Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was a producer of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes (1985). At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was a licensed dealer in agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (1985), and bonded by Respondent Travelers Indemnity Company (Travelers). At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Travelers was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The complaint filed by Petitioner was filed timely in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes. From November 5, 1987, through June 10, 1988, Respondent purchased from Petitioner 71 dozen squash, 375 dozen collard greens, 247 dozen mustard greens and 147 dozen turnip greens for a total price of $7,386.00. All produce was delivered between November 5, 1987 and June 10, 1988. No payments have been made by Respondent for the above produce. Respondent has not denied receiving the produce nor did Respondent complain about the produce's quality or condition upon delivery. Respondent owes $7,386.00 to Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $7,386.00. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent fails to timely pay the Petitioner as ordered, then Respondent Travelers be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1985) and that the Department reimburse the Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: C. L. Norman Route 2, Box 2160 Starke, Florida 32091 David Norman Norman's Country Market, Inc. 515 Northwest 23rd Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32069 Traveler Indemnity Company Attention Breet A. Ragland 988 Woodcock Road Suite 102 Orlando, Florida 32803 Doyle Conner, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mallory Horne, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agricultural and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Clinton H. Coulter, Jr. Attorney at Law Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue Whether Respondent Robin Audifredd d/b/a St. Francis Place a/k/a Family Ties (Respondent) operated an assisted living facility without a required license and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the sole owner of St. Francis Place. She has never done business as "Family Ties, ACLF, Inc." At all pertinent times, Respondent held a license from the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation to operate St. Francis Place as a boarding home. Respondent's license to operate St. Francis Place as a boarding house allows up to 16 residents. Respondent provides non-transient housing for her residents. During pertinent times, there were approximately 13 residents housed at St. Francis Place. Some residents of St. Francis Place have conditions such as alcoholism, dementia, schizophrenia, manic depression, memory loss, and head trauma. Most of the residents of St. Francis Place were placed by other agencies, such as the United States Veterans Administration (VA). In addition to housing residents for pay, at the time of the hearing, Respondent was providing housing to three former homeless residents free of charge. According to the Complaint, Respondent was operating St. Francis Place in a manner that required a license from the Agency as an ALF because she was providing "personal services"2/ to one or more residents who were not related to Respondent. A license from the Agency is not required for facilities that provide "personal services" to no more than two non-relative residents who do not receive optional state supplementation, if the owner or renter of the facility resides at the facility. See Conclusions of Law 65, infra. According to Respondent, she did not need to be licensed as an ALF because she resided at St. Francis Place and only provided "personal services" to one non-relative resident, who was not receiving optional state supplementation. There is no evidence that any resident of St. Francis Place was receiving optional state supplementation during the pertinent time period. Respondent owns the building located at 1030 Jo Jo Road, Pensacola, Florida, from which she operates St. Francis Place. Respondent also owns a home at 425 Belle Chase Way, Pensacola, Florida. According to Respondent, she "resides" at both 1030 Jo Jo Road and at 425 Belle Chase Way, in Pensacola, Florida. Respondent testified that she actually spends more time at 1030 Jo Jo Road, where St. Francis Place is located. Petitioner's employees provided testimonial evidence to the effect that Respondent spends a great deal of time at St. Francis Place. Their testimony supports a finding that Respondent spends three or four nights a week at St. Francis Place. Despite the evidence showing that Respondent spends a lot of her time at St. Francis Place, it is found that Respondent's residence is 425 Belle Chase Way, Pensacola, Florida, rather than 1030 Jo Jo Road, based upon the following findings which are supported by clear and convincing evidence: Respondent claims homestead exemption at 425 Belle Chase Way. Respondent receives her phone bill at 425 Belle Chase Way address. In 2009, Respondent's address was listed as 425 Belle Chase Way on the title listing Respondent as a co-owner of her mother's motor vehicle. Respondent had no regular room at St. Francis Place. Rather, she either slept on a couch near the main entrance or on a couch in a back room. Although Respondent would also occasionally sleep in a room set aside for residents when there was a vacancy, Respondent had no regular room at St. Francis Place to sleep or keep her clothes. In February of 2009, Respondent's attorney in Respondent's divorce proceedings listed Respondent's address as 425 Belle Chase Way. Prior to February 2010, the Florida Department of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety (DMV) listed Respondent's address as 425 Belle Chase Way. On February 13, 2010, the DMV issued Respondent a duplicate driver's license indicating that her address was 425 Belle Chase Way. By the time of the final hearing, the address listed on Respondent's Florida driver's license had been changed to 1030 Jo Jo Road. The change of address from 425 Belle Chase Way to 1030 Jo Jo Road was made on April 8, 2010, just five days prior to the final hearing. Despite the recent change, Respondent testified that she did not know what address was listed on her driver's license. That testimony was not credible. Neither was Respondent's testimony that she "resided" at St. Francis Place. The phone number and address for St. Francis Place is listed in the Pensacola area 2009 AT&T Real Yellow Pages (Yellow Pages) under the heading "Assisted Living." At the final hearing, Respondent explained that she never authorized the listing and has contacted Yellow Pages and asked them to remove the listing. Respondent's testimony in that regard is undisputed, and it is found that Respondent did not authorize St. Francis Place to be listed in the Yellow Pages under the heading "Assisted Living." On March 25, 2009, a site visit of St. Francis Place was conducted by the Medicaid Fraud Unit of the Florida Attorney General's Office. The next day, on March 26, 2009, the Agency for Health Care Administration conducted a survey of St. Francis Place. The undisputed testimony clearly showed that, when the site visit and survey were conducted, there was one resident, identified as "G. T.," who was totally contracted and required assistance with daily living such as bathing, dressing, feeding, and taking medications. Respondent admits, and it is found, that Respondent and her employees provided "personal services" to G. T. within the meaning of applicable ALF licensing laws. G. T. is a resident who has had multiple sclerosis for many years. Respondent has known G. T. for over 16 years. G. T. had been a resident of St. Francis Place since it first opened its doors approximately six years prior to the date of the final hearing. The Agency was aware that G. T. was a resident of St. Francis Place and was receiving personal services prior to the March 2009, site visit and survey. There is no indication, however, that the Agency took any action prior to March 2009, to alert Respondent that she was considered to be operating an ALF without a license. Katherine Cone and Norma Endress were members of the teams who conducted the site visit and survey of Respondent's St. Francis Place facility on March 25 and March 26, 2009, respectively. During her visit on March 25, 2009, Ms. Cone believed that resident G. T. was not receiving proper care and arranged for her transport to a local hospital. G. T. was treated and released back to St. Francis Place. According to Ms. Endress, who saw G. T. the very next day, she observed no demonstrated harm to any resident at St. Francis Place. The evidence is insufficient to conclude that G. T. was harmed while a residing at St. Francis Place.3/ After the site visit and survey, both Ms. Cone and Ms. Endress believed that, in addition to the personal services provided to G. T., there was evidence that staff at St. Francis Place was providing personal services in the form of assistance in administering medications or filling pill organizers for other residents. The evidence presented at the final hearing, however, was insufficient to show, clearly and convincingly, that personal services were rendered to other residents. The insufficient evidence included: Photographs and the surveyors' recollections of pill reminder or pill organizer boxes that looked as though they were full of medications; Photographs and the surveyors' recollections of medication containers stored in a centrally located medication cart with wheels; Photographs and Ms. Cone's recollection of documents in folders above the medication cart containing information related to transportation and outside services for residents such as pharmacies and transportation companies. Ms. Cone's testimony that one of Respondent's employees, Kathleen Wentworth, told her at the time of the site visit that she maintained pill organizers with medications for several residents, and that Ms. Wentworth had signed a statement to the effect that staff at St. Francis Place administered medications to residents. Ms. Endress' testimony that one of the residents told her that staff at St. Francis Place had filled his pill reminder box. The evidence was insufficient because it was not further supported. Respondent and her testifying employees explained, and other evidence indicated, that the medication cart remained unlocked and was accessible so that residents could retrieve their own medications. There was no testimony from a St. Francis Place resident, employee or Respondent, or anyone else with actual knowledge, indicating that either Respondent or her employees ever assisted any resident other than G. T., with their medications. As far as Ms. Cone's hearsay recollection of what Ms. Wentworth told her, Ms. Wentworth testified at the hearing that the conversation did not occur. In addition, while Ms. Cone remembered a written statement signed by Ms. Wentworth, no such document was entered into evidence. Finally, photographs and Ms. Cone's recollection of folders with documents about services available from other vendors, such as pharmacies or transportation providers, did not show that Respondent was providing personal services to her residents. According to Ms. Endress, prior to leaving St. Francis Place after the site visit on March 26, 2009, she informed Respondent that Respondent was operating without the requisite ALF license, and that Respondent would be hearing from the Agency within 10 days. In contrast, Respondent testified that one of the Agency's employees, Ms. Klug, told her that she could "care for two people without an ALF license," and that Ms. Endress had given her similar assurances. Consistent with Ms. Endress's recollection, the Agency sent a letter to Respondent dated March 27, 2009, which informed Respondent that the Agency "considers you to be operating as an Assisted Living Facility (ALF) without being licensed." Considering that letter, together with the recollection of Ms. Endress, and the comparative credibility of the witnesses testifying on this point, it is found that, while one or more Agency employees informed Respondent that there was an exception to the AFL license requirements, Ms. Endress informed Respondent on March 26, 2009, that Respondent needed an ALF license, and that Respondent would be hearing from the Agency within ten days. The Agency's letter mailed to Respondent on March 27, 2009, stated in its entirety: Dear Ms. Audiffred, You are hereby notified that the Agency for Health Care Administration considers you to be operating as an Assisted Living Facility (ALF) without being licensed. Based on Section 429.14(1)(m), Florida Statutes (Fla. Stat.), it is unlawful to own, operate, or maintain an assisted living facility without obtaining a license under Chapter 429, Part I, F.S. Section 429.02(6), Fla. Stat., defines an ALF as "any building or buildings, section or distinct part of a building, private home, boarding home, home for the aged, or other residential facility, whether operated for profit or not, which undertakes through its ownership or management to provide housing, meals, and one or more personal services for a period exceeding 24 hours to one or more adults who are not relatives of the owner or administrator." The statute provides an exemption from licensure for not more than 2 adults who do not receive optional state supplementation (OSS) when the person who provides the housing, meals and personal services owns or rents the home and resides therein. This exception can be found in Section 420.04(2)(d), Fla. Stat. Based on evidence of unlicensed activity, the Agency intends to proceed with all available legal action, including bringing injunctive proceedings against you in a court of competent jurisdiction, to insure that you immediately cease and desist from offering these services. Further, Section 429.19(7), Fla. Stat., provides that "any unlicensed facility that continues to operate after agency notification is subject to a $1,000 fine per day". [sic] If you believe you are not operating as an ALF in violation of law as described, you may submit in writing any information which would demonstrate that to the Agency within 24 hours of receipt of this notice. Any information you wish to have considered by the Agency must be actually received within 24 hours of your receipt of this Notice of Violation. If you have any questions, you may reach me at 850-922-8822. The letter was signed by Barbara Alford, R.N., B.S.N., Field Office Manager, and was copied to Alberta Granger, Assisted Living Unit Manager, and to the Regional Attorney. The fines set forth in the Complaint are premised upon penalties accruing at the rate of $1,000 per day from the day after the Agency's March 27, 2009, letter to Respondent, through July 21, 2009, when the Agency found that G. T. was still residing at Respondent's facility. According to paragraph 13 of the Complaint, "pursuant to § 408.812, Fla. Stat. (2009), the Agency notified the Respondent by certified mail that the facility was in violation of Florida Law on March 27, 2009." The Agency's March 27, 2009, letter, however, does not refer to section 408.812, contains a number of wrong citations to the law, and is equivocal on the issue of whether the Agency was actually requiring Respondent to cease and desist. The law in effect in March 2009 when the letter was written was the 2008 version of Florida Statutes, not the 2009 version referenced in the Complaint.4/ The first paragraph of the March 27, 2009, letter refers to section 429.14(1)(m), Florida Statutes, for the proposition that "it is unlawful to own, operate, or maintain an assisted living facility without obtaining a license. " There is, however, no section 429.14(1)(m) in either the 2008 or 2009 version of section 429.14. The next statutory reference in the letter is in the second paragraph which refers to section 429.02(6) for the definition of ALF. Both the 2008 and 2009 versions of section 429.02(6), however, define "chemical restraint," not ALF. Although, further down in the second paragraph, the letter correctly refers to section 429.04(2)(d), for the exception where no license is required; the third paragraph of the letter erroneously refers to section 429.19(7) for the quote "any unlicensed facility that continues to operate after agency notification is subject to a $1,000 fine per day." That language does not appear in either the 2008 or 2009 version of section 429.19, and has not appeared in chapter 429 since 2006. In fact, instead of providing for a $1,000 per day fine, section 429.19(7), Florida Statutes (2008), in effect on the date of the letter, provides: In addition to any administrative fines imposed, the agency may assess a survey fee, equal to the lesser of one half of the facility's biennial license and bed fee or $500, to cover the cost of conducting initial complaint investigations that result in the finding of a violation that was the subject of the complaint or monitoring visits conducted under s. 429.28(3)(c) to verify the correction of the violations. A provision for the imposition of a $1,000 per day fine from the date of notice does not appear in either the 2008 or 2009 versions of chapter 429. Rather, the authority to impose a $1,000 per day fine for operating an ALF without a license which was in effect in March 2009, when the letter was written is found in section 408.812(4), Florida Statutes (2008), which provides that "[a]ny person or entity that fails to cease operation after agency notification may be fined $1,000 for each day of noncompliance." Although the Complaint, served approximately 9 months after the letter, refers to section 408.812, the letter does not even mention chapter 408. In addition, the actual language of section 408.812(4) differs from the quote in the letter from an old version of section 429.19(7) that was no longer in effect. Aside from being inaccurate on the law, the letter does not explain why the Agency "considers" Respondent to be operating an ALF without a license, or what aspects of Respondent's operations required her to need a license beyond her license to operate a boarding house. Even though the letter fails to describe which aspects of Respondent's operations violate the law, and does not set forth the referenced "evidence of unlicensed activity," the letter advises Respondent that she may submit information to the Agency within 24 hours to demonstrate that she is "not operating an ALF in violation of law as described." Additionally, although suggesting that the Agency intends to proceed with legal action to insure that Respondent "cease[s] and desist[s] from offering these services," the letter does not identify which services or tell Respondent to stop operations. In addition to giving Respondent time to provide the Agency with information that she is not in violation of the law, the letter advises Respondent of the exception to the requirement of a license for not more than 2 adults "when the person who provides the housing, meals and personal services owns or rents the home and resides therein." While it has been found that Respondent did not actually reside at St. Francis Place, it is further found that Respondent believed that she could care for two patients without an ALF license as mentioned in the letter. Respondent received the Agency's March 27, 2009, letter on or about April 1, 2009. Within 24 hours after receiving the letter, Respondent sent the Agency an undated written response addressed "To Whom it May Concern." Respondent's written response mentioned that she had discussed with Ms. Endress, the one resident that they "give care to" and that Ms. Endress had advised, "Well legally you can take care of two people without a license." Respondent's written response further reported that a representative from the VA had suggested to several of Respondent's residents that they should move out. Respondent's written response also advised that a number of visits and surveys of St. Francis Place had been conducted in March 2009, by various agencies, including the VA, the Medicaid Fraud Unit from the Florida Attorney General's Office, the Florida Department of Children and Families, and the Agency. The last paragraph of Respondent's written response states: St. Francis Place is a liscenced [sic] non-transient rooming house and the arrangements provided by our business is stated below. The renters residing at St. Francis Place are responsible for their own medications, laundry, and living quarters. As a non-transient rooming house and being in operation for the past six years, we have always encouraged our renters to maintain their own independence. Six of the thirteen renters have their own Florida drivers liscence [sic]. Several of the renters attend school or maintain employment. Several renters perform odd jobs for pay at St. Francis Place, such as yard work, sweeping porches, or taking out trash etc. Monthly Rent includes: three meals a day accessible laundry room transportation upon request utilities garbage service use of telephone cable. On July 21, 2009, surveyors from the Agency once again visited St. Francis Place and observed that G. T. was still residing there and receiving personal services. Sometime after July 21, 2009, the Florida Department of Children and Families moved G. T. from St. Francis Place to a facility known as the "Villas" in an Alzheimer's lock-down unit. The Agency never sought an injunction to force Respondent to cease operating St. Francis Place. There is no evidence that the Agency suggested to Respondent corrective measures or actions that she could take to comply with the law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration issue a final order finding that Respondent Robin Audifredd d/b/a St. Francis Place5/ operated an assisted living facility without a license in violation of section 408.812, but imposing no administrative fine or penalty. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May, 2011.
The Issue Whether, under the provisions of sections 604.15 - 604.34, Florida Statutes, Lester Towell Distributors, Inc., is entitled to recover $2,098 for agricultural products ordered by and delivered to VBJ Packing, Inc
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made. Lester Towell is a dealer in Florida-grown agricultural products. VBJ is a dealer in Florida-grown agricultural products. On May 22, 1995, VBJ placed an order with Lester Towell to purchase a quantity of extra-large green bell peppers. Lester Towell delivered 200 boxes of such peppers to VBJ on May 23, 1995. To fill this order, Lester Towell purchased 63 boxes of peppers from producer Ott Farms, Inc., in Estero, Florida, and 137 boxes from producer Thomas Produce, in Boca Raton, Florida. Lester Towell did not act as agent for these producers; it purchased the products outright. On May 22, 1995, VBJ placed an order with Lester Towell to purchase a quantity of yellow corn. Lester Towell delivered 100 boxes of such corn to VBJ on May 24, 1995. To fill this order, Lester Towell purchased 100 boxes of corn from producer Wilkinson-Cooper, in Belle Glade, Florida. Lester Towell did not act as agent for this producer; it purchased the products outright. On May 24, 1995, VBJ placed an order with Lester Towell to purchase a quantity of jalapeno peppers, white corn, and red radishes. Lester Towell delivered two boxes of jalapeno peppers, 26 boxes of white corn, and 20 boxes of red radishes to VBJ on May 25, 1995. To fill this order, Lester Towell purchased 2 boxes of jalapeno peppers from producer Ott Farms, Inc., in Estero, Florida, and 26 boxes of white corn and 20 boxes of red radishes from producer American Growers in Belle Glade, Florida. Lester Towell did not act as agent for these producers; it purchased the products outright. Lester Towell filed its complaint with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services ("Department") pursuant to the provisions of section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes, because VBJ did not pay for the products identified above. There is, however, no evidence to establish that Lester Towell was a producer or the agent or representative of a producer with respect to the products for which it seeks payment. It is, therefore, not a "person" entitled to file a complaint with the Department against VBJ and its surety.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order dismissing the complaint of Lester Towell Distributors, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 3nd day of July 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July 1996
The Issue Whether Respondent, Xencom Facility Management, LLC (Xencom), terminated the employment of Petitioners solely because the contract under which they were working ended.
Findings Of Fact Xencom provides general maintenance, landscaping, housekeeping, and office cleaning services to retail facilities. In September of 2015, Xencom entered three contracts for services with CREFII Market Street Holdings, LLC (CREFII). The contracts were to provide maintenance, landscaping, and office cleaning services for a mall known as Market Street @ Heathbrook (Market Street) in Ocala, Florida. Michael Ponds, Xencom’s president, executed the contracts on behalf of Xencom. Two individuals executed the contracts on behalf of CREFII. One was Gar Herring, identified as manager for Herring Ocala, LLC. The other was Bernard E. McAuley, identified as manager of Tricom Market Street at Heathbrook, LLC. MG Herring was not a party or signatory to the contracts. MG Herring does not own or operate Market Street. A separate entity, The MG Herring Property Group, LLC (Property Group), operated Market Street. The contracts, in terms stated in an exhibit to them, established a fixed price for the year’s work, stated the scope of services, and detailed payment terms. They also identified labor and labor-related costs in detail that included identifying the Xencom employees involved, their compensation, and their weekly number of hours. The contract exhibits also identified operating costs, including equipment amortization, equipment repairs, fuel expenses, vacation costs, health insurance, and storage costs. The contracts ended December 31, 2016. The contracts specify that Xencom is an independent contractor. Each states: “Contractor is an independent contractor and not an employee or agent of the owner. Accordingly, neither Contractor nor any of Contractor’s Representatives shall hold themselves out as, or claim to be acting in the capacity of, an agent or employee of Owner.” The contracts also specify that the property manager may terminate the contract at any time without reason for its convenience. The contracts permit Xencom to engage subcontractors with advance approval of the property manager. They broadly describe the services that Xencom is to provide. Xencom has over 80 such contracts with different facilities. As the contracts contemplate, only Xencom exerted direct control of the Petitioners working at Market Street. Property Group could identify tasks and repairs to be done. Xencom decided who would do them and how. In 2013, Xencom hired Michael Harrison to work as its Operations Manager at Market Street. He was charged with providing services for which Property Group contracted. His immediate supervisor was Xencom’s Regional Manager. In 2016, that was David Snell. Mr. Snell was not located at Market Street. Property Group also did not have a representative on site. Before Xencom hired him, Mr. Harrison worked at Market Street for Property Group. Xencom hired the remaining Petitioners to work at Market Street under Mr. Harrison’s supervision. Each of the Petitioners completed an Application for Employment with Xencom. The application included a statement, initialed by each Petitioner, stating, “Further, I understand and agree that my employment is for no definite period and I may be terminated at any time without previous notice.” All of the Petitioners also received Xencom’s employee handbook. As Xencom’s Operations Manager and supervisor of the other Petitioners, Mr. Harrison was responsible for day-to-day management of Petitioners. He scheduled their work tasks, controlled shifts, established work hours, and assigned tasks. Mr. Harrison also decided when Petitioners took vacations and time off. His supervisor expected him to consult with Property Group to ensure it knew what support would be available and that he knew of any upcoming events or other considerations that should be taken into account in his decisions. As Operations Manager, Mr. Harrison was also responsible for facilitating payroll, procuring supplies, and managing Xencom’s equipment at the site. Xencom provided Petitioners work uniforms that bore Xencom’s name. Xencom required Petitioners to wear the uniforms at work. Xencom provided the supplies and equipment that Petitioners used at work. Only Xencom had authority to hire or fire the employees providing services to fulfill its contracts with the property manager. Only Xencom had authority to modify Petitioners’ conditions of employment. Neither MG Herring, Property Group, nor Xencom held out Petitioners as employees of MG Herring or Property Group. There is no evidence that MG Herring or Property Group employed 15 or more people. Property Group hired Tina Wilson as Market Street’s on- site General Manager on February 1, 2016. Until then there was no Property Group representative at the site. The absence of a Property Group representative on-site left Mr. Harrison with little oversight or accountability under the Xencom contracts for Market Street. His primary Property Group contact was General Manager Norine Bowen, who was not located at the property. Ms. Wilson’s duties included community relations, public relations, marketing, leasing, litigation, tenant coordination, lease management, construction management, and contract management. She managed approximately 40 contracts at Market Street, including Xencom’s three service agreements. Ms. Wilson was responsible for making sure the contracts were properly executed. Managing the Xencom contracts consumed less than 50 percent of Ms. Wilson’s time. During the last weeks of 2016, Mr. Harrison intended to reduce the hours of Kylie Smithers. Ms. Wilson requested that, since Ms. Smithers was to be paid under the contract for full- time work, Ms. Smithers assist her with office work such as filing and making calls. Mr. Harrison agreed and scheduled Ms. Smithers to do the work. This arrangement was limited and temporary. It does not indicate Property Group control over Xencom employees. Ms. Wilson was Xencom’s point of contact with Property Group. She and Mr. Harrison had to interact frequently. Ms. Wilson had limited contact with the other Xencom employees at Market Street. Friction and disagreements arose quickly between Mr. Harrison and Ms. Wilson. They may have been caused by having a property manager representative on-site after Mr. Harrison’s years as either the manager representative himself or as Xencom supervisor without a property manager on-site. They may have been caused by personality differences between the two. They may have been caused by the alleged sexual and crude comments that underlie the claims of discrimination in employment. They may have been caused by a combination of the three factors. On November 21, 2016, Norine Bowen received an email from the address xencomempoyees@gmail.com with the subject of “Open your eyes about Market Street.” It advised that some employees worked at night for an event. It said that Ms. Wilson gave the Xencom employees alcohol to drink while they were still on the clock. The email said that there was a fight among Xencom employees. The email also said that at another event at a restaurant where Xencom employees were drinking, Ms. Wilson gave Ms. Smithers margaritas to drink and that Ms. Smithers was underage. The email claimed that during a tree-lighting event Ms. Wilson started drinking around 3:30 p.m. It also stated that Ms. Wilson offered a Xencom employee a drink. The email went on to say that children from an elementary school and their parents were present and that Ms. Wilson was “three sheets to the wind.” The email concludes stating that Ms. Wilson had been the subject of three employee lawsuits. On December 14, 2016, Ms. Wilson, Ms. Bowen, and Mr. Snell met at Property Group’s office in Market Street for their regular monthly meeting to discuss operations at Market Street. Their discussion covered a number of management issues including a Xencom employee’s failure to show up before 8:00 to clean as arranged, security cameras, tenants who had not paid rent, lease questions, HVAC questions, and rats on the roof. They also discussed the email’s allegations. The participants also discussed a number of dissatisfactions with Mr. Harrison’s performance. Near the end of a discussion about the anonymous email, this exchange occurred:2/ Bowen: Okay, so I know that David [Snell], I think his next step is to conduct his own investigation with his [Xencom] people, and HR is still following up with John Garrett, and you’re meeting with Danny [intended new Xencom manager for Market Street] tonight? David Snell: Yes. Bowen: To finish up paperwork, and, based on his investigation, it will be up to Xencom to figure out what to do with people that are drinking on property, off the clock or on the clock, you know, whatever, what their policy is. * * * Bowen: So, I don’t know what to make of it. I’m just here to do an investigation like I’m supposed to do and David is here to pick up the pieces and meet with his folks one-on- one, and we’ll see where this takes us. This exchange and the remainder of the recording do not support a finding that Property Group controlled Xencom’s actions or attempted to control them. The participants were responsibly discussing a serious complaint they had received, their plan to investigate it, and pre-existing issues with Mr. Harrison. The exchange also makes clear that all agreed the issues involving Xencom employees were for Xencom to address, and the issues involving Property Group employees were for Property Group to address. At the time of the December 14, 2016, meeting, the participants were not aware of any complaints from Mr. Harrison or Mr. Smithers of sexual harassment or discrimination by Ms. Wilson. On December 15, 2016, Gar Herring and Norine Bowen received an email from Mr. Harrison with an attached letter to Xencom’s Human Resources Manager and others. Affidavits from Petitioners asserting various statements and questions by Ms. Wilson about Mr. Harrison’s and Mr. Smithers’ sex life and men’s genitalia and statements about her sex life and the genitalia of men involved were attached. Xencom President Michael Ponds received a similar email with attachments on the same day. On December 21, 2016, Mr. Ponds received a letter from Herring Ocala, LLC, and Tricom Market Street at Heathbrook, LLC, terminating the service agreements. Their agreements with Xencom were going to expire December 31, 2016. They had been negotiating successor agreements. However, they had not executed any. Xencom terminated Petitioners’ employment on December 21, 2016. Xencom no longer needed Petitioners’ services once MG Herring terminated the contract with Xencom. This was the sole reason it terminated Petitioners.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order denying the petitions of all Petitioners. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 2018.
The Issue Whether the Respondent Five Brothers Produce owes the Petitioner $16,493.00 for green beans that Five Brothers Produce accepted, sold, and shipped to the buyer as the Petitioner’s agent/broker.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Five Brothers Produce accepts agricultural products from growers for sale or consignment and acts as an agent/broker for the growers. Currently, Five Brothers Produce represents 25 to 30 growers as agent/broker. Five Brothers Produce has a surety bond issued by Old Republic Surety Company to secure payment of sums owed to agricultural producers. Veggie Growers grows agricultural produce in fields located in Homestead, Florida. On or about April 28, 2009, a buyer employed by Five Brothers Produce examined Veggie Growers' crop of green beans in the field. He suggested that Veggie Growers pick the beans and deliver them to Five Brothers Produce for sale. On April 28, 2009, Veggie Growers delivered 796 boxes of hand-picked green beans to Five Brothers Produce. The beans were inspected and accepted for sale by an employee of Five Brothers Produce. The Marketing Agreement and Statement included on the Grower Receipt for the produce given to Veggie Growers by Five Brothers Produce provided in relevant part: The grower gives Five Brothers Produce the right to sell or consign to the general trade. No guarantees as to sales price are made and only the amounts actually received by Five Brothers Produce, less selling charges, cooler charges, and any other charges will be paid to the grower. Final settlement will be made within a reasonable length of time and may be held until payment is received from the purchaser. On April 29, 2009, Veggie Growers delivered 514 boxes of hand-picked green beans to Five Brothers Produce. The beans were inspected and accepted for sale by an employee of Five Brothers Produce. The Marketing Agreement and Statement included on the Grower Receipt for the produce delivered by Five Brothers Produce to Veggie Growers on April 29, 2010, included the same provision as quoted above. Veggie Growers received a picking advance of $3980.00 on the beans from Five Brothers Produce on April 28, 2010, and it delivered a total of 1310 boxes of green beans to Five Brothers Produce on April 28 and 29, 2009. The beans picked by Veggie Growers on April 28 and 29, 2009, were in good condition when they were picked, packed, and delivered to Five Brothers Produce. On April 29, 2009, Five Brothers Produce sold 50 crates of Veggie Growers’ beans to J. H. Harvey for $15.00 per crate. On April 30, 2009, Five Brothers Produce shipped the remaining 1260 crates of green beans received from Veggie Growers to Chenail Fruits et Legumes (“Chenail”) in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. In this shipment, Five Brothers Produce also included 84 crates of beans obtained from growers other than Veggie Growers, for a total of 1344 crates of green beans. The invoice issued by Five Brothers Produce reflecting the sale of 1344 boxes of green beans to Chenail identified the price of the beans as $11.50 per box, together with a Ryan recorder, which is used to measure the temperatures during transit, and pallets furnished by Five Brothers Produce, for a total due from Chenail of $16,671.50. Chenail received the shipment of beans at 11:30 on May 3, 2009, and requested an inspection at 5:32 on May 4, 2009, stating on the inspection request that it was “protesting the above described load due to poor condition on arrival.” Pursuant to the agreement between Chenail and Five Brothers Produce, a private inspection report was ordered, which was to include digital temperatures, “as conclusive evidence of the condition of this product noted upon arrival at destination.” The Certificate of Inspection indicated that the inspection report was completed at 7:00 on May 4, 2009, and that no decay was in evidence; that an average of 15 percent of the beans exhibited “dark green pepper spot discoloration ((resembling bruising) affecting materially the appearance),” with a range of six percent to 22 percent; that an average of two percent of the beans exhibited russeting; an average of seven percent of the beans were flabby, with a range of three percent to 12 percent; and that an average of four percent of the beans exhibited wind scars, with a range of one percent to 10 percent. The report also reflected that the bean crates were “in good order properly packed. Finally, the pulp temperature of the beans was noted in the report at 40 degrees Fahrenheit; the warehouse temperature was noted as 40 degrees; and the outside temperature was noted as 63 degrees. No temperature was noted for the vehicle in which the beans had been shipped, presumably because the beans had been off-loaded. A Commodity References form for beans was attached to the inspection report. It included information that the United States Department of Agriculture recommended storing snap beans at 40 to 45 degrees Fahrenheit; that the “standard grade tolerances” for defects in U.S. No. 1 snap beans is 13 percent total, “including 5 % serious including 1 % soft decay.” The Commodity References form also included information that, for a “[m]aximum percentage for a 5 day normal transit,” the “Suitable Shipping Condition/F.O.B. Good Delivery Guideline” for snap beans is 18 percent total, “including 8 % serious including 3 % decay.” The condition of the beans shipped by Five Brothers Produce exceeded the standard tolerances. The Commodity References form also indicated that, if the beans were held at a temperature cooler than 40 degrees Fahrenheit, there would have been evidence of decay in the form of surface pitting and russeting, with rusty brown specks, and the beans would “then become spotted and sticky when removed to warmer temperatures.” There was no indication on the Certificate of Inspection that the beans exhibited any of these features except that an average of two percent of the beans were russeted. Pursuant to these standards, Chenail properly considered the 1344 crates of beans shipped from Five Brothers Produce to be defective. Based on the results of the inspection report of the 1344 crates of beans, Chenail sent Five Brothers Produce a statement reflecting that it would remit to Five Brothers Produce a total of $1,275.70 U.S. The statement showed that Chenail paid nothing for 374 crates of beans; $6.00 Canadian per crate for 112 crates; $8.00 Canadian per crate for 336 crates; and $9.00 Canadian per crate for 522 crates. Based on these figures, Chenail calculated that the total gross amount due to be paid to Five Brothers Produce for the 1344 crates of beans was $6,446.40 U.S. Chenail then deducted $5,170.70 U.S. for inspection, pallets, recorder, transport, and warehousing costs and indicated it would remit to Five Brothers Produce a net total of $1275.70, or an average of $0.95 per crate of beans. Five Brothers Produce subsequently sent an invoice to Chenail for $1,491.20 U.S., or a average of $1.11 per crate, after deducting the charges Chenail had included for the pallets and the recorder, which had been furnished by Five Brothers Produce. Five Brothers Produce sent Veggie Growers a Grower Lot Status form showing the history of the 1310 crates of hand-picked “bush” beans it received from Veggie Growers on April 28 and 29, 2009. The form reflects the sale of 50 crates of beans to J. H. Harvey on April 29, 2009, at $15.00 per crate. It also reflects a price $0.95 per crate for the 1260 crates of Veggie Growers snap beans included in the shipment to Chenail, for a total sale amount of $1,458.09. Five Brothers Produce deducted from this amount a $50.00 loading fee and a $30.00 selling charge for the beans sold to J. H. Harvey and the $3,980.00 advance paid to Veggie Growers for the beans. Five Brothers Produce did not take a loading charge or a selling charge for the 1344 crates of beans sent to Chenail. According to the calculations of Five Brothers Produce, Veggie Growers had a net return of -$2,601.91 on the 1310 crates of beans. The market dictates how quickly Five Brothers Produce can sell the produce it accepts as agent/broker. In late April, snap beans generally do not sell quickly because there are a lot of beans available. Beans should be sold and shipped as soon as possible after picking. Snap beans will usually last only seven days from the date of picking. It normally takes two or three days for a shipment of produce to travel from Five Brothers Produce to Canada. Sometimes beans that are in good condition at the time they are shipped are not good enough to survive the trip to Canada. Summary The evidence presented by Veggie Growers is not sufficient to establish that it is entitled to any additional payment for the beans it delivered to Five Brothers Produce on April 28 and 29, 2009. Veggie Growers established that it picked the beans and delivered them to Five Brothers Produce at the suggestion of a representative of Five Brothers Produce, who inspected the beans in the field and found them acceptable, and that the beans were acceptable when delivered to Five Brothers Produce. Indeed, on April 29, 2009, when the final 514 crates of beans were delivered to Five Brothers Produce, Five Brothers Produce sold 50 crates for $15.00 per crate, establishing that the beans were of good quality when delivered. Nonetheless, there was no evidence presented to suggest that Five Brothers Produce did not use its best efforts to locate a buyer for the remaining 1260 crates of beans within a reasonable time after the beans were delivered, nor was any evidence presented to suggest that Five Brothers Produce did not properly store, load, and ship the beans to Chenail. The beans were shipped from Five Brothers Produce on April 30, 2009; the inspection report shows that the beans were properly packed; and there is no indication that the beans had been stored at an improper temperature.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order dismissing the complaint of Veggie Growers, Inc., against Five Brothers Produce, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2010.
Findings Of Fact CENTRAL FLORIDA's complaint for Unfair Termination in the form of a letter dated July 9, 1986, was filed in triplicate with the Department of Highway Safety and Motor vehicles on July 10, 1986, and alleged as follows: CENTRAL FLORIDA MACK TRUCKS, INC. has two agreements with MACK TRUCK, INC. The first agreement is a Mack Distributor Agreement dated July 1, 1967. The second agreement is a Mack Mid-Liner distributor Agreement dated September 20, 1979. MACK TRUCKS' letter of April 10, 1986, indicates they are "terminating" my agreements. As alleged by Petitioner CENTRAL FLORIDA, Respondent has terminated two Distributor Agreements, the MACK Agreement dated July 1, 1967, and the Mid-Liner Agreement dated September 20, 1979. To the extent the letter/complaint addresses the Mack Distributor Agreement dated July 1, 1967, it should be dismissed upon authority of Yamaha Parts Distributors, Inc. v. Ehrman, 316 So.2d 557 (Fla. 1975). In Yamaha, the Florida Supreme Court was faced with the unfair termination statute here at issue, Section 320.641 Florida Statutes, and the issue of its applicability to dealer agreements entered into between manufacturers and dealers prior to the effective date of the statute, January 1, 1971. On the basis of Article I, Section 10, of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 10, of the Florida Constitution, regarding impairment of contracts, the Supreme Court held We hold that Section 320.641, Florida Statutes, applies prospectively to motor vehicles franchise contracts signed after its effective date. Yamaha Parts Distributors, Inc. v. Ehrman, 316 So.2d at 560. Yamaha is unambiguous. Therefore, as to the Mack Distributor Agreement, Section 320.641 does not apply. The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, and through it the Division of Administrative Hearings and the undersigned hearing officer, have no jurisdiction to adjudicate the Complaint for Unfair Termination as it addresses the July 1, 1967 Mack Distributor Agreement. This determination was made in an Order entered in DOAH Case No. 86- 2622 on August 28, 1986. Since August 28, 1986, Petitioner has provided a more definite statement as to the Mack Mid-Liner Distributor Agreement which has been determined by the under signed Hearing Officer to be in compliance with her previous order. On October 3, 1986 Respondent moved for severance of the two distributor agreements, which severance was granted by an Corrected Order entered October 27, 1986. That order re-numbered the cause as pertains to the July 1, 1967 Mack Distributor Agreement as DOAH Case No. 86-4136 and retained DOAH Case No. 86-2622 for the cause as it pertains to the Mack Mid-Liner Distributor Agreement. Within its motion, Respondent represented that a recommended order (presumably leading to a final order) be entered at this time. Respondent has shown good cause for granting the relief prayed for. Without such relief, the Mack Distributor agreement hangs in limbo until such time as a recommended order is entered incorporating the August 28, 1986 ruling on the Mack Distributor Agreement and resolving all disputed issues of material fact concerning the Mack Mid-Liner Distributor Agreement is entered (presumably at least 30 days after conclusion of the final formal evidentiary hearing now scheduled to conclude January 6, 1987). Continuation of this situation pending the formal evidentiary hearing on the Mack Mid-Liner Distributor Agreement, typing of transcripts, submission of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, entry of a recommended order, filing of exceptions, and entry of the agency's final order prejudices Respondent Mack in that Mack is unable to appoint a new distributor in Central Florida.
Recommendation That the Secretary of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a final order dismissing this cause only as the July 1, 1967 Mack Distributor Agreement. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of October, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald E. Cabaniss, Esquire 11 East Pine Street Post Office Box 1873 Orlando, Florida 32302 Dean Bunch, Esquire 305 South Gadsden Street Post Office Drawer 1170 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 C. Jeffrey Arnold, Esquire 857 North Orange Avenue Post Office Box 2967 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue Whether Respondents (“Dobson’s” and “Western Surety”) should be required to pay an outstanding amount owed to Petitioner, Doug Lancaster Farms, Inc. (“Lancaster Farms”).
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing, the record as a whole, and matters subject to official recognition, the following Findings of Fact are made: Oden Hardy was the general contractor for a project in Apopka, Florida, known as the Space Box project. Dobson’s, a subcontractor on the Space Box project, contracted to purchase 269 trees (including Live Oaks, Crape Myrtles, Elms, and Magnolias) for $53,245.00 from Lancaster Farms. Dobson’s supplied Lancaster Farms with all the information needed to file a “notice to owner” as authorized by section 713.06, Florida Statutes. A truck from Dobson’s picked up the trees and transported them to the site of the Space Box project. Upon arriving with the trees, Dobson’s discovered that there was no means by which the trees could be watered at the site. Rather than attempting to jury rig some manner of watering system as requested by Oden Hardy, Dobson’s transported the trees to its place of business, and the trees remain there. The parties have stipulated that Dobson’s has paid all of the invoices except for Invoice No. 5810, totaling $12,580.00. There is no dispute that the trees at issue are “agricultural products” within the meaning of section 604.15(1). There is also no dispute that Dobson’s is a “dealer in agricultural products” within the meaning of section 604.15(2).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order approving the claim of Doug Lancaster Farms, Inc., against Dobson’s Woods and Water, Inc., in the amount of $12,630.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry K. Dobson Dobson's Woods and Water, Inc. 851 Maguire Road Ocoee, Florida 34761-2915 Kelly Lancaster Doug Lancaster Farms, Inc. 3364 East County Road 48 Center Hill, Florida 33514 Western Surety Company Post Office Box 5077 Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57117-5077 Kristopher Vanderlaan, Esquire Vanderlaan & Vanderlaan, P.A. 507 Northeast 8th Avenue Ocala, Florida 34470 (eServed) Steven Hall, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 (eServed) Honorable Nicole “Nikki” Fried Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, and on the deposition testimony received in evidence, I make the following findings of fact: On October 30, 1985, the Florida Department of Transportation ("FDOT") received and opened sealed bids on State Project Number 72270-3431, in Duval County, Florida. Five bids were submitted for this project. The lowest bid, in the amount of $6,235,948.35, was submitted by Hubbard Construction Company ("Hubbard"). The amounts of the other bids were as follows: the second low bidder, $6,490,796.91; the third low bidder, $6,519,447.90; the fourth low bidder, $7,470,941.74; and the fifth low bidder, $7,477,038.49. All bids submitted were more than seven per cent over FDOT's estimate of the project price. The two lowest bids also appeared to be unbalanced and, as set forth in more detail below, the Hubbard bid was in fact unbalanced in several particulars. It is FDOT policy to give special review to bids that are more than seven per cent above the estimated price of the project. All bidders were made aware of this policy by the following language on the first page of the Notice To Contractors: Bidders are hereby notified that all bids on any of the following projects are likely to be rejected if the lowest responsive bid received exceeds the engineer's estimate by more than seven per cent (7 percent). In the event any of the bids are rejected for this reason, the project may be deferred for readvertising for bids until such time that a more competitive situation exists. Upon review of the bids submitted on the subject project, FDOT decided to reject all bids. By notices dated December 6, 1985, all bidders were advised that all bids were rejected. The stated reasons for the rejection of all bids were as follows: All bids were too high; the apparent first and second low bidder's bids were unbalanced and the apparent first low bidder failed to meet the WBE Requirements. Hubbard submitted its formal written protest to the FDOT regarding the proposed rejection of its bid on the subject project on January 3, 1986. This protest was made pursuant to Section 120.53, Florida Statutes (1985), the instructions to bidders and bid information provided by the Department, and rules of the Department, including Rules 14-25.04 and 14-25.05, Florida Administrative Code. Unbalancing occurs when a contractor puts a higher price on a particular item of work in the project in anticipation of using more of that item than the FDOT has estimated will be required. Unbalancing can also occur when a lower than estimated price is placed upon a particular item. When a bid appears to be unbalanced, the bid is submitted to the Technical Awards and Contract Awards committees for review. In this case, the FDOT's preliminary estimate personnel discovered six items that were unbalanced within Hubbard's bid. The first item of concern was an asphalt base item for which the FDOT's estimate was $4.00 per square yard and the Hubbard bid was $19.29 per square yard. The second item was clearing and grubbing for which FD0T's estimate was $50,000 and Hubbard's bid was $200,000. The third item was removal of existing structures for which FDOT's estimate was $190,762 and Hubbard's bid was $38,000. The fourth item was installing new conductors for which FDOT's estimate was $251,000 and Hubbard's bid was $141,000. The fifth item was removal of existing pavement for which FDOT's estimate was $78,000 and Hubbard's bid was $153,000. Finally, the sixth item was surface asphalt items for which FDOT's estimate was $98,000 and Hubbard's bid was $169,000. The FDOT has a policy that any bid that is seven per cent or more over the estimate will go before the Awards Committee for review. Further, the FDOT has a policy that whenever the bids are more than seven per cent higher than the estimate, the FDOT's Bureau of Estimates will then review their estimate and the apparent low bidder's bid to determine whether the original estimate was correct. The FDOT maintains a Women's Business Enterprises ("WBE") program. The FDOT's program requires that successful bidders provide for participation of women owned and controlled business in FDOT contracts. The program is implemented by the setting of so-called "goals" for certain projects. The goal is stated as a percentage of the total dollar bid for each project. Thus, the WBE goal for a project requires that the bidder utilize FDOT certified WBE's in constructing the project to the extent that the FDOT's goal is a percentage of the total bid. The FDOT has implemented rules to effectuate its WBE program. Rule 14- 78, Florida Administrative Code (amended effective May 23, 1984). In submitting a bid, the rules offer the bidder the option of meeting the WBE goals or submitting proof of a good faith effort to meet the goal and if a good faith effort is sufficient, the FDOT may waive the goal. The FDOT's bid package and specifications, as furnished to contractors, in no place referred to the Department's rule providing that only 20 percent of the amount of subcontracts with WBE suppliers shall count toward the goals on Federal aid projects. The specifications clearly state that WBE suppliers may be counted toward the goals. The specifications as furnished by the Department also imply that the 20 percent rule applies only to non-federal aid jobs. The project in question in this case is a Federal aid project. There is a conflict between the rule and the language of the specifications which creates an ambiguity in the specifications, as well as a trap for the unwary bidder who overlooks the requirements of the rule. The FDOT is in the process of amending the specifications to make them conform to the rule. The Special Provisions contained within the bid specifications established certain minority participation goals for this project--ten per cent for Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBE) and three per cent for Women Business Enterprises (WBE). FDOT personnel analyzed the bid documents submitted by Hubbard according to the criteria set forth at Rule 14-78, Florida Administrative Code, and determined that Hubbard exceeded the DBE goal but failed to meet the WBE goal. Hubbard's WBE participation was two per cent. All other bidders on the project met both of the DBE and WBE goals. When Hubbard submitted its bid on this project, Hubbard thought that it had complied with the three per cent WBE goal by subcontracting 3.5 per cent of the contract price to WBE certified firms. However, 2 per cent of the contract price was to be subcontracted to a WBE for supplies to be furnished by a WBE who was not a manufacturer. Accordingly, when the 20 per cent rule discussed above was applied to that 2 per cent, the total amount of WBE participation which could be counted toward Hubbard's compliance with the rule was approximately 2 per cent, which was less than the 3 per cent goal. Once it was determined that Hubbard had failed to meet the WBE goal, FDOT personnel analyzed Hubbard's good faith efforts package pursuant to Rule 14-78, Florida Administrative Code. Hubbard's good faith efforts package failed to demonstrate that Hubbard had taken sufficient action in seeking WBE's to excuse its failure to meet the WBE goal for this project. Similarly, Hubbard's evidence at the hearing in this case was insufficient to demonstrate that Hubbard had taken sufficient action in seeking WBE's to excuse its failure to meet the WBE goal for this project. Most telling in this regard is that all four of the other bidders on this project were successful in meeting or exceeding the DBE and WBE goals.
Recommendation For all of the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Florida Department of Transportation issue a Final Order rejecting all bids on Federal Aid Project No. ACIR-10-5 (76) 358 (Job No. 72270-3431). DONE AND ORDERED this 24th day of March 1986, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN DOAH CASE NO. 86-0O24BID The following are my specific rulings on each of the proposed findings of fact submitted by each of the parties. Rulings on findings proposed by the Petitioner, Hubbard Construction Company The substance of the findings of fact proposed by the Petitioner in the following paragraphs of its proposed findings have been accepted and incorporated into the findings of fact in this Recommended Order: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8. The substance of the first sentence of paragraph 6 is accepted. The remainder of paragraph 6 is rejected as an unintelligible incomplete statement. Paragraph 7 is rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. (The Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction were not offered in evidence.) Paragraph 9 is rejected for a number of reasons, including not being supported by competent substantial evidence, being to a large part irrelevant, being predicated in part on an erroneous notion of which party bears the burden of proof, and constituting in part legal argument rather than proposed findings of fact. The first and third sentences of paragraph 10 are accepted in substance. The second and fourth sentences of paragraph 10 are rejected as irrelevant. The last sentence of paragraph 10 is rejected as irrelevant and as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 11 is rejected as irrelevant and as including speculations which are not warranted by the evidence. Paragraph 12 is rejected as irrelevant and as including speculations which are not warranted by the evidence. Paragraph 13 is rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence and as being contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rulings on findings proposed by the Respondent, Department of Transportation The substance of the findings of fact proposed by the Respondent in the following paragraphs of its proposed findings have been accepted and incorporated into the findings of fact in this Recommended Order: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. Paragraph 9 is rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: John E. Beck, Esquire 1026 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Thomas Drawdy, Secretary Department of Transportation Mail Station 57 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064
The Issue The issues are as follows: (a) whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner based on his sex and race in violation of Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes (2003); and (b) whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment act by retaliating against Petitioner in violation of Section 760.11(7), Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black male. He began working as a truck driver for Respondent on May 29, 2002. Mike Helms, Petitioner's supervisor, was responsible for hiring Respondent's truck drivers. During the year and a half that Mr. Helms worked for Respondent, 80 to 90 percent of the truck drivers hired were black. During the hearing, Petitioner testified that he repeatedly requested Respondent's mechanics to repair the leak in his truck cab beginning in August 2002. Petitioner stated that Respondent's mechanics did not repair the truck cab until sometime after August 2003 when he was not working and a white female truck driver was driving his truck. Petitioner's allegations of disparate treatment involving the repair of the truck have not been considered here because the record does not reflect that they were raised in Petitioner's original or amended complaint or during FCHR's subsequent investigation. Because the allegations were not raised in either of Petitioner's complaints, FCHR never considered them, which would have allowed consideration in the contested hearing. Petitioner also testified that Respondent did not enforce the no-smoking policy in the driver's lounge until Mr. Helms became ill with a heart condition. The allegations that Mr. Helms dismissed Petitioner's complaints without explanation prior to that time were not included in Petitioner's original or amended complaint. There is no record evidence that Petitioner ever raised an issue involving the no-smoking policy during FCHR's investigation or that FCHR ever considered Respondent's alleged failure to enforce the no-smoking policy, which would have allowed consideration in the contested hearing. Respondent provided its truck drivers with radio/ telephones so that they could communicate with each other and with the office. Each driver had an assigned radio/telephone that he or she used every day. Each night the drivers would leave their telephones in an unsecured area of the truck office that was accessible to all employees. Typically, each telephone was programmed to identify incoming calls by the number of the unit making the call. In other words, the unit number of the person initiating the call would appear on the recipient's screen. However, the recipient's telephone could be programmed to show the name of the incoming caller instead of his or her unit number. On February 17, 2003, Petitioner was using the telephone usually assigned to him. During the day, he noticed that the word "nigger" was programmed into his internal telephone directory. Petitioner made this discovery when he scrolled through his internal telephone directory to place a call to another unit. Petitioner realized that someone had programmed his telephone to show the racial slur when unit 12 called him. Unit 12 was an extra phone, used by the drivers when their phones were not working properly. Therefore, the person who programmed the racial slur into Petitioner's assigned telephone did not know necessarily which driver would be using unit 12 on February 17, 2003. It follows that the driver who used unit 12 on February 17, 2003, might not have known that the derogatory name would appear on Petitioner's screen when unit 12 contacted Petitioner. Petitioner first checked with a couple of drivers who verified that their internal telephone directories were not programmed to identify unit 12 as "nigger." Petitioner concluded that he was the only target of the epithet. Petitioner then called unit 12/"nigger" and discovered that Ed Wight was using the spare telephone that day. Petitioner believed that only a few drivers knew how to program names into an internal telephone directory. He assumed that Mr. Wight was responsible for tampering with his telephone. Petitioner waited to confront Mr. Wight at Respondent's pit. Petitioner put the radio in Mr. Wight's face and asked him if he had programmed the name in the telephone. Petitioner told Mr. Wight that he did not "play that way" and did not appreciate it.1/ Next, Petitioner drove his truck into Respondent's parking lot at a high rate of speed. Mr. Helms, who was standing outside, feared the truck would not stop before it struck him. After Petitioner's truck slid to a stop, he emerged yelling and screaming. Petitioner then threw his telephone at Mr. Helms. Mr. Helms did not understand why Petitioner was so upset until Petitioner showed Mr. Helms the racial slur in Petitioner's internal telephone directory. Petitioner then got into his truck and sped away. Mr. Helms later learned that Petitioner had confronted Mr. Wight at the pit, accusing him of programming the racial slur into Petitioner's telephone. In the meantime, Mr. Helms instructed Petitioner to go home and not to return to work until Mr. Helms called him. When Petitioner returned to work, he met with Mr. Helms and Mr. Wight. During the meeting, Petitioner apologized to Mr. Wight for confronting him. Mr. Helms advised Petitioner that he was suspended for two days for his conduct toward Mr. Wight and for driving into the parking lot in an unsafe manner. There was no evidence that Mr. Wight was responsible for the racial slur. Therefore, Mr. Wight was not disciplined. During the hearing, Petitioner admitted that he does not know who programmed the racial slur into his telephone. He acknowledged that no one at work ever called him by that name again. Petitioner testified that he has never heard Mr. Helms or anyone else in a position of authority at Respondent's place of business make a racially derogatory comment in his presence. Respondent took appropriate steps to ensure that future racial slurs could not be programmed anonymously into the telephones. Specifically, Mr. Helms padlocked the doors that led to the room where the telephones were stored when they were not in use. This was inconvenient for Mr. Helms because he had to be at the office every time a driver picked up or returned a telephone. Nevertheless, Mr. Helms knew it was important to secure the telephones to prevent any recurrence of the problem experienced by Petitioner. Mr. Helms did not believe that a driver would admit to being responsible for the racial slur. Therefore, he did not interview all of the drivers. Instead, Mr. Helms spoke to a couple of drivers, asking them to come forward with any information that might reveal the identity of the guilty person. Mr. Helms hoped the drivers he talked to would cooperate by sharing information circulating among the employees. For these reasons, Mr. Helms considered his investigation to be ongoing. However, neither Mr. Helms nor any other member of Respondent's management team ever found out who was responsible for the racial slur. Respondent did not conduct any special meeting to educate the drivers about Respondent's intolerance of racial discrimination. Respondent's employee handbook clearly prohibits any type of racial discrimination, including but not limited to, "racial and ethnic slurs, jokes or other derogatory remarks about or directed toward minority groups." Respondent required all employees to acknowledge that they have received and read the employee handbook. Petitioner signed the employee acknowledgement on January 10, 2003. The handbook states that failure to comply with safety rules is an offense that may subject an employee to discipline. The handbook also states that an employee may be discharged for threatening another employee or showing disrespect for a supervisor. On May 1, 2003, approximately two and a half months after the telephone incident, Respondent promoted Petitioner to the position of crew chief. Mr. Helms made the decision to promote Petitioner. As crew chief, Petitioner was responsible for leading a group of drivers and was eligible for a monthly bonus in the amount of $250.00 if no accidents or traffic violations occurred during the month. Petitioner resigned his position as crew chief in August 2003. He made the decision to step down as crew chief because he did not believe the compensation was sufficient. During the hearing, Petitioner testified that he believed Mr. Helms treated four specifically-named male drivers more favorably than Petitioner. Petitioner testified that three of these drivers were black males and one was a white male. Petitioner did not include allegations of Mr. Helm's alleged favorable treatment of the four male drivers in his original or amended complaint. There is no record evidence that FCHR investigated or considered these allegations, which would have allowed consideration in the contested hearing. On October 1, 2003, Petitioner hauled a load of dirt to Respondent's dump. The person responsible for telling drivers where to dump and for pulling them out when they got stuck in the mud was David Cochran, a white male. On this occasion, Petitioner followed Mr. Cochran's instructions and got stuck. Because Mr. Cochran ignored Petitioner's request for assistance in getting his truck out of the mud, Petitioner called Mr. Helms to report that Mr. Cochran was not providing assistance. After waiting for 40 to 45 minutes, Petitioner's crew chief, Tommy Bennett (a black male), and another driver, Leonard Glover (a white male) came by to speak to Petitioner. Petitioner explained that he was waiting for Mr. Cochran to pull his truck out of the mud. Mr. Glover then hooked his truck to Petitioner's truck and freed Petitioner's truck from the mud. Approximately one half hour later, Petitioner returned to the dump. He saw a white female truck driver stuck in the same location. Mr. Cochran immediately pulled her truck from the mud. At this point, Petitioner decided that Respondent was discriminating against him. First, he called a television station. Next, he called FCHR regarding the process of filing a complaint. He then called Vicki Goodman, Respondent's director of human resources, requesting documentation regarding the February 17, 2003, telephone incident. Petitioner did not tell Ms. Goodman about the incident with Mr. Cochran. When Ms. Goodman inquired why Petitioner wanted the documents, he responded that he was dissatisfied with Ms. Goodman's and Mr. Helms' response to the telephone incident. Ms. Goodman advised Respondent that there was no information about the telephone incident other than as discussed with Petitioner eight months before. She also told him he was not entitled to a copy of the report of that incident. Ms. Goodman then inquired whether Petitioner was concerned about something else that was occurring in the workplace. Petitioner responded by saying, "I really don't want to talk about it right now. You'll find out soon enough." During the hearing, Petitioner testified that he told Ms. Goodman, "[s]omeone from FCHR would be contacting her soon." In papers submitted to FCHR, Petitioner claimed he responded to Ms. Goodman's inquiry by stating that "[s]omeone would be contacting her in the near future in reference to the information that [he] was requesting.” Petitioner's testimony that he informed Respondent on October 1, 2003, that he was filing a complaint with FCHR is not persuasive. On October 5, 2003, Petitioner signed a written Charge of Discrimination. He filed the charge with FCHR on October 7, 2003. In the meantime, Mr. Helms received a complaint from a female truck driver, Tina Pincumbe, on October 6, 2003. The complaint involved allegations of sexual harassment by Petitioner toward Ms. Pincumbe and other female truck drivers.2/ Upon hearing Ms. Pincumbe's complaint, Mr. Helms referred her to Ms. Goodman. He made the referral because he felt Ms. Pincumbe would be more comfortable talking with another female. Ms. Pincumbe went to Ms. Goodman's office and made a statement that was reduced to writing. During the interview, Ms. Goodman told Ms. Pincumbe that it was important for other women who were uncomfortable with the way Petitioner was treating them to come forward. Later on October 6, 2003, Janice Simpson voluntarily visited Ms. Goodman's office. Ms. Simpson also signed a written statement, accusing Petitioner of sexual harassment. On October 7, 2003, Sheila Nichols, a female truck driver, was working light duty in the office. Ms. Goodman approached Ms. Nichols as part of her investigation. Ms. Nichols subsequently signed a written statement containing allegations of unwanted advances by Petitioner. On October 7, 2003, Cathie Corrie, a female truck driver, approached Mr. Helms with allegations about Petitioner's unwanted advances. Mr. Helms referred Ms. Corrie to Ms. Goodman. On October 8, 2003, Ms. Corrie signed a statement alleging sexual harassment by Petitioner. On October 8, 2003, Ms. Goodman interviewed Mr. Helms and several male truck drivers. On October 9, 2003, Ms. Goodman interviewed Petitioner, who denied all allegations of sexual harassment in a written statement. Respondent placed Petitioner on administrative leave pending completion of the sexual harassment investigation. Based on her investigation, Ms. Goodman concluded that the allegations of sexual harassment by the four females had merit. She completed a written report and recommended that Behzad (Steve) Ghazvini, Respondent's owner, discipline Petitioner. Mr. Ghazvini and Mr. Helms met with Petitioner either October 10, 2003, or October 13, 2003.3/ During the meeting, Mr. Ghazvini informed Petitioner that he was discharged from employment for violating Respondent's policy prohibiting sexual harassment. Mr. Ghazvini terminated Petitioner's employment based on the similarity of the sexual harassment complaints by the female truck drivers, Ms. Goodman's judgment that the women were telling the truth, and out of concern that Respondent would be morally and legally responsible if Petitioner harmed the female employees. When Mr. Ghazvini made the decision to fire Petitioner, neither he nor anyone on Respondent's management team were aware that Petitioner had contacted FCHR to file a discrimination complaint. Respondent received notice about the discrimination complaint for the first time on October 15, 2003. The next two truck drivers that Respondent hired after terminating Petitioner were Troy Rowells, who was hired on October 21, 2003, and Darrell Butler, who was hired on October 22, 2003. Both men are black.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of law, it is ORDERED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 2004. END NOTES 1/ Mr. Wight did not testify at the hearing. Testimony that Mr. Wight denied programming the racial slur into Petitioner's telephone is inadmissible hearsay. 2/ Neither Ms. Pincumbe nor any of the other female truck drivers testified at the hearing. Any reference here to their allegations of sexual harassment is inadmissible hearsay except to show Respondent's reaction to the complaints. 3/ The record is not clear whether Respondent met with Petitioner to terminate his employment on Friday, October 10, 2003, or Monday, October 13, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Vicki Goodman Sandco, Inc. 2811 Industrial Plaza Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32310 Craig J. Brown, Esquire Brown & Associates, L.L.C. 223 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Brian S. Duffy, Esquire McConnaughhay, Duffy, Coonrod, Pope & Weaver, P.A. Post Office Drawer 229 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0229 Gary R. Wheeler, Esquire McConnaughhay, Duffy, Coonrod Pope & Weaver, P.A. Post Office Box 550770 6816 Southpoint Parkway No. 500 (32216) Jacksonville, Florida 32255-0770
