The Issue This is a case in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent on the basis of Respondent's alleged violation of Section 458.331(1)(c), Florida Statutes, in that he has been convicted or found guilty of a crime which directly relates to the practice of medicine or to the ability to practice medicine. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION By Administrative Complaint signed on October 3, 1985, the Respondent was charged with a violation of Section 458.331(1)(c), Florida Statutes. Specifically, the Administrative Complaint alleges that the Respondent has been convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a large quantity of marijuana. Approximately 20 minutes before the commencement of the hearing, the Hearing Officer received a telephone call from a man who identified himself as Frances K. Buckley. Mr. Frances Buckley stated that he is an attorney in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. and that he is the father of the Respondent in this case. Attorney Buckley advised the Hearing Officer that his son was still incarcerated at Danbury, that an appeal of his son's conviction was pending, that there had been no disposition of the appeal, and that he expected his son to be released from prison sometime within the next three months. Attorney Buckley advised the Hearing Officer that he was providing the foregoing information at the request of his son. Attorney Buckley did not purport to be acting as attorney for his son and did not make any motions. The substance of the foregoing conversation was made a part of the hearing record, whereupon the Department was asked what course of action it preferred. The Department having expressed a preference for going forward, and there being no motion for continuance, the formal hearing was conducted at the time and place set forth in the Second Notice of Hearing issued on December 19, 1986. At the hearing the Petitioner presented the testimony of one witness and offered several exhibits in evidence, all of which were received. A transcript of the proceedings at hearing was filed on April 14, 1987, and by memorandum issued April 15, 1987, all parties were reminded that they had until April 24, 1987, within which to file their post-hearing submissions to the Hearing Officer. on April 22, 1987, the Petitioner filed a timely proposed recommended order containing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The substance of all of the findings of fact proposed by the Petitioner has been included in the findings of fact in this recommended order. By letter dated April 22, 1987, and received on April 27, 1987, the Respondent moved for an enlargement of time and for a new hearing. By order issued May 1, 1987, the motion for new hearing was denied and the motion for enlargement of time was granted to the extent of allowing the parties until May 15, 1987, within which to file proposed recommended orders and/or memorandums of law. On May 15, 1987, the Respondent filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the order of May 1, 1987, and seeking a continuance of further proceedings in this case until September 15, 1987. The merits of the last mentioned motion are addressed in the conclusions of law hereinafter. The Respondent has not filed any proposed findings of fact.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony of the witness and on the exhibits received in evidence, I make the following findings of fact. The Respondent, David K. Buckley, is a licensed physician in the state of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0021232, and was so licensed at all times material to this case. On June 7, 1985, in the U.S., District Court for the District of Maine, the Respondent pled guilty to and was convicted of the offense of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a large quantity of marijuana, in violation of Title 21 U.S. Code, Section 846. As a result of that conviction, the Respondent was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of five years. The crime described above directly relates to the practice of medicine and to the ability to practice medicine. The ability to prescribe, administer, and dispense controlled substance in a lawful manner is an important aspect of the practice of medicine. Conviction of the crime described above is indicative of an inability to prescribe, administer, and dispense controlled substances in a lawful manner. An inability to lawfully prescribe, administer, and dispense controlled substances directly relates to the practice of medicine and to the ability to practice medicine.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Board of Medicine enter a final order in this case to the following effect: Concluding that on the basis of the facts found above the Respondent is guilty of violating Section 45.331(1) (c), Florida Statutes, and Imposing a penalty of a suspension of Respondent's license for a period of three years, with reinstatement of the license only upon a showing by Respondent of ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety, and upon reinstatement place Respondent's license on probation for a period of five years. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of May, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Ray Shope, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 3130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-075O David K. Buckley, M.D. 102311-036 Danbury Federal Correctional Institution Pembroke Station Danbury, Connecticut 06811 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 ================================================================ =
The Issue Should discipline be imposed against Respondent's license as a limited surety agent for violation of Section 648.45(2)(a) (e), and (k), Florida Statutes (2006)?
Findings Of Fact On January 6, 2003, DFS issued Respondent a series 2-34 limited surety agent (bail bond) license. That license remains valid. On May 3, 2006, in State of Florida vs. Vincent Lamone Addison, in the Circuit Court, 14th Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, in and for Gulf County, Case No. 06-0107CF, Respondent was charged by information with: Count I, Possession with intent to sell/deliver within 1000 feet of place of worship or convenience business; Count II, Possession of marijuana in excess of 20 grams, offenses contrary to Section 893.13, Florida Statutes (2005), third degree felonies. In the same information, in Count III, it was charged that he did obstruct (an) officer without violence, a violation of Section 843.02, Florida Statutes (2005), a first degree misdemeanor. On December 18, 2006, the assistant state attorney in Circuit Court Case No. 06-107CF, filed a Motion to Consolidate, asking that the Court enter an order consolidating the count for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, with the count related to possession of more than 20 grams of marijuana. On December 19, 2006, in Circuit Court Case No. 06- 107CF, a Plea, Waiver and Consent was signed by Respondent as defendant in that case, attested by his counsel and the assistant state attorney, and found by the Circuit Court Judge to be a plea freely and voluntarily made and sworn to and subscribed before the court and approved and accepted by the court related to possession of marijuana, a third degree felony with a statutory maximum imprisonment of five years. The plea was made upon the agreement that the adjudication be withheld, with service of three-years' probation, to terminate after 18 months if all conditions were complete and no violations of the probation had occurred. In addition, by order of the Circuit Court Judge, certain charges/costs/fees were imposed in Circuit Court Case No. 06-107CF. When Respondent executed his Plea, Waiver and Consent in Circuit Court Case No. 06-107CF, it reflected that the charge of "Obstruct officer without violence" had been stricken by line and initials provided, by what appears to be the defense counsel and the assistant state attorney in the case. In Circuit Court Case No. 06-107CF, as reflected in an order by the Circuit Court Judge referring to those proceedings, entered December 19, 2006, upon his appearance before the Court with representation, it indicates a plea of nolo contendere was entered. It pertained to Count I. On the form order, it refers to "Sales/Del/Poss/cannis-w/in-100Ft. Church 893.13(1)(a) 3F." Under that reference is found "Poss. Marijuana in Excess 20 grs. 893.13(6)(a) 3F". The numbers refer to Section 893.13(1)(a) and (6)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), and "3F" refers to third degree felony. In this order it was reflected that the adjudication of guilt was withheld, and that the defendant received three-years' probation, to terminate after 18 months upon satisfaction of conditions of probation. The court order refers to fees required by the court to satisfy its terms for accepting the plea. On December 21, 2006, in Circuit Court Case No. 06- 107CF, the Circuit Court Judge entered an Order Withholding Adjudication of Guilt and Placing Defendant on probation. In this order it reflects entry of a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of "Possession of more than 20 grams, 3rd-Degree Felony," for which the Respondent received three years of probation. Other conditions of the probation were reflected in this order, to include the costs and fees imposed by the Court. On January 12, 2007, precisely the same order was entered by the Circuit Court Judge. In addition to the nolo contendere plea in Circuit Court Case No. 06-107CF, Respondent in his testimony at hearing in the present case, acknowledged that the drug offense took place in Port St. Joe, Florida. He was arrested on April 21, 2006. Respondent did not contest the charges because marijuana was found on the console of his car and some was in his front pocket. Respondent's understanding of his nolo contendere plea was that it was to possession of marijuana exceeding 20 grams. The amount was somewhere in the range of 118 to 120 grams. In the present case, Respondent through his testimony, explained that he had been diagnosed with lupus and that he smoked marijuana to help his body function while confronting his disease. Respondent is aware that possession of marijuana in Florida is illegal, even if intended for the purpose he had in mind to provide him relief from the pain of lupus. Respondent is not acting in the capacity of a bail bond agent at this time. That loss of income has had significant impact on his earning capacity. Mr. Tynalin Smiley, who resides in Port St. Joe where the Respondent lives, has known the Respondent from the time Respondent was born. They are good friends. Mr. Smiley belongs to the same church as Respondent. He visits in Respondent's home at times. He believes that Respondent is a respectable person in the community. Mr. Robert Humphrey, who resides in Dothan, Alabama, met Respondent in 1996 when Respondent did an internship from Troy State University. Mr. Humphrey and Respondent worked in the area of juvenile justice, going into schools and providing counseling to students. Over the years Mr. Humphrey has kept in contact with Respondent. Occasionally Mr. Humphrey and Respondent are together socially. They go out to dinner. Respondent has attended Mr. Humphrey's church. Mr. Humphrey looks upon himself as being a big brother to Respondent. Mr. Humphrey has observed that Respondent remains active in the Respondent's community. Mr. Humphrey believes that Respondent regrets his choice that led to the action against him, that involving the marijuana possession that has been discussed.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered Respondent in violation of Section 648.45(2)(a), (e) and (k), Florida Statutes (2006) and revoking Respondent's limited surety agent (bail bond) license. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of July, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: William Gautier Kitchen, Esquire Gregg Marr, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Vincent Lamone Addition Post Office Box 483 Port St. Joe, Florida 32457 Honorable Alex Sink Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Sumner, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The capitol, Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent engaged in conduct unbecoming a public servant in violation of Chapter 89-404, Section 8, Laws of Florida, as amended by Chapter 90-395, Section 8, Laws of Florida (the "Civil Service Act") and Rules 3-1.1 and 3-1.3 of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office ("Rules 3-1.1 and 3-1.3").
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a constitutional officer of the State of Florida who is responsible for providing law enforcement and correctional services within Pinellas County, Florida. At all times pertinent to this case, Respondent was employed by Petitioner. On September 6, 1999, Respondent responded as backup deputy sheriff to the apartment of Mr. Cornell Cunningham and Ms. Karen Stewart. The purpose of the response was to arrest Mr. Cunningham on a civil warrant for failure to pay child support. Deputy Ward Snyder was the primary deputy on the call. Deputy Snyder is also employed by Respondent. It was raining outside when the two deputies arrived at Mr. Cunningham's residence. Mr. Cunningham invited both deputies inside. Once inside, Deputy Snyder talked to Mr. Cunningham and advised him of the civil arrest warrant. Deputy Snyder also contacted the Sheriff's Office to confirm that the warrant was still valid. While Deputy Snyder was talking to Mr. Cunningham and the Sheriff's Office, Respondent conducted a security search of the residence to confirm that no one else was present in Mr. Cunningham's apartment. By the time Respondent completed the security search, Deputy Snyder had finished his telephone call. Respondent concluded his search of the residence in the kitchen. While standing in the kitchen, Respondent stood adjacent to and viewed a countertop that separated the kitchen from the dining area. The kitchen and counter top were well lit with florescent lighting. Respondent observed a marijuana seed on the countertop. Respondent picked the seed up from the countertop and held it up for Deputy Snyder to see. Respondent said, "We got a problem here." Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham were standing in the dining room adjacent to the countertop that separated the kitchen from the dining room. Deputy Snyder had a clear and unobstructed view of the countertop. A Nike shoebox was on the countertop inside the kitchen. The shoebox contained a hinged top that opened from one side and also contained circular holes in the sides. Respondent, Deputy Snyder, and Mr. Cunningham were within two or three feet of the shoebox. The top on the shoebox was closed. There was no other access into the shoebox other than through the top of the shoebox. Respondent removed his flashlight from his belt, turned it on, shined the light into the holes in the side of the shoebox, and observed the contents of the shoebox. Respondent then opened the shoebox and looked inside the shoebox. Respondent observed a small bag of marijuana and a small scale inside the box. Respondent then told Deputy Snyder that there was "a problem." Respondent then showed Deputy Snyder the contents of the box. Mr. Cunningham denied ownership of the shoebox as well as any knowledge of its contents. The deputies arrested Mr. Cunningham based on the civil warrant for failure to pay child support. Mr. Cunningham protested his arrest and asserted that the matter had been taken care of. However, he did not physically resist, did not threaten either deputy, and did not display any intent to flee. Neither deputy charged or arrested Mr. Cunningham at the time with any offense related to the marijuana or the scale. Deputy Snyder transported Mr. Cunningham to the Pinellas County Jail on the original civil warrant. While Deputy Snyder was transporting Mr. Cunningham to jail, Respondent contacted Deputy Snyder by radio. Respondent told Deputy Snyder that Respondent was going to charge Ms. Stewart with criminal offenses related to the possession of marijuana and the scale. Mr. Cunningham overheard the radio conversation between the two deputies and stated that he would claim ownership of the marijuana and scale. Upon hearing this, Deputy Snyder advised Mr. Cunningham of his rights. Mr. Cunningham then denied ownership of the contraband. While Deputy Snyder transported Mr. Cunningham to jail, Respondent remained at Mr. Cunningham's residence and awaited the arrival of Ms. Stewart. With the consent of Ms. Stewart, Respondent conducted a further search of the residence. The further search revealed additional marijuana in a drawer located in the kitchen where the shoebox was located. Respondent combined the marijuana found in the drawer with the seed on the countertop and the marijuana previously found in the shoebox. Respondent then seized the contraband and proceeded to the jail where he charged Mr. Cunningham with felony possession of marijuana and misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Respondent prepared an arrest report stating that Respondent had observed marijuana "scattered" on top of the kitchen counter. Respondent also stated in the report that, "Laying next to the scattered marijuana in a partially opened Nike shoebox, was a clear plastic baggie filled with marijuana and also laying next to that baggie was a silver hand-held weight scale." Respondent’s supervisor, Sergeant Robert Helmick, approved the report on the same day that Respondent prepared the report. On the following day, September 7, 1999, Deputy Snyder prepared his supplemental report of the events occurring at the Cunningham residence. In his report, Deputy Snyder stated that Respondent "pointed out a seed on the kitchen countertop. There was a Nike shoebox also on the countertop. Deputy Broome used his flashlight to illuminate the inside of the box by shining the light through a hole in the box. Deputy Broome then opened the box and displayed a bag of what appeared to be marijuana and a small balance scale." Deputy Snyder’s report also recited the events occurring in his vehicle as he transported Mr. Cunningham to jail. Sergeant Helmick, who was off duty that day, did not review or approve Deputy Snyder's report. Rather, Corporal Larry Weiland approved Deputy Snyder's report. Sergeant Helmick did not see Deputy Snyder’s report until much later. Three days later, on September 10, 1999, Respondent participated in a pre-filing investigation conducted at the office of the State Attorney for Pinellas County. Assistant State Attorney Patricia Cope conducted the investigation. As part of the investigation, Ms. Cope took the sworn testimony of Respondent. In his testimony to Ms. Cope, Respondent repeated the same version of events found in his report. Respondent testified to Ms. Cope that he had observed marijuana scattered on the countertop and that the top of the shoebox on the countertop was ajar. Respondent further testified that he was able to see the marijuana and the scale inside the shoebox through the space created by the partially open top of the shoebox. Ms. Cope specifically asked Respondent whether the shoebox was open or closed in order to confirm that Respondent's search was within the scope of the plain view doctrine. Respondent testified that the shoebox was open. Ms. Cope did not speak with Deputy Snyder or review his report. As a result of the investigation and the information provided by Respondent, Mr. Cunningham was charged with felony possession of marijuana and misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Sometime after Ms. Cope's conversation with Respondent, Deputy Snyder spoke with Sergeant Helmick concerning the discrepancies between the two reports filed by Deputy Snyder and Respondent. Sergeant Helmick advised Deputy Snyder to allow the discrepancies to be worked out by the state attorney’s office and to allow the criminal process to run its course. Sergeant Helmick did not report the discrepancies to the state attorney’s office, to his supervisors, or to anyone else. At the time, Sergeant Helmick did not initiate any complaint or investigation against either Respondent or Deputy Snyder. In June 2000, depositions were set in the criminal prosecution of Mr. Cunningham. Ms. Cope contacted Deputy Snyder to inquire about the possibility of having the shoebox tested for fingerprints. At that time, Deputy Snyder directed Ms. Cope's attention to the discrepancies in the respective reports prepared by Deputy Snyder and Respondent. Ms. Cope reviewed the reports and the discrepancies between the two reports. Ms. Cope concluded that the discrepancies would create a problem in the criminal prosecution of Mr. Cunningham. The discrepancies between the accounts by Respondent and Deputy Snyder created the possibility that Respondent had conducted an illegal search of the shoebox that would render the evidence seized as a part of that search inadmissible. The plain view doctrine applicable to the law of search and seizure would allow the search of the shoebox if the top had been ajar and the contents of the shoebox could be observed. However, the search would not be lawful if the shoebox top was closed and observation of the contents could have only been accomplished by shining a light through the holes in the box. The differing statements in the reports of the two deputies placed the credibility of Respondent in question. No independent evidence was available, including the testimony of Mr. Cunningham, from which it could be ascertained which deputy was being truthful. The State Attorney’s Office deemed it unfair to the defendant, the court, and the witnesses to proceed on a case where the prosecution could not be certain if the evidence was properly seized. Ms. Cope referred the matter to Mr. Robert Lewis, her supervisor. Mr. Lewis reviewed the reports of the two deputies and agreed with Ms. Cope's assessment that the discrepancies precluded any further criminal prosecution of Mr. Cunningham. Ms. Cope cancelled the depositions set in the Cunningham case on the grounds that Respondent had been accused of lying and that the two investigating police officers recalled two inconsistent views of the events that occurred at Mr. Cunningham's residence. Mr. Lewis then instructed Ms. Cope to enter a nolle prosequi of the charges against Mr. Cunningham. After the State Attorney's Office filed the nolle prosequi, the State Attorney’s Office referred the matter to the Sheriff's Office. The matter was brought to the attention of Major Samuel F. Lynn, the commander of the road patrol division. Major Lynn prepared an administrative inquiry form that disclosed the allegations communicated to him by the State Attorney’s Office. Thereafter, the Administrative Investigation Division of the Sheriff’s Office ("AID") initiated an investigation. During the investigation, Respondent and Deputy Snyder each provided a sworn statement to the investigators. The investigators also obtained a sworn statement from Ms. Cope and a letter from Mr. Lewis. The investigators were unable to locate Mr. Cunningham and therefore did not interview him or ascertain his account of the matters at issue in this proceeding. During the investigation, Respondent had the opportunity to offer additional information or comments. Respondent’s attorney placed a statement on the record at the conclusion of Respondent’s sworn statement. Respondent did not offer any witnesses on his behalf or provide the investigators with any information pertaining to the location of Mr. Cunningham. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Board conducted a hearing concerning the charges against Respondent. The charges were: Violation of Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office Civil Service Act, Laws of Florida, 89-404, as amended by Laws of Florida, 90-395, Section 6, subsection 4: violations of the provisions of law or the rules, regulations, and operating procedures of the office of the Sheriff; Violation of Rule and Regulation of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office, 3-1.1 (Level Five violation), 006, relating to untruthfulness by being untruthful in relation to the seizure of narcotics at the Cunningham residence. Violation of Rule and Regulation of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office, 3-1.3 (Level Three violation), 060, relating to standards of conduct by bringing discredit upon the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office by being untruthful and by inaccurately documenting facts and circumstances submitted to the State Attorney’s Office. Respondent was present at the hearing, had an opportunity to offer a statement, responded to questions, and presented additional evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board determined that Respondent violated the Civil Service Act and Rules 3-1.1 and 3-1.3. The violations resulted in a cumulative point total of 65 points under the progressive discipline policy of the Sheriff's office. The 65 points were added to 23 discipline points that the Sheriff's Office had previously assessed against Respondent for a total of 88 progressive discipline points. When a deputy has 88 progressive discipline points, Petitioner's progressive discipline policy authorizes discipline that ranges from a ten-day suspension to termination. Petitioner terminated Respondent's employment. Respondent violated relevant portions of the Civil Service Act and Rule 3-1.1 by being untruthful in relation to the seizure of narcotics at the Cunningham residence. Respondent conducted an improper search at the residence of Mr. Cunningham. Respondent then charged Mr. Cunningham with a felony and misdemeanor offense related to the fruits of that search. Respondent then prepared a false report relating the events occurring at Mr. Cunningham's residence and then provided false testimony under oath to the State Attorney’s Office. Respondent violated relevant portions of the Civil Service Act Rule 3-1.3 and by bringing discredit upon the Sheriff's Office. Respondent was untruthful by inaccurately documenting facts and circumstances submitted to the State Attorney’s Office. Respondent's conduct discredited the Sheriff's Office by encouraging mistrust of law enforcement officers and by creating the appearance that persons in law enforcement engage in improper tactics to effectuate an arrest. Respondent's untruthfulness resulted in the improper arrest and prosecution of an individual. Truthfulness on the part of a deputy sheriff is an important part of the job. It is necessary in order to maintain discipline and to preserve the integrity of the agency and the functions performed. Respondent's untruthfulness violated those essential elements and exposed the Sheriff's Office to the potential for civil liability for an improper arrest. Although much of Respondent's testimony was credible and persuasive, there were significant parts of Respondent's testimony that were neither credible nor persuasive. The flawed part of Respondent's testimony was inconsistent with prior statements by Respondent and with the testimony of Deputy Snyder. For the most part, no one inconsistency in Respondent's testimony, standing alone, would be sufficient to adversely affect Respondent's credibility. However, the cumulative effect of all of the inconsistencies deprives Respondent's testimony of credibility and persuasiveness concerning material issues in this case. In an earlier sworn statement to AID, Respondent testified that he found marijuana on the countertop in Mr. Cunningham's apartment, showed the seed to Deputy Snyder, and then looked inside the shoebox. At the final hearing, however, Respondent testified that he found the marijuana seed on the countertop, saw the marijuana in the shoebox, and then walked over to Deputy Snyder to show him the marijuana seed. Respondent further testified at the final hearing that he could not recall whether he picked up the seed first or saw the marijuana in the shoebox first. Respondent made inconsistent statements regarding the location of Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham at the time that Respondent found the seed and searched the shoebox. At the final hearing, Respondent insisted that Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham never got within ten to fourteen feet of the shoebox. In an earlier sworn statement to AID, however, Respondent indicated that Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham were two to three feet from the shoebox. Respondent made inconsistent statements regarding the position of the top of the shoebox at the time that Respondent found the seed and searched the shoebox. Respondent testified at final hearing that the shoebox was open between 1.5 and 2.0 inches. In a sworn statement to AID, however, Respondent testified that the top of the shoebox was open less than one inch. Respondent made inconsistent statements regarding the manner in which he shined light from his flashlight into the shoebox. At final hearing, Respondent testified that he shined light into the holes on the side of the shoebox. In an earlier deposition, however, Respondent testified that he shined the light in the top of the shoebox where the top was open and could not remember if the shoebox had holes. Respondent made inconsistent statements regarding the location of the marijuana on the countertop. At the final hearing, Respondent indicated that the marijuana was spread out into the center of the dark countertop where there was a white paint spot, as shown in one of the photographs in evidence. However, the drawing provided during the course of Respondent's earlier deposition did not indicate that marijuana was spread into the center of the dark countertop where the white paint spot was located. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the location of the shoebox. Respondent placed the shoebox close to the wall where it may have been more difficult for Deputy Snyder to view the box. Deputy Snyder placed the shoebox in the middle of the countertop where it was more easily seen. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the vantage points of Respondent and Deputy Snyder. Respondent placed Deputy Snyder ten to fourteen feet from the shoebox and stated that Deputy Snyder could not see the shoebox or the marijuana from that vantage point. Deputy Snyder placed himself within two to three feet of the shoebox and stated that he had an unobstructed and clear view of the countertop and the shoebox. Deputy Snyder's testimony was consistent with an earlier sworn statement to AID by Respondent indicating that Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham were two to three feet from the shoebox. See Finding of Fact 43. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the amount of marijuana on the countertop. Respondent stated there was a considerable amount or marijuana on the countertop. Deputy Snyder stated there was no marijuana on the countertop except the seed displayed to him by Respondent. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the actions taken by Respondent in looking into the shoebox. Respondent testified that he identified the debris, saw the marijuana in the shoebox, showed the seed to Snyder, and then looked into the shoebox. Deputy Snyder testified that Respondent showed him a seed, shined his light into a hole in the shoebox, and then opened the shoebox. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the actions of Respondent after discovering the marijuana and the shoebox. Respondent claimed he walked from the kitchen into the living and dining area to display the seed to Deputy Snyder. Deputy Snyder testified that Respondent remained in the kitchen and displayed the seed across the countertop. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the issue of whether Respondent had his flashlight out before he looked into the shoebox or removed it in order to look inside the shoebox. Respondent testified he had the flashlight out the entire time he was in the residence. Deputy Snyder stated that Respondent removed the flashlight from his belt in order to look into the shoebox. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the issue of whether Deputy Snyder was on the telephone when Respondent observed the marijuana and shoebox and pointed these items out to Deputy Snyder. Respondent stated that Deputy Snyder was on the telephone when these events occurred. Deputy Snyder testified that he had completed his call by the time Respondent arrived in the kitchen. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the ability of Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham to be in the dining room and close to the countertop. Respondent claimed that the dining room table and chairs did not allow sufficient room for Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham to be within two or three feet of the countertop in the dining room. Deputy Snyder and other testimony by Respondent concerning the dimensions of the dining room and table and chairs indicated there was sufficient room for Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham to stand in the dining room within two or three feet of the shoebox. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding Respondent's testimony that he searched the shoebox, in part, because he was concerned over the existence of booby traps in the shoebox. Deputy Snyder saw no such concern indicated in Respondent’s actions. Respondent's testimony that he was concerned the shoebox contained booby traps is neither credible nor persuasive. Respondent testified that the room was sufficiently well lit to allow him to clearly see the marijuana inside the partially open shoebox without shining his flashlight into the shoebox before opening it. Respondent attempted to explain why he used his flashlight in a well-lit kitchen by expressing concern that the shoebox may have contained booby traps. Regarding the discrepancies between the testimony of Respondent and Deputy Snyder, there is no apparent motive for Deputy Snyder to fabricate his version of the events or to attempt to create any form of disciplinary problem for Respondent. Respondent had no prior experience with Deputy Snyder that would create a reason for Deputy Snyder to be untruthful. Respondent suggested that Deputy Snyder fabricated his report and testimony in exchange for a transfer to a position as a detective. That testimony is neither credible nor persuasive. Deputy Snyder’s transfer occurred months before any concerns arose pertaining to Respondent. There is no evidence that Deputy Snyder played any role in the initiation of the investigation. Deputy Snyder's initial disclosure to his supervisor did not result in any investigation or action against Respondent. The transfer to the detective unit was a lateral transfer without any increase in rank, pay, or benefits. The evaluation system in effect at the Sheriff's Office provided a specific component for self-initiated arrests. The arrest of Mr. Cunningham in this case falls into the category of self-initiated arrests and could have resulted in a positive evaluation component for Respondent, who already had 23 disciplinary points against him. Respondent has a prior disciplinary history. In June 1999, Respondent received a one-day suspension and five disciplinary points for violating rules that are not relevant to this proceeding. In January 2000, Respondent received a three- day suspension and 15 disciplinary points for violating rules that are not relevant to this proceeding. The two violations resulted in 20 progressive points with a range of discipline from reprimand to a three-day suspension. In August 2000, Respondent received a seven-day suspension for violating rules that are not relevant to this proceeding. The violations consisted of three level three violations resulting in the assignment of 40 disciplinary points. The 40 points were combined with ten "modified points" from the prior violations and resulted in a total of 50 progressive points with a range of discipline from a five-day suspension to termination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of conduct unbecoming a public servant and terminating Respondent's employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard C. Millian, Esquire Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire Tew, Zinober, & Barnes, L.L.P. 2655 McCormick Drive, Prestige Professional Park Clearwater, Florida 33759 B. Norris Rickey, Esquire Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 34756 Keith C. Tischler, Esquire Powers, Quaschnick, et al. 1669 Mahan Center Boulevard Post Office Box 12186 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-2186
Findings Of Fact Rule 23-21.03(9)(b) , Florida Administrative Code, the rule under challenge, contains a list of forms to be used by the Commission in parole grant-and-rescind types of proceedings. The particular form which is challenged is PCG-4.4, entitled "Special Commission Action." The Commission on September 7, 1983, extended petitioner's presumptive parole release date (PPRD) by utilizing form PCG-4.4. Petitioner and the Commission agree that invalidation of the challenged rule will not affect petitioner's PPRD. Petitioner does not challenge the method by which Rule 23-21.03(9)(b) , Florida Administrative Code, was promulgated.
The Issue The matters to be determined in this case concern an administrative complaint which has been filed against Monroe Monford a/k/a Monroe Monford, Jr. seeking to take disciplinary action based upon the allegation that the Respondent, by the entry of a plea of guilty to a violation of Section 893.13(1)(e) Florida Statutes, possession of cocaine, has thereby violated Sections 455.227(1)(c) and 465.016(1)(f), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Monroe Monford also known as Monroe Monford, Jr. is a pharmacist licensed under the laws of the State of Florida, License No. 0009494 whose address is 3822 Elbert Avenue, Jacksonville, Florida 32208. In June of 1982 an investigation was conducted by the Duval County Sheriff's office, Duval County, Florida leading to the arrest of the Respondent. The arrest occurred at 5929 Ramona Boulevard in the Days Inn Motel. A monitor had been placed in the room where a suspected drug transaction was to occur and it was determined that the Respondent was involved in that transaction to the extent of conducting a test to ascertain if the substance being purchased was actually cocaine. It was later determined to be cocaine. Another individual who was in the room with Monroe Monford, one Eddie Lee Tuff, went to a car to obtain money that was being paid for cocaine. Subsequent to that time law enforcement officials entered the room which was under surveillance and found Monroe Monford on the bed counting the money in question. Monford was arrested for a violation of Section 893.135, Florida Statutes, trafficking in a controlled substance, namely cocaine. In response to charges which were brought against Respondent in the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, Case No. 82- 5383CFS, Respondent entered a plea of guilty to the sale of cocaine and received a period of probation of five years, assessment of court costs in the amount of $12,153 and as a special condition of probation, was prohibited from practicing pharmacy in Florida or any other state while serving the probationary term. The offense to which he plead guilty was a violation of Section 893.13, Florida Statutes. Respondent was not adjudged guilty of the violation of law to which he plead, imposition of the sentence having been withheld pending the satisfactory completion of the probationary period. The date of the court disposition of the case was October 15, 1982.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations described in the Administrative Complaint? If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Department is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. Respondent is now, and has been since October 4, 1979, a licensed pharmacist in the State of Florida. He holds license number PS 0017661. In October of 1987, based upon Respondent's having the year before "pled guilty [in criminal court] to one count of grand theft and one count of possession of diazepam," the Board of Pharmacy suspended Respondent's license for a period of one year and placed him on probation for a period of three years, commencing upon the conclusion of his suspension. On February 4, 1991, February 11, 1991, February 19, 1991, March 6, 1991, and April 18, 1993, in exchange for cash, Respondent sold to Melvin Owens, who was serving as a confidential informant for the Drug Enforcement Administration, 3/ various quantities of drugs, to wit: quazepam, under the brand name of Doral (February 4, February 19, and March 6), triazolam, under the brand name of Halcion (February 4, February 11, February 19, March 6, and April 18), alprazolam, under the band name of Xanax (February 11, February 19, March 6, and April 18), and diethylpropion hydrochloride, under the brand name of Tenuate Dospan (March 6), without first being presented with a prescription for these drugs. All five transactions took place in Palm Beach County, Florida. Although Respondent was employed as a pharmacist at a Phar-Mor Discount Pharmacy (hereinafter referred to as "Phar-Mor") located in Palm Beach County at the time of these transactions, in selling these controlled substances to Owens, Respondent was not acting in the usual course of his professional practice as a Phar-Mor pharmacist. Respondent did not have a permit authorizing him to act as a drug wholesaler at the time of these transactions. On April 24, 1991, Respondent was indicted in federal court on five counts of unlawful distribution of controlled substances for his role in the above-described transactions. Subsequently, the Department issued a three-count Administrative Complaint charging Respondent with wrongdoing in connection with these transactions. Respondent pled guilty to the federal criminal charges pursuant to a plea agreement. Thereafter, Respondent was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to 60 days confinement, followed by two years of supervised release, on each count of the federal indictment, with the sentences to run concurrently.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Board enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in Counts I, II, and III of the Administrative Complaint and disciplining him for having committed these violations by revoking his license. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 12th day of October, 1993. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 1993.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent violated the provisions of chapter 440, Florida Statutes,1/ by failing to secure the payment of workers’ compensation, as alleged in the Stop-Work Order and Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure workers’ compensation coverage for the benefit of their employees. Respondent is a corporation with its principal office 3981 North W Street, Unit 36, Pensacola, Florida 32505. At all relevant time periods, Respondent has been engaged in business as a contractor in the construction industry. On March 28, 2012, after receiving a public referral regarding alleged uninsured construction activity at 2544 North D Street in Pensacola, Florida (the Site), Department Compliance Investigator Angelia Brown visited the Site. Upon Ms. Brown's arrival, there were plumbers and a siding company at the Site. According to Ms. Brown, she also saw an individual attaching u- shaped metal clips between the inside beams and the roof and soffits of the house that was being constructed at the Site. The plumbers had a workers' compensation policy and the siding workers had exemptions from workers' compensation requirements. Ms. Brown spoke to the man who appeared to be attaching the metal clips. Based upon that conversation, Ms. Brown concluded that the man was a subcontractor and Respondent's employee. The evidence, however, does not support that conclusion. The man, whose name is apparently Robert Madron, was not called as a witness at the final hearing. According to Ms. Brown, Mr. Madron told her he had his own company. Ms. Brown, however, was unable to obtain information verifying that assertion. Further, while Mr. Howard had paid Mr. Madron prior to Ms. Brown's visit for unsolicited work Mr. Madron had performed for Mr. Howard, consisting of picking up trash and repairing some equipment owned by Mr. Howard, Mr. Howard denied that Respondent ever employed Mr. Madron. Rather than showing that Mr. Madron was a subcontractor with his own business or an employee of Respondent, the evidence adduced at the final hearing indicated that Mr. Madron, who was known as "Gomer" by Mr. Howard, was an unemployed, homeless person, living in nearby woods. Mr. Madron would often come to the Site and surrounding neighborhood looking for work and food. Mr. Howard was surprised that Ms. Brown had taken Mr. Madron seriously, because Mr. Howard believes that Mr. Madron's facial expressions and unbalanced, awkward gait are obvious indicators that Mr. Madron is unstable and has mental problems. Ms. Brown issued a Stop-Work Order to Mr. Madron the day of her first visit at the Site, March 28, 2012. The evidence presented at the final hearing, however, failed to show that Mr. Madron was ever employed by Respondent. The next day, March 29, 2012, Ms. Brown returned and observed four other individuals working at the Site. The individuals included Robert Jones, Charles Lyons, Martin Shaughnessy, and Allen Weeden. While Ms. Brown concluded that these individuals were Respondent's employees on March 29, 2012, the evidence shows that they were paid for the work that day by Pacesetter Personnel, an employee-leasing company. Aside from alleging that Respondent employed Mr. Madron, the Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is based upon Respondent's alleged employment and failure to provide workers' compensation coverage for Mr. Jones, Mr. Lyons, Mr. Shaughnessy, and Mr. Weeden. In addition, the Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment alleges that Respondent employed its officer, Mr. Howard, during a lapse in Mr. Howard's exemption from workers' compensation. There was no testimony from Robert Jones, Charles Lyons, Martin Shaughnessy, or Allen Weeden offered at the final hearing and the evidence is otherwise insufficient to show that those individuals were employed by Respondent on March 29, 2012. The Department's investigator, Ms. Brown, further concluded that Pacesetter Personnel had not provided worker's compensation coverage for those four men on March 29, 2012. Her conclusion, however, was based on a conversation she said she had with Pacesetter Personnel. The Department did not offer the testimony from anyone at Pacesetter, nor did it offer any non- hearsay evidence to support Ms. Brown's conclusion that Pacesetter Personnel was not providing workers' compensation to those four individuals. Further, the only evidence that the Department offered to prove that Messrs. Jones, Lyons, Shaughnessy, and Weeden were ever employed by Respondent, or to support the Third Amended Penalty Assessment, consists of Mr. Howard's cancelled checks to those individuals. The Third Amended Penalty Assessment seeks an assessment for Robert Jones from January 1 to March 28, 2012. At the final hearing, Mr. Howard testified that Mr. Jones is a relative, and the payment to Mr. Jones was a loan to help Mr. Jones with moving expenses. There is no contrary evidence. The Third Amended Penalty Assessment provides an assessment for Charles Lyons for the periods from July 1, 2010 to December 31, 2010, and from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011. The assessment is based upon one check to Mr. Lyons in the amount to $480. Mr. Howard testified that Mr. Lyons had an exemption from workers' compensation. The Department presented no contradictory evidence. The Third Amended Penalty Assessment seeks an assessment for Martin Shaughnessy for several time periods based upon several checks from Mr. Howard. Mr. Howard testified that Mr. Shaughnessy had an exemption and the Department presented no contrary evidence. The Third Amended Penalty assessment also seeks an assessment for James Howard, individually, from July 17 to August 11, 2011, during which time there was a lapse in his certificate of exemption from workers' compensation. The evidence showed that, other than that 26-day lapse, Mr. Howard has maintained his exemption since 2003. The Department presented no evidence that Mr. Howard provided services to, or was paid by, Respondent during the time that his exemption had lapsed. The only evidence presented was a check from Respondent's checking account showing a payment to Mr. Howard's mother during the lapse period. Mr. Howard testified that the check was to reimburse his mother for the use of her American Express card to purchase materials and supplies. The Department presented no countervailing evidence. In sum, the evidence presented at the final hearing was insufficient to support the Stop Work Order or Third Amended Penalty Assessment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Workers’ Compensation enter a final order dismissing the Stop-Work Order and Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 2013.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Petitioner’s request for exemption from employment disqualification should be approved.
Findings Of Fact On June 21, 1991, Aaron Foreman (Petitioner) was convicted of one count of "possession of THC with intent to deliver" in the Circuit Court of Walworth County, State of Wisconsin, Case Number 90CR00080. At the time of the arrest, the Petitioner was a student at the University of Wisconsin in Whitewater. He resided with several other students in the upstairs apartment portion of a residence. On or about February 1, 1990, local Whitewater law enforcement officials, apparently investigating one of the roommates for burglary, executed a search warrant and entered into the apartment where the Petitioner was living. During the search of the apartment, law enforcement officers discovered a quantity of marijuana in the apartment and bedrooms of the residents. The Petitioner had a refrigerator in his bedroom, within which law enforcement officers discovered a large plastic bag containing 26 smaller plastic bags, each containing a quantity of marijuana. The total weight of the plastic bags of marijuana within the Petitioner's refrigerator was identified in the charging document as approximately 126 grams. In Count One of the charge, the Petitioner and three other persons (apparently the roommates) were jointly charged with possession with intent to deliver more than 500 grams of THC, an element of marijuana. In Count Four of the charge, the Petitioner was individually charged with possession with intent to deliver 91 grams of THC. The record of the hearing does not establish the reason for the difference between the weight of the marijuana allegedly discovered and the THC quantities with which the defendants were charged. According to the Petitioner's testimony at hearing, the Petitioner participated in marijuana use, and bought and sold marijuana within a "small circle of friends" and his roommates. On June 21, 1991, the Petitioner entered a plea of "no contest" to Count Four as part of an agreement to resolve the drug possession charges, and as stated previously, was convicted of felony under Wisconsin law. According to the Judgement of Conviction, Count One of the charge was dismissed. As a result of the plea agreement, the Petitioner was sentenced to nine months in jail, two years of probation, and a fine of approximately $2,700. The Petitioner served the jail sentence in a work release program, continued to attend college and obtained an undergraduate degree in sociology from the University of Wisconsin. The Petitioner paid the fine imposed by the sentence and successfully completed the probationary period as of September 19, 1993. Subsequent to completion of the sentence, the Petitioner became employed as a licensed social worker in Wisconsin. From 1993 to 1999, the Petitioner was employed by "Southeastern Youth and Family Services," as a social worker. The Petitioner's employment evaluations range from "very good" to "outstanding." In July 1999, the Petitioner underwent a background screening prompted by his application for employment by Eckerd Youth Alternatives, Inc., a program that, in part, provides services to young persons involved in the juvenile justice system and funded through contract with the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (Department). Based on the conviction, the Department notified Eckerd Youth Alternatives, Inc., that the Petitioner was disqualified from employment. The Petitioner requested that the Department review the disqualification. The Department responded by letter dated June 19, 1999, advising that the desk review would be granted and identifying the information that the Petitioner was required to submit to facilitate the review. The Petitioner responded to the June 19 letter by supplying the requested information to the Department. The matter was apparently reviewed by a "Priscilla A. Zachary, BSU Supervisor" for the Department, who forwarded the file along with a cover memo to Perry Turner, the Department's Inspector General. As Inspector General, Mr. Turner is the person authorized by the Department to make decisions on disqualification exemption applications. Ms. Zachary's cover memo incorrectly identifies the crime for which the Petitioner was convicted and states that the Petitioner's June 21, 1991, conviction was for "Possession with Intent to Deliver" more than 500 grams of THC. According to the Judgement of Conviction, Count One of the charge, wherein the Petitioner and other persons were jointly charged with possession with intent to deliver more than 500 grams of THC, was dismissed. On August 5, 1999, Mr. Turner determined that the Petitioner's application for exemption should be denied. Mr. Turner based his decision on his belief that the Petitioner's felony conviction was for an amount of marijuana beyond that which Mr. Turner believes could be reasonably identified as being for "personal use" and which was intended for distribution. By letter dated August 5, 1999, the Petitioner was notified of the Department's decision by letter and advised of his right to challenge the denial in an administrative hearing. During the hearing, the Petitioner testified as to the events leading to his conviction and identified his efforts at rehabilitation. At the hearing, the Petitioner testified that his initial experience with marijuana occurred in approximately 1988, when he entered the University of Wisconsin at Whitewater. The Petitioner testified that at the time of the 1990 arrest, he was an "immature" college student who recreationally used marijuana within his circle of friends and with whom he sold or exchanged marijuana. Other than the Petitioner's admission, there is no evidence that the Petitioner actually sold marijuana. There is no evidence that the Petitioner was arrested or charged with the sale of marijuana. There is no evidence that the Petitioner was a part of any continuing marijuana distribution organization. There is no evidence that, other than the arrest at issue in this proceeding, the Petitioner has ever been arrested for any other reason. Review of the charging documents suggests that the charge of "intent to deliver" was based on the quantity of the marijuana found in the apartment and the apparent candor with which the residents dealt with the law enforcement officials who executed the search warrant and investigated the situation. The Petitioner's arrest occurred approximately eleven years ago. The Petitioner's conviction was approximately ten years ago. The Petitioner completed the probationary portion of his sentence more than seven years ago. There is no evidence that there was any physical injury or harm done to any individual as a result of the Petitioner's conviction. There is no evidence that granting the Petitioner's request for exemption presents a danger to the Petitioner or to any other person. The Petitioner has continued with his education and in December 2000 received his master's degree in Criminal Justice from the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee. The Petitioner has also sought to obtain a pardon from the Governor of Wisconsin. By letter dated August 28, 2000, the Governor's Pardon Advisory Board notified the Petitioner that it was recommending to the Governor that a pardon be granted. Although the vote by the Board was not unanimous, the majority of the members believed that the pardon should be granted "based on positive adjustment, lack of subsequent criminal justice system contacts, non-violent nature of the crime, and valid job concerns." As of the date of the hearing, the Governor of Wisconsin had not acted on the Board's recommendation to grant the Petitioner's pardon request.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Juvenile Justice grant the request of Aaron Foreman for exemption from employment disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Aaron Foreman 10500 West Fountain Avenue Apartment No. 411 Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53224 Lynne T. Winston, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 William G. Bankhead, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Robert N. Sechen, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building, 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
