Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Fahmy M. Rizk, M.D., is a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME0028230. The Respondent is engaged in the practice of medicine at 117 San Carlos Boulevard, Ft. Myers Beach, Florida 33931. A formal hearing was held on August 22, 1978, before a hearing officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings, which resulted in a Recommended Order to the Board of Medical Examiners. The Recommended Order, with findings of fact and conclusions of law, was adopted as the Final Order of the Board of Medical Examiners on October 27, 1978, resulting in the suspension of Respondent's license for two (2) years. Respondent petitioned for reinstatement and modification of the suspension by Petition For Reinstatement And Modification Of Suspension heard on October 25, 1980, in Tampa, Florida. The petition resulted in a Final Order of the Board of Medical Examiners, entered on November 19, 1980, accepting a proposed Stipulation executed by the Respondent, Fahmy M. Rizk, M.D., on November 1, 1980. In the Stipulation, Respondent agreed, among other things: I shall be placed on a probationary status throughout the remainder of my practice of medicine in the State of Florida. During this period of probation, I shall be subject to the following terms and conditions: * * * (c) I shall examine or treat female patients only with the constant attendance of a licensed physician or nurse. Under the Final Order of the Board of Medical Examiners dated November 19, 1980, pursuant to the Stipulation executed by the Respondent on November 1, 1980, Respondent was reinstated to practice medicine in the State of Florida, based upon the requirements in the Stipulation. On June 6, 1981, the Board of Medical Examiners heard Respondent's request to practice medicine outside of a structured medical environment, and the request was denied June 26, 1981. On December 6, 1981, Respondent again requested of the Board of Medical Examiners a modification of his probation terms and conditions to once more practice outside of a structured medical environment, and the request was denied by Order dated January 14, 1982. On June 6, 1982, Respondent petitioned the Board of Medical Examiners for termination of his probation status, and the request was denied by Final Order of the Board of Medical Examiners on June 15, 1982. Again, on December 3, 1983, Respondent petitioned the Board of Medical Examiners to terminate his probation, and the request was denied by Order of the Board of Medical Examiners on January 13, 1984. However, Respondent's orders of probation were modified to relieve Respondent of the requirement that he make semiannual appearances before the Board and to reduce his monitoring physician's reporting from monthly to quarterly. In the year ending approximately February 2, 1986, Respondent examined or treated female patients without the attendance of either a licensed physician or a nurse, licensed or unlicensed. Respondent knew that he was required to have either a licensed physician or nurse in attendance when he examined or treated female patients. Between January and June, 1983, Respondent hired a nurse who was not licensed in Florida for $3.50 an hour to be in attendance when he examined or treated female patients. He misrepresented to Petitioner's investigator that the nurse was licensed in Florida and that she worked for Respondent through 1985. In April, 1985, Respondent also attempted to avoid the conditions of his probation by attempting to persuade Petitioner's investigator that the conditions of his probation had been modified to permit him to examine and treat female patients as long as another female was present although no such modification had been made. Much of the incriminating evidence Petitioner presented consisted of statements Respondent made to Petitioner's investigator. These statements were made voluntarily after the investigator informed Respondent that he was not obligated to speak to the investigator.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Medical Examiners enter a final order holding Respondent, Fahmy M. Rizk, M.D., guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(h) and (x), Florida Statutes (1985), and suspending his license until payment of a $1000 fine, payable in not more than 90 days. DONE AND ORDERED this 6th day of April, 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3572 These rulings on the parties' proposed findings of fact are made to comply with Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1985). Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-8. Accepted and incorporated. 9.-24. Subordinate to facts found. 25.-27. Accepted and incorporated. 28.-66. Subordinate to facts found. (It should be noted that "Dr. Murphy," as indicated in the transcript and referred to in proposed finding 29, should be Dr. Mufdi, according to the Hearing Officer's notes.) Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-4. Accepted and incorporated. 5.-6. Accepted but subordinate to facts found and unnecessary. Last sentence rejected as erroneous conclusion of law; rest accepted and subordinate to facts found. Accepted but subordinate to facts found and unnecessary. 9.-13. Accepted but subordinate to facts found. Rejected that the advice was "in spite of the official policy and procedures" because proof was that the advice was in accordance with the official policy and procedures. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence to the extent it implies she was Respondent's only nurse. The evidence was Respondent told Potter that Cordias was part-time and worked when Muskatello was off. Also subordinate as a recitation of testimony. 16.-17. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (Other matters were discussed, too.) Also subordinate. Last sentence rejected, as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence, that those were the only matters discussed; rest rejected in part as erroneous conclusions of law as to the existence of a "fifth amendment privilege" and "right to an attorney" and in part as contrary to the finding that Potter did advise Respondent of his right to remain silent but otherwise accepted and subordinate to facts found. If "medical office" means "examination room," accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. First sentence accepted but subordinate to facts found; as to the second sentence, Potter's testimony was that in October, 1985, Respondent said Muskatello had not worked for him in the last four months; third sentence rejected as contrary to the finding that Respondent told Potter that Muskatello worked for Respondent through 1985 (although the transcript of the final hearing will reflect that Potter's testimony was not presented in a clear and readily understandable manner); last sentence subordinate to facts found. Subordinate in part to facts found and in part to facts contrary to facts found. Again, the transcript of the final hearing will reflect that Potter's testimony was not presented in a clear and easily understandable manner. It is equally clear that the facts found could have been proved more easily by evidence in addition to Respondent's admissions. But, as found, the evidence as a whole was sufficient to prove both that Mrs. Rizk was not a nurse, licensed or unlicensed, and that Respondent did examine or treat female patients in the year ending approximately February 2, 1986, without a licensed physician or nurse, licensed or unlicensed, being in attendance. Rejected as contrary to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: David D. Bryant, Esquire 1107 D. Jackson Street Suite 104 Tampa, Florida 33602 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire FREEMAN & LOPEZ, P.A. 4600 West Cypress Avenue Suite 410 Tampa, Florida 33607 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Van Poole Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact Stipulated facts The Respondent, Raul A. Tamayo, M.D., is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME0051659. At all times material hereto, the Respondent worked on a part-time basis, solely as an employee, at Westchester Clinic. The Respondent was neither an owner nor a principal of Westchester Clinic, nor was he an employer of Simon Hajje. The Respondent has had no prior discipline against his license to practice medicine in the State of Florida. Facts proved at hearing From early April of 1990 until November 16 of 1990, Dr. Simon Hajje also worked as an employee of the Westchester Clinic. During the time he worked for the Westchester Clinic, Dr. Simon Hajje was not licensed as a medical doctor in the State of Florida. During the time he worked for the Westchester Clinic, Dr. Simon Hajje's job title was "medical assistant." During the period that Dr. Hajje and the Respondent were employed at the Westchester Clinic, there were also numerous other physicians who worked there on a part-time basis on many different work schedules. On November 15, 1990, a Department investigator named Ms. Georgina Jorge went to the Westchester Clinic where, using the assumed name of Megalyn Guzman, she pretended to be a patient in need of medical attention. On that day Ms. Jorge was taken to an examination room where she met Dr. Simon Hajje. Thereupon, Dr. Hajje, acting as if he were a licensed medical doctor, took a medical history from Ms. Jorge, examined Ms. Jorge, and then wrote two prescription forms which he ultimately gave to Ms. Jorge. As she was leaving the clinic, Ms. Jorge asked the receptionist for the name of the doctor and she was given a card on which the name "Dr. Hajje-Tamayo" was written. On the following day, November 16, 1990, Ms. Jorge returned to the Westchester Clinic, again using the assumed name of Megalyn Guzman, and asked to see "Dr. Hajje-Tamayo." Ms. Jorge again saw Dr. Simon Hajje, whereupon she told him that she had lost one of the prescriptions. Dr. Simon Hajje thereupon wrote and delivered to Ms. Jorge another prescription to replace the allegedly lost prescription from the previous day. The prescription forms given to Ms. Jorge on November 15 and 16, 1990, were on prescription forms that had the name, address, and telephone number of the Westchester Clinic Center printed at the top. Those prescription forms also had a manuscript signature at the bottom that appeared to read "R. Tamayo, M.D." With regard to the two prescription forms given to her on November 15, 1990, Ms. Jorge observed that the prescription forms were signed before Dr. Simon Hajje started filling them out. She was unable to make such an observation regarding the prescription form given to her on November 16, 1990. On November 16, 1990, Ms. Jorge also retrieved six other presigned blank prescription forms that had the name, address, and telephone number of the Westchester Clinic Center printed at the top and had the manuscript signature of the Respondent at the bottom. None of the medications on the prescription forms given to Ms. Jorge by Dr. Simon Hajje were controlled substances. Dr. Hajje found the presigned prescription forms described above on a desk in one of the examination rooms at the Westchester Clinic. The Respondent never gave Dr. Hajje permission to take any of the presigned prescription forms and give them to Ms. Georgina Jorge. Dr. Hajje never told the Respondent that he was going to write prescriptions on the presigned forms and give them to Georgina Jorge. Dr. Hajje never told the Respondent that he was going to take the presigned prescription forms and write prescriptions for any patient. Dr. Hajje never said anything to the Respondent and never did anything that would cause the Respondent to expect that Dr. Hajje would write prescriptions on the presigned forms and give the prescription forms to Georgina Jorge. On November 19, 1990, Ms. Jorge interviewed the Respondent at the Respondent's private practice office located at 9473 West Flagler, Miami, Florida. Ms. Jorge had never seen the Respondent prior to the November 19, 1990, interview, nor had she spoken to him prior to the interview. During the course of the interview on November 19, 1990, Ms. Jorge showed the Respondent the prescription forms Dr. Hajje had issued to her and also showed him the other presigned blank prescription forms she had retrieved from the Westchester Clinic. Upon being told what had happened, the Respondent became very emotional and stated that he did not realize that Dr. Hajje had issued any prescriptions. The Respondent was very shocked and very surprised that Dr. Hajje had issued the prescriptions in question. The Respondent denied any knowledge of Dr. Hajje's actions in this regard and explained to Ms. Jorge that he might have left some presigned prescription forms behind at the Westchester Clinic because, as a matter of convenience and efficiency, he sometimes presigned blank prescription forms in order to save time while with his patients. In the course of this explanation, the Respondent showed Ms. Jorge a prescription pad he had in his possession that had two blank prescription forms that had been presigned by the Respondent. The presigned prescription forms the Respondent showed to Ms. Jorge on November 19, 1990, were different from the ones she saw on November 15 and 16, 1990, at the Westchester Clinic, because the ones on November 19 had printed at the top the Respondent's name and the addresses of the Respondent's private offices. On November 19, 1990, when Ms. Jorge showed the Respondent the prescription forms she had received from Dr. Hajje and the six blank presigned prescription forms she had retrieved on November 16, 1990, the Respondent examined those prescription forms and acknowledged that the signatures on all of those prescription forms appeared to be his signature. Prior to the interview on November 19, 1990, the Respondent did not realize that the act of presigning blank prescription forms was (and still is) prohibited by statute. The Respondent studied medicine in Havana, Cuba, in the early 1970's and also practiced in Cuba before coming to this country. Due to the heavy case loads that are common for physicians practicing in Cuba, it was common for such physicians to develop the habit of presigning documents such as prescription forms and having a physician's assistant fill out the prescriptions pursuant to instructions from the physician. Dr. Simon Hajje's activities on November 15 and 16, 1990, described above, led to his arrest on charges of engaging in the unlicensed practice of medicine. Those activities were also made known to the Board of Medicine when Dr. Hajje applied for a license to practice medicine in the State of Florida. Nevertheless, Dr. Hajje was licensed in due course and continues to be licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida. The Respondent is well respected, both personally and professionally, by physicians in the medical community in which he practices. Physicians who know him well regard the Respondent as an honest and honorable individual who is an excellent and dedicated physician.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine issue a Final Order in this case to the following effect: Dismissing the violations charged in Counts Two and Three of the Administrative Complaint on the grounds that the evidence is insufficient to prove the violations charged in those two counts; Concluding that the Respondent is guilty of having, on at least one occasion, violated Section 458.331(1)(aa), Florida Statutes (1990), as charged in Count One of the Administrative Complaint; and Imposing an administrative penalty consisting solely of a written reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 1993, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1993. APPENDIX The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Findings submitted by Petitioner: Paragraphs 1 through 7: Accepted in substance, with a number of details corrected or clarified to conform to the evidence. Paragraph 8: Rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. (There is evidence that the Respondent presigned "some" prescription forms, but there is no clear evidence that he did so on "numerous occasions" and there is no clear evidence that he was doing so throughout a two-year period from November 1988 to November 1990.) Paragraph 9: Rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence and as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (There is no evidence that the Respondent intended for anyone other than himself to issue the prescription forms he presigned.) Paragraph 10: Rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence and as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (There is no evidence that the Respondent authorized Dr. Simon Hajje to issue prescriptions, that he delegated the issuance of prescriptions to Dr. Hajje, or that he even knew Dr. Hajje was issuing prescriptions.) Findings submitted by Respondent: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraphs 2 and 3: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary historical or background details. Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21: Accepted in substance, with a number of details corrected or clarified to conform to the evidence. Paragraph 22: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 23: First sentence accepted in substance to the effect that the Respondent was very surprised and in a state of shock when he learned that Dr. Simon Hajje had issued prescriptions presigned by the Respondent. The remainder of this paragraph is rejected as consisting of subordinate and unnecessary details and legal arguments. Paragraph 24: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 25: Accepted in substance, but with a large number of unnecessary details omitted. Paragraph 26: Rejected as constituting legal argument rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 27, 28, and 29: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 30: Rejected as constituting legal argument rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 31: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 32: Accepted in substance, with exception of last sentence. Last sentence is rejected as legal argument. Paragraphs 33, 34, 35, and 36: Rejected as consisting of a combination of subordinate and unnecessary details and arguments about the sufficiency of the evidence. Paragraphs 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, and 44: Accepted in substance, with a number of details corrected or clarified to conform to the evidence, and with other details simplified to the bare essentials. COPIES FURNISHED: Francesca Plendl, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Steven R. Ballinger, Esquire, and Morton J. Morris, Esquire 2500 Hollywood Boulevard Suite 212 Hollywood, Florida 33020 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Jack McRay, Esquire General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent, a licensed physician, committed violations of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, sufficient to justify the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against his license.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is Michael A. Fuentes, M.D., a licensed physician at all times pertinent to these proceedings, holding medical license number ME 0044461. Respondent's last known address is 311 Akron Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15216. Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. The Pennsylvania State Board of Medicine is the licensing authority for the State of Pennsylvania. The Connecticut Board of Medicine is the disciplining body for the State of Connecticut. On or about July 27, 1994, the Pennsylvania State Board of Medicine indefinitely suspended Respondent’s license to practice medicine and then stayed that suspension while placing Respondent on five year's probation. The Board found Respondent to be an impaired physician who had been non-compliant with treatment recommendations. On or about August 26, 1996, the Pennsylvania State Board of Medicine, reviewed its earlier decision and shortened the probationary period to three years. Respondent did not report the Pennsylvania State Board of Medicine’s action in either instance to Petitioner’s representatives in the State of Florida. On October 19, 1993, the Connecticut Board of Medicine summarily suspended Respondent’s license to practice medicine due to his mental impairment and failure to undergo a complete psychiatric evaluation. Subsequently, on or about June 20, 1995, the Board revoked Respondent’s license to practice medicine in Connecticut. Respondent did not report the Connecticut State Board of Medicine's action in either instance to Petitioner's representatives in the State of Florida. Respondent is guilty of having action taken against his license to practice medicine by the licensing authorities of the State of Pennsylvania and the State of Connecticut, violations of Section 458.331(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Additionally, Respondent did not notify the Florida Board of Medicine within 30 days of the license disciplinary actions taken by either the State of Pennsylvania or the State of Connecticut against his license, notifications required by Section 458.331(1)(kk), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the charges set forth in the Administrative Complaint and revoking his license to practice medicine in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Carol Lanfri, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Stephen M. Chizmadia, Esquire 125 Sun Dance Road Stamford, Connecticut 06905 Michael A. Fuentes 32 Lake Drive Darien, Connecticut 06820 Michael A. Fuentes c/o The Royal Inn Route 219, Boot Jack Summit Ridgway, Pennsylvania 15853 Marm Harris, Executive Director Agency for Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0770 Pete Peterson, Esquire Department of Health Building 6, Room 102-E 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Building 6 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 James Howell, Secretary Department of Health Building 6, Room 306 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Harry M. Katz, M.D., is a medical doctor. His address is P.O. Box 192, Cedar Hill, Missouri 63016. He maintains an active family practice in the area of that location and is licensed by the agency charged with regulating and licensing medical doctors in the State of Missouri ("Missouri Board"). The Petitioner is seeking reinstatement of his medical doctor's license revoked by the Florida Board's Final Order of February 14, 1966. The Respondent is the Board of Medicine of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation located at 1940 North Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida. It has denied the Petitioner's reinstatement of his Florida medical doctor's license, which initial agency action resulted in this formal proceeding. The Petitioner falls within that class of physicians whose licenses were revoked prior to June 1994 and under the legal authority cited herein, are entitled to petition for reinstatement. In order to have his license reinstated, the Petitioner must demonstrate that he is capable of practicing medicine with reasonable skill and safety, as required by Subsection 458.331(4), Florida Statutes (1991). On February 14, 1966, the State Board of Medical Examiners revoked the Petitioner's medical license for aiding, assisting and promoting an unlicensed physician to practice medicine and surgery at his hospital and by apparently failing to correctly perform physical examinations upon pilots for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), although he certified them as physically fit. The Petitioner had employed a physician (surgeon) to practice at his hospital in Clearwater, Florida, including the performance of surgery. Sometime later, while that physician was in his employ, the Petitioner learned that his license had been either revoked or suspended. The Petitioner states that he promptly contacted the State Board of Medical Examiners to ascertain what his responsibility was in terms of employing such a physician, who was unlicensed, without the Petitioner's knowledge. The Petitioner states that he was informed by the Executive Director of the Medical Board that, in effect, he was not liable or subject to enforcement action by the Board for unknowingly allowing the unlicensed physician to practice under the circumstances described in the Petitioner's testimony in this case. Nevertheless, the Petitioner was ultimately prosecuted by the Medical Board for this activity, some of which occurred soon after he became aware of the doctor's license suspension, and also for allegedly certifying pilots as physically fit to the FAA when he had not actually done complete physical examinations. The Petitioner maintains that, indeed, he did do physical examinations on the four pilots, but testified that he did not do prostate examinations because it was not medically necessary, with pilots of such a young age to do such examinations. The Board found that he could not have done adequate physicals if the pilots were not required to disrobe. In any event, his medical license was revoked, which he freely admits. Sometime in 1972, the Petitioner was prosecuted on a federal indictment, concerning charges in the nature of "medicare fraud". In essence, the Petitioner was charged with billing the medicare system for doctor/patient visits, for patients in his hospital, for each day the patients resided in his hospital, which apparently did not conform to medicare regulations. The Petitioner maintains that, indeed, he made the visits he billed for and believed that he was billing correctly for them. Nonetheless, he acknowledges that he was convicted and sentenced to two years in the federal prison facility at Eglin Air Force Base for those charges. Shortly after his confinement, the sentence was reduced to one year. The Petitioner appealed both the state license revocation and the federal criminal conviction, but both were upheld on appeal. The Petitioner testified concerning circumstances surrounding his federal trial involving purported inappropriate, ineffective and possible failure by the prosecution to reveal potential exculpatory evidence representation by his counsel, the effect of which he was unable to overturn in the appellate process. Be that as it may, as the Petitioner concedes, he did have his medical doctor's license revoked in 1966 and suffered a federal conviction in 1972. The Petitioner's license to practice medicine in the Commonwealth of Kentucky was revoked based upon the Florida disciplinary action, and his Alabama license was voluntarily surrendered on the same basis. His application for licensure in South Dakota was denied based, in effect, upon the Florida disciplinary action, and his application for a State of Louisiana medical license was denied, as to full licensure, on the same basis. The State of Louisiana, however, did grant him a conditional license to practice medicine, which authorized him to practice as an employed physician at the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola. He served in that capacity and was promoted to medical director of the facility, providing medical care for some 4,000 inmates. Additionally, the Petitioner applied for licensure with the Kansas Board of Healing Arts, but elected not to pursue that licensure. The application was deemed withdrawn. The various state medical licensing boards revoked the Petitioner's pre-existing licensure or denied his applications for licensure based upon the Florida disciplinary action. Those other state boards took the position that he had to cure the licensure deficiency in Florida before he could be licensed in the other states. Those licensure actions were not based upon any independent disciplinary prosecutions in those states. The Petitioner practiced as a physician III and physician IV in the Louisiana Department of Corrections at the penitentiary at Angola from sometime in 1973 until 1981. He became medical director of that facility. He performed a competent and honorable medical practice at that facility, as shown by unrefuted testimony in this proceeding and by the testimonial letters stipulated into evidence. The Petitioner is currently licensed to practice medicine in the State of Missouri, where he has conducted a family practice since 1981. During his tenure in practice in Missouri, he had four malpractice suits filed against him. The first suit was settled for the sum of $1,200.00. The second and third suits were dismissed. The fourth suit resulted in a verdict in his favor. The verdict was later set aside, but the case was settled for the sum of $15,000.00. One of the malpractice suits resulted in the State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts in Missouri inquiring into his practice in that instance. His licensure status was not disciplined, but the Missouri Board required him to take the SPEX examination administered by the Federation of State Medical Boards. He took that examination and passed it with a score of 81. The Petitioner is held in high esteem by his colleagues in the medical profession in Missouri, as shown by the testimonial letters in evidence and by a certificate of appreciation he was awarded by the St. Louis University Medical Center for his support and medical practice in conjunction with the St. Louis University Hospital's clinical services and teaching mission in conjunction with its operations as a teaching hospital. He has referred numerous patients to that facility and has received favorable comment on his evaluation, treatment of patients, and the good standards with which he has conducted his practice. The Petitioner is licensed to prescribe narcotics without restriction. He is current with all of the required continuing medical education requirements and exceeds those requirements. He held a certificate of membership in good standing with the American Medical Association at least through July 1, 1993. He is a participant in good standing in the Medicare and Medicaid programs in the State of Missouri. He holds a valid certificate from the United States Department of Health and Human Services for clinical laboratory services. He is a participating physician in good standing with the Medicare and Medicaid programs and with the Blue Cross/Blue Shield program and is approved by the United States Department of Transportation to perform its required physicals. During his tenure in Louisiana, he was a member in good standing in the Louisiana State Medical Society from approximately 1976 to 1980 and an officer of that association. He is a member in good standing of the American Medical Association as an AMA senior physician, the Southern Medical Association, since about 1982, and the American Correctional Association. Additionally, he has been board certified in the field of family practice by the American Board of Family Practice since 1976, in good standing. The Petitioner has labored with a commendable dedication to good medical practice in amassing the above-found credits to his medical practice since suffering the above-referenced blemishes on his professional record so long ago, culminating in his demonstration to the Missouri State Board of his ability to safely engage in the practice of medicine by passing the SPEX examination with a high score. He has demonstrated that he is capable of and has practiced medicine with reasonable skill and safety, as required by Subsection 458.331(4), Florida Statutes (1991). The testimony of Georgia Leigh Katz, the Petitioner's daughter, speaks eloquently to the high level of character demonstrated by the Petitioner's single-minded dedication to his medical practice, even under his diminished professional standing for over 20 years. That demonstration of the perseverance and character with which he has approached his practice of medicine, under professionally and legally straitened circumstances during that time, certainly militates in favor of finding him rehabilitated from his prior disciplinary blemishes. Ms. Katz' testimony was unrefuted and is adopted herein by reference as true. She thus established that, although not the fault of the medical board nor the federal court, the Petitioner's disciplinary action in Florida and the federal court conviction effectively destroyed his family. Shortly thereafter, he and his wife were divorced; and he, for much of the ensuing, approximate quarter century, has had to live apart from his children, in a distant state, while attempting, with his licensure impairment, to earn a relatively meager living and to support his family. He has made herculian efforts to support his family and himself with his medical practice, which could not reach its full potential because of the blemishes upon his professional record. Ms. Katz' testimony demonstrated, in a truly heart-rending way, the effect which this has had upon the Petitioner, his children and his former wife, their mother, in terms of the lack of financial security these circumstances imposed and, more importantly, the emotional hardship caused to the Petitioner and his family. The Petitioner's dedication to his profession under these debilitating circumstances for these long years certainly demonstrates a rehabilitation of character in the Petitioner. This rehabilitation, coupled with the showing that he is competent and capable of practicing medicine with reasonable skill and safety, shows that his new licensure in Florida would pose no risk to its citizens but rather would be a benefit to them. Counsel for the Board apparently avers that the Petitioner unrealistically claims that the Florida Board of Medicine, and its counterparts in other states, are engaged in some covert conspiracy to continue to deny him licensure, to impair his professional standing and medical practice. Questions by counsel, however, as well as those by the Hearing Officer, reveal that, although it is granted that the Petitioner has a great deal of emotional investment and anguish resulting from his multiple bouts with his licensure restrictions, that he really intended to explain in his testimony, in an imperfect way, that his licensure problems in the other states are interrelated with the root disciplinary action in Florida and that the Florida disciplinary action and the federal conviction, has had a legally operative effect with the medical practice acts in the other named states which cannot be cured until his licensure status in Florida can be restored. The Hearing Officer does not find from the testimony and evidence that the Petitioner has an unrealistic thought process leading to a perception on his part that there is a real conspiracy between the medical boards of the various named states or any of their personnel. The Respondent also appears to take the position that the Petitioner cannot truly demonstrate rehabilitation unless he comes before the Board to express apology and contrition for his past conduct, and it decries his remonstrances concerning his disciplinary record. In fact, however, the Petitioner does not deny the past disciplinary actions, although he did seek to explain their circumstances in an exculpatory way. On one level, it might seem a valid criticism that the Petitioner expresses no contrition or apology for his past conduct. On the other hand, he appears to genuinely believe in his innocence or at least his lack of moral turpitude concerning his disciplinary circumstances. This genuine belief on his part has motivated him to resist expressions of apology to the Florida Board, while exercising every available remedy to overturn the disciplinary action. This fact supports an inference that he is a man who has adhered to genuinely- held convictions, even through years of professional and personal adversity such a stand may have imposed upon him; rather than to "kowtow" to expediency and, by humble contrition, surrender those convictions simply to facilitate his re-entry into a lucrative profession in Florida. Given the preponderant evidence adduced by the Petitioner in this proceeding, such a lack of expressed apology or contrition evinces more of strong character than a lack of rehabilitation. In any event, the Petitioner has certainly already suffered sufficiently for any such lack of contrition.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor, demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that the license to practice medicine in the State of Florida of Harry Meyer Katz, M.D., be reinstated. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2797 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-25. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-14. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. 15. Rejected, in favor of the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as subordinate thereto. 16-18. Rejected, in favor of the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as subordinate thereto. Accepted. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as not entirely consonant with the preponderance evidence of record and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not itself dispositive of the material issues presented. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul Watson Lambert, Esquire 2851 Remington Green Circle Suite C Tallahassee, Florida 32308-3749 Michael A. Mone, Esquire Gregory A. Chaires, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay, Esq. General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent abused its discretion in withdrawing its certification of eligibility which had authorized Petitioner, a physician who was educated and trained in Nicaragua, to enroll in a course at the University of Miami that is necessary for his licensure to practice medicine in the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact On October 19, 1989, Petitioner submitted to the Board of Medicine an application for licensure as a physician in the State of Florida. This application sought licensure by examination pursuant to Section 458.311(10), Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a physician who received his education and training in Nicaragua and who had practiced medicine in Nicaragua for approximately twenty years before moving to Florida. At no time pertinent to these proceedings was Petitioner licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida. Petitioner's application sought the Board of Medicine's certification that Petitioner was eligible to enroll in a physician training course offered by the University of Miami. Petitioner needed to successfully complete this course as part of the licensure by examination process. Petitioner enrolled in this class after his eligibility was certified by the Board of Medicine on February 19, 1990. In April of 1990, a joint investigation of the L.A. Surgical Medical Center in Miami, Florida, (L.A. Center) was undertaken by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the Florida Department of Professional Regulation (DPR). While those agencies had reason to believe that an unlicensed physician was operating out of that facility, Petitioner was not initially a target of the investigation. Petitioner was, at the times pertinent hereto, the administrator of the L.A. Center. At the times pertinent to this proceeding Ramon Prieto was an undercover investigator employed by DPR. On April 25, 1990, Mr. Prieto presented himself to the L.A. Center complaining of severe back pains and asked to see a doctor. There was no licensed physician on the premises of the L.A. Center even though Mr. Prieto presented himself at approximately 1:00 p.m., which is during the L.A. Center's normal business hours. Mr. Prieto was seated in the waiting area where he waited for approximately twenty minutes. Petitioner came into the area in which Mr. Prieto had been waiting, told Mr. Prieto to come with him, and escorted Mr. Prieto into a doctor's office. In connection with Mr. Prieto's visit on April 25, 1990, Petitioner performed a medical examination, made a medical diagnosis, prescribed and dispensed medication, ordered x-rays, and created medical records. Petitioner also prescribed and provided medication for Mr. Prieto's wife based on Mr. Prieto's description of her symptoms even though Petitioner had not examined her or talked to her. Mr. Prieto requested that Petitioner give to him medication for himself and for his wife. While Mr. Prieto pretended to be in considerable pain, the evidence does not establish that his condition was treated by Petitioner as an emergency. On April 26, 1990, Mr. Prieto returned to the L.A. Center where he was again prescribed medication by Petitioner. Mr. Prieto was billed for Petitioner's services and for the medication that Petitioner gave to Mr. Prieto for himself and for his wife. On April 26, 1990, after Mr. Prieto's return visit, Petitioner was arrested by agents of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. An information was filed against Petitioner charging him with two counts of practicing medicine without a license, which are third degree felony charges. On August 16, 1990, the Board of Medicine withdrew its certification of Petitioner's eligibility to continue the course at the University of Miami. Thereafter Petitioner filed his request for a formal administrative hearing. On September 24, 1990, the Board of Medicine entered an order which stayed its Order entered August 16, 1990, pending the resolution of this administrative proceeding. On September 10, 1990, in the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida, Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the criminal charges that had been filed against him. The plea was accepted, adjudication of guilt was withheld, and Petitioner was sentenced to two days of time served. There was no evidence that Petitioner had engaged in the practice of medicine in the State of Florida without a license before or after April 25-26, 1990. The Board of Medicine had received no complaints regarding Petitioner other than those related to the events of April 25-26, 1990. Petitioner knew that his conduct with Mr. Prieto was wrong and that it constituted the unlicensed practice of medicine.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which upholds the Board of Medicine's withdrawal of its certification of Jose M. Bermudez's eligibility to take the subject University of Miami course. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 25th day of March, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1991. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-5894 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Petitioner. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 1 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 2 - 6 are rejected as being the recitation of testimony that is either subordinate to the findings made or unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondent. 1. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1 - 10 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Allen R. Grossman, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 1603 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Stephen H. Rosen, Esquire 2600 Douglas Road, Penthouse #2 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact By agreement with the prosecution Dr. Brown had sought to delay consideration of his procedural motion to dismiss DPR Case No. 91-06883/DOAH Case No. 92-1076, pertaining to the patients J.C., D.R., T.E. and K.J. The parties to that action anticipated considering the motion at the final hearing as part of the case on the merits. The hearing officer was persuaded that the procedural motion to dismiss had to be examined separate and apart from the consideration of the case on the merits as to those four patients. Consequently the motion to dismiss was entertained concerning its evidential and legal basis prior to a hearing on the merits. This led to the decision on June 9, 1992, to dismiss the action pertaining to treatment of the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E., with leave to refile at some future date. The decision to dismiss was based upon the pertinent facts and law when examined in accordance with Section 455.255(1), Florida Statutes. The motion to dismiss the action concerning treatment of the patient K.J. was denied. The reason for the dismissal was announced in the record on June 9, 1992, and memorialized in the transcript of the proceedings. It was concluded that there was not an adequate basis to institute an investigation concerning the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E.; that the Department of Professional Regulation, now the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, did not furnish Dr. Brown or his attorney with a copy of the complaint or the document that resulted in the initiation of the investigation pertaining to the three patients; and, that Dr. Brown did not have the statutorily mandated opportunity to respond to the accusations made against him related to the care that he provided those three patients. Therefore, the procedural requirements under Section 455.225(1), Florida Statutes, had not been met and the case as it pertained to the three patients was dismissed with leave to refile. The procedural requirements related to the patient K.J. had been met and it was appropriate to present the K.J. case to the Probable Cause Panel for its deliberation, unlike the circumstance with the other three patients. It was determined that the quality of consideration by the Probable Cause Panel when voting to prosecute Dr. Brown for his treatment of K.J. was adequate. Based upon the ruling directed to the treatment of patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. the Department of Professional Regulation was not allowed to proceed against Dr. Brown for the care rendered those patients. A subsequent recommended order addressed in substance the prosecutions associated with DPR Case No. 91-06883/DOAH Case No. 92-1076 pertaining to the patient K.J.; DPR Case Nos. 011343 and 011344/DOAH Case No. 91-5325 and DPR Case Nos. 8901804, 0111385 and 0111353/DOAH Case No. 91-6358, traced the history of those cases in the preliminary statement to the recommended order and identified the prior ruling dismissing the actions pertaining to the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. That recommended order was not an invitation to the Board of Medicine to respond to a recommendation of dismissal. The recommended order in the cases pertaining to patients other than J.C., D.R., and T.E. was entered on December 30, 1992, based upon the formal hearing conducted pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, on various dates in June and July, 1992, and concluded on July 10, 1992, before the present hearing officer. On February 26, 1993, the Board entered its final order in the above- referenced cases and commented to the effect that it had approved the recommended dismissal by the hearing officer concerning the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. with leave to refile. Neither party appealed the hearing officer's decision dismissing those counts within DPR Case No. 91-06883/DOAH Case No. 92-1076 directed to the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. On March 8, 1993, Dr. Brown took an appeal from the final order of the Board of Medicine entered on February 26, 1993, which included the comment approving the actions by the hearing officer in dismissing the counts pertaining to the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E., but without prejudice to bring those actions again following compliance with Section 455.225, Florida Statutes. Robert C. Brown, Jr., M.D., is a licensed physician practicing in the state of Florida. He has held a license entitling him to practice in that state at all times relevant to the inquiry. At relevant times Dr. Brown has practiced medicine at 4519 Brentwood Avenue, Jacksonville, Florida, 32206. He is the sole medical practitioner of an incorporated professional practice. He has had less than 25 employees and his net worth has been not more than 2 million dollars. Dr. Brown is the only share holder in his incorporated professional association. No one else has ownership interest in the incorporated professional association. At times Dr. Brown has drawn a salary from the professional association as an employee of the professional association. His request for attorney's fees and costs are directed to the actions of the Department of Professional Regulation for its procedural noncompliance with Section 455.225, Florida Statutes, and the subsequent decision of the Board of Medicine to find probable cause and to have the Department of Professional Regulation proceed against Dr. Brown for care rendered the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. The action to recover attorney's fees and costs not to exceed $15,000 was filed on April 27, 1993. The petition for attorney's fees and costs of April 27, 1993, was amended on July 15, 1993. Dr. Brown retained the law firm of Stowell, Anton and Kraemer to represent him in the aforementioned cases pertaining to the administrative prosecutions. His present attorney, Julie Gallagher, was principal counsel in those cases. No issue has been taken with the notion that $165.00 is a reasonable hourly rate for her services in defending Dr. Brown in the administrative prosecutions. Dr. Brown has paid all fees and costs charged by his lawyer in preparation for and participating in the proceedings related to the administrative prosecutions. To challenge the alleged procedural infirmities associated with the right to investigate, notice to the accused, opportunity for the accused to respond to the accusations and deliberations by the Probable Cause Panel contemplated by Section 455.225, Florida Statutes, it was not necessary for Dr. Brown to fully develop his defense on the merits of the accusations pertaining to patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. Dr. Brown's counsel in the exhibit associated with claims for attorney's fees and costs has highlighted the exhibit through color-codes in an attempt to assist the hearing officer in understanding the meaning of that exhibit. This color-code system attempts to identify those instances in which Dr. Brown claims that the work done on his behalf is associated only with patients with J.C., D.R. and T.E. and other occasions where a percentage is set forth in relation to work done in the entire DPR Case No. 91-06883/DOAH Case No. 92-1076, to include K.J. and in the other cases referenced before. The code is described in the August 16, 1993 cover letter from counsel for Dr. Brown. No attempt is made through the coding system to differentiate between those actions taken in moving to dismiss DPR Case No. 91-06883/DOAH Case No. 92-1076 pertaining to the patients J.C., D.R. and T.E. from other activities related to defending the accusations about those patients on the merits. The right to recover, if at all, is limited to those attorney's fees and costs associated with the motion to dismiss counts pertaining to the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E., together with the attorney's fees and costs associated with the present case. No other efforts by Dr. Brown's attorneys may be the proper subject for recovery. Not only was it not necessary to know information concerning the merits of the administrative complaint pertaining to patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. to pursue the motion to dismiss on procedural grounds, the decision that was made did not resolve the merits set forth in the administrative complaints directed to Dr. Brown's treatment of J.C., D.R., and T.E. The possibility exists that Dr. Brown could be called upon to defend against similar accusations to those set forth in the DPR Case No. 91-06883/DOAH Case No. 92-1076 at which time he could prepare himself to defend the merits and if successful that would be the appropriate moment to seek attorney's fees and costs for that aspect of the case. The arrangement by stipulation between the parties in the prior prosecution to delay consideration of the motion to dismiss until the place at which prosecution of the cases involving J.C., D.R., and T.E. were being examined on their merits was not appropriate. Consequently, Dr. Brown may not assert that he was required to prepare his motion to dismiss on procedural grounds simultaneously with his defense on the merits of the administrative complaint directed to the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. Within this context, taking into account a lack of opposition to the $165.00 hourly rate charged by Dr. Brown's counsel, the following amounts are found to be associated with the pursuit of the motion to dismiss those counts related to patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. and claims under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, to recover attorney's fees and costs: 3/11/92-$165.00; 3/14/92-$165.00; 3/16/92-$125.00; 3/31/92-$100.00; 4/2/92-$247.50; 4/6/92- $62.50; 4/6/92-$198.00; 4/10/92-$50.00; 4/16/92-$10.00; 4/17/92-$50.00; related to the motion to dismiss and 4/27/93-$165.00; 5/3/93-$33.00; 5/12/93-$15.00; 5/17/93-$82.50; 6/14/93-$165.00; related to the prosecution of the petition for attorney's fees and costs. No proof was offered concerning any special circumstances that point to any injustice in awarding attorney's fees and costs in the amount identified.
Findings Of Fact Michael A. Doub was employed as a correctional officer I at DeSoto Correctional Institution, Department of Corrections. He held this position from October 3, 1986 until he was determined to have abandoned his position on June 8, 1989. During this period, Doub's work performance had been rated at the "achieves standards" level. Doub had in excess of twenty (20) days of accumulated leave credits available for use at the time of his separation from employment with the Department. On June 4, 1989, Officer Doub was arrested by the Hardee County Sheriff's Department on the charge of sexual battery. Doub was taken to the Hardee County Jail where he was confined until he could post appropriate bail. Doub was scheduled to work from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on June 4, 1989. On June 4, 1989, DeSoto Correctional Institution, specifically Lieutenant James Jacobs, was notified by Sergeant J. Krell of the Hardee County Sheriff's Department of Doub's arrest, the charges pending against him and his confinement at the Hardee County Hail pending the posting of appropriate bail. Lieutenant Jacobs is Officer Doub's immediate supervisor. This contact was not initiated at Officer's Doub's request. Officer Doub was aware the Sheriff's Department had notified the Institution of his whereabouts and situation. Doub did not contact the Institution in order to specifically request that he be granted leave pending his release from jail. On June 12, 1989, Officer Doub was released from the Hardee County Jail after posting bail. On the same date, he received the letter of abandonment from DeSoto Correctional Institution. On June 12, 1989, Officer Doub contacted DeSoto Correctional Institution seeking permission to return to work. This requested [sic] was denied based on the letter of abandonment. Thereafter, Doub filed a request for review of the decision of the Institution finding him to have abandoned his position. The criminal charge of sexual battery pending against Officer Doub was withdrawn by the State Attorney of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Hardee County, Florida.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner be reinstated as a Correctional Officer I, as he did not abandon his position within the Career Service System for three consecutive workdays. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Gene "Hal" Johnson, Esquire 300 East Brevard Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Perri King, Esquire Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Louis A. Vargas, Esquire General Counsel Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Richard L. Dugger, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Ms. Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 =================================================================
