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BOARD OF OPTOMETRY vs BRIAN LLOYD WEBER, 94-006366 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Nov. 08, 1994 Number: 94-006366 Latest Update: Nov. 03, 1997

The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Respondent's license as an optometrist in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Petitioner, Board of Optometry, was responsible for the licensing of optometrists and the regulation of the practice of optometry in this state. Respondent was licensed as an optometrist in Florida, practicing under license number OP0001451, originally issued on September 21, 1978. Some time prior to or during 1987, Respondent, Dr. Brian L. Weber, dissatisfied with what he found to be the practice of large optical dispensers with regard to pressuring optometrists to prescribe lenses, decided to open a facility where patients needing glasses could receive an eye examination from a licensed optometrist and also, if the patient so desired, obtain the eye wear prescribed. Consistent with what he perceived to be the rules of the Board of Optometry at that time, Dr. Weber entered into a business venture with Mr. Record, a licensed optician, through which a patient could do just that. In 1990, Dr. Weber and Mr. Record changed the name of the business to 29/49 Optical, Inc., and as of March 2, 1990, operated five separate stores under that name. Dr. Weber and Mr. Record incorporated the company within which each ultimately owned 50 percent of the stock of the corporation. Dr. Weber provided the funds to start the business, and Mr. Record, the "sweat equity." Mr. Record was made president of the company because he had the experience in opticianry and was responsible for operations. Weber was the "money man," and provided the overall business goals and strategy. Once the corporation was established and the initial filing was completed, Mr. Record was responsible for recurring filings as a matter of course. The firm, 29/49 Optical, Inc., was in the business of providing optician services. The leases for the stores were taken out in the name of the company which, in essence, provided a "turn-key" office to a licensed optometrist who was one of those individuals associated with Respondent in the optometry practice known as Brian L. Weber and Associates. Each of the optometrists in the association was an independent contractor, associated in practice with Respondent. None of them were employees of 29/49 Optical, Inc. In each of the offices of 29/49 Optical, Inc., was a display area where glass frames were displayed and fitted, a waiting room used both by customers of the optical shop and patients of the resident optometrist, a storage room, and, for the exclusive use of an optometrist, an examining room equipped with those items and supplies necessary for the accomplishment of eye examinations. As was the custom in the profession at the time, this office, owned or leased by 29/49 Optical, Inc., was furnished to the optometrist at little or no cost. Though it was hoped that the optometry patients would choose to have their prescriptions for glasses or contact lenses filled at 29/49 Optical, Inc., they were under no obligation to do so, and many did not. Patients seen by an optometrist in the 29/49 Optical, Inc. offices were billed by the optometrist for the optometry services and by the optical company for the cost of any glasses or contact lenses purchased. The two charges were paid separately, the payments placed in separate accounts. Payments for eye examinations by an optometrist were deposited to the account of Brian L. Weber, optometrist. Payments for glasses or lenses were deposited to the accounts of 29/49 Optical, Inc. The funds were neither mixed nor co-mingled, and funds placed in the account of Brian L. Weber were not used to pay the expenses of the 29/49 Optical, Inc. stores. Each optometrist maintained his or her own patient records which were stored in a filing cabinet maintained for that purpose separate and apart from the files relating to the operation of the 29/49 Optical, Inc. stores. Only the optometrists made entries to those records. Since the optometrists who manned the offices in the 29/49 Optical, Inc., stores were independent contractors, within basic guidelines as to routine procedures and office hours, they were free to work such hours as they chose and to charge what they believed to be appropriate fees for other than routine procedures. They were paid with funds drawn from the account of Brian L. Weber, into which the patient fees for optometry services were deposited. In addition to the associates who practiced at the individual shops, Dr. Weber also practiced at each and all of the shops periodically. Mr. Record was paid from the checking account maintained by 29/49 Optical, Inc., on which account either Record or the Respondent could write checks. Dr. Weber is quick to admit that the advertisement for 29/49 Optical, Inc., which appeared in the March 1, 1990, edition of the St. Petersburg Times is a poorly worded advertisement. So much of the advertisement which implies a total price to be paid to 29/49 which includes examination and glasses is admittedly inappropriate, and when he saw the proof prior to publication, he claims to have made appropriate changes which would have corrected the deficiencies. However, the corrections dictated by Respondent were not made, and the inappropriate advertisement was published. His immediate complaint to the newspaper after the first publication date resulted in an immediate correction. Respondent claims that when the disciplinary action was initiated against him in 1992, he immediately contacted the newspaper and requested a letter which would clarify the situation. He did not tell the paper what to say, and the subsequent letter from the paper relates to a failure to have his name appear in the March 1, 1990, advertisement. This is not the defect in the advertisement of which the Board complains. Dr. Liane, a Board certified optometric physician, a former Chairman of the Board of Optometry and now an expert for and consultant to the Board, reviewed the case file in this matter for the Board, along with the transcripts of other cases relating to Dr. Weber. None of the other matters was based on disciplinary action. To his recollection, the Board's rule on corporate practice was promulgated in 1986, at the time he was a member of the Board. At that time, the Board conducted numerous workshops around the state to advice practitioners of the standard of practice in that regard. Dr. Liane was also on the Board's legislative committee when Chapter 463, Florida Statutes, was enacted. The Board of Optometry was concerned with the protection of the public from the danger of allowing opticians or unlicensed entities to have input into whether lenses were needed. The Board, and the legislature, wanted to allow optometrists to practice with other licensed health care practitioners, but not with unlicensed opticians. After the legislation was passed, the Board promulgated its Rule 21O-3.008, which outlines factors which must be shown in order to prove corporate practice. One of the prohibitions in the rule relates to any practice or pronouncement which "implies" that the corporate or unlicensed entity is providing professional services. In the instant case, Dr. Liane is of the opinion that the original advertisement in question implies that 29/49 Optical, Inc., is offering a complete eye examination. As was noted previously, Respondent agrees, and it is so found. Having considered all the evidence available to him, including the advertisement of March 2, 1990, and the assumption of the lease arrangements existing prior and up to 1990, Dr. Liane concluded that Respondent was involved in an unauthorized corporate practice. While a side-by side practice between optometrists and opticians is common and approved, it may not be within a corporate practice by the same individuals who are in business together.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Optometry enter a Final Order dismissing Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint; finding him guilty of Count III thereof and imposing an administrative fine of $250.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Alexandria E. Walters, Esquire William C. Childers, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Angela T. Hall Agency Clerk Department of Health 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Grover Freeman, Esquire 201 East Kennedy Boulevard Suite 1950 Tampa, Florida 33602 Eric G. Walker Executive Director Board of Optometry 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Pete Peterson General Counsel Department of Health 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 6, Room 102-E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (3) 120.57463.014463.016
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BOARD OF OPTOMETRY vs JACK L. HARGRAVES, 89-004522 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Aug. 21, 1989 Number: 89-004522 Latest Update: Feb. 16, 1990

The Issue The issue for decision herein is whether or not Respondent exhibited fraud, deceit, negligence, incompetence, or misconduct in the examination and fitting of a patient for contact lenses in violation of Subsection 463.016(1)(g) and (h), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what, if any, administrative penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Optometry, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of optometry in Florida, pursuant to Section 20.30 and Chapters 455 and 463, Florida Statutes. Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed optometrist who holds license number 0000437, and his last address of record is Zodiac Optical, 1211 South Dale Mabry Highway, Tampa, Florida 33 On February 21, 1987, Respondent examined and fitted Patricia Gama for hard contact lenses and Ms. Gama paid $154.00 for the lenses. On that date, Respondent obtained an initial refraction for the right eye of -1.25 and for the left eye of -1.00 (eye glass prescription only) and by use thereof, fitted Gama with contact lenses. At the time, Gama was employed as a cashier at a commercial retail establishment. Gama immediately began experiencing discomfort with the contacts, specifically blurred vision, red eyes and headaches. Gama found it difficult to read the cash register keys and function as a cashier. Gama advised Respondent of her discomfort on February 25, 1987, and at that time, Respondent fitted Gama with another set of contact lenses. Gama continued to experience discomfort with the contact lenses and after advising Respondent of such, Respondent on February 27, 1987, fitted Gama with a third set of contact lenses. Gama's discomfort with the contact lenses continued and she again advised Respondent of his discomfort. On March 18, 1987, Respondent fitted Gama with a fourth set of contact lenses. Through it all, Respondent used eleven different lenses in an effort to properly fit Gama; however, she continued to experience discomfort. Throughout Respondent's endeavor to properly fit Gama with contact lenses, he did so in a courteous and professional manner. However, Gama's husband insisted that she seek a second opinion from another optometrist, obtain a refund from Respondent and discontinue using the lenses Respondent prescribed. On April 22, 1987, Respondent's partner, Dr. William Hunter, refunded $74.00 of the total purchase price of $154.00 that Gama paid. He also gave Gama the prescription prepared for her by Respondent. Respondent works in a group practice which is owned by Dr. Hunter. Dr. Hunter has a policy of giving only a 50% refund within thirty days of purchase if the patient is not satisfied. On the following day, April 23, 1987, Gama was examined and fitted for contact lenses by Dr. Julian Newman. Respondent's initial refraction was twice as strong as Dr. Newman's refraction. It is not uncommon for patients, such as Gama, to test differently for glasses on different days which can result in different refraction readings on different days. Likewise, it is not unusual for an optometrist to note different refractions for the same patient on different days, or to make an error in the refraction readings for the same patient. When this is done however, the optometrist should try to correct the mistake if, in fact a mistake is made. Here, Respondent strived to satisfy Gama and never ceased efforts to comfortably fit her with contact lenses. Respondent made a refund to Gama in keeping with office policy which appeared reasonable under the circumstances considering the time spent with Gama before she decided to seek another opinion from another optometrist. (Testimony of Drs. Julian D. Newman, O.D. and Joel Marantz, O.D. both of whom were expert witnesses in this proceeding.) Respondent's receptionist, Beatrice Franklin, paid $100.00 to Gama on or about December 11, 1987, in exchange for Gama signing a request to drop her charges against Respondent at the Department of Professional Regulation. Respondent had no knowledge of Ms. Franklin's actions, and in fact, Sharon Hosey, a receptionist employed by Respondent, corroborated Respondent's testimony respecting lack of knowledge on his part as to any payments to Gama other than the $74.00 refund in exchange for her withdrawal of the complaint with Petitioner or to otherwise obtain Gama's signature on a release. Respondent was conscientiously attempting to comfortably fit Gama with contact lenses when Gama decided to seek a second opinion. He did so by changing the prescriptions on several occasions, including changing to lenses made by a different manufacturer. In the process, Respondent tried eleven different contact lenses. Respondent was willing to continue treating Ms. Gama and provide the required follow-up care.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Board of Optometry enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed herein in its entirety. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16 day of February, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth R. Alsobrook, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack L. Hargraves, O.D. 1211 South Dale Mabry Highway Tampa, Florida 33629 Patricia Guilford, Executive Director Florida Board of Optometry Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 =================================================================

Florida Laws (2) 120.57463.016
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF OPTOMETRY vs JOSEPH C. MILLER, 00-003543PL (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Deland, Florida Aug. 30, 2000 Number: 00-003543PL Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
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BOARD OF OPTOMETRY vs. WILLIAM A. HUNTER, 82-000112 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-000112 Latest Update: Oct. 23, 1990

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was and remains a licensed optometrist in the State of Florida, having been issued License No. 000595. Respondent's present address is 4636 North Dale Mabry, #619, Tampa, Florida 33614. The Respondent, prior to relocating his office to Tampa, Florida, practiced optometry in Tallahassee, Florida, in an office adjacent to the Pearle Vision Center in the Governor's Square Mall. He closed that office the last week of December, 1980. Treatment of Wendell Harrison The Respondent first saw Wendell Harrison on October 11, 1980. At that time, Respondent was offering a special of $59.00 for three visits which included an examination and prescription, contact lenses, and the fitting of those lenses. The first of the three visits was the initial examination and prescription. The second visit occurred after the patients received their lenses, and the third visit was a follow-up visit for the purpose of ensuring that the lenses were fitted properly and there were no problems. On October 11, 1980, Mr. Harrison was examined by Dr. Hunter and given a prescription for contact lenses. On that date, Mr. Harrison paid the Respondent $40.00 of the $59.00 total charge. On October 22, 1980, Mr. Harrison received his contact lenses and returned to the Respondent's office for his second visit. During that visit, he was shown how to insert the lenses and also saw a film on how to care for the lenses. At this time, he paid the $19.00 balance of the total charge of $59.00. Subsequent to the second visit, Mr. Harrison experienced blurred vision and pain, especially in his left eye. He returned to Dr. Hunter and informed him of the blurred vision and pain. Dr. Hunter made no examination of Mr. Harrison's eyes or the lenses and informed him the lenses would tighten up and that he should continue to wear them. Mr. Harrison continued to have problems and returned to Dr. Hunter's office the first week of January, 1981. The office was closed. Mr. Harrison did not recall seeing a sign in the window or door of the closed office, but was informed by someone employed at the Pearle Vision Center next door that Dr. Hunter had left and that a Dr. Ian Field was handling problems with Dr. Hunter's patients. Mr. Harrison then made an appointment to see Dr. Field. After an examination, Dr. Field told Mr. Harrison not to put the lenses back into his eyes and not to use them. Dr. Field wrote a prescription for new lenses and refitted Mr. Harrison with the new lenses. Mr. Harrison experienced only minor problems in getting used to the new lenses and had no problem with blurred vision with the new lenses. The prescription of the lenses prescribed for Wendell Harrison by Dr. Hunter was improper in that the lenses corrected the vision in his right eye to only 20/40 which is the minimum for driving a vehicle in Florida. The left eye was corrected only to 20/40 and three additional letters on the next line of the chart. The lenses were also improperly fitted to Mr. Harrison's eyes, and as a result, moved around too much and would ride up underneath the upper lids of his eyes. By letter dated February 3, 1981 (see Petitioner's Exhibit 3), Mr. Harrison contacted Dr. Hunter and requested a full refund of his $59.00 fee. Dr. Hunter responded by letter dated February 9, 1981 (see Petitioner's Exhibit 4) and refunded with that letter $9.00 of the $59.00 paid by Mr. Harrison. Treatment of Maureen Sue Woodward Sometime in the Fall of 1980, Maureen Sue Woodward visited the office of the Respondent in Governor's Square Mall for the purpose of an examination and fitting of contact lenses. On the first visit, Ms. Woodward was examined by Dr. Hunter and was given a prescription for contact lenses. She took the prescription next door to Pearle Vision Center to have the prescription filled. Ms. Woodward, on the first visit, was quoted a price of $75.00 for three visits and this is the amount she paid Dr. Hunter. The three visits were to consist of first, an examination and prescription, secondly, the actual insertion and instruction on care of the lenses, and lastly, a follow-up visit to make certain there were no problems. After she received her contact lenses, she returned to Dr. Hunter's office for instruction on how to insert them and care for them. She watched a film about the cleaning of the lenses. Following the second visit, she wore the contacts just as she had been instructed to wear them and began to experience problems. Her eyes were bloodshot, burning, and tearing as a result of the contact lenses. Ms. Woodward returned to Dr. Hunter's office a third time and explained the problems she was experiencing. Dr. Hunter performed no examination of her eyes or the lenses but told her she was not cleaning them properly. She returned home and continued to clean the lenses as prescribed in the written instructions she had been given by Dr. Hunter and continued to have the same problems of bloodshot eyes, tearing, and burning. Dr. Hunter had told her to come back if she had any further problems. When she returned to Dr. Hunter's office in early January, 1981, the office was closed and there was a note on the door of the closed office referring patients to Dr. Ian Field in the Tallahassee Mall. Her third visit with Dr. Hunter had been approximately a week earlier and he had not mentioned the possibility that he might be leaving Tallahassee. The only information given by the note on the door was that Dr. Hunter's patients were referred to Dr. Field. On January 7, 1981, Mrs. Woodward was seen by Dr. Ian Field. The contact lenses which had been prescribed by the Respondent had an improper prescription. Prescriptions for contact lenses are in plus or minus. A prescription at zero has no prescription at all and is clear glass. A nearsighted person needs something for distance and requires a minus prescription and a farsighted person requires a plus prescription. The power of both lenses prescribed by Dr. Hunter for Mrs. Woodward were more plus than they should have been. When Mrs. Woodward saw Dr. Field on January 7, 1981, she was continuing to wear the contacts prescribed by Dr. Hunter. She was also experiencing blurred vision and bloodshot eyes. Her right eye felt scratchy. Treatment of Barbara Magnusson Stathos The Respondent examined Barbara Magnusson Stathos and prescribed contact lenses sometime prior to September 29, 1980. The agreed fee was $59.00 for three visits and Ms. Stathos had her second visit with Dr. Hunter on September 29, 1980, after picking up her contacts. After receiving her contacts Ms. Stathos experienced problems and called Dr. Hunter's office. She spoke with Dr. Hunter at that time. She continued to have problems and when she returned to Dr. Hunter's office, he had left the area. Barbara Stathos was then seen as a patient by Dr. Walter Hathaway, an optometrist, on January l7,1981. She was using a liquid chemical method of disinfectant for the lenses Dr. Hunter had prescribed for her. Thirty to forty percent of the population has an allergic reaction to these particular chemical disinfectants. There were deposits and coatings on the lenses which had been prescribed for Barbara Stathos by Dr. Hunter. Dr. Hathaway replaced her lenses and switched her to a heat disinfectant method. This solved her problem. The problem of coatings and deposits on her lenses would not have corrected itself. Such a condition would have required an optometrist to correct it. Treatment of Marianne Topjian On December l2, 1980, Marianne Topjian was given a prescription by Dr. Hunter for contact lenses. Subsequent to December 12, 1980, she received her contact lenses. On January 8, 1981, Marianne Topjian saw Dr. Ian Field. She was having problems with the contact lenses prescribed by Dr. Hunter. These lenses had an improper prescription in that they did not correct her vision for close work. The lenses should correct for distance as well as close work. Standard of Care and Requirement for Due Notice The standard of care for optometrists in the Tallahassee community in 1980 and 1981 required proper follow- up care in order to ensure that contact lenses fit properly, that the prescription was proper, and that the patient was not experiencing any problems requiring correction by the optometrist. The follow-up care includes necessary examinations to determine the source of any problems being experienced by the patient. Some degree of follow-up care is required with every patient who is fitted with contact lenses by an optometrist. The standard of care in the Tallahassee community, as well as the nation, requires that when a physician leaves his practice and relocates to another community, he must give notice to his patients and make certain that patients under his active care are taken care of by another optometrist. The relocating optometrist must also make arrangements to make the records of his patients available to them. Neither Wendell Harrison nor Maureen Woodward were given notice by the Respondent that he was leaving Tallahassee and relocating elsewhere. Wendell Harrison and Maureen Woodward were under his active care at the time Dr. Hunter left Tallahassee, and no proper arrangements were made by Dr. Hunter for the follow-up care for the problems that these two persons had complained about. Dr. Hunter saw Maureen Woodward approximately one week prior to his departure, and he did not inform her that he was considering leaving Tallahassee. Prior to leaving Tallahassee, the only arrangements made by Dr. Hunter involved one phone call with a Dr. Orb who planned to move into Dr. Hunter's office in Governor's Square Mall. Dr. Orb agreed generally to take care of any of Dr. Hunter's patients, but no specific financial arrangement was made for such treatment and no specific patients experiencing current problems were discussed. Dr. Hunter did not know when Dr. Orb would be moving into the office, and there was no evidence that he called Dr. Orb in Tallahassee after his departure to determine if Dr. Orb was, in fact, caring for his patients. No arrangement at all had been made with Dr. Ian Field. The Respondent was negligent and fell below the standard of care in the community by failing to provide proper follow-up care to Wendell Harrison. The Respondent specifically failed to examine Mr. Harrison and take appropriate steps to determine the cause of the blurred vision and discomfort complained of by Mr. Harrison on his third visit Having been made aware by an active patient that the patient was having ongoing continuous problems with the new contacts, the Respondent failed to make arrangements upon his departure from Tallahassee to ensure that Mr. Harrison would receive the necessary care to correct his problems, if they continued. As a result of failing to provide proper follow-up care, the Respondent failed to diagnose and correct the improper prescription in the lenses received by Mr. Harrison. The Respondent was negligent and fell below the standard of care in the community in his treatment of Maureen Sue Woodward by failing to provide her with proper follow-up care after she was fitted with contact lenses by the Respondent. After Maureen Woodward complained of bloodshot eyes, burning and tearing, the Respondent did not perform an examination of her eyes or contact lenses in order to determine the cause of these problems. Having been made aware of these problems, he did not make proper arrangements upon his departure from Tallahassee to ensure that Ms. Woodward would receive the necessary follow- up care to correct these problems in the event that the problems continued. By failing to perform the appropriate examinations and to provide the appropriate follow-up care, the Respondent failed to diagnose and correct the improper prescription in the lenses received by Maureen Woodward. There was insufficient evidence to show that the Respondent breached any standard of care in the community with regard to his treatment of Marianne Topjian and Barbara Magnusson Stathos. Neither of these patients testified in the administrative proceedings.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent be found guilty of Counts 6, 8, 9, and 11 of the First Amended Administrative Complaint and that he be required to pay an administrative fine of $1,000. It is further recommended that the Respondent be placed on probation for a period of six (6) months subject to such conditions as the Board deems appropriate to ensure that the Respondent is completely familiar with and follows the requirements for proper follow-up care with patients being fitted with contact lenses. It is recommended that Counts 1 through 5, 7, 10, and 12 through 16 of the Administrative Complaint be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph W. Lawrence, II, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William F. Daniels, Esquire 127 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ms. Mildred Gardner Executive Director Board of Optometry 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================

Florida Laws (1) 463.016
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DYER KEMP GARVIN, JR. vs. BOARD OF OPTICIANRY, 82-000484 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-000484 Latest Update: Jul. 10, 1982

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Dyer Kemp Garvin, Jr., has never completed a course of study at a recognized school of opticianry. On April 2, 1957, however, he began working and training under Ralph C. Cronbaugh, a licensed optician, at Daytona Optical Center in Daytona Beach, Florida. He learned how to read a lensometer, interpret prescriptions for eyeglasses, figure base curves, measure the seg height and various physiognomic features, cut and edge lenses, fit lenses to the frame and so forth. Petitioner worked under Mr. Cronbaugh's supervision an average of 48 or 50 hours a week continuously until June of 1961, even though the training program as such ended after three years. Some time before June of 1961, petitioner registered as an apprentice with and paid a fee to the Florida Association of Dispensing Opticians. On June 3, 1961, petitioner became a member of the Florida Association of Dispensing Opticians. Some 15 years later the Florida Board of Opticianry instituted its own apprenticeship program for the first time. From June of 1961 until at least June of 1963, petitioner remained at the Daytona Optical Center under the supervision of Steve Stevenson, a licensed optician. For nine months or a year longer, he worked under a third licensed optician at the Daytona Optical Center, Andrew H. Hollaway. Petitioner moved to Alabama from Daytona Beach. There he managed an office for Bausch-Lomb in Birmingham, then went into business for himself under the name Jasper Optical Center in Jasper, Alabama. He actively practiced as a dispensing optician in Jasper for more than three years immediately preceding his application for licensure in Florida. Petitioner is a past vice-president of the Alabama Society of Dispensing Opticians and a former member of the board of directors of the International Society of Dispensing Opticians. He is now licensed as a dispensing optician in Alabama and has been for the last 18 years. Petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 3 and 4. Although the licensing scheme in Alabama is different from Florida's, petitioner's uncontroverted testimony was that he holds and has held a state occupational license in Alabama. This is corroborated by the affidavit of an Alabama judge, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4, and a copy of petitioner's 1981-1982 license. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. For the past six years, petitioner and other dispensing opticians have worked to establish a state board to regulate opticianry in Alabama, but these efforts have been stymied by optometrists who have successfully opposed the legislation. As a matter of policy, respondent refuses to let dispensing opticians licensed in Alabama and other states with similar regulatory arrangements take the Florida dispensing opticianry examination. In preparing the foregoing findings of fact, the hearing officer has had the benefit of petitioner's post-hearing correspondence and respondent's proposed recommended order. Proposed fact findings that have not been adopted have been rejected as irrelevant or unsupported by the evidence.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent admit petitioner to the dispensing opiticanry examination and license petitioner as a dispensing optician if he successfully completes the examination. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Dyer Kemp Garvin, Jr. Post Office Box 1127 Destin, Florida 32541 Chris D. Rolle, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Suite 1602 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 H. Fred Varn, Executive Director Board of Opticianry 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION DYER KEMP GARVIN, JR. Petitioner, vs. DOAH CASE NO. 82-484 STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, BOARD OF OPTICIANRY, Respondent. /

Florida Laws (3) 120.57455.213484.007
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BOARD OF OPTOMETRY vs. MARK N. DOBIN, 86-004484 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-004484 Latest Update: Jul. 24, 1987

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Mark N. Dobin (Dobin), was at all times material hereto licensed to practice optometry in the State of Florida, and held license number OP 0001202. Inadequate Eye Examinations On November 5, 1985, Alison Lichtenstein, an investigator employed by the Department of Professional Regulation (DPR), entered Dobin's offices in Margate, Florida. Using the assumed name of Alison Smith, Ms. Lichtenstein, who was wearing glasses at the time, requested that Dobin perform a routine eye examination, with the exception of tonometry. Dobin undertook the requested examination, and was paid his fee of $25.00. The visual analysis performed by Dobin on Ms. Lichtenstein failed to include the following minimum proceduresrequired by Rule 21Q-3.007, Florida Administrative Code: (a) an adequate patient history, since he failed to inquire whether Lichtenstein was taking any medication; (b) an external examination; (c) a pupillary examination; (d) visual field testing; and (e) a biomicroscopy. On November 5, 1985, Mary Pfab, a licensed optometrist in the State of Florida, entered Dobin's offices in Margate, Florida. Using the assumed name of Mary Parker, Ms. Pfab, who was wearing contact lenses, requested that Dobin perform a routine eye examination, with the exception of tonometry. Dobin undertook the requested examination, and was paid his fee of $25.00. The visual analysis performed by Dobin on Ms. Pfab failed to include the following minimum procedures required by Rule 21Q-3.007, Florida Administrative Code: (a) an adequate patient history, since he failed to inquire of Pfab's personal medical history, her medications, her family medical history, or her family ocular history; (b) a pupillary examination; and (c) visual field testing. An optometrist's failure to perform the minimum procedures required by Rule 21Q-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, can have a profound impact on the results of his examination. Pertinent to this case, the procedures omitted by Dobin were of import because: Many medications mask the symptoms of a number of eye diseases. A failure to ascertain what medications a patient is taking could, therefore, result in the optometrist missing or not checking for certain diseases. A personal medical history is likewise important to an informed examination. Pre-existing injuries and diseases can have a profound impact on an optometrist's findings, and the cause of that finding is important too the ultimate diagnosis and treatment of the patient. The patient's family medical and ocular history is also important to an informed examination. For example, a person with a family history of diabetes, cataracts or glaucoma is more likely to have such disease than one without such family history. Consequently, if alerted by such information, the optometrist could diagnose the presence of such disease and prescribe treatment at a much earlier stage of its development than might ordinarily be the case. A pupillary examination evaluates the nervous system which connects the eye and retina to the brain. A failure to perform such examination could cause the optometrist to overlook the existence of a brain tumor or other forms of nerve damage. Visual field testing is a diagnostic tool used to detect the presence of gross nerve damage, traumatic cataracts, glaucoma, diabetes, and certain peripheral retinal diseases. Absent such test, these diseases might not be detected. In this case, the import of Dobin's failure to perform a visual field test was heightened. Visual field testing and tonometry are two of the three diagnostic procedures utilized to detect glaucoma. Where, as here, tonometry was not performed, the importance of visual field testing is more significant to the early detection of that disease. Biomicroscopy is a diagnostic tool used to detect the presence of bacterial conjunctivitis, corneal ulcers, corneal scars, blepharitis, and some lid injuries. Absent stich test, these diseases or injuries might not be detected. An external examination is important to the detection of skin cancer, skin lesions, blepharitis, and bacterial or allergic conjunctivitis. Absent such examination, these ocular problems might be overlooked. Inadequate Patient Records Contrary to the requirement of Rule 2IQ-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, the patient case record for Ms. Lichtenstein and Ms. Pfab did not reflect whether the following tests were performed or if performed the results: (a) a complete patient history, (b) an external examination, (c) a pupillary examination, (d) a visual field test, (e) an internal examina- tion, (f) a biomicroscopy, and (g) diagnosis and treatment. The inadequacy of Dobin's patient records would adversely affect his ability, and that of a subsequent treating optometrist, in treating these patients. Absent a medical history and the results of the tests performed, an optometrist is severely hampered in his ability to track the progress of diseases, or to detect their onset. Exercising Influence For Financial Gain Petitioner asserts that Dobin, by accepting a fee for a vision analysis that did not comply with the minimum requirements of Rule 2IQ-3.007(1), Florida Administrative Code, violated Section 463.0l6(1)(m), Florida Statutes. That section prohibits: Exercising influence on the patient in such a manner as to exploit the patient for financial gain of the licensee or of a third party. Petitioner's proof was not persuasive. While the patients in this case may not have received the minimum examination mandated by law, I am not persuaded that such failure constituted the exercise of influence to exploit a patient contemplated by Section 463.016(1)(m). There was no showing that Dobin recommended unnecessary tests or unnecessary products, or that he otherwise sought to influence their choice of procedures or materials for financial gain. Such being the proof, the Petitioner failed to demonstrate a violation of Section 463.016(1)(m) Unlicensed Practice Of Optometry Petitioner further asserts that Dobin's "association" with Eye-Wear Glasses, Inc., his landlord, violated the provisions of Section 463.0l4(1)(c), Florida Statutes, and Rule 2IQ-3.008, Florida Administrative Code. Section 463.014(1) provides: (c) No optometrist shall engage in the practice of optometry with any organization, corporation, group, or lay individual. This provision shall not prohibit optometrists from employing, or from forming partnerships or professional associations with, optometrists licensed in this state. And, pertinent to this case, Rule 2IQ-3.008 provides: No licensed practitioner shall enter into any agreement which adversely affects the licensed practitioner's exercise of free, independent and unlimited professional judgment and responsibility, or which permits any unlicensed person or entity to practice optometry through the licensed practitioner by controlling and/or offering `optometric services to the public. The professional judgment of a licensed practitioner should be exercised solely for the benefit of his patients and free from any compromising influences and loyalties. The Board will consider the circumstances of the practice including but not limited to, the following factors in determining whether a violation of Section 463.014, F.S., has occurred: Whether the licensed practitioner holds himself out to the public as available to render professional services in any manner which implies that the licensed practitioner is professionally associated with or employed by an entity which itself is not a licensed practitioner. For purposes of this rule "entity" shall refer to any corporation, lay body, organization, individual or commercial or mercantile establishment which is not a licensed practitioner. The term "commercial or mercantile establishment" shall include, but not be limited to, an establishment in which the practice of opticianry is conducted pursuant to Chapter 484. Whether the professional office space occupied by the licensed practitioner is such that it does not clearly and sufficiently indicate to the public that his practice of optometry is independent of, and not associated with the entity. Whether the licensed practitiQner has a telephone listing and number that is separate and distinct from that of the entity or whether the phone is answered in a manner that does not identify his optometric practice or whether the telephone is answered in a way that indicates that the licensed practitioner is professionally associated with or employed by the entity. Whether the entrance to the building or commercial or mercantile area in which the licensed practitioner's practice is located sufficiently identifies that the licensed practitioner is practicing his profession independent of, and not associated with the entity. Whether advertisements, including those placed in a newspaper and/or telephone directory, imply that the licensed practitioner is professionally associated with, or employed by an entity. Whether the licensed practitioner maintains full and total responsibility and control of all files and records relating to patients and the optometric practice, in accordance with Rule 2IQ-3.003. Whether the licensed practitioner has full and complete control and discretion over fees charged to patients for his services and billing methods. Whether the provisions of a lease or space agreement between the licensed practitioner and the entity operate so as to impair the licensed practitioner's free, independent, and unlimited professional judgment and responsibility. Whether the arrangements for the furnishing of equipment or supplies to the licensed practitioner operate so as to impair the licensed practitioner's free, independent, and unlimited professional judgment and responsibility. Eye-Wear Glasses, Inc., is owned and operated by two licensed opticians. By a "rental agreement" dated October 12, 1983, Eye-Wear Glasses, Inc., and Dobin entered into an agreement whereby Dobin was sublet space within Eye-Wear Glasses' premises. That "rental agreement" provided: RENTAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN EYEWEAR GLASSES INC. AND DR. MARK N. DOBIN Rent shall be $1.00 per month, and shall continue for a 2 year period with continuing 2 year options. This lease will go into affect on October 17th 1983. The rent of $1.00 per month shall include water, electricity, and air conditioning. Dr. Mark N. Dobin will be responsible to supply all equipment, stationary, and supplies needed to run an Optometric Office. Dr. Mark N. Dobin will have a phone installed at his own expense and his monthly bill along with Yellow Pages advertising c shall be paid by him. Dr. Mark N. Dobin will be allowed to advertise independent of Eyewear Glasses Inc. at his own expense. A key allowing access to the premises shall be given to Dr. Mark N. Dobin. Fees for Services performed by Dr. Mark N. Dobin, will be determined by Dr. Mark N. Dobin and shall be collected independent of those fees from Eyewear Glasses. Being a private entity, Dr. Mark N. Dobin shall have the right to determine his own office hours, days worked and vacation time, but he shall try to coordinate these days with those of Eyewear Glasses Inc. if this is possible. Renter, Dr. Mark N. Dobin, has the option of selling his practice and its contents to another Eye Doctor. This sale may include all records and files of patients belonging to Dr. Mark N. Dobin. At the time of sale, Eyewear Glasses Inc. has the right to renegotiate the lease, but not to alter it in such a way as to make the sale of the practice uninviting. Before the sale is finalized a 3 month trial period may be requested by either party. If Dr. Mark N. Dobin is unable to sell his practice, Eyewear Glasses Inc. has the right of first refusal to purchase his practice or his equipment. If the office is unoccupied for a period of 30 days, Eyewear Glasses Inc. has the option of subleasing the practice to another Eye Doctor, until which time the practice is sold or Dr. Mark N. Dobin returns. Dr. Mark N. Dobin has the right to hire another Eye Doctor to work his office during vacation time, or other times when he is not available. If Eyewear Glasses Inc. is not happy with the performance of said Eye Doctor. it may request that another Doctor be hired by Dr. Mark N. Dobin, but the final decision shall be his. Dr. Mark N. Dobin has the right to hire c an employee at his own expense, to assist in his office. A key to the premises may be given to said employee, but permission must first be granted by Eyewear Glasses inc. If either partner of Eyewear Glasses Inc. decides to sell his share of the corporation to the other, all points of this lease agreement shall remain in affect. If both owners agree to sell their share of the corporation, Dr. Mark N. Dobin shall have the right of first refusal to purchase Eyewear Glasses Inc. and its contents. Eyewear Glasses Inc. agrees to build a partition at its own expense in order to meet Florida State Optometric Board requirements. A Covenant of Restriction with a radius of 5 miles shall go into affect 2 years from the beginning of this lease, and shall last for a period of 3 years from the termination of this lease. Dr. Mark N. Dobin shall not sell eyeglasses or other optical excessories, excluding all items pertaining to the sale and dispensing of contact lenses. The space occupied by Dobin, which consisted of approximately 248 square feet, was located at the rear of the optician's store, and accessible by way of a sliding glass door from the store or through a back glass door from the shopping mall area. Consequently, customers of either business had an unrestricted view and access to the business of either profession. Considering the physical layout of the premises, as well as the view of the premises afforded by Petitioner's exhibit 5, the proof established that Dobin held himself out to the public in a manner that implied he was professionally associated with or employed by Eye-Wear Glasses, Inc. Indeed, the "rental agreement" itself depicts a business association more far reaching than that of landlord and tenant, and served to impair Dobin's exercise of free, independent, and unlimited professional judgment and responsibility. 1/

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOM)MENDED that Respondent, Mark N. Dobin, be placed on probation for twelve (12) months, and that an administrative fine of $3,000 be imposed upon him. DONE AND ORDERED this 24th day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-4484 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: 1. Addressed in paragraph 1. 2-3. Addressed in paragraph 2. 4. Addressed in paragraph 3. 5-6. Addressed in paragraph 2. 7-9. Addressed in paragraph 4. 10. Addressed in paragraph 5. 11-12. Addressed in paragraph 4. 13-22. Addressed in paragraph 6(a) -(g). 23-24. Addressed in paragraph 7. 25. Addressed in paragraph 8. 26. Addressed in paragraphs 9-10. 27-31. Addressed in paragraphs 11-13. COPIES FURNISHED: Phillip B. Miller, Esquire c Robert D. Newell, Jr., Esquire 102 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark N. Dobin 7384 West Atlantic Boulevard Margate, Florida 33063 Mildred Gardner, Executive Director Board of Optometry 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Honorable Van B. Poole Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750

Florida Laws (2) 463.014463.016
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LORI C. ABEL vs BOARD OF OPTOMETRY, 92-000248RX (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jan. 08, 1992 Number: 92-000248RX Latest Update: Feb. 27, 1992

The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Petitioner's document filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on January 8, 1992, which was initially construed to be a petition challenging an existing rule, and which was assigned to the undersigned on January 16, 1992, should be dismissed as argued in the motion to dismiss filed by the Respondent on January 28, 1992.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a second year medical student currently enrolled at the University of South Florida, College of Medicine, in Tampa, Florida. Petitioner is a licensed optometrist in the State of Florida and graduated valedictorian from the University of Houston, College of Optometry in May, 1990. In Florida, the Board of Optometry (Board) retains licensed optometrists who write the questions for the licensing examination administered by the Board. In some instances, the same examination drafters are retained by the Board to administer the practical portions of the examination. Thus, the drafter of the questions may proctor the examination given to examinees. Further, in some instances, the examination drafters have working in their employ unlicensed optometrists or optometry students who receive training from such employer. When that occurs, the unlicensed employee may receive assistance from the employer not available to others who would seek licensure by examination. This appearance of assistance or potential assistance is created because the drafter of the examination is also the grader and employer of the unlicensed person who must be tested for licensure. It is the Petitioner's position that licensed optometrists who provide both the content of the written test and administer the practical portions of the examination for licensure should not also serve as mentor or employer of those seeking licensure by the same examination. Petitioner has not cited an existing rule that regulates the activities described. Rule 21Q-4.006, Florida Administrative Code, adopts by reference Rule 21-11.014, Florida Administrative Code, as the rule governing examination security and monitoring for the Board. That rule provides, in pertinent part: Any individual found by the Department or any board within the Department to have engaged in conduct which subverts or attempts to subvert the examination process may have his or her scores on the examination withheld and/or declared invalid, be disqualified from the practice of the profession, and/or be subject to the imposition of other appropriate sanctions by the Department or, if administered by a board within the Department, by the applicable board. Conduct which subverts or attempts to subvert the examination process includes: Conduct which violates the security of the examination materials. . . Petitioner has not alleged that anyone violated the foregoing rule. Rather, Petitioner maintains that allowing the activities described above to continue gives the appearance of impropriety or increases the potential for impropriety.

Florida Laws (4) 120.52120.54120.56120.68
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BOARD OF OPTICIANRY vs. DAVID SOMERVILLE, 86-000805 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-000805 Latest Update: Dec. 23, 1986

The Issue The issues in this case concern an administrative complaint brought by the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Opticianry (Petitioner) against David Somerville (Respondent). It is alleged, among other claims, that the Respondent was licensed as an apprentice optician in the state of Florida and while in that capacity practiced opticianry without the benefit of supervision; entered a plea to dispensing optical devices without a license; and committed various forms of fraud related to the sponsorship of his apprentice training, all in violation of provisions of Chapters 455 and 484, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 21P, Florida Administrative Code.

Findings Of Fact Part A The following facts are found based upon the prehearing stipulation of the parties: a. Respondent is and has been, at all times material to the Administrative Complaint filed in the instant case and at all times relating to the hearings in the instant case, a licensed apprentice optician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number DA 0001541. Respondent's last known address is Brandywine Optical, 3112 N. Woodland Blvd., Brandywine Shopping Village, Deland, Florida. Respondent, David Somerville, is the owner of a business named Brandywine Optical located at 3112 North Woodland Blvd., Brandywine Shopping Village, Deland, Florida. Respondent is not now nor has he ever been licensed as an optician or optometrist in the State of Florida. On September 19, 1984, the Respondent filled out an application to be registered as an apprentice optician. On September 19, 1984, Madison Ziegler filled out an application to be Respondent's sponsor. The application signed by David Somerville stated that his supervising optician, Madison Ziegler, began supervising him on September 19, 1984. Ziegler was not present at the Respondent's optical shop on September 20, 1984, and in fact only worked one or two Saturday afternoons, in September. Madison Ziegler was employed full-time with Century 21 Optical, in Holly Hill, Florida. Part B Factual findings based upon the testimony adduced at hearing and in consideration of exhibits admitted at hearing: When Respondent made application to serve as an apprentice optician under the supervision of Madison Ziegler, on September 19, 1984, the arrangement called for forty-four hours of apprenticeship per week. This internship was to be performed at the business known as Brandywine Optical located at 3112 North Woodland Boulevard, Deland, Florida, respondent's business premises. On October 25, 1984, Geraldine B. Johnson, manager of the Office of Investigative Services for the Department of Professional Regulation, went to Brandywine Optical. She was accompanied by investigator Diane Radideau of the Department of Professional Regulation. While in the store, the only person in attendance was the Respondent. Johnson presented the Respondent with a prescription for eyeglasses, and the Respondent filled that prescription. In the course of this exchange, Respondent took the prescription from Ms. Johnson and assisted her in obtaining frames for the glasses. Respondent measured her eyes for trifocals and indicated that the glasses would be ready sometime within that week. On October 31, 1984, Ms. Johnson returned in the company of another employee of the Department of Professional Regulation, John E. Danson. At that time, no other persons were in the business premises of Brandywine Optical other than the Respondent and the two Department of Professional Regulation employees. Ms. Johnson obtained the glasses, Respondent fitted them on her face and provided her with a carrying case, the balance of the bill was paid and Ms. Johnson and Mr. Danson left the store. Before leaving, at the behest of Ms. Johnson, Respondent presented Ms. Johnson with a business card which identified the Respondent as dispensing optician and further indicated that Brandywine Optical was a store at which prescriptions involving eye glasses and contact glasses were filled. A photocopy of that card is found as part of the Petitioner's composite Exhibit 4 admitted into evidence. This also sets forth the prescription involved with Ms. Johnson's glasses, which Respondent placed on the back of the business card. On February 13, 1985, Respondent requested that the sponsorship of his apprentice training be transferred from Madison Ziegler to Leslie Virginia Darden. Within the Petitioner's composite Exhibit 6 is found a form, Apprentice Transfer of Sponsor, purportedly executed by Madison Ziegler indicating that he had supervised Respondent for a minimum of 40 hours per week between October 11, 1984, and January 18, 1985. This is an inaccurate portrayal. As stated before, Ziegler was involved in the supervision on only one or two Saturday afternoons in September 1984. Consequently, when Respondent transmitted with his Apprentice Transfer of Sponsor Request, the Apprentice Transfer of Sponsor form set out as an enclosure he was submitting information about his apprenticeship which was patently false related to the length of time over which Madison Ziegler had served as his sponsoring optician. On February 13, 1985, Leslie Virginia Darden executed the application for sponsorship of Respondent as apprentice optician. Leslie Virginia Darden was licensed by the state of Florida as an optician at that time. Her actual sponsorship of the Respondent took place over a period of approximately two days in February 1985. Upon the termination of the sponsorship, the Board of Opticianry was made aware of this change by telephone call from Ms. Darden. The effective date of termination of the sponsorship was February 19, 1985. A form executed by Ms. Darden further confirmed her choice to be removed as sponsor. This form, entitled Apprentice Optical Termination Form, is found as Petitioner's Exhibit 8 admitted into evidence. Ms. Darden also authorized Respondent to sign her name on a form known as Apprentice Transfer of Sponsor which is found as part of the Petitioner's composite Exhibit 6 admitted into evidence noting a change in sponsorship. As established in Petitioner's Exhibit 5 admitted into evidence, judgment and sentence in the case State of Florida vs. David Somerville, in the County Court in and for Volusia County, Florida - Div. "A," Case No. 84-15535-A, Respondent entered a plea of guilty to dispensing optical glasses without a license. He was placed on six months' probation and as a special term of probation was ordered not to dispense optical devices other than in accordance with a circumstance involving full-time supervision by a licensed optician. This judgment and sentence was placed against the Respondent on February 14, 1985. In February 1985, Samuel Rosenberg, who was licensed as an optician in the state of Florida, was contacted by the Respondent. An arrangement was made in which Rosenberg would work as an employee at Brandywine Optical for a period of twenty hours a week. This arrangement lasted for four or five weeks. It did not contemplate having Rosenberg sponsor the Respondent's apprenticeship. As reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit 7 admitted into evidence, on March 14, 1985, Samuel Rosenberg made application as sponsor of an apprenticeship program for the benefit of David Somerville. In that application it was indicated that Rosenberg would supervise the apprenticeship of Somerville for a period of forty hours a week. Initially there was an arrangement in which twelve hours of supervision was to be provided Somerville by Rosenberg in supervising work as an optician at a stand in a flea market. In addition, four days a week, for a total of twenty-eight hours, were given to Somerville under Rosenberg's supervision at the Brandywine Optical address. This arrangement lasted for about nine months. From that point forward, the arrangement was to have Rosenberg supervise Somerville at the flea market on Saturdays for eight hours and to provide thirty-two hours of supervision at Brandywine Optical Monday through Thursday. Rosenberg was led to believe that on Friday an optometrist was in the Brandywine Optical offices, and according to Somerville's remarks to Rosenberg, the optometrist does all work related to eye glasses, etc., and Somerville was only involved with the selection of eye glasses and use of the telephone, unrelated to the practice of opticianry. On August 27, 1985, Douglas Vanderbilt, an investigator with the Department of Professional Regulation, went to the Brandywine Optical store. When he entered the store, Somerville and another customer were the only persons he saw. The customer was trying on frames and making a selection of frames, with the assistance of Somerville. Vanderbilt picked out some frames that he wanted to buy. Somerville took the glasses that Vanderbilt had and made measurements from those glasses. This was in furtherance of the preparation of a new pair of spectacles at a cost of $110. Sixty dollars was paid down. Some of the measurements Somerville made pertaining to Vanderbilt involved bifocals. No prescription had been presented by Vanderbilt and Somerville used the old glasses which Vanderbilt had as a basis for measurement. Vanderbilt was presented with a business card which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence. The business card reflects Brandywine Optical, prescriptions filled, eye glasses and contact lenses. It gives the business address and indicates that David Somerville is the dispensing optician. Somerville, upon the questioning of Vanderbilt, confirmed that the name Somerville reflected on the card and the Respondent Somerville were one and the same person. On September 9, 1985, Vanderbilt returned to the business premises at Brandywine Optical. At that time, only Somerville was present. Somerville broke the black stainless steel frame across the bridge of the new glasses. Consequently, Vanderbilt picked out a brown frame, and Somerville fitted the brown pair of glasses on Vanderbilt. AGGRAVATION Part C On February 28, 1986, Somerville entered a plea of nolo contendere to dispensing optical devices without a license in the action of State of Florida vs. David C. Somerville, in the County Court in and for Volusia County, Florida, Case No. 85-15487-A. He was given one year's probation to run consecutive to a previous probation and again cautioned not to conduct any business without the presence of supervisory personnel required in his apprenticeship status. In the course of the order of the court, reference was made to Section 484.007(e)(3), Florida Statutes, and Rule 21P-16.01(4), Florida Administrative Code. A copy of the information and judgment and sentence related to this matter may be found as Petitioner's composite Exhibit 10 admitted into evidence. This offense pertained to the circumstance of the purchase of spectacles by Vanderbilt.

Florida Laws (7) 120.57455.227484.007484.013484.014775.082775.084
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ELIZABETH NICOLITZ vs BOARD OF OPTICIANRY, 93-001182F (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 26, 1993 Number: 93-001182F Latest Update: Nov. 29, 1994

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is Elizabeth Nicolitz who has been actively licensed in Florida as an optician since May 1, 1985. The Respondents are the Board of Opticianry and the Department of Professional Regulation. The Petitioner sought her attorney's fees and costs from an administrative proceeding, DOAH Case No. 92-1477, which was initiated by the filing of an administrative complaint on October 23, 1991, seeking disciplinary action against the Petitioner. The First District Court of Appeal summarized the facts and law leading up to this attorney's fees and costs case in Nicolitz v. Board of Opticianry and Department of Professional Regulation, 609 So.2d 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), as: Nicolitz was previously placed on probation and ordered to file quarterly reports. When two of those reports were late filed, an administrative complaint was filed against her. Through counsel she executed an "election of rights" form and disputed the allegations of fact and sought a formal hearing before a Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) hearing officer in accordance with Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The matter was referred to DOAH, where counsel for the Depart- ment of Professional Regulation (Department) and counsel for Nicolitz entered into a prehearing stipulation. The Department construed this stipula- tion as demonstrating an absence of disputed issues of material fact and, in accordance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 22I-6.033, moved the hearing officer to relinquish jurisdiction. The DOAH hearing officer considered Nicolitz's response in opposition to the motion to relinquish jurisdiction, heard oral argument, and denied the motion. Several weeks later, and one day before the scheduled formal hearing, counsel for the Department filed an "notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice." This pleading essentially tracked the earlier motion to relinquish jurisdiction in concluding that no material issues of fact were in dispute, and sought dismissal without prejudice to the Department's right to proceed before the Board of Opticianry (Board) in an informal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes. The hearing officer entered an order which "ratified" the voluntary dismissal and purported to dismiss the administrative complaint. See F.A.C. Rule 22I-6.037. When an informal hearing was scheduled before the Board, Nicolitz petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition and we issued an order to show cause. We have considered the petition, the responses of the Department and the Board, and petitioner's reply, and grant relief. . . . [The opposition] is based in part on an argument that [Ms. Nicolitz] has failed to acknowledge and comprehend the relationship between the Department and the Board in disciplinary proceedings. While we agree that relationship is key to proper resolution of this dispute, we find it is respondents [Department and Board] who miss the mark. The disciplinary proceeding essentially evolves in three stages, the first being an investigation by the Department and its report to the Board as to the existence of probable cause. See SS. 455.225(1), (2), and (3), Fla. Stat. (1991). The Board then may direct the Department to file an formal complaint and the Department shall "prosecute that complaint pursuant to the provisions of chapter 120." S. 455.225(4), Fla. Stat. The prosecution, second stage of the disciplinary proceeding, may or may not result in a referral to DOAH, but if it does, the relationship of the Board and the Department is altered. In the first stage, and during the third stage when jurisdiction returns to the Board and it enters a final order in accordance with section 455.225(6), the Board is a quasi-judicial body and the Department acts as an investigative and prosecuting authority. While jurisdiction lies with DOAH, however, that tribunal has jurisdiction and the Board is a party to the proceedings. S.120.57(1)(b)(3). During the DOAH proceedings, the Department acts as counsel of record for the Board and, we conclude, the Board must be bound by its counsel's actions. Those actions include voluntary dismissal of a complaint. Petitioner filed her attorney's fees and costs petition pursuant to Section 57.111 F.S. with the Division of Administrative Hearings on February 26, 1993, less than sixty days after the District Court's mandate issued. That is the case sub judice. She seeks attorney's fees and costs starting from October 29, 1991. The disciplinary litigation and administrative background between Ms. Nicolitz and Respondents could be described as a long and dreary "mini war," fought in sequential encounters. An abbreviated chronology of this epic struggle is essential to reach the material issues at bar, and illustrates that most of the time the right hand of the bureaucracy had no idea what its left hand was doing, even when the right hand directed the left hand to act. Ms. Nicolitz was licensed in Florida as a Dispensing Optician Lic. No. DO 0002492, and owned an optical establishment in Jacksonville known as "Specs and Company, Inc." During the summer of 1986, Ms. Nicolitz became the sponsor of an apprentice optician named Douglas H. Stewart. Chapter 484 F.S. permits licensed opticians to sponsor an apprentice optician for training purposes and allows the apprentice to perform a limited number of opticianry tasks, subject to the regulations contained in Rules 21P-16.001 through 21P-16.011 F.A.C. On June 30, 1986, while Ms. Nicolitz was away from the establishment, apprentice Stewart measured a patient's pupillary distance and segment height for assembling and fitting a pair of glasses in apparent violation of Rule 21P- 16.003 F.A.C. On December 12, 1986, the Department initiated disciplinary action against Ms. Nicolitz's license through the filing of a formal complaint styled DPR v. Elizabeth Nicolitz, Case No. 0072717. The case was subsequently resolved by stipulation of the parties, and Ms. Nicolitz signed the stipulation on March 23, 1987. The stipulation was then presented to the Board of Opticianry on April 10, 1987. A final order was filed May 12, 1987, ordering Ms. Nicolitz to pay an administrative fine of $250.00 within 30 days. Additionally, she would be placed on probation for one year and as a condition of probation, she was required to file quarterly reports, commencing the first of the month three months from the date of the filing of the final order. On May 12, 1987, Ms. Patricia B. Guilford, Executive Director of the Board of Opticianry wrote Ms. Nicolitz pointing out that the final order had been officially filed and as such, the terms of the March 23, 1987 stipulation must now be fulfilled. Ms. Guilford also pointed out that the administrative fine of $250.00 was due on or before June 12, 1987 and that Ms. Nicolitz's probation had begun, effective May 12, 1987, and would end June 12, 1988. The letter further specified that there were "specific terms and conditions" of probation that had to be met. As part of the letter, she included a copy of the filed final order. This package was sent by U.S. Certified Mail to Ms. Nicolitz and was signed for by her agent. Ms. Nicolitz paid the $250 fine on June 1, 1987. However, she did not thereafter file her quarterly reports with the Board in satisfaction of the other terms of her stipulation. On October 6, 1990, the Board of Opticianry filed a new administrative complaint, styled DPR v. Elizabeth Nicolitz, Case No. 0106310, alleging that Ms. Nicolitz had violated the previous final order by failing to submit the required quarterly reports in a timely fashion. Ms. Nicolitz responded to the Department by asserting that she had never received the final order, especially in reference to the probation requirement. On the advice of counsel, Ms. Nicolitz suggested that a new stipulation agreement be entered between her and the Department calling for new starting dates for her probation and quarterly reports. As agreed to, the new stipulation required Ms. Nicolitz to file quarterly reports on March 31, 1990, June 30, 1990, September 30, 1990, and December 31, 1990. In entering into the new stipulation agreement, the Department took into consideration allegations made by Ms. Nicolitz and her counsel that the final order may not have been properly served upon her, and agreed to dismiss pending complaint DPR v. Elizabeth Nicolitz, Case No. 0106310, filed October 6, 1990. That case was presented to the November 18, 1989 Probable Cause Panel for closure. The Panel heard the arguments and agreed to closure. During all of this period, agency personnel had harbored suspicions of Ms. Nicolitz because they felt she should have known what to do and when to do it because she had signed the stipulation and because of the agent's signature on the receipt for the final order. There were misinterpretations of the earlier closing order and attorneys for both parties fired off accusatory, and eventually explanatory and apologetic, letters. In any case, it was abundantly clear as of November 18, 1989 at the latest, that Ms. Nicolitz knew she must file her quarterly reports on March 31, 1990, June 30, 1990, September 30, 1990, and December 31, 1990. As per her agreement, Ms. Nicolitz submitted her first and second quarterly report on March 22, 1990 and June 1, 1990, respectively. However, she failed to submit the third quarterly report which was due September 30, 1990. The Board sent her a letter notifying her that she was delinquent. She then submitted the third report on October 16, 1990. She was again late with the filing of her last quarterly report due December 31, 1990. The Board once again notified her of the delinquency, and she submitted the last quarterly report on February 11, 1991. On October 23, 1991, a formal administrative complaint was filed. It charged Ms. Nicolitz with a violation of Section 484.014(1)(i) F.S., which provides for discipline of a licensee for: Violation of a lawful order of the board or department previously entered in a disciplinary hearing or failing to comply with a lawfully issued subpoena of the department. That administrative complaint became the underlying DOAH Case No. 92-1477, the procedural history of which is set out in Findings of Fact 3-4 supra. A more detailed factual history behind how the administrative complaint came to be filed is set out infra. There has never been any dispute that Ms. Nicolitz filed her first two of four required probation reports on time or that they were properly mailed directly to the Department of Professional Regulation instead of the Board. Since it was due on September 30, 1990, Ms. Nicolitz's third report, dated October 16, 1990, was 16 days late when she wrote it. Administrative Assistant Leah R. Hickel is an employee of the Board of Opticianry, whose paycheck is issued by the Department. In a letter dated October 17, 1990 Ms. Hickel advised Ms. Nicolitz that her quarterly report due September 30 had not been timely received and that she had thirty days from the date of Ms. Hickel's October 17, 1990 letter (i.e. November 16, 1990) to file the third quarterly report and comply with the terms of the final order. Ms. Nicolitz's October 16, 1990 report was stamped in as received by the Board on October 23, 1990. Ms. Hickel's letter and Ms. Nicolitz's third report must have crossed in the mail, but the third report was clearly timely received by the Board within the terms of Ms. Hickel's letter, and it may be reasonably inferred to have been received even earlier by the Department. Ms. Hickel sent a similar letter to Ms. Nicolitz on February 6, 1991 to the effect that Ms. Nicolitz's December 31, 1990 final quarterly report had not yet been received and that she must submit it within 30 days (i.e. March 8, 1991). The fourth report was filed with both Respondents within the time-frame provided in that letter. Contrary to the testimony of Susan J. Foster, the current Executive Director of the Board of Opticianry, and Manty Morse, a member of the Board and one of the members of the Probable Cause Panel which arrived at the new administrative complaint on September 16, 1991, the overwhelming record evidence is to the effect that Leah Hickel had apparent authority to extend the time for Ms. Nicolitz to file her third and fourth reports. Also, on the issue of whether or not Ms. Hickel had actual authority to extend probationers' time for reporting, it is found that she did. The Board had adopted a policy of extending by 30 days the time for filing probation reports as reflected by the minutes of an open meeting held November 3, 1989, stating: "The Board directed Ms. Hickel to send a 30-day letter any time a person is found not in compliance with a Final Order and to refer to complaints if they do not respond." (Emphasis supplied). Board Member Dale Wenal, the Board attorney, Theresa Bender, and the Department prosecutor, Renee Alsobrook, were present at the February 9, 1990 Board meeting when the November 3, 1989 Board meeting minutes were discussed and adopted. Board members, including Ms. Wenal, voted for adoption of the minutes, and both sets of minutes were preserved as a standard business record of the Board. This method of doing regular Board business, i.e. the instruction of its support service personnel, was common practice of this particular collegiate body. Under these circumstances, it is immaterial that a formal motion and vote to "create" such a policy did not occur at either meeting. It is also immaterial that Ms. Wenal and Ms. Morse were not present at the November 3, 1989 meeting and that Ms. Morse was not present at the February 9, 1990 meeting. No one for either the Board or the Department notified Ms. Nicolitz that she was in violation upon her late-filing of the third or fourth probation reports, filed within the extensions granted by Ms. Hickel on October 17, 1990 and February 6, 1991. However, on February 12, 1991, Ms. Hickel sent a memorandum to Denise Love, Senior Complaint Analyst, to the effect that she now wanted to initiate a complaint for violating the prior final order. Ms. Love advised Ms. Nicolitz via a February 26, 1991 letter of a preliminary investigation. Ms. Love already had signed the Department's internal uniform complaint form on February 21, 1991. To further obfuscate what the agency(ies) were doing, while the Department was initiating the investigation preparatory to an administrative complaint for late filed reports, Ms. Hickel notified Ms. Nicolitz by letter dated March 1, 1991 that: This will acknowledge receipt of your last quarterly report, received in this office on February 15, 1991. Please be advised we are notifying the office of licensure to remove your license from pro- bationary status, this date. The effect of the foregoing letter was to remove Ms. Nicolitz's license from probationary status as of March 1, 1991. By letter of March 28, 1991, Ms. Love invited a response to her February 26, 1991 letter from Ms. Nicolitz. Ms. Nicolitz, now thoroughly confused and frustrated, responded that she had sent all her reports and Ms. Hickel had acknowledged receipt thereof. On April 30, 1991, Ms. Love sent a similar letter to Ms. Nicolitz stating that no response from Ms. Nicolitz had been received. Ms. Nicolitz's attorney then entered the fray and wrote Ms. Love on May 21, 1991 advising her of the March 1, 1991 Hickel letter removing Ms. Nicolitz from probation. Ms. Love had already prepared an investigative synopsis to the file dated May 8, 1991. It was not altered thereafter by her. It reads: SECTION I - ALLEGED VIOLATION Failure to comply with terms of Final Order previously entered in a disciplinary hearing; violation of a rule. STATUTE/RULE NUMBER Rule 21P-8.020(2)(i), FAC; Section 484.014(1)(g), Fla. Stat. SECTION II - SYNOPSIS This investigation is predicated on the receipt of a complaint on 2/14/91 from the Board of Opticianry, alleging that Subject has failed to comply with the terms of the Final Order issued in DPR case #0072717. Subject was placed on probation and required to submit quarterly reports to the Board, but has not done so; Subject was notified of the complaint by letter to inquire dated 2/26/91 and again on 4/30/91. Response from Subject was received 4/24/91. Subject states that she has now complied with the terms of the Final Order and has submitted all of her quarterly reports. She says that Leah Hickel of the Board of Opticianry will confirm this. (Emphasis supplied). The Probable Cause Panel (Ms. Manty Morse and Ms. Dale Wenal) had at least the following items before them when considering Ms. Nicolitz's case on September 16, 1991: a uniform complaint form, a proposed closing order and a recommendation for a letter of guidance, an administrative complaint, a previously issued final order and attached affidavit of service, a memorandum of finding of probable cause, the four letters from Ms. Nicolitz to the Board purporting to be her quarterly reports, findings made by the Department, the two "extension" letters from Leah Hickel dated October 17, 1990 and February 6, 1991, the investigative synopsis, and the March 1, 1991 Hickel letter removing Ms. Nicolitz from probation. The materials had been received and reviewed by panel members earlier. Ms. Marcel Flannigan of the Department, Renee Alsobrook and Lucy Sneider, attorneys for the Department, and Theresa Bender, Counsel for the Board of Opticianry, were also present for the meeting. The direct evidence at formal hearing by Manty Morse was that she was unaware as of the September 16, 1991 Probable Cause Panel meeting of the Board's prior delegation of authority to Ms. Hickel and that she had not interpreted the Hickel letters as granting an extension for Ms. Nicolitz's third and fourth reports. With the advice of counsel, the panel had viewed each day which the probation reports were late as a separate violation of the prior final order which had never been formally modified. The exchange at the Probable Cause Panel Meeting went as follows: A VOICE: She's saying she filed her reports on April 17th of 1991. MS. ALSOBROOK: After Lea wrote. A VOICE: After. In other words, had she not written to her we'd still be waiting for her. MS. ALSOBROOK: And we also wrote her on September 30th of 1990 and she sent her report for that quarter in on October 23rd. So you may want to file an AC. It's up to you. A VOICE: An AC, air conditioning? MS. ALSOBROOK: An administrative complaint. What would you all like? You have probable cause; you can do either one. It's up to you. A VOICE: Well I would find probable cause, okay, and do file an Administrative Complaint. MS. BENDER: Okay. So you previously had found probable cause and -- A VOICE: Letter of Guidance. MS. BENDER: -- wanted to close it with a letter of guidance. A VOICE: But I would like to change that and have an Administrative Complaint. I don't feel good about this the other way. THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay. MS. ALSOBROOK: What section, 484.014(i), failure to comply with Final Orders? THE CHAIRPERSON: You don't want to send a letter to -- you want a response. A VOICE: I can't imagine that they would have attorneys -- MS. ALSOBROOK: Ready for the next one? (Whereupon, the above matter was concluded) Ms. Morse's formal hearing testimony essentially corroborated the statements made by the panel members at the September 16, 1991, Probable Cause Panel meeting. Her comments reflect the following, in part: Q With regard to the Nicolitz case, do you remember being provided with the entire investigative file? A Yes. Q When you reviewed this file to find probable cause, can you explain briefly why probable cause was found? A Probable cause was found because she didn't file her reports on time. Q Did the panel consider that each day that the reports were beyond the cutoff date for the quarter to be a violation? A Yes, we did. And we were upset that it had taken this long for her compliance and still she had not done it in a timely manner. Q Did you consider her to be, in essence, ignoring the Board? [objection] Q How did you interpret Ms. Nicolitz's actions as far as the late filing? A Well, the way the panel saw them, myself and Mrs. Wenal, was that she really didn't care, you know, and that's why we were both upset. So, she was just disregarding all the orders that were given to her previously and now, even though we had extended for her to file her reports, you know, two years, three years later. Q Do you recall if the prosecutor had recommended that you find probable cause? A Yes. Q Do you recall if the prosecutor had indicated a recommended penalty or action after you found probable cause? A I remember that they wanted a letter of guidance at that time. Q What is a letter of guidance? A It's to explain to her that there was probable cause found and for her to, you know, tell what went wrong and to guide her so she would not do it again, I guess. Q Did the panel decide to issue a letter of guidance? A At first we thought that was the proper thing to do. But then when we got into discussion, that we saw how far the case went and we saw all this inconsistency, you know, and she still filed late, that's when we decided not to go with the recommendation of the attorney. Q And what was the direction of the probable cause panel to the prosecutor? A It was to find probable cause, that we had found, and to file an administrative complaint. (Emphasis supplied) It is accepted that at the time of the Probable Cause Panel meeting, Ms. Morse did not have actual knowledge of the actual authority reposed in Ms. Hickel by the Board's actions of November 3, 1989 and February 9, 1990, but Ms. Morse's lack of actual knowledge of the Board's directive to Ms. Hickel is not controlling as to whether or not the panel's decision to file a new administrative complaint was substantially justified. Board members have a duty to advise themselves concerning the Board directives which have been previously issued to staff. Nor is it indicative of substantial justification whether or not Ms. Nicolitz knew of the content of the prior Board minutes. It is material whether the Probable Cause Panel knew or should have known on September 16, 1991, when it determined there was probable cause Petitioner had committed a violation, rejected the Department's recommendation for closing, and instructed the Department to file an administrative complaint, that the prior Board directive permitting extensions had been issued and what the panel did, knowing that the extensions had been granted. From her presence and vote on February 9, 1990, it may be inferred that on September 16, 1991 Ms. Wenel had actual knowledge of Ms. Hickel's actual authority to grant extensions and ignored it. It also is clear that on September 16, 1991, both Ms. Wenal and Ms. Morse also ignored the apparent authority of Ms. Hickel's October 17, 1990 and February 6, 1991 letters, which were physically before them, and knew of and also ignored Ms. Nicolitz's ultimate compliance with those letters, which were also before them, and that both Panel members did so because the Hickel letters were contrary to the members' subjective perception that Ms. Nicolitz had been ignoring them and their prior final orders. They also ignored the apparent ratification of Ms. Nicolitz's probation compliance contained in the March 1, 1991 Hickel letter. Their deliberations indicate no adequate basis for a probable cause determination since they had Ms. Nicolitz's quarterly reports and Ms. Hickel's extension letters before them and could not have been misled by the Department's report to the effect that Ms. Nicolitz only "states that she has now complied." (Emphasis supplied) The Department report also told them that Ms. Nicolitz requested that they ask Ms. Hickel to confirm all her assertions. Leah Hickel worked for the Board. Had the Panel consulted Leah Hickel, any doubts concerning her authority to grant extensions could have been cleared up. Therefore, the Panel ignored all exculpatory evidence pointed out by the accused. The Panel did not have a basis in law or fact for the administrative complaint actually filed. The Panel also deviated from proper legal and standard procedure by not conducting a clear vote on a finding of probable cause. 1/ Ms. Nicolitz's first report (March 22, 1990) stated that as of December 1989, she had closed Specs and Company Inc.'s optical business and that for the first quarter she had not practiced opticianry. The second report (June 1, 1990) stated she had not practiced opticianry in the second quarter. The third report (October 16, 1990) stated she had done nothing optical at all during the third quarter, other than going to a few optical meetings. The fourth report (February 11, 1991) reported that nothing had changed, Petitioner was not working for anyone as an optician and she had not done so for the last quarter of 1990. Ms. Nicolitz's four reports to the Board under the terms of her probation were that she had "closed Spec's and Company's Optical Business;" was home "out of all business settings;" "had not practiced opticianry," "was not operating a business and had not done anything optical at all," and "was not working optically or for anyone as an optician," throughout the whole of 1990. Despite a great deal of backpedalling on the foregoing representations as contained in pleadings and papers filed immediately prior to formal hearing with the intent to defuse Respondents' motion for summary final order of dismissal, Ms. Nicolitz's oral testimony at formal hearing does not appear to materially alter the representations contained in her four reports for the year 1990. To the extent that she has made any inconsistent statements in any form concerning the year 1990, those statements are found not to be credible. It is therefore found that Ms. Nicolitz was not operating as a "small business party" during the whole of 1990. With regard to her situation in 1991-1992, the only years relevant to the attorney's fees and costs incurred in the underlying case, Ms. Nicolitz testified that she operated Specs and Company, Inc. as an optical shop only until December 1989, when she closed it and moved into her two residential garages the portion of optical equipment which she was unable to sell. She did this, because, as she put it, "a question of conflict of interest arose" with her opthalmologist husband's work at Baptist Eye Institute. Specs and Company, Inc. was not administratively dissolved until October 9, 1992, but it was clearly no more than a de facto corporation at all times material. Ms. Nicolitz appeared in her individual capacity in the underlying case, and Specs and Company, Inc. was not a party. Prior to her licensure, Ms. Nicolitz was apparently only an appentice employee of the corporation. It is unclear if that status of "employee" altered after she was licensed in 1985. From 1982 until Ms. Nicolitz ceased to compete with her husband due to alleged "conflict of interest" in 1989, her corporation had all the indicia of doing business including maintaining a location open to the public during normal business hours; providing opticianry services to customers; having optical equipment, a lease agreement, secretarial staff, office equipment, finishing lab, city occupational license, business stationery, advertising, income, bank accounts; filing returns and paying sales and corporate taxes; and filing W-2 forms for employees. After 1989, any equipment which had not been sold sat in residential garages, and Ms. Nicolitz maintained no occupational license or any other indicia of a business. She specifically did not operate a business for profit out of any location labelled "Specs and Company, Inc." or "Elizabeth Nicolitz, O.D." at any time after December, 1989. Ms. Nicolitz's testimony and her answers to discovery were inconsistent or vacillated with regard to whether or not she considered what she personally did during 1991-1992 to constitute "practicing opticianry." Putting the best light on it, Ms. Nicolitz was clear that she did not think anything she did for family or friends during 1991-1992 constituted practicing opticianry "until I thought about it," immediately before a hearing on the motion for summary final order in this fees case. Her position at formal hearing was that merely maintaining an active individual professional opticianry license was sufficient to constitute "practicing opticianry." She gave as an example of what she was capable of doing as, "[A]t any time if I wanted to practice opticianry that I could. If someone was absent at, let's say Lens Crafters and they needed me to come in, I would bring my license in with me and practice under Lens Crafters with my new license for them." Admittedly, however, she never was actually employed anywhere by any other optician during this period of time. Rather, she listed herself for income tax purposes in both 1991 and 1992 as a "consultant" employee of her husband's business, "Ernest Nicolitz, M.D. P.A." She testified that this term meant "design consultant." Her husband is a medical physician, an opthalmologist. The total of the practice of opticianry now recollected by Ms. Nicolitz for 1991-1992 is that over some unspecified period of time, on sporadic occasions, she pushed lenses back into glasses frames for children whose names she did not know and with whom she had no ongoing relationship when their tumbling activities at a gym she belongs to resulted in the lenses popping out; in March or April of 1991, she replaced stripped screws in a neighbor's damaged glasses frames and heated the frames in hot water to mold them back in shape for the neighbor's face; later, she sold the same neighbor some glasses frames with nonprescription display lenses for the neighbor's mother, apparently without ever seeing the mother, and definitely without reporting the $50 sale as professional or any other type of income, and without paying any sales or other tax thereon. Ms. Nicolitz derived no pay as an optician for any of these activities and had no prescription for the tumblers, the neighbor, or the neighbor's mother. She had her professional license but no occupational license in her own name. Also, at a time no more definite than "in the fall" of 1991, Ms. Nicolitz was involved in fitting hunting glasses for her husband and son, one pair each. At her home, upon written prescriptions from her opthalmologist husband, Ms. Nicolitz fitted frames to her husband's face and her son's face, took the offset of the pupillary distance due to the scope on a gun and then "we figured out the density of the lenses we would be using and we figured out, what, you know, color tones we wanted to use in the lens. And then we ordered the lenses and had them ground at a lab to my specifications." Although she testified that her husband did not know how to offset the optical center for the hunting glasses and could not physically measure himself, her overall description shows Ms. Nicolitz was working under the direction, not of a customer, but of her husband, the opthalmologist, for whom she worked as a "consultant." She charged no separate opticianry fees and had no occupational license in her own name. Clearly, she was intentionally not in competition individually in her own right or as "Specs and Company, Inc." with her husband for "conflict of interest" purposes. Ms. Nicolitz and her C.P.A., Mr. Shelton, whose expert testimony came by way of deposition, estimated her personal net worth as between $400,000 and $450,000 for 1991-1992, but given that Ms. Nicolitz's C.P.A. made his estimates purely for family financial planning purposes 2/ and Ms. Nicolitz eschewed any concrete knowledge of her own financial affairs, their evidence does not establish Petitioner's net worth. The Department's C.P.A. expert witness estimated the combined worth of Ms. Nicolitz and her husband as $2,190,000, based upon tax returns and Mr. Shelton's deposition. No evidence categorized Petitioner's personal net worth as derived in any significant part as related to her practice of opticianry, or established the net worth of Specs and Company, Inc. or broke out with reasonable clarity Ms. Nicolitz's "personal net worth from personal and business investments." The testimony of the three attorneys who testified as to fees and costs has been thoughtfully considered and weighed. It is found that Petitioner was obligated to her attorney for fees and costs for 15.30 hours and no allowable costs as of the date of voluntary dismissal of the underlying case, for 40.30 hours and $279.70 in allowable costs as of the date the initial petition for fees and costs was filed February 26, 1993, for 40.30 hours and $279.70 in allowable costs as of the date of filing of the amended fees and costs petition herein; and for 126.30 attorney hours and $368.05 costs as of the commencement of formal hearing on fees and costs herein. The rate of $200.00 dollars per hour charged by Petitioner's counsel is a reasonable hourly rate, given the unique circumstances of this case. At that rate, Petitioner's counsel established sufficient hours to reach the $15,000 statutory cap prior to the commencement of formal hearing on the attorney's fees and costs issues. 3/

Florida Laws (7) 120.57120.68455.219455.225484.002484.01457.111
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BRIAN LLOYD WEBER AND BRIAN LLOYD WEBER AND ASSOCIATES vs BOARD OF OPTOMETRY, 96-005350RU (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 08, 1996 Number: 96-005350RU Latest Update: Apr. 09, 1997

The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether alleged statements attributed to the Board of Optometry were made by the Board, and if so, whether the statements constitute unpromulgated rules prohibited by Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes, (Supp. 1996).

Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated as a matter of fact that: The FOA is a not-for-profit Florida corporation whose membership is comprised of optometrists licensed under Chapter 463, Florida Statutes, to practice optometry in Florida. All FOA members are subject to and regulated by the Board of Optometry and its rules. The FOA has approximately 1,022 members. The Board of Optometry is the agency responsible for regulating the optometric practice of all FOA members. Board rules and agency statements of general applicability regulate the optometric practice of all FOA members. Individual members of the FOA, being subject to and regulated by the rules and policy of the Board of optometry, are persons whose substantial interests will be affected by the alleged agency statements and are thus substantially affected persons within the meaning of Section 120.56(1)(e), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1966). As all members of the FOA are subject to and regulated by Board rules and statements of general applicability, a substantial number of the FOA’s members would be substantially affected by the alleged statements. The objective of the FOA is to promote and protect the interests of the general public and licensed optometrists in ensuring the availability of high quality eye care at an affordable price. The FOA represents its members through the provision of education and training, and by participation in administrative proceedings, legislative activities, and court litigation. Petitioner, Brian Lloyd Weber, O.D., is an optometrist licensed and practicing in Florida. Petitioner, 29/49 Optical Inc., (29/49), is a corporation which operates optical establishments in Florida. The Board of Optometry is the state agency in Florida which licenses optometrists and regulates the practice of optometry in this state. On January 29, 1992, the Probable Cause Panel of the Board of Optometry determined there was probable cause to discipline the license of Dr. Weber because of an alleged violation of Section 463.014(1)(b), Florida Statutes, involving the corporate practice of optometry. Thereafter, on February 2, 1992, an Administrative Complaint was filed with the Board which alleged that Dr. Weber had violated the cited statute by engaging in the practice of optometry with a corporation not composed of other health care providers; by entering into a corporate arrangement which permitted an unlicensed person to practice optometry through Dr. Weber, in violation of Rule 21Q-3.008, (now Rule 59V-3.008, Florida Administrative Code); and by holding himself out to the public as available to render professional services in a manner which implies he is professionally associated with an entity which is not a licensed practitioner, also in violation of the Rule. The investigation conducted by the then Department of Professional Regulation, which led up to the action of the panel and the filing of the Administrative Complaint indicated that Dr. Weber owned 250 shares of stock in 29/49, along with an optician, Anthony Record, not licensed to provide optometry services, who also owns stock in the corporation. Allegedly, the corporation operated at five different locations, at one or more of which eye examinations were performed. It was also alleged that 29/49 had publicly advertised itself as an entity which provided complete eye examinations, and that Dr. Weber performed the eye examinations described in the advertisements. In fact, Dr. Weber is a director and officer of 29/49. He holds a 75% ownership share in the corporation. Both Dr. Weber and Mr. Record control the corporation and share the duties and profits of the operation. The firm provides optitianry services, as defined in Sections 484.002(3) and (7), Florida Statutes. Dr. Weber asserts that the operations of 29/49 are separate from the operations of his optometric practice, and claims that the Board’s direction to him to change the corporate structure of 29/49 so as to dissolve his partnership with a lay person is a continuation of what he claims is a long-standing policy of prohibiting the joint ownership of an optitianry between and optometrist and a lay person. Before a hearing was held on the Administrative Complaint, Dr. Weber and counsel for the Board entered into a stipulation which, if accepted by the Board, would have resolved the pending disciplinary action. The stipulation was presented to the Board at its July 8, 1993 meeting, at which time the Board voted to reject it and to propose a counter-stipulation. At that meeting, the Board did not enunciate any of the alleged agency statements at issue here nor did it take a position as to what Dr. Weber must do to rectify the practice situation to its satisfaction. Nonetheless, by Order dated September 9, 1993, the Board formally rejected the proposed stipulation and proposed its own stipulation. On September 12, 1996, Dr. Weber and the Agency’s counsel presented a second stipulation to the Board for settlement of the disciplinary matter, but again the Board voted to reject the stipulation and to offer its own second counter- stipulation. This counter-proposal called for Dr. Weber to change his corporate structure so that he no longer violated the statutory prohibition against practicing optometry with non- licensed individuals, and that he no longer practice with a lay person. This second counter-proposal by the Board did not enunciate any of the alleged agency statements at issue herein. This second counter-proposal was promulgated in an Order of the Board issued on October 15, 1996. Sections 463.014(1)(a)&(b), Florida Statutes, provide: No corporation, lay body, organization, or individual other than a licensed practitioner shall engage in the practice of optometry through the means of engaging the services, upon a salary, commission, or other means or inducement, of any person licensed to practice optometry in this state. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit the association of a licensed practitioner with a multidisciplinary group of licensed health care professionals, the primary objective of which is the diagnosis and treatment of the human body. No licensed practitioner shall engage in the practice of optometry with any corporation, organization, group or lay individual. This provision shall not prohibit licensed practitioners from employing, or from forming partnership or professional associations with, licensed practitioners licensed in this state or with other licensed health care professionals, the primary objective of whom is the diagnosis and treatment of the human body. Consistent therewith, the Board of Optometry has promulgated Rule 59V-3.008, Florida Administrative Code, which implements the provisions of the statute. Rule 59V-3.008, Florida Administrative Code, restates the intent of the legislature regarding the need for licensure of practitioners of optometry, defines a “licensed practitioner”, and thereafter outlines with particularity those actions which may and those which may not be carried on by licensed optometrists in Florida. The rule is quite clear in its definitions and leaves little room for misunderstanding regarding what constitutes the practice of optometry and optometric services; those individuals who must be licensed; what professional activities a licensed practitioner may perform and what activities constitute a violation of Section 463.014,Florida Statutes. Of specific relevance to the issues herein are: (15)(b) Entering into any agreement (whether written or oral) which allows, permits or facilitates an entity which itself is not a licensed practitioner to practice optometry, to offer optometric services to the public, or to control through any means whatever any aspect of the practice of optometry. Allowing, permitting, encouraging, forbearing, or condoning any advertisement including those placed in a newspaper, magazine, brochure, flier, telephone directory, or on television or radio, which implies or suggests that the licensed practitioner is professionally associated or affiliated with an entity which itself is not a licensed practitioner. Occupying or otherwise using professional office space in any manner which does not clearly and sufficiently indicate to the public that his/her practice of optometry is independent of and not associated with an entity which itself is not a licensed practitioner. , (I), and(j), [which all refer with specificity to some action which relates to the practice of optometry by a licensed practitioner with an entity which itself is not a licensed licensed practitioner.] This rule has been challenged in the courts and determined to be a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioner claims that pronouncements by the Board of Optometry since the passage of the relevant statute and the promulgation of the relevant rule, including a Declaratory Statement by the Board in response to a Petition therefore by Phillip R. Sidran, O.D. in 1991, found at 13 FALR 4804; and in discussion of members at various meetings of the Board’s Probable Cause Panel; all indicate that the Board has formulated a policy regarding the instant issue which is neither a statute nor a properly promulgated rule. In 1991, Dr. Sidran, a licensed optometrist, sought a declaratory statement from the Board regarding the propriety of having a licensed optician share the revenues and responsibilities deriving from the optical portion of his practice. In its Declaratory Statement, issued on October 9, 1991, the Board specifically referred to and quoted the controlling portions of the statute and the rule which it then interpreted as indicating such an arrangement was prohibited. At no time did the Board promulgate new guidelines or expand the strictures imposed by the existing statute and rule. It applied an existing statute and rule to the factual situation posed by Dr. Sidran and concluded that under the facts of that case, the existing statute and rule prohibited the proposed relationship. The subsequent discussion of that opinion at the meeting of the Board’s Probable Cause Panel, convened on January 29, 1992, to consider proposed disciplinary action against Dr. Weber for the situation described here with 20/49, again interpreted existing statute and rule but did not formulate policy. Petitioner further refers to two additional meetings of the Board of Optometry at its meetings on July 8, 1993 and September 12, 1996, at both of which the members present discussed the situation regarding Dr. Weber’s business relationship in 29/49. He claims that in both situations, the Board members made policy statements which should have been formalized through the promulgation of a rule amendment or supplement. Review of the transcripts of those meeting does not support Dr. Weber’s position, however. It is clear that in each case the Board members examined the facts presented to them, applied the existing statutory and rule provisions to those facts, and concluded that the Petitioner’s actions constituted a violation of existing law. The Board’s position vis a vis Dr. Weber’s business arrangement was made a part of the Board’s counter-proposal to the stipulation of settlement initially agreed to by Dr. Weber and the Department’s counsel. In it’s counter-stipulation, which came out of the September 12, 1996 Board meeting, the Board required Dr. Weber to “... change his corporate structure so he is no longer in violation of Section 463.014(1)(b), Florida Statues, and that [his] practice be changed so that he is no longer practicing with a lay person.”

Florida Laws (7) 120.52120.54120.56120.57120.68463.014484.002
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