Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: The applicant Flagship Bank of Orlando is a subsidiary of the Flagship Banks of Florida in Miami, which owns 23 banks with 66 banking offices and had assets of $1,847,000,000.00 at the end of 1979. The main office of the applicant is located at 1400 East Colonial Drive in Orlando, some nine miles from the proposed branch site. The applicant presently has two branch banking facilities in operation in Orlando: the West Branch Office, located at 3500 West Colonial Drive, and the Sand Lake Road Office, located at 6707 Sand Lake Road, which opened in September of 1979. The West Branch Office has assets of approximately $8,000,000.00 and the Sand Lake Road Office has deposits of approximately $2,700,000.00. As of June 30, 1979, the applicant had 3.8 percent of the total amount of deposits in Orange County, Florida. As of June 30, 1979, the applicant's total deposits were $60,063,000.00. For the year 1979, its net profit to asset ratio was 1.19 percent. At the end of February, 1980, the applicant's after-tax net income was $177,379.00, giving it a 1.3 percent ratio on an annual basis. As of February 29, 1980, the adjusted capital asset ratio was 11.88 percent. The applicant's liquidity ratio is 34 percent or 35 percent, and it presently has approximately $6.00 in reserve for each classified asset dollar. The applicant's president, H.E. Davis, has been with the applicant since 1973 and has been in banking since 1956. The proposed branch manager is Mike A. Fettig, who has been with the applicant for three and a half years and is presently an assistant branch manager with the applicant's Sand Lake branch office. Dean Murdock is the proposed branch loan officer and has been in banking since 1965. Vicky McHoy is the proposed branch assistant manager. She has been in banking with the applicant for 12 years. Additional staff at the proposed branch will be experienced bank personnel pulled from the applicant's main office or other branches. Due to their active training program, the applicant's president does not believe that this will have a detrimental effect upon its management capabilities. The proposed branch bank will offer extended weekday drive-in teller hours and Saturday banking hours, in addition to a full range of services including an automatic teller machine, night depository, foreign currency exchange, commercial and installment lending at the branch level, safety deposit boxes, and Visa and Master Charge. Only one other bank in the Orlando area offers foreign currency exchange services. According to the application, the interior of the proposed branch bank will contain a lobby area of approximately 1,300 square feet, with provisions for four inside teller stations. One drive-in teller will operate from within the building with provision for two remote teller lines. The building will also contain an employee lounge, two restrooms, a bookkeeping and/or work area, a storage area, a meeting room, two offices and customer booths. Based upon the applicant's actual experience at its Sand Lake Road Office, it is estimated that the cost of the building will be $162,000.00. The applicant presently owns the land and there was no evidence of any insider transaction in the purchase of the land. The applicant estimates that it will have total deposits at the end of the first year of operation in the amount of $3,000,000.00, and that it will have total deposits of $5,000,000.00 and $6,000,000.00 at the end of the second and third years of operation. The site selected for the proposed branch is located on Oak Ridge Road west of the intersection of said Road and South Orange Blossom Trail at the southwest corner of Texas Avenue and Oak Ridge Road. Oakridge Road is a main east/west thoroughfare in the area, and the proposed site is adjacent to a shopping center containing 23 stores, including a Winn Dixie and Eckerds Drug Store. The applicant's primary service area (PSA) is bordered by four main highways: the Florida Turnpike, some 2 1/4 miles to the west of the proposed site; Interstate 4 and Pinelock Avenue, some 3 3/4 miles north; Orange Avenue, some 2 3/4 miles east; and Sand Lake Road, some 1 3/4 miles south. The area is a mixture of residential housing, retail, wholesale, distribution facilities and light manufacturing. The applicant's goal in operating the proposed branch office is to acquire new customers in a rapidly growing area and to service its existing customers in the area. Presently, the applicant has 250 deposit customers and 70 loan customers residing or doing business within the designated primary service area. The applicant estimates the population of the PSA to be approximately 38,800, with the greater density of population being on the east side of Orange Blossom Trail. The majority of persons in the PSA are employed in clerical, sales and other lower income categories. The average per capita income within the PSA was $10,882.00 in 1979. According to data published by the University of Florida, Division of Population, the estimated population of Orlando on April 1, 1979, was 124,658, indicating an annual average growth rate of 2.9 percent since the 1970 population figure of 99,006. According to the same data, the total population of Orange County in April of 1979, was estimated at 441,337, indicating an average annual growth rate of 3.1 percent since the 1970 population of 344,311. Net migration into Orange County between 1970 and 1979 accounted for 73.07 percent in population growth. Between April of 1970 and July 1, 1978, the weight of retirees (the 65+ age group) in the County's total population increased from 9.6 to 10.5 percent; and the weight of the labor force (ages 15 - 64) increased from 61.7 to 66.0 percent. The per capita personal income for Orlando increased from $5,985 in 1976 to $6,535 in 1977, and the increases for Orange County were from $6,496 in 1976 to $7,093 in 1977. The state averages for the same two years increased from $6,101 to $6,697. The December 1979 issue of the Orlando SMSA Labor Market Trends shows an average unemployment rate of 5.8 percent for the twelve month period ending in November 1979, as compared to 6.4 percent for the comparable 1978 period. Within the applicant's designated PSA, there are three operating main offices of commercial banks - Landmark Bank of Orlando, Royal Trust Bank of Orlando and ComBank/Pine Castle Bank. These banks are located at a distance from 1.8 miles to 3 miles from the proposed site. There are two opened and operating branch bank facilities and four approved but unopened branch banks within the PSA. The closest existing banking office, the branch of the Sun First National Bank of Orlando, is located 1.0 mile east of the proposed site. The proposed sites of the approved, but unopened branch banks are located between 1.5 miles and 2 miles from the proposed site. The approved branch site of the protestant, Pan American Bank of Orlando, is located some 641 yards from the applicant's proposed site, and it is expected to open in April of 1980. There are also three branch offices of savings and loan associations in operation and two branches approved but unopened. The existing banking and savings and loan facilities in the area have all experienced significant increases in deposits over the past two years. Data as of June 30, 1979, from the Comparative Figures Report of the Florida Bankers Association indicate that the banks in Orlando experienced the following increases over the year's period: 18.7 percent in total loans, 13.8 percent in time deposits, 6.8 percent in demand deposits and 10.8 percent in total deposits. The name selected for the proposed branch banking facility is Flagship Bank of Orlando - Oakridge Office. No evidence was produced that such name would be misleading or confusing to the public. There was no testimony adduced at the hearing that the applicant was not in substantial compliance with all state and federal laws effecting its operations. In accordance with the provisions of Florida Statutes, 120.57(1)(a)(12), conclusions of law and a recommendation are not included in this Report. Respectfully submitted and entered this 24th day of April, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence O. Turner, Jr. Comptroller Gerald A. Lewis Pan American Bancshares, Inc State of Florida 150 Southeast Third Avenue The Capitol Post Office Box 010831 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Miami, Florida 33101 Benjamin F. Smathers, Esquire Smathers and Kemp 801 North Magnolia Avenue Post Office Box 3267 Orlando, Florida 33802 Karyln Anne Loucks Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE DIVISION OF BANKING PAN AMERICAN BANK OF ORLANDO, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 80-235 FLAGSHIP BANK OF ORLANDO and OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, Respondents. /
The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in activities requiring licensure as a real estate professional without such licensure in violation of Sections 455.228 and 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes, thereby violating the provisions of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a licensing and regulatory agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility and duty to administer the provisions of Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent has never been licensed by Petitioner as a real estate professional in the State of Florida. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was a vice-president of Wall Street Mortgage Corporation (Wall Street). On November 21, 1996, Jessie Finley and Wall Street entered into a contract (the Finley contract) whereby Ms. Finley agreed to sell to Wall Street a house located at 1417 Thirteenth Street, West Palm Beach, Florida (the subject property) for the sum of $40,000.00. The Finley contract required Wall Street to make a deposit in the amount of $1,000.00 that would be forfeited if Wall Street defaulted on the contract. The subject property was in foreclosure as of November 21, 1996. Wall Street arranged to purchase the second mortgage at a deep discount and to forestall the foreclosure. The Finley contract reflected that there would be no real estate commission paid and that the buyer intended to immediately resell the property. There was no provision stating whether the buyer could assign its interest in the Finley contract to a third party. Respondent caused an advertisement to be placed in the Palm Beach Post on February 8 and 9, 1997 (a Saturday and Sunday, respectively), which provided certain information about the subject property, including its status in foreclosure, the number of bedrooms and baths, the total square footage, and the estimated value ($65,000) and assessed value ($57,000). The advertisement offered the subject property for sale for the sum of $39,000 and provided a telephone number for prospective purchasers to call. Angelina Salvia responded to the advertisement on February 9, 1997, by calling the telephone number listed in the advertisement. Respondent answered Ms. Salvia's call and told her the street address. Ms. Salvia drove by the house and made a follow-up call to Respondent. During the second telephone conversation, Respondent and Ms. Salvia agreed to meet at the subject property the next day so he could show her the interior of the house. On February 10, 1997, Wall Street, as seller, and Ms. Salvia, as buyer, entered into a contract (the Salvia contract) by which Ms. Salvia agreed to purchase the subject property for the sum of $39,000. She paid Wall Street a deposit in the amount of $8,000 on February 10, 1997. She agreed to pay the sum of $2,000 ten days later. The balance of the purchase price was due at the closing, which was set for on or before March 11, 1997. The Salvia contract contained a special clause that provided as follows: "Buyer shall receive clean title with no liens except Buyer's new 1st mortgage." Respondent signed the Salvia contract with Ms. Salvia on the signature designated as the Seller. The signature line did not explicitly state that he was signing as vice-president of Wall Street. Petitioner's contention that Respondent was acting in his individual capacity when he executed this contract is rejected because the greater weight of the evidence established that he was acting as a corporate officer on behalf of the corporation. The Salvia contract reflected that the provision pertaining to the payment of real estate commissions was not applicable. On February 10, 1997, Respondent and Ms. Salvia discussed that she would require a mortgage to finance the balance of the purchase price. Respondent recommended to Ms. Salvia a person who could give her a prompt answer to her credit application. 1/ Ms. Salvia was not able to get financing for the balance of the purchase price and defaulted on her contract to purchase the subject property. 2/ On March 12, 1997, Wall Street, through Respondent, executed a contract to sell the subject property to Keith Stopforth for the sum of $42,000.00. Mr. Stopforth signed the contract the following day. The Stopforth contract closed on March 24, 1997, with Ms. Finley deeding the property to Mr. Stopforth. Wall Street never held fee simple title to the subject property. Its interest in the property was based on the Finley contract.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 2000.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: On July 31, 1973, petitioner submitted to respondent its application to organize and operate a new banking facility in St. Cloud, Osceola County, Florida. A filing date of August 20, 1973, was assigned by respondent. Accompanying the application was a long and detailed Economic Survey dated June, 1973, containing economic information and statistics pertaining to the City of St. Cloud and its environs. By letter dated October 26, 1973, the management of the Sun Bank of St. Cloud, the only bank existing in St. Cloud, opposed the establishment of petitioner's proposed bank, citing as grounds therefore the present economic conditions and the limited economic growth prospects for the St. Cloud area. By letter dated February 20, 1974, The First National Bank of Kissimmee protested the granting of a charter for any new bank in Osceola County, contending that "additional banks could only dilute the deposits of the existing banks, and this would not be in the areas' interest." An investigation of petitioner's application was conducted by Frank C. Dobson, a state bank examiner for respondent, on February 19, 1974. By a report dated February 22, 1974, Mr. Dobson recommended disapproval of the application on the ground that three of the five factors were considered unfavorable. Mr. Dobson considered the factor of "financial history, condition of the bank, and fixed assets" to be favorable, as well as the factor of "adeqeacy of capital." Considered unfavorable were future earnings prospects," "general character of management" and "convenience and needs of the community." In contrast to the petitioner's original estimate of total deposits in the amount of $10,000,000.00 at the end of its third year of operation, Examiner Dobson projected deposits of only $6,000,000.00 at the end of the third year and therefore concluded that petitioner would not achieve a profitable position. Based upon his observation that the originally proposed chief executive officer, Mr. John J. Jenkins, might possibly he unable to await favorable action on petitioner's application and that the proposed Vice President and Cashier, Mr. Robert J. McTeer, would need supervision and guidance, Mr. Dobson considered the factor of "general character of management" unfavorable. After a brief resume of each of the proposed directors and officers, Dobson concluded that each was considered "satisfactory" with the exception of McTeer, who was considered only "fair." The unfavorable rating on the factor of "convenience and needs of the community" was based upon Dobson's opinion that the proposed site did not appear conducive to convenient service, the existing bank in St. Cloud was completing a new facility which would provide adequate service for its customers and a national bank application was pending. On October 16, 1974, Fred O. Dickinson, Jr., then State Commissioner of Banking, issued his conditional approval order on petitioner's application. This order indicates that a change in location of petitioner's proposed bank was made and that M. Raymond Daniel was designated as president. Mr. Daniel accepted the conditions on October 18, 1974. In January of 1975, present Comptroller Gerald A. Lewis revoked the conditional approval of Mr. Dickinson. An updated economic survey dated April of 1975 was submitted to respondent on behalf of petitioner. An update investigation was conducted by State Bank Examiner Fred H. Brannen, Jr. on May 21, 1975. Mr. Brannen reviewed the file and found as favorable the factors of "financial history, condition of the bank and fixed assets" and "adequacy of capital." Listed as "borderline-favorable" was the factor of "general character of management." Brannen agreed with the projected figures of the original examiner, Mr. Dobson, and thus reported the factor of "future earnings prospects" as unfavorable. Mr. Brannen found the factor of "convenience and needs of the community" to be unfavorable, noting that the proposed site appeared to be somewhat removed from the existing businesses, Sun Bank of St. Cloud had completed its new facility and planned to use its old building as a remote facility and that the proposed national bank was rejected by regulatory authorities. Based upon his examination, Mr. Brannen concurred with the original recommendation of disapproval. On April 1, 1975, the Sun Bank of St. Cloud filed with respondent its application for authority to open a remote facility at 1001 New York Avenue in St. Cloud. A Comptroller's Conference was held in regard to this application on August 8, 1975, and respondent granted approval for the remote facility on or about September 25, 1975. On June 10, 1975, a Comptroller's Conference was held for the purpose of updating and culminating the investigation of petitioner's application. By a supplement dated June, 1975, petitioner presented additional data concerning existing financial institutions in Osceola County and in six other counties with similar populations as Osceola County. No protestants of the application appeared at this conference. On June 20, 1975, respondent received from the Sun Bank of St. Cloud a 37-page booklet containing comments relating to petitioner's application. It was Sun Bank's conclusion that public convenience and advantage would not be promoted by the establishment of petitioner's bank and that local conditions did not assure reasonable promise of successful operation for petitioner and those banks already established in the community. It appears that petitioner has changed the proposed location of its bank several times since submitting its original application. At the Comptroller's Conference on June 10th, the proposed site was described to be at the intersection of New York Avenue with U.S. Highway 192/441 In its Comments regarding petitioner's application, Sun Bank describes the location formerly proposed the intersection of Neptune Road and U.S. Highway 192/441. This is also the site discussed in the reports of both examiners. 13.. In August of 1975, petitioner presented to respondent a Supplemental Summary relevant to petitioner's application versus the Sun Bank's application for authority to open a remote facility in St. Cloud. On November 17, 1975, Comptroller Lewis concluded that petitioner's proposal did not meet the requirements of F.S. s659. 03(2). As grounds therefore, the Comptroller cited the following: ... The primary service area had a 1970 population of 10,000; the applicants estimate that the service area has a current population of 16,000. The proposed bank's site is approximately .4 of a mile from the existing bank in St. Cloud. The proposed bank would not appear to be any more convenient for the residents of St. Cloud than the existing bank. The applicants have made some showing that the proposed bank would have some pro-competitive advantage for the residents of St. Cloud. However, the banks in Kissimmee are accessible by some of the St. Cloud residents. For this reason, the issue of a monopoly in the existing St. Cloud bank is not as compelling as it might otherwise be. On balance, it appears that the public convenience and advantage would be promoted to some extent by the establishment of the proposed bank, although the case is not an overwhelming one. As shown above, the population base of the service area is fairly small and future growth is not expected to be significant. The population of St. Cloud increased by less than 1,000 persons between 1960 and 1970. The existing bank in St. Cloud had total deposits, as of June 30, 1975, of less than $20 million and its total deposits during the last two calendar years increased by less than $4 million. It appears that local conditions do not assure reasonable promise of successful operation of the proposed bank and the existing banks. On the basis of the foregoing, the Comptroller has concluded that, while the first criterion may be met in this case, the second criterion is not met. Therefore, the application is denied. Since the conclusion renders the other four criteria moot, the Comptroller has not reached any conclusions with respect to those other four criteria." Four banks, all members of various statewide holding companies, presently exist in Osceola County. There is one bank, the intervenor herein, in St. Cloud, which bank also has a remote facility in St. Cloud, and there are three banks in Kissimmee, which is eight to ten miles west of St. Cloud. Petitioner's proposed primary service area is defined to be the City of St. Cloud and its environs. Its general service area is defined to be all of Osceola County. Population estimates by witnesses for petitioner and for the intervenor differed. Petitioner estimated the present population of the general service or trade area to be slightly in excess of 41,000, while figures contained in the booklet entitled "Florida Estimates of Population" show Osceola County to have an estimated population of 36,668 as of July 1, 1975. The petitioner estimates the primary service area population to be in excess of 16,000, and this figure was not disputed by the intervenor. In fact, in its application for a remote facility, the intervenor stated that the "Osceola Planning Commission is projecting that the population of the St. Cloud trade area will increase to approximately 45,000 by 1990." As of the 1975 year end, the intervenor Sun Bank, the existing bank In St. Cloud, had total deposits of $21,210,955.50. During the first quarter of 1976, total deposits increased by over $1,600,000.00 at Sun Bank. Over the past five years, deposits at Sun Bank have doubled. The three Kissimmee banks have a combined total of over $40,000,000.00 in deposits. Net profits at the end of 1975 for the existing four banks in the County were as follows: approximately $286,000.00 for the First National Bank of Kissimmee; $216,198.87 for Sun Bank of St. Cloud; $22,359.66 for the Exchange Bank of Osceola; and a figure of minus $56,231.32 for the Flagship Bank of Kissimmee. The Flagship Bank opened in 1974 in a modular unit and moved into a new facility in its second year Using twenty-four factors to measure the economic growth rating of Osceola County, Mr. William C. Payne, a bank marketing consultant, rated said County along with six other counties of similar size. Osceola was rated second, preceded only by Citrus County. The Comparative Figures Report for December 31 1975, as compared with December 31, 1974, shows the following percentages for Osceola County and statewide: OSCEOLA STATEWIDE TOTAL LOANS 12.8+ 4.7- TOTAL TIME DEPOSITS 20.1+ 7.5+ TOTAL DEMAND DEPOSITS 0.4- 2.0- TOTAL DEPOSITS 10.1+ 3.3+ The presidents of three of the four existing banks appeared and testified as protestants to petitioner's application. The presidents of Flagship and First National in Kissimmee felt that a new bank in St. Cloud would have an adverse effect upon them because they each have a number of customers who are residents of St. Cloud. First National estimates that it has 200 customers from St. Cloud representing approximately $500,000.00 in deposits. Sun Bank recognized than most of petitioner's customers would be derived from Sun's bank, and estimated that probably one million dollars in deposits would be lost to petitioner, thus reducing Sun's profit figures. Sun opened its remote facility in St. Cloud in December of 1975 and First National submitted its application for a remote or branch facility in St. Cloud in January of 1976. Due to financial backing and management expertise and assistance, all three presidents felt that a holding company bank, as opposed to an independent bank, would have a better chance of success in St. Cloud. Flagship pays over $14,000.00 per year as a member of a holding company, while Sun and First National each pay approximately $90,000.00 per year. Sun Bank felt that a certain bank could exist in St. Cloud and that it would, in fact, promote competition. All three presidents noted that 1974 and 1975 were lean years for banking, but that loan demands and total deposits were now increasing. As noted above, petitioner's proposed new bank is to be independently owned and operated at the corner of U.S. Highway 192/441 and New York Avenue in St. Cloud. This downtown intersection provides the only permanent stop light on the main thoroughfare through St. Cloud, and the site provides easy access from either the east/west direction of the main highway or the north/south direction of New York Avenue. It should be noted again that this proposed site is not the same site reviewed by the two state bank examiners in their reports nor by the Sun Bank in its Comments submitted to respondent in June 1975. There was no evidence that the proposed name of petitioner's new bank -- Public Bank of St. Cloud -- would create any conflict or confusion with the name of any other existing bank. There is no evidence in the record that petitioner's proposed capital structure is other than adequate. Its total capitalization is proposed to be $1,000,000.00 and its deposits are estimated to be $7,000,000.00 at the end of the third year of operation. Mr. Payne's updated June, 1976, survey (Exhibit 13) contains drawings and details of petitioner's proposed banking house quarters. The physical structure will promote convenience to customers and the proposed costs are sufficient and reasonable. Security and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation requirements have been met. Petitioner's proposed Board of Directors consists of ten men. Included therein are attorneys, bankers, cattlemen, a physician, a pharmacist, a University of Florida athletic director and those engaged in real estate development and sales. While some directors do not reside in St. Cloud, others have lived there for years, with one director claiming to have some 1,200 blood relatives in the area. Two of the proposed directors, one of which is the proposed chief executive office, has previously been involved with newly chartered banks. At least three of the proposed directors presently serve as directors of other banks in Florida. The proposed president, Mr. Raymond Daniel, will move to St. Cloud and will devote all his time to his duties as president and director. Two of the proposed directors, one of which is the largest shareholder and the other of which is the proposed vice president and cashier, have suits pending against them for considerable amounts of money. One has a judgment against him in the amount of approximately $40,000.00, and the presidents of two banks in Osceola County testified that his reputation in the community as a businessman was not good.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that respondent disapprove petitioner's application to organize and operate a state banking facility in St. Cloud for the reason that petitioner, while showing that it satisfies all other criteria, has failed to illustrate that all its officers and directors possess sufficient ability and standing to assure a reasonable promise of successful operation. It is further recommended that such disapproval be without prejudice to petitioner to file with the respondent, if it so desires, within fifteen days of respondent's final order, an amended list of directors and/or officers and that respondent render a decision upon this criterion within twenty days from the filing thereof. Respectfully submitted and entered this 30th day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Gerald A. Lewis Comptroller State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mr. Clyde M. Taylor TAYLOR, BRION, BUKER & GREENE, P.A. P.O. Box 1796 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Attorney for Petitioner Mr. Nicholas Yonclas AKERMAN, SENTERFITT & EIDSON Box 231 Orlando, Florida 32802 Attorney for Intervenor Mr. Earl Archer The Comptroller's Office State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Attorney for Respondent ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE DIVISION OF BANKING PUBLIC BANK OF ST. CLOUD (proposed new bank), Petitioner. vs. CASE NO. 76-088 STATE OF FLORIDA, DIVISION OF BANKING, Respondent, SUN BANK OF ST. CLOUD, Intervenor. /
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Tarpon Financial Corporation is a federal banking corporation engaged in general banking services in the State of Florida, with its principal place of business in Tarpon Springs, Florida. Petitioners are not subsidiaries of, or associated with, either First National Bank of Florida, Inc., or First Florida Banks, Inc. On or about June 16, 1987, Petitioners submitted to and requested approval from Respondent of the name "First National Bank" as a service mark. Respondent denied registration of this service mark on June 29, 1987 by letter stating, "(W)e have a mark registered under the same or similar name and class." On August 6, 1987, Petitioners requested reconsideration citing the Rand McNally Banker's Directory, a nationally issued banking directory, to support its position that the same or similar service mark it seeks to register is not already in use in the State of Florida. The Respondent again denied the request on August 14, 1987 by letter stating, "Our records indicate 'First National Bank of Florida' is an active Florida corporation. We have no record of any name change." Petitioners sought reconsideration again on August 27, 1987, and requested that the matter be reviewed by Respondent's trademark committee. After review by that committee, Petitioners' application was denied for a third time on September 8, 1987. The service mark, "First National Bank of Florida," was registered with Respondent on June 16, 1982, and given mark number 927091. The owner of this mark is First National Bank of Florida, Inc., Tampa, Florida, and annual reports have been filed with Respondent in June of each year, including June 8, 1988, thereby indicating the mark has not been abandoned. The Respondent's records indicate that "First National Bank of Florida" is an actively registered service mark. The fact that it does not appear in the Rand McNally Banker's Directory does not establish that it is not an active mark registered with Respondent. The period of registration for service marks is ten years, and therefore the registration of "First National Bank of Florida" expires June 16, 1992, subject to renewal. The Respondent cannot register marks unless they are distinguishable from service marks already registered. Competent substantial evidence was not presented to support Petitioner's claim that "First National Bank," the mark it seeks to register, is distinguishable from "First National Bank of Florida," which is already registered. The absence of the phrase "of Florida" from the mark Petitioner seeks to register does not distinguish it from the mark already registered
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioners' application to register the service mark, "First National Bank." DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of August, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-1250 Rulings on Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 3, but otherwise Rejected in Finding of Fact 5 and as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 3-4. Rejected in Finding of Fact 7 and Rejected as unsupported in the record. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected in Finding of Fact 7. Rejected as irrelevant and unsupported in the record. Rejected as unsupported in the record. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 6-7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 8-9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 10. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald R. Hall, Esquire Suite 402, Corporate Square 2900 U.S. Highway 19, North Clearwater, Florida 34621 Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State The Capitol, Room LL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue Whether Respondent properly denied Petitioner's application for licensure as a Life and Variable Annuity and Health Insurance Agent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner applied for licensure as a Life and Variable Annuity and Health Insurance Agent. Petitioner's application was signed and mailed to the Department of Insurance on or about January 27, 1998. Petitioner's application for licensure was denied by the Department on or about May 5, 1998. Two months later, on July 6, 1998, the Department issued an Amended Denial Letter that set forth the basis for the denial. According to the Amended Denial Letter, Petitioner's license was denied because she failed to meet the licensure requirements set forth in Sections 626.611(1) and (7) and 626.785(1), Florida Statutes. As a basis for the alleged violations, the Department stated: The Office of the Attorney General filed a civil action against you as vice-president and a director of the H.O.M.E. Program, and the H.O.M.E. Program along with other directors, alleging that the Program was formed as a not-for-profit corporation. . . to help people buy a house for themselves to live in. The complaint alleges that the Program offered a variety of services for a "Service Fee," has not provided any services, and that those fees were deposited into an account with NationsBank and the money was then misappropriated by one Jerome Ellington. The Attorney General still has a case pending against the H.O.M.E. Program and has stipulated to dismiss the cause of action against you with prejudice only at the conclusion of the lawsuit against the remaining defendants. You Charita Strode, were terminated from employment with NationsBank for wiring funds out of the H.O.M.E. Program's account in November 1997, after specifically being told by the Regional Service Support Manager that the funds needed to remain in the account until all items had cleared. The bank was placed in a loss situation of over $6,000 and due to your behavior you were terminated because you abused your authority in order to achieve the funds transfer, and did not follow supervisory instructions. That is evidence of lack fitness and trustworthiness. Further, it was determined by the Unemployment Compensation Appeals Bureau that you were discharged for misconduct and the Appeals referee resolved the conflicts in favor of your former employer. Petitioner was employed by NationsBank in January 1994, and, except for a six-month voluntary leave of absence, worked there continuously until she was terminated in January 1998. Prior to going on voluntary leave, Petitioner was manager of the NationsBank Gunn Highway Banking Center. During her first year with NationsBank, Petitioner was a management trainee associate. Thereafter, Petitioner became a manager, a position in which she served for the remainder of her tenure with NationsBank. As a manager, Petitioner was assigned to several NationsBank banking centers and was responsible for the operations, sales, and service of the centers to which she was assigned. Additionally, Petitioner's responsibilities included training and supervising more than fifty associates. In the spring of 1997, Petitioner was promoted from bank officer to an assistant or associate vice-president. While employed at NationsBank, Petitioner received at least two awards for her job performance. In 1997, Petitioner was recognized by NationsBank as a member of Florida Team One, a commendation that recognizes excellence in sales. One of the banking centers managed by Petitioner also received an award for service quality, an award received by only 20 to 30 percent of NationsBank banking centers. In May 1997, Petitioner first met and became acquainted with Jerome Ellington, the owner and founder of the H.O.M.E. Program. According to its literature, the H.O.M.E. Program was a "Christian Home Building Program" designed to assist individuals in building or remodeling their homes. Petitioner was particularly interested in the program because of her desire to become a homeowner. Based on her interest, Petitioner asked Mr. Ellington questions about the H.O.M.E. Program, how to become a member, and how to help other people who might be interested in the program. Petitioner became a client of the H.O.M.E. Program. As a client, Petitioner was required to pay to the program an initial fee of $1700 and a monthly maintenance fee of approximately $170 for three months. Based on her belief that the H.O.M.E. Program was a legitimate organization whose purpose was to assist individuals in purchasing homes, Petitioner told several family members and friends about the program. She told these individuals that the program would allow them to purchase homes for themselves and encouraged them to "look into it." Eventually, like Petitioner, between six and eight of these individuals paid the required fees and became clients of the H.O.M.E. Program. In late June or early July 1997, Petitioner became involved with the H.O.M.E. Program, serving on the program's Financial Advisory Board. The purpose of the Financial Advisory Board was to act as an agent to control the finances of the H.O.M.E. Program. During the time Petitioner was a named member of the advisory board, it met in July or August 1997, to organize that board. Other than this initial organizational meeting, the advisory board never met nor did it ever function in any official manner. In late July 1997, at about the time the H.O.M.E. Program was incorporated, Petitioner was selected by Mr. Ellington to serve as a member and elected as vice-president of the H.O.M.E. Program's Board of Directors (Board or Board of Directors). While Petitioner was on the Board, it seldom met. In July or August 1997, the H.O.M.E. Program set up three bank accounts at NationsBank. Each of the accounts had three signators, all of whom were officers of the H.O.M.E. Program: Bernadette Orsley, treasurer; Jerome Ellington, president; and Petitioner, vice-president. The address of record listed on the H.O.M.E. Program account was 7819 North Dale Mabry Highway, Suite 208, Tampa, Florida. From August 1997 through January 1998, Petitioner took a voluntary leave of absence from NationsBank to do work for the H.O.M.E. Program and to explore the possibility of going into business for herself. Petitioner's work with the H.O.M.E. Program involved setting up "outside services to clients once they got into their homes." Jerome Ellington was the chief executive officer and president of the H.O.M.E. Program. During the time that Petitioner was on the H.O.M.E. Program's Board and the Financial Advisory Board, Petitioner found that Mr. Ellington was not open about the expenditures he claimed to be making on behalf of the H.O.M.E. Program. Attempts were made by Petitioner and one other Board member to develop, initiate, and implement better accounting practices, operational procedures, and financial controls for the H.O.M.E. Program. For example, one recommendation was that two signatures be required on all checks written on the H.O.M.E. Program accounts. However, these efforts proved futile because Mr. Ellington was unwilling to implement any changes and relinquish financial control of the program's finances. By letter dated October 28, 1997, NationsBank advised the H.O.M.E. Program that due to the chargeback activity involving its three accounts, the bank was closing the accounts, effective ten days from the date of the letter. The letter acknowledged that the relationship between NationsBank and the H.O.M.E. Program was "a contractual one and under the terms of our Deposit Agreement either party can terminate the relationship at any time without cause." Chargeback activity occurs when items that are deposited or credited to the account are returned to the bank dishonored for a variety of reasons. NationsBank's concern with the H.O.M.E. Program accounts was that the excessive chargeback activity might possibly place the bank at risk of loss. In October 1997, Patricia McSweeney, then Regional Service Manager for NationsBank, spoke to Petitioner about the H.O.M.E. Program accounts and reiterated the contents of the October 28, 1997, letter from NationsBank. Upon learning from Ms. McSweeney that NationsBank was closing the H.O.M.E. Program's three accounts, Petitioner requested that the bank allow the three accounts to remain open to receive two electronic deposits that were scheduled to be made in November 1997. The electronic deposits were to be made on or about November 5 and 20, 1997. Ms. McSweeney agreed to leave the H.O.M.E. Program accounts open to receive the November electronic deposits and told Petitioner that there could be no check activity on the accounts. This agreement between Petitioner and Ms. McSweeney modified the terms of the October 28, 1997, letter and the accounts remained open beyond the time designated in that letter. However, the modification was not memorialized in writing and no date was established for closing the H.O.M.E. Program accounts once the November electronic deposits were made. With regard to the agreement between Petitioner and Ms. McSweeney, there was a material misunderstanding of how the H.O.M.E. Program accounts were to be handled during this extension. Ms. McSweeney's intent and understanding was that the account would remain open on a "credits-only" basis so that the credits could be received and posted to the account, and then allowed to age. Moreover, Ms. McSweeney believed there would be no check activity in the H.O.M.E. Program account, thereby eliminating or reducing the likelihood that the bank would be placed in a loss situation. On the other hand, Petitioner understood the agreement to mean that no checks could be written on the account or deposited into the H.O.M.E. Program account. However, Petitioner also believed that once the electronic deposits were made to the account, funds could be withdrawn from the account to cover the H.O.M.E. Program's expenses. The anticipated electronic deposits were made to the H.O.M.E. Program account as scheduled on or about November 5 and 20, 1997. After the November 5, 1997, electronic deposit of between $8,000 and $10,000, on November 10, 1997, Petitioner went to the NationsBank Carrollwood Banking Center and withdrew approximately $9,000 from one of the H.O.M.E. Program accounts to make a payment to the H.O.M.E. Program's line of credit. Petitioner believed that this withdrawal was permissible and not inconsistent with or in violation of the agreement with Ms. McSweeney. Furthermore, when Petitioner made the withdrawal, she was unaware of any flag on the account and no bank representative informed her that the account was so designated. At no time, either on November 10, 1997, or later, did any NationsBank representative notify Petitioner that the account was flagged and that the $9,000 withdrawal was improper and should not have been allowed. On or about November 20, 1998, the second electronic deposit was received and posted to the H.O.M.E. Program account. On the morning of November 20, 1997, Petitioner telephoned the NationsBank's Gunn Highway Banking Center and spoke with Michelle Shumate. Petitioner and Ms. Shumate knew each other because prior to Petitioner's going on leave, she was a bank officer and/or manager of the Gunn Highway Banking Center. During her telephone conversation with Ms. Shumate, Petitioner requested that two cashier's checks be drawn from the H.O.M.E. Program account and that the checks be made payable to the H.O.M.E. Program. The funds were to be used for operating expenses of the H.O.M.E. Program. When Petitioner requested the two cashier's checks, she did not perceive the requested transaction as being inconsistent with or in violation of the agreement she and Ms. McSweeney had made. Petitioner's interpretation of the agreement was that the H.O.M.E. Program was only precluded from writing checks to third parties on checks issued on the program's accounts. Because the cashier's checks were certified funds, Petitioner knew that there was no potential, at that time, for a loss situation. After Ms. Shumate's telephone conversation with Petitioner, Ms. Shumate immediately called Ms. McSweeney, her supervisor, and advised her of Petitioner's request for two cashier's checks. At hearing, in explaining her reason for calling Ms. McSweeney, Ms. Shumate made no mention of the account being flagged. Rather, Ms. Shumate stated, "I had knowledge of chargeback activity of the account, and I made it a policy for myself that before doing anything for any H.O.M.E. Program accounts, I would call a supervisor." Based on Ms. Shumate's testimony and written statement concerning Petitioner's request for two cashier's checks, it appears that Ms. Shumate's decision to call Ms. McSweeney was not because the accounts were flagged, but rather because of her personal knowledge of the problems with the H.O.M.E. Program accounts. In response to Ms. Shumate's call, Ms. McSweeney told her that the H.O.M.E. Program accounts were "credit only" accounts and withdrawals or debits were not to be made on the account. Thirty minutes after Petitioner requested the cashier's checks, she came to the drive-through window of the NationsBank Gunn Highway Banking Center to pick up the checks. Ms. Shumate then told Petitioner that Ms. McSweeney had advised her that the H.O.M.E. Program account was a "credit only" account and that there could be no check activity on the account. Pursuant to Ms. McSweeney's directive, Ms. Shumate told Petitioner that if she had any questions, she should call Ms. McSweeney. Petitioner then immediately called Ms. McSweeney from her cellular telephone. However, when Petitioner was unable to reach Ms. McSweeney, she left a voice mail message for her. After leaving the Gunn Highway Banking Center, Petitioner then went to pick up a Ms. Barnes for a 9:00 a.m. meeting. When the meeting concluded, Petitioner took Ms. Barnes back to the H.O.M.E. Program Office located at 7819 North Dale Mabry Highway. Petitioner then went to the NationsBank Carrollwood Banking Center, the banking center closest to the H.O.M.E. Program Office. Petitioner signed in as a representative of the H.O.M.E. Program to request customer service. Petitioner then met with a consumer banker regarding having a wire transfer made from one of the NationsBank H.O.M.E. Program accounts to the program's new account at First Union. Petitioner gave the consumer banker the H.O.M.E. Program account number and the Petitioner and the consumer banker filled out the required forms necessary to effectuate the wire transfer. When the form was completed, the consumer banker initiated the wire transfer in the system and Petitioner left the Carrollwood Banking Center. Immediately prior to the wire transfer, the H.O.M.E. Program account from which the funds were taken had a balance of approximately $23,000. The amount that Petitioner had wire transferred from the NationsBank's H.O.M.E. Program account was $19,800. The purpose of the transfer was to put funds into the H.O.M.E. Program's account at First Union to meet the program's expenses. Petitioner was aware there had been a history of minimal chargebacks on the account, in the form of drafts. Based on this knowledge, when Petitioner initiated the wire transfer, she left a balance in the account that she believed would be sufficient to cover any potential chargebacks from the electronic drafts. Petitioner based the estimate on the past experience of the chargebacks from electronic drafts. When Petitioner requested that funds be removed from the H.O.M.E. Program account, she never anticipated that it would result in or contribute to a loss by NationsBank. When Petitioner requested the wire transfer, neither the consumer banker nor anyone else at the bank told her that the account was flagged and that funds could not be wired from the H.O.M.E. Program account. The transfer went smoothly and in accordance with NationsBank's routine business practices. On the afternoon of November 20, 1997, after the wire transfer was made, Petitioner spoke to Ms. McSweeney, who asked her why she had made the wire transfer. During that conversation, it became clear that there was a misunderstanding between Petitioner and Ms. McSweeney regarding how the H.O.M.E. Program's NationsBank accounts were to be handled in November 1997. Ms. McSweeney told Petitioner that she had told Petitioner "not to do that," apparently referring to their October agreement regarding Petitioner's request to allow the H.O.M.E. Program accounts to remain open in November. Petitioner then told Ms. McSweeney that she had never said that to her. Petitioner indicated to Ms. McSweeney that the H.O.M.E. Program needed funds from the account for its operating expenses and that she never would have asked that the accounts be allowed to remain open to receive the electronic deposits if the organization were absolutely prohibited from accessing the funds. In the days or weeks after the funds were wired from one of H.O.M.E. Program accounts at NationsBank, the chargebacks on the accounts were in excess of any amount that they had ever been. Between November 20, 1998, the date the wire transfer was made, and January 30, 1998, the date Petitioner's termination, NationsBank sustained a loss of approximately $6,000. This loss has not yet been recovered by the bank. Had the wire transfer not been made, NationsBank may not have sustained this loss. However, the approximate $6,000 loss by NationsBank may not be attributable to the November 20, 1997, wire transfer. Two other individuals on the H.O.M.E. Program accounts, including Jerome Ellington, were authorized signators on the H.O.M.E. Program accounts and could have made withdrawals. At the hearing, personnel of NationsBank did not state unequivocally that the other authorized persons on the H.O.M.E. Program accounts had not made withdrawals from the accounts between November 1997 and January 1998. NationsBank personnel did not rule out that such withdrawals had been made, but stated only that to confirm whether such withdrawals had been made, the bank records, which were unavailable, would have to be reviewed. If, in fact, such withdrawals were made, those withdrawals could have contributed to or been responsible for the bank's financial loss. In November 1997, the previously existing problems and disputes within the H.O.M.E. Program organization exacerbated. Mr. Ellington, president and founder of the H.O.M.E. Program, who had previously encouraged Petitioner's involvement in the program, both as a client and officer, now would no longer allow Petitioner to transact business on the H.O.M.E. Program accounts. Consequently, once the excessive chargebanks in the H.O.M.E. Programs account surfaced, Petitioner was unable to move funds back to NationsBank. Her requests to Mr. Ellington that he move funds to NationsBank were disregarded. When Petitioner was on the H.O.M.E. Program's Board of Directors, the Board not only failed to meet on a regular basis, but was also prohibited by Mr. Ellington from functioning as a governing body. Mr. Ellington controlled the H.O.M.E. Program, including the "purse strings" of the organization. Petitioner lost approximately $2,000, the total amount of the funds she invested as a client in the H.O.M.E. Program. Moreover, Petitioner also lost a substantial part of approximately $3,000 to $4,000 of her personal funds that she had used for the H.O.M.E. Program to cover some of its operating expenses. In one instance, during her early involvement with the H.O.M.E. Program, Petitioner co-signed a loan agreement for the organization to have a phone telephone system installed in the program's office. After the H.O.M.E. Program failed to make the payments, Petitioner paid off the loan and received no reimbursements. In the first week of December 1997, Petitioner received a copy of minutes from Special Meeting of the Board held on November 18, 1997. Petitioner received no notice of that meeting and, consequently, was not in attendance. The minutes of the meeting reflect that the only three Board members and/or officers present at the meeting were: Jerome Ellington, president; Jacqueline Garcia Ellington, secretary; and Bernadette Orsley, treasurer. Pursuant to the minutes of the November 18, 1997, Special Meeting of the Board, under the category of "New and Urgent Agenda Items," Mr. Ellington initiated a discussion regarding his dissatisfaction with Petitioner, one other Board member, and two staff members. The minutes reported that Mr. Ellington stated that the organization was facing "certain and immanent (sic) insurrection" by Petitioner and the other three individuals. Moreover, the minutes indicated that the labor force was "being manipulated into a confused state of loyalty and that this along with a confrontation of gross insubordination" by Petitioner and the other three individuals was "usurpatous (sic) to the general operations of the Firm and extremely deleterious to Client confidence." According to the minutes, following the discussion, Mr. Ellington moved to vote on the removal or termination of Petitioner and the other three individuals "in view of their attempted take over of the business and a number of other possible infractions of the law." Following Mr. Ellington's motion, by a unanimous vote of the three Board members/officers attending the Special Meeting, Petitioner and the other absent Board member were removed from the Board and the two staff members were terminated, effective immediately. Prior to Petitioner's receiving the minutes of the Special Meeting, she was unaware of her removal from the Board. On January 30, 1998, near the end of her voluntary leave, Petitioner met with officials of NationsBank. Petitioner was advised that her employment with NationsBank was being terminated, effective immediately, because she had failed to follow and had directly violated instructions of the service support manager, Ms. McSweeney. These charges stemmed from the incident involving the transfer of funds on November 20, 1997. Petitioner explained to NationsBank officials that she did not understand that the agreement with Ms. McSweeney prevented the removal of funds from the H.O.M.E. Program accounts. Petitioner also told the NationsBank officials that her behavior with regard to the accounts was consistent with her understanding of the agreement. In this regard, Petitioner informed NationsBank staff that prior to the wire transfer, in November 1997, she had made a withdrawal from the account to pay on the program's line of credit with no problem. Petitioner also told the bank officials that when that withdrawal was made, no one at the bank advised her that the withdrawal was improper or that the account was flagged. Notwithstanding Petitioner's explanation, NationsBank terminated Petitioner's employment, effective immediately. After Petitioner was terminated from NationsBank, she applied for unemployment benefits. The application was denied and Petitioner appealed. In the Notice of Decision issued on the matter, the appeals referee concluded that the Petitioner, claimant in that proceeding, "intentionally violated direct orders from her supervisor." Petitioner had fiduciary duties with regard to her position as vice-president and member of the Board and member of the Financial Advisory Board of the H.O.M.E. Program. However, for the reasons stated above, Petitioner's efforts to perform these duties were thwarted by tactics employed by Mr. Ellington. On January 10, 1998, Petitioner first learned that the Florida Attorney General's Office had been investigating the H.O.M.E. Program, when she was served with a civil action brought by the Attorney General. The Complaint, filed on December 13, 1997, named the H.O.M.E. Program, Inc., Jerome Ellington, and Board members, including Petitioner, as defendants. Among the allegations contained in the Complaint were that the funds collected by the H.O.M.E. Program had not been placed in an escrow account as had been represented to members and that the program had not initiated construction on any residence for any of its 140 clients. The Complaint also alleged that Mr. Ellington withdrew or transferred approximately $31,000 from a H.O.M.E. Program account and of that amount, $23,000 was transferred by Mr. Ellington from a H.O.M.E. Program's account at NationsBank to First Union on November 27, 1997. Moreover, the Complaint alleged that a substantial amount of those funds were used by Mr. Ellington for his personal expenses and approximately $17,000 of the program funds, at one time in Mr. Ellington's possession, remained unaccounted for. The Complaint contained no allegations that Petitioner or any other Board member had misappropriated H.O.M.E Program funds or, at any time, had organization funds in their possession which could not be accounted for. Pursuant to a Stipulated Settlement Agreement (Agreement) entered into on May 18, 1998, the Complaint was dismissed without prejudice against Petitioner "until the conclusion of the lawsuit against each of the remaining Defendants at which time the cause of action against [Petitioner] shall be dismissed with prejudice, provided that [Petitioner] has complied with the terms of the Agreement." In this regard, the Agreement requires the Petitioner to cooperate and assist the Attorney General's Office in the investigation and litigation relating to the Complaint. The Agreement acknowledged and expressly stated that Petitioner's acceptance of the Agreement did not constitute an admission that she violated the laws of Florida as alleged in the Complaint. To determine fitness and trustworthiness of applicants for insurance licenses, the Department looks at the applicant's history and activities in which the applicant participated. Also, the Department considers other issues, such as whether there were victims of the applicant's activities; whether someone was financially harmed; whether money and/or fiduciary duties were involved; and whether the actions were willful. In evaluating Petitioner's application, the Department had several concerns. First, the Department determined that Petitioner had willfully violated or refused to obey a supervisor's direct orders by moving funds out of the H.O.M.E. Program account and that as a consequence thereof, the bank lost several thousand dollars. In the Amended Denial Letter, the Department alleged that Petitioner accomplished this by "abusing" her position with the bank. From this uncorroborated information the Department received from NationsBank, the Department concluded that Petitioner's conduct demonstrated a lack of fitness and trustworthiness. Second, in making the final decision to deny Petitioner's application, the Department considered the fact that Petitioner had been a named defendant in the aforementioned Complaint filed by the Attorney General. Prior to the Department's issuing the Amended Denial Letter, it was aware that the Complaint had been dismissed as to Petitioner. Nonetheless, the Department found it significant that the Complaint had been dismissed without prejudice and that the Agreement had been reached in exchange for Petitioner's cooperation and testimony. The Department believed that the Agreement did not suggest that the underlying events that gave rise to the allegation in the Complaint did not occur. Finally, as a basis for its decision with regard to Petitioner's application, the Department relied on an Unemployment Appeals Bureau decision denying Petitioner unemployment benefits. The Department apparently found it significant that the referee in that proceeding found Petitioner's account of the events less credible than that of NationsBank and concluded that Petitioner "intentionally violated direct orders from her superior." Based on these considerations, the Department then concluded that the allegations raised in the Complaint demonstrated that Petitioner lacked the fitness to fulfill the fiduciary responsibilities required of an insurance agent. When the Department issued the Amended Denial Letter, it was unaware that Petitioner had been removed from the H.O.M.E Program Board in November 1997, because of her efforts to have the program implement financial controls for the funds it was collecting and expending. The Department was also unaware or failed to consider the short period of time Petitioner was associated with the Board, that Petitioner was a client of the H.O.M.E. Program, and that she lost money as a result of her involvement with the program.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue to Petitioner, Charita Michelle Strode, a license as a Life and Variable Annuity and Health Issuance Agreement. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Steve E. Baker, Esquire Delano Stewart, Esquire Stewart, Joyner, Jordan-Holmes, P.A. 1112 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33672 Elenita Gomez, Esquire Mechelle R. McBride, Esquire Department of Insurance 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On October 20, 1998, the Department received an application to acquire control of the First Bank of Miami by Rene de Picciotto, who is a citizen of Italy residing in Switzerland. Mr. de Picciotto currently owns approximately twenty-three percent of the outstanding common stock of the First Bank of Miami and proposes to increase his percentage of ownership to thirty-five percent of the bank's outstanding common stock. The First Bank of Miami is a state-chartered financial institution located in Miami, Dade County, Florida. The bank is insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), and Mr. de Picciotto filed a Notice of Change in Control with the FDIC. The FDIC conveyed its intent not to disapprove the acquisition in a letter dated April 8, 1999. In a notice published in the October 30, 1998, edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly, the Department complied with the requirements of Section 120.80(3)(a)1.a., Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998), by providing notice that Mr. de Picciotto's application had been filed, by advising the public that it could submit comments for inclusion in the record, and by advising that any person could request a public hearing by filing a request with the Clerk of the Department of Banking and Finance within twenty-one days of the date the notice was published. No request for a hearing was received from a member of the public. However, since the application at issue involves the acquisition of the First Bank of Miami by a foreign national, the Department requested a public hearing and forwarded the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings as required by Section 120.80(3)(a)4. On May 27, 1999, Mr. de Picciotto complied with the requirements of Section 120.80(3)(a)4. by causing a notice to be published in The Miami Herald advising that a public hearing on his application to acquire control of the First Bank of Miami would be held on June 10, 1999, at the Division of Administrative Hearings in Tallahassee, Florida, and via telephone from the offices of the First Bank of Miami. The Miami Herald is a newspaper of general circulation in Dade County, Florida, which is the community served by the First Bank of Miami. The hearing was held as scheduled, but no member of the public appeared at either the Division of Administrative Hearings in Tallahassee or via the telephone conference connection with the First Bank of Miami. Mr. de Picciotto appeared in person at the public hearing in Tallahassee, Florida, as required by Section 120.80(3)(a)4. Mr. de Picciotto has extensive experience in banking. After receiving a baccalaureat degree from the French Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales in 1964, Mr. de Picciotto worked from 1965 until 1973 for the Banque Indosuez, a leading European merchant bank. He has been involved in banking continuously since that time. From 1973 until 1978, Mr. de Picciotto managed the offices of the affiliates of the Trade Development Bank located in Switzerland, Paris, Luxembourg, and Belgium. From 1978 until 1981, Mr. de Picciotto was manager of the Financiere Indosuez, the Swiss unit of the Banque Indosuez, and was involved in portfolio management for individuals with a high net worth. In 1981, Mr. Picciotto purchased Progespar, an affiliate of the Banque Indosuez located in Switzerland, and he ultimately acquired thirty-three percent of the bank's stock. The bank was renamed Financiere Fransad in 1981, and it operated independently as a private bank until 1991, with its deposits growing during that time to 1.5 billion Swiss francs. Meanwhile, in 1986, Mr. de Picciotto obtained a license to open a bank in Lausanne, Switzerland, with initial equity of ten million Swiss francs. Mr. de Picciotto owned fifteen percent of the stock of this bank, which operated under the name of Cantrade Banque Lausanne and operated as a private bank involved in international finance. In 1987, Cantrade Banque Lausanne acquired a local Swiss bank named Banque Intercommerciale de Gestion, which had a representative located in Miami, Florida. In 1991, Financiere Fransad and Cantrade Banque Lausanne merged, and the resulting bank was named Cantrade Private Banque Lausanne. Mr. de Picciotto owned forty percent of the equity in this bank, and was vice chairman of the board. The bank managed deposits of 2.5 billion Swiss francs and employed 90 people. It continued to maintain a representative in Miami. In 1994, Mr. de Picciotto purchased one-hundred percent of the equity in Cantrade Private Banque Lausanne. In 1995, Banque Centonale de Geneve, which is a state bank organized under the Republic of Geneva, Switzerland, and owned by local governments in and around Geneva, purchased forty percent of the equity in Cantrade Private Banque Lausanne, which was renamed Compaginiv Bancarede Geneve. The bank currently employs 250 people and manages deposits of 10.5 billion Swiss francs, an increase from deposits of three billion Swiss francs in 1995. Mr. de Picciotto has been chairman of the bank since June 1995. During the approximately thirty years he has been in banking, Mr. de Picciotto has never been disciplined by any governmental authority in connection with any financial institution with which he has been affiliated or in connection with any financial transaction, and he has not been denied regulatory approval for the acquisition, merger, or creation of any financial institution. Except with respect to the application under consideration, Mr. de Picciotto is not aware of any pending or potential government investigation into his background, finances, or ownership of any financial institution, and he has never had a lawsuit filed against him. Mr. de Picciotto is well-regarded in the international banking community, and he enjoys a reputation of honesty and integrity in international banking circles. He has never been convicted of, or pled guilty or no contest to, any violation of Section 655.50, Florida Statutes; of Chapter 880, Florida Statutes; or of any similar federal or state law. Mr. de Picciotto has extensive experience in launching new banking operations and in developing and expanding small existing banks similar to the First Bank of Miami. He does not intend to implement any immediate significant changes in the management of the First Bank of Miami, and he intends to operate the bank in a manner that will benefit the interests of the general public, the depositors, the creditors, and the other shareholders of the bank. Mr. de Picciotto intends to use his personal funds to acquire the additional equity in the First Bank of Miami, and the purchase will cause no strain on his financial resources. Mr. de Picciotto's personal funds are sufficient to allow him to contribute to the bank any additional capital that may be required by state or federal regulatory agencies. The evidence presented is sufficient to establish that Mr. de Picciotto enjoys an impeccable reputation and possesses the experience and financial responsibility necessary to participate in controlling and managing the affairs of the First Bank of Miami in a legal and proper manner. The proof also is sufficient to establish that the interests of other shareholders, depositors, and creditors of the bank and of the public generally will not be jeopardized by the proposed acquisition by Mr. de Picciotto of thirty-five percent of the outstanding common stock of the First Bank of Miami. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of July, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Saturnino Lucio, Esquire Lucio, Mandler, Bronstein, Garbett Stiphany & Martinez, P.A. 701 Brickell Avenue, Suite 2000 Miami, Florida 33131 Robert Alan Fox Assistant General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Suite 526, The Fletcher Building 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Harry Hooper, General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Suite 526, The Fletcher Building 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Honorable Robert F. Milligan Comptroller, State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether respondent, Swiss Bank Corporation (Swiss Bank) violated job service regulations.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, John D. Topley, a native of Great Britain, is a citizen of the United States of America, and a resident of the State of New York. Respondent, Swiss Bank Corporation (Swiss Bank), is one of the three largest banks in Switzerland, and maintains its headquarters in Basel, Switzerland. Currently, Swiss Bank operates eight branches in the United States, including its most recent operation, the "Miami Agency", which commenced operations on December 1, 1987. Respondent, Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security (Department) is the State job service agency charged with the responsibility of administering, inter alia, job service regulations under the provisions of 20 CFR Parts 651-658. Background In or about September 1988, Swiss Bank filed an application with the Department for alien employment certification on behalf of Joseph Zeller (Zeller), a Swiss citizen, to enable it to employ Zeller as vice president and branch manager of its Miami Agency. According to the application, Zeller was the holder of an E-1 visa, which permits a maximum admission to the United States of one year, and had been employed by Swiss Bank as the vice president and branch manager of the Miami Agency since December 1987. According to the application, the full description of the job duties as vice president and branch manager of the Miami Agency were to be as follows: Responsible for overall supervision and management of Foreign Banking Agency with projected first year assets of approximately $100 million. Special emphasis on start-up marketing of services and longterm profitability of the Agency while overseeing the proper performance of the Agency's operations and employees. Specific duties include: Develop, evaluate and implement marketing strategies. Support account officers on marketing calls. Review and approve credit proposals and subsequent offers and agreements. Monitor efficient loan administration while foreseeing future needs of corporate clients. Review all loan proposals before forwarding to U.S. headquarters and overseas parent office Credit Committees. Consult with officers and clients in loan negotiations. Exercise full managerial authority concerning staffing performance appraisals, promotions, salary recommendations, and terminations. Prepare yearly budget utilizing input of all departments. Monitor, on exception basis, all operational and computer activity of the Agency. Make certain that accounting principles and audit procedures are in compliance with banking standards. In addition, must oversee the daily asset funding and foreign exchange activities and oversee deposit and private client activities. The minimum education, training and experience for the position was stated to be 5 years for the job offered or 5 years experience in a position as a "senior manager for a Major International Commercial Bank with management responsibilities for developing and maintaining relationships with banks and commercial clients abroad," a special requirement of "strong oral and written Spanish" was indicated, and the basic rate of pay was stated to be $139,000 per annum. When the application was filed with the Department, Swiss Bank had apparently made no effort to recruit United States workers since Part A, Section 21, of its application evidenced no such efforts, but simply stated that Swiss Bank "will advertise and post notice of job opening upon instructions from Department of Labor." Consistent with the requirements of 20 CFR Part 656.20(c), the application concluded with a certification of conditions of employment by Swiss Bank, under penalty of perjury, that: e. The job opportunity does not involve unlawful discrimination by race, creed, color, national origin, age, sex, religion, handicap, or citizenship; * * * h. The job opportunity has been and is clearly open to any qualified U.S. worker. Swiss Bank's Recruitment Efforts By memorandum of December 12, 1988, the Department instructed Swiss Bank to advertise the aforesaid job opportunity in a professional publication. Notwithstanding, Swiss Bank advertised the job opportunity in The Miami Herald, a newspaper of general circulation, on December 26, 27 and 28, 1989, and posted a notice of such job opportunity at its place of business for the two week period of December 26, 1988 through January 9, 1989. In response to the newspaper advertisement, the Department received seven resumes which it forwarded to Swiss Bank for consideration. No response was gendered by the notice posted at Swiss Bank. By letter of January 25, 1989, Swiss Bank advised the Department that none of the seven applicants met the requirements for the position, purported to delineate the reasons why each applicant failed to qualify, and requested that the Department continue the "expedicious processing" of Swiss Bank's application for alien employment certification on behalf of Mr. Zeller.1 In response, on or about January 30, 1989, the Department advised Swiss Bank that the advertisements it had run were contrary to the Department's memorandum of December 12, 1988, which had advised Swiss Bank to advertise the job opportunity in a professional publication, that such advertisements were unlikely to produce a satisfactory test of the United States work force, and that its application was not likely to be approved as submitted.2 The Department concluded by inquiring of Swiss Bank as to whether it wished to re- advertise or whether it wished the Department to forward the application "AS IS" to the certifying officer. By letter of March 8, 1989, Swiss Bank advised the Department that it had elected to re-advertise the job opportunity, and would do so by running an advertisement in one issue of The Wall Street Journal. The advertisement appeared in The Wall Street Journal on April 19, 1989, under that newspaper's "positions available" section, and provided as follows: VICE PRESIDENT & BRANCH MANAGER: Resp for overall superv & mgmt of Foreign Banking Agency w/projected 1st yr assets of approx $100 mil. Special emph on start-up marketing of services & long term profitability of the Agency while overseeing proper performance of agency's operations & employees. Spec duties incl: Dvlp, eval & implement marketing strategies. Support acct officers on marketing calls. Review & approve credit proposals & subseq offers & agreements. Monitor efficient loan admin while foreseeing future needs of corporate clients. Review all loan proposals before forwarding to U.S. headquarters & overseas parent office Credit Committees. Consult w/officers & clients in loan negotiations. Exerc full managerial authority concerning staff performance appraisals, promotions salary recommendations, & terminations. Prepare yearly budget utilizing input of all depts. Monitor, on exception basis, all operational & computer activity of Agency. Make certain acct principles & audit procedures are in compliance w/banking standards. Oversee daily asset funding & FX activities & oversee deposit & private client activities. Will supervise 10-20 workers. Sal $139,000/yr; M-F, 9-5. Reqmnts: 5 yrs exp performing the above described duties or 5 yrs exp as a Sr. Mgr for a major intern'l comm'l bank w/mgmt respons for developing & maintaining relationships w/banks & comm'l clients abroad. Must have strong oral & written Spanish. RESUME ONLY TO JOB SERVICE OF FLORIDA, 701 S.W. 27 AVENUE-ROOM 15, Miami, FL, 33135. Ref: Job Order #FL0020357. Such advertisement described the job opportunity and minimum job requirements in the same manner as Swiss Bank had described them in its application for alien employment, discussed supra, and was the last advertisement Swiss Bank was to run for the position. In response to The Wall Street Journal advertisement, the Department received 34 resumes which it referred to Swiss Bank for consideration. By letter of June 2, 1989, Swiss Bank advised the Department that, after review of the resumes, it had found 27 applicants unqualified and that it proposed to contact 7 applicants, including Mr. Topley, to personally discuss their banking experience and qualifications for the position. Notably, such letter contained the following introductory paragraph: Our minimum requirements for the position are five years' experience in the job offered or five years' experience as a manager with a major international commercial bank with management responsibilities for developing and maintaining relationships with banks and commercial clients abroad. The position also requires the services of an individual with strong abilities in oral and written Spanish. As our head office is located in Basel, Switzerland and our international correspondent, commercial, and private banking operations are structured so as to be attached to our General Management in Basel, we must also rely on the services of an individual in the position of Vice President & Manager of our Miami office who has European banking experience, providing international banking services to international private and corporate clients, and developing and marketing correspondent and commercial services with European banks and commercial clients. This is essential not only as it relates to the overall structure of the Bank, but is also in conjunction with the marketing plan implemented in 1989 under the newly constituted management and sales organization for the business sector "Correspondent Banking" and the new General Management Division, "Supervision International Organization." (Emphasis added). Pertinent to this case, this was the first occasion that Swiss Bank emphasized European capital market experience as a minimum requirement for the position, and neither The Wall Street Journal advertisement nor Swiss Bank's application for alien employment certification mentioned such requirement. Such "requirement" would, however, be subsequently featured as the primary reason for rejecting the 7 applicants ultimately interviewed. On June 15, 1989, Mr. Topley, at the request of Swiss Bank, appeared for an interview at its New York Branch, located at 4 World Trade Center, New York, New York. The person selected by Swiss Bank to interview Mr. Topley, and apparently the other 6 candidates, was a young personnel officer recently arrived from Switzerland, whose English was poor, and who could not speak intelligently because of an apparent lack of knowledge regarding banking activities in the United States or Latin America. Mr. Topley's "interview" took at most 20 minutes, and he was never interviewed by anyone else for the position including, as would be appropriate considering the nature of the position, a high level officer of the bank with knowledge of the area. Such "interview", for a senior executive position paying $139,000, requiring fluent Spanish, and high level job experience, by a personnel officer with no experience in the area and who could not reasonably evaluate the candidates' qualifications, was a patent sham. By letter of July 27, 1989, Swiss Bank advised Mr. Topley that he had not been selected to fill the position. In so doing, the bank stated: Although your background and qualifications are impressive, we regret that the position has been filled by an applicant who more fully meets our needs... Such letter was misleading in that none of the applicants had been selected to fill the position. Rather, by letter of August 10, 1989, Swiss Bank would advise the Department that it had found none of the applicants it interviewed met its immediate needs or minimum requirements, and requested that the Department "proceed towards certification of our application on behalf of Mr. Joseph Zeller." In its letter of August 10, 1989, to the Department regarding the results of its interviews with the 7 applicants, Swiss Bank further expanded the minimum job requirements for the position, first alluded to in its letter of June 2, 1989, and relied heavily on such "requirements" as a basis for rejecting the 7 applicants. As a predicate to its evaluation of the applicants, Swiss Bank stated: We are seeking to permanently fill the position of Vice President and Branch Manager of our Miami Agency. Our minimum requirements for the position are five years' experience as a manager with a major international commercial bank, with management responsibilities for developing and maintaining relationships with banks and commercial clients abroad, and strong abilities in oral and written Spanish. As we are a Swiss bank with headquarters in Basel, Switzerland, we must also rely on the services of an individual who has banking experience in the European market, providing international banking services, including capital transactions such as private placements to U.S. and foreign institutional investors, and private banking services, primarily to overseas high net worth individuals and institutions. The actual and targeted activities of our Miami Foreign Banking Agency are concentrated in two areas: private banking services for wealthy overseas individuals and institutions, and the development and marketing of financing and equity placements for U.S. and other North and South American companies in the European financial market. This includes raising capital through bonds, notes, commercial paper and other types of financing vehicles, as distinguished from corporate lending activities. It also includes the structuring of financing such as Eurobond transactions involving underwriting the issue and its placement among non U.S. investors. (Emphasis added). The representations emphasized in the aforesaid letter find no parallel in Swiss Bank's application for alien employment certification or the minimum requirements for the position set forth in The Wall Street Journal. To the contrary, they are repugnant to the representations Swiss Bank made to the Department by letter of December 1, 1988, to justify its special requirement that the position required a person with "strong oral and written Spanish" capabilities. Pertinent to this issue, such letter stated: The banking services provided by our Miami office are geared particularly to a Latin-American and U.S. Hispanic clientele comprised of private and institutional investors. These clients constitute a mix of high net-worth South American investors who regularly travel to the United States to conduct their finances and participate in U.S. investment opportunities, and a domestic Miami clientele, made-up primarily of high net-worth Cuban and other wealthy U.S. Hispanic investors. The complex nature of investments and monetary developments which must be explained to, and understood by, our clients requires a sophisticated command of both oral and written Spanish. Likewise, a comfortable business environment is absolutely essential to the ability to attract clients and maintain client relationships among high net-worth investors. This, in turn, requires our ability to convey trust and a thorough understanding of the intricacies of capital preservation, tax reduction and inflation protection through the mechanics of customized financial planning and problem-solving, including the use of a variety of complicated products such as fixed/call deposits; money market, numbered checking, and custody accounts; credit options; and various other investment services. * * * While our entire promotional campaign is replete with emphasis on our language capabilities (including Spanish-language literature prepared specifically for the Miami Agency that promotes our exceptional ability to provide services in English, Spanish, German and French), the Spanish language requirement for officers posted to Miami is more than a marketing tool for attracting new clientele. As indicated previously, the Miami Agency was opened to expand our private banking services in the United States to high net-worth international investors, and to function as the U.S. center of activity for our Latin America Private Banking II operations, including Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia, and Ecuador. (See New York Branch Organizational Chart that identifies Latin America Private Banking positions reporting to our Vice President & Branch Manager in Miami.) * * * The Vice President & Manager of the Miami Agency must utilize Spanish- language capabilities virtually the entire work-day. He is required to speak Spanish and lend support as the branch's highest authority when representing the Bank on all marketing calls; he must supervise relationships with all borrowing and non-borrowing private clients; he must develop and implement marketing strategy that appeals to a Spanish-speaking clientele; he must supervise a full staff of Spanish-speaking employees; he must consult with officers and clients individually and in tandem in loan negotiations; and he must oversee Latin American private client activities for the Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia, and Ecuador desks as well as private client activities for Miami. Finally, as its rationale for rejecting Mr. Topley as a candidate for the position, Swiss Bank stated in its letter of August 10, 1989, that: Mr. Topley presently works for the Park Avenue Bank, a small bank privately owned by Middle East capital. The bank typically provides personal financial services and manages U.S. expenses for non-resident clients. He left the First American Bank of New York because a new President restructured the bank to build-up the domestic area and cut-back international. Mr. Topley's international experience was primarily focused on the credit side. While he established First American's international division and private banking group, the division was soon cut-back and the international private banking group was negligible, consisting of just two people. Mr. Topley developed a private banking marketing plan, but was relieved of his private banking responsibilities before he was allowed to carry it out. Mr. Topley's experience with Bank of Montreal in merchant and correspondent banking and as a credit and marketing officer were all on the credit side. Furthermore, Mr. Topley's international experience has been limited to Latin America, with some background in Asia and the Middle East. He does not have any European capital market experience. The foregoing justification for the rejection of Mr. Topley's application is not an accurate representation of his experience, as reflected by his resume or otherwise. To the contrary, Mr. Topley has extensive experience as an international banker with major financial institutions, with an emphasis on start-up and management of branches and subsidiaries, over twenty-five years of such experience in Latin America, and speaks fluent Portuguese and Spanish. Contrary to the aforesaid letter, Mr. Topley's international banking experience was not primarily focused on the credit side, and his international experience was not limited to Latin America, assuming such was a legitimate factor, such that he had no European capital market experience. Rather, during his tenure with Libra Bank Limited, London, England, and with Bank of Montreal, New York and Toronto, Mr. Topley had a great deal of European capital market experience. In sum, the rationale advanced by Swiss Bank for the rejection of Mr. Topley is a fabrication, and Mr. Topley has demonstrated that he is qualified by education, training and experience for the position offered by Swiss Bank. Mr. Topley Complains By letter of August 16, 1989, to the Department, Mr. Topley registered a complaint regarding the hiring practices of Swiss Bank. In so doing, Mr. Topley stated: It is my belief and contention that this bank, in order to justify their placing of a Swiss national, namely Mr. J. Zeller, as Vice President and Manager of their de-novo branch in Miami, went through a bogus job search, initiated by an ad in the Wall Street Journal on April 18, 1989 . . . with no intention of hiring any of the numerous applicants, which included myself. The reason for doing this, in my opinion was to conform with the Labour Certification requirements of the State of Florida, which I believe states that 'a foreign national can only be employed in a stated senior position if a qualified American citizen cannot be found.' It should be mentioned here that Mr. Zeller, the Swiss national, was already in place as Vice President and Manager of the Miami Branch of the Swiss Bank Corporation when the ad was placed for that very position on April 18, 1989. Mr. Topley's "belief and contention" is aptly supported by the credible proof in this case. While Mr. Topley's complaint was pending, the Department had transmitted Swiss Bank's application for alien employment certification to the regional certifying officer, U.S. Department of Labor, Atlanta, Georgia. On May 17, 1990, that office advised Swiss Bank that it proposed to deny the request for certification based on Swiss Bank's failure to meet the requirements of 20 CFR Part 656 based on its conclusion, inter alia, that at least one United States worker who applied was qualified for the position. Swiss Bank filed a notice of rebuttal to the findings of the U.S. Department of Labor, but thereafter withdrew its request for certification on behalf of Mr. Zeller, which was confirmed by the Department of Labor on July 10, 1990. The announced rationale for Swiss Bank's withdrawal of such application was "because the person who is now in charge of our Miami Office possesses a green card and does not require an alien labor certificate." Such person, chosen by Swiss Bank to fill the position of Vice President and Manager of the Miami Agency, was Mr. Ruedi Burri, a Swiss citizen.
The Issue In Case No. 00-0262, the issue is whether Respondent Wells is guilty of various acts and omissions that would justify the imposition of an order removing him as a director of Respondent First Bank or imposing upon him an administrative fine of $10,000. In Case No. 00-0262, an additional issue is whether Respondent Alters waived his right to request a hearing; if not, an additional issue is whether Respondent Alters is guilty of various acts and omissions that would justify the imposition of an order removing him as a director of Respondent First Bank or imposing upon him an administrative fine of $5000. In Case No. 00-0434, the issue is whether Respondent First Bank must pay Petitioner the costs of the examination conducted by Petitioner from September 13 through October 15, 1999, and, if so, the amount of such costs for which Respondent First Bank is liable.
Findings Of Fact Background of First Bank and Wells The incorporators filed Articles of Incorporation for Respondent First Bank of Jacksonville (First Bank) on August 8, 1988. Requiring at least five directors, the articles identify the following persons as the initial directors: Irby S. Exley, Sr., Edward L. Green, Nicholas W. Kish, William C. Mick, Jr., and Respondent Clyde N. Wells, Jr. (Wells). Wells, as “President/Cashier” of First Bank, filed amended articles of incorporation on July 25, 1990, naming the same initial directors. Elaborating upon the method of electing directors, the amended articles provide that the shareholders shall elect directors, except when the board of directors elects a director to fill a vacancy. Article V, Paragraph 4, of the amended articles authorize the election of a director by the vote of a “majority of the remaining or sitting directors, although less than a quorum of the Board is sitting at such vote.” Wells was a scholarship student at the University of Georgia, from which he graduated in 1958. He attended law school at the University of Georgia and earned his law degree in 1962. After a year or two practicing with a large corporate law firm in Philadelphia, Wells moved to Jacksonville, where he joined a local law firm and began to specialize in corporate, tax, and real estate law. He later obtained Florida Bar certification in tax law. Wells first became professionally involved with banks when he represented several banks owned by Florida National Bank. Leaving the regulatory work to larger firms, Wells and his firm provided legal services in loans, transactions, and litigation. In the late 1960s, Wells became a director of, and general counsel to, Marine National Bank. Although he continued to provide services for Florida National Bank, Wells served Marine National Bank until its sale in 1982. Wells’ involvement with Marine National Bank introduced him to the operational side of banking, such as receiving and disbursing funds, and the regulatory environment in which banks function. At this time, Wells acquired some knowledge about banking hardware and software. Wells’ involvement with Marine National Bank also introduced him to the regulatory side of retail banking. For instance, the Office of the Controller of the Currency criticized the extent to which buildings and land represented the bank’s capital. Wells communicated with the federal regulatory agency about a possible sale of a building, but the situation eventually resolved itself by the growth of the bank’s other assets. While associated with Marine National Bank, Wells was closely involved with the establishment of other banks owned by the holding company that owned Marine National Bank. Following the sale of Marine National Bank in 1982, Wells served as special counsel to First Commercial Bank of Live Oak. He also served as special counsel to General Financial Systems, a 29-bank holding company that controlled the banks with the largest deposits in Palm Beach County. After General Financial Systems sold its banks, Wells returned to a general law practice in Jacksonville. In 1985, after Wells had been out of banking for at least three years, Wells and some Jacksonville residents discussed the possibility of forming a new bank, which became First Bank. From 1986-89, Wells was involved in organizing First Bank. He and the others hired Scott Bain as a consultant and president. Mr. Bain, who had been a vice president of Barnett Banks for several years, served the group for a couple of years. However, at about the time of the opening of First Bank, Mr. Bain suffered a personal tragedy in the death of a young child, and he and his wife moved to North Carolina. Wells tried to persuade Mr. Bain to return to Jacksonville and manage First Bank when it opened. Wells had not intended to serve as the president of First Bank, although he had likely intended to provide legal services to the bank. Of the 310,000 outstanding shares in First Bank, Wells personally owns 75,000 shares and Welco Investment Trust, of which Wells owns beneficially, 90,000 shares. The value of Wells’ overall investment in First Bank was originally valued at $1.7 to $2.0 million. Background of Federal and State Regulation of First Bank Annual Examinations and Reports of Examination First Bank began operations on August 28, 1989, as a federally insured State bank that is not a member of the Federal Reserve System. As such, First Bank is under the concurrent jurisdiction of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Petitioner. In practice, the federal and state banking agencies alternate responsibility for conducting annual bank examinations, which must take place at intervals no greater than 36 months. Following annual examinations, Petitioner has prepared reports of examinations (ROE) dated July 5, 1995; September 2, 1997; and September 13, 1999. The FDIC has prepared ROEs dated May 22, 1996; December 7, 1998; and March 20, 2000. Petitioner commenced the proceeding to remove the directors approximately three months after the ROE dated September 13, 1999. The 1999 ROE followed the 1998 ROE by only nine months, and the 2000 ROE followed the 1999 ROE by only six months. Counsel devoted a significant amount of hearing time to issues involving the admissibility of these six ROEs. The Administrative Law Judge declined to admit any of the ROEs as hearsay exceptions in the form of official records or business records. After considerable discussion, the Administrative Law Judge admitted the ROE dated September 13, 1999, for all purposes (subject to a relatively minor exception set forth above) and admitted the 1998 and 2000 ROEs, but not for the truth of their contents. A particularly difficult evidentiary issue arose as to the admissibility of the 2000 ROE. Although the FDIC was prepared to allow Petitioner to call as a witness the FDIC examiner who had prepared this ROE, the FDIC was unwilling, until several days after the hearing had started, to allow opposing counsel to examine the work papers supporting this ROE. As authorized by federal law, the FDIC had withheld these work papers when the FDIC examiner had been deposed. After the FDIC belatedly agreed to produce these work papers, opposing counsel argued that the tardiness of the production had prejudiced their clients. Most persuasively, counsel argued that this tardy production of work papers would impose upon their clients considerable additional costs that would have been saved if the FDIC had produced the work papers by the time of the deposition of the federal examiner. Finding merit to this claim, the Administrative Law Judge excluded the 2000 ROE for the truth of its contents. Federal and State Enforcement Decisions Using the findings of the various ROEs, Petitioner and the FDIC have issued three orders concerning First Bank. These are the FDIC’s May 26, 1998, Decision and Order to Cease and Desist, which is based on a Recommended Decision dated January 22, 1998 (collectively, Cease and Desist Order); Petitioner’s October 13, 1998, consent Final Order approving a September 29, 1998, Settlement Stipulation (collectively, Consent Order); and the FDIC’s September 8, 1999, Safety and Soundness Order (Safety and Soundness Order). FDIC’s 1998 Cease and Desist Order Based on Petitioner’s ROE dated July 5, 1995, and the FDIC’s ROE dated May 22, 1996, the Cease and Desist Order notes that Petitioner had assigned First Bank a composite CAMEL rating of 2, with a 5 for the management component, and that the FDIC also had assigned a 5 for the management component. The evaluation scheme, now known as CAMELS ratings, assigns a rating ranging from the best of 1 to the worst of 6 for composite performance and for each of six criteria crucial to a bank’s operation: capital, assets, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity. “Capital” is the adequacy of the capital. As defined in the FDIC Division of Supervision Manual of Examination Policies (FDIC Examination Manual), “capital” is a measure of the maintenance of “capital commensurate with the nature and extent of risks to the institution and the ability of management to identify, measure, monitor, and control these risks.” For capital, a rating of 1 means “a strong capital level relative to the institution’s risk profile”; a rating of 2 means “a satisfactory capital level relative to the financial institution’s risk profile”; a rating of 3 means “a less than satisfactory level of capital that does not fully support the institution’s risk profile,” even “if the institution’s capital level exceeds minimum regulatory and statutory requirements”; a rating of 4 means “a deficient level of capital” in which “viability of the institution may be threatened”; and a rating of 5 means “a critically deficient level of capital such that the institution’s viability is threatened.” “Assets” is the quality of assets, including the loan and investment portfolios, real estate, and other assets. As defined in the FDIC Examination Manual, a rating of 1 means “strong asset quality and credit administration practices”; a rating of 2 means “satisfactory asset quality and credit administration practices”; a rating of 3 means “asset quality or credit administration practices are less than satisfactory”; a rating of 4 means “deficient asset quality or credit administration practices”; and a rating of 5 means “critically deficient asset quality or credit management practices.” “Management” is, according to the FDIC Examination Manual, the “capability of the board of directors and management, in their respective roles, to identify, measure, monitor, and control the risks of an institution’s activities and to ensure a financial institution’s safe, sound, and efficient operation in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.” As defined in the FDIC Examination Manual, the following ratings apply to management: A rating of 1 indicates strong performance by management and the board of directors and strong risk management practices relative to the institution’s size, complexity, and risk profile. All significant risks are consistently and effectively identified, measured, monitored, and controlled. Management and the board have demonstrated the ability to promptly and successfully address existing and potential problems and risks. A rating of 2 indicates satisfactory management and board performance and risk management practices relative to the institution’s size, complexity, and risk profile. Minor weaknesses may exist, but are not material to the safety and soundness of the institution and are being addressed. In general, significant risks and problems are effectively identified, measured, monitored, and controlled. A rating of 3 indicates management and board performance that need improvement or risk management practices that are less than satisfactory given the nature of the institution’s activities. The capabilities of management or the board of directors may be insufficient for the type, size, or condition of the institution. Problems and significant risks may be inadequately identified, measured, monitored, or controlled. A rating of 4 indicates deficient management and board performance or risk management practices that are inadequate considering the nature of the institution’s activities. The level of problems and risk exposure is [sic] excessive. Problems and significant risks are inadequately identified, measured, monitored, or controlled and require immediate action by the board and management to preserve the soundness of the institution. Replacing or strengthening management or the board may be necessary. A rating of 5 indicates critically deficient management and board performance or risk management practices. Management and the board of directors have not demonstrated the ability to correct problems and implement appropriate risk management practices. Problems and significant risks are inadequately identified, measured, monitored, or controlled and now threaten the continued viability of the institution. Replacing or strengthening management or the board of directors is necessary. Section 4.1.V of the FDIC Examination Manual links a bank’s performance under the other CAMELS components to its management component: “Consequently, examiners’ findings and conclusions in regard to the other four elements of the CAMELS rating system are often major determinants of the management rating.” “Earnings” means “not only the quantity and trend of earnings, but also factors that may affect the sustainability or quality of earnings,” such as likely loan losses or undue exposure to interest-rate volatility. As defined in the FDIC Examination Manual, a rating of 1 indicates “earnings that are strong”; a rating of 2 indicates “earnings that are satisfactory”; a rating of 3 indicates “earnings that need to be improved”; a rating of 4 indicates “earnings that are deficient” because they are “insufficient to support operations and maintain appropriate capital and allowance levels” and may leave the institution with “erratic fluctuations in net income or net interest margin, the development of significant negative trends, nominal or unsustainable earnings, intermittent losses, or a substantive drop in earnings from the previous years”; and a rating of 5 indicates “earnings that are critically deficient.” “Liquidity” is the ability of the financial institution to meet its anticipated funding needs with cash, assets readily convertible to cash, deposits, and loans. As defined in the FDIC Examination Manual, a rating of 1 means “strong liquidity levels and well-developed funds management practices”; a rating of 2 means “satisfactory liquidity levels and funds management practices” so that the institution “has access to sufficient sources of funds on acceptable terms to meet present and anticipated liquidity needs,” even though “[m]odest weaknesses may be evident in funds management practices:; a rating of 3 means “liquidity levels of funds management practices in need of improvement” because the institution “may lack ready access to funds on reasonable terms or may evidence significant weaknesses in funds management practices”; a rating of 4 means “deficient liquidity levels or inadequate funds management practices”; and a rating of 5 means “liquidity levels or funds management practices so critically deficient that the continued viability of the institution is threatened.” “Sensitivity” is sensitivity to market risk, which reflects the “degree to which changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, commodity prices, or equity prices can adversely affect a financial institution’s earnings or economic capital.” As defined in the FDIC Examination Manual, a rating of 1 means that “market risk sensitivity is well controlled and that there is minimal potential that the earnings performance or capital positions will be adversely affected”; a rating of 2 means that “market risk sensitivity is adequately controlled and that there is only moderate potential that the earnings performance or capital position will be adversely affected”; a rating of 3 means that “control of market risk sensitivity needs improvement or that there is significant potential that the earnings performance or capital position will be adversely affected”; a rating of 4 means that “control of market risk sensitivity is unacceptable or that there is high potential that the earnings performance or capital position will be adversely affected”; and a rating of 5 means that “control of market risk sensitivity is unacceptable or that the level or market risk taken by the institution is an imminent threat to its viability.” According to the FDIC examination manual, the composite rating is based on a “careful evaluation of an institution’s managerial, operational, financial, and compliance performance.” A composite rating of 1 means that the financial institution is “sound in every respect and generally [has] components rated 1 or 2.” A composite rating of 2 means that the financial institution is “fundamentally sound” and generally has “no component rating more severe than 3.” A composite rating of 3 means that the financial institution exhibits: some degree of supervisory concern in one or more of the component areas. These financial institutions exhibit a combination of weaknesses that may range from moderate to severe; however, the magnitude of the deficiencies generally will not cause a component to be rated more severely than a 4. Management may lack the ability or willingness to effectively address weaknesses within appropriate time frames. Financial institutions in this group generally are less capable of withstanding business fluctuations and are more vulnerable to outside influences . . .. Additionally, these financial institutions may be in significant noncompliance with laws and regulations. Risk management practices may be less than satisfactory relative to the institution’s size, complexity, and risk profile. These financial institutions require more than normal supervision, which may include formal or informal enforcement actions. Failure appears unlikely, however, given the overall strength and financial capacity of these institutions. A composite rating of 4 means that the financial institution exhibits: unsafe and unsound practices or conditions. There are serious financial or managerial deficiencies that result in unsatisfactory performance. The problems range from severe to critically deficient. The weaknesses and problems are not being satisfactorily addressed or resolved by the board of directors and management. Financial institutions in this group are generally not capable of withstanding business fluctuations. There may be significant noncompliance with laws and regulations. Risk management practices are generally unacceptable relative to the institution’s size, complexity, and risk profile. Close supervisory attention is required, which means, in most cases, formal enforcement action is necessary to address the problems. Institutions in this group pose a risk to the deposit insurance fund. Failure is a distinct possibility if the problems and weaknesses are not satisfactorily addressed and resolved. A composite rating of 5 means that the financial institution exhibits: extremely unsafe and unsound practices or conditions; exhibit[s] a critically deficient performance; often contain[s] inadequate risk management practices relative to the institution’s size, complexity, and risk profile; and [is] of the greatest supervisory concern. . . . The Cease and Desist Order states that Petitioner’s ROE dated July 5, 1995, found the management of First Bank unsatisfactory because: [First Bank’s] staffing was found to be inadequate, in part because of excessive employee turnover. [First Bank’s] board of directors was failing to provide [First Bank] sound management, adequate guidance in the form of appropriate written policies, or adequate supervision of management. Wells dominates [First Bank’s] board of directors, and the board of directors did not adequately supervise management’s operation of [First Bank]. [First Bank’s] board of directors had not responded to regulatory recommendations with respect to deficiencies in [First Bank’s] operating policies. [First Bank] did not have a Strategic Plan. [First Bank] employed an annual budget that had no written assumptions to support its projections and unrealistically continued to project net losses. Wells could not attest to the accuracy of the general ledger, [First Bank] lacked an effective internal audit program, and [First Bank] needed to hire a full-time president, a cashier, and a loan officer. [First Bank’s] board of directors inappropriately delegated its authority by permitting Wells to set his own salary and bonus and by permitting Wells to authorize and approve payments of legal bills by [First Bank] to Wells’ law firm without review by [First Bank’s] board of directors. [Petitioner] cited these practices as an apparent conflict of interest.] [First Bank’s] Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income as of December 31, 1994 and March 31, 1995 contained errors and needed to be amended and re-filed. During the period covered by the Report, [First Bank] had violated six laws and regulations, including violations of the Financial Record Keeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions regulation, 31 C.F.R. Part 103. [First Bank] did not adequately segregate the duties of its employees. The door to the Bank’s computer room was frequently left open, providing unrestricted access to the computer facility. The Cease and Desist Order states that the FDIC’s ROE dated May 22, 1996, found that Wells, who was the controlling shareholder of First Bank, had been the only officer of First Bank since its formation and had served as the bank’s president, chief executive officer, chairman of the board of directors, and general counsel--all despite the fact that, prior to September 1989, Wells’ banking experience had been limited to that of bank counsel and director. The Cease and Desist Order states that the ROE dated May 22, 1996, found that First Bank had failed to respond as required to Petitioner’s July 5, 1995, ROE because: [First Bank’s] board had not adopted the following policies in conformity with the Board resolution [adopted after Petitioner’s examination]: Loan Policy, Appraisal Policy, Regulation O Policy, Amendment and Restatement of Asset/Liability Management Policy, and Strategic Plan. [First Bank’s] general ledger had not been reconciled and appropriate internal routine and controls had not been implemented. The Board had neither adopted the First Amended Internal Controls and Audit Program, nor implemented it as required. [First Bank] still employed a budget that had not been revised since 1994, which incorporated outdated assumptions. [First Bank] had engaged in twenty-five violations of fifteen statutes and regulations. [First Bank] had failed to submit any reports with respect to its continuing violation of section 655.60(2) of the Florida Statutes. Concerning internal routine and controls, the Cease and Desist Order states that the ROE dated May 22, 1996, found that First Bank had failed to respond as required to Petitioner’s ROE dated July 5, 1995, because: [First Bank] had not reconciled its general ledger suspense account since February, 1995. During the period covered by the FDIC’s May 22, 1996 examination, [First Bank] did not routinely reconcile its subsidiary ledgers. [First Bank] failed to segregate the duties of its employees. From October, 1995 until March 31, 1996, [First Bank’s] general ledger suspense account had an unreconciled gross credit balance that ranged from $96,000 to $186,000. As of March 31, 1996, which was the date as of which the FDIC examined its financial records during the May 22, 1996 examination, [First Bank’s] general ledger suspense account had an unreconciled gross credit balance of $137,000. From February, 1995 through May 22, 1996, [First Bank] did not reconcile the demand deposit suspense account. As of March 29, 1996, [First Bank’s] demand deposit accounts as reflected in the general ledger exceeded the demand deposit accounts as reflected in subsidiary ledgers by $8,949. As of March 29, 1996, [First Bank’s] time deposit accounts as reflected in the general ledger exceeded the time deposit accounts as reflected in subsidiary ledgers by $740,367. As of June 12, 1996, [First Bank’s] time deposit accounts as reflected in the general ledger were short by $74,474 of the time deposit accounts as reflected in subsidiary ledgers. As of May 27, 1996, [First Bank’s] total loan accounts as reflected in the general ledger were short by $12,000 of the total loan accounts as reflected in the subsidiary ledgers, and examiners were unable to reconcile these accounts during the FDIC’s May 22, 1996 examination. From January 1996 to April, 1996, [First Bank] did not reconcile its correspondent account with Independent Banker’s Bank of Florida. As a result of [First Bank’s] failure to reconcile its correspondent account with the Independent Banker’s Bank of Florida from January, 1996 to April, 1996, [First Bank] filed a Report of Condition and Income (“Call Report”) as of March 31, 1996, that incorrectly stated [First Bank’s] federal funds sold position by $51,000. As of the FDIC’s May 22, 1996 examination, three of [First Bank’s] prepaid expense accounts had not been accurately reconciled since March, 1996, and an accurate reconciliation of these accounts during the examination led to a correction in [First Bank’s] March 31, 1996 Call Report and to two items being classified as Loss. [First Bank’s] vault cash account was not reconciled between March, 1995 and April, 1q996, and during the FDIC’s examination, [First Bank’s] vault cash was found to be short by $831. [First Bank’s] teller cash accounts were not reconciled from September, 1995 until the FDIC’s May 22, 1996 examination, when one teller cash account was found to be short by $97 and another teller cash account was found to be short by $498. [First Bank] failed to make appropriate entries reflecting depreciation in four depreciation accounts from January, 1996 until the FDIC’s May 22, 1996 examination and in two other depreciation accounts from February, 1996 until the FDIC’s May 22, 1996 examination. As a result of the failure to keep the depreciation accounts current, [First Bank’s] March 31, 1996 Call Report failed to reflect $5,000 in depreciation for February and March, 1996, and the May 22, 1996 classified [sic] as Loss $6,000 in unrecognized depreciation for April and May, 1996. During the period covered by the FDIC’s May 22, 1996 [ROE, First Bank’s] wire transfer logs were incomplete, no review of daily wire transfer transaction logs was performed, and neither internal nor external audit procedures extended to review of [First Bank’s] wire transfers. Legal expenses of $4,284 for services performed by Wells’ law firm on behalf of [First Bank] between September and December, 1995, did not reflect the dates the expenses were incurred. [First Bank] operated without a security officer from March, 1996, until the FDIC’s May 22, 1996 examination. Concerning administration, supervision, and control, the Cease and Desist Order states that the ROE dated May 22, 1996, found the following conditions: Forty seven percent of the loan files reviewed by FDIC examiners, as measured by dollar volume, reflected documentation exceptions regarding credit data or collateral documentation. [First Bank] had not incorporated the requirements of Rule 3C-100.600 into its Appraisal Policy despite the fact that this discrepancy was pointed out to [First Bank] in [Petitioner’s] July 5, 1995 [ROE] and in subsequent correspondence between the Bank and [Petitioner]. Several of [First Bank’s] commercial loan files did not contain current financial statements from the borrowers. Some of [First Bank’s] loan files contained no evidence that financial statements that had been obtained from borrowers had ever been analyzed by [First Bank’s] personnel. Although [First Bank’s] Loan Policy includes a loan grading system, [First Bank’s] management had not implemented a loan grading program and did not maintain a watch list of loans that merit special attention. [First Bank] had not corrected deficiencies in its Investment Policy that had been identified by [Petitioner] in its July 5, 1995 [ROE]. These deficiencies included a failure to address potential investments in mortgage derivatives and structured note securities. [First Bank] had neither implemented a consistent system of accounting procedures nor employed a full-time accounting person or a qualified cashier or a qualified loan officer in response to the recommendations received from its external auditor and from [Petitioner] during 1995. In the absence of a qualified cashier and in the absence of a qualified loan officer, [First Bank] required lower level employees to perform functions for which they were not qualified. As for electronic data processing systems, the Cease and Desist Order notes that the FDIC, which, on June 11, 1996, had conducted an examination of First Bank’s information systems, had assigned them an unsatisfactory rating of a 4, signifying “unacceptable conditions and a high potential for operational or financial failure.” Noting that the FDIC examiner had recommended that the FDIC pursue action against First Bank to correct the deficiencies in its information systems, the Cease and Desist Order states that the FDIC’s ROE dated June 11, 1996, found the following deficiencies: [First Bank] operated its data center without internal audit coverage of the data center’s operations. [First Bank] had not tested a backup site for its data processing operations for three years. [First Bank] failed to maintain backup data files in a fireproof area. [First Bank] operated its data center without a disaster recovery program. [First Bank’s] electronic information system was not compatible with the system in use at the backup site, because [First Bank’s] operating system and applications software had not been updated with the vendor’s new software releases for the previous two years. [First Bank’s] software was not updated because [First Bank’s] hardware system was outdated and lacked the capacity to operate the updated software. [First Bank] was operating its data center in contravention of its EDP Policy with respect to the following: failure to store daily backup tapes in a fireproof location; failure to review on line log reports daily; failure to perform reconciliations on records regarding demand deposit accounts, savings accounts, certificates of deposit, or loan accounts; and failure to perform periodic internal audits of [First Bank’s] data processing functions. [First Bank’s] disaster recovery program was such that [First Bank’s] ability to continue operations without interruption after a disaster was questionable. [First Bank] operated its data center without appropriate internal controls with respect to the following: failure to reflect access to the data center by non- data center personnel; failure to review the daily on-line activity report; [and] failure to reconcile the daily totals generated by [First Bank’s] application programs to the general ledger. [First Bank] operated without a policy regarding the use of microcomputers, although [First Bank] was using microcomputers in its operations. Concerning annual financial disclosures, the Cease and Desist Order states that the ROE dated May 22, 1996, found the following failures: As of the FDIC’s May 22, 1996 examination, [First Bank] had failed to prepare an annual financial disclosure statement by March 31 of any year since [First Bank] opened for business in 1989. By letter dated April 24, 1996, in response to a request for [First Bank’s] annual financial disclosure, [First Bank] transmitted to William L. Durden, an attorney for minority shareholders of [First Bank], a financial disclosure that consisted only of a balance sheet and a net income figure and did not include the legend required by section 350.4(d) In April of each year from 1990 through 1996 inclusive, [First Bank] transmitted to its shareholders a notice of the annual shareholder’s [sic] meeting but failed to include in each such notice an announcement regarding the availability of annual financial disclosures. By letter[s] dated July 17, 1995, August 1, 1995, September 25, 1995, and October 10, 1995, Donald A. Robinson, an attorney for the estate of a deceased shareholder of [First Bank] requested [First Bank’s] annual financial disclosure statement for the year 1994. [First Bank] had not, as of the FDIC's May 22, 1996 examination, provided the annual financial disclosure statement required by Robinson. By letter dated May 8, 1996, William L. Durden, an attorney representing minority shareholders of [First Bank], requested [First Bank’s] annual financial statement. On May 24, 1996, [First Bank] transmitted to Durden financial information that included a balance sheet but did not include the remainder of the information required by section 350.4(a). The Cease and Desist Order discusses the failure of Wells, who was representing First Bank in the FDIC proceeding, to participate effectively. In early 1997, Wells failed to comply timely with an order compelling discovery, and he belatedly produced documents that were not fully responsive to the discovery requests, although he later supplemented his response. During oral argument on May 1, 1997, in response to a motion for sanctions, Wells claimed that arm and back conditions had prevented him from moving boxes of documents and fulfilling his discovery obligations. Unpersuaded by Wells’ “incredible” claims, the federal Administrative Law Judge determined, at the hearing and by written order dated May 12, 1997, that Wells had tried to delay the hearing. For sanctions, the federal Administrative Law Judge excluded all evidence related to documents not timely produced, except for certain documents prepared by the FDIC and documents generated by First Bank and delivered to the FDIC before the commencement of the proceeding. Following the administrative hearing, which took place from June 2-9, 1997, the Administrative Law Judge assessed total costs for discovery abuses of $3245.44. The Cease and Desist Order determines that the FDIC proved by a preponderance of the evidence that First Bank had engaged in unsafe or unsound banking practices, as defined by 12 U.S.C. section 1818(b), “by operating with a board of directors that had failed to require Bank management to implement necessary practices and procedures that reflect operational guidelines established by the board of directors.” The Cease and Desist Order determines that the FDIC proved by a preponderance of the evidence that First Bank had violated 12 C.F.R. 364.101, Standards for Safety and Soundness, by failing to maintain adequate internal controls and information systems; 12 C.F.R. 326.8 by failing to develop and maintain administration of a program reasonably designed to monitor compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act; 12 C.F.R. 350.3(a) by failing to prepare and make available on request an annual disclosure statement; 12 C.F.R. 350.3(b) by failing to timely provide its annual financial disclosures statement to persons requesting this document; 12 C.F.R. 350.4(a)(1) by failing to include in its annual financial disclosures information that is comparable to the information contained in specified Call Report schedules; and 12 C.F.R. 350.8 by failing to promptly provide an annual financial disclosure statement to persons requesting this document. The Cease and Desist Order determines that the FDIC proved by a preponderance of the evidence that First Bank had violated Section 658.48(1), Florida Statutes, by extending credit to any one borrower exceeding 25 percent of the bank’s capital accounts when the loan was fully secured; Section 655.044(2), Florida Statutes, by carrying as an asset in any published report or any report submitted to Petitioner a note or obligations that is past due or upon which no interest has been received for at least one year; Section 658.48(5)(d), Florida Statutes, by failing to document as a first lien real estate mortgages securing loans; and Section 655.60(2), Florida Statutes, by making loans based on the security of the real estate without adequate written appraisal standards and without policies previously established by the board of directors. Based on these violations, the Cease and Desist Order concludes that First Bank “repeatedly engaged in imprudent acts that resulted in an abnormal risk of loss or damage to the Bank” and “defiantly refused to implement needed remedial actions.” The Cease and Desist Order thus suggests an “enforceable functioning program that will facilitate operation of the Bank in a safe and sound manner.” In conclusion, the Cease and Desist Order warns that the “fact that the institution may not be operating at a loss in the current economic climate is no guarantee that unsafe and unsound practices will not eventually bear a bitter fruit.” The Cease and Desist Order discusses at length one substantive exception of First Bank and two substantive exceptions of the FDIC to the Recommended Decision, from which the preceding citations have been drawn. As for First Bank’s exception, the Cease and Desist Order recognizes that “smaller institutions cannot be expected to maintain the same level of segregation of responsibilities as their larger counterparts,” but the order rejects the exception. As for the FDIC’s exceptions, the Cease and Desist Order concludes that First Bank also violated 12 U.S.C. Section 1817(a)(1) by submitting erroneous, uncorrected Call Reports dated December 31, 1994; June 30, 1995; September 30, 1995; December 31, 1995; and March 31, 1996; and 12 C.F.R. 309.6(a) by disclosing its (favorable) supervisory subgroup assignment without FDIC authorization. The Cease and Desist Order orders First Bank to cease and desist from the following unsafe or unsound banking practices or legal violations: Failing to provide adequate supervision and direction over the affairs of the Bank by the board of directors of the Bank to prevent unsafe or unsound practices and violations of laws and regulations; Operating the Bank with management whose policies and practices are detrimental to the Bank and jeopardize the safety of its deposits. Failure by the Bank’s board of directors to require Bank management to implement practices and procedures that reflect operational guidelines established by the Bank’s board of directors; Failing to provide the Bank with operational personnel who have experience that is adequate to ensure safe and sound operation of the Bank and to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations; Failing to provide adequate training to operational personnel; Operating the Bank with policies and practices that result in excessive employee turnover; Failing to implement generally accepted internal accounting procedures and effective internal audit controls; Failing to adopt and implement fully an appropriate loan policy, an . . . appropriate appraisal policy, and an appropriate asset/liability management policy; Failing to maintain financial records sufficiently accurate to enable the Bank to comply with applicable reporting requirements established by federal laws and regulations; Failing to prepare accurate annual financial statements; Failing to make accurate annual financial disclosure statements available to shareholders in a timely manner; Omitting pertinent or required financial information from the Bank’s annual disclosure statements; Failing to maintain adequate documentation in loan files; Failing to correct operational problems identified by the Bank’s external auditors; Operating the Bank with inadequate information systems and management reporting systems, as described in the FDIC’s EDP [ROE dated] June 11, 1996; and Engaging in violations of applicable federal and state laws and regulations, as more fully described [in the FDIC’s ROE dated] May 22, 1996. The Cease and Desist Order directs First Bank and its institution-affiliated parties to take the following affirmative action: Not later than thirty (30) days from the effective date of the ORDER, the Bank’s board of directors shall develop, or shall retain an independent banking consultant with experience in the evaluation of bank management to develop, a written analysis of the Bank’s management and staffing needs (“Management and Staffing Plan”), which shall include, at a minimum: identification of both the type and number of officer and operational staff positions that are needed to manage and supervise the affairs of the Bank in a safe and sound manner; evaluation of each current Bank officer and staff member to determine whether these individuals possess the ability, knowledge, experience,training, and other qualifications that are required to perform present and anticipated duties, including adherence to the requirements of this ORDER, adherence to the Bank’s policies, and operation of the Bank in a safe and sound manner; a review of the rate of turnover of Bank employees during the past five years and a plan to recruit, hire, and retain any additional or replacement personnel with the requisite ability, knowledge, experience, and other qualifications to fill Bank officer or staff positions consistent with the analysis and assessment heretofore described in Paragraph 1(a)(i) and (ii) of this ORDER; and a review of the training deficiencies that were identified in the FDIC’s [ROE dated] May 22, 1996. Not later than thirty (30) days from the effective date of this ORDER, the written Management and Staffing Plan shall be submitted to the Regional Director and to the Comptroller for review and comment. Not later than sixty (60) days from the date of such submission, the Bank’s board of directors shall approve the Management and Staffing Plan, taking into consideration any comments received from the Regional Director and/or the Comptroller within that period, and such approval shall be recorded in the minutes of the Bank’s board of directors. Thereafter, the Bank shall implement the Management and Staffing Plan. Subsequent modifications of the Management and Staffing Plan may be made only if, at least [30] days prior to the effective date of any proposed modification, the Bank submits such proposed modification to the Regional Director and to the Comptroller for review and if the Bank’s board of directors shall have approved such modification after considering any responsive comments submitted by the Regional Director and/or the Comptroller. Not later than ninety (90) days from the effective date of this ORDER, the Bank shall have and retain qualified management consistent with the Management and Staffing Plan that is required by Paragraph 1 of this ORDER. At a minimum, such management shall include officers with proven ability in managing a bank of comparable size. Such officers shall have proven ability in managing a loan portfolio of at least comparable size and shall have an appropriate level of lending, collection, and loan supervision experience necessary to supervise any anticipated growth in the Bank’s loan portfolio, and shall have proven ability in managing the assets and operations of a financial institution of at least comparable size and with banking operations experience sufficient to supervise the upgrading of the Bank’s operational deficiencies. Such officers shall be provided the necessary written authority to implement the provisions of this ORDER. The qualifications of management shall be assessed on its ability to: comply with the requirements of this Order; operate the Bank in a safe and sound manner; comply with applicable laws and regulations; and restore all aspects of the Bank to a safe and sound condition. As long as this ORDER remains in effect, the Bank shall notify the Regional Director and the Comptroller in writing of any changes in management. Such notification shall be in addition to any application and prior approval requirements established by section 32 of the FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. §1831i, and implementing regulations; must include the names and qualifications of any replacement personnel; and must be provided at least [30] days prior to any individual’s assuming a management position. Not later than sixty (60) days from the effective date of this ORDER, the Bank shall adopt and implement an internal audit program. Thereafter, the Bank shall operate with an effective, ongoing system of internal audits. Not later than thirty (30) days from the effective date of this ORDER, the Bank’s board of directors shall adopt, and the Bank shall implement, a plan to correct the Bank’s internal routine and control deficiencies, including specific provisions to assure that: suspense accounts are reconciled in a timely fashion; subsidiary accounts are reconciled to the general ledger in a timely fashion; accounting errors, once discovered, are resolved in a timely fashion; general ledger entries are initiated consistently, correctly, and in a timely fashion; and the duties of Bank employees are segregated in a manner that minimizes the potential for misapplication of funds, defalcation, or sabotage. Effective immediately, and until such time as the Bank’s accounts are successfully reconciled, the Bank shall retain the full-time services of a qualified, independent accountant, who shall be responsible for reconciling the Bank’s accounts as expeditiously as possible, but in no event later than thirty [30] days from the effective date of this ORDER. Not later than thirty (30) days from the effective date of this ORDER, the Bank shall amend its [Call Reports] as of December 31, 1996; December 31, 1997; and March 30, 1998, to the extent deemed necessary by the Regional Director, and shall file amended [Call Reports] that accurately reflect the Bank’s financial condition as of the date of each such report. Not later than thirty (30) days from the effective date of this ORDER, complete and accurate annual financial disclosure statements that conform in all respects to the requirements of Part 350 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 350, shall be provided without charge to all persons who have requested copies of the Bank’s annual disclosure statements as of December 31, 1996, and December 31, 1997. Thereafter, the Bank shall prepare such disclosure statements, and make such disclosure statements available, in conformity with Part 350 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations. Not later than January 31, 1999, the Bank shall engage a qualified, independent accounting firm to conduct an opinion audit of the Bank’s books as of December 31, 1998. Upon completion of such audit, the independent accounting firm shall present its final report directly to the Bank’s board of directors. The Bank’s board of directors shall cause the Bank to correct promptly all deficiencies that may be identified in such audit report. The minutes of the Bank’s board of directors shall record any action that is taken by the Bank’s board of directors in response to such audit report. Effective immediately, and until such time as the Bank has been able to reconcile its accounts, as required by Paragraph 5 of this ORDER, and to correct its [Call Reports], as required by Paragraph 6 of the ORDER, the Bank’s board of directors shall, not less frequently than monthly, review all actions taken by the Bank to correct the deficiencies in the Bank’s accounting practices and internal routines and controls identified [in the FDIC’s May 22, 1996, ROE]. Such review shall be recorded in the minutes of the Bank’s board of directors. Not later than sixty (60) days from the effective date of this ORDER, the Bank shall develop, and the Bank’s board of directors shall review, an appropriate plan (the “EDP Plan”) for the safe and sound operation of the Bank’s electronic data processing equipment, software, operating procedures, and facilities, which shall include any modifications, consistent with guidance issued by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, that may be necessary for the Bank to achieve Year 2000 readiness. Within [60] days from the effective date of this ORDER, the Bank shall submit such EDP Plan to the Regional Director and to the Comptroller for review and comment. Within 30 days from the receipt by the Bank of the FDIC’s written response to the EDP Plan, and after consideration by the Bank’s board of directors of comments from the Regional Director, if any, the Bank’s board of directors shall approve, and the Bank shall implement, such EDP Plan. Thereafter, for as long as this ORDER shall remain in effect, the Bank’s board of directors shall ascertain that the Bank’s electronic data processing is conducted in accordance with such EDP Plan. At a minimum, such EDP Plan shall provide for: the acquisition and operation by the Bank of hardware and software systems that are appropriate for the safe and sound conduct of the Bank’s business; development and implementation of an appropriate, ongoing internal audit of the operations of the Bank’s information systems; immediate acquisition and permanent retention of access to an EDP backup facility that is operationally compatible with the Bank’s hardware, software, and data files; appropriate segregation of duties among the Bank employees (and contractor personnel, if any) who perform functions related to electronic data processing; storage of backup copies of operating systems, application programs, and data files in a secure, fire- resistant environment at a remote site; reconciliation of all major applications to the general ledger on a daily basis; development and implementation of an appropriate policy . . . regarding the Bank’s use of microcomputers; prompt review by the Bank’s board of directors of all audit reports and regulatory reports regarding the Bank’s electronic data processing, and written recordation of the responses by the Bank’s board of directors to such reports; i[x]. prompt correction of all information systems deficiencies identified in audit reports and regulatory reports; and x. periodic review of the Bank’s EDP Policy by the Bank’s board of directors and of Bank management’s implementation of the Bank’s EDP Policy and EDP Plan. Not later than thirty (30) days from the effective date of this ORDER, the Bank shall eliminate from its books, by collection, charge-off or other proper entries, all assets or portions of assets classified “Loss” by the FDIC as a result of its examination of the Bank as of May 22, 1996, which have not been previously collected or charged off, unless otherwise approved in writing by the Regional Director and the Comptroller. Not later than sixty (60) days from the effective date of this ORDER, the Bank shall review and revise its written loan policy to include the following elements: a requirement that before advancing any loan the Bank must obtain, analyze, and verify credit information which will be sufficient to identify a source of repayment and support for the scheduled repayment plan; a requirement that all collateral documentation or evidence of collateral documentation be obtained and reviewed before loan proceeds are disbursed; a requirement for the maintenance and review of complete and current credit files on each borrower with extensions of credit outstanding; [a] requirement for the establishment of criteria and guidelines for the acceptance and review of financial statements; and [a] requirement for appraisal procedures which, at a minimum, satisfy the requirements of Part 323 of the FDIC’s Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 323, and applicable Florida banking laws and regulations. Not later than sixty (60) days from the effective date of this ORDER, the Bank shall implement procedures to ensure that the Bank’s loan policy and all subsequent modifications to the Bank’s loan policy are strictly enforced. 13. Not later than sixty (60) days from the effective date of this ORDER, the Bank shall correct the cited deficiencies in the assets listed for “Credit Data or Collateral Documentation Exceptions” [in the FDIC ROE dated] May 22, 1996. Thereafter, the Bank shall service these loans in accordance with its written loan policy as amended to comply with this ORDER and in accordance with safe and sound banking practices. Not later than January 31, 1999, the Bank shall prepare a realistic and comprehensive budget and earnings forecast for calendar year 1999 and shall submit this budget and earnings forecast to the Regional Director and Comptroller for review and comment. As long as this ORDER remains in effect, the Bank shall prepare annually realistic and comprehensive calendar year budget and earnings forecasts for each year subsequent to 1998 and shall submit these budget and earnings forecasts to the Regional Director and the Comptroller for review and comment no later than January 31 of each year. In preparing the budget and earnings forecasts required by paragraph 14 of this ORDER, the Bank shall, at a minimum: identify the major areas in, and means by which the board of directors will seek to improve, the Bank’s operating performance; and describe the operating assumptions that form the basis for, and adequately support, major projected income and expense components. Quarterly progress reports comparing the Bank’s actual income and expense performance with budgetary projections shall be submitted to the Regional Director and Comptroller concurrently with the other reporting requirements set forth in paragraph 23 of this ORDER. The Bank’s board of directors shall meet and review such progress reports, which review shall be recorded in the minutes of the board of directors. Not later than thirty (30) days from the effective date of this ORDER, the Bank shall take all necessary steps, consistent with sound banking practices, to eliminate or correct all violations of law and regulations committed by the Bank, as described [in the FDIC ROE dated] May 22, 1996. In addition, the Bank’s board of directors shall take appropriate steps to ensure that the Bank is operated in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations. Not later than thirty (30) days from the effective date of this ORDER, the Bank shall adopt and implement an internal loan review and grading system to provide for the periodic review of the Bank’s loan portfolio in order to identify and categorize the Bank’s loans, and other extensions of credit which are carried on the Bank’s books as loans, on the basis of credit quality. Within ninety (90) days from the effective date of this ORDER, the Bank shall have and thereafter retain a qualified Bank Secrecy Act officer (“Officer”). The Officer must be a senior bank official who shall be responsible for the Bank’s compliance with [the] Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§5211-5326, its implementing regulation, 31 C.F.R. Part 103, and Part 326 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 326. The Officer shall be given written authority by the Bank’s board of directors to implement and supervise the Bank’s Bank Secrecy Act program, including but not limited to, providing appropriate training for the Bank’s employees in the bank secrecy laws and regulations (the “Bank Secrecy Laws”) enumerated in section 326.8(b) of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. §326.8(b); establishing internal controls and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Bank Secrecy Laws; and performing or supervising periodic internal audits to ascertain compliance with the Bank Secrecy Laws and/or the Bank’s Bank Secrecy program. The Officer shall report directly to the Bank’s board of directors. The Bank shall provide the Officer with appropriate training in the Bank Secrecy Laws, and each instance of said training shall be reported to, and recorded in, the minutes of the board of directors. The Bank shall promptly notify the Regional Director and the Comptroller of the identity of the Officer. If the Officer is to be added as a director of the Bank or employed as a senior executive officer, the Bank shall comply with the requirements of section 32 of the Act, 12 U.S.C. §1831i, and section 303.14 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. §303.14, prior to the addition of the Officer to such position. The assessment of whether the Bank has a qualified Officer shall be based upon the Officer’s record of achieving compliance with the requirements of this ORDER and with the Bank Secrecy Laws. Within ninety (90) days from the effective date of this ORDER, the Bank shall adopt and implement a written program to ensure the Bank’s compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§5311-5326, as required by 12 C.F.R. §326, Subpart B. At a minimum, a system of internal controls shall be designed to: identify reportable transactions in a timely manner in order to obtain all the information necessary to properly complete the required reporting forms; ensure that all required reports are accurately completed and properly filed; ensure that customer exemptions are properly granted and recorded, including the maintenance of documentation sufficient in detail so as to substantiate exemptions granted; provide for adequate supervision of employees who accept currency transactions, complete reports, grant exemptions, or engage in any other activity covered by 31 C.F.R. Part 103; and v. establish dual controls and provide for separation of duties. The Bank shall adopt and implement a system of testing, internal or external, for compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act and the Department of the Treasury’s Regulation for Financial Record Keeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions (“Financial Record Keeping Regulations”), 31 C.F.R. Part 103, which include, at a minimum: a test of the Bank’s internal procedures for monitoring compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act, including interviews of employees and their supervisors who handle cash transactions; a sampling of large currency transactions followed by a review of currency transaction report filings; a test of the validity and reasonableness of the customer exemptions granted by the Bank; a test of the Bank’s record keeping system for compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act; and documentation of the scope of the testing procedures performed and findings of the testing. Any apparent violations, exception or other problems noted during the testing procedures should be promptly reported to the board of directors. Each calendar quarter following the effective date of this ORDER, the Bank or a consultant shall perform an internal audit of the Bank’s Bank Secrecy Act program. Any audit of the Bank Secrecy Act program performed by the Bank shall be performed or supervised by the Officer. The results of the audit and any recommendation by the Officer, the consultant and/or the board of directors shall be recorded in the minutes of a meeting of the board of directors. Effective immediately, and for as long as the ORDER shall remain in effect, the Bank’s board of directors, not less frequently than monthly, shall review all actions taken by the Bank to comply with the requirements of this ORDER. Such review by the board of directors shall be recorded in the minutes of the Bank’s board of directors. Not later than sixty (60) days from the effective date of this ORDER, the Bank’s board of directors shall develop a three-year strategic plan for the Bank (“Strategic Plan”), which shall address, at a minimum: (i) economic conditions and economic forecasts regarding the Bank’s market area; (ii) potential methods for achieving growth in the Bank’s total assets; (iii) potential methods for improving the Bank’s operations in the context of any projected growth in the size of the Bank’s total assets; (iv) carrying on the functions of the Bank’s management in the event of a loss of the services of current personnel; and (v) integration of an assessment of the Bank’s staffing needs with the Bank’s business plan. Following the effective date of this ORDER, the Bank shall send to its shareholders or otherwise furnish a description of this ORDER: (i) in conjunction with the Bank’s next shareholder communication and also (ii) in conjunction with its notice or proxy statement preceding the Bank’s next shareholder meeting. The description shall fully describe this ORDER in all material respects. The description and any accompanying communication, statement or notice shall be sent to the FDIC . . . and to the Comptroller, for review at least twenty (20) days prior to dissemination to shareholders. Any changes requested to be made by the FDIC or the Comptroller shall be made prior to dissemination of the description, communication, notice or statement. Not later than ninety (90) days from the effective date of this ORDER, and not later than thirty (30) days following the end of each calendar quarter while this ORDER is in effect, the Bank shall furnish written progress reports to the Regional Director and to the Comptroller detailing the form and manner of all actions taken to secure compliance with this ORDER and the results of such actions. Such reports may be discontinued when the corrections required by this ORDER have been accomplished and the Regional Director and the Comptroller have released the Bank in writing from making further reports. All progress reports and other written responses to this ORDER shall be reviewed by the board of directors of the Bank and made a part of the minutes of the appropriate board meeting. As a result of the sanctions imposed upon [First Bank] for failure to produce discovery and violations of Orders issued by the Administrative Law Judge, not later than thirty (30) days from the receipt of this ORDER, the Bank’s board of directors shall pay costs in the amount of $3,235.44 to the FDIC. Pursuant to delegated authority, the Regional Director may, upon a showing of good cause, amend the compliance deadlines for any of the undertakings required by this ORDER. The provisions of this ORDER shall become effective ten (10) days from the date of its issuance and shall be binding upon the Bank, its institution-affiliated parties, and its successors and assigns. Further, the provisions of this ORDER shall remain effective and enforceable except to the extent that, and until such time as any provisions of this ORDER shall have been modified, terminated, suspended, or set aside by the FDIC. Petitioner’s 1998 Consent Order Based on Petitioner’s ROE dated September 2, 1997, the Consent Order settled administrative litigation that Petitioner had instituted against First Bank, Wells, and the other directors who are respondents in this case, plus one director no longer serving as a director of First Bank. In that litigation, Petitioner sought, among other things, an order removing Wells from the board of directors of First Bank and prohibiting Wells from serving on the board of directors of any other state-chartered financial institution. Paragraph 4 of the Settlement Stipulation incorporated into the Consent Order requires the respondents to cease and desist from violations of Section 655.033(1), Florida Statutes, and to take the following “affirmative remedial action”: As soon as practicable, but in no event later than sixty days after the execution of this Settlement Stipulation by the Respondents, and subject to prior approval by [Petitioner], Respondents shall hire new and appropriately qualified management personnel to assume responsibility for daily operations and core banking functions of [First Bank] for the duration of the Consent Order. Management personnel acceptable to [Petitioner] shall be selected and employed to perform the positions of president/chief executive officer, cashier, and senior lending officer. Any person selected by the Board of Directors to serve as president/chief executive officer shall have a demonstrated capability to manage a bank comparable in size to [First Bank]. Any person selected by the Board of Directors to serve as cashier shall have a demonstrated ability to manage and balance the accounts of a bank comparable in size to [First Bank]. Any person selected by the Board of Directors to serve as senior lending officer must have a demonstrated level of lending, collection, and loan supervision experience necessary to supervise and enhance the safety and soundness of the loan portfolio of the Bank. In determining whether to approve the selection of any person under this paragraph, [Petitioner] shall make its determination based on the ability of the candidate to: operate the bank in a safe and sound manner; comply with all applicable laws and regulations; assist in restoring the Bank to a safe and sound condition; and comply with the requirements of the [Cease and Desist Order] applicable to their area(s) of responsibility. The president, as chief lending officer of the Bank, may also discharge the duties of senior lending officer until the Bank has employed an individual to fill the position on a permanent basis. Upon written request submitted to [Petitioner] by the president employed by the Bank pursuant to Paragraph 4.A.1 of this Stipulation, the selection of a permanent senior lending officer may be delayed for no more than 90 days beyond the deadline specified in Paragraph 4.A in order to facilitate the hiring of a qualified person. For the duration of [the] Consent Order . . ., the Respondents shall provide [Petitioner] and the FDIC with written notice of any change in the complement of executive officers employed by the Bank. Any replacement executive officer as defined in §655.005(1)(f), Florida Statutes, shall be subject to the approval procedures of §655.0385, Florida Statutes. An application for approval must be submitted to [Petitioner] and to the FDIC at least 30 days before the candidate’s assumption of management duties on behalf of the Bank. Effective on the date that his successor as president and chief executive officer is approved by [Petitioner] and FDIC, [Wells] shall resign as President and Chief Executive Officer of [First Bank]. All named Respondents agree on behalf of the Bank, and [Wells] agrees individually as well, that, subsequent to this resignation, Wells will take no further action on behalf of [First Bank] in the capacity of “executive officer” within the meaning of §655.005(1)(f), Florida Statutes, for the duration of the Consent Order . . .. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prohibit Wells from serving as legal counsel, inclusive of general counsel, or as consultant to [First Bank], or from receiving appropriate, reasonable compensation from [First Bank] for services provided by Wells in the capacity of counsel or consultant to the Bank. [Petitioner] agrees that Wells may serve as a director of [First Bank] and may serve on any duly constituted committee of the Board of Directors. Wells may continue to serve as Chairman of the Board of Directors if, and only if, by appropriate resolution of the Board of Directors of the Bank in accordance with §655.005(1)(f), Florida Statutes, he is excluded from participating, other than in the capacity of a director, in any major policymaking functions of [First Bank], and receives no additional compensation attributable to service as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank. This paragraph shall not be deemed to disallow [Wells] from participation in reasonable Bank-paid group insurance. Respondents agree to adopt a resolution of the Board of Directors of [First Bank], pursuant to §655.006(1)(f), Florida Statutes, excluding [Wells] from participating, other than in the capacity of a director, in any major policymaking functions of [First Bank]. This resolution shall be maintained in force by the Board of Directors for the duration of [the] Consent Order . . .. Respondents agree that the primary tasks of the new management employed pursuant to this Stipulation will be to eliminate all unsafe and unsound practices detailed in [Petitioner’s] September 1997 [ROE] and to assure compliance by [First Bank] with the [Cease and Desist Order]. Respondents agree to provide new management with written authority by resolution to take such actions as may be appropriate and necessary to implement remedial action and compliance assurance activity. Respondents, individually and collectively, agree to take all actions appropriate and necessary to remedy any and all deficiencies in policies and procedures applicable to [First Bank] as noted in periodic examination reports prepared by [Petitioner] and the FDIC. [Wells] agrees that he shall not willfully or intentionally interfere with the proper execution or discharge of delegated or assigned duties performed by the new management personnel employed by the Bank under the provisions of this Stipulation. Actions taken by [Wells] that fall within the scope of authority of a director of the Bank shall not be deemed to violate this paragraph. [Wells] acknowledges that [Petitioner] considers this paragraph to be a material term of this Stipulation and that any violation of this paragraph will be deemed a material breach of the Consent Order. Paragraph 10 of the Settlement Stipulation states that the respondents acknowledge that, although they do not waive their right to litigate such issues, the “failure to comply with any of the terms, obligations, and conditions of this Stipulation or [Consent Order] will constitute grounds for disciplinary or other adverse action.” 3. FDIC’s 1999 Safety and Soundness Order Paragraph 2 of the Safety and Soundness Order states that the FDIC has determined that First Bank is deficient in meeting the safety and soundness standards set forth in Part 364 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12. C.F.R. Chapter III, and the laws of the State of Florida. In particular, Paragraph 2 states: The board of directors has failed to provide sufficient resources for the Bank to meet Year 2000 timetables established by the FFIEC; The Bank’s Year 2000 project plan does not adequately address critical aspects of the Year 2000 program; The Bank’s Business Resumption Contingency Plan is inadequate; The Bank has not fully implemented its formal Year 2000 liquidity guidelines; The Bank has not completed an effective external review of its Year 2000 program. The Safety and Soundness Order asserts that the FDIC notified First Bank of these deficiencies on May 21, 1999, and “requested” that First Bank submit a compliance plan. First Bank submitted a compliance plan, but the FDIC found it unacceptable and issued, on July 21, 1999, a Notice of Intent to Issue a Safety and Soundness Order. In a response filed on August 4, 1999, First Bank submitted a revised Year 2000 Plan. However, Paragraph 6 of the Safety and Soundness Order states that the FDIC found the revised plan “unacceptable” for the following reasons: The board of directors has failed to allocate the necessary resources in order to comply with FFIEC guidelines. The bank is currently operating without a President and Chief Executive Officer and the Year 2000 project manager has not been given the requisite authority to fulfill his responsibilities regarding Year 2000 readiness. The plan does not establish acceptable guidelines for the renovation of all mission-critical systems within an acceptable time frame. The plan fails to address implementation of internal mission-critical systems that are Year 2000 ready. The plan does not provide a strategy to test the business resumption contingency plan. The plan does not specifically require that monthly management reports to the board of directors contain the information outlined in the “Interagency Statement on Year 2000 Business Risk.” The plan does not provide for the submission of monthly written progress reports to the Regional Director of the FDIC and the Comptroller of the State of Florida. Concluding that First Bank is deficient in meeting the safety and soundness standards established under Part 364 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 364, the Safety and Soundness Order directs First Bank to: Allocate all necessary resources to achievement compliance with FFIEC Year 2000 guidelines. Within 15 days of the effective date of this Order, the board of directors shall: hire and retain a qualified Year 2000 consultant, or qualified personnel, to oversee implementation of an acceptable Year 2000 Plan, whereby the Bank achieves compliance with all FFIEC Year 2000 guidelines within 20 days of the effective date of this Order. The board of directors shall provide the consultant or hired personnel with sufficient resources to achieve Year 2000 compliance within that time frame. The qualifications of the Year 2000 consultant or personnel shall be assessed on the ability of the Year 2000 consultant or personnel to comply with the provisions of this Order. appoint and retain a qualified senior bank officer as the Year 2000 project manager. The board of directors shall provide the Year 2000 project manager with sufficient resources and authority to achieve Year 2000 compliance. The Year 2000 project manager shall submit monthly reports regarding the status of the Bank’s Year 2000 readiness to the board of directors. The monthly reports shall address the items specified for quarterly board reports in the Guidelines, the FFIEC Guidelines and, specifically, the FFIEC’s December 17, 1997 issuance entitled “Interagency Statement on Year 2000 Business Risk.” The qualifications of the Year 2000 project manager shall be assessed on his/her ability to comply with the provisions of this Order. Within 15 days of the effective date of this Order, renovate, as necessary, all mission-critical systems used by the Bank to make them Year 2000 ready and, within 20 days from the effective date of this Order, implement those Year 2000 ready systems. Develop a Business Resumption Contingency Plan within 20 days of the effective date of the Order that provides workable plain language guidance to employees and can be implemented immediately. At a minimum, the Business Resumption Contingency Plan shall: set forth the Bank’s plans to recover lost or damaged data and to mitigate risks associated with the failure of its systems at critical dates; include identification of the Bank’s core business processes and a specific recovery plan for the possible failure of each core business process; establish a manual bookkeeping system to operate parallel with the computer system beginning November 1, 1999, unless the FDIC and State Regulatory authorities have reviewed and verified that the bank is operating in compliance with all FFIEC Year 2000 guidelines; and develop a method to validate and test the Business Resumption Contingency Plan within 20 days of the effective date of the Order. Provide for the external review of Year 2000 readiness by a qualified, independent third party within 30 days from the effective date of the Order. Establish a line of credit with the appropriate Federal Reserve Bank within 20 days of the effective date of this Order. Following the effective date of this Order[,] the Bank shall send to its shareholders or otherwise furnish a description of this Order (i) in conjunction with the Bank’s next shareholder communication and also (ii) in conjunction with its notice or proxy statement preceding the Bank’s next shareholder meeting. The description shall fully describe this Order in all material respects. . . . Provide for the submission of a progress report on the requirements of this Order within 30 days of the effective date of the Order, and monthly thereafter, until the Order is terminated. The progress report shall be sent to the Regional Director of the FDIC and the Comptroller of the State of Florida. The Safety and Soundness Order concludes: This ORDER will become effective ten (10) days after its issuance. The provisions of this ORDER will be binding upon the Bank, its institution-affiliated parties, successors and assigns. Each provision of this ORDER shall remain effective and enforceable except to the extent that, and until such time as, any provision shall be modified, terminated, suspended, or set aside by the FDIC. By Order Terminating Safety and Soundness Order issued on April 2, 2000, the FDIC cancelled the Safety and Soundness Order. First Bank’s Response to Regulatory Interventions These cases are about the adequacy of First Bank’s efforts to solve its operational problems as addressed by the directives from Petitioner and the FDIC. The Cease and Desist Order and Consent Order arise from the three reports of examination issued in 1995, 1996, and 1997. The period during which First Bank responded to these directives is largely 1998 and 1999. Petitioner’s ROE dated September 13, 1999, is the contemporaneous, comprehensive assessment of the adequacy of First Bank’s efforts and responses. These cases also require consideration of the role of Wells in creating and eliminating the operational problems experienced by First Bank. Petitioner’s representatives have frequently stated that the problems of First Bank would be amenable to quick solution if Wells were to sever his policymaking, consulting, and legal counseling ties to the bank. Although the determinative facts in this case are largely confined to 1998 and 1999, the preceding nine years’ operation of First Bank is relevant to the analysis of the events of 1998 and 1999. During the first nine years of the bank’s existence, Wells served as the president, until he was forced to resign, pursuant to the Consent Order, in the fall of 1998. After his resignation, though, Wells remained intimately involved with the bank’s operations as a director, consultant, and general counsel. Under Wells’ supervision as president, the bank’s internal accounting was so poorly maintained that nearly all of the internal accounts of First Bank were out of balance for extended periods of time and demanded many months of effort to balance these accounts and reconcile the subsidiary ledger accounts with the general ledger account. Under Wells’ supervision as president, an unreasonably large opportunity for employee theft existed because the bank's employees did not perform financially sensitive tasks under dual control, even to the extent practicable for a small bank. Under Wells’ supervision as president, the bank’s information technology and data processing systems were poorly integrated into operations and insufficiently secured to prevent the loss of data in the event of catastrophe. Under Wells’ supervision as president, the bank’s personnel turned over at excessive rates. However, under Wells’ supervision as president, First Bank initially earned composite CAMELS ratings of 2 during four ROEs conducted by Petitioner and the FDIC in 1992, 1994, and 1995. During this time, First Bank earned four ratings of 1 for capital and assets, three ratings of 2 and one rating of 1 for liquidity, and three ratings of 2 and one rating of 3 for earnings. However, even during this period, First Bank earned three ratings of 3 and, in 1995, one rating of 5 for management. The 1996 and 1997 ROEs, on which the Cease and Desist Order are based, assigned First Bank composite ratings of 3, and the 1998, 1999, and 2000 ROEs assigned First Bank composite ratings of 4. The record does not explain why these management problems intensified in the mid 1990s. However, under Wells’ supervision as president, these problems undermined the operations of First Bank and ultimately necessitated the regulatory interventions of the Cease and Desist Order and Consent Order. The record amply demonstrates that, without these interventions, First Bank, under Wells’ supervision as president, would have been unable or unwilling to resolve the numerous issues undermining its operations. The Cease and Desist Order and Consent Order issued at a point when the federal and state regulators reasonably expected that First Bank, although a small bank, would have matured operationally after nine years’ existence. However, even the minutes of the meetings of the board of directors of First Bank for 1997 reveal a disturbing level of disorganization and lack of focus among the directors, especially Wells. The minutes of the March 11, 1997, meeting of the board of directors illustrate one aspect of the organizational problems confronting First Bank and Wells’ inability to identify a plan for resolving the matter. According to the minutes of this meeting, Wells complained that: Organization of the Bank was proving to be one of the most difficult challenges possible. Personnel have failed or refused to follow policy guidelines and administrative requirements. The Bank generated several hundred forms prior to the organization of the Bank to expedite the handling of administrative, operational, loan and compliance matters. Most of these forms are basically disregarded by staff personnel. Employee turnover has been an ongoing problem at First Bank. However, the March 11 minutes reveal that Wells ignored the opportunity to analyze the challenge of attracting and retaining qualified personnel and identify specific solutions. Instead, Wells indulged himself in a personal diatribe whose evident purpose seems to have been to assign the blame for First Bank’s personnel problems on the undisciplined youth of Jacksonville and, to a lesser extent, their parents and school administrators. Displacing an informed examination of First Bank’s pay structure and working conditions, Wells’ denunciation of the pool of potential bank employees stated: Virtually all of the businesses and trades are publicly complaining over the quality of personnel and the ability of employees to to [sic] discharge assigned duties. This results from either lack of or poor training and the failure of the student or institution to educate the graduate in the various disciplines of which he or she were engaged in the educational process. Unfortunately, high school graduates exhibit a “warehousing” mentality. These young people oftimes describe and exhibit the attitude that they have been warehoused for their last few years of high school as opposed to receiving serious educational training and support. Conversations with educators at the high school level indicate that the students are undisciplined and virtually out of control. Responsible teachers from both Wolfson and Mandarin High Schools have advised the Bank that discipline is missing from the children’s home life. These educators say that School policy and procedures, as well as parent objections, prevent adequate discipline being applied during the school day. We are continuing to search for qualified personnel or graduates of various institutions who may be able to assist the Bank within the available employment funds of the Bank. Evidently having satisfied himself that he had adequately addressed the bank’s considerable personnel issues, Wells, according to the minutes, then turned to apparent maintenance deficiencies concerning the exterior of First Bank and, again, found Jacksonville youth to blame. Noting that three juveniles had recently been arrested for throwing golf balls and shooting guns into merchants’ signs along San Jose Boulevard, Wells stated that vandals had broken off all outside water spigots and removed floodlights at the bank. “Consequently, we are cautious about the implementation of further sign work and about repair to existing exterior facilities because of a continuing destructive environment. Merchants advise the Bank that these are, in large part, ‘latchkey’ young people who are frustrated and bored, but because of circumstances engage in destructive conduct against both public and private property.” Three months later, though, the minutes were not so richly detailed as to Wells’ description of the pending FDIC administrative litigation, in which he represented First Bank without fee. As already noted, Wells’ inability or refusal to comply timely with discovery and his “incredible” explanation not only resulted in the imposition of over three thousand dollars in discovery costs, but also in the exclusion of much of the bank’s evidence from the hearing. The first meeting of the board of directors after the Administrative Law Judge imposed these sanctions was May 20, 1997. The minutes state only that Wells advised the other directors that all pleadings would be kept in the wall unit at the bank, and he “encouraged the Directors to become very aware of the various allegations and defenses being filed in this regard.” The minutes of the meeting of the board of directors on June 26, 1998, report confirmation from Wells that “the payment of costs on sanctions had been paid to the FDIC,” although the statement does not reveal whether Wells or First Bank paid this amount. The record does not permit detailed findings of the substance of Wells’ legal representation of First Bank, apart from his obvious mishandling of the FDIC litigation and his prudence in deferring to outside counsel for the present litigation. Much of Wells’ work has involved the preparation of documentation, as to which he is experienced, and nothing in the record suggests any incompetence in this area. Some of his work has involved regulatory matters, as to which he is now experienced, but the record does not support a finding of any special competence in this area, even now. However, the record reveals a considerable level of disorganization in at least one aspect of Wells’ legal work: invoicing. According to the minutes of the meeting of the board of directors on October 31, 1997, Wells presented the board in October 1997 several invoices for legal work that he had done in 1996. The minutes of the meeting of the board of directors on April 16, 1998, note that bank staff had found an unpaid legal statement from Wells dating back three years. The minutes of the meeting of the board of directors on October 15, 1998, acknowledge the receipt of previously unpresented legal invoices for work done by Wells 12-21 months earlier. Under Wells’ supervision as president, First Bank adhered to conservative financial practices, protecting the quality of the bank’s loan portfolio, but at the expense of growth. In its initial business plan, First Bank had projected total assets of $15 million within three years. As of June 30, 1999, First Bank had total assets of only $8.3 million, down from a high of $9.3 million on December 31, 1993. Although its capital remains sufficient for its level of operations, First Bank had, until the quarter ending March 31, 2000, less capital than when it was organized. First Bank has never paid a dividend to Wells or its minority shareholders, who are dissatisfied with the performance of their investment and have commenced litigation against Wells and First Bank. First Bank’s earnings have declined in recent years. Net income in 1995 and 1996 was about $100,000 annually. Net after-tax earnings were $71,000 and $31,000 for 1997 and 1998, respectively. In 1999, First Bank suffered a net after-tax loss of $33,000. From 1997-99, First Bank’s interest income was $675,000, $624,000, and $290,000, respectively. However, year-to-date figures, through June 30, 2000, reveal that First Bank’s total income was $313,298--107 percent of budget--and its total expenses were $278,851--85 percent of budget. The bank’s performance through June 30, 2000, may reflect a reversal of the negative trends in earnings and revenues, which, at least for revenues, may have been partly attributable to the end of adverse local publicity concerning Y2K compliance. During the latter half of 1999 and early 2000, First Bank was the subject of numerous unflattering newspaper stories in The Florida Times-Union reporting, among other things, that the FDIC had issued the Cease and Desist Order, Petitioner had required Wells to resign as president in the Consent Order, the person hired to replace Wells as president had resigned only nine months after taking the job, First Bank was the last of over 10,000 banks under the FDIC to have demonstrated Y2K compliance, minority shareholders had sued for $3.5 million for the mismanagement of the bank, and First Bank, although financially sound, had been unable to balance its books and maintained poor internal controls. The directors are unpaid and, except for Wells, do not appear to own shares of First Bank. When he served as president, Wells earned $20,000 in 1989, $40,000 annually from 1990-93, and $62,000 annually from 1994 through his resignation as president in 1998. Following Wells’ resignation as president, a consulting agreement between First Bank and Welco, Inc., a corporation controlled by Wells, has required Wells personally to provide consulting services at the hourly rate $40 with a guaranteed annual minimum of $38,000. From all sources, as president, general counsel, and consultant, Wells has received compensation of over $500,000 from First Bank in its 11 years of existence. Three major additions to personnel marked 1998. The first such addition was the replacement of Wells by A. Richardson Tosh (Tosh), as reflected by the minutes of the meeting of the board of directors on September 9, 1998. The minutes state that First Bank hired Tosh, as president and chief executive officer, for $50,000 annually. Following regulatory approval, Tosh began working in these capacities in mid October 1998. The next two personnel events were the addition of James Giddens (Giddens) and Kim Jufer (Jufer). The minutes of the meeting of the board of directors on November 13, 1998, confirm and ratify the employment of Giddens in an unspecified capacity and Jufer as the manager of the operations department and staff accountant. Tosh’s banking career began in March 1964. Prior to his arrival at First Bank, Tosh had been the president of three financial institutions for a total of over 16 years. In his conversations with Wells, Tosh learned that his duties would be twofold: eliminating operational problems and marketing. The two main operational problems confronting Tosh were out-of-balance accounts and Y2K compliance. Tosh found the books and records in extremely poor condition. As Giddens testified, almost every account was out of balance. These erroneous books and records generated unreliable financial information for the board of directors and the FDIC in quarterly financial reports known as call reports submitted by the bank. The directors were aware of the problem, although probably not its severity; the 1997 and 1998 minutes reflect unsuccessful attempts by the directors to have a bank employee balance the internal accounts. Jufer and Giddens proved indispensable to the task of balancing the bank’s accounts. However, consistent with the relatively limited authority extended Tosh, he had to obtain the approval of the board of directors to hire these two employees. Jufer worked fulltime on the books and records, and Tosh worked parttime to help her until Giddens, who is a certified public accountant with considerable bank audit experience, joined First Bank a few weeks after Jufer’s arrival. Tosh’s second operational concern was Y2K compliance. By October 1998, First Bank had already missed one FDIC deadline. Shortly after Giddens’ arrival, Tosh turned his attention to the Y2K problem. If ever good, the relationship between Tosh and Wells did not take long to start to deteriorate. Other directors assured Tosh that they wanted him to report any incidents of interference by Wells in the performance of Tosh’s duties as president. An early example of the extensiveness of the involvement of the board of directors, although not necessarily Wells alone, in the management of First Bank is reflected in the minutes of the meeting of the board of directors on November 13, 1998, in which the directors approved directives detailing specific job responsibilities of all bank employees. The board issued numerous directives, whose effects were to limit Tosh’s managerial authority. At the next meeting of the board of directors, which took place on December 10, 1998, the minutes state that Tosh informed the board that he was outsourcing payroll functions, and the board directed Tosh not to outsource the payroll due to the limited number of employees. At the first board meeting of 1999, which took place on January 14, Tosh reported that he had found a bank in Perry whose hardware and software systems were sufficiently compatible with those of First Bank that it might serve as a backup source for disaster recovery. The directors requested that Tosh find a second site, but Tosh justly responded that their first priority should be testing the Perry bank to see if the backup plan could be implemented there. By this time, Tosh was handling Y2K issues, as well as other operational matters, such as compliance with the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act, collection matters, and some internal control issues. As to these matters, Respondent Gunti was also intimately involved. By letter to Wells and the other directors dated February 7, 1999, Tosh complained about their use of directives without obtaining management input to solve the problems of the bank. In particular, Tosh criticized directives that could delay time-sensitive projects, such as Y2K testing. Tosh also noted a tendency for the directors to provide employees with binders full of policies and procedures, rather than hire experienced, competent employees capable of implementing bank policies. Addressing Wells, Tosh suggested that “it is time for him to limit his duties to those that we agreed on at the time of my interviews.” He added: “it is clear that nearly everyone that works here at the bank has a difficult time working with Mr. Wells. This level of frequent tension is not conducive to a productive workplace. Furthermore, tension produces turnover.” Turning to recent accomplishments, Tosh commended Jufer and Giddens for their work. Referring to the recent FDIC examination, which resulted in the ROE dated December 7, 1998, Tosh observed that as many as seven FDIC examiners had been at the bank for four weeks. Conceding that they were only doing their job, Tosh wrote that the timing of the examination “could not have been much worse for us.” Exacerbating the disruption to staff, such as Jufer and Giddens, was that the examiners were having the same problem that staff has in finding necessary records. Turning to work to be undertaken, Tosh noted that First Bank was having trouble finding a senior loan officer, but had obtained an extension to mid March from Petitioner to fill this position. Referring to marketing, Tosh conceded that he had not been active and that the bank needs to grow, but, when he had agreed to take on substantial marketing duties, he had had no idea of the “chaos” present at First Bank. As for Y2K mainframe testing, Tosh expressed his concern that the bank has no one with the expertise to evaluate their testing. Tosh concluded this portion of the letter with his concern, shared by the board, of the “lack of income in the near term for the bank.” He repeated his expectation, first stated during his interviews, that he hoped that the bank would spend the money to prepare to make profitable loans. On this point, he reemphasized the importance of a good senior loan officer who, although costly, would bring a book of business to First Bank. Tosh described the building as “exceptional,” but “filthy dirty” inside and lacking bright lighting and signs at night. Tosh concluded his letter by returning to the issue of Wells. Asserting that “Wells has steadfastly held onto the CEO functions,” Tosh warned that he would not remain with First Bank only to serve as a branch manager and ensure apparent compliance with the Consent Order. Tosh asked the board to “reassign and limit [Wells’] continued management function.” At the meeting of the board of directors on March 30, 1999, Tosh reported that the testing at the Perry bank had been successful, and the board reminded him that they wanted a second backup site. The minutes of the March 30 meeting reveal another aspect of the disorganization of First Bank. Hampering the bank’s efforts to timely find documents and present an attractive place to bank for customers, the minutes note that several directors “had complained of the organization and clean-up of internal Bank facilities because of the unsightly stacking of binders, file boxes standing in the teller areas visible to customers, records stacked in the lounge area, discarded equipment being stacked in a pile in the lounge area, waste materials needing shredding or other destruction, [and] unsightly organization of the storage areas (including material storage).” However, the minutes of the special meeting of the board of directors on August 18, 1999, disclose that, five months later, the unattractive disarray and obvious disorganization of the bank’s premises continued to be a problem. At a special meeting of the board of directors on April 12, 1999, the directors emphasized the need for prompt action on marketing and business development. The [Acting] Chairman [Respondent Gunti] restated the continuing operating loss must be addressed by management promptly. He again reaffirmed repeated requests for a marketing plan from Mr. Tosh and recommendations for business development activity. The Chairman stated that the Bank staff is being underutilized for customer service because of the poor attendance of customers. . . . At a special meeting of the board of directors on April 20, 1999, the directors asked Tosh to review available services for prospective customers and to survey competitors for the services that they provide customers. At the meeting of the board of directors on April 22, 1999, Tosh reported that he had made little progress in finding a senior loan officer. However, he reiterated that Wells had not interfered with his performance of his duties. By internal memorandum to the directors dated April 28, 1999, Tosh asked the board to consider Jufer’s compensation. The memorandum states that Tosh had promised her a salary review in six months, if she would initially accept $30,000 annually. Praising her work to this point, Tosh recommended that the board promote her to vice president, raise her salary to $34,000 annually, and pay her a bonus of $2000. At the meeting of the board of directors on May 13, 1999, Tosh reported that the findings of the Y2K examination team were unsatisfactory, and he recommended that the board engage a consultant to review the status of the bank’s Y2K compliance. The minutes are not clear as to the action that the board took, but it did not accept Tosh’s recommendation. Wells opposed this recommendation because he had not yet finished preparing the bank’s Y2K plan. According to the minutes of the May 13 meeting, Tosh again reported that Wells had not interfered with Tosh’s performance of his duties and that efforts to find a senior loan officer had not been successful. On questioning by directors as to possible interference by Wells, Tosh noted one incident in which a signature on a bank check had been lined out, but Respondent Gunti stated that he had done it because he was not aware of the nature of the payment. Illustrative, though, of the extent to which the directors involved themselves in management, Tosh had written the check to purchase some much-needed office furniture. Again, the directors inquired about the marketing efforts. The minutes note that Tosh was to have implemented a call program, but he had been unable to do so. The May 13 minutes also disclose that the directors had appointed Giddens as vice president and comptroller. Two days later, Tosh announced his resignation, effective June 15, 1999. Jufer also resigned at this time. By memorandum dated May 25, 1999, to the board of directors, Tosh warned that First Bank needed immediately to engage a consultant to assure timely Y2K compliance. The memorandum states: “We are lay people trying to do a specialty project. . . . Since the overall Y2K plan should have been done last summer, we are risking too much by doing it at this late date by ourselves.” Petitioner called Tosh as a witness, and his testimony was somewhat adverse to Respondents. However, Tosh testified that Respondents Gunti and Minor participated actively in directors' meetings and were concerned about compliance with the Cease and Desist Order and Consent Order. Tosh also testified that, by the summer of 1999, the mainframe and software were Y2K compliant. This testimony is credited. Tosh’s experiences at First Bank reveal the detailed level to which directors involved themselves in management issues, although, for a bank as small as First Bank, this is not unusual. However, Tosh’s experiences also reveal some of the shortcomings of the directors in handling management issues. The directors repeatedly misprioritized important tasks. From the start of their relationship with Tosh, for example, the directors were preoccupied with Tosh's spending valuable time finding a second backup site. As Tosh recognized, this would have been a misallocation of limited resources given the numerous operational challenges lying ahead of First Bank, especially as to Y2K compliance. Later, the directors became preoccupied with Tosh's spending time marketing First Bank. Although Tosh could have improved revenues by focusing more effort in marketing, his insignificant shortcomings in marketing had considerably less effect on revenues than did the directors’ misguided refusal to take Tosh’s recommendations to pay a sufficient sum of money to attract a senior loan officer with a book of business and to hire a Y2K consultant in May of 1999. The failure of the directors to timely obtain expert Y2K assistance proved especially costly to bank revenue later in 1999 after a deposit runoff due to adverse publicity surrounding First Bank. Although First Bank’s hardware and software were in fact Y2K compliant when Tosh departed, the directors failed to appreciate the magnitude of the remaining tasks of demonstration testing and preparation of a Y2K compliance plan, which Wells, despite his unfamiliarity with hardware and software systems, had been trying without success to prepare. However, Tosh also serves as a useful reference point concerning the overall condition of First Bank, despite the managerial shortcomings revealed during his tenure. Two weeks after his departure, Tosh introduced investors who, with Tosh, were interested in purchasing the stock of First Bank. At a special meeting of the board of directors on June 8, 1999, the directors approved the hiring of T. Dale Ferguson (Ferguson) as loan officer, effective June 15, 1999. At a regular meeting of the board of directors on June 10, 1999, the directors approved the hiring of Ferguson as senior loan officer, subject to regulatory approval. At a special meeting of the board of directors on June 24, 1999, the directors approved the appointment of Giddens to the position of interim president, pending the conclusion of an advertisement campaign for a permanent president. As Wells and Respondent Gunti noted, though, the adverse publicity received by First Bank had also hampered its search for a president. By letter dated July 14, 1999, to the board of directors, Petitioner notified each director that he was in violation of the Consent Order and Settlement Stipulation and, absent corrective action within 90 days, Petitioner would seek administrative fines in the amounts of $10,000 against Wells, $5000 against Respondents Alters, Drummond, and Gunti, and $2500 against Respondent Minor. At a special meeting of the board of directors on July 16, 1999, the directors approved the hiring of outside counsel to defend the bank in the legal action brought by the minority shareholders. Also, noting deficiencies cited by the FDIC in First Bank’s Y2K compliance, the directors approved an enlargement of the duties of a consultant, Reed Dearing (Dearing), to various Y2K duties. At a special meeting of the board of directors on August 10, 1999, the directors reviewed with Ferguson the marketing plan to increase bank revenues. The directors approved an executive directive specifying officer marketing activity and asked Ferguson to survey the activity of competitors to assist the directors in strategic planning. At a meeting of the board of directors on August 26, 1999, Ferguson, who was serving as Y2K project manager for First Bank, reported that the bank’s Y2K plan had failed to win approval for a second time, and the bank had assigned to Dearing the task of rewriting the plan. A letter dated August 23, 1999, from Dearing to Wells states that the May 13, 1999, business resumption contingency plan, which First Bank adopted as part of its Y2K plan, lacked necessary content, made vague assumptions, and was extremely wordy and unreadable. The letter notes that Y2K work by Ferguson has been hampered by the failure of the board to delegate him any authority, so that he must continually seek board approval for all decisions. Dearing noted that the deficiencies in the business resumption contingency plan were the focus of the FDIC’s pending Safety and Soundness Order. After Tosh’s departure, Giddens continued to work on the books and records. Although he had already completed the majority of the work, considerable, detailed effort remained. Having already restored the books and accounts so that they were accurate on a going-forward basis, Giddens analyzed information, often years old, to achieve a comprehensive balancing and reconciliation. Eventually, the main adjustment was an addition, to the bank’s favor, of $21,214.36 to the cash items account, as accepted by the board of directors on October 29, 1999. At the request of Petitioner’s examiners, Giddens issued corrected call reports to reflect this adjustment. The best indicator of the point of completion of Giddens’ work on the books and records is found in the minutes of a special meeting of the board of directors on August 31, 1999. The outside auditor appeared at the meeting and informed the directors that he was again working on his audit for the years 1996 and 1997, which he had been forced to suspend due to the condition of the books and records. On August 18, 1999, outside auditors issued an independent auditors report concerning First Bank’s financial position through 1998. As interim president of First Bank, Giddens was only employed at the rate of $14 hourly for an average of 15 hours of week. Freely expressing his dissatisfaction with his rate of pay, although not the hours, Giddens nevertheless testified that Wells had not interfered with Giddens’ performance of his duties. In reality, those duties are more in the nature of a chief financial officer, not chief executive officer. Giddens has over 30 years’ experience in bank auditing and accounting, including internal controls. His limited experience in operations derives from an assignment to Jamaica on which he was to hire and train a bank auditor, but, due to an unexpected strike, Giddens had to run operations for a relatively short period of time. Working on the books and records, Giddens gained a unique insight into the problems of First Bank. For example, where Wells might complain generally about employees misusing forms, Giddens encountered specific instances, such as the practice of some employees to use loan checks when they ran out of cashier checks, thus leaving both accounts out of balance. As his work on the books and records began to reach completion in the summer of 1999, Giddens devoted more time to internal controls. Dual control of sensitive assets, such as travelers’ checks or the night deposit box, poses unique problems for a bank with only a half of a dozen employees. However, Giddens implemented numerous internal controls to reduce the risk of employee theft. For example, under Giddens, First Bank imposed dual control upon travelers’ checks, even though Giddens had never seen another bank have to do this; Fedline wire transfers (where one person had to load and another person had to transmit), even though First Bank’s wire transfer procedures left it no more exposed to risk than had the procedures of Barnett Bank, where Giddens had worked for many years immediately prior to coming to First Bank; tellers’ cash drawers, for which different persons do unannounced money counts; and official checks, where, due to employee attrition, different persons perform the necessary reconciliations. As for internal auditing, Giddens admitted that First Bank lacks a program, but, befitting a bank of its size, has internal control systems that are verified periodically by independent persons. As Respondents Gunti and Minor testified, the directors do not do internal audits, but Giddens does. In fact, on December 20, 1998, Giddens and Tosh found a $1700 shortage in one teller’s cash box, and they referred the matter to the state attorney’s office. As for accounting practices, Giddens detailed all of the objections of Petitioner’s examiners and rebutted each of them or showed that they did not present a material risk of loss or damage. As for security practices, Giddens acknowledged that the combinations and locks had not been changed since the departure of Tosh, and the bank needs to deal with these issues. However, the bank had already dealt with minor deficiencies with the bait money that it supplies tellers in the event of a robbery. In general, Giddens testified credibly that First Bank is adequately staffed to handle the volume of business that it experiences. As described by Respondent Gunti, First Bank handles only about 40 transactions daily. At a special meeting of the board of directors on September 17, 1999, the directors gave Ferguson the authority to do whatever was necessary to implement the Y2K plan, including the business resumption contingency plan, and authorized him to purchase, on a competitive basis, needed items, as outlined in a Y2K budget. At a meeting of the board of directors on September 29, 1999, the directors for the first time in this record cast opposing votes as to a matter. Respondent Alters noted that the directors had received a letter of intent to purchase the assets or stock from the Bank by Evergreen Bancshares, Inc., evidently a different group from that in which Tosh had been involved. Wells moved that the board require the prospective purchaser first to provide background information, but Respondent Alters moved that the directors waive this requirement and consider the prospective offer directly. Joining Wells were Respondent Drummond and Wells’ son, who had been recently appointed to the board, so that Respondent Alters’ attempt to waive the requirements was defeated. However, Respondent Drummond later switched his vote, so that the directors waived the requirements that the prospective purchaser first provide background information. At Wells’ request, the directors deferred consideration of the matter until October 1, 1999. At the same meeting, Ferguson reported to the directors that the FDIC had rejected the first two Y2K plans submitted by First Bank. Dearing had given management a rough draft of his rewrite on September 15, 1999, but management had made some changes with which Dearing had disagreed. The Y2K committee had adopted a revised plan on September 27, 1999, but the FDIC had recently informed the bank that it had to rewrite the entire Y2K plan. Ferguson reported to the directors that he had deferred implementing his business development responsibilities until he had completed his Y2K tasks. At a special meeting of the board of directors on October 4, 1999, the directors agreed to respond to the Evergreen letter of intent, but to require certain conditions precedent to further discussion, including disclosure to the directors of the amount of the purchase offer to the minority shareholders. At a special meeting of the board of directors on October 25, 1999, the board of directors discussed the Safety and Soundness Order and the Y2K deficiencies cited in that order. At a meeting of the board of directors on October 29, 1999, the directors addressed earnings, noting that expenses were over budget and income was under budget. They discussed the continuation of an operating loss and addressed Ferguson’s marketing activity, which remained on hold until resolution of the Y2K issues. Directors advised Ferguson that customer service and attention to detail would increase revenues, not, as he had tried, reduced banking costs. By letter dated November 12, 1999, to the board of directors, Ferguson noted that the FDIC had still not determined that First Bank was Y2K compliant. However, according to his letter, the FDIC Y2K examiner had said that the plan looked “fine,” but that the FDIC had not issued a written determination. Ferguson detailed recent Y2K activity, documenting his considerable efforts at securing regulatory approval. At a meeting of the board of directors on November 12, 1999, the directors discussed five loan delinquencies. The largest of the loans was for about $101,000 and was secured by a first mortgage on a residence valued at $400,000 several years ago. The smallest loan was for $649. A third loan was due to an internal error by First Bank in which it credited an account with $22,000 and did not discover the error for five months. After obtaining a note from the account holder, First Bank received a couple of payments, but had received nothing more, and collections prospects were dim. The last two loans were to Respondent Alters. One was a $20,000 unsecured note for leasehold improvements that became due on August 1, 1999. Respondent Alters had requested a renewal of the loan. The other loan was for a balance of $2800, which had been renewed in January 1999 for an additional 18 months; however, Respondent Alters had already fallen behind by three monthly payments of $153 each. Respondent Alters assured Ferguson that he would pay the past- due payments on these loans. Also at this meeting, Ferguson assured the directors that First Bank had complied with all Y2K requirements and should be certified as having done so. Ferguson stated that the bank had discharged all of its responsibilities under the Safety and Soundness Order, except for mailing notices to shareholders at the next regular communication with shareholders. At a special meeting of the board of directors on November 19, 1999, the directors told the chair of the loan committee to obtain from Respondent Alters adequate security for the $20,000 unsecured loan, as well as to require that Respondent Alters bring current a first mortgage loan and home equity loan secured by his residence. Ferguson advised the directors that Petitioner’s examiners, as part of their examination resulting in the September 13, 1999, ROE, would require that First Bank add $16,000 to its loan loss reserves due to the loans to Respondent Alters and the account holder wrongly credited with $22,000. Giddens also informed the board that one of Petitioner’s examiners had told him to amend the bank’s call reports to reflect the $21,214.36 credit to the cash items account. At a special meeting of the board of directors on November 23, 1999, Petitioner’s Bureau Chief and counsel presented the September 13, 1999, ROE. The Bureau Chief noted that the condition of First Bank was “very poor” with continuing violations of laws and regulations, deficiencies in internal controls, and other problems. The Bureau Chief stated that the “basic reason” for these problems was Wells, and he restated an earlier demand, which he had presented to the directors in the summer, that they remove Wells from the board and as general counsel. The Bureau Chief stated that Petitioner would bring an enforcement action, if the directors failed to act. Respondent Minor noted that the other directors could not legally remove Wells, and the Bureau Chief acknowledged the obvious problem posed by directors trying to remove another director who was the majority shareholder. Petitioner’s counsel added that Petitioner would prove by clear and convincing evidence that Wells is “in complete control of the bank and its operation.” An FDIC representative attending the meeting noted that First Bank would be upgraded from unsatisfactory, presumably concerning Y2K compliance. Petitioner’s examination of First Bank ran from September 13 to October 15, 1999. The ROE dated September 13, 1999, contains an composite CAMELS rating of 4 and component ratings of 2 for capital, 2 for assets, 5 for management, 4 for earnings, 3 for liquidity, and 3 for sensitivity. There can be no dispute concerning the ratings for capital, assets, and earnings. As for earnings, First Bank was experiencing an operating loss in 1999 and a downward trend in earnings. A rating of 4 for earnings indicates “intermittent losses” and “significant negative trends.” The record likewise permits no challenge to the rating of 3 for sensitivity, as the bank did not maintain an active system for identifying, measuring, and monitoring interest rate risk. A rating of 3 for sensitivity indicates either that the “control of market risk sensitivity needs improvement or that there is significant potential that the hearings performance or capital position will be adversely affected.” First Bank needed to improve its control of market risk and therefore did not merit a rating of 2 for sensitivity. The liquidity rating of 3 is clearly erroneous, however. The examiner assigned to this component correctly rated First Bank a 2, but the examiner in charge changed the rating to a 3. In doing so, the examiner in charge weighed the loss of nearly three quarters of a million dollars in deposits. The ROE states that public knowledge of First Bank’s Y2K difficulties had resulted in a decline in liquid assets. Although the ROEs dated December 7, 1998, and March 20, 2000, were not admitted for the truth of their contents, their contents are available to impeach other evidence. Both the 1998 and 2000 CAMELS ratings for liquidity were 2. The liquidity ratio in 1998 was substantially the same as the liquidity ratio in 1999; both years, the ratio of cash and short-term, marketable securities to deposits and short-term liabilities was around 30 percent. Likewise, the 1999 ratio of net loans and leases to total assets--63.69 percent--had not changed significantly from the prior year. The reliability of First Bank on potentially volatile liabilities had actually halved from 1998 to 1999. Another improvement as to liquidity from 1998 to 1999 was that First Bank had increased its credit line with the Independent Bankers’ Bank of Florida by $1 million to $1.713 million. The 2000 liquidity analysis also undermines the 1999 liquidity rating of 2. The 2000 ROE found that First Bank, misinterpreting a state statute, had reserved an additional 15 percent of a specified amount, resulting in the maintenance of more generous levels of liquidity than required. It is a likely inference that First Bank similarly misinterpreted the statutory requirement in 1999. The 2000 analysis also notes that the deposit base stabilized through the end of 1999, after an earlier runoff. The 2000 analysis states that the bank’s largest depositor is the Welco Investment Trust, which maintains 22 percent of the total deposits and is controlled by Wells. One adverse development arising after the 1999 ROE is that First Bank appears no longer to have its line of credit with Independent Bankers’ Bank of Florida. But the 2000 analysis notes that the loan portfolio, reflecting the bank’s “extremely conservative collateral-based lending philosophy,” does not leave it particularly vulnerable to economic risk, especially given the strength of the local economy, including real estate, which accounts for 70 percent of the bank’s loans. Referring to the FDIC Examination Manual definitions of ratings for liquidity, the 3 assigned in the 1999 ROE is clearly erroneous, probably reflecting undue weight assigned to a few months during which the Y2K runoff was at its height and apprehension that the deposit runoff might continue. A rating of 3 means that the bank’s liquidity levels or funds management practices are in need of improvement--facts not present in this record. A rating of 2 indicates satisfactory liquidity levels and funds management practices, even though “[m]odest weaknesses” may accompany funds management practices--facts clearly supported by this record. Of course, the key component is management, for which the 1999 ROE assigns First Bank a 5. As defined in the FDIC examination manual, this rating is reserved for management and directors that have not “demonstrated the ability to correct problems and implement appropriate risk management practices.” These uncorrected problems “now threaten the continued viability of the institution.” The rating of 4 accommodates “deficient management or board performance” in which the “level of problems and risk exposure is excessive.” Under a rating of 4, uncorrected problems “require immediate action by the board and management to preserve the soundness of the institution.” As distinguished from a rating of 5, for which replacing or strengthening management or the board is “necessary,” a rating of 4 means that replacing or strengthening management or the board “may be necessary.” A rating of 4 for management, thus, hardly represents a regulatory endorsement. To the contrary, a rating of 4 accommodates significant management deficiencies. Although not as severe as the irredeemable and comprehensive incompetence reflected by a rating of 5, these management deficiencies may nonetheless eventually impact the soundness of the institution and may only be correctable by the replacement of the incompetent parties. The present record supports a management rating of 4, not 5, in the 1999 ROE. The most difficult rating to examine is the composite rating. Under the FDIC Examination Manual, a bank with a 5 for any component generally cannot qualify for a composite rating of 3. Therefore, with a 5 in management, First Bank properly should have received no better than a composite rating of 4, which First Bank received in the 1999 ROE. However, raising the management component to a 4 and the liquidity component to a 2 increases the likelihood that the correct component rating would be 3. The distinction between the composite rating of 3 and 4 is the distinction between an institution that requires only “some degree of supervisory concern” and one that is engaging in “unsafe and unsound practices.” This is the basic question posed by these cases. In 1998 and 1999, First Bank accomplished much, including the two main tasks confronting Tosh: cleaning up the books and records and attaining Y2K compliance. Later in 1999, First Bank implemented greater internal controls, obtained an independent audit of its financial position, and implemented improved accounting, data processing, and security procedures. Even in management, First Bank showed some improvement in late 1998 and 1999, as reflected in part by the gains in the areas identified in the preceding paragraph. Capable persons filled key managerial roles during this time. From the time of Wells’ resignation as president to the present, Giddens has ably served as cashier, although not, as nominally titled, as president. For nearly the same period, Ferguson has served well as senior loan officer; for the reason noted in the Conclusions of Law, his post-hearing departure--probably not a positive development--is not properly included in this record. For the first part of this period, Tosh served ably as president. Petitioner claims that Wells effectively served as president during Tosh’s tenure. However, despite Tosh’s letter somewhat to the contrary, Tosh’s assurances to the board were consistent. Frankly, the best inferential proof that Wells was not serving, in effect, as president during Tosh’s tenure was the success enjoyed by Tosh, Giddens, and Jufer and, thus, First Bank. When Wells was in charge, the operations of First Bank suffered; after Wells resigned as president, the operations of First Bank improved substantially. The other board members made an honest effort to ensure compliance with the Consent Order, and they were successful. Petitioner claims that Wells effectively served as president after Tosh’s departure. As already found, Giddens was not really the president. However, he performed some tasks that might be associated with a chief executive officer, and the directors and Ferguson performed the remainder. Wells did not rise above the rest of the directors and seize executive control of First Bank after Tosh left. Gradually, the other directors, especially Respondents Gunti and Minor, acquired more experience with banking operations and were better able to discharge these tasks. The directors held numerous meetings, sometimes only days apart, from 1997 through 1999. Some of the directors visited the bank almost daily. Although they did not oppose Wells often, they did on at least two occasions. In addition to the handling of the already-discussed Evergreen offer, Respondents Gunti and Minor, evidently as part of a majority of the board, wisely prevailed upon Wells to sign the Settlement Stipulation. Undoubtedly, the directors have been influenced by Wells, at times strongly. However, this influence does not, as Petitioner contends, mean that Wells has reasserted his previous duties as president. It is more likely that this influence is due to Wells’ status as the majority shareholder, largest depositor, and, despite his shortcomings, only board member with legal and banking experience. By permitting Wells to serve as a director, consultant, and general counsel, the Consent Order necessarily permitted Wells to occupy a significant role in guiding the affairs of First Bank, especially when, as here, the directors have assumed greater management responsibilities. Undoubtedly, the directors, other than Wells, still offer more in enthusiasm and dedication than they do in experience in banking operations. But they, perhaps including Wells, have demonstrated the capacity to learn from past mistakes. At present, there is a reasonable chance that the other directors will continue to develop and exercise independent judgment, so as not to follow Wells’ occasional invitation to preoccupy themselves with unimportant details rather than larger issues. At the same time, the other directors will have the benefit of the example of Wells’ conservative banking philosophy, tight-fisted control of costs, and overall commitment to the bank. At times, Wells’ leadership has been wrongheaded, as evidenced by his preoccupation with trying to complete the Y2K business resumption contingency plan despite his clear lack of qualifications. At times, Wells’ leadership has been indiscriminate, as evidenced by his preoccupation with controlling costs at the expense of missed opportunities for innovation and growth. At times, Wells’ leadership has been absent, as evidenced by his bizarre denunciation of the job market when he and the other directors badly needed to make some tough decisions to stop excessive employee turnover and retain qualified management. It is unclear whether Wells will respond to this regulatory intervention by maturing as a director and allowing the other directors and bank management also to develop, perhaps in different directions. If Wells is unable to do so, this regulatory intervention notifies him that future material deficiencies in his performance will become increasingly costly for him personally and also, eventually, for the bank to which he has devoted himself. As discussed in the Conclusions of Law, for the extraordinary relief of removal or restriction of a director, Petitioner must first prove a willful violation of the Consent Order or Settlement Stipulation. These documents incorporate the Cease and Desist Order, but not, for the reasons explained in the Conclusions of Law, the Safety and Soundness Order. The considerable and reasonably successful efforts, during late 1998 and 1999, of all of the directors, including Wells, to overcome the considerable problems facing First Bank preclude a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, of a willful violation of the Consent Order or Settlement Stipulation. Even if Petitioner had proved a willful violation of the Consent Order or Settlement Stipulation, it would have to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that, as a result of the violation, First Bank will likely suffer loss or other damage, that the interests of the depositors or shareholders could be seriously prejudiced, or that Wells has received financial gain and, as to the financial-gain criterion, the violation involves personal dishonesty or a continuing disregard for the safety and soundness of First Bank. Petitioner has failed to prove that any violation will likely cause First Bank to suffer loss or damage or could cause serious prejudice to depositors or shareholders. It is unnecessary to consider at length the financial-gain criterion because, even if Petitioner had proved financial gain to Wells, Petitioner has not proved any dishonesty or disregard for the bank’s safety and soundness in Wells’ compensation. For these reasons, Petitioner is not entitled to an order removing or restricting Wells. This finding would be unchanged by the application of the preponderance standard of proof. However, as noted in the Conclusions of Law, for the more modest relief of an administrative fine, Petitioner is required to prove, again by clear and convincing evidence, a mere violation of the Settlement Stipulation. As noted in the Conclusions of Law, the fine is up to $2500 daily for any such violation, up to $10,000 daily for a reckless violation, and at least up to $50,000 daily for a knowing violation. Petitioner has proved that Wells violated the Settlement Stipulation by failing to cause First Bank to employ a president after the departure of Tosh and a senior loan officer before the arrival of Ferguson. The record does not suggest that various committees of directors can take the place of qualified persons in these key managerial positions. Although insufficient to establish a reassertion of presidential duties, Wells' position of leadership on the board, as well as the focus of the Consent Order in removing Wells as president, fairly impose upon Wells personally the monetary responsibility for these failures. The record amply supports the inference that, if Wells had wanted to fill these two key managerial positions at all times, the board would have done so. It did not because Wells did not. As Petitioner must live by the deal that it struck, so must Wells. It is unnecessary to determine Wells’ state of mind in connection with these violations of the Settlement Stipulation. The periods of noncompliance as to the positions of president and senior loan officier lasted far longer than four days, so the $2500 daily fine, which does not require a reckless or knowing violation, justifies considerably more than the $10,000 fine that Petitioner seeks to impose at this time. This is a personal fine for which Wells shall neither seek nor accept reimbursement, directly or indirectly, from First Bank. As discussed in the Conclusions of Law, Petitioner is entitled to the costs of examination and supervision only if it proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that First Bank has engaged in an unsafe or unsound practice. Petitioner has failed to prove such a practice. In particular, Petitioner has failed to prove that any violation of an order from Petitioner or the FDIC creates the likelihood of loss, insolvency, or dissipation of assets or otherwise prejudices the interest of the specific financial institution or its depositors. Even if Petitioner had proved such a practice, it would be precluded from recovering any costs, at this time, due to the recent pressure upon First Bank's earnings and the extraordinary expenditures that it made during 1999 in improving its operations and responding to regulatory interventions. Obviously, though, this finding is not an exemption from the responsibility to pay such costs in the future, under appropriate circumstances. The final issue is whether Respondent Alters waived his right to demand a hearing. The Administrative Law Judge gave Respondent Alters the time between the two sets of hearing dates to obtain from an old computer a print-out of a letter in which he claimed to have requested a hearing. Petitioner’s representatives disclaimed any knowledge of such a letter. Producing a dated letter at the latter portion of the hearing, Respondent Alters was required to admit that, although he had not earlier disclosed this substantial addition, he had typed in the date shown on the letter between the dates of the two hearings. Respondent Alters did not timely request a hearing, and he waived his right to request a hearing. Petitioner is thus entitled to any and all relief that it seeks against him.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order: Dismissing Respondent Alters’ request for a hearing as untimely filed under circumstances showing that he waived his right to request a hearing and imposing such penalties as the department deems fit, consistent with law. Dismissing the department’s claim for reimbursement of examination and supervision costs from First Bank for the 1999 examination. Imposing a $10,000 fine against Respondent Wells, with a condition that he pay the fine personally and neither seek nor accept reimbursement, directly or indirectly, from First Bank. Dismissing all other claims for relief against Respondent Wells and all claims for relief against the remaining respondents, other than Respondent Alters. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Robert F. Milligan Department of Banking and Finance Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Plaza Level 09 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Robert Beitler, Acting General Counsel Department of banking and finance Fletcher Building, Suite 526 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Richard T. Donelan, Jr. Chief Banking Counsel Robert Alan Fox Assistant General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Suite 526, The Fletcher Building 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 William G. Cooper Cooper, Ridge & Beale, P.A. 200 West Forsythe Street, Suite 1200 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Jeffrey C. Regan Hendrick, Dewberry & Regan, P.A. 50 North Laura Street, Suite 2225 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Timothy D. Alters, pro se 2020 Vela Norte Circle Atlantic Beach, Florida 32233 Arthur G. Sartorius, III 1919 Atlantic Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32207
The Issue In DOAH Case No. 92-2455 the Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Banking (Department) seeks to recover the costs of examination and supervision of Bay Bank and Trust Company (Bay Bank). As reason, Bay Bank is alleged to have engaged in unsafe or unsound practices as discovered in the examination the Department made of Bay Bank on March 31, 1991. In addition, the Department seeks to impose a late payment penalty in the amount of $100.00 per day commencing on November 15, 1991, and an administrative fine of $1000.00 per day commencing on December 16, 1991. See Section 655.045(1), Florida Statutes (1991). In DOAH Case No. 92-3744 the Department seeks entry of a cease and desist order directed to Bay Bank and to John Christo, Jr. (Christo, Jr.) and John Christo, III (Christo, III). See Section 655.033, Florida Statutes (1991). Moreover, the Department seeks to remove Christo, Jr. and Christo, III, as Bay Bank Directors and to prohibit their participation in the affairs of Bay Bank or any other financial institution regulated by the Department. See Section 655.037, Florida Statutes (1991). In particular the Department seeks to impose this discipline based upon alleged unsafe and unsound practices as determined through the Department's March 31, 1991, examination conducted at Bay Bank and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) examination conducted at Bay Bank on November 18, 1991; for alleged breaches of the written agreement entered into between Bay Bank and the Department following the March 31, 1991 examination; for alleged violation of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 C.F.R. s. 215.4, known as Regulation O; for alleged violation of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. s. 371(c), and for alleged violation of fiduciary duties associated with the previously described acts by Christo, Jr. and Christo, III.
Findings Of Fact Prehearing Stipulations of Fact The following facts were admitted and required no proof at the final hearing: At all times material hereto, Bay Bank and Trust Company ("Bay Bank") has been a state-chartered, federally insured bank operating under Charter No. 188-T, having a principal place of business at 509 Harrison Avenue, Box 1350, Panama City, Florida, 32402. At all times material hereto, Florida Bay Bank, Inc. ("FBB") has been a Florida corporation operating as a one bank holding company. FBB owns 100 percent of Bay Bank. At all times material hereto, John Christo, Jr. has been chairman of the board of FBB, John Christo, III has been president and Irene Christo has been secretary/treasurer. Until November, 1992, John Christo, Jr. was Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Bay Bank. From November, 1992, John Christo Jr. has been Chairman of the Board of Bay Bank. Until July, 1992, John Christo, III was a Director and President of Bay Bank. From July, 1992 until the present, Christo III has been Vice-Chairman of the Board of Bay Bank. At all times material hereto, JCJ Irrevocable Trust ("JCJ Trust") has been a trust, the managing trustee of which has been John Christo, III. Each of the children of John Christo, Jr. has possessed a beneficial interest in JCJ Trust in at least the following amounts: John Christo, III - 40 percent James Phillip Christo - 30 percent Irene L. Christo - 30 percent FBB has two classes of voting securities outstanding, voting preferred stock and common stock. At all times material hereto, John Christo, Jr. owned approximately 97 percent of the preferred stock and JCJ Trust owned more than 65 percent of the common stock of FBB. John Christo, Jr. was Chairman of the Board and owned approximately 32 percent of the outstanding shares of Bay Savings Bank, a state chartered savings and loan association in West Palm Beach. JCJ Trust owned approximately 37 percent of Bay Savings Bank. FBB owned approximately 5 percent of Bay Savings Bank. Bay Savings Bank failed and was placed in receivership by the Resolution Trust Corporation on September 6, 1992. On April 18, 1986, the Board of Directors of Bay Bank voted to approve two irrevocable standby letters of credit in favor of SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, N.A. ("SouthTrust") for the benefit of John Christo, Jr. (LOC #281) and JCJ Trust (LOC #282) respectively. These letters of credit were unsecured. These loans at SouthTrust were originally obtained by the Christos for the purpose of providing the initial capitalization of Bay Savings Bank in West Palm Beach. These letters of credit were subsequently renewed and approved by the Board of Directors of Bay Bank on April 18, 1989 and again on February 15, 1990. These renewal letters of credit, like #281 and #282, were unsecured. On February 19, 1991, the Board of Directors of Bay Bank voted to again renew the irrevocable letters of credit in favor of SouthTrust for the benefit of and to secure the debts of JCJ Trust and John Christo, Jr. to SouthTrust. Christo, Jr. was present at the board meeting when the board voted to approve LOC #509. Christo, III voted with the Board of Directors of Bay Bank to approve LOC #509. On February 25, 1991, Bay Bank issued the irrevocable letter of credit (LOC #509) in favor of SouthTrust in the aggregate amount of $425,000 for the benefit of and to secure a debt owed by JCJ Trust to SouthTrust. The terms of LOC #509 permitted SouthTrust to draw any amounts of funds due and payable to SouthTrust from JCJ Trust that were at least 30 days past due, up to the limit of LOC #509. On September 23, 1991, SouthTrust sent Bay Bank a letter indicating that SouthTrust would draw on LOC #509 because JCJ Trust owed SouthTrust $433,429.17, which amount was past due for more than 30 days. On October 2, 1991, Bay Bank funded a loan in the amount of $425,000 to JCJ Trust to cover LOC #509 as drawn upon by SouthTrust. The note was signed by Christo, III as trustee of JCJ Trust. The note was unsecured. On February 25, 1991, Bay Bank issued the irrevocable letter of credit (LOC #510) in favor of SouthTrust in the aggregate amount of $425,000 for the benefit of and to secure a debt by Christo, Jr. to SouthTrust. The terms of LOC #510 permitted SouthTrust to draw any amount of funds due and payable to SouthTrust from Christo, Jr. that were at least 30 days past due, up to the limit of LOC #510. Christo, Jr. was present at the board meeting when the board voted to approve LOC #510. John Christo, III voted with the Board of Directors to approve LOC #510. On August 26, 1991, SouthTrust notified Bay Bank that it would draw on LOC #510 because Christo, Jr. owed SouthTrust $425,000, which amount was past due for more than 30 days. On September 3, 1991, Bay Bank funded an unsecured loan in the amount of $425,000 to Christo, Jr. to cover LOC #510 as drawn upon by SouthTrust. The note was signed by Christo, Jr. Although bank documents reflect board approval of LOC #509 and #510, there is no bank document relating to LOC #509 or #510 reflecting approval by the Board of Directors, on or about the time of the issuance of LOC #509 and #510, of the terms of any loan to John Christo, Jr. or JCJ Trust that might be made should the letters of credit be drawn upon by SouthTrust. In December, 1990, Bay Bank exchanged a 1986 Ferrari Testarossa with FBB in exchange for a 1984 Ferrari 4001. The Bank booked the value of the 4001 as $35,954 and FBB booked the value of the Testarossa at $110,793. The Testarossa had a market value in excess of that of the 4001. No security was given by FBB in connection with this transaction. Other Facts The State Examination and Findings Pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)15, Florida Statutes (1992 Supp.) (Use of Manuals) Consistent with long-standing practices in examining Bay Bank and other financial institutions over which the Department has had jurisdiction, it performed an examination to assess Bay Bank's financial condition and banking practices. This examination took place on March 31, 1991. In performing the examination it employed the use of a manual produced by the FDIC which the Department has used in conducting examinations beginning in 1977, to include examinations of Bay Bank. The Department also utilized its Examination Procedures Manual. Again, this manual had been referred to in the past when conducting examinations of this and other regulated institutions. As had been its custom the Department also utilized a document known as Management Evaluation Guidelines, derived from information gained from the state of Texas. Prior to the March 31, 1991 examination the Department had used the Management Evaluation Guidelines in performing examinations of Bay Bank. The Department has substantially affected the interest of Bay Bank and the Christos by resort to the three manuals in conducting the March 31, 1991 examination. None of these manuals had been adopted as rules when the March 31, 1991 examination was made; however, on August 6, 1993, Respondent noticed its intent to adopt the manuals as rules through incorporation by reference into an existing chapter within the Florida Administrative Code. The FDIC Manual establishes a rating system known as the Camel rating system. That acronym stands for measurements of a bank's condition related to capital, asset quality, management, earnings and liquidity. Out of component scores assigned to those measurements of the bank's condition, but not through averaging, an aggregate score is assigned which identifies the overall health of the institution. An aggregate score of 1 is the highest rating, with aggregate scores of 4 or 5 considered to be substandard. In March, 1991, as in its general experience with prior examinations, the Department equated the assigned aggregate score of 4 with unsafe and unsound practices by Bay Bank. This opinion was held when taking into account the specific conditions within the bank found at the time of examination and as set forth in the post-examination written report. The Camel rating system had its origin with the Federal Financial Institutions Examinations Council and was designed to identify institutions that needed closer supervisory attention. It is a system that had been used in regulation of banks since the 1970s. The FDIC Manual and the state Examination Procedures Manual include definitions of the numerical ratings found within the Camel rating system. The source material for arriving at the Camel ratings are constituted of the lending institution's records and other information gathered during the examination sessions. In assigning the Camel ratings in the March 31, 1991 examination, the Department followed these approaches. In addition to the Camel rating system, the FDIC Manual sets forth criteria related to determining whether a bank violated federal banking statutes and regulations. On this occasion the Department considered the criteria set forth in the FDIC Manual to determine whether Bay Bank violated federal law. The Department's Examination Procedures Manual explains procedural steps that the examiners took in conducting the March 31, 1991 examination. The state Examination Procedures Manual affords latitude to the examiners to deviate from guidelines set forth in the manual if the deviation can be supported in writing. The right to deviate from the guidelines was available upon the occasion of the March 31, 1991 examination. Over and above the possibility that an examiner, in this case an examiner performing the examination on March 31, 1991, would deviate from the guidelines set forth in the state Examination Procedures Manual, the entire examination process draws upon the experience of the examiner in a somewhat subjective manner and in recognition that the activity of bank examination is one that requires flexibility in thinking. Specific guidance to the examiners contained within the state Examination Procedures Manual includes a statement of expected documentation that a bank should have in support of its loans, instructions concerning how to grade the bank, as well as how to proceed with the examination, to include various operational steps to be taken while conducting the examination. The state Examination Procedures Manual also sets forth personnel duties for the examiners. The state Examination Procedures Manual sets forth the need for bankers to adhere to safe and sound banking practices. The Management Evaluation Guidelines sets forth guidance for the examiners, to include their responsibilities in the March 31, 1991 examination, related to assessing bank management. This guidance is in addition to the guidance set forth in the FDIC Manual and the state Examination Procedures Manual. The Management Evaluation Guidelines sets out instructions about its use and provides worksheets to be executed in the assessment process. The rating system contemplated by the Management Evaluation Guidelines ties in with the Camel rating system. Aside from the legal requirements set forth in Chapter 655, Florida Statutes, the Department has not established formal rules which would further define the term "unsafe and unsound" practices as that term describes the circumstances under which the Department would assess a bank for costs of examination and supervision, seek to order a bank or its directors, officers and employees to cease and desist or seek the removal of a bank's officers and directors and to restrict and prohibit those officers and directors from participating in the affairs of that bank or any other financial institution over which the Petitioner has regulatory authority. Other than information gained during an examination, to include the March 31, 1991 examination, concerning perceptions held by the examiners about the Camel ratings for the bank, as reflected in the examination report provided to the bank and through the aforementioned manuals, the Department has made no attempt to specifically describe its use of the Camel ratings. The explanation of the Camel rating as set forth in the three manuals would become codified requirements of law if the rule enactment process is concluded. The contents of those manuals would be specifically disseminated to affected persons with that eventuality; however, such an arrangement would have only prospective utility as a means to specifically notify a regulated entity concerning the imposition of the regulatory terms set forth in the manuals. When the March 31, 1991 report of examination was prepared there were no formal written rules or other written guidance concerning the occasion upon which the Department would seek a written agreement as opposed to an imposition of a cease and desist order in trying to correct problems with a bank discovered through the examination process. Instead, the Department exercised its discretion consistent with findings made during the examination. The three manuals offer assistance in the proper exercise of regulatory discretion concerning corrective action directed to a given institution and had that part to play in the March 31, 1991 examination process as well as the overall decision to pursue the present cases. As far back as 1984 it has not been the Department's policy to provide copies of the state Examination Procedures Manual to institutions being examined under its terms. It was not the policy to provide a copy of the state Examination Procedures Manual to the Bay Bank at the March 31, 1991 examination. On the other hand, there has never been any prohibition against allowing the members of the banking industry in Florida or others to have access to the state manual. Similarly, the Department does not provide copies of the FDIC Manual to the public, nor did it provide a copy of the FDIC Manual to Bay Bank when the March 31, 1991 examination was conducted. The Department does not deem the failure to provide that manual and the state Examination Procedures Manual as an inappropriate oversight. The Department is not conversant with the opportunities which the public, to include Bay Bank, would have to obtain the FDIC Manual from federal officials. The Department makes the assumption that the FDIC Manual is available from the FDIC. Finally, Respondent does not publish the Management Evaluation Guidelines for the benefit of members of the regulated industry, but it would provide a copy of the Management Evaluation Guidelines on request. In particular, it did not provide a copy of the Management Evaluation Guidelines to Bay Bank associated with the March 31, 1991 examination. None of the three manuals discussed are deemed to be confidential. Ultimately, the decision to take administrative action based upon the findings made in the March 31, 1991 examination must be factually supported and legally correct, whatever contribution was made to the regulatory function when the Department chose to make its customary usage of the three manuals in performing the March 31, 1991 examination. Petitioners Exhibit No. 2 is the report of examination for March 31, 1991. It identifies the aggregate Camel rating of 4 and sets forth the reasons for that finding. As set forth in the report of examination there were numerous unsatisfactory conditions found during the March 31, 1991 examination. In particular, the findings in the report of examination identify a number of unsafe or unsound practices, together with other shortcomings in the performance by Bay Bank, its management, employees and directors. In carrying out the examination of March 31, 1991, the examination team was constituted of 14 examiners to include two Area Financial Managers, two Financial Examiner Analyst Supervisors, and two Financial Specialists. Two members of the examination team were trainees. The work performed by the trainees was supervised and the examination findings made were not constituted of work performed by the trainees that had not been reviewed. In conducting the examination 2,538 hours were devoted to the task. Additionally, the examiner in charge spent 116 hours planning the examination and writing the report of examination, activities conducted away from the bank. The costs of examination and supervision was $67,494.20. Review was made of the examination report through various department employees. This arrangement was in accordance with normal departmental routine for conducting such review. The only notable change to the report prepared by the Examiner in Charge concerned the component Camel rating for assets wherein the Examiner in Charge had failed to offer a written explanation for assigning a component rating of 4 when written guidelines in the state Examination Procedures Manual called for a 5 for that component. Consequently the component rating was changed by the Bureau Chief for the area where Bay Bank conducts its business. This change for the asset component did not modify the overall Camel rating. Among the unsafe and unsound practices discovered in the March 31, 1991 examination was Bay Bank's failure to establish an adequate loan loss reserve. The management and directors had set aside approximately 1.364 million dollars for loan loss reserve. The methodology utilized by the Department to identify an adequate loan loss reserve revealed the need for 4.05 million dollars to be available for that function. That methodology is accepted. Therefore, the deficiency in the loan loss reserve approximated 2.686 million dollars. This shortfall was brought about by the ineffective methods of risk identification which the bank management and its directors had utilized prior to the March 31, 1991 examination. For a substantial period of time prior to the March 31, 1991 examination Bay Bank had maintained a significantly higher percentage of noncurrent loans and leases than its peers, while maintaining a loan loss reserve comparable to its peers. This contributed to the inadequate loan loss reserve. Bay Bank questioned the formula employed by the Department to establish loan loss reserves wherein it is anticipated that 10 percent losses are contemplated for substandard loans. Bay Bank claimed to have a loss experience for substandard loans in the range of 2 to 4 percent. Nonetheless, the Bay Bank internal loan watch-list estimated the loss of approximately 9.14 percent for each loan that it had designated as substandard, which more closely approximates the formula utilized by the Department in establishing a proper loan loss reserve. The deficiency in the loan loss reserve is high and contrary to standards expected of Bay Bank in maintaining a loan loss reserve, so much so that it constitutes an unsafe and unsound practice. Without providing an adequate reserve the financial health of the banking institution is at risk, in that the management has a false picture of the bank's condition when making decisions about banking activities. The deficiency in the loan loss reserve creates the likelihood of abnormal risk or loss, insolvency, or dissipation of assets or other serious prejudice to the interests of the bank and its depositors. During the March 31, 1991 examination, the examiners found numerous instances where the bank management had failed to establish or enforce internal routines and controls. Included within those findings were: Improper recordation of other real estate (ORE) within the bank's books, contrary to bank loan policies, Failure to obtain and maintain current appraisals on ORE and pending ORE, Failure to establish adequate records to allow reconciliation of income and expenses relating to ORE and to maintain adequate documentation thereof, Failure to comply with the bank's loan policies preventing the continued accrual of interest on loans delinquent 90 days or more, Failure to implement credit risk grades established in loan policies more than a year before the examination period, Disorganized and outdated loan file information, Statutory violations associated with loans that were past due for more than a year and Failure to document secured real estate loans as first liens, a requirement by the bank's loan policy and state law. As the examination report states, Bay Bank's Board of Directors had implemented a corrective plan of action dated January 31, 1989, which responded to material deficiencies that had been reported in the June 30, 1988 FDIC report of examination and the November 30, 1987 Department report of examination. The findings within the March 31, 1991 examination show significant violations of the internal plan for corrective action implemented on January 31, 1989, especially in the area of adequate loan policies and the need to insure compliance with the requirements of law. The failure to establish and enforce internal routines and controls and noncompliance with the January 31, 1989 corrective plan of action point to practices and conduct contrary to proper expectations incumbent upon Bay Bank, its management and directors, thereby constituting unsafe and unsound practices that creates the likelihood of abnormal risk or loss, insolvency, or dissipation of assets or otherwise seriously prejudices the interests of Bay Bank or its depositors. The March 31, 1991 examination revealed violations of laws and regulations governing the bank's activities. Taken together these violations point to an unsafe and unsound practice that creates the likelihood of abnormal risk or loss, insolvency or dissipation of assets or otherwise seriously prejudices the interests of the bank or its depositors. On the occasion of the March 31, 1991 examination it was appropriate for the Department to advise Bay Bank to refrain from paying dividends until asset quality, earnings and capital had improved sufficiently to justify dividend payments. Prior to the examination Bay Bank had paid questionably high dividend amounts in a circumstance in which the bank's capital position was tenuous. The excessive levels of adversely classified loans discovered during the March 31, 1991 examination were somewhat the product of conditions in the local economy. However, the outside influences in the economy did not completely explain the deteriorating loan portfolio and offer a defense to imprudent lending practices and the failure to adequately diversify the loan portfolio. The imprudent lending practices were manifested through inadequate risk identification and lack of proper attention to problem loans. In the final analysis the bank management and directors were responsible for the loan portfolio's substandard condition. The circumstances associated with adversely classified loans as commented on in the March 31, 1991 examination report are indicators of unsafe and unsound practices by bank management and the directors, creating the likelihood of abnormal risk or loss, insolvency, or dissipation of assets or otherwise seriously prejudicing the interests of the bank or its depositors. Costs of Examination, Late Payment Penalty and Administrative Fine On July 26, 1991, the Department transmitted a copy of its March 31, 1991 examination report to Bay Bank. Then on July 31, 1991, the Department began a free-form negotiation process to try and get Bay Bank to honor an invoice in the amount of $67,494.20 which constituted the costs associated with examination and supervision for the March 31, 1991 examination. The theory for claiming those costs was pursuant to Section 655.045, Florida Statutes (1991), which indicates that the Department may recover the costs of the examination and supervision against banks engaging in unsafe and unsound practices as defined at Section 655.005(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1991). The correspondence dated July 31, 1991, asked Bay Bank to remit payment within 30 days of receipt of the invoice setting forth the costs of the examination and supervision. The correspondence reminded Bay Bank that a late payment penalty of up to $100.00 a day might be imposed for overdue examination and supervisory fees. This reminder was as contemplated by Section 655.045, Florida Statutes (1991). A dialogue commenced between the Department and Bay Bank through further correspondence in which Bay Bank was unavailing in its attempt to convince the Department that its practices as revealed through the March 31, 1991 examination were not unsafe and unsound, thereby setting aside the right for the Department to assess the costs of examination and supervision. Rather than apprising Bay Bank that it could contest the preliminary agency decision concerning assessment of costs of examination and supervision related to the March 31, 1991 examination, by resort to procedures set forth in Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, the Department sent another free-form notification on October 2, 1991, stating that the Department continued to assert its claim based upon the belief that the practices found in the March 31, 1991 examination constituted unsafe and unsound practices. Again the October 2, 1991 correspondence instructed Bay Bank to remit $67,494.20 within 30 days of receipt of the letter. Having failed to hear from the bank by virtue of its October 2, 1991 communication, the Department again wrote on November 13, 1991, this time telling Bay Bank that the Department had determined to impose a late payment penalty of $100.00 per day commencing November 5, 1991, and of the possibility of imposing a $1,000.00 per day administrative fines if payment were not received. This November 13, 1991, correspondence was free-form. As with prior correspondence it did not advise Bay Bank of its right to seek relief pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. On February 5, 1992, another free-form communication was provided vying for the cost of the examination and supervision related to the March 31, 1991 examination, reminding Bay Bank that the Department was persuaded that it was entitled to a late payment penalty of $100.00 per day commencing November 5, 1991, and informing Bay Bank that as of December 16, 1991, a date upon which the Department surmised Bay Bank had received an earlier communication, that the Department was imposing an administrative fine of $1,000.00 per day. As was the circumstance of prior occasions the February 5, 1992 correspondence was free- form and failed to advise Bay Bank concerning its right to seek administrative relief from the decision by the agency to seek the costs of examination and supervision for alleged unsafe and unsound practices. Finally, the Department issued an administrative complaint to recover the costs of examination and supervision associated with the March 31, 1991 examination. This complaint was dated March 11, 1992, and advised Bay Bank of its right to contest the determination concerning whether the practices by Bay Bank were unsafe and unsound, thus entitling the Department to collect the costs of examination and supervision associated with the March 31, 1991 examination. The administrative complaint also asserted claims for late penalty and administrative fines dating from November 5, 1991 and December 16, 1991 respectively. Bay Bank contested the administrative complaint leading to the formal hearing which this recommended order addresses. Absent a rule describing the occasion upon which the Department would seek to recover costs of examination and supervision for unsafe and unsound practices, the Department has acted rationally and has been acceptably consistent in exercising its discretion to recover the costs of examination and supervision when comparing the Bay Bank experience to other circumstances where the Department had the opportunity to recover costs of examination and supervision based upon unsafe and unsound practices within an institution. Further Administrative Correction: The Written Agreement Based upon the results of the March 31, 1991 examination the Department deemed it necessary to initiate administrative action against Bay Bank and its directors in accordance with Section 655.033, Florida Statutes (1991). That provision allows the Department to impose cease and desist orders for unsafe and unsound practices, violations of laws relating to the operation of the bank, violation of rules of the Department, violation of orders of the Department or breach of any written agreement with the Department. The law contemplates that a complaint shall be drawn stating the facts that support the action and noticing the accused of the opportunity to seek hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. The Department did not file the formal administrative complaint. Instead, through negotiations with Bay Bank and its directors it addressed the concerns the Department had about the findings made in the report of examination through entry of a written agreement between the Department and Bay Bank and its directors. In anticipation of the written agreement the directors of Bay Bank passed a resolution in support of the written agreement. The directors took that action on September 17, 1991. Two directors were not immediately available to execute the written agreement as such by signing the document. Their unavailability delayed the submission of the written agreement signed by Bay Bank until October 4, 1991. On that date Bay Bank transmitted the signed written agreement to the Department. In support of the written agreement there was a stipulation between the parties to enter into the written agreement. Given the language of the stipulation to enter the written agreement and the written agreement itself, it was contemplated that both documents be executed simultaneously by the Bay Bank directors and that the Department would sign the stipulation to enter the written agreement at the time that the directors signed the stipulation to enter the written agreement. The signing of the stipulation to enter into the written agreement and the written agreement itself by Bay Bank directors and the signing of the stipulation to enter into the written agreement by the Department would make the written agreement effective upon the date of issuance by the Department subsequent to those activities. The written agreement would be issued after the Comptroller signed it. The stipulation to enter into the written agreement was signed by both parties on October 7, 1991. The language employed with the signing of the stipulation to enter the written agreement stated: WHEREFORE, and it is resolved, that in consideration of the foregoing, the Department and Bay Bank and Trust Co., Panama City, Florida and each of the directors, hereby execute this Stipulation and consent to its terms, this 7th day of October, 1991. The exact language related to the effective date of the written agreement was set forth in the stipulation to enter into the written agreement at Paragraph 6 which stated: Effectiveness. Bay Bank and each of the directors stipulate and agree that the Agreement attached hereto shall be effective on the date of its issuance by the Department. The version of the written agreement upon which the Department has based its actions is dated September 29, 1991, and carries the Comptroller's signature. On October 9, 1991, through correspondence from Department's counsel to counsel for Bay Bank, the Department acknowledged receipt of the written agreement signed by the directors. The October 9, 1991 correspondence from the Department to the bank goes on to describe the notion that when the Comptroller signed the written agreement one of the originals would be forwarded to the bank for its file. This comment makes the meaning of the September 29, 1991, signature by the Comptroller unclear. Further contributing to the confusion, there is a reference in the next paragraph to the October 9, 1991 correspondence, to the effect that some conversation was held between counsel for the Department and a Joel McLamore in the office of counsel for the bank, about an agreement made in the course of that conversation, that the written agreement had an effective date of September 29, 1991. On October 14, 1991 the written agreement was docketed by the Department. On that same date the Department sent the bank a copy of the written agreement as executed by the Comptroller. Again, this correspondences from the Department stated that the written agreement had an effective date of November 29, 1991. On November 12, 1991, further correspondence was directed from the Department to Bay Bank making mention that the Department considered the effective date of the agreement to be September 29, 1991. Before the occasion of the administrative complaint seeking a cease and desist order and removal and prohibition directed to Christo, Jr. and Christo, III there was no dispute concerning the effective date of the written agreement. Now Bay Bank and the Christos assert that the written agreement was effective on October 7, 1991, contrary to the Department's position that the effective date is September 29, 1991. The general purposes which the parties had in mind for entering into the stipulation for entry of the written agreement are set out in Paragraph 1 to that stipulation which states: Consideration. The Department has determined that necessary grounds exist to initiate an administrative proceeding pursuant to Section 655.033, Florida Statutes, against Bay Bank and each of the directors. Bay Bank and each of the directors wish to cooperate with the Department and avoid the initiation of administrative litigation. Accordingly, Bay Bank and each of the directors, hereby stipulate and agree to the following terms in consideration of the Department's forbearance from initiating such administrative litigation through the attached Written Agreement (hereinafter Agreement). This intent by the parties to resolve their differences is brought forth in the written agreement where it states: WHEREAS, in an effort to avoid the consequences of protracted litigation and by virtue of signing the Stipulation, Bay Bank and each of the directors have waived their rights to separately stated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, such findings and conclusions would be taken from and based upon the most recent State Report of Examination, specifically the State's Report of Examination dated March 31, 1991. By the terms of the stipulation for entry into the written agreement Bay Bank and its directors consented had agreed to the entry of the written agreement and to comply with the provisions, without admitting or denying violations of laws or regulations or rules and without admitting or denying that those entities had engaged in any unsafe and unsound practices. There was a section within the stipulation to enter into the written agreement which spoke to the matter of future administrative action by the Department against Bay Bank or its directors where it stated: 7. Future Action. The Stipulation is being entered into without prejudice to the rights of the Department and to take such further action, joint or severally, against Bay Bank and the directors as the Department deems necessary and appropriate to insure compliance with the terms of the Stipulation and the attached Agreement, any other Agreement or order entered against Bay Bank, and/or to prevent any violation of laws relating to financial institutions. The written agreement did not speak to the opportunity for the Department to seek costs of examination and supervision pursuant to Section 655.045, Florida Statutes (1991), and to pursue removal and prohibition actions against Christo, Jr., and Christo, III, as Bay Bank officers pursuant to Section 655.037, Florida Statutes (1991), based upon findings made in the March 31, 1991 examination. Among requirements of the written agreement was found Paragraph 5 (a) which states: As of the effective date of this Agreement, the Bank shall not extend, directly or indirectly, any additional credit to or for the benefit of any borrower who has a loan or other extension of credit from the Bank which has been charged-off or classified, in whole or in part, "Loss" or "Doubtful" and is uncollected. The prohibition of this paragraph 5(a) shall not prohibit the Bank from renewing or extending the maturity of any credit, provided that the renewal or extension is approved by the full board and that all interest due at the time of such renewal or extension is collected in cash from the borrower. An additional requirement of the written agreement was set forth in Paragraph 7 where it states: As of the effective date of this Agreement, all new loans or lines of credit (including renewals and extensions of existing loans and lines of credit, but excluding additional advances under existing lines of credit) in an amount of $200,000 or more shall require the prior approval of the Bank's board of directors or the directors' committee designated to approve and review loans, and all such loans or lines of credit shall be supported by a written summary that provides the board of directors or directors' committee with the information sufficient for it to make a prudent decision. The Department seeks to impose discipline based upon alleged violations of the written agreement as set forth in the administrative complaint of May 15, 1992. Specifically, that administrative complaint contains allegations of violation of the written agreement associated with Paragraphs 5(a) and 7 directed to Bay Bank and the Christos for cease and desist and as a means of removal and prohibition against the Christos. Concerning Paragraph 5(a), Bay Bank allowed a customer to post over drafts on his checking account, thus maintaining an overdraft position, commencing September 28, 1991, and ending November 18, 1991. The allegations related to Paragraph 7 are discussed under the section in the recommended order detailing events about the letter of credit and a subsequent loan to JCJ Trust said to be made without board approval and proper documentation. Beyond alleged violations of the compromise of the differences between the Department, Bay Bank and its directors embodied by the written agreement, the May 15, 1992 administrative complaint seeks to impose discipline against the Christos for findings made in the course of the March 31, 1991 examination. Those allegations are associated with the manner in which the Christos conducted themselves as officers and directors of Bay Bank based upon findings made through the examination of March 31, 1991 related to the Christos' fiduciary duties. These latter allegations are grounded upon the contention that the Christos were responsible for the unsafe and unsound practices discovered during the March 31, 1991 examination. In response to problems with the payment of dividends Paragraph 2e of the written agreement stated: 2. (e) During the life of this Agreement, the bank shall not pay any dividends at any time it is in noncompliance with the capital and reserve requirement specified in paragraphs 2.(b), 3., 9., or Section 658.37, Florida Statutes. Prior to declaration of dividends, the board of directors will certify the bank's compliance with the cited sections and provide that certification to the Department. Letters of Credit and Loans On April 18, 1986, Bay Bank issued an unconditional/ irrevocable letter of credit to South Trust Bank of Alabama for JCJ Trust and a similar letter of credit to South Trust Bank of Alabama for Christo, Jr. Both letters of credit were in the amount of $425,000.00. The letters of credit expired on February 25, 1989. South Trust had required letters of credit as preconditions to granting the loans described on the stipulated facts herein. At some point in time unsigned notes and security agreements were placed in the files of Bay Bank associated with the Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust letters of credit. The terms of the notes and security agreements to address the contingency that South Trust Bank would draw upon the letters of credit were not identified. Also missing was an amount of collateral to secure repayment. Nonetheless, there appeared to be a commitment by Bay Bank to meet the contingency where South Trust Bank drew upon the letters of credit by Bay Bank by then offering to loan money to Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust at an undisclosed rate. The Bay Bank records merely describe the collateral arrangement for such a contingent liability as "open". Further letters of credit were requested by Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust and issued by Bay Bank in the amount of $425,000.00 each to favor South Trust. The next letters of credit were issued on April 26, 1989. The duration of those letters of credit was until February 25, 1990. The letters of credit of April 26, 1989, had been approved by action of the Bay Bank directors through a common certification for John Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust in which Christo, Jr. and Christo, III, abstained from voting and other beneficiaries through the JCJ Trust who were directors to Bay Bank were absent. When the letters of credit were issued on April 26, 1989, the loan line presentation for Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust revealed that no collateral was required when issuing the letters of credit to favor South Trust Bank. Included with the documents under consideration by the directors when they decided to issue these letters of credit was customer profile information for Christo, Jr., a statement of financial condition dated December 31, 1988 for Christo, Jr., a balance sheet for JCJ Trust from December 31, 1988, a February 28, 1989 portfolio investment review for JCJ Trust, and a review of assets of JCJ Trust as of December 31, 1988. On February 15, 1990, the Bay Bank directors again voted to approve lines of credit to favor South Trust Bank in amounts of $425,000.00 each at the request of Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust. The common certification of approval shows that Christo, Jr. and Christo, III abstained, while Missey Christo and Phillip Christo beneficiaries under JCJ Trust and directors voted to approve the issuance of the letters of credit. Again the loan line presentations for Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust reveal that collateral was not required in issuing the two letters of credit. The terms of the duration of the letters of credit issued on February 25, 1990, ended on February 25, 1991. The beginning date for the letters of credit was February 25, 1990. The Bay Bank records reveal a customer profile of John Christo, Jr., as associated with the letter of credit approved on February 15, 1990. The information concerning the customer profile is dated February 13, 1990. On February 19, 1991, the Bay Bank directors were requested to and voted to issue letters of credit to favor South Trust Bank related to Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust in the amount of $425,000.00 each. The common certification of approval shows that Christo, Jr. abstained from voting. Christo, III, voted in favor of the letters of credit as did Phillip Christo and Missey Christo, other directors and beneficiaries under JCJ Trust. In association with the letters of credit on February 19, 1991, the loan line presentations for Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust revealed that no collateral was provided. The act of approval involved a customer profile for Christo, Jr. from February 12, 1991. Also included was a balance sheet for JCJ Trust dated December 31, 1989, with notes to the financial statement. The duration of the respective letters of credit was February 25, 1991 through February 25, 1992. A draft or drafts drawn on the respective letters of credit would be honored through March 25, 1992. Each time Bay Bank through its directors voted to approve letters of credit to favor South Trust Bank at the request made by Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust, the directors exercised distinct acts of discretion. The letters of credit issued in 1986, 1989, 1990 and 1991 did not establish terms that would entitle Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust to an automatic renewal once a prior letter of credit expired. Each letter of credit had its own identifying number. The common features of the respective letters of credit were that they were irrevocable and transferable. Commencing with the series of the letters of credit issued in 1989 and extending through the series in 1990 and 1991, the basis for drawing on the letters of credit was a statement from South Trust Bank that the amount for which the draft was drawn was representative of amounts due and payable by Christo, Jr. or JCJ Trust to South Trust Bank on loans extended from South Trust Bank to Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust which were a minimum of 30 days past due. The March 31, 1991 examination did not report that the actions by Christo, Jr., Christo, III, and other beneficiaries that the JCJ Trust who were directors had violated any laws or regulations in their conduct around the time the Bay Bank directors' made their February 19, 1991 decision to approve the letters of credit to favor South Trust Bank. Contentions of violations of laws or regulations concerning the conduct by Christo, Jr. and Christo, III first arose in the May 15, 1992 administrative complaint for cease and desist and removal and prohibition. The administrative complaint concerning inappropriate action by Christo, Jr. and Christo, III in their consideration of the extension of the letters of credit to South Trust Bank through the February 19, 1991 meeting of Bay Bank directors and the consequences of that decision is somewhat premised upon findings made by the FDIC in the November 18, 1991 examination as adopted by the Department, in which the FDIC reported violations of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 C.F.R. 215.4 (Regulation O), and Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. s. 371(c). Related allegations about the letters of credit are based upon claims of breaches of fiduciary duties by the Christos. A further discussion of the November 18, 1991, federal examination follows. A notation was made in the March 31, 1991 examination concerning the Christo, Jr. letter of credit issued on February 25, 1991 in the amount of $425,000.00 wherein it is described in the examination report as, "additionally, a contingent liability of an unfunded, unsecured letter of credit to South Trust Bank of Alabama, N.A. to secure a $425,000.00 note there, also exist." As of August 26, 1991, Christo, Jr. was past due on his obligation to South Trust Bank and South Trust Bank drew upon the letter of credit. The draw was in the amount of $425,115.00 which was paid from Bay Bank to South Trust Bank on August 26, 1991. On September 3, 1991, Christo, Jr. signed a term disclosure note and security agreement in the amount of $425,000.00 at an annual interest rate of 10.736 percent. That interest rate was not more favorable than an ordinary customer of Bay Bank could have obtained. No security was required when Bay Bank made its September 3, 1991 loan to Christo, Jr. On September 23, 1991, the JCJ Trust debt to South Trust Bank having been overdue for more than 30 days, South Trust Bank drew upon the letter of credit associated with JCJ Trust. The draw was in the amount of $425,000.00. On October 2, 1991, a loan in the principle amount of $426,479.80 was made from Bay Bank to JCJ Trust, Christo, III as Trustee, to cover the draw that had been made by South Trust Bank against Bay Bank upon the letter of credit. The granting of this loan is alleged to be in violation of paragraph 7 to the written agreement. It is not a violation because the loan predates the effective date of the written agreement. The maturity date on the loan made on October 2, 1991, was October 1, 1992. The annual percentage rate was 10.885, interest terms that were not more favorable to JCJ Trust than would be available to Bay Bank's ordinary customers. In February, 1992, the Bay Bank directors took action to approve the loan that had been made to JCJ Trust on October 2, 1991. No indication is made in the credit file records of Bay Bank concerning the date upon which the Bay Bank directors may have approved the September 3, 1991 loan to Christo, Jr. Prudent lending practices would not have justified the approval of the February 26, 1991, letters of credit requested by Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust when taking into account credit information made available to the Bay Bank directors, especially when considering that the letters of credit were approved without provision of security from the requesting parties, Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust. It can be inferred that Christo, Jr., Christo, III, and other directors were aware that the custom and practice within Bay Bank was to not extend letters of credit in excess of $100,000.00 without requiring provision of security in the way of mortgages on real estate, certificates of deposit or a combination of both forms of security. At the time the February 19, 1991 decision was made to approve the letters of credit to South Bay at the request of Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust, it can be inferred that Christo, Jr. and Christo, III, recognized that terms of credit should not have been granted to those requesting parties because the arrangements did not comport with terms available to other borrowers. This admonition included reference to more beneficial terms to "related interests" and "affiliates." JCJ Trust was a "related interest" and "an affiliate" at the time the decision was reached on February 19, 1991, to approve the letter of credit requested by JCJ Trust through Christo, III. Christo, Jr. and Christo, III, as trustee for JCJ Trust had made no alternative arrangements to make Bay Bank whole in the event South Trust Bank called on the letters of credit issued February 26, 1991. This refers to an arrangement separate and apart from the unsecured notes which were signed by Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust in the person of Christo, III, following the draws by South Trust against the letters of credit, as a means of protecting Bay Bank at a time when the bank was troubled financially. The February 19, 1991, decision to approve letters of credit requested by Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust were not adequately supported with an underlying written justification contrary to existing bank policy and prudent banking practice. As with the extension of the line of credit on February 26, 1991, the financial position of Christo, Jr. did not justify the unsecured loan that Bay Bank made to him on September 3, 1991. These arrangements were contrary to prudent banking practice. Moreover, it was violative of the Bay Bank loan policies and constituted more favorable treatment than an ordinary customer would receive. The loan was contrary to the policies in that the unsecured loan was not "supported by satisfactory balance sheet and income statement information with repayment from demonstrated cash flow or reasonably certain conversion of its assets." Similar problems were in evidence concerning the loan made to JCJ trust on October 2, 1991. Prudent bankers would not have extended the credit to JCJ Trust, to include a lack of security, contrary to the credit opportunities a normal customer would have had. The balance sheet available to support the JCJ loan was out of date. Moreover, the availability of funds to repay the loan according to the balance sheet was inadequate. The problems with the Christo, Jr. September 3, 1991 loan concerned heavy debt obligations for notes payable to Bay Bank and South Trust and a questionable position concerning assets that were readily available to meet debt service at the time the decision was being reached to extend the September 3, 1991 credit. These problems were evident in the December 31, 1989 financial statement pertaining to Christo, Jr. The principle asset available to JCJ Trust to meet the debt obligations contemplated by the October 2, 1991 loan were associated with Bay Bank stock. The Bay Savings Bank stock which was shown on the December 31, 1989 balance sheet for JCJ Trust had no value as support for the October 2, 1991 loan in that the savings bank had been declared insolvent by the Department and placed in conservatorship through the Resolution Trust Corporation in September, 1991. The Bay Bank stock was not a liquid asset to meet the loan obligation, there being no apparent market for its disposal as a means to obtain ready cash to meet the debt obligation envisioned by the note issued on October 2, 1991. Nor could dividends be anticipated as a means to meet the debt obligation, Bay Bank having been criticized in the March 31, 1991 examination for paying out dividends in a circumstance in which there was a need to infuse additional capital to bolster the loan loss reserve deficit and in view of the limiting features in the written agreement concerning payment of dividends. In this connection the true value of the Bay Bank stock when considering the methods employed for its valuation is uncertain during the period of time at which the loans were made to JCJ Trust and Christo, Jr., those dates being October 2, 1991 and September 3, 1991 respectively. Although more recent financial statements not found in the credit files associated with the loans made on September 3, 1991, and October 2, 1991, to Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust respectively was potentially available in making the decisions concerning those loans, those more recent financial statements do not depict a financial position by the borrowers that would justify the loans. Strictly considered, the existence of other financial statements had no pertinence at the time that the loans were made, because the loan and discount committee and the directors made their decisions based upon matters found within the credit file and it is their actions at the moment that warrant criticism. After the letter of credit issued on February 25, 1991 to Christo, Jr. was drawn upon, the September 3, 1991 note for repayment by Christo, Jr., to Bay Bank was one without collateral and for which no payment was due until maturity on September 3, 1992 and about which the source of repayment was questionable. Therefore, it involved more than the normal risk of repayment. After the letter of credit issued on February 25, 1991 to JCJ Trust was drawn upon, the October 2, 1991 note for repayment by JCJ Trust to Bay Bank as one without collateral and for which no payment was due until maturity on October 1, 1992 and about which the source of repayment was questionable. Therefore, it involved more than the normal risk of repayment. Christo, III's claim that when he voted on February 19, 1991 to approve the JCJ Trust letter of credit that he did so through inadvertence is not persuasive. The protocol for considering this letter of credit was the same as had been the case in the past when the directors decided to provide a letter of credit for JCJ Trust. On those prior occasions Christo, III, had abstained from voting on the JCJ Trust on a single voting sheet for JCJ Trust and Christo, Jr. Nothing had changed in the voting sheet format for February 19, 1991. His claim that he was confused and mistakenly voted for the JCJ Trust letter of credit on February 19, 1991, because it also contained a reference to the Christo, Jr. letter of credit is not credible. The idea that his decision was inadvertent based upon some confusion is rejected in favor of the inference that his choice to vote was through negligence or intent. FDIC Examination The circumstances associated with the JCJ Trust February 25, 1991 letter of credit and the ensuing loan of October 2, 1991, that have been described form the basis for the FDIC through the November 18, 1991 report of examination to comment that violations of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 C.F.R., s. 215.4 and Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. 371(c) had occurred. In addition, the FDIC in its November 18, 1991 examination rated Bay Bank through the Camel rating system as an aggregate 4. As with the prior rating by the Department, Bay Bank was observed by the FDIC to be engaged in unsafe and unsound practices through acts of commission or omission by its management team and directors. Although some changes can be seen through the findings made in the state examination performed on March 31, 1991 compared to the report of examination by the FDIC on November 18, 1991, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6, they do not tend to substantially alter the impression about the persistent problems within the institution. In particular, the FDIC directed criticism to the board of directors concerning the need for the directors to ensure that executive management was cognizant of applicable laws and regulations pertaining to the bank's activities and the need to develop a system to affect and monitor compliance with those laws and regulations. This observation was made notwithstanding the recognition that members of the board of directors for Bay Bank would not necessarily be expected to have personal knowledge of those laws and regulations, but would need to make certain that the laws and regulations received high priority attention by the bank's everyday managers. The FDIC also commented on a problem with maintaining an appropriate internal control system and an adequate means of auditing as evidenced by violations found within the November 18, 1991 report. The board was reminded to evaluate the adequacy of the bank's loan watch-list as that device was calculated to assist in determining the proper allowance for loan losses, and from there establish a sufficient loan loss reserve. The loan loss reserve was criticized. The regulators subsequent adjustment to the loan loss reserve calculation following the November 18, 1991 examination still revealed a deficiency in the loan loss reserve. There was a continuing problem with asset quality showing a further deterioration from the March 31, 1991 state examination. This pertains to adversely classified loans in the categories of loss and doubtful loans, when taking into account the need to comply with the written agreement in charging off 100 percent of loss and 50 percent of doubtful. Among the adversely classified loans which were mentioned in the FDIC examination was the October 2, 1991 loan to JCJ Trust. The November 18, 1991 report reminded Bay Bank to dispose of other real estate at the earliest favorable opportunity. The FDIC examination pointed out the weakness in the bank's capital position due to large loan losses. When the examination was conducted on November 18, 1991, the liquidity ratio was found to be unsatisfactory. Fiduciary Duties Generally, Christo, Jr. and Christo, III, were sufficiently apprised of the practices which are complained of and proven here to be held accountable for their respective actions or inactions as bank officers. More specifically, Christo, Jr., and Christo, III, were knowledgeable concerning the respective financial positions of Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust associated with the letters of credit approved on February 25, 1991, for Christo, Jr., in his personal capacity and Christo, III, as Trustee for JCJ Trust. The Christos knew or should have known about the Bay Bank loan policies for issuing letters of credit on February 25, 1991. The basis for imputing this knowledge or need for knowledge is premised upon the fact that Christo, Jr., was then CEO and Christo, III, was then president of Bay Bank. Given their positions as officers the Christos knew or should have known that the letters of credit that were issued on February 25, 1991, were by terms dissimilar to those afforded the ordinary bank customer when receiving a letter of credit. Similarly, the Christos knew or should have known that the loans that were made to Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust on September 3, 1991 and October 2, 1991 respectively were pursuant to arrangements that were not otherwise available to an ordinary bank customer. Another reason for holding the Christos to knowledge of relevant requirements for proper practices and conduct in bank affairs is based upon the fact that Christo, Jr., had been a banker, and for the most part, a chief executive of a bank, for a period approximating 30 years at the time the decisions were made concerning the letters of credit and loans once the letters of credit were drawn upon. In a related capacity Christo, III, has been a national bank examiner and has worked in banking for a period of approximately 25 years to include 10 years service with Bay Bank as an executive officer. Notwithstanding their background and knowledge the Christos allowed conditions to arise in association with the issuance of the two letters of credit and the loans that were made following draws, in contravention of internal loan policies, prudent banking practices and laws and regulations. It is to be expected that the Christos should have reminded the other directors that internal bank policies and laws and regulations would not allow more favorable treatment for Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust concerning the issuance of letters of credit in February of 1991 and loans in September and October, 1991, to pay back the draws, especially when taking into account that security was not required for the transactions in question. The need for the other directors who voted to issue the letters of credit and to approve loans following the draws, to conform to acceptable banking practices in their respective positions as directors, does not excuse the Christos from their affirmative duty to remind the other directors to conform to internal policies and laws and regulations concerning equal treatment of other persons and bank officials when establishing letters of credit and making loans. The Christos failed to properly exercise their fiduciary duties when action was taken concerning the letters of credit and subsequent loans following the draws. It was not enough for Christo, Jr., to abstain from participating in the decision to approve his letter of credit and that for JCJ Trust. It was even more inappropriate for Christo, III, to affirmatively vote in favor of the letters of credit for JCJ Trust and Christo, Jr. The arrangements made for the benefit of Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust left Bay Bank exposed for $850,000.00 in disbursements without security should the letters of credit be drawn upon and that arrangement continued following the decision to make loans to Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust in a related amount after the letters of credit were drawn upon. The Christos as the principal managers of the bank when the examinations were conducted were shown through the findings made in the examination reports to have breached their fiduciary duties. By failing to meet their responsibilities concerning the findings made in the two examinations and related to the Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust letters of credit and loans, the Christos engaged in unsafe and unsound practices whose consequences created the likelihood of abnormal risk or loss, insolvency or dissipation of assets which seriously prejudice the interests of Bay Bank and its depositors when taking into account the overall condition of Bay Bank at the time at which the letters of credit were issued and the loans made following the draws. History of Regulatory Correction The external history of action by the Department to correct problems within Bay Bank is constituted of the written agreement that has been described. Consistent Agency Practices As alluded to before, the treatment given other institutions which the Department regulates when considering the propriety of assessing the costs of examination and supervision does not point out inconsistent agency practices. Having reviewed the evidence concerning inconsistent agency practice in removal and prohibition of individuals from participating in banking in Florida, while the means to affect removal from an institution may not have always been the same, the outcome anticipated by that process is sufficiently consistent and the factual differences between cases do not lead to a finding that the agency has acted inconsistently when comparing its effort to remove the Christos with other removal actions described at hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of facts and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be issued which assesses the cost of examination and supervision for the March 31, 1991 examination in the amount $67,494.20; That denies the imposition of a levy for late payment of $100.00 per day commencing November 5, 1991 and beyond; That denies the imposition of an administrative fine for intentional late payment in the amount of $1,000.00 per day commencing December 16, 1991 and beyond; That orders Bay Bank, its officers, directors, or other persons participating in the conduct of the affairs of Bay Bank, to cease and desist from engaging in practices which would allow Christo, Jr., and Christo, III, to obtain credit from Bay Bank in contravention of laws and regulations, and which breach the October 14, 1991 written agreement and Bay Bank internal policies; That prohibits Christo, Jr., from participating in Bay Bank or any other financial institution regulated by the Department as an officer or in a similar position for Bay Bank or any other financial institution or becoming a director in any other financial institution and that restricts Christo, Jr., in his directorship at Bay Bank from participating in any decision to select or dismiss Bay Bank officers or directors; That prohibits Christo, III, from participating in Bay Bank or any other financial institution regulated by the Department as an officer or in a similar position for Bay Bank or any other financial institution or becoming a director in any other financial institution and that restricts Christo, III, in his directorship at Bay Bank from participating in any decision to select or dismiss Bay Bank officers or directors; DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of February, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-2455 and 92-3744 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed facts submitted by the parties: Petitioner's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 26 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 27 and 28 constitute conclusions of law. Paragraphs 29 through 81 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 82 constitutes legal argument. Paragraphs 83 through 85 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 86 is not relevant. Paragraphs 87 through 123 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 124 is rejected. Paragraphs 125 through 136 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 137 constitutes legal argument. Paragraphs 138 through 145 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 146 constitutes a conclusion of law. Paragraph 147 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 148 constitutes a conclusion of law. Paragraphs 149 through 152 constitute legal argument. Paragraph 153 through 170 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 171 through 181 constitute legal argument. Paragraph 182 through 201 are subordinate to facts found. Respondent's Facts: Paragraphs 4 through 7 with the exception of the latter sentences found within subparagraphs 13 through 15 to paragraph 7 are subordinate to facts found. Those latter sentences within the subparagraphs are not relevant. Paragraphs 8 through 10 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 11 is subordinate to facts found with the exception that subparagraph 1 in its suggestion that the Department does not adequately explain its assignment of an aggregate score is rejected, as is the contention at subparagraph 9 that Camel rating may be changed at a "whim" and that a change was made to a component Camel rating in the March 31, 1991 examination without justification for that change. Paragraph 12 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 13 is rejected. Paragraph 14 is not relevant. Paragraphs 15 through 30 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 31 as it attempts to defend the accusations in the administrative complaint is rejected. Paragraph 32 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 33 through 36 are not relevant. Paragraph 37 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 38 is rejected. Paragraph 39 is not relevant. Paragraph 40 is rejected. Paragraph 41 is not relevant. Paragraph 42 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 43 is not relevant. Paragraphs 44 through 48 are subordinate to facts found, except that the subparts to Paragraph 48 constitute legal argument. Paragraph 49 is not relevant. The first sentence to Paragraph 50 is not relevant. The second sentence is rejected. Paragraphs 51 and 52 are rejected. Paragraph 53 constitutes legal argument. Paragraphs 51 and 52 are rejected. Paragraph 53 constitutes legal argument. Paragraphs 54 through 56 are not relevant. Paragraphs 57 and 58 are rejected. Paragraph 59 is not relevant. Paragraph 60 does not form a defense to the accusations. Paragraph 61 and 62 are rejected. COPIES FURNISHED: Alan C. Sundberg, Esquire Robert Pass, Esquire E. Kelley Bittick, Jr., Esquire Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel Smith & Cutler, P.A. 500 Barnett Bank Building 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William G. Reeves, General Counsel Albert T. Gimble, Chief Banking Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Suite 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William A. Friedlander, Esquire Raymond B. Vickers, Esquire Craig S. Kiser, Esquire 424 West Call Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gerald Lewis, Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact This proceeding results from the filing of an application for a commercial bank charter by Respondent Sunny Isles Bank (proposed) (hereinafter "Sunny Isles Bank") with the Respondent Office of Comptroller (hereinafter "Comptroller") on August 9, 1984. The organizers of the proposed Sunny Isles Bank were originally listed as Sami Behar, Martin Dayton, Arthur Horowitz, Sylvia Lazare, Julius Littman, Christine Mallock, Morris Massry, Robert S. Oller, and Alvin Stern. Thereafter, Sami Behar's name was withdrawn. At no time have any names of proposed officers been advanced. The organizers who are also the proposed directors propose to locate a new bank at 17140 Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida. That proposed location falls within a community commonly known as Sunny Isles. Sunny Isles falls within the primary service area (hereinafter "PSA") designated by the organizers and has an eastern border of the Atlantic Ocean, a western border of the Intracoastal Waterway, a southern reach to Baker's Haulover Cut and a northern boundary at the southern edge of Golden Beach. Additionally, the organizers define their proposed PSA to include, to the west of Sunny Isles, an area called Eastern Shores, which is part of the City of North Miami Beach. The organizers' delineation also includes in their proposed PSA the town of Golden Beach lying north of Sunny Isles. The protestant Petitioner Jefferson National Bank at Sunny Isles (hereinafter "Jefferson") is a commercial bank located within the designated proposed PSA. In the charter application they certified as true and correct, the proposed directors made intentional mis- representations as to stock subscriptions for the proposed Sunny Isles Bank. Completely omitted are approximately a dozen stock subscribers. The application misrepresented the ownership of the stock at the time it was filed with the Comptroller, and the proposed directors have continued to fail to disclose at any subsequent time the facts which had been omitted. The application further misrepresents the shares subscribed to by Morris Massry. The application states that Massry had subscribed to 10,000 shares of the proposed Sunny Isles Bank. In fact, the stock subscription agreements produced by the proposed Sunny Isles Bank show that Massry subscribed to only 5,000 shares of the proposed bank stock. The charter application also misrepresents the number of shares owned by Julius Littman by indicating that Littman owned 10,000 shares as of August 7, 1984, the date the application was filed. However, the subscription agreements reveal that Littman owned only 5,000 shares on that date although he has subsequently purchased 6,000 additional shares. The application falsely represents that, at the time of filing, no relative of a proposed director had subscribed to shares of stock in the proposed Sunny Isles Bank. In fact, Jack Massry, the brother of Morris Massry, had, as of August 7, 1984, subscribed to 5,000 shares of stock in the bank. The applicants have further failed to notify the Comptroller in writing at any subsequent time of this omission. The application also falsely represents that no elected or appointed public official other than Julius Littman was a stock holder at the time of filing the application. In fact, Joseph Moffat, an elected city councilman in North Miami Beach, had subscribed to 2,500 shares before August 7, 1984. Littman is and has been a member of the North Miami Beach city council along with Moffat and, accordingly, knew at the time the application was filed of Moffat's public official status. Again, the applicants have failed to subsequently disclose this misrepresentation to the Comptroller. See Confidential Exhibit "A". See Confidential Exhibit "A". In addition to the above-described misrepresentations contained in the application, various false statements and omissions are found in the organizers' biographical reports. Alvin Stern knowingly withheld the information that numerous complaints had been filed against the Royal Glades Convalescent Home of which Stern was the principal owner for many years. Stern also failed to disclose, as was required in Section ll(C) of his biographical report, the fact that a number of investigations by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services had been undertaken with respect to Royal Glades. Stern testified at the final hearing that such investigations were known to him at the time they were undertaken, yet, he offered no explanation for failing to disclose those investigations. See Confidential Exhibit "A". See Confidential Exhibit "A". See Confidential Exhibit "A". There is nothing ambiguous about the disclosure forms the organizers of Sunny Isles Bank failed to complete honestly. Further, there is nothing unclear about the certification each executed. The numerous misrepresentations made by those organizers in the application and supporting biographical reports reveal a lack of honesty for a position of public trust which requires ongoing and truthful disclosure to regulatory authorities. In addition to the misrepresentations made by them, the proposed directors evidence a consistent pattern of indifference to their prospective positions and responsibilities as directors of the Sunny Isles Bank. Christine Mallock not only failed to read the charter application but cannot read English. Yet, she certified the truth and correctness of the application. Although she believes it is "flattering" to be a director of a bank, she does not know what a director or a bank does and has no information regarding the plans for the proposed Sunny Isles Bank. Alvin Stern, another proposed director, is also unfamiliar with banking and the duties of a bank director. He has no knowledge of any plans for the proposed bank including the marketing, deposit mix, or services to be offered. He is further unaware if any of the other proposed directors have any banking experience. Martin Dayton, another proposed director of the bank, has no banking experience except as a bank customer and testified to having no idea what his duties as a director would entail other than attending meetings. Dayton has no knowledge of the proposed bank's services or plans for operation. Dayton became involved with and invested in the proposed bank without doing any investigation as to the soundness of the investment opportunity or the actual functioning of the bank. Robert Oller, another organizer of the proposed bank, has no understanding about the proposed bank or his duties as a director. He does not know what services the bank will offer or what customer base it expects to develop. Moreover, he has not read the charter application, despite his signature on the application certifying that it is true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. Arthur Horowitz, another proposed director of the proposed bank, is primarily interested in the bank because he "would like to have been involved in a bank." Horowitz has no idea what his duties as a director would be and assumes that the job would take only a few hours a week. He did not fully read the application before it was submitted, nor did he ever discuss it with Littman. See Confidential Exhibit "A". Massry was selected by Littman to be a director of the proposed bank in the hope that he would bring funds into the bank. Massry resides primarily in Troy, New York, but recently has begun spending approximately one week per month in Broward County where he has acquired certain rental units. Even though Massry is touted as the "money man" for the proposed bank, he has made no agreement with his partners to move any of the funds relating to their Broward County investments to the proposed Sunny Isles Bank in Dade County, let alone into a non-interest- bearing account at that proposed bank. He further testified that he is satisfied with the services he receiyes from the bank in Broward County with which he currently does business. Massry has no current ties to the Sunny Isles area and, if approved as a director, would be expected to have limited participation in the affairs of the Sunny Isles Bank. Julius Littman is the chief organizer of the proposed Sunny Isles Bank. He admitted at the final hearing to having "hand-picked" only his friends and relatives to be proposed directors of the Bank in order that he could control them. It was interesting to note Littman's testimony since he primarily testified in terms of "my bank", "I will", and "I decided." Although Littman's wife, Sherry Littman, has not yet been proposed as a director, Littman testified that he intended to make her a director along with his mother-in-law, Sylvia Lazare. Littman's intention of controlling his friends and relatives at "his bank" explains, most likely, the reason why no proposed director other than Littman knows anything about the other directors; the bank's marketing plans, its proposed services and interest rates, or its proposed customer base. Littman's plan has apparently been successful thus far in that each of the proposed directors signed the application filed with the Comptroller without asking questions and without reading the application to know the contents. Each person appears to have simply signed the paper handed to them with "no questions asked" even though that paper contained a statement that each director was certifying that the application was true and correct. Littman undertook his efforts to create "his bank" while he was a member of the Advisory Board of Jefferson National Bank and while his wife Sherry Littman and his mother- in-law Sylvia Lazare were employees of Jefferson National Bank. Although Littman testified that his wife has had no involvement with his bank, she is the person who wrote to the Comptroller on stationery of Jefferson National Bank regarding the forms necessary to file the application for the proposed Sunny Isles Bank. Littman sees no conflict of interest in he and his wife and his mother-in-law organizing a bank to compete with Jefferson National while he served on Jefferson's Advisory Board and while his wife and his mother-in-law were employed by Jefferson since they began their efforts during a time when it appeared as though Jefferson might be sold. Not only did that fail to take place, but no contract for sale was ever executed. When the talk about Jefferson's alleged sale ceased, however, Littman's efforts did not. While still a member of Jefferson's Advisory Board, Littman approached two of Jefferson's officers (other than his wife and his mother-in-law) in an attempt to interest them in coming to work at the proposed Sunny Isles Bank. During the time that Littman served as an Advisory Board member at Jefferson, he, as subscription agent, was selling stock subscriptions in the proposed Sunny Isles Bank. Although Littman testified that he did not ask any of the proposed directors of the Sunny Isles Bank to keep the bank's organization a secret, the testimony of several of the directors establishes that Littman specifically requested that they not reveal the creation or the plans of the proposed bank. No proposed director of the proposed bank has any direct banking experience as required by law for approval of a bank charter application. The evidence is uncontroverted that only two of the proposed directors are alleged to have the direct banking experience required for any proposed bank: Julius Littman and his mother-in-law Sylvia Lazare. Littman's only banking experience is his membership on the Advisory Board at Jefferson. However, his role on that Advisory Board was honorary, and he served in only a community relations function. His involvement as an Advisory Board member gave him no direct experience in the operation of the bank since Jefferson did not involve its Advisory Board members in any decisions regarding the bank's operation but rather involved them only as reporters of the community's perception of Jefferson National Bank. Sylvia Lazare also lacks the banking experience required by the Comptroller. Although the application represents her to have been an officer at Jefferson National Bank familiar with all phases of banking, the evidence introduced at the final hearing in this cause clearly shows that her employment with Jefferson was as a Community Relations Officer, that is, someone who solicits customers for the bank and who helps existing customers with personal services such as filling out their deposit slips for them. Lazare testified directly opposite to the representation of her experience made in the application filed with the Comptroller. She testified that she is not familiar with the mechanics of loan transactions, nor does she understand such basic banking concepts as acceleration of indebtedness or waiver of acceleration. She has never worked in operations, has never been employed as a teller, has never made loans, and has not worked in the bookkeeping department of a bank. Most significantly, she herself admitted that she is not qualified to do anything as a bank officer or director other than community relations work. Based upon Lazare's own testimony; her inclusion in the application is a sham. She was unaware that she was to be a director of the proposed Sunny Isles Bank, was not even asked by Littman to be one, and is not interested in being a director. Although Lazare signed the charter application for the proposed bank certifying that the application was true and correct to the best of her knowledge, she never read the application and never knew that Littman was proposing her as a director. Although Sunny Isles Bank argues that any deficiency in its proposed board of directors can be cured by simply substituting other proposed directors and does not justify the denial of the application for a charter, that argument overlooks the repeated misrepresentations and complete ignorance and indifference to banking and to a director's responsibility to the public and regulatory authorities so that the substitution suggested would require a substitution of the entire proposed board of directors. Even if an entirely new proposed board of directors were required, such a substitution would not overcome Littman's stated intent of selecting only directors who would be controlled by him, a control which involves conflict of interest and intentional misrepresentations both to a regulatory agency and under oath in the formal proceeding in this cause. A bank's PSA is the small geographical area from which a proposed bank expects to draw approximately seventy-five percent of its deposits. The proposed Sunny Isles Bank improperly delineates its PSA by adding Eastern Shores and Golden Beach to the Sunny Isles community. The correct PSA for the proposed Sunny Isles Bank consists of the traditional Sunny Isles area and is bounded on the east by the Atlantic Ocean, on the south by Baker's Haulover Cut, on the west by the Intracoastal Waterway, and on the north by the southern limits of the town of Golden Beach. By improperly including Eastern Shores and Golden Beach in its PSA, the organizers somewhat improved the demographic and age characteristics of its PSA population. The inclusion of these two residential areas reduces the average age of the population and increases the affluence and size of the population. There is no data base for including the residents of Eastern Shores and Golden Beach in the proposed PSA for the Sunny Isles Bank. Rather, the actual deposit experience of Jefferson, located in Sunny Isles, reveals that it is not realistic to project significant deposit levels from Eastern Shores or Golden Beach. Residents of Eastern Shores are more likely to head toward the mainland and the 163rd Street Shopping Center commercial areas for their shopping and banking needs, while residents of the Golden Beach area are more likely to travel to Aventura Mall across the William Lehman Causeway or north to the Hallandale commercial centers for their shopping and banking needs. There is no basis for the assumption that residents of Eastern Shores and Golden Beach who have not historically shopped and banked in the Sunny Isles area will suddenly do so if a charter is granted to the proposed Sunny Isles Bank. Within the PSA proposed by the Sunny Isles Bank, there are ten offices of financial institutions offering commercial and personal banking services. These financial institutions include savings and loan associations as well as commercial banks. The evidence shows without dispute that services provided in this area by savings and loan associations and commercial banks are essentially similar. Although Jefferson is the only home office commercial bank in the PSA, there is no meaningful distinction between a home office institution and a branch office institution in the Sunny Isles area. Other facts confirm a less than dynamic commercial base for the proposed bank. The population of the service area projected by the proposed Sunny Isles Bank is 24,800. Of this number, approximately fifty-two percent are age 65 or over. The PSA as properly defined has a population of approximately 16,200, of which sixty percent are age 65 or over. Median family income using either the proposed PSA or the properly defined PSA falls below both the state and county average. The Sunny Isles area, in which the proposed bank wishes to locate, attracts tourists and transient residents, and the primary industry in Sunny Isles is tourism. Tourism, however, has declined significantly in the Sunny Isles area. Many hotels and motels have been converted to condominiums which now house transient residents. In fact, the declining economic condition of Sunny Isles is a matter of such grave concern as to prompt a study by a Dade County Task Force which concluded that, among other things, a budget of approximately $15.8 million would be necessary to begin to revitalize the troubled Sunny Isles tourist economy. Elderly residents, such as those in the Sunny Isles area, primarily make use of a bank's deposit services, based upon a tendency of an elderly population to save and not to spend. Therefore, there is less need for the traditional banking services of lending, and financial institutions are primarily recipients in such an area of time deposits rather than demand deposits. No evidence was offered by the proposed Sunny Isles Bank to indicate that the banking needs of the proposed PSA are not being met by the financial institutions presently servicing the area. To the contrary, testimony establishes that the Sunny Isles area is, in fact, highly competitive with respect to the banking business and in particular with respect to loans and lending transactions. The proposed Sunny Isles Bank has not demonstrated any ability to service the Sunny Isles area any differently or any better than the various savings and loan associations and commercial banks already established there. Accordingly, it offers no significant additional services at a substantial advantage or convenience to a significant number of people. Although Sunny Isles expects to have restricted Saturday banking hours, the evidence is not clear that this service is not already available through the other financial institutions in the area or that there is a need for Saturday banking hours in an area populated by tourists and retired persons.. Although the proposed Sunny Isles Bank intends to have a "drive-in" teller area, there is no evidence to suggest that this is a service not already available within the Sunny Isles area or that such a service would cause any residents of Eastern Shores or Golden Beach to begin banking in Sunny Isles where they have not banked previously. Of the 270 businesses in the Sunny Isles area in December, 1984, one-third were vacant. While some new businesses may have opened more recently, there is no evidence that economic conditions have, as of this time, improved significantly. Between 1980 and 1984 twenty-five percent of the motel units in the Sunny Isles area were either converted to condominiums or closed. No new motels have been built since 1980. Further, no new residential development has been completed in the past few years in the Sunny Isles area. Especially in this troubled climate, the proposed Sunny Isles Bank's projection of $7.5 million in deposits after one year is unrealistic and without evidentiary support in the record. The deposits projected by the organizers are far in excess of the actual experience of other banks in the proposed PSA. In fact, the organizers project a growth rate seven times that of Pan American's Sunny Isles bank and four times that of County National in Eastern Shores. The record fails to show a basis for the organizers' projected growth rate or projections in deposit levels or types for the proposed Sunny Isles Bank. Moreover, in the Sunny Isles area demand deposits fell by forty-five percent between December 1979 and December 1983. In view of this clear trend; the proposed Sunny Isles Bank's expected ratio of time to demand deposits is clearly unrealistic. Despite its projections of ratios of 1.5 to 1 in the first year, 1.9 to 1 in the second year and 2.3 to 1 in the third year, the experiences of other banks in the PSA indicate that a proper time to demand deposit ratio is approximately 4 to In fact, the most recent statistics show that the total amount of demand deposits have fallen from September 1983 through September 1984 in the PSA delineated by the organizers. The proposed Sunny Isles Bank has also projected unrealistically its rental expenses with respect to the banking premises it proposes to occupy. The unaccounted-for expenses will require at least an extra $16,000 in rental liabilities, plus an annual cost of living increase. The proposed Sunny Isles Bank also unrealistically projected $40,000 as sufficient for contingency and other expense items. A review of overlooked expenses indicate that attorneys' fees, insurance, accounting fees, real estate taxes and other expenses were not estimated while other anticipated expenses are significantly understated. The proposed Sunny Isles Bank further unrealistically projected that it would be able to immediately sublease 2,600 square feet of space at the proposed site of the banking house. This is a questionable expectation in an area with a significant vacancy rate. The proposed Sunny Isles Bank also failed to include in its budget a large accrued rental which has accumulated from December 1, 1984, according to the terms of the executed lease admitted in evidence herein. That sum is significant. In view of the evidence showing that both deposit levels and deposit mix will fall far short of the figures needed for profitability, and in light of the likelihood that their expenses will be substantially higher than reported by the organizers, there is no basis for concluding that the proposed Sunny Isles Bank will become profitable within three years. Accordingly, the organizers of the proposed Sunny Isles Bank have not shown that local conditions indicate reasonable promise for successful operation. There is no factual basis which would support the granting of the application for a charter for the proposed Sunny Isles Bank since there is no proposed director who has exhibited the necessary qualifications to be a director of a bank in Florida, since the-primary service area was improperly delineated causing many of the figures relied upon in the application to be invalid, since there is no showing that any public convenience and advantage would be served by the establishment of an additional commercial bank in the Sunny Isles area--let alone a substantial convenience and advantage for a significant number of people, and since there does not appear to be a reasonable promise of successful operation for the proposed Sunny Isles Bank. These deficiencies in the application prohibit any amendment to the application that would qualify it for the grant of a charter. DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of November, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald Lewis, Comptroller State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32301 Carl Morstadt, Esquire Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, FL 32301 Kendall B. Coffey, Esquire Julie K. Oldehoff, Esquire 1401 Brickell Avenue, PH-1 Miami, FL 33131 Shalle Stephen Fine, Esquire 46 S.W. 1st Street Miami, FL 33130 Michael Colodny, Esquire 626 N.E. 124th Street North Miami, FL 33131 APPENDIX The following proposed findings of fact of Jefferson National Bank at Sunny Isles have either been adopted verbatim or have been adopted as modified to conform to the evidence: 2- 5, 11-22, 25, 26, 28, 31-42, 47-51, 53-59, and 61-70 The following proposed findings of fact of Jefferson National Bank at Sunny Isles have been rejected "as not constituting findings of fact but as constituting either argument of counsel or conclusions of law: 1, 6-10, 23, 24, 43- 46, 52, and 60. The following proposed findings of fact of Jefferson National Bank at Sunny Isles have been rejected as not being supported by competent, substantial evidence: 27. The following proposed findings of fact of Jefferson National Bank at Sunny Isles have been rejected as being subordinate: 29 and 30. The following proposed findings of fact of Sunny Isles Bank have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but as constituting either argument of counsel or conclusions of law: 1-3, 9, and 10. The following proposed findings of fact of Sunny Isles Bank have been rejected as not being supported by competent, substantial evidence: 4-8.
