The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner, Daniel O. Cobb, is entitled to payment of claims for surgery performed on Ms. Cobb, Susan Catherine Cobb, his spouse, on November 11, 1985, and whether Respondent, the State, is estopped from denying coverage. A prehearing stipulation was filed limiting the facts, issues, exhibits and witnesses. The stipulated facts were incorporated into the Recommended Order and are in the Final Order as well. Petitioner presented the testimony of himself and his spouse. Petitioner's exhibits 2 through 6 were accepted into evidence. Exhibits 3 and 4 constituted hearsay. The Department presented the testimony of Hazel Rosser and Joseph F. Wellman. Four exhibits by the Department were offered into evidence and were accepted. Neither party ordered a transcript. Only the Department filed a proposed recommended order and findings of fact. The Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law in the Recommended Order are hereby adopted, except in Findings of Fact Nos. 16, 17, and 18, Mrs. Scott is changed to Mrs. Cobb and in Findings of Fact No. 18, Mr. Scott is changed to Mr. Cobb.
Findings Of Fact Daniel O. Cobb was an employee of the Florida Department of Transportation during 1985. Mr. Cobb and his spouse, Susan Cobb, had family coverage under the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "State Plan"), until November 1, 1985. The State Plan is administered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield. Pursuant to the agreement between the State of Florida and Blue Cross/Blue Shield benefits which are payable under the State Plan are governed by a "Benefit Document." Each year, State employees are given an opportunity change the form of health insurance coverage they wish to have. During this "open enrollment period" an employee covered by the State Plan can elect to participate in a Health Maintenance Organization and an employee covered by a Health Maintenance Organization can elect to participate in the State Plan. During 1985, there was an open enrollment period between September 9, 1985, and September 20, 1985. During the 1985 open enrollment period State employees, including Mr. Cobb, were provided a Notice to Employees in which they were advised to carefully review information contained in a Benefit Comparison Brochure, a Rate Comparison Chart and a Health Care Plan Selection Form. These documents were provided to all State employees. The Selection Form instructed employees to "Please read the employee notice about HMO service areas and effective date of coverage before completing this section." State employees were also advised that any change in coverage would be effective November 1, 1985. On September 19, 1985, Mr. Cobb signed a State of Florida Employes Group Health Self Insurance Plan, Change of Information Form. Pursuant to this Change of Information Form, Mr. Cobb elected to terminate his health insurance coverage with the State Plan. On the Change of Information Form it was indicated that Mr. Cobb's election to terminate his coverage under the State Plan was to be effective November 1, 1985. Therefore, Mr. Cobb was informed and should have known that he was no longer eligible for medical cost payment for himself or his family pursuant to the State Plan after October 31, 1985. Mr. Cobb also signed a Member Enrollment (Group) and Physician Selection Form on September 19, 1985. Pursuant to this Form, Mr. Cobb enrolled himself, his Spouse and their children, in Health Options, Inc., a health maintenance organization. Mr. Cobb's participation in Health Options, Inc., began November 1, 1985. On September 19, 1985, Mr. Cobb was provided a list of Health Options, Inc., approved physicians which were available for use by Mr. Cobb and his family. Mr. Cobb designated Gerald A. Giurato, M.D., as his primary care physician on the Physician Enrollment Form which he signed on September 19, 1985. On October 28, 1985, Mr. Cobb was mailed a copy of the Health Options Member Handbook which, among other things, describes the grievance procedure to be followed when medical expenses were not paid by Health Options Inc., and the manner in which physicians were to be used in order to be entitled to payment, of their charges. The Handbook informed Mr. Cobb that all care had to be arranged through a primary care physician and that only services provided or approved by the primary care physician were covered. The Handbook also indicated that treatment by physicians who were not approved by the primary care physician would be the responsibility of the patient. During 1985 Mrs. Cobb was under the care of Alexander Rosin, M.D. Dr. Rosin performed surgery for the removal of a cyst on Mrs. Cobb, on November 11, 1985. Dr. Rosin was not a physician approved by Health Options, Inc., or Mr. Cobb's primary care physician. Nor was the surgery approved. Claims attributable to the November 11, 1985, surgery were submitted to the State Plan. Claims, for the charges of Dr. Rosin, Scott Blonder, M.D., and a Pathologist were submitted. The expenses for the November 11, 1985, surgery were incurred after coverage of Mr. and Mrs. Cobb under the State Plan ended. The type of surgery performed on Mrs. Cobb was also not authorized by the Benefit Document. No claims were submitted to Health Options, Inc., for medical expenses incurred for Mrs. Cobb's operation on November 11, 1985. None of the medical expense attributable to Mrs. Cobb's November 11, 1985, surgery were incurred with physicians or facilities approved by Health Options, Inc. By letter dated August 27, 1986, the Department denied the claims submitted to the State Plan attributable to Mrs. Cobb's November 11, 1985, surgery. Mr. Cobb filed a request for an administrative hearing to contest the Department's proposed denial.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMEDED that a final order be issued by the Department denying payment of claimed expenses attributable to Mrs. Cobb's surgery of November 11, 1985. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 864109 The Department has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number, of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 18. The letter denying payment was dated August 27, 1986, and not September 4, 1986. See DOA exhibit 1. 2 7. 3 Hereby accepted. 4 7. 5 3. 6 4 and 5. 7-9 6. 10-12 11. Summary of testimony and irrelevant. Summary of testimony argument. Concerning the weight to be given evidence and cumulative. 15 7. 16 Hearsay. 17-18 Conclusion of law. 19-20 16. 21 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 22 15. COPIES FURNISHED: O. C. Beakes, Esquire Lindner Smith, Jr., Esquire 836 Riverside Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32205 Andrea R. Bateman, Esquire Department of Administration Room 438, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Adis Vila, Secretary 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 =================================================================
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that Respondent, Department of Administration, enter a Final Order that Petitioner, Marvin Brownlee, is owed a total of $158.56 under the State of Florida Employees' Group Health Insurance Program consisting of $126.08 of expenditures previously conceded to be eligible coverage but not yet paid, plus $32.48 of expenditures for bed underpads or chucks determined after final hearing to be covered. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of February, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 84-0806 Rulings On Petitioner's Proposed Findings Of Fact. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. No items before the effective date of the State's self-insurance program, May 1, 1978, were found to be covered. Covered by Findings 2 through 6. Rulings On Respondent's Proposed Findings Of Fact. 1-2. Covered by Finding 1. Covered by Finding 7. 4-6. To the extent necessary and relevant, covered by Findings 8 through 11. Rejected as not supported by the totality of the evidence; covered by Findings 2 through 6. Covered by Finding 6. Covered by Findings 3 through 6. Covered by Findings 2 and 5. Second sentence specifically rejected as not supported by the totality of the evidence. As found, the specific use of the underpads is to catch and absorb Brownlee's excrement. But they are part of an overall method for control of Brownlee's bowels and, as such, aid in his physical well-being. See Conclusion 3. Rejected. First, it is unnecessary to recite the agency's preliminary decision. Second, there was no evidence of the qualifications of the persons determining that the underpads are not "medically necessary." Third, the determination is not supported by the totality of the evidence. See Findings 2 and 5. (The part on prescription drugs is covered by Findings 3 through 6 and 10.) COPIES FURNISHED: Marvin Brownlee Route 3, Box 581 Havana, Florida 32333 Augustus D. Aikens, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gilda Lambert Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on September 15, 2000, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Insurance is the state agency responsible for licensing insurance agents in Florida and with regulating their conduct. Section 624.307 and Chapter 626, Part I, Florida Statutes (1999). At the times material to this proceeding, Ingrid Machado was Florida-licensed insurance agent. In March 1999, Teresita Baldor was interested in purchasing health insurance. Ms. Baldor had previously owned a private school and had been insured through the school's group health insurance policy. After she sold the school and began teaching mathematics at Miami-Dade Community College and Saint Thomas University, she no longer had health insurance coverage. On or about March 10, 1999, Ms. Machado met with Ms. Baldor at Ms. Baldor's home. Ms. Baldor knew Ms. Machado only as an insurance agent and did not know whether Ms. Machado was affiliated with an insurance agency. Ms. Machado told Ms. Baldor during the March 10, 1999, visit that she would try to place Ms. Baldor in a group for health insurance purposes but that she did not know at that time the group Ms. Baldor would be placed in or the name of the insurance company that would provide the health insurance coverage. Ms. Machado told Ms. Baldor during the visit that she would let Ms. Baldor know the name of the company providing her coverage and that she would send Ms. Baldor the coverage information. During her March 10, 1999, visit to Ms. Baldor's home, Ms. Machado asked Ms. Baldor for general identification information, such as her name and social security number, and for other information, such as her weight. Ms. Baldor did not sign any document during this visit and cannot recall if Ms. Machado completed any form during their conversation. Ms. Machado asked Ms. Baldor to make out two checks, one in the amount of $175.00 and one in the amount of $100.00, but Ms. Baldor does not remember Ms. Machado's telling her the reason she needed two separate checks. Ms. Machado asked Ms. Baldor to leave the line for the name of the payee blank, again telling Ms. Baldor that she did not yet know which insurance company would ultimately provide health insurance coverage to Ms. Baldor. Ms. Machado told Ms. Baldor that the name of the company would be filled in on the checks at a later time. Ms. Machado told Ms. Baldor that she would have health insurance coverage effective March 15, 1999. On or about March 20, 1999, Ms. Baldor telephoned Ms. Machado because Ms. Baldor had not received any information regarding health insurance coverage. Ms. Machado told Ms. Baldor that she was having complications with her pregnancy and could no longer handle Ms. Baldor's insurance matters. Ms. Machado gave Ms. Baldor the telephone number of the "Durey Agency," told her that this agency would work with her to obtain health insurance coverage, and gave her Ray Gonzalez's name. Ms. Machado had no further contact with Ms. Baldor after the telephone conversation on or about March 20, 1999, during the times material to this proceeding. At some point, Ms. Baldor called the telephone number Ms. Machado had given her to find out why she had not received any information regarding her health insurance coverage. Ms. Baldor told the person who answered the phone, a woman named Maria, that she wanted her checks back if she could not give her any information "right then." Later the same day, Maria called Ms. Baldor and told her that she had been placed in a group for health insurance purposes. A Neighborhood Health Partnership Enrollment Form was submitted to the Neighborhood Health Partnership on behalf of Ms. Baldor. On the form, Ms. Baldor was identified as an employee of "International Marketing." A signature appeared on the bottom of the form purporting to be that of Ms. Baldor, and the date next to the signature was "5/10/99." Ms. Baldor never saw the Neighborhood Health Partnership Enrollment Form. A few weeks after Maria told Ms. Baldor that she had been placed in a group for health insurance purposes, Ms. Baldor received a package from the Neighborhood Health Partnership that contained an identification card indicating that she was enrolled in the "International Marketing Group" and indicating that her insurance coverage with the Neighborhood Health Partnership was effective as of June 15, 1999. During Ms. Baldor's conversations with Ms. Machado, Ms. Machado never mentioned the Neighborhood Health Partnership or International Marketing Group. The checks Ms. Baldor provided to Ms. Machado were made payable to the Durey Insurance Group and were processed by the bank on or about May 17, 1999. In addition, Ms. Baldor wrote checks to the Durey Insurance Group dated July 10, 1999, and August 9, 1999, as payment for her health insurance premiums. Ms. Baldor's insurance coverage with the Neighborhood Health Partnership was eventually cancelled. It was Ms. Baldor's understanding that it was cancelled because the Durey Insurance Group did not remit her premium to the Neighborhood Health Partnership and because the "International Marketing Group" in which she was placed by the Durey Insurance Group did not exist. Summary The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Ms. Machado's actions with respect to her dealings with Ms. Baldor demonstrated a lack of fitness or trustworthiness or demonstrated that Ms. Machado lacked reasonably adequate knowledge and technical competence to engage in the transaction of insurance. The Department presented no evidence to establish any standards of skill, ability, knowledge, or competence by which Ms. Machado's acts or omissions can be judged to determine if she committed any of the violations with which Ms. Machado is charged. It is not possible to determine from the evidence presented if Ms. Machado's actions deviated from a standard of fitness or trustworthiness which a reasonably prudent insurance agent would be expected to exhibit under the circumstances or if Ms. Machado's conduct fell below a standard establishing the degree of knowledge and technical competence which a reasonably prudent insurance agent would be expected to exhibit under the circumstances. 2/ The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Ms. Machado engaged in any unfair method of competition or deceptive practices or knowingly made any misrepresentations to Ms. Baldor regarding health insurance coverage. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Ms. Machado took some minimal information from Ms. Baldor and told her she would place her in a group for health insurance coverage. The uncontroverted evidence further establishes that Ms. Machado did not represent to Ms. Baldor that she would place Ms. Baldor in any specific group, that she would place Ms. Baldor with any particular insurance company, 3/ or that Ms. Baldor would be provided with any specific coverage or benefits. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Ms. Machado knowingly collected from Ms. Baldor any sums in excess of premium because, at the time Ms. Machado collected the two checks from Ms. Baldor, Ms. Machado did not know which insurance company would write health insurance coverage for Ms. Baldor and, therefore, did not know what the premium would be. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Ms. Machado knowingly collected from Ms. Baldor any premium for insurance that was not, in due course, provided. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Ms. Machado initially agreed to procure health insurance coverage for Ms. Baldor; however, because of her pregnancy, Ms. Machado referred Ms. Baldor to the Durey Insurance Group approximately ten days after Ms. Machado's only meeting with Ms. Baldor and advised Ms. Baldor that the Durey Insurance Group would assist Ms. Baldor in obtaining health insurance. There is no persuasive evidence establishing that Ms. Machado knew or should have known that Durey Insurance Group would not, in due course, provide legitimate health insurance coverage to Ms. Baldor. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish that Ms. Machado had any involvement, directly or indirectly, in the transaction in which the Durey Insurance Group identified Ms. Baldor as an employee of "International Marketing" and obtained health insurance for Ms. Baldor with the Neighborhood Health Partnership as a member of the "International Marketing Group." 4/ Furthermore, the evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Ms. Machado's actions made her a source of injury to Ms. Baldor or anyone else. As noted above, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that, soon after Ms. Machado's visit with Ms. Baldor on March 10, 1999, Ms. Machado advised Ms. Baldor that she could not act as Ms. Baldor's agent in placing her with a health insurance company, that she had sent Ms. Baldor's information and checks to the Durey Insurance Group, and that Ms. Baldor should contact the Durey Insurance Group for further assistance. Ms. Baldor's contacts subsequent to the latter part of March 1999 with respect to her health insurance coverage were exclusively with personnel who purported to be affiliated with the Durey Insurance Group. A representative of the Durey Insurance Group notified Ms. Baldor that her health insurance would be provided by the Neighborhood Health Partnership, and Ms. Baldor's premium checks were made payable to the Durey Insurance Group. Finally, the Neighborhood Health Partnership Enrollment Form identifying Ms. Baldor as an employee of International Marketing is dated approximately two months after Ms. Machado's last contact with Ms. Baldor, and the Department failed to present any evidence tending to establish that Ms. Machado had any involvement in the preparation of this form.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance issue a final order dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint against Ingrid Machado. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2000.
The Issue Whether the State of Florida through its Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan is responsible for paying medical expenses incurred by Petitioner's newborn child where Petitioner had only individual coverage in effect at the time of that child's birth?
Findings Of Fact The State of Florida makes available to its employees several group insurance programs. In the area of health insurance, employees may choose to participate in the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan, or they may enroll in a number of different HMOs depending upon the county in which each employee resides. The State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan (hereinafter "the Plan") is a plan of self insurance established by the State, specifically described in a Benefit Document, and administered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield. In addition to the provisions of the Plan embodied in the Benefit Document, the self insurance plan is regulated by those rules contained in Chapter 22K, Florida Administrative Code. If an employee voluntarily chooses to participate in the Plan, the State as the employer contributes to the employee's costs by paying a portion of the premium for each employee. HMOs wishing to capture a portion of the State employee insurance market may participate in bidding procedures whereby the winner(s) can offer insurance to State employees in particular geographical locations. Winning HMOs must comply with many of the rules and provisions involved in the Plan but are still able to establish additional benefits and requirements for coverage. If an employee voluntarily chooses to participate in an HMO insurance program, the State will assist with the employee's costs by contributing to that employee's insurance premium expense. At the time that they commence employment with the State, employees may elect to participate in the Plan, in one of the HMOs approved for that particular geographical location, or may choose to not participate in any of the voluntary insurance programs offered through the State. Thereafter, employees may only join one of the insurance programs or switch between programs during an annual open enrollment period. An employee may purchase individual coverage, insuring only himself or herself, or an employee may purchase family coverage, insuring that employee and one or more of his or her eligible dependents. During an open enrollment period, an employee may switch between individual coverage and family coverage for the following year. Under the State Plan, there is an exception to the restriction that employees may only change coverage and health plans during the open enrollment period. An employee having individual coverage may change to family coverage within 31 days after the date of acquisition of any eligible dependent. In that event, coverage for the eligible dependent does not relate back to the date of acquisition but rather will commence on some future date following the payment of the additional premium required for the additional family coverage. Similarly, an employee with only individual coverage may begin family coverage prior to acquiring eligible dependents and may obtain coverage for those dependents effective on the actual date the dependent is acquired by making application in time for a complete month's premium to be deducted prior to the first day of the month during which the dependent(s) will be acquired. In other words, payment must be made prior to the acquisition of an eligible dependent and the change to family coverage with its increased premium must be made prior to the acquisition of the dependent in order that coverage can be effective as of the date of acquisition. During open enrollment periods, all employees (even those not currently participating in any of the insurance programs offered by the State) are given summary information regarding the various programs in which they are being given an opportunity to participate. Brochures giving summarized comparisons of the Plan and the relevant HMOs are provided to all employees. Employees are advised, if they have questions regarding the Plan, to contact their personnel officer or the Division of State Employees' Insurance. After the employee makes a selection as to which health plan he or she wishes to participate in, if any, the employee will subsequently receive more detailed information about that plan. For example, an employee choosing to participate in the Plan will subsequently receive a copy of the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan Brochure. The first page of that Brochure specifically advises the employee that the brochure does not include all of the provisions, definitions, benefits, exclusions, and limitations of the Plan. The Brochure specifically advises the employee that it is a summary of the benefits and that any questions the employee might have should be presented to the employee's agency personnel offices or the Office of State Employees' Insurance, and provides that latter office's address and telephone numbers. The Plan itself is a lengthy document which is not distributed to each individual employee but rather is made available to each agency's personnel office for reference by any interested employee. Under the Plan, a woman with individual coverage is entitled to maternity or pregnancy benefits. As part of those benefits, charges for "well baby care," i.e., the charges for the nursery for the baby, are covered under the Plan as part of the maternity benefit of the mother. In well-baby care, charges are not incurred by the baby as a separate patient. On the other hand, if a baby is ill and is admitted to the hospital as a patient in its own right, well-baby care coverage does not apply, and family coverage must be in effect or the infant will be an uninsured individual under the State Plan. The Dade County Public Defender's Office has approximately 265 employees. Faith Quincoses, an Administrative Assistant in that office, began her employment there in 1981 when the office had approximately 165 employees. As the number of office personnel increased, it was determined that someone within that Office should be responsible for employee benefits. That assignment was given to Quincoses, who at the time had duties related to payroll. Quincoses had no training in employee benefits, particularly employee insurance benefits, prior to her assuming responsibility for those duties at the Dade County Public Defender's Office. After she assumed those duties, the Public Defender's Office provided her with no training, and that office did not send her to any of the training sessions regularly conducted by Respondent for employees with and without personnel duties, including those seminars related to employee insurance benefits. When Quincoses would receive informational brochures and memoranda from Respondent regarding employee insurance benefits, she would read them but intentionally did not study them. She did not believe it was her responsibility to assist employees in selecting a particular insurance plan, or in advising employees as to which plan best met that employee's needs, or in answering any specific questions regarding coverage that any employee may have other than routine questions. Although many, if not most, of the informational brochures received from time to time by Quincoses advised employees (including Quincoses) to contact the Division of State Employees' Insurance with any questions regarding benefits and coverage, Quincoses did not contact that office when she had questions about the several insurance plans offered by the State to its employees. She very seldom contacted the Division of State Employees' Insurance to ask questions; rather, she discussed insurance benefits and coverage questions on an almost daily basis with a payroll clerk who worked for the Justice Administrative Commission, an agency belonging to the judicial branch of government with no responsibility or authority for administering the various insurance programs for state employees. Although Quincoses knew that she did not posses a copy of the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan and had never read a copy, she made no effort to obtain a copy other than to once request a copy from the payroll clerk she daily contacted at the Justice Administrative Commission. When told by that payroll person that she did not have a copy of the Plan, Quincoses made no further efforts to obtain a copy and never requested a copy from the Division of State Employees' Insurance. Quincoses knew she was not an insurance expert and did not feel the need to become one. She believed that her responsibilities regarding the various insurance programs made available to employees by the State of Florida was to simply disseminate information provided to her, fill out the appropriate forms for payroll deductions, answer routine questions, and refer specific questions to the Division of State Employees' Insurance. She rightfully believed that each employee's decision as to which of the individual plans that employee should select was the employee's responsibility. Petitioner Annemarie Harris is an attorney employed as an Assistant Public Defender by the Dade County Public Defender's Office since October, 1983. As a new employee, she chose to enroll in one of the group health insurance programs approved by the State. She chose to join an approved HMO plan rather than enroll in the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan. Thereafter, and up through December of 1987, each year during the open enrollment period, Petitioner chose to participate in one of the approved HMOs rather than the State's Self Insurance Plan. In December of 1987, the contract between the HMO of which Petitioner was a member and the State of Florida was being terminated, and Petitioner therefore had the option of selecting to participate in one of the other group health insurance programs offered through the State of Florida. In December of 1987, Petitioner was three months pregnant. Her baby was due to be born approximately June 20, 1988. Petitioner was, therefore, very interested in the most extensive coverage which she could obtain for her maternity benefits. Petitioner advised Quincoses that her expected delivery date was June 20, 1988, and that she wished her newborn to be covered by the insurance policy to be selected by Petitioner. Quincoses advised Petitioner that the baby's expenses would be covered if Petitioner added the newborn baby to Petitioner's coverage within 31 days after the date the baby was born. Quincoses did not advise Petitioner that waiting until after the baby's birth would mean that the baby would not be an individual insured until after Petitioner had paid the premium in time for the baby to be added as an insured by the first day of a month subsequent to the baby's birth, since Quincoses did not understand that distinction. The information Quincoses gave Petitioner was wrong and is not contained in any of the written materials describing the Plan which had been transmitted by the State to Quincoses or Petitioner, and is contrary to the information contained in Chapter 22K, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner then conducted her own investigation of which health plan she wished to choose by asking her friends that worked in the Public Defender's Office about their personal experiences. Further, as Petitioner testified at the final hearing in this cause, Petitioner's husband strongly insisted that she choose the State's Self Insurance Plan in which Plan he had previously participated as a State employee and with which he therefore had some familiarity. Petitioner did not contact the Division of State Employees' Insurance regarding her specific questions and specific situation, did not consult the Benefit Document itself and did not--although both she and her husband are attorneys--consult the rules and regulations regarding coverage contained within Chapter 22K, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner voluntarily selected the State's Self Insurance Plan and purchased only individual coverage, insuring herself at a lower premium than family coverage which would have covered the newborn infant as of the date of the baby's birth. It is unknown whether Petitioner relied solely on the advice of Quincoses in choosing to purchase individual coverage rather than family coverage, whether Petitioner relied instead on the advice she obtained from questioning her friends or whether she relied upon her husband's desires, in choosing to participate in the State Plan or in choosing to purchase only individual coverage. Although the basis for Petitioner's decision is unknown, her intentions at the time are clear. She planned to, and took steps to, initiate the paperwork necessary to switch to family coverage and pay the additional premium required early enough so that insurance for the baby would be in place on June 1, 1988, prior to the baby's expected arrival date. During April of 1988, Petitioner caused Quincoses to begin filling out the appropriate forms so that Petitioner would have family coverage in place as of June 1, 1988. Since Quincoses had earlier advised Petitioner that Petitioner could switch to family coverage after the baby's birth (which would make the baby's coverage effective subsequent to the baby's birth) but Petitioner chose instead to attempt to convert to family coverage prior to the baby's birth (which was contrary to Quincoses' advice and would have established coverage immediately upon the baby's birth), it can be reasonably inferred that Petitioner understood that the difference between converting to family coverage prior to the baby's birth rather than subsequent to the baby's birth involved the sole issue of the date on which the baby's coverage would become effective. Although Quincoses initiated the paperwork to have family coverage in place for Petitioner prior to the baby's birth expected to occur on June 20, 1988, Petitioner experienced complications with her pregnancy causing the baby to be delivered prematurely on April 24, 1988, prior to Petitioner signing and processing the paperwork started by Quincoses. Almost immediately after the baby's birth, the baby was transferred from the hospital in which her mother was a patient to another hospital where the baby was admitted as a separate patient. The baby remained in that hospital for some time, incurring medical expenses of approximately $180,000.00. Petitioner's medical expenses were paid by the Plan pursuant to her individual coverage. The baby's medical expenses were submitted to the Plan. Petitioner's claim for payment of the baby's medical expenses was denied for the reason that the baby was admitted to a different hospital than the mother as a separate patient but was not an insured under any insurance policy as of the date of the baby's birth, the date on which the baby commenced incurring her own personal medical expenses. When Petitioner converted her individual coverage to family coverage subsequent to the baby's birth, her claims for payment of the baby's medical expenses incurred subsequent to the date upon which the baby became an insured under the State Plan were denied since they arose from a condition pre-existing the date of commencement of insurance coverage. On April 24, 1988, Petitioner's newborn child was not an insured under the State Plan since Petitioner only had individual coverage on that date.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's claims for payment of medical expenses incurred by Petitioner's newborn baby which are the subject of this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 27th day of October, 1989. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO 88-5519 Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact numbered 1-4, 7-9, 15-18, 34, 35, 37, 38, and 40-42 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact numbered 5, 6, 10-12, 21, and 33 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact numbered 13, 14, 39, 44, and 45 have been rejected as being subordinate to the issues for determination herein. Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact numbered 19 and 22-25 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting recitation of the testimony, argument of counsel, or conclusions of law. Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact numbered 20, 26-31, and 43 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration herein. Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact numbered 32 has been rejected as being contrary to the weight of the totality of the evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact numbered 36 has been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues involved herein. Respondent's proposed Findings of Fact numbered 1-5, 7-18, the second 19-24, the first 27, the second 26, the second 27, and 28 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed Findings of Fact numbered 6, the first 19, 25, and the first 26 have been rejected as being subordinate to the issues required to be determined in this proceeding. COPIES FURNISHED: James N. Hurley, Esquire William P. Harris, Jr., Esquire Mitchell, Harris, Horr & Associates 2650 Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33137-4590 William A. Frieder, Esquire Department of Administration Office of the General Counsel 440 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 A. J. McMullian, III Interim Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 =================================================================
The Issue Whether the Department of Management Services properly denied medical insurance reimbursement to Petitioner, a covered dependent of a state employee insured by the State Employees' Preferred Provider Organization health plan, for Genotropin recombinant growth hormone prescribed for the treatment of long- term growth failure associated with idiopathic short stature.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The state group insurance program is a package of insurance plans offered to, among others, state employees and their dependents. § 110.123(2)(k), Fla. Stat.1/ Petitioner Arturo Puerto is insured as a dependent of a state employee, and is a participant in the state's group self- insured plan, known as the State Employees' Preferred Provider Organization health plan ("PPO plan" or "state plan"). The state plan includes a state employees' prescription drug program. § 110.12315, Fla. Stat. Pursuant to Section 110.123(3)(c), Florida Statutes, the Department is responsible for contract management and day- to-day management of the state employee health insurance program. Section 110.123(5)(c), Florida Statutes, authorizes the Department to contract with an insurance carrier or professional administrator to administer the state plan. The current contract provider of the state plan's pharmacy program is CareMark Inc. ("CareMark"). However, the Department makes all final decisions concerning the existence of coverage or covered benefits under the state plan. The Department's authority in this regard may not be delegated to a contract provider. § 110.123(5), Fla. Stat. Petitioner was born on February 12, 1992. On or about February 3, 2009, Petitioner's physician prescribed Genotropin, a recombinant growth hormone ("GH")2/ approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") as therapy for short stature, including idiopathic short stature ("ISS"). ISS is short stature that does not have a diagnostic explanation, in an otherwise healthy child. ISS is also called "non-GH-deficient short stature." The Group Health Insurance Plan Booklet and Benefits Document, effective January 1, 2007, as modified on January 1, 2009, includes the terms and conditions of participation in the PPO plan and the benefits provided by the PPO plan. The booklet and benefits document contains a section describing the prescription drug program. Participants in the PPO plan are automatically enrolled in the prescription drug program, which features a network of retail pharmacies and a mail order program. The participant makes a co-payment for covered prescriptions. The booklet and benefits document sets forth a list of drugs that are covered, and a list of drugs that are not covered under the prescription drug program. Under the heading "Important Information about the Prescription Drug Program," the document states the following concerning specialty medications:3/ 5. Certain medications, including most biotech drugs, are only available through Caremark Specialty Pharmacy Services. Generally, these drugs are for chronic or genetic disorders including, but not limited to, multiple sclerosis, growth deficiency and rheumatoid arthritis and may require special delivery options, (i.e. temperature control). Caremark Specialty Pharmacy provides 24/7 access and can be contacted at 1-800-237-2767. * * * 12. As part of the Caremark Specialty Services, Caremark will administer the Advanced Guideline Management program for the State Employees' PPO Plan. Advanced Guideline Management is intended to optimize outcomes and promote the safe, clinically appropriate and cost-effective use of specialty medications supported by evidence based medical guidelines. Failure to meet the criteria for Advanced Guideline Management during the respective use review will result in denial of medication coverage for the Plan participant and discontinuation of medication coverage for the Plan participant in the case of concurrent use review. The Advanced Guideline Management Program is a process by which authorization for a specialty medication is obtained based on the application of currently acceptable medical guidelines and consensus statements for appropriate use of the medication in a specific disease state. Therapies reviewed under the Specialty Guideline Management Program include, but are not limited to, the following: multiple sclerosis, oncology, allergic asthma, human growth hormone, hepatitis C, psoriasis, rheumatoid arthritis, and respiratory syncytial virus. Additional therapies may be added from time to time.... CareMark's current guideline covering Genotropin and similar GH medications is set forth in a 2008 CareMark document titled, "Specialty Pharmacy Program for Growth Hormone and Endocrine-Metabolic Disorders." The document contains flow charts describing the criteria employed by CareMark to determine coverage for specific conditions. Among the criteria set forth in the flow chart for prescribing GH to children with ISS is the following question: "Does pre-treatment growth velocity and height meet the AACE (American Association of Clinical Endocrinologists) criteria for short stature?" (See Appendix N). If the answer to the question is "no," then the criteria direct that coverage for the prescription of GH should be denied. Appendix N sets forth the following "AACE criteria for short stature": < -2.25 standard deviations below the mean for age and sex based on patient's growth rate, adult height prediction of less than 5'3" for boys and less than 4'11" for girls. Appendix N is based on the AACE's "Medical Guidelines for Clinical Practice for Growth Hormone Use in Adults and Children-- 2003 Update" and a December 2003 AACE Position Statement on growth hormone usage in short children.4/ The CareMark document is not explicit as to whether the quoted elements of the AACE criteria for short stature are to be considered in the disjunctive. However, the AACE Position Statement expressly states that GH use is indicated for ISS only for children whose height is "< - 2.25 standard deviations below the mean and have an adult height prediction of less than 5'3" for boys and less than 4'11" for girls." (Emphasis added.) The height standard deviation criterion used by CareMark to determine the appropriateness of Genotropin therapy as a treatment for ISS was shown to be consistent with FDA criteria and the specifications established by Pfizer, the manufacturer of Genotropin. The medical records submitted on behalf of Petitioner show that at the time Genotropin therapy was prescribed in February 2009, Petitioner's height was 162.5 cm (5'4"). This was 1.66 standard deviations below the mean for his age and sex. Untreated, his predicted final height was 164 cm (5'4 1/2"). At the time Genotropin therapy was prescribed, Petitioner did not meet the height standard deviation requirement. His height standard deviation was 1.66 standard deviations below the mean. The deviation required by the CareMark criteria was greater than 2.25 standard deviations below the mean. At the time Genotropin therapy was prescribed, Petitioner did not meet the adult height prediction requirement. Petitioner was already 5'4" tall and was projected to reach a height of 5'4 1/2" without treatment. The CareMark criteria required a projected adult height without treatment of 5'3" or below. The PPO plan denied payment for the Genotropin therapy because Petitioner did not meet criteria established by CareMark through its Specialty Pharmacy Program guidelines. The booklet and benefits document makes no provision for exceptions to strict conformity to the CareMark criteria. At the hearing, Petitioner's representative acknowledged that Petitioner does not meet the criteria for Genotropin therapy, but requested that the Department order such coverage as an exception to the criteria.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance enter a final order denying coverage for Petitioner's prescription for Genotropin therapy. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of March, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of March, 2010.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for the licensure and discipline of persons holding or those eligible to hold various insurance licenses. At all times material to this case, Respondent was licensed and eligible for licensure in this state as a health insurance agent. For all policies described below, Respondent was eligible to receive a sales commission and a bonus package which provided Respondent incentive to complete sales of insurance policies. At all times material to this case, Respondent acted as a sales agent for the following insurance companies: Diversified Health Services, National States Insurance Company, Penn Treaty, and Transport Life. Respondent sold health insurance policies, Medicare supplements, home nursing-care policies, nursing home policies, and booster plans to supplement additional coverage under Part B of Medicare. On or about April 20, 1988, Respondent went to the home of Martha and Sam Klingensmith in Port St. Lucie, Florida. Respondent's visit was in response to an information lead card that Mrs. Klingensmith had mailed to an insurance company. Mr. Klingensmith had had surgery in January, 1988, on a malignant brain tumor. Mrs. Klingensmith was anxious for her husband to receive the best care possible and hoped to obtain insurance benefits to help with the costs associated with that care. Mrs. Klingensmith told Respondent about her husband, who was too sick to be interviewed by Respondent (he was bedridden in another room). At that time Mrs. Klingensmith advised Respondent that she and her husband had Medicare supplement policies through a group policy from AARP. Respondent did not review that policy. On or about April 20, 1988, Respondent completed insurance applications for Mr. and Mrs. Klingensmith for nursing home insurance policies. The application form provided, in part, the following questions: Is the insurance being applied for intended to replace any accident or sickness insurance, health service or health maintenance contract? * * * Complete the following for each person named above who now has insurance in force or pending: * * * Does any person above have or ever had any of the following: (Underline condition) A. Tumor, cancer, malignancy or growth of any kind? * * * g. Disease of the rectum or intestine, stomach, kidney, prostate, urinary bladder, liver, gall bladder? * * * 7.a. Has any person named above consulted or been treated by any physician or practitioner in the last five years? b. Has any person named above been confined in a hospital in the last five years? * * * 9.a. List conditions for which medication has been taken or doctor consulted within the past six months: * * * 10. If any part of questions 6 or 7 was answered YES give details--otherwise--answer question by stating "NONE" On the application form for Mr. Klingensmith, Respondent wrote the following responses: as to question 4, "No" was entered; as to question 5, "NONE" was entered; as to 6.a. "Yes" was checked; as to questions 7a. and 7b., "Yes" was checked; as to question 9, only medications not conditions were listed; and under question 10, the remaining effects were indicated as "Good Health." The answers given by Respondent to questions 5, 9, and 10 were incorrect and contrary to the information Mrs. Klingensmith had given Respondent. Mrs. Klingensmith signed the application for her husband. On Mrs. Klingensmith's application form completed by Respondent on April 20, 1988, the answer to question 5 was incorrect and contrary to the information Mrs. Klingensmith had given Respondent. On or about May 17, 1988, Respondent returned to the Klingensmith home and completed an application for Mr. Klingensmith for an extended care insurance policy. The application for that policy was identical to the one described above. Respondent completed the form and gave the same responses that are indicated above. Respondent knew that Mr. Klingensmith had the National States policy from April, 1988, and he failed to include that information on the application. Further, since Mr. Klingensmith remained bedridden, the response of "good health" to question 10 continued to be false and contrary to the information supplied by Mrs. Klingensmith. On August 17, 1988, Respondent went to the Klingensmith home and completed two applications for Mr. 5 Klingensmith: one for a Medicare supplement insurance policy and one for a hospital confinement indemnity insurance policy; both to be issued by National States. On September 14, 1988, Respondent went to the Klingensmith home and completed an application for Mr. Klingensmith to receive a medical/surgical insurance policy from National States. That application did not disclose any of the prior policies sold by Respondent, was again signed by Mrs. Klingensmith (her husband continued to be gravely ill), and falsely stated that Mr. Klingensmith was in good health. At all times material to the sales of the five policies described above for Mr. Klingensmith, Respondent knew or should have known that Mr. Klingensmith was terminally ill. Respondent either did not report the information given by Mrs. Klingensmith or chose not to inquire further based upon the answers she gave him. Mr. Klingensmith died, at home, in October, 1988. In connection with the Klingensmith policies Respondent was required to complete a certification form pursuant to Rule 4-46.004, Florida Administrative Code. That form is to be signed by the insurance applicant. Without Mrs. Klingensmith's prior consent or knowledge, Respondent executed certification forms on behalf of the Klingensmiths. In August, 1988, Mrs. Klingensmith asked Respondent to examine a cancer insurance policy issued by Bankers Fidelity Life Insurance Company covering the Klingensmiths. Respondent failed to disclose that policy on the applications completed in August and September, 1988. Further, Respondent failed to accurately disclose the benefits of that policy to Mrs. Klingensmith. The cancer policy would provide additional benefits which the Respondent should have known could be helpful since Mr. Klingensmith had been diagnosed with a malignant tumor. In September, 1988, Respondent sold a medical/surgical policy to Charles Areni. Subsequently, in April, 1989, Mr. Areni asked Respondent to assist him in the completion of claims forms. Respondent went to Mr. Areni's home, helped him complete the claims forms, and sold him a National States Medicare supplement insurance policy. At that time, Respondent knew Mr. Areni had been hospitalized since a cancerous prostate problem had reoccurred, and that Mr. Areni was taking medication for pain associated with his most recent surgery. The application completed by Respondent for Mr. Areni was the same form described in paragraph 6 above. Respondent submitted the following false responses to the questions posed by that questionnaire: in response to question 5, "None" was entered; to question 6a. Respondent checked "No" when he knew or should have known (based upon Mr. Areni's answers) that the prostate condition was cancerous; and "None" to question 9. Further, Respondent provided that Mr. Areni was in good health in response to question 10. At that time Mr. Areni was not in good health, and, while his prognosis was uncertain, it was apparent that he was in poor health. On or about January 19, 1989, Respondent went to the home of Ruth Stone in Fort Pierce, Florida. That visit was 7 in response to Mrs. Stone's mailed in lead card. At that time, Mrs. Stone was insured by American Life Assurance Corporation with whom she had a Medicare supplement policy. Mrs. Stone told Respondent about her policy but did not show it to him. Without reviewing the existing policy, Respondent advised Mrs. Stone that a policy he could offer her through National States would be a better buy. Based upon Respondent's representations, Mrs. Stone elected to apply for a policy through Respondent. To that end, Respondent completed the application described in paragraph 6 for Mrs. Stone. Respondent answered question 5 incorrectly since he knew that Mrs. Stone had a current policy. Later, after speaking with her other agent, Mrs. Stone cancelled the National States policy by stopping payment on her check. She later gave a sworn statement to the Department. After Respondent found out about Mrs. Stone's complaint to the Department, he asked her to change her statement since he might lose his job. On or about February 17, 1988, Respondent went to the home of Edward and Julia Whitham in Fort Pierce, Florida. Respondent sold the Whithams Medicare supplement policies to be issued by National States. The policies sold to the Whithams did not cover dental or optical services. At the time they purchased the policies, the Whithams were under the impression that optical and dental services were covered. Respondent signed the certifications required by Rule 4-46.004, Florida Administrative Code, for the Whithams without their prior consent or approval.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Insurance, Office of the Treasurer enter a final order revoking the Respondent's health care insurance license. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Nancy S. Isenberg and Dennis Silverman Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services Room 412, Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Kelli Hanley Crabb Battaglia, Ross, Hastings & Dicus, P.A. 980 Tyrone Boulevard St. Petersburg, Florida 3371014 APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 89-4986 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT: Paragraphs 1 through 35 are accepted. Paragraph 36 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 37 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 38 is accepted. Paragraphs 39 through 48 are accepted. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT: Paragraph 1 is accepted. Paragraph 2 is accepted. Paragraph 3 is accepted. Paragraph 4 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 5 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 6 is accepted as to the fact that the Whithams purchased policies from Respondent; otherwise, rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 7 is rejected as unsupported by the record. Paragraph 8 is accepted. With regard to paragraph 9, it is accepted that the Whithams asked that their policies be reinstated; otherwise rejected as unsupported by the record or irrelevant. Paragraph 10 is rejected as unsupported by the record. The first sentence of paragraph 11 is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 12 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 13 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 14 is accepted as to their complaint against the company but is irrelevant. The first sentence of paragraph 15 is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted with the notation that Mrs. Stone did advise Respondent that she had a policy in effect. She was shopping for a cheaper policy that offered as good or better benefits. Respondent made no effort to review Mrs. Stone's policy. Paragraph 16 is rejected as irrelevant. With regard to paragraph 17, it is accepted that based upon Respondent's representations, Mrs. Stone purchased a national States policy; otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 18 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. With regard to paragraph 19, it is accepted that Mrs. Stone spoke with her agent and decided to stop payment on the check to National States; otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 20 is not supported by the record and is, therefore, rejected. Paragraph 21 is rejected as-irrelevant. Paragraph 22 is accepted. With regard to paragraph 23, it is accepted that the application disclosed a prostate condition; otherwise rejected as not supported by the record. Paragraph 24 is accepted. Paragraph 25 is accepted. Paragraph 26 is accepted with the notation that Respondent did not complete the application with all of the pertinent information that Mr. Areni gave him; consequently, Respondent was attempting to have the policy issued when he knew or should have known that Mr. Areni's cancer would preclude him from being eligible. Paragraph 27 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence; see the notation to paragraph 26 above. Paragraph 28 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 29 through 31 are accepted. The first sentence of paragraph 32 is accepted. With regard to the second sentence, it is accepted that Respondent was not supposed to write insurance for cancer patients, however, the overwhelming evidence in this case established that Respondent did just that. The first sentence of paragraph 33 is accepted. It is further accepted that Mrs. Klingensmith executed the applications on behalf of herself and her husband; otherwise the paragraph is rejected as either unsupported by the record or contrary to the weight of the evidence. The first sentence of paragraph 34 is accepted. The remainder is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence since the comment was only made in relation to Mr. Klingensmith's day-to-day behavior. He undoubtedly had some good days relative to his more severe days. It is further concluded that Mr. Klingensmith was never seen by any visiting insurance person other than as a bedridden person. Mr. Bessimer's comment that Mr. Klingensmith could have been napping was not credible in light of the total circumstances known to Respondent. Paragraph 35 is accepted but is irrelevant. The second sentence of paragraph 36 is accepted. With regard to the first sentence of that paragraph, it is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Mrs. Klingensmith's account of the conversation has been deemed more credible than the Respondent's. Paragraphs 37, 38, and the first sentence of paragraph 39 are accepted. With regard to the remainder of paragraph 39, it is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 40 is accepted but is irrelevant.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as an insurance agent in the State of Florida licensed to sell health insurance. At all times material hereto, Respondent was not formally affiliated with Cleveland Insurance Agency. However, Cleveland Insurance Agency often referred clients to Respondent for health and Medicare supplement policies because Cleveland Insurance Agency did not handle those type policies. Prior to November 1987, Respondent, working in conjunction with Cleveland Insurance Company, sold to Irene Goldberg a health insurance policy issued through Provider's Fidelity Insurance Company (Provider's Fidelity). On November 29, 1987, Ms. Goldberg paid $1,504.56 as the annual renewal premium for this health insurance policy which extended her coverage through December 4, 1988. In March of 1988, Ms. Goldberg contacted Cleveland Insurance Agency and requested that someone review her health insurance coverage. Cleveland Insurance Agency referred Ms. Goldberg's request to Respondent. Respondent was familiar with the terms and conditions of the health insurance coverage Ms. Goldberg had in place and he knew that she had paid the premium for this policy through December 1988. Upon visiting with Irene Goldberg on or about March 10, 1988, Respondent presented Ms. Goldberg with a business card that intentionally misrepresented his status with Cleveland Insurance Company. Because Ms. Goldberg had placed most of her insurance needs through Cleveland Insurance Agency during the past few years, Respondent intentionally misled Ms. Goldberg into thinking that he was formally affiliated with Cleveland Insurance Agency. During that visit, Respondent recommended to Ms. Goldberg that she purchase a policy of insurance issued by First National Life Insurance Company (First National) to replace her Provider's Fidelity policy. Ms. Goldberg specifically discussed with Respondent a preexisting medical condition which required periodic medical treatment and the need for the treatment required by this condition to be covered by the new policy. Respondent assured Ms. Goldberg that the preexisting condition would be covered by the new policy. Respondent also told Ms. Goldberg that he would cancel the Provider's Fidelity policy and that he would secure on her behalf a pro rated refund of the premium she had paid to Provider's Fidelity. Based on Respondent's representations, Ms. Goldberg agreed to purchase the First National policy. On March 30, 1988, Ms. Goldberg gave to Respondent a check made payable to First National Life Insurance Company in the amount of $1,892.00, the amount Respondent had quoted as the full annual premium. A few days later, Respondent contacted Ms. Goldberg and advised her that there would be an additional premium in the amount of $1,360.00, which Ms. Goldberg paid on April 4, 1988. This additional premium was, according to Respondent, for skilled nursing care coverage which First National had added as a mandatory feature of the policy Ms. Goldberg had purchased. The skilled nursing care coverage was, in fact, a separate policy which was not a mandatory feature of the policy Ms. Goldberg thought she was purchasing from First National. Respondent misled Ms. Goldberg as to the terms of the policies he had sold her and as to the number of policies he had sold her. Respondent represented that the premiums he had collected on behalf of First National were in payment of a single health insurance policy. Respondent had sold Ms. Goldberg four separate policies, and he collected a commission for each of the policies. When Ms. Goldberg received her insurance documents from First National, she learned for the first time that Respondent had sold her four separate policies of insurance, including a cancer policy that she and Respondent had never discussed. In addition to the health and cancer policies, Respondent sold Ms. Goldberg a home convalescent care policy and a separate skilled nursing care policy. Respondent had sold Ms. Goldberg policies of insurance that Ms. Goldberg had not requested and that she did not know she was buying. Upon reading the health policy, Ms. Goldberg discovered that her new First National Life policy excluded her preexisting condition. Ms. Goldberg contacted Respondent who told her that he had not cancelled the Provider's Fidelity policy as he had agreed to do and that he had not tried to get the pro rated refund of the Provider's Fidelity premium. Respondent told her that any claim she might have for the preexisting condition should be filed under the Provider's Fidelity policy. Ms. Goldberg then complained to First National which, after an investigation, refunded to Ms. Goldberg the premiums she had paid for the three policies. Respondent had received a commission on the policies of insurance he had sold to Ms. Goldberg. As of the time of the hearing, Respondent had not reimbursed First National for the commission he had received based on the premiums that were subsequently refunded to Ms. Goldberg. In February 1988, Respondent met with Helen Krafft to discuss her health insurance needs. During the course of the meeting, Respondent presented to Ms. Krafft a business card which intentionally misrepresented his affiliation with Cleveland Insurance Agency. This business card misled Ms. Krafft into believing that Respondent was formally affiliated with Cleveland Insurance Agency. On February 18, 1988, Respondent sold to Ms. Krafft a health insurance policy through First National and a health insurance policy issued through American Sun Life, at which time he collected a premiums in the total amount of $519.80 for six months of coverage from each of the two policies. In July 1988, Respondent visited with Ms. Krafft at her place of work and told her that she should pay her renewal premiums for the health insurance policies on or before August 1, 1988, to avoid a premium increases. Respondent knew, or should have known, that there were no premium increases scheduled for those policies and that there were no discounts for early payment of the premiums The renewal premiums Respondent quoted Ms. Krafft for the two policies totaled $485.40. At Respondent's instructions Ms. Krafft delivered to Respondent her signed check dated July 18, 1988, in the amount of $485.40 with the payee's name left blank. Respondent accepted these trust funds from Ms. Krafft in a fiduciary capacity. Instead of using these funds to pay the premiums as he had agreed to do, Respondent filled his name in on Ms. Krafft's check and cashed it. Ms. Krafft learned that Respondent had not used the funds she had given him to renew her two policies when she started getting late payment notices from the two insurance companies with accompanying threats of cancellation if the premiums were not paid. In late September 1988, Respondent paid to Ms. Krafft the sum of $485.40 in cash. In June of 1988, Steven R. and Marilyn Hill applied, through Respondent, for a health policy with First National. The Hills paid the initial premium of $304.37 by check made payable to First National on June 26, 1988. Because of underwriting considerations, First National informed Respondent that the Hills would have to pay a higher premium to obtain the insurance they wanted. The Hills were not willing to pay the higher premium and requested a refund of the amount they had paid. First National made the refund check payable to Steven Hill and mailed the check to Respondent. There was no competent, substantial evidence as to what happened to the check other than First National Life stopped payment on the check and it never cleared banking channels. A second refund check was later delivered to Steven Hill. First National contended at the hearing that Respondent had accrued a debit balance in the amount of $2,692.45 as a result of his dealings as an agent of the company. Respondent contended that he is entitled to certain offsets against the amount First National claims it is owed based on commissions he contends that he had earned but had not been paid. First National had not, prior to the hearing, submitted to Respondent any type of accounting of sums due, nor had it explicitly demanded any specific sum from Respondent. Instead, First National had made a blanket demand that Respondent return all materials belonging to First National and advised that future commission checks would be held in escrow. From the evidence presented it could not be determined that Respondent was indebted to First National.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order which finds that Respondent committed the multiple violations of the Florida Insurance Code as set forth in the Conclusions of Law portion of this Recommended Order and which further revokes all licenses issued by the Department of Insurance and Treasurer to Respondent, John Richard Klee. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division Of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-3269 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 1 are adopted in material part by paragraph 1 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 2 are adopted in material part by paragraph 1 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 3 are adopted in material part by paragraph 12 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 3 are rejected in part as being a conclusion of law. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 4 are adopted in material part by paragraph 5 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 5 are adopted in material part by paragraph 3 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 6 are adopted in material part by paragraph 4 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 7 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 8 are adopted in material part by paragraph 5 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 9 are adopted in material part by paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Recommended Order. 10 are adopted in material part 11 are adopted in material part 12 are adopted in material part 13 are adopted in material part 14 are adopted in material part 15 are adopted in material part 16 are adopted in material part 17 are adopted in material part 18 are adopted in material part 19 are adopted in material part 20 are adopted in material part 21 are adopted in material part 22 are adopted in material part 23 are adopted in material part 24 are adopted in material part 25 are rejected as being The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 5 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraphs 5 and 7 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 10 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 11 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 11 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 12 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 2 and 10 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 13 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 13 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 13 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 26 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 27 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 28 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 29 are adopted in material part by paragraph 14 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 30 are adopted in material part by paragraph 14 of the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Roy H. Schmidt, Esquire Office of the Treasurer Department of Insurance 412 Larson Building Tallahassee Florida 32399-0300 Greg Ross, Esquire 400 Southeast Eighth Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Don Dowdell General Counsel The Capitol Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Hon. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Mark Alan Gable, is currently eligible for licensure and is licensed in Florida as a life and health insurance agent and was so licensed at all times relevant to these proceedings. Respondent at all times relevant to these proceedings was licensed in this state to solicit health insurance on behalf of National States Insurance Company (herein National). On or about September 28, 1988, Respondent visited the home of Mabel Bowmaster of Sarasota, Florida, for the purpose of soliciting health insurance. At the time, Ms. Bowmaster was insured under the provisions of a protective life medicare supplement insurance policy. Ms. Bowmaster was interested in purchasing a policy that offered custodial nursing care benefits as her protective life policy did not offer such coverage. Respondent was not a stranger to Ms. Bowmaster as he had sold her a medicare supplement policy in 1987 and had processed claims for Ms. Bowmaster during 1987, although she did not remember him. Although Ms. Bowmaster was interested in purchasing custodial care, when Respondent explained to her the cost of the coverage versus the benefits that she could receive, she was convinced that the premiums for a custodial care policy was too expensive and she declined to purchase the coverage. In fact, Respondent tendered a certification to Ms. Bowmaster which acknowledged that she had been explained the benefits, that she understood them and there is, in that medicare supplement policy, a specific exclusion of custodial care. (Respondent's Exhibit 18 and 3.) During August 1989, Ms. Bowmaster was visited by another insurance agent, a Chris Morrison, who was also soliciting insurance. At agent Morrison's urging, Ms. Bowmaster cancelled the medicare supplement policy that Respondent had sold her after he showed her a copy of a St. Petersburg Times article which was critical of Respondent and after Morrison suggested that Respondent was in trouble with the Petitioner. When Ms. Bowmaster cancelled her insurance policy that she purchased from Respondent, she wrote a letter to National States Insurance Company asking them not to honor the bank draft authorization that she had signed for the year 1989. Notwithstanding the letter Ms. Bowmaster sent to National, the bank draft was honored. As a result, Ms. Bowmaster filed an insurance consumer service complaint with Petitioner stating the reason for cancelling the policy was that she had duplicative coverage as a result of her purchase of the same coverage from Mr. Morrison and she therefore requested a refund of the National policy in light of her request that the bank draft be terminated. In none of Bowmaster's correspondence to National during August and November 1989, was there any reference of any misrepresentation of coverage by Respondent for custodial care coverage. On or about February 11, 1988, Respondent visited the home of Alice V. Bowling of Bradenton for the purpose of soliciting health insurance. Ms. Bowling is an 82 year-old widow whose primary source of income is social security. At the time, Ms. Bowling was insured under the provisions of a Prudential Insurance AARP (American's Association of Retired Persons) medicare supplement insurance policy and an Old Southern medicare supplement insurance policy. Respondent discussed with Ms. Bowling her existing insurance coverages. Ms. Bowling was interested in obtaining an insurance policy that would pay benefits for hearing aids, eyeglasses and dental care. Neither of her existing policies offered such benefits. Respondent's purpose in visiting Ms. Bowling during February of 1988 was to follow-up on a lapse of a National States Medical/Surgical policy. During the interview with Ms. Bowling, she informed Respondent that she had in effect a policy with AARP and the National policy that was soon to lapse. She did not tell him that she had a policy with Old Southern. While Ms. Bowling testified that she showed Respondent a copy of the Old Southern policy, the evidence adduced at hearing indicates otherwise. It was noted that when Respondent purchased the National States policy during 1987, she did not tell that agent about the existence of the Old Southern policy. (Respondent's Exhibit 7.) Additionally, when Ms. Bowling signed the notice to applicant regarding replacement of accident and sickness insurance form, she indicated that she was replacing a Prudential policy. The application for insurance also indicates her replacement for the Prudential policy. After Respondent reviewed with Ms. Bowling her AARP policy and the National States policy, he advised her that he could process some claims for her under the lapsed National States policy. As a result, Respondent submitted claims for Ms. Bowling and she was reimbursed for medical bills for which she had not previously sought payment. (Respondent's Composite Exhibit 8.) Respondent and Ms. Bowling discussed eyeglass and hearing aid coverage to determine if she should purchase it. However, based on Ms. Bowling's desire to hold the cost of insurance down, and after Respondent explained to her that under the eyeglass-hearing aid rider, it would cost her approximately $340 in premiums to get $500 in coverage, she declined such coverage. By way of example, Respondent explained that the premium for the rider was $125, deductible of $75 pays 80% with a maximum coverage of $500; so on a $700 bill, it would pay $500, indicating that the insurance payment of $340 was for $500 worth of benefits. Evidence of Ms. Bowling's rejection was noted in the outline of coverage which specifically excludes eye glasses and hearing aids. (Respondent's Exhibit 10.) Ms. Bowling acknowledged that the benefits of the policy was clearly explained to her. After Respondent's initial visit, Ms. Bowling decided to cancel the policy. Upon receiving notice of cancellation, Respondent called upon Ms. Bowling to determine her reason for cancelling the policy. Respondent again explained the coverage to Ms. Bowling in the presence of her son. Ms. Bowling acknowledges that Respondent explained to her at the second visit that eye glasses, dentures and hearing aids were not covered by the policy, that the rider would be required to provide that coverage; and she then again elected not to purchase the rider coverage but kept the policy in force. Evidence of this continuation of coverage is in Ms. Bowling's handwriting which reflects "After talking to my agent Mark Gable, I have decided to keep the UMS 1060437 in force." Thereafter, Ms. Bowling again decided to cancel the policy and in correspondence with National States, she related that after reviewing the policy with others, she concluded that she could not afford the coverage. Ms. Bowling, at the time, made no complaint about Respondent having misrepresented the existence of eyeglass or similar coverage, but simply requested a refund. After the company failed to forward a refund to Ms. Bowling, she filed a complaint with Petitioner asserting that she was entitled to a refund, but she made no reference to any claim of misrepresentation of coverage. At hearing, Ms. Bowling acknowledged that she cancelled the policy because the coverage was too expensive. Ms. Bowling made no mention of any misrepresentation by Respondent for coverage for eye glasses, dentures or hearing aids until the interviews by Petitioner's investigators. On or about July 19, 1990, Respondent visited the home of Fred V. Lively of Englewood for the purpose of discussing health insurance. At the time, Mr. Lively had recently purchased an American Traveler's Long-Term care insurance policy effective as of July 13, 1990, and offered custodial nursing care insurance benefits. It is alleged that Respondent sold a nursing home policy to Mr. Lively representing that the policy provided coverage for custodial care and he failed to advise Mr. Lively that the policy called for a three (3) day confinement in a hospital as a condition precedent to the payment of benefits. The policy that Respondent sold to Mr. Lively did not require such a waiting period as it included a rider eliminating the waiting period. This fact was confirmed by William J. O'Connor, the manager of policy services for National States. During July of 1990, Mr. Lively was running a lapse notice on the National States policy previously sold to him by Steve Daggett, a former employee of National States. Initially, Respondent showed the Livelys a Penn States policy and a Transport Life policy for nursing home care, both of which included custodial care. The premiums on both policies approached $5,000 a year and the Livelys determined that they were too expensive. As a result, they were rejected. Thereafter, Respondent explained the National States nursing care policy which provided skilled and intermediate care and the Livelys elected to purchase the nursing care policy. Prior to the Livelys purchase, Respondent reviewed the coverage provided and an outline of coverage was left with the Livelys as well as an outline prepared by Respondent. In addition, based on the pendency of administrative charges in this matter, Respondent had the Livelys acknowledge, in their own handwriting, that "all of the benefits of this outline has been explained to me in full and a signed copy of this outline has been left with me, by my agent, Agent is Mark Gable," followed by the signature of Fred Lively. (Respondent's Exhibits 15 and 16.) Additionally, the Livelys signed two further certifications and a customer survey report prepared by Respondent. This was done in an attempt by Respondent to avert claims generated by other agents by having new clients under certification to indicate that the coverage was explained. Shortly after the Respondent sold the insurance to the Livelys, Steve Daggett, the agent who had sold the Livelys their American Traveler's policy, arrived at the Livelys' home and convinced Mr. Lively that his policy was to have included custodial care; cited that Respondent had failed to reveal that and he (Daggett) related that Respondent had failed to reveal that he (Lively) suffered from diabetes for the purpose of suggesting that Respondent had "clean sheeted" the application which would thereafter result in a denial of coverage if a claim was made. A review of Respondent's application filed with the Lively deposition showed that Respondent revealed the existence of Mr. Lively's diabetes. Sometimes after August 21, 1990, Respondent again visited the Livelys and requested that they reconsider their decision to cancel the policy. Following Respondent's review of the policy and the coverages, Mr. Lively signed a letter which was submitted to National States requesting that the policy be kept in force. National States received the letter and the cancellation of the Lively policies was rescinded. On or about October 6, 1988, Respondent visited the home of Martha Roche for the purpose of soliciting health insurance. As a result of their discussion, Ms. Roche purchased two National States insurance policies. Although Ms. Roche testified that Respondent represented himself as an insurance adjuster for the purposes of gaining entry into her home, the testimony does not comport with the documentary evidence or her practice with respect to letting insurance agents into her home. At times, Ms. Roche has had as many as three insurance agents in her home at one time. Respondent was following up on a lapse notice with respect to prior National States policies which Ms. Roche had purchased from Respondent. At her front door, Respondent showed Ms. Roche his insurance license and she granted him entrance. On November 3, 1988, or less than thirty (30) days after the policy was originally written by Respondent, Respondent returned to Ms. Roche's home after receiving a notice of cancellation with respect to the policy in question. After discussing the matter with her, she decided to save the policy and wrote a handwritten note asking that the coverage be continued. During the November 3, 1988 meeting with Ms. Roche, which was well after the bank draft authorization had been submitted to National States, Ms. Roche indicated that she did not wish to stay on the draft plan in the following year. Respondent explained to Ms. Roche that she should write a letter to National States and to the bank to terminate the bank plan. In addition to this advice, Respondent was aware that National States would advise Ms. Roche of her right to terminate the bank plan and the procedure for termination as the bank plan is a contract between the insured and the bank. Respondent was without authority to terminate the bank plan that Ms. Roche authorized. Ms. Roche requested cancellation of the bank draft as Respondent instructed her, although the bank continued payment until she filed a complaint with Petitioner, complaining that National States insurance had failed to cancel her bank draft plan. Ms. Roche fails to allege in her complaint to Petitioner or otherwise suggest that Respondent used any false pretense to gain entry to her home. Ms. Roche's complaint was that National States did not refund her money after she wrote requesting a refund. Subsequently, a refund was given to Ms. Roche.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner enter a Final Order dismissing the Second Amended Administrative Complaint filed herein in its entirety. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Martin Errol Rice, Esquire 696 First Avenue North Post Office Box 205 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue at the hearing was whether Petitioner is entitled to a premium refund of her health insurance premium.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Mildred Daw, is a retired State employee. She is enrolled in the State of Florida, State Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan (the Plan). Prior to retiring, Petitioner amended her coverage in the Plan, changing from single coverage to family coverage. Petitioner modified her coverage so that her husband would be covered under the Plan. Petitioner's husband was under age 65 and qualified for Medicare Parts A and B. Petitioner was not qualified for Medicare coverage. The premium for family coverage was $178.44 per month. Petitioner began paying this amount shortly before she retired in December 1984. By letter dated, July 8, 1985, the Division of State Employees' Insurance notified retirees that: If you are under age 65 and eligible for Medicare Part A and B because of disability, you may now be eligible for Medicare Coordination coverage at the reduced rate. Please notify our office if you are eligible and send a copy of your Medicare card. Your premium will be reduced the month following our receipt of your notice and the copy of your Medicare card. The letter was sent to retirees and made no mention of surviving spouses or that a current spouse, who fit within the Medicare category, could qualify the insured for Medicare Coordination coverage. The Medicare Coordination coverage is the only program that the State offers in which it is the spouse of the insured/retiree who can qualify the insured for new benefits or different coverage. In this case, the different coverage or new benefit was solely a reduction in premium. Otherwise, the benefits under the family coverage and the Medicare Coordination coverage were the same. An ordinary person reading the letter would not have been placed on notice and would not have assumed that anyone other than the retiree was covered by the letter. If Petitioner had immediately elected the Medicare Coordination coverage, her premium would have been reduced by $42.76 a month, beginning with the August 1985, payment. The July 8, 1985, letter was mailed by first class mail to all retired State employees in the Plan. The business practice of the Division is to mail any such letters to the address of the retiree listed with the Division of Retirement and given to the Division of State Employees' Insurance or to the most current address the Division of Employees Insurance has for that particular retiree. In this case, the address which the Division of Retirement would have had on Petitioner in 1985 was her old address in Jacksonville. However, by July 1985, Petitioner had mailed the Division of State Employees' Insurance a change of address card with her new Pensacola address. She did not mail the Division of Retirement a change of address. There is no evidence as to which address the Respondent mailed the July 8, 1985, letter. Without such evidence Respondent is not entitled to a presumption of proper notice when a letter is mailed to a party with the correct address. Petitioner does not remember receiving the July 8, 1985, letter. She would have elected the Medicare Coordination coverage had she been aware of its availability. Petitioner became aware of her eligibility for reduced premiums in October 1987, when she received an informational bulletin from the Division of State Employees' Insurance. The bulletin stated the premium rates for various types of insurance coverage, including the reduced premiums for family coverage with members of the family who are qualified for Medicare benefits. Petitioner telephoned the Division and was instructed by Division personnel to send in a copy of her husband's Medicare card in order to establish her eligibility for the reduced premium. Petitioner sent a copy of her husband's Medicare card to the Division in October 1987. On November 6, 1987, Petitioner requested a refund of excess insurance premiums paid from July 1985, through November 1987. On December 28, 1987, Petitioner was informed by the Respondent that the earliest date a change in coverage could become effective was October 1987, because Petitioner had not applied for a change of coverage prior to that time. Petitioner was awarded an excess premium refund for the premium paid for November coverage. The Rules governing the Plan are found in Chapter 22I-1, Florida Administrative Code. This Chapter generally requires that an employee or retiree perform an affirmative act, by completing an informational form and sending it to the Department, before any change in coverage can be effectuated. The reason for such a requirement is that the Department has no way of knowing the number of eligible employees or retirees, without being supplied that information from the insureds, so that the Plan's administrator can better manage the Plan's funds to provide an adequate amount for the payment of claims. However, competing with this Rule is the Respondent's policy that a retiree who is otherwise eligible for certain benefits, but did not receive any notice of such eligibility is entitled to retroactive benefits. This policy is based on the Division's duty to administer the State's health plan, including notifying retirees of the availability of new types of coverage or benefits. The evidence showed that this policy takes precedence over the Rule when the Division has failed to notify an eligible retiree. In this case the Division failed to notify Petitioner of her eligibility for Medicare Coordination coverage due to her spouse's qualifications. Petitioner is therefore entitled to retroactive benefits beginning July 1985. Since the benefit of the Medicare Coordination coverage is a reduced premium, Petitioner is entitled to a refund of the excess premium of $42.76 a month from July 1985, through October 1987. The refund for that time period totals $1,154.52.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order refunding to Petitioner excess premiums paid to the Department in the amount of $1,154.52. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 89-301 The facts contained in paragraphs a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j and k of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance, in so far as material. The facts contained in paragraphs l, m, and n of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Facts are subordinate. The facts contained in paragraph p of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Facts were not shown by the evidence. The facts contained in paragraph o of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are rejected. The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance, in so far as material. The facts contained in paragraphs 13 and 14 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are subordinate. The facts contained in paragraph 7 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact were not shown by the evidence except for the fact relating to the letter being mailed first class mail. COPIES FURNISHED: Karren Lessard 15 West La Rua Street Pensacola, Florida 32521 Larry D. Scott Senior Attorney Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Andrew McMullian III Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue Whether Petitioner timely notified Respondent, Division of State Group Insurance of a "qualifying status change" (QSC) event, so as to allow Petitioner to cancel her participation in the State Group Health Insurance Program during the Plan Year- 2006. Petitioner seeks a refund of amounts deducted/paid because her insurance was continued.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been a covered participant in the Program, authorized by Section 110.123, Florida Statutes, at all times material. As provided in Section 110.123(3)(c), Florida Statutes, Respondent DMS, through its administrative entity, DSGI, is responsible for contract management and day-to-day administration of the Program. DMS has contracted with Convergys, Inc., to provide human resources management services including assisting in the administration of the Program. Convergys performs these tasks in part through an on-line system known as "People First." However, as provided in Section 110.123(5), Florida Statutes, final decisions concerning the existence of coverage or covered benefits under the Program are not delegated, or deemed to have been delegated, by DMS. Section 110.161, Florida Statutes, requires DSGI, as the responsible administrative entity, to administer the Program consistent with Section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code, so that participants will obtain the pre-tax advantages provided by Section 125. One of the federal requirements to maintain the pre-tax status is that the plan's sponsor (e.g., the State of Florida) administer the plans and apply each plan's rules in a manner that does not discriminate and that treats all participants equally. In this case, Petitioner was enrolled in the Health Program Plan Year 2006, i.e. from January 1, 2006, through December 31, 2006. Allowing a Plan member to retroactively cancel her participation during a Plan Year without having properly reported a QSC could put the entire pre-tax program in jeopardy. A QSC is a change in status as listed in the Plan which would allow an employee to cancel or otherwise change participation in the Plan during the Plan Year if requested by the employee within 31 days of the change in status. Converting from full-time to part-time state employment is a QSC event. On April 21, 2006, Petitioner converted from full-time employee status to part-time employee status. Therefore, the QSC event in this case occurred on April 21, 2006, when Petitioner went from being a full-time to a part-time employee. However, in order to effect a change in health insurance coverage, Petitioner was required to request a change in health insurance coverage no later than May 22, 2006. To request a change in health insurance coverage, Petitioner would have needed to contact Convergys in a timely manner, i.e. within 31 days of April 21, 2006. For People First, Convergys maintains a tracking system known as "Siebel," which tracks written correspondence to or from state employees and notes telephone calls between state employees and Convergys associates. Standard business procedure for Convergys is that the telephone logs are not verbatim notations of the conversations, but are a summary of those conversations, including a description of the reason for the call and the action taken by any Convergys associate that took the call. The Convergys policy is that all calls are to be notated. All service associates are trained to note all calls. Convergys employees are trained to make the call notes during the telephone conversation or soon thereafter. A notation is to be made by the Convergys employee in the Siebel system, and a case is opened when the service representative cannot assist the caller or when further action is required. The case notes are also to be recorded in the system. None of the People First, DGS/DGSI, or Convergys records reflect any contact by Petitioner within the 31 days following April 21, 2006, although they reflect several later contacts concerning her complaint that her coverage was not timely cancelled. Petitioner testified that she used her sister's cell phone to telephone People First "after two or three weeks" and that she discussed cancellation of her participation in the state insurance program and flirted with the Black male who answered the phone, but who seemed not to have much experience in the cancellation process. Petitioner was not able to provide the name or position of the person with whom she allegedly spoke or the date or time of her telephone call. The fact that Petitioner testified that she knew that she "had to around the middle or so" of the month to request her change of coverage, illustrates Petitioner's rather loose interpretation of when this alleged call occurred. Petitioner presented no witness or documentation to corroborate her testimony that she had received oral assurances during that phone call to the effect that the change she requested had been completed through People First. Petitioner's representation that the telephone company could not get the phone records of this telephone call due to the passage of time is not credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services enter a final order ratifying its October 13, 2006, denial of Petitioner's requested retroactive cancellation of enrollment in the State Group Health Insurance Plan. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of July, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Ericka L. Ledbetter 739 South Shelfer Stree Quincy, Florida 32351 Sonja P. Matthews, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 John J. Matthews, Director Department of Management Services Division of State Group Insurance 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0949
