractor's examination given on June 16, 1994. Petitioner attended a review session and claimed that as to question 2 his scratch sheet from the examination demonstrates he had used formulas properly and that he had inadvertently marked the incorrect response on the answer grid sheet. The minimum score required to pass part III of the examination was 70. For each of the challenged questions in part III (2, 4, 7, 9, 11, 17, 18, and 20) Respondent presented competent evidence to support the correct answer as scored by the Department. The Petitioner did not present credible evidence to dispute the accuracy of the answers which had been deemed correct by the Department. Based upon those answers, the Petitioner's score sheet was tabulated correctly. The questions challenged were clearly and unambiguously worded and contained sufficient factual information to reach a correct answer. The examination was open book and applicants were allowed to use reference materials. All current techniques were considered before the correct answer was chosen. All knowledge needed to reach a correct answer was within a candidate's expected range of expertise. The Department's scoring of part III was not arbitrary, capricious, or devoid of logic. For each of the challenged questions, the correct answer was scored at a higher percentage than the answers marked by Petitioner. In fact, for question 4, for example, 79 percent of the examinees scored the correct answer while only 3 percent marked the same answer as Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Bureau of Testing enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's challenge to the general contractor's examination. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-5214 Rulings on the Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Petitioner did not number the paragraphs denoted as "STATEMENT OF FACTS AND FINDINGS". The lettered paragraphs are addressed as listed; but where no letter identified the paragraph, the rulings are as to the paragraphs in the order of presentation. Paragraph [A] is accepted. Paragraph [B] is accepted to the extent it identifies Petitioner as a candidate otherwise rejected as not supported by the weight of the credible evidence. Petitioner's citation to Rule 21E-16.005 is an error. It is accepted that the minimum passing grade for the challenged part is 70 percent out of 100 percent. Paragraph [C] is accepted in substance; however, Petitioner's citation to Rule 21E-16.003 is an error. The next paragraph is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is accepted as a correct statement of procedural review. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 4 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 7 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 9 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 11 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected as not a statement of fact. Petitioner's scratch sheets have been received as Petitioner's exhibit 1. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 17 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected as not a statement of fact. Petitioner's scratch sheets have been received as Petitioner's exhibit 1. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 18 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 20 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph [D] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is not supported by the evidence. Paragraph [E] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is not supported by the evidence. The next paragraph is merely an address for the Department and is not a statement of fact. Paragraph [F] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is irrelevant. Paragraph [G] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is irrelevant. The next paragraph is merely an address for the Division and is not a statement of fact. Paragraph [H] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is irrelevant. Paragraph [I] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is irrelevant. Paragraph [J] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is irrelevant. Paragraph [K] is rejected as contrary to the record in this case since an order of prehearing instruction was not entered in this case and interrogatories were not served. Paragraph [L] is rejected as irrelevant, not a statement of fact, and contrary to the record. Moreover, Petitioner's scratch sheets have been received as Petitioner's exhibit 1. Paragraph [M] is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph [N] is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph [O] is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph [P] is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Paragraphs 4 through 11 are accepted. Paragraph 1 is accepted as statement of procedural information. Paragraph 2 is accepted as to the substance but is not a statement of relevant fact. Paragraph 3 is accepted as to the substance but is not a statement of relevant fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert E. Rosser P.O. Box 560541 Miami, Florida 33256-0541 William M. Woodyard Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Richard Hickok Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board 7960 Arlington Expressway, Suite 300 Jacksonville, Florida 32211-6310
