Findings Of Fact On March 22, 1977 during a routine inspection of various service stations in Vero Beach, a sample of No. 2 diesel fuel was taken from the pump at English Brothers Truck Stop. Upon analysis at the mobile laboratory the sample was found to be below the minimum flash point for No. 2 diesel fuel and the inspector returned to the station the same day and issued a stop sale notice. (Exhibit 3). Three additional samples were taken, and when analyzed they too were found to be below minimum flash point for this type fuel. Upon receipt of the stop sale notice the station manager notified Respondent. After the fuel had been analyzed at the state laboratory Respondent was notified that since the retail value of the contaminated fuel exceeded $1,000 it could pay $1,000 in lieu of having the fuel confiscated. Respondent owns the fuel at English Brothers Truck Stop until such time as the fuel is removed through the pump for sale. Upon receipt of the notice of the contaminated fuel, which was in one 4,000 gallon tank, Respondent immediately sent three employees to remove the contaminated fuel and clean the tank. Thereafter Respondent attempted to locate the source of the contamination but without success. Since the flash point was lower than allowed for diesel fuel the most likely source of contamination was gasoline which is a higher priced fuel than diesel. Standards used by the Petitioner in determining the required characteristics of fuels are those prescribed by the ASTM. Respondent distributes some 750,000 gallons of diesel fuel per month and this is the first report of contamination of its fuel in the eight and one half years Respondent has been in business.
The Issue Whether Respondent’s license as a septic tank contractor should be disciplined.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is registered with Petitioner as a septic tank contractor and authorized to provide septic tank contracting services, holding Registration No. SR0890264 and Authorization No. SA0900453. David B. Grimes is employed by Bay County Health Department as an inspector responsible for the inspection of on- site sewage systems. On August 22, 2007, Mr. Grimes inspected an on-site sewage treatment disposal system (OSTDS) being constructed by Respondent at 5431 John Pitts Road, Panama City, Florida. The OSTDS failed to meet the minimum rule requirements due to a defective tank and improperly installed drainfield. The tank was defective because its dimensions were smaller than the dimensions required to enable the tank to have sufficient liquid capacity for the system being installed. Mr. Grimes told Respondent that he could not approve the system. Upon learning that the system would not be approved, Respondent, who is a large man and larger than the inspector, threatened to do bodily harm to Mr. Grimes and stated, “I am going to whip your ass”. He also used other profanity in a threatening and serious voice. The inspector began to put his tools into the tool container on the back of his truck. When the inspector attempted to close the container’s lid and leave, Respondent blocked the path of the inspector and would not let him close the truck-bed lid. Respondent insisted the system be inspected and approved so he could finish the job. Other than blocking his path, Respondent did not take any other physical action towards harming Mr. Grimes. Other than with his hands, the evidence did not show that Respondent had the means to cause serious harm to Mr. Grimes. However, Mr. Grimes felt some fear for his safety and was very uncomfortable. He refused to approve the system and left the premises. He called his supervisor to report the incident and request a second inspection by his supervisor. Later that day, Mr. Grimes and his supervisor inspected the OSTDS. Respondent was not present. The inspector concurred with Mr. Grimes’ findings and the system was not approved. On August 23, 2007, Mr. Grimes made a second visit to the property to continue the inspection of the OSTDS. The drainfield was corrected and a new and larger tank was installed. The dimensions of the tank were again smaller than required to meet the liquid capacity of the tank. Additionally, the tank had a gap in the seal around the intake feed line. It was, therefore, defective and could not be approved. Mr. Grimes told Respondent that he could not approve the system. Respondent again grew angry when he was told the new tank was also defective and would not be approved. Respondent stated that Mr. Grimes was the worst inspector in the area and made other derogatory remarks towards him. Respondent also threatened to make trouble with the inspector’s employment and/or “get him fired” unless the system was passed. The evidence did not show that Respondent made any physical moves toward Respondent or otherwise impeded his inspection. The inspector was again fearful for his personal safety although the evidence did not demonstrate a reasonable basis for such fear. The OSTDS was not approved and Mr. Grimes left the work site. There was no evidence that Respondent followed through with interfering with Mr. Grimes’ employment. At best, the evidence showed that Respondent’s threat to interfere with the inspector’s employment was mere hyperbole. Such comments are common. While silly and rude, the mere threat of an employment action does not rise to the level of being unlawful and does not demonstrate misconduct sufficient to impose discipline on Respondent’s license. On the other hand, the actions of Respondent towards the inspector when he threatened to do bodily harm to the inspector, and blocking his attempts to leave unless he approved the system, did constitute gross misconduct on the part of Respondent. Even though Respondent’s actions were unsuccessful, Respondent’s words coupled with his conduct go beyond mere hyperbole and constitute an unlawful threat towards a public official to influence the official’s actions. Respondent’s actions did not cause physical or monetary harm to any person. In the past, Respondent was disciplined by letter of warning in Case Number SC0478 in 2000, for covering a new installation in violation of the system construction standards and by citation in Case Number SC0591 in 2001, for creation of a sanitary nuisance, negligence, misconduct, and falsification of inspection report. The instant violation is a second violation for misconduct and a repeat violation of the rules of the Department.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that Respondent's license be disciplined for violations of the Florida Administrative Code Rule 64E-6.022 and that his Septic Tank Contractor License No. SR0890264 and Authorization No. SA0900453 be fined in the amount of $500.00 and suspended for 90 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of May, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of May, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney M. Johnson, Esquire Department of Health Northwest Law Office 1295 West Fairfield Drive Pensacola, Florida 32501 G. D. Yon, Jr. Yon Septic Tank Co. 2988 Hwy 71 Marianna, Florida 32446 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Dr. Ana M. Viamonte-Ros, Secretary Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Josefina M. Tamayó, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not Respondent was selling "polluted" gasoline in violation of the standards set forth in Chapter 525.06, Florida Statutes (1980), and Rule Chapter 5F-2, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. The Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, is an agency of State government which has the obligation to inspect petroleum products in keeping with the provisions of Chapter 525, Florida Statutes (1980). 2/ The Respondent is a corporation which sells products in the State of Florida at an outlet located at 1050 U.S. 98 North in Brooksville, Florida. On November 11, 1981, a sample of three (3) petroleum products, i.e., regular gasoline, unleaded and diesel fuel was taken from Respondent's location which is known as Chuck's Car Wash. A laboratory analysis by Petitioner revealed that the unleaded gasoline showed a lead content above .110 grams per gallon. This reading is above the .05 gram per gallon maximum allowable lead content as set forth in Rule Subsection 5F-2.01(1)5(j), Florida Administrative Code. An analysis of the regular gasoline revealed an End Point of 494 degrees F. This reading is above the 446 degrees F maximum allowable End Point as set forth in Rule Subsection 5F-2.01(1)(c)4, Florida Administrative Code. Finally, an examination of the diesel product revealed a Flash Point below 60 degrees F. This reading is below the 120 degrees F allowable Flash Point as set forth in Rule Subsection 5F-2.01(3)(b), Florida Administrative Code. The results of these analyses were made known to Respondent and he was afforded the option of either immediately halting the sale of the products or to post a cash bond in the amount of $1,000.00 for 5,900 gallons sold of the above- referred products in lieu of confiscation of the remaining 1,681 gallons of the products. (See Release Notice or Agreement dated November 12, 1981.) Respondent posted a bond in the amount of $1,000.00. In the Release Notice, Respondent was advised that all three (3) products were to be removed from its tanks and new products dropped. Respondent was also afforded the opportunity to remove the no-lead which could he sold as leaded regular with the remaining two (2) products to be used in Respondent's private equipment. Petitioner's inspector who works out of portable laboratory No. 3, Jamie Gillespie, removed the samples from Respondent's tanks and conducted the analyses of the products. Inspector Gillespie made Respondent aware of his findings and his decision to post a Stop Sale Notice of the subject products. Inspector Gillespie obtained the cash bond from Respondent. Use of the above-referred products may cause catalytic converters to become contaminated; restrict exhaust systems and release excessive pollutants in the atmosphere. Use of these products also may clog fuel filters and carburetors. The low Flash Point from the diesel product may cause an engine to "run away" and in some instances may blow the head assembly from a diesel engine. Additionally, use of diesel with such a low Flash Point may contaminate dry injector nozzles and shorten the life of a diesel engine. (Testimony of Gillespie and Morris, inspectors and chemists employed by Petitioner, who conducted analyses of the subject products.) As stated, Respondent did not appear at the hearing to contest or otherwise rebut the charges alleged by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and the entire record compiled herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding the Respondent in violation of Rule Subsections 5F-2.01(1)5(j), 5F-2.01(1)(c)4, and 5F-2.01(3)(b), Florida Administrative Code, and thereby, Respondent should be subjected to the penalties set forth in Section 525.06, Florida Statutes (1980), and the $1,000.00 bond posted be estreated. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April, 1982.
Findings Of Fact On June 28, 1978, the respondent Department of Environmental Regulation gave notice that the Environmental Regulation Commission would consider the adoption of an emergency rule at their regularly scheduled meeting on July 12, 1978. The impetus for such an emergency rule was apparently the results of the Florida Sulfur Oxides Study which were orally presented to the Commission at a meeting held on June 20-22, 1978. The study is an eleven volume text, parts of which were separately submitted to the Commission in January, February, and April of 1978, involving the environmental effects of sulfur dioxide and related matters. The written final report was submitted in May of 1978. Pursuant to the provisions of Florida Statutes, Section 120.54(4), petitioner Florida Lung Association filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings its "petition for determining the validity of a proposed emergency rule" on July 7, 1978. The emergency rule was approved by the Environmental Regulation Commission at its meeting on July 12, 1978, and said rule was filed with the Secretary of State on July 14, 1978. On the same date, July 14th, Florida Power and Light Company and Jacksonville Electric Authority filed their motion to intervene in the rule challenge proceeding. On July 16, 1978, Jacksonville Electric Authority filed its motion to dismiss the petition. The cause was noticed for hearing on July 19, 1978. On July 20th, Florida Power and Light filed its motion to dismiss. On July 26, 1978, the Division of Administrative Hearings received petitioner's amendment to the petition seeking relief pursuant to the provisions of Florida Statutes, Section 120.56, should relief under Florida Statutes, Section 120.54 be deemed improper. The petitioner and the Department of Environmental Regulation entered into a Stipulation prior to the hearing agreeing as to certain factual matters and stipulating that the Florida Lung Association is a substantially interested party in the proceeding and had standing to bring this action. The undersigned was duly designated by the Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings as the Hearing Officer in this proceeding. It was determined by her that all pending motions would be heard and ruled upon at the time of the scheduled hearing inasmuch. as the time constraints imposed upon rule challenge proceedings did not allow for all parties to respond in writing to all motions within the seven day period specified by Rule 28-5.25(3), F.A.C., and inasmuch as the Hearing Officer was to be out of town on the three days prior to the hearing. At the beginning of the hearing on July 28, 1978, the undersigned granted the motions to intervene. The motions to dismiss were based upon the allegations that petitioner lacked standing to challenge the emergency rule in question; that the Environmental Regulation Commission, rather than the Department of Environmental Regulation, was the agency whose rule was being challenged and that an emergency rule cannot be contested under Florida Statutes, Section 120.54(4) The undersigned denied both motions to dismiss. It was and is concluded from the pleadings, the evidence adduced at the hearing and the stipulation between petitioner and respondent that the petitioner herein does have standing to challenge the emergency rule in question. Respondent the proper agency to be named in this proceeding, inasmuch as the Environmental Regulation Commission (ERC) is simply a part of that agency and sits as the agency head on certain specified matters. While Chapter 120 does not appear to make adequate provision for a challenge to a proposed emergency rule, that issue is now moot in light of the presently existing status off the challenged rule and the amendment to the petition alleging a cause of action under Florida Statutes, Section 120.56. As amended by Chapter 78-425, Laws of Florida (SB 860) Section 120.56 now provides explicitly for challengers to the validity of emergency rules before the Division of Administrative Hearings. Turning now to the merits of the petition, as amended, it is contended that the rule in question is an invalid exercise of legislative authority because no immediate danger to the public health, safety or welfare existed which would justify the enactment of an emergency rule pursuant to Florida Statutes, Section 120.54(9). The factual background of the emergency rule is not in dispute. On April 7, 1977, respondent adopted a rule which permitted Florida Power and Light and Jacksonville Electric, the intervenors herein, to burn a higher sulfur content fuel at their respective plants in Manatee and Duval Counties until August 1, 1978. On that date, those plants would be required to burn fuel with a lower sulfur content. On June 15, 1977, the ERC considered a proposed rule which would extend the time within which the intervenors herein could burn the higher sulfur content fuel from August 1, 1978, to February 1, 1979. The Commission refused to approve this proposed rule and it was not enacted. On June 20-22, 1978, the Commission was given an oral presentation of the results of the Florida Sulfur Oxides Study. As a result of this meeting, the Commission gave notice on June 28, 1978, of its intent to consider an emergency rule allowing the intervenors to extend the date for burning higher content fuel from August 1, 1978, until October 1, 1978. The Commission considered the emergency rule at its meeting held on July 12, 1978, approved it and filed it with the Secretary of State on July 14, 1978. The ERC gave the following "specific reasons for finding an immediate danger to public health, safety and welfare": If the emergency rule is not immediately adopted and Section 17-2.05(6), Table II, Item E(1)(c), F.A.C., amended, the cost to Florida Power & Light Company and Jacksonville Electric Authority to use lower sulfur fuel between August 1, 1978 and October 1, 1978 will be $1,373,000.00. This cost will be directly passed on to the customers of these utilities through fuel adjustment provisions. The additional cost would be paid to foreign countries for the purchase of oil. These passed on costs are not warranted in light of the fact that the Environmental Regulation Commission is presently considering to permanently amend by October 1, 1978 Section 17-2.p.5(6), Table II, Item E(1)(c), F.A.C., so that both of these power plants may use at least the higher sulfur fuel allowed by the emergency rule. As a result of the Florida Sulfur Oxides Study, the presentations made pursuant thereto at the June 20, 21 and 22, 1978 Environmental Regulation Commission Hearing, and the bearing held on this emergency rule on July 12, 1978, the Commission finds no significant environmental benefits to be gained by using the lower sulfur fuel during the two months period. (Copies of the monitoring data for these two power plants modeling data for the Manatee power plant and the Florida Sulfur Oxides Study may be inspected at the address below.) Both of these power plants have been using the sulfur content fuel proposed in the emergency rule since June of 1977 without violating any of the applicable ambient air quality standards. Also because of the large amounts of oil purchased at one time by the utilities and the lead time required for such purchases, it would not be economical for the utilities involved to order a different sulfur content fuel for only a two month period. Accordingly, unless the emergency rule is enacted the customers of these utilities will be charged $1,373,000.00 without obtain- ing any significant environmental benefits and the utilities will be unable to economically purchase fuel. These facts present an immediate danger to the public health, safety and welfare which can only be remedied by the enactment of the emergency rule and by making this emergency rule effective as of the date of filling (sic) or July 13, 1978 whichever is earliest. It was further stated, as "reasons for concluding that procedure used is fair under the circumstances" that the emergency rule procedure was the only procedure available to grant the relief required in that a permanent rule could not be promulgated in time. The Commission noted that the emergency rule was only effective for a two-month period "at which time the Commission will decide on a permanent rule pursuant to Chapter 120 Florida Statutes, for these two power plants." The transcript of the hearing held by the ERC on July 12, 1978, makes it abundantly clear that the Commission did not consider the adoption of the emergency rule to be a commitment to adopt a similar permanent rule which would be effective subsequent to October 1, 1978. Indeed, it was stated by several Commissioners that the entire matter would be dealt with anew and on its merits in September. Were there no emergency rule in effect permitting the intervenors to burn the higher sulfur content fuel, it would cost Florida Power and light $680,000.00 to purchase the lower content fuel for the two month period of August, and September. This cost would be passed on the the consumer. The cost to the average residential customer using one thousand kilowatt hours of electricity would be thirteen cents ($.13) per month. For the average utility bill, this would result in an increase of .03 percent. For Jacksonville Electric, the same costs are $693,000.00 or approximately $1.65 per month per average residential consumer, or a 3.5 percent increase in the average utility bill. The higher sulfur content fuel results in an additional discharge of from 2.4 to 2.6 tons of sulfur dioxide per hour into the air. Neither the Jacksonville nor the Manatee County plants have violated the State's ambient air quality standard during the one and a half years they have been permitted by rule to burn the higher content fuel. Section 120.54(9), Florida Statutes, permits agencies to avoid the formalities of proper rulemaking procedures only when there is a bona fide finding that "an immediate danger to the public health safety, or welfare requires emergency action." Thus, in order to sustain the exercise of emergency action, there must be a clear showing of danger to the public health, safety or welfare and that danger must be shown to be an immediate danger. As recognized in Fuller v. Gardner, 190 So. 442 (Fla. 1939), an agency's assumption of emergency powers in the absence of a bona fide emergency violates basic rights of due process, and constitutes a usurpation of power. A review of the testimony and the record of this proceeding does not support respondent's finding of either a danger to the public health, safety or welfare or an immediacy necessitating emergency action. The substance of the emergency rule -- permission to burn a higher sulfur content fuel than would otherwise be permitted -- certainly does not alleviate or obviate some immediate danger to the public health or safety. Petitioner's only witness on this subject testified that any ingested particles of sulfur dioxide could cause damage to the human lung. However, there was no testimony as to whether the higher sulfur contents allowed by the rule, as opposed to the lower content which would be binding upon the intervenors in the absence of a rule, would present a definite health hazard to residents of Duval or Manatee Counties. Nevertheless, the respondent's own statement of specific findings and reason's of immediate danger do not illustrate an emergency situation with regard to public health or safety. These findings are that there are "no environmental benefits to be gained by using the lower sulfur fuel during the two months period." A mare showing of no harm is not sufficient to satisfy the statutory test for the adoption of emergency rules. The statute requires an immediate danger to the public health. The fact that there may be no significant environmental benefit if a rule is not enacted simply does not justify noncompliance with proper rulemaking procedures. This then leaves the issue of whether there is an immediate danger to the public welfare absent the enactment of the emergency rule. The concept of public welfare is broad and embraces a variety of interests, including monetary and economic interests. It was the testimony of petitioner's expert witness on this subject that the costs involved if the intervenors were required to burn the lower sulfur content fuel would be passed on to the average consumer at the rate of increases in their utility bills of .03 and 3.5 percent. This witness opined that such an increase would not be significant for a two-month period and that the impact on the Florida economy would be inconsequential. There simply is no evidence in the record herein to illustrate that the situation was of such a nature that normal rulemaking procedures were precluded. Even if it were conceded that the total expenditure of $1,373,000.00 could have an adverse impact upon the Florida economy, where is the urgency or immediacy which must exist prior to the exercise of emergency rulemaking procedures? The rule sought to be amended has been in effect since April of 1977. It was to self-destruct on August 1, 1978. The agency was aware of this, as were the intervenors. When confronted in June of 1977 with a request to extend the rule's operation to February 1, 1979, the Environmental Regulation Commission refused the request and failed to so amend the rule. The first three volumes of the Florida Sulfur Oxides Study came in to the Commission in January, 1978. Six volumes were received in February, and the remaining two volumes were received in April, 1978. In May, the ERC received the final written report. Apparently, the summarizing results were orally presented to the Commission at a meeting held on June 20, 21 and 22, 1978. The transcript of the Commission's - July 12, 1978, hearing on the emergency rule, as well as the findings and reasons attending the emergency rule, indicate that the Commission still has not reached a decision as to whether the rule's contents will be repromulgated to be effective after October 1, 1978. 1/ Thus, it appears that any immediate danger in July of 1978 was not created by newly acquired knowledge concerning the effect of the emission of certain levels of sulfur dioxide into the air or by some sudden change which would adversely affect Florida's economy. The emergency was therefore not created by considerations of the public health, safety or welfare. Rather, if there was an emergency at all, it was created by an avoidable administrative failure to properly amend the existing rule to provide an extension for the desired time period. As clearly held in Postal Colony Co., Inc. v. Askew, 348 So.2d 338 (Fla. App. 1st 1977), an emergency created wholly by an agency's failure to take timely action cannot justify extraordinary measures. The emergency rule provisions of Florida Statutes, Section 120.54(9) constitute an extraordinary means of adopting a rule when a true emergency exists which makes compliance with normal rulemaking procedures impossible. The record in this case is barren of evidence that, in mid-July of 1978, there was an immediate danger to the public health, safety or welfare requiring emergency action. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the respondent's emergency rule 17ER78-1, which purports to amend Section 17-2.05(6), Table II, Item E(1)(c), F.A.C., by extending the date from August 1, 1978, to October 1, 1978, constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative authority. Done and entered this 7th day of August, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether the Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for clean up costs associated with the Initial Remedial Action, (IRA), activities of the Abandoned Tank Restoration Program performed at his facility, and if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact At all times the Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection, (Department), has been the state agency in Florida responsible for the administration of the state's Abandoned Tanks Restoration Program. Petitioner is the owner and operator of Mohammad's Supermarket, Department facility No. 29-8628197, a food market and gasoline station located at 3320 Hillsborough Avenue in Tampa. Petitioner has owned and operated the facility for approximately the last ten years. The facility in question included three 5,000 gallon gasoline underground storage tanks and one 5,000 diesel underground storage tank. The diesel tank has not been used for the storage of diesel product for the entire time the Petitioner has owned the facility, at least ten years, but the three gasoline tanks were in use after March 1, 1990. Gasoline tanks were reinstalled at the facility and are still in use. In March, 1993, Petitioner removed all four underground storage tanks from the facility and performed initial remedial action. The field and laboratory reports of the soil and groundwater samples taken at the site at the time the tanks were removed showed both gasoline and diesel contamination. In October, 1993, the Petitioner submitted an application for reimbursement of certain costs associated with the IRA program task to the Department. Thereafter, by letter dated August 5, 1994, the Department notified Petitioner that it had completed its review of the reimbursement application and had allowed Petitioner 25% of the total amount eligible for reimbursement. This was because since the Petitioner continued to use the gasoline tanks after March 1, 1990, the Petitioner's ATRP eligibility is limited to clean up of only the diesel contamination. Petitioner's application for reimbursement covered the entire cost of the tank removal, both gasoline and diesel, and did not differentiate between the costs associated with the remediation of the gasoline contamination and those associated with the diesel contamination. The 25% allowance was for the one tank, (diesel fuel), which was eligible for ATRP clean up reimbursement. The Department subtracted from the personnel costs in the amount of $5,996.25, claimed in Section 2A of the claims form, the sum of $45.00 for costs associated with ATRP eligibility status; $497.50 claimed as a cost associated with the preparation of a Tank Closure Report, and $3,508.75 claimed as costs associated with the preparation of a preliminary Contamination Assessment Report, (CAR). These deductions were made because costs associated with ascertaining ATRP eligibility status, the preparation of a Tank Closure report, and the preparation of a preliminary CAR are all costs ineligible for reimbursement. These three ineligible costs total $4,051.25. When this sum is deducted from the amount claimed, the remainder is $1,944.50. The Department then reduced this figure by prorating it at 25% for the diesel tank and 75% for the gasoline tanks, disallowing the gasoline portion. With that, the total reimbursement for Section 2A, personnel, costs is $486.25. Petitioner claimed $1,765.00 for rental costs, (Section 2C), associated with soil removal, from which the Department deducted the sum of $1,550.00 which represents costs associated with the preparation of a preliminary Contamination Assessment Report, (CAR), which is not eligible for reimbursement. The balance of $215.00 was reduced by the 75%, ($161.27), which related to the three gasoline tanks, leaving a balance of $53.75 to be reimbursed for rental costs attributable to the diesel contamination. Petitioner also claimed $12,865.75 for miscellaneous costs associated with soil removal. This is listed under Section 2I of the application. From that figure the Department deducted the sum of $9,455.99 as costs attributable to the three gasoline tanks. In addition, $2,017.43 was disallowed because it related to the preliminary CAR, and $3,151.99 was deducted because the tank was removed after July 1, 1992. The applicable rule requires justification in the Remedial Action Plan, (RAP), for removal of tanks after that date. Such costs, when justified, can be reimbursed as a part of a RAP application. A further sum of $1,759.66 was deducted from the 2I cost reimbursement since the applicant got that much as a discount on what it paid. Together the deductions amounted to $16,385.07, and when that amount is deducted from the amount claimed, a negative balance results. Section 3 of the application deals with soil treatment. Subsection 3I pertains to such miscellaneous items as loading, transport and treatment of soil. The total amount claimed by Petitioner in this category was $13,973.44. Of that amount, $10,480.00 was deducted because it related to the three gasoline tanks. The amount allowed was $3,493.44, which represents 25% of the total claimed. Category 7 on the application form deals with tank removal and replacement. Section 7A relates to personnel costs and Petitioner claimed $4,187.00 for these costs. Of this, $3,140.25 was deducted as relating to the three gasoline tanks and amounted to 75% of the claimed cost. In addition, $1,046.75 was deducted because the diesel tank was removed after July 1, 1992 and there was no justification given for the removal at that time. This cost might be reimbursed through another program, however. In summary, all personnel costs were denied, but so much thereof as relates to the diesel tank may be reimbursed under another program. Section 7C of the application form relates to rental costs for such items as loaders, trucks and saws. The total claimed was $2,176.00. Of this amount, $1,632.00 was deducted as relating to the three gasoline tanks, and an additional $544.00 was deducted as being associated with the non-justified removal of the diesel tank after July 1, 1992. As a result, all costs claimed in this section were denied. In Section 7D, relating to mileage, a total of $12.80 was approved, and for 7G, relating to permits, a total of $28.60 was approved. In each case, the approved amount constituted 25% of the amount claimed with the 75% disallowed relating to the three gasoline tanks. Section 7I deals with miscellaneous expenses relating to tank removal and replacement. The total claimed in this section was $2,262.30. A deduction of $1,697.11 was taken as relating to the three gasoline tanks, and $565.69 was deducted because the removal after July 1, 1992 was not justified in the application. This cost may be reimbursed under a separate program, but in this instant action, the total claim under this section was denied. Petitioner asserts that the Department's allocation of 75` of the claimed costs to the ineligible gasoline tanks is unjustified and inappropriate. It claims the majority of the costs where incurred to remove the eligible diesel fuel contamination and the incidental removal of overlapping gasoline related contamination does not justify denial of the costs to address the diesel contamination. To be sure, diesel contamination was detected throughout the site and beyond the extend of the IRA excavation. The soil removed to make room for the new tanks was contaminated and could not be put back in the ground. It had to be removed. The groundwater analysis shows both gasoline and diesel contamination at the north end of the property furthest from the site. The sample taken at that point, however, contains much more gasoline contaminant than diesel. Petitioner contends that the costs denied by the Department as relating to gasoline contamination were required in order to remove the diesel contamination and Petitioner should be reimbursed beyond 25%. It contends that the diesel contamination could not have been removed without removing all four tanks.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner request for additional reimbursement of $27,653.82 and affirming the award of $6,629.07. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: W. Douglas Beason, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Francisco J. Amram, P.E. Qualified Representative 9942 Currie Davis Drive, Suite H Tampa, Florida 33619 Virginia B. Wetherell Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Kenneth Plante General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000
The Issue The issues to be determined in this case are whether Respondents should pay the administrative penalty, investigative costs, and attorney’s fees and undertake the corrective actions that are demanded by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (the “Department”) as set forth in the Final Amended Notice of Violation, Orders for Corrective Action, and Administrative Penalty Assessment.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Department is the administrative agency of the state of Florida having the power and duty to protect Florida’s air and water resources and to administer and enforce the provisions of chapters 376 and 403, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder in Florida Administrative Code Title 62. Germain is a licensed Florida attorney. From May 2006 to January 2013, Germain was the record owner of the real property at 1120 West Main Street, Leesburg, Lake County, Florida (the “Germain property”). Leesburg’s is an active Florida corporation that was incorporated in January 2013 by Germain. Germain is Leesburg’s sole corporate officer and sole shareholder and has managerial authority over the Germain property. John Doe 1-5 is a placeholder designation used by the Department for the purpose of covering all potential entities to which Germain might transfer the property. No other such entity materialized. Background A gas station was operated on the Germain property continually from the 1920s through the late 1980s. During the 1980s and perhaps for a longer period, C.E. Griner operated the gas station under the name Griner’s Service Station. Griner’s Service Station had at least three underground storage tanks (“USTs”) used to store leaded and unleaded gasoline. In 1989 or 1990, Griner ceased operation of the gas station and the USTs were filled with concrete and abandoned in place. The Germain property has not been used as a gas station since that time. In 1990, the Department inspected the Germain property and prepared a report. The inspection report noted that the USTs at the Germain property “were not cleaned properly prior to filling with concrete.” The report also noted that the tanks were not properly abandoned in place. No evidence was presented to explain in what way the tanks were not properly abandoned, or to indicate whether the Department took any enforcement action based on this report. In 1996, Gustavo Garcia purchased the Germain property from Griner. In May 2006, Germain purchased the property from Garcia. Another gas station, operating for many years under several names (now “Sunoco”), is located at 1200 West Main Street, across a side street and west of the Germain property. Since 1990, one or more discharges of petroleum contaminants occurred on the Sunoco property. There were also gas stations at the other two corners of the Main Street intersection, but no evidence was presented about their operations or conditions. In March 2003, apparently as part of a pre-purchase investigation, testing was conducted at the Sunoco property that revealed petroleum contamination in the groundwater. Soil contamination was not reported. S&ME, Inc. (“S&ME”), an environmental consulting firm, subsequently submitted a discharge report to the Department’s Central District Office in Orlando. Later in 2003, S&ME conducted an initial site assessment for the Sunoco property. In the report it produced, S&ME noted that it found concentrations of petroleum contaminants in the groundwater that were above the Department’s Groundwater Cleanup Target Levels (“GCTLs”). The concentrations exceeding GCTLs were in samples taken from the eastern side of the Sunoco property, closest to the Germain property. In 2004, S&ME completed a Templated Site Assessment Report for the Sunoco property. Groundwater samples from the eastern portion of the Sunoco property again revealed petroleum contamination exceeding GCTLs. Garcia, who owned the Germain property at the time, allowed S&ME to conduct soil testing on the Germain property. The soil samples were taken by direct push methods and were tested with an organic vapor analyzer (“OVA”), which revealed toluene, ethylbenzene, total xylenes, naphthalene, 1-methyl naphthalene, and total recoverable petroleum hydrocarbons exceeding the Department’s Soil Cleanup Target Levels (“SCTLs”). In 2005, another private environmental consulting firm, ATC Associates, Inc. (“ATC”), performed a Supplemental Site Assessment on the Sunoco property and produced a report. As part of its assessment, ATC installed three monitoring wells on the Germain property and collected groundwater samples. These groundwater samples revealed petroleum constituent concentrations that exceeded GCTLs and were higher than concentrations found in groundwater samples taken under the Sunoco property. Both the 2004 and 2005 site assessment reports concluded that the groundwater in the area flowed from the southeast to the northwest; that is, from the Germain property toward the Sunoco property. Germain referred to a figure in S&ME’s 2004 report that he claimed indicated a southeasterly flow of groundwater from Sunoco toward the Germain property. However, a preponderance of the evidence establishes that groundwater flow in the area is generally northwesterly from the Germain property toward the Sunoco property. Based on the results of its testing, ATC concluded in its site assessment report that the groundwater contamination on the eastern portion of the Sunoco property had migrated from the Germain property. ATC also took soil samples from the Germain property. It screened the soil samples with an OVA and reported petroleum contamination exceeding the Department’s SCTLs. Petroleum contamination in soil typically does not travel far horizontally. It remains in the vicinity of the source. Therefore, the soil contamination found on the Germain property indicates an onsite source of the contamination. All of the assessment reports were filed with Seminole County, presumably with the Department of Public Safety, Emergency Management Division, which is the local entity with which the Department contracted to inspect and manage petroleum facilities in the area. These reports were public records before Germain purchased his property. A June 2005 Memorandum from Seminole County informed Bret LeRoux at the Department’s Central District Office that ATC’s 2005 site assessment report indicated the Germain property was the source of petroleum contamination. The Memorandum recommended that the Department contact the owner of the property about the contamination. The Memorandum was filed at the Department. After the Department received the Memorandum, it requested and received the site assessment reports from Seminole County. The Department did not notify Garcia or the public about the contamination in 2005. The Department did not notify Germain about the contamination until August 2007. All Appropriate Inquiry The principal factual dispute in this case is whether Germain undertook “all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and use of” the Germain property before purchasing it, as required by section 376.308(1)(c)1/: [A person acquiring title to petroleum- contaminated property after July 1992] must also establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she undertook, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and use of the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability. Before he purchased the Germain property in 2006, Germain knew that it had been a gas station for a number of years. Garcia told Germain that the USTs had been filled with concrete and were “within the law.” Germain was also aware that the Sunoco USTs had recently been excavated and that there was a problem with the tanks and possible contamination there. Germain said he spoke with neighbors about the property, but he did not say what he learned from them. Before the purchase, Germain conducted a visual inspection of the property and saw “several little metal plates” in the parking lot. Germain claimed it was only later that he learned that some of the plates were covers for groundwater monitoring wells. Germain said he visited and reviewed files at a Lake County office, but he was not specific about which county offices he visited. He also went to the Leesburg Historic Board to review property records. Germain’s testimony was not clear about what records he saw on these visits. Germain did not go to the office of the Seminole County Department of Public Safety, Emergency Management Division, to view records pertaining to the Germain property. He did not claim to have gone to the Department’s Central District Office in Orlando. In other words, Germain did not go to the offices of the agencies responsible for regulating petroleum USTs. Nor did Germain say that he talked to any knowledgeable employee of these agencies by telephone about possible contamination issues on the Germain property. While at a Lake County office, Germain searched the DEP website and saw two documents that indicated the USTs on the Germain property had been closed in place. One of the documents indicated a cleanup status of “no contamination.” Germain claimed that he relied on these documents to conclude that the property was clean. The Department explained that the phrase “no contamination” is used in its database as a default where no contamination has been reported and no discharge form has been filed. It is not a determination based on a site investigation that the site is free of contamination. However, the Department had received information that the Germain property was contaminated, so its explanation of the “no contamination” status for the Germain property was unsatisfactory. Germain does not practice environmental law. He neither claimed nor demonstrated knowledge or experience with the legal or factual issues associated with petroleum contamination. Germain did not present evidence to establish that he followed “good commercial or customary practice” in his investigation of the property as required by section 376.308(1)(c). Good commercial practice in the purchase of property upon which potentially contaminating activities have occurred entails consultation with a person with appropriate knowledge and experience. Germain did not consult with an environmental attorney or environmental consultant regarding the potential liability associated with property used as a gas station. If Germain had hired an environmental consultant to assist him, the consultant would have known where to find public records about the gas station, including any soil and groundwater analyses. An environmental consultant would have seen the site assessment reports and other public records that indicated petroleum contamination on the Germain property. A consultant would likely have recommended a Phase I environmental site assessment (“ESA”). A Phase I ESA entails, generally, determining past uses of a property, inspecting the property for visible indications of potential contamination, and reviewing aerial photographs, historical documents, and public records related to the property and its surroundings. A Phase II ESA would follow if potential contamination is discovered and usually includes taking soil and groundwater samples. In considering whether all appropriate inquiry was undertaken by a purchaser of contaminated property, section 376.308(1)(c) directs the court or administrative law judge to take into account: any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant, the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if uncontaminated, commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the property, the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at the property, and the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection. Germain did not have specialized knowledge regarding the regulation of petroleum USTs. However, as a lawyer, he was familiar with the practice of employing or working with professionals with specialized knowledge in order to achieve the objectives or solve the problems of his clients. If Germain’s legal assistance had been sought by a client to solve an environmental problem, Germain would have declined to proceed because he did not possess the requisite knowledge or he would have sought the assistance of an environmental lawyer or environmental consultant. In purchasing the Germain property, Germain did not undertake the reasonable steps a lawyer must take for a client. No evidence was presented about the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the Germain property. Germain did not show that the site assessment reports and other documents discussed above were not “reasonably ascertainable information.” Although a visual inspection by a lay person would not have disclosed the presence of contamination at the property, an environmental consultant would have recognized the groundwater monitor wells and would have known to seek information about the reason for their installation and the groundwater sampling results. Taking all relevant considerations into account, Germain failed to show that he made all appropriate inquiry before he purchased the Germain property. Germain transferred the property to Leesburg’s in January 2013 in part to limit his potential personal liability for petroleum contamination. The Germain property is Leesburg’s primary asset. Because Leesburg’s took title to the Germain property after the NOV was issued, it had full knowledge of the contamination and cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser. Post-Purchase Investigation In August 2007, the Department sent Germain a letter informing him that the Department had reason to believe his property was contaminated with petroleum and requiring him to conduct a site assessment pursuant to rule 62-770.600(1).2/ In September 2007, the Department sent Germain the 2004 and 2005 site assessment reports. Germain did not conduct a site assessment. At the final hearing, the Department did not state whether it had made any effort to take enforcement action against Griner, whom the record evidence indicates was the owner of the gas station when the discharge occurred. In 2012, the Department issued Germain a notice of violation for failing to conduct a site assessment and remediation. After Germain transferred the property to Leesburg’s, the Department issued the Final NOV to add Leesburg’s as a Respondent. The Final NOV seeks penalties of $10,000 against Germain, and $10,000 against Leesburg’s. While investigating this matter, the Department incurred expenses of $11,380.37 in investigative costs. Confirmation of On-site Contamination Despite the site assessment reports that documented contamination on the Germain property, Germain disputed the Department’s claim that the property was contaminated. The Department conducted testing and completed a Site Investigation Report in 2010. Because Germain would not allow the Department onto his property, the Department installed groundwater monitoring wells adjacent to the Germain property to the west and south, and collected groundwater samples. The Department confirmed the northwesterly flow of groundwater documented in previous reports and found elevated levels of petroleum contaminants above GCTLs, including benzene, ethylbenzene, toluene, xylene, total lead, EDB, and total recoverable petroleum hydrocarbons. Monitoring wells west of, or downgradient of, the Germain property showed high levels of groundwater contamination, while monitoring wells to the south and southeast, or upgradient of the property showed no signs of contamination, indicating that the source of the groundwater contamination was on the Germain property. Based on the site assessments and its own investigation, the Department determined that the Germain property is the source of petroleum contamination detected along the eastern portion of the Sunoco property. Germain and Leesburg’s did not present any expert testimony to support their claim that the Germain property is not contaminated or that the contamination migrated to the Germain property from offsite. A preponderance of the record evidence shows that the Germain property is the source of the petroleum contamination found in the onsite soil and groundwater, as well as in groundwater on the eastern portion of the Sunoco property.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is licensed as a dealer of special fuel pursuant to Florida Statutes 206 and has been assigned license Number 1627. The pertinent sections of Florida Statutes which are applicable to this case are ss206.86(1), (6), (8), 206.87, 206.89, 206.93, 206.94 and Ch. 212. The pertinent rules of the Department of Revenue applicable to special fuels sales involved herein is 12A-2.03. The deposition of Albert Colozoff and all answers to interrogatories and responses to requests for admissions are admissible as evidence and are to be made a part of the record in this cause. The Petitioner sold special fuels to Zamora Truck and Car Services, Roberts Equipment Company and Florida Petroleum, Inc. Petitioner was assessed by the Respondent for tax on 1,979,201 gallons of special fuel sold by it and paid tax and interest as set forth in the letter attached hereto as Exhibit A. That no penalty paid on any of the tax paid pursuant to that letter. That Petitioner did not remit taxes that were due during the month the sales of special fuel were reported on any of the sale to Zamora, Roberts or Florida Petroleum or the remaining 1,417,263 gallons sold. Zamora and Roberts represented to Belcher that they were purchasing all special fuel from Belcher for exempt agricultural use. Due to past dealings and delivery of the special fuel to a farm, Belcher believed and relied upon the facts represented to it by Zamora and Roberts. However, Belcher did not obtain written documentation of this agricultural use from Zamora or Roberts and did not furnish the Department with any such written documentation. Belcher did not obtain resale certificates or exemption certificates or dealer license numbers from Zamora, Roberts or Florida Petroleum. Nor did the report forms filed by Belcher contain resale certificates, exemption certificates or dealer license numbers from Zamora, Roberts or Florida Petroleum. An employee of the Department advised Belcher that Zamora and Roberts were under investigation for fraudulent failure to report taxes. Belcher paid sales tax on sales of special fuel in the amount of $18,589.53 on the sale of 538,030 gallons of special fuel. Zamora is not a licensed dealer of special fuels. Florida Petroleum is not a licensed dealer of special fuel. Roberts is not a licensed dealer of special fuel. Belcher did not fraudulently file incorrect monthly special fuels reports. The Department of Revenue audited Belcher and computed tax, penalty and interest due as set forth in the documents attached hereto as Exhibit B. The Department of Revenue advised Belcher of its duties regarding reporting requirements in the letters from L. N. Thomas attached as Exhibit C.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Respondent's assessment be upheld with respect to Petitioner's tax deficiency, penalty and interest as set forth in the assessments with adjustments to be made for payments paid by Petitioner under the "sales tax" theory. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Mail: 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: James R. McCachren, Jr., Esquire Ervin, Varn, Jacobs, Odom & Kitchen Post Office Box 1170 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 William D. Townsend, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether the application of Petroleum Products Corporation for reimbursement of the cost of assessment and clean-up of soil and groundwater contamination at its site in Broward County, Florida, under the State Underground Petroleum Environmental Response Act of 1986 should be granted.
Findings Of Fact The Legislature provided a system for the clean-up of sites contaminated as the result of the storage of petroleum or petroleum products in the State Underground Petroleum Environmental Response Act of 1986 (Super Act), Chapter 86-159, Laws of Florida, codified primarily as Section 376.3071, Florida Statutes. The Super Act contains a reimbursement program funded by the Inland Protection Trust Fund. Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes, permits reimbursement of allowable costs for the rehabilitation of sites contaminated from discharges related to the storage of petroleum or petroleum products. Petroleum Products Corporation owns a parcel of land located at 3130 Southwest 17th Street, Pembroke Park, Florida. From 1959 to 1970 Petroleum Products Corporation operated a facility on that land which collected used oil from service stations and automobile dealerships, processed it, and sold it either as fuel oil or lubricating oil. About 90% of 150,000 gallons of used oil processed monthly at the facility was sold as fuel; the remaining oil was sold as lubricating oil, but even when sold as lubricating oil, it was sometimes burned as fuel because re-refined oil makes good fuel. The storage tanks were located on the southeastern portion of the property, near Carolina Road. The facility used a two-phase distillation process. Used oil was distilled to remove water, after which it could be sold as fuel oil. If processed in the second phase, for sale as lubricating oil, it was distilled further, and treated with sulfuric acid and clay to remove additives and residue, and change color. This phase produced a waste consisting of acid/clay sludge. This sludge is generally very black, and has a pH of approximately 3. It is very viscous, and has the consistency of roofing cement; laymen would describe it as tar. It does not flow easily, but is liquid enough to be pumped. This processing also occurred in the southeast part of the property. While the recycling facility produced lubricating oil using the acid/clay treatment from 1959 to 1970, the acid sludge was hauled to a municipal dump, or placed in pits dug into the ground on the north and east of the plant site. When the pits were dug, they were dug below the water level, and there was water in the pits before the sludge was dumped in them. The disposal of sludge in pits on the recycling site was a prevailing industry practice, and violated no regulatory requirements at the time. Operators considered on-site disposal of sludge preferable to hauling sludge to a landfill. During periods of heavy rain, some of the sludge may have overflown the pits and spread to nearby land, where it would become mixed with the surface soil. Petroleum Products Corporation ceased making lubricating oil in 1970, but continued to process used oil into fuel oil. The local Broward County Pollution Control Agency asked Petroleum Products Corporation to remove the acid/clay sludge from its property, and to refill the pits with other fill material. Petroleum Products Corporation acceeded to this request, and a great volume of sludge, perhaps hundreds of thousands of gallons, was removed from the pits, which were then refilled under the supervision of the Broward County Pollution Authority. Receipts Petroleum Products Corporation produced at the hearing, or thereafter from the custody of the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, show that more than 150 truck loads of sludge were removed and hauled to landfills operated by Metropolitan Dade County or by the City of Surfside. Some pockets of the sludge remain at the site of the pits because they were not completely emptied. The backfill was clean fill, and the area was then bulldozed so that warehouses could be constructed in the area. This filling and bulldozing changed the contour of the land from what it had been in the past. The Department contends that much of the sludge was spread out over an extended area of the site, and not removed to landfills. The evidence is persuasive that almost all of the sludge from the pits was removed to landfills. The testimony of Mr. Blair denying that the sludge was spread was credible. In addition, on-site spreading of the sludge would have been impracticable. As a tar-like substance, if spread out, it would have been tracked everywhere. It would stick to the tracks or wheels of any vehicles operating on the surface, and was so acidic it would burn or irritate the skin of anyone who came in contact with it. It would be extremely difficult to perform maintenance on equipment used to spread the sludge because of the need to clean the sludge off, so that the mechanic would not be burned. In addition, there are a large number of receipts evidencing the systematic hauling of the sludge to landfills. The logic of Mr. McDonnell's testimony is persuasive: If you have the alternate, which they obviously did, of hauling it away and simply dumping it, no one would go out and deliberately choose to do a very difficult job [spreading the sludge over the property] where there is an easy alternative available to them. (Tr. 285) Although the facility ceased its re-refining of lubricating oil in 1970, it continued to collect, process, and sell used oil as a fuel until 1984. About 150,000 gallons per month of used oil were processed and sold as fuel. The oil was typically crank case engine oil which contained the substances normally found in used oil of that type. There is no persuasive evidence that Petroleum Product Corporation ever received any hazardous waste, or mixed used oil with any hazardous waste. Used oil is not listed as a hazardous waste by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency or by the Department. The used oil collected and recycled at Petroleum Product's facility was pumped into and stored in above-ground storage tanks. There were, over time, from 10 to 25 tanks, which ranged in size from 12,000 to 20,000 gallons. Normally, the facility stored between 400,000 and 500,000 gallons of used oil. Occasionally, the facility also received virgin oil, but it was processed quickly or sold because of its higher value. At the peak of its operation, the facility had 25 to 35 storage tanks. Recycling operations had slim profit margins and were small operations. Storage tanks, pumps, and other equipment were bought used, often from other businesses dealing in virgin petroleum products. That used equipment was often rusty or deteriorating. Tank bottoms could have holes in them as the result of rust from standing water; tanks were sometimes riveted, and would have side or bottom leaks. The tanks had virtually no overfill protection. When oil was pumped in, it would overflow from the top and run down the sides. Operators were typically not careful with the oil, because it had a very low value, about 2 to 5 cents a gallon. A spill of a few thousand gallons was regarded as an inconsequential matter. The pumps used in storing oil often had leaks in packing seals, or had screw joints which would leak. Tank valves, also usually bought as used equipment, were often installed without new stem packing, and also would leak during operation. Almost no preventive maintenance was done, because it was not cost-effective to do so. Equipment was repaired only if its current state of repair interfered with operations, which usually meant that leaks were not repaired until they created a fire hazard. Leaks and spills from used oil storage tanks, including their pumps, valves, and piping, were common. A great volume of used oil leaked or spilled from Petroleum Products Corporation's tanks, pumps, and piping over its 25 year operation. There were also large oil spills resulting from four or five major fires at the facility in the 1960s. The fire in 1963, which may have been the result of vandalism, caused 40,000 to 60,000 gallons of use oil to spill from storage tanks; 8 or 10 tanks were destroyed. There were no dikes, so that the oil flowed freely. When firemen used water on the fire, the oil was absorbed into the soil. Another major fire occurred in October, 1966 in which three oil storage tanks collapsed spilling about 50,000 gallons of oil. Another 25 foot high oil tank collapsed on a firetruck. There is no way to know, with certainty, the volume of used oil, virgin oil, and lubricating oil which spilled or leaked into the ground on the site. It is reasonable to believe that 9 to 12 gallons of oil would have leaked or spilled each day at the facility, which would have resulted in spill of over 100,000 gallons of oil. This estimate, made by Mr. McDonnell, is credible and is conservative, given the volume of oil also spilled during the fires. Petroleum Products Corporation does not contend that the leaks and spills from process tanks, rather than from storage tanks, are eligible for reimbursement of site assessment and cleanup costs. Oil leaked from both, however, and once in the ground, the oils are indistinguishable. Due to the capacity of the tanks and the years they were in use, however, it is reasonable to assume that 15% or less of the leaks and spills were attributable to process tanks. After processing, most of the oil was burned as fuel. Some was used as a lubricant. The only difference between used oil sold as fuel or lubricant was that the lubricating oil had the additives removed and the color changed. Both burn well. There is an insufficient basis in this record to justify the Department's interpretation excluding this site from eligibility for cleanup because oil processing ocurred at the site to produce lubricating oil. Section 376.3071 does not disqualify all or part of a site from eligibility for cleanup reimbursement because a portion of the used oil stored there was ultimately used as lubricants. In 1984 a Department investigator asked Petroleum Products Corporation to install exploratory wells to determine whether there was contamination at the site. Petroleum Products engaged the firm of Dames & Moore to undertake a preliminary investigation, which revealed that there was groundwater contamination in the form of floating hydrocarbons. On April 1, 1985, the United States Environmental Protection Agency and Petroleum Products Corporation entered into a consent order agreement which required the removal of 17 above-ground tanks leaking used oil into the ground, which constituted a continuing source of contamination. Petroleum Products Corporation contracted with Conversion Technology Corporation to recover and recycle the oil and wastes, with Waldron's tank cleaning services to clean the empty tanks and drum the sludge, with Cuyahoga Wrecking Service to make the tanks inoperable, and with Seven & Seven Transporters to remove the waste to a disposal facility. The employee of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency who was in charge of the site commended Petroleum Products Corporation for its cleanup effort, and wrote as the OSC [on- scene coordinator] for this EPA-monitored cleanup I may say that [Petroleum Products Corporation] exemplified industrial cooperation and responsibility in combating the vexing problem of hazardous waste management. (Petitioner's Exhibit 9) Petroleum Products Corporation cooperated with the Environmental Protection Agency and with the Department in determining how to deal with the contamination. It has already spent approximately $150,000 to perform remedial action. Contamination at the site is of three types: oil floating in the groundwater, soil contamination, and groundwater contamination. It is not possible to clean any individual phase of the contamination without affecting the other phases. Attempts at remediation must be monitored to prevent an influx of organic contaminants into the aquifer. Similarly, the cost related to the cleanup of an individual phase of contamination cannot be isolated because of the inter-related nature of the cleanup phases. The creation of a cone of groundwater depression is necessary for any recovery of the free or floating oil. The cost of recovery of the free product cannot be separated from groundwater cleanup because it is necessary to treat large quantities of groundwater involved in creating a cone of depression. To the extent that a proportion of the cost might be estimated, the cost associated with the recovery of free product would be a minor portion of the overall cleanup. There is currently a free product recovery effort in place at the site, which is intended to prevent further migration of the product off-site. This ongoing action is not considered an element of the site cleanup. The most feasible method of cleanup for the free product will involve the excavation of the soils to create a trench. The free product and ground water will be recovered as they flow into the trench. During October and November of 1984, Environmental Science and Engineering, Inc., a consulting firm working under contract with the Department, assessed the extent of free floating oil in the groundwater under the Petroleum Product Corporation's site. Those consultants found a free floating layer of oil from 5" to 30" thick under approximately one-half of the one acre site Petitioner still owns. The free product generally mirrors the location of the former recycling facility and its storage tanks. The viscosity of the free product is comparable to about 40-weight engine oil. Environmental Science and Engineering estimates that the floating layer of oil contains 20,000 to 60,000 gallons of recoverable petroleum product. The direction of ground water flow and the migration of contaminants off-site is to the east or southeast. The soil above the oil layer has been saturated with oil because of the fluctuations of the layer with movement of the water table as the area experiences heavy rains or dry spells. Wells drilled in the location of the former sludge lagoons to the north and east of the plant site reveal a heavy slightly liquid type of sludge. The oil in the lagoon sites is immobile, and no free product collects in the wells after 24 hours. One sample collected in the mason jar shows a slight degree of oil separation after 24 hours. This anecdotal evidence of separation is not very informative, and is not persuasive that oil separates from the remaining sludge on-site. See, Finding 32, below. A second assessment of soil and groundwater contamination was done by another consulting firm under contract with the Department, Ecology and Environment, Inc. That study showed free floating product at the site. The only calculation of the amount of free floating oil was that done by Environmental Science and Engineering, Inc., see, Finding 29, estimating that there would be 20,000 to 60,000 gallons of recoverable oil. That calculation understates the amount of oil in the ground. The estimate given by George McDonnell of 103,000 gallons is more persuasive. It is consistent that the large amounts of oil which leaked or spilled at the site over a 25 year period. It is unlikely that any appreciable portion of the approximately 103,000 gallons of floating oil has its genesis in the separation of oil from the acid/clay sludge which had been disposed in the two lagoons for the following reasons: Oil associated with acid/sludge would be quite acidic, and have a pH between 2 and 4. The pH scale is not a linear scale, so differences in pH are quite dramatic as the pH values change. Samples of free product shows a uniform pH of approximately 6 or 7. In almost all 31 monitoring or observation wells the pH is consistent with the characteristics of used oil, (a pH of 6 or 7), not the pH of sludge (a pH of 2 to 4). The only sample which disclosed a low pH was that taken in monitoring well number 3 which was located in the former sludge lagoon site. The groundwater flows to the east or southeast. This does not explain the presence of free product to the west and southwest of the sludge pits nor the absence of free product to the east of the pits. The viscosity of the oil is similar to that of 40-weight engine oil and not highly viscous, as the tar-like sludge would be. The oil in the sludge pits is basically immobile and no free product surfaced in the monitoring well after waiting 24 hours. The pH of the free product is nearly neutral. The Department believes that the sludge was mixed with lime rock or fill and spread over the site to increase the pH of the oil. This is unpersuasive. Mixing with lime rock would increase the pH of the sludge (tend to bring it towards neutral) but it would not cause the dramatic lowering of acidity which would bring the sludge to a pH of 6 or 7. In addition, the viscosity of the sludge would not be so changed by mixing the sludge with fill that its viscosity would become similar to that of 40-weight engine oil. To believe that the free product results from sludge disposal rather than leaks ignores the normal operating practice of used oil recovery facilities in the late 50s and 60s where spills from storage tanks, pumps, and piping were very common. Little of the free product has been recovered through the current remediation efforts. If not recovered, over time the approximately 103,000 gallons of floating oil will spread to adjacent property. To recover this oil by conventional trench or well recovery operations will probably cost $250,000 or more. The capital cost of the groundwater recovery/discharge system, with monitoring wells, will be about $85,000; cost of operating and maintenance are approximately $180,000. The firm of Ecology & Environment, Inc., collected soil samples at 56 locations in two phases in its remedial investigation. Forty-six of the samples were taken at shallow depths (27 at 8 inches, 19 at approximately 10 inches); 10 more samples were taken in the old disposal pit sites at depths between 0 and 35 feet). The two primary classes of contaminants found in the soil were lead and organics (hydrocarbons associated with petroleum products). Both contaminants are found in used oil. The lead and organic contaminants were found in the shallow soils over the southern half of the site. Very little contamination was found beyond the main area of site activity. The soil contamination was concentrated in the plant and former disposal pit areas. Samples with high lead concentrations were found in the former disposal pit sites. Contamination extended to a depth of 25 feet in one soil sample from a former pit, where oily plastic sludge was found with fine sand or clay. The two former pit sites are the only places with documented contamination below a 10 foot depth. Although the organic contamination extended laterally further than the lead contamination, Environment & Ecology concluded that the wider distribution did not reflect contamination from Petroleum Product Corporation's activities. The general area has long been the site of commercial and industrial activities, and there are many other possible sources for contamination including a firing range, which would have been disposing of lead bullets fired at the range, a generator plant, and a former spray-painting facility. Solvents and other chemicals used in these activities would contribute to soil and groundwater contamination. The consultants had been told by area businesses that small scale dumping of industrial chemicals in the vicinity has been common. Soil samples revealed a "great deal of heterogeneity." There was no uniform distribution of soils in the shallow zone. This probably occurs because after the reprocessing operations ended in 1970, the land was cleared and filled, so that many of the warehouses now in the area could be constructed. Most of the upper 8 to 10 feet is fill material. The ground water was monitored by installing 38 wells on the site, most of which were screened at depths of 10 to 12 feet. Five intermediate wells with depths of 50 feet and two deep wells of 100 to 200 feet were also installed. Every sample exhibited a pH of between 6.4 and 7.4. The primary contaminants were lead, organics, and chromium. The evidence does not indicate the source of the chromium. It is unrelated to Petroleum Product Corporation's activities. The groundwater contamination, both metal and organic, was only in the shallow zone. It extends laterally roughly to the same extent of the shallow contamination found in the soil. This suggests that the contaminants in the soil migrated due to seepage from rainfall or fluctuation in the water table into the groundwater. The water table is about five feet below the land surface. The Department has argued that the contaminants in the soil and groundwater were caused by mixing and spreading of the sludge material during the early 1970s over the surface of the area. This hypothesis has already been rejected for the reason stated in Findings 7 and 8, above. It is more likely that the soil contamination resulted from frequent spills and leaks of oil from storage tanks years ago. The soil contaminants are those found in used oil. The area generally is flat. There was no impediment to oil spills flowing over a large surface area, following the contour of the land at that time. Depending on the method used to clean up the site, the cost of rehabilitating the area will range between two and forty-six million dollars. It will cost over one million dollars to recover and treat contaminated groundwater. Approximately 110,000 cubic yards of contaminated soil must be removed and treated, the majority of that coming from the area outside the former sludge pits. The presence of contamination at the site is to be expected, given the site's former use. All of the 8 turnpike facilities and 8 maintenance yards operated by the Florida Department of Transportation report petroleum contamination from tanks, and the Department of Transportation has estimated cleanup cost will range from $20 to $30 million, although DER believes the cost may be $5 million. The cleanup will be funded by the Inland Protection Trust Fund, as would the reimbursement in this case. The cost of rehabilitation is in the range of estimates that the Department has received for other petroleum contamination sites. In summary, the Petitioner's site is contaminated primarily from leak and spills of used and virgin oils processed or unprocessed and from storage tanks, pumps and integral piping. Small spills were continuous and some associated with fires were massive. The only portion of the site not contaminated due to leaks and spills is the residual soil and groundwater contamination from the sludge disposal pits, which is a small part of the overall contamination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Petroleum Products Corporation fo eligibility to participate in the cleanup program funded by the Inland Protection Trust Fund be granted. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of July, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX Rulings on Findings of Fact proposed the Petitioner: As will be obvious, the proposed order submitted by Petroleum Products Corporation comported closely with the Hearing Officer's view of the evidence, and with some modification was essentially adopted as proposed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9 and 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10, to the extent necessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as unnecessary and subordinate. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 31. Adopted in Findings of Fact 31 and 32. Adopted in Finding of Fact 33 Rejected as repetitious of Finding of Fact 6. Rejected, see Findings of Fact 25 and 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. Adopted in Finding of Fact 37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. Adopted in Finding of Fact 40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 41. The spreading theory is rejected in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. See also the stipulation of the parties entered as Exhibit 22. Rejected as unnecessary. Rulings on Findings of Fact proposed by the Department. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted as modified in Finding of Fact 2. Discussed in the Conclusions of Law, see page 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Implicit in Findings of Fact 3 and 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected as unsupported by the transcript references given. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5 Rejected as unnecessary. Generally rejected; see Finding of Fact 6 concerning the filling of the disposal pits. While some pockets of sludge remain at the site of the pits, the volume is difficult to determine. In an absolute sense, those pockets may contain a substantial amount of sludge, but on a comparative basis, by far the greatest part of the sludge was removed. Rejected as unnecessary. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 32(1), but see the final sentence of (1). Generally adopted in Findings of Fact 25, 28, and 34. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 28, since the recycling facility and storage tanks were on the southern part of the property. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Implicit in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected because the process tanks necessarily store the product being processed, serving as a vessel to contain the product. Rejected, see Finding of Fact 3 with respect to the turnover in the volume of used oil processed at the facility. Only about 10 percent of the oil was reprocessed as lubricating oil. This is more significant than the volume of the tanks. See also Tr. 24 with respect to the storage capacity, and Finding of Fact 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected because the surficial drainage has probably been changed by the filling and regrading of the property in preparation for building the warehouses. See Finding of Fact 6. The current surficial flow says little about the flow when the facility operated in the late 1950's and throughout the 1960's. Adopted in Findings of Fact 15 through 19. Adopted in Findings of Fact 17 and 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Generally rejected, the evidence is persuasive that about 50,000 gallons of oil were lost in the 1966 fire. (See Tr. 36-37.) Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Rejected, the free product covers approximately one-half acre. Rejected, the more persuasive evidence is the 103,000 gallons estimated by Mr. McDonnell. See Finding of Fact 31. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. See Findings of Fact 28 and 34. Rejected because it is unlikely that sludges are separating in the former sludge lagoon. See Finding of Fact 30. The source of the oil is more likely the substantial loss of oil which occurred from the fires and from leaks over the years which is now floating above the ground water. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 28. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 28. Rejected as unpersuasive. Rejected, the source of the free product is not leaching from the disposal pit, but the oil from over flows and leaks during operation as well as large inundations during fires. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected, see Finding of Fact 30. Rejected because oil does not separate from the sludge. Rejected for the reason given for rejecting Finding of Fact 63. Rejected, the seepage is not the result of separation in the disposal pits, but from the plume of free product in the ground above the ground water. Rejected as unnecessary, but the similarity of the oil seeping from the sludge pit area to waste oil is consistent with its source as leaks and spills inicident to fires. Rejected because the sludge does not separate. Rejected because the sludge does not separate. Rejected because the sludge does not separate, see Finding of Fact 30. Rejected as unnecessary; obviously as there is no more storage, so there is no more source for leaks or spills. 71-73. Discussed in Finding of Fact 30. Rejected because liquid product will not accumulate. Rejected because the sludge does not separate. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32(1). Adopted in Finding of Fact 32(5). Adopted in Finding of Fact 32(1). Rejected for the reason stated in Finding of Fact 32(5). Rejected for the reason stated in Finding of Fact 32(5). Rejected as unnecessary and for the reason stated in Finding of Fact 32(5). Adopted in Finding of Fact 32(1), which is consistent with the source of the free product being used oil rather than separation from sludge remaining onsite. 83-84. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected because the testimony of Mr. McDonnell has been accepted. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Rejected as redundant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Implicit in the finding that lead is a contaminant found in used oil. See Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected as unnecessary. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 35. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary; see also, Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32(1). Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary, although there were disposal pits in the north and eastern parts of the property. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34 with respect to location, but the testimony with respect to spreading of the sludge is rejected. See Finding of Fact 7. It is unlikely that sludge was spread over the site. The more likely explanation for the appearance of sludge in the lithologic logs for the southern end of the site is that the disposal lagoons periodically overflowed after heavy rains and provided a mechanism for the active transport of sludge out of the disposal pits into some areas on the southern end of the site. Apparently the northern area now occupied by the warehouses was higher, because no sludge was found in observation wells 4, 5 and 19. Rejected, page 41 of DER's Exhibit 3 shows no sludge at observation well 5, which the proposed finding implies. 107-112. Generally rejected because the testimony with respect to the surface flow from the tank area being to the south is rejected because the grading of the property as the warehouses were built likely changed the contour of the land. Mr. Levin's testimony was not particularly strong; for example, at page 25 of his prefiled direct testimony he states, "And for the shallow soil contamination I would still have to lean towards the fact that the materials were mixed and spread." 113-114. The sludge contamination is not the predominant or source of contamination. Rather, it is the oils which floated across the land and were carried into the soil and resulted from the leaks and spills. 115-120. Generally accepted in Finding of Fact 36, although subordinate to that finding. 121. Generally accepted, although the soil contamination by lead is attributable to leaks and spills from the used oil. 122-124. Rejected as unnecessary. Accepted in Finding of Fact 25. Accepted in Finding of Fact 38. 127-128. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 36, especially the last sentence, and 38. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 39. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 39, especially the last sentence. Rejected as unnecessary. 132-134. Accepted in Finding of Fact 39. 135. Rejected because the soil contamination is the result of leaks and spills of oil. 136-137. Rejected, it is more likely that the neutral pH of the ground water is the result of the essentially neutral contaminant, the used oil. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary, although consistent with Finding of Fact 39 that the lateral extent of ground water contamination mirrors the soil contamination which has resulted from leaks and spills. 140-141. The predominant source of contamination is leaks and spills. 142. Rejected, the area affected by the leaks and spills is large, due especially to the fires and consequent loss of large amounts of oil from tanks. See Finding of Fact 41. 143-144. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 145. Although true, not relevant. 146-148. Rejected, whether the Environmental Protection Agency is correct or not in its assessment is not at issue here. This site was contaminated by used oil. 149-150. Although true, not relevant. Implicitly accepted in that no finding with respect to "bias" has been made. Rejected as legal argument. Rejected because the predominate source of contamination is an eligible source. Rejected, but the source here falls within the statutory directive. Rejected. The site here is predominantly contaminated by used oil, which is eligible. The eligible portion is not a minor part of the entire of the contamination. COPIES FURNISHED: R. L. Caleen, Jr., Esquire OERTEL, HOFFMAN, FERNANDEZ & COLE Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 Gary Early, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact On December 25, 1979, Garden Oliver, a petroleum inspector with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (hereafter Department) took a gasoline sample from the number one storage tank at Thompson Service Station, 4001 South Olive Avenue, West Palm Beach, Florida. This sample was shipped to Port Everglades, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, for analysis and on January 8, 1980, the Petitioner was notified that the unleaded gasoline in the storage tank was illegal in that it contained .55 gram of lead per gallon, which is in excess of .05 gram of lead per gallon allowable under the Department rules governing the sale of unleaded gasoline to the public. On the basis of the laboratory analysis, Mr. Oliver placed a stop sale notice on the tank which dispensed the illegal unleaded gasoline. However, in the interim period between the original sampling and posting of the stop sale notice, an additional delivery of unleaded gasoline was placed in storage tank number one which necessitated a second sample. The laboratory analysis was performed in Port Everglades and again showed a lead content in excess of that allowed by Department rules. The Petitioner was permitted to post a $1,000 bond to secure the release of 3,160 gallons of leaded gasoline remaining in tank number one which was then sold by the service station as regular gasoline. The Petitioner attempted to discover the cause of the contamination and found that during the course of renovation of the service station an existing line running' between storage tanks was overlooked. The lime ran between a leaded and unleaded storage tank which had recently been converted from leaded and permitted the leaded gasoline to flow into and contaminate the unleaded tank. The contamination was not deliberate and the problem has now been corrected by sealing off the line. There is no dispute as to the facts as set forth above. The only dispute is whether Petitioner is entitled to the refund of the $1,000 bond because of the unusual circumstances surrounding this case. In mitigation, the Petitioner has asserted that Sunmark Industries has am unblemished record of serving the public and that the cause of the contamination was accidental. The Petitioner has not challenged the authority of the Department to require the posting of a $1,000 bond in lieu of confiscation.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department return to the Petitioner $500.00 of the $1,000 bond required to be posted in lieu of confiscation of 3,160 gallons of leaded gasoline. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 8th day of January, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Chastain, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 513, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Arthur Weyant Maintenance Supervisor Sunmark Industries Post Office Box 13135 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33318 John Whitton Chief, Bureau of Petroleum Inspection Division of Standards Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Early on the morning of September 3, 1982, Mr. Robert W. Taylor, a driver for Fleetwing Petroleum Company, loaded his truck at the Marathon Oil Company Refinery terminal in Tampa, Florida, for the Triangle Refineries, Inc., with 2,001 gallons of super-unleaded gasoline, 2,000 gallons of unleaded regular gasoline, and 3,501 gallons of regular leaded gasoline. The super-unleaded was loaded into Compartment 1 of four compartments on the trailer, which holds a maximum of 2,500 gallons. On the previous day, this trailer had been used by another driver, Floyd Mills; and before loading the trailer at the terminal, he, Taylor, personally flushed out the tanks to insure no contamination. After completing the loading procedure, Mr. Taylor drove directly to the Hardee's station at 24203 Highway 60 E, Lake Wales, Florida, where it was loaded into the station's tanks. The delivery consisted of 3,501 gallons of regular gas, 2,000 gallons of unleaded gas, and 2,001 gallons of super-unleaded gas, as reflected on the delivery log for that date. This was somewhat unusual, since it was the first time Mr. Taylor had ever taken super-unleaded to that station. The receipt for delivery, executed by Walter Winslett, Jr., on September 3, 1982, shows that the quantities and qualities described above were received. During a routine inspection of the Hardee station on September 29, 1982, Mr. Willis Aldridge, an inspector with the Florida Department of Agriculture, took samples of all the gas at the station, including the regular, the unleaded, and the Super-unleaded. These samples, taken in the normal manner, were sealed inside a case with a lead wire seal, identified, and sent off to the lab at Tallahassee. Several days later, on October 5, 1982, Mr. Aldridge received a phone call from the Department of Agriculture laboratory in Tallahassee advising him that the super-unleaded product taken from the Hardee station exceeded the lead tolerance and that he should immediately stop its sale. Thereafter, the following day, he went back to the Hardee station, where talking with the manager, Mr. Winslett, he told him what the problem was, issued a stop sale notice for that grade gas, and sealed the pump dispensing it. Mr. Winslett stated this one load of super-unleaded was the only one he had ever received. The Stop Sale Notice identifies, inter alia, the product, the brand name, the pump number, and the amount still in the tank. This last figure is determined by sticking a gauging stick into the tank. Since this was the first time the station had carried super-unleaded, 2,001 gallons had been delivered, and 998 gallons remained, that meant that slightly over 1,000 gallons had been sold of that product. At this point, Mr. Aldridge advised the station operator he could either give up what was in the ground or pay a penalty on the amount sold to a maximum of $1,000. Since this grade gasoline was selling at that time for $1.32 a gallon, the value of the gasoline still in the ground was greater than the penalty. When the Stop Sale Notice was issued on October 6, 1982, Fleetwing officials requested a few days to consider their options, and on October 14, 1982, advised Mr. Aldridge that they elected to post bond in the penalty amount ($1,000) and would meet him at the station the next morning. When he arrived, Mr. Aldridge met with Mr. C. W. May, Jr., a representative of Fleetwing Petroleum, who posted the required bond, and the remaining 998 gallons of super- unleaded were released. The product in question was tested at the Florida Department of Agriculture Lab Complex in Tallahassee under the supervision of Mr. Ben W. Bowen, of the Lab Testing Section. The tests seen on the super-unleaded sample, utilizing the American Society of Testing and Materials standards adopted by the State of Florida, revealed this particular sample contained 0.15 gram of lead per gallon. Two tests were utilized. An initial field test was used to scrutinize the samples as they came in. If any sample failed this test, a second test utilizing the X-ray florescence method is used. Since the maximum allowed is 0.05 gram per gallon, this sample had three times the lead limit and was therefore subject to confiscation. The effects of using excessively leaded gasoline in cars designed to burn unleaded gas are: (1) the calalytic converter will be ruined, and (2) damage to the engine with continued use. Replacement of a catalytic converter could run to several hundred dollars. The contaminated gasoline was the property of, and offered for sale by, the Respondent, Fleetwing Corporation. The pumps used for dispensing were identified as to type of gasoline and bore the Fleetwing logo.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be required to forfeit $500 of the $1,000 bond posted and the unforfeited $500 be returned to the Respondent. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of March, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Chastain, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard C. May, Esquire 4110 South Florida Avenue Suite B Lakeland, Florida 33803 The Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
