Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: During the development stage of a condominium project, known as Lake Villas Condominium, in Altamonte Springs, Florida, First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando foreclosed on some forty (40) units of the project. At that time, approximately in November of 1975, thirty-one (31) units already had fee- simple owners or were under a lease/purchase option and they were not involved in the foreclosure proceedings. Mr. David McComb, a vice-president and mortgage loan officer with First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, was given the responsibility of assuring the completion of the remaining units, selling the units and setting up a homeowners' association for the Lake Villas Condominium. The petitioner Lake Villas Condominium Association's five-position board of directors was originally comprised of three members who were personnel of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, so that First Federal would have majority control at a time when it held the ownership to the majority of the units. In June of 1976, thirty-seven of the seventy-one units had been sold to individuals. Thereafter, the composition of the petitioner's board of directors changed and the individual-unit owners held the majority of the five positions. Mr. McComb, as a representative of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, remained on the board of directors and continued First Federal's attempts to sell the remaining unsold units. First Federal retained a sales representative who lived in one of the condominium units, operated her sales office from one of the vacant units owned by First Federal and was paid a real estate commission when she sold a unit. The sales contract on the last of the units owned by First Federal was closed on December 12, 1977. Prior to mid-1976, the Florida Power Corporation account for seven or eight common element meters was in the name of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, doing business as Lake Villas Condominium Association, and the billing statements were mailed to the Orlando office of First Federal Savings and Loan. In June or July of 1976, after the majority of units had been purchased by individual owners and majority control of the board of directors was obtained by the individual owners, Mr. McComb of First Federal placed a telephone call to the respondent's Winter Park office. The purpose of this call was to inform respondent that First Federal wanted the account name and address for the seven or eight meters changed and to inform respondent that the Lake Villas Condominium Association had taken over responsibility for the accounts. Mr. McComb spoke on the telephone to a female who handled commercial accounts for the respondent's Winter Park office and informed her that he wanted the name of First Federal Savings and Loan taken off the account and the bills to be mailed to the Lake Villas Condominium Association at a post office box in Altamonte Springs. The female to whom Mr. McComb spoke took down the information regarding the account numbers and change of billing names and addresses, and told him she would take care of it. Mr. McComb did not inquire about a rate adjustment, and no discussion was had concerning rates for the seven or eight meters. Following the June or July, 1976, discussion between Mr. McComb and a female at the respondent's Winter Park office concerning a change in billing name and address, the billing statements were sent and received at the post office address of the Lake Villas Condominium Association, Inc. in Altamonte Springs. Approximately one year later, in mid-1977, Mr. McComb was forwarded some delinquent notices on the seven or eight meters. They had originally been sent to the petitioner's post office box in Altamonte Springs, but were thereafter forwarded to Mr. McComb's attention at First Federal. Mr. McComb noticed that, although the post office address had been changed, the accounts were still in the name of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando. He then placed another telephone call to the respondent's Winter Park office, spoke with a female in the commercial department and requested that the name of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando be removed from the account and that the Lake Villas Condominium Association, Inc. be inserted as the new-named customer. The female informed Mr. McComb that this request would be taken care of and that nothing further need be done. No inquiry by Mr. McComb or discussion was had concerning a rate adjustment for these seven or eight meters. Electricity for the individual living units of the Lake Villas Condominiums are separately metered. In addition, there are seven or eight separately billed meters which service the common areas of the condominium, such as the two swimming pools, the internal street and sidewalk lighting, the clubhouse and small post lamps for an open green area. From at least April of 1979 through October of 1980, no commercial activity occurred in any of the condominium units. In April of 1979, Mr. O. K. Armstrong became the manager of the Lake Villas Condominiums and was responsible for the association's financial transactions. He noticed in May of 1979 that the bills for the seven or eight subject meters contained the name of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, though they did list the condominium's post office box number for the address. After speaking with Mr. McComb about the matter, Mr. Armstrong telephoned a Mr. Harbour at the respondent's Winter Park office. It was during this discussion that petitioner, through Mr. Armstrong, learned that the seven or eight common element meters might qualify for a residential, as opposed to the higher commercial, rate. Thereafter, the rates for the seven or eight meters were changed by Florida Power Corporation from commercial to residential. The request of Mr. Armstrong for a retroactive application of those residential rates to January 1, 1976, which would amount to a refund of all amounts paid in excess of the residential rates from that date, was denied by Mr. Harbour, respondent's office manager in Winter Park. During the hearing, the petitioner verbally amended the request for retroactive application of the residential rate from January 1, 1976, to July of 1976.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition filed by the Lake Villas Condominium Association, Inc. be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 17th day of June, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Mapp Hunter, Pattillo, Marchman, Mapp and Davis Post Office Box 340 Winter Park, Florida 32790 Blair W. Clack Assistant Counsel Post Office Box 14042 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Arthur Shell Public Service Commission Legal Department 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steve Tribble, Clerk Florida Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts relevant to the issues presented for determination are found: At the first hearing on January 8, 1981, the petitioner and the respondent stipulated and agreed that an appropriate rate base for petitioner's water operations was $249,622, that an appropriate rate base for petitioner's sewer operations was $714,919, and that an appropriate overall rate of return on petitioner's net investment was 13.07 percent. The reopening of the hearing was occasioned by a dispute over the appropriate amount of contributions-in-aid-of- construction (CIAC) attributable to petitioner's sewer operations. The petitioner takes the position that $84,500 is the appropriate amount of CIAC and the respondent and intervenor are of the opinion that the appropriate amount of CIAC is $317,000. Thus, the prior stipulation with regard to the figures contained in petitioner's Exhibit 4 is dissolved and the appropriate rate bases are dependent upon a resolution of the disputes concerning CIAC and additional rate case expenses occasioned by the reopening of the hearing. Quality of Service. The fifteen customers who testified at the hearing were concerned primarily with the large increase in sewer rates requested by the petitioner. The majority of petitioner's customers are elderly, retired persons on fixed incomes. Other than one witness who did not like the taste of the water and two customers who complained of billing errors, there was no adverse testimony concerning the quality of water or sewer services provided by petitioner to its customers. The petitioner's water and treated sewage consistently meets the standards and regulations imposed by regulatory agencies. There are no corrective orders or citations outstanding against petitioner's water or sewer operations. Charge for Delinquent Accounts. The petitioner presently computes a late payment charge of five percent of the overdue balance on delinquent accounts. Its request to charge a $10.00 fee when delinquency in payment results in a termination of water service and a charge of $2.20 for processing a delinquent bill which does not result in a termination of service is based upon actual labor and mailing costs necessary to the performance of these functions. These charges are reasonable and comport with similar charges made by other utility companies. Monthly Versus Quarterly Billing Cycle. The petitioner is presently billing its customers on a quarterly basis and has requested approval to change to monthly billing. The additional expense associated with monthly, as opposed to quarterly, billing would amount to $22,626.00 annually, or approximately 64 cents per customer per bill. The working capital allowance formula of one-eighth operation end maintenance expense is based upon a 45-day lag period or monthly billing system. If petitioner continues to bill on a quarterly cycle, its working capital allowance should be increased. Meters do occasionally stop working, meter boxes and covers become broken and water lines can develop leaks. Billing on a monthly basis would allow the petitioner to determine on a more frequent basis when a meter or a water line becomes inoperable, thus assuring that customers are accurately billed and preventing hazardous conditions with possible liability on petitioner's behalf. On a quarterly billing system, a meter could be incorrectly functioning for 90 to 150 days before the utility becomes aware of it. Between 1978 and 1900, the petitioner replaced 405 meters. No evidence was offered as to the amount of water, and therefore revenue, lost as a result of the nonfunctioning meters. With the exception of those in Duval County, most water and sewer utilities bill their customers on a monthly basis. Rate Case Expenses. Prior to the close of the January 8, 1991, hearing, the petitioner and the respondent Public Service Commission stipulated that the appropriate amount of rate case expense was $57,900.00 and that said expense should be amortized over a three-year period. The only remaining issue is the appropriate amount of rate case expense resulting from the reopening of the hearing due to the dispute regarding CIAC, and the appropriate period of amortization as to those expenses. The petitioner has claimed additional rate case expenses attributable to the new hearing in the amount of $15,100.00, for a total rate case expense of $73,000.00. This $15,100.00 is made up of additional attorneys' fees in the amount of $9,000.00, additional fees to three certified public accountant firms in the amount of approximately $4,000.00 and additional printing costs and miscellaneous costs of approximately $2,000.00. These amounts constitute estimates based upon incurred and expected hours of professional time occasioned by the new hearing. The figures were prepared for the April 10 hearing and do net include expenses or time spent on the May 14, 1981 hearing. The subject application is the petitioner's first application for a rate increase. While the use of one accounting firm may have been more economical and efficient, the use of two independent accounting firms is not unusual in a utility's first rate case due to the necessity of gathering historical data, the preparation of the minimum filing requirements of the Public Service Commission and the expertise required in regulatory matters. The two independent consulting firms did not engage in duplications of effort. The reopening of the hearing to resolve the CIAC dispute also resulted in many hours of PSC staff time. The petitioner has gained an extended benefit from the legal and accounting work done in this first application for a rate increase, and rate case expenses in a future application should be lower as a result of the efforts devoted to the present rate increase request. A three-year period has been a normal and reasonable period of time between rate cases. Contributions-in-aid-of-construction. The petitioner provides water and sewer service to the Beverly Hills Subdivision, which was developed in several stages. Units 1, 2 and 3 have septic tanks and Units 4, 5 and 6 are connected to a centralized sewerage treatment plant. During the period of 1069 and 1970, the petitioner collected a premium of $500.00 for homes sold in Units 4 and 5. There was evidence that some purchasers of homes in Units 4 through 6 were charged a premium of $1,000.00. Since no evidence was adduced as to the number of $1,000.00 fees which were collected, it is assumed for computational purposes that all such fees collected were in the amount of $500.00. There premiums were printed on petitioner's promotional literature as "houses in sewer areas extra." On land sales contracts, the premiums were referred to as "land improvements," "sewers" or "Unit 4 or 5 improvements," and on the closing statements the premiums were referred to as "land improvement fee." This fee was separate from and in addition to the monthly or quarterly charge for day to day sewer service. The utility presented no evidence that there was any other reason for the collection of $500.00 for "improvements" in Units 4 through 6. The collected premiums for the years 1969 and 1970 in the amount of $84,500.00 were recorded on the petitioner's books as "sales -- sewer charge" and the petitioner reduced the plant account and revenues by this amount. Also, in 1969, a New York branch office collected $500.00 fees in the total amount of $14,500.00. This amount was recognized by petitioner as taxable income and was not credited to the plant account. While the petitioner does not concede that the $500.00 premiums collected in 1969 and 1970 actually constitute CIAC, it does not contest the inclusion of the $84,500.00 as CIAC since it did not pay federal income taxes on that amount in 1969 and 1980. In 1971, petitioner continued to collect $500.00 premiums for lots sold in Units 4 through 6 and treated them in the same manner as they were treated on its books and records in 1969 and 1970. The amount of $54,500.00 was collected as premiums in 1971. Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service audited the petitioner's 1971 tax return and treated the $500.00 collections amounting to $54,500.00 as revenue subject to income tax liability. The petitioner continued to collect the $500.00 premiums from purchasers in Units 4 through 6 until 1974. Due to the Internal Revenue Service report or directive which classified the 1971 $500.00 premiums as revenues, the petitioner incurred federal income tax liability on the premiums collected from 1971 through 1974. In 1972, the books of the petitioner changed with respect to the treatment of the $500.00 premiums. Prior to that time, the funds were segregated and declared as reductions to plant. After that time, the funds were treated on the corporate books as revenues from the sale of homes and were placed in a separate corporate account. Funds from sources other than sewer premiums wore also deposited into that account and monies from that account were used for such things as engineering services, sewer plant construction, roads, advertising, repairs, storm drainage and materials. Promotional materials, contracts of sale and closing statements, as well as customer testimony, indicate that petitioner consistently characterized the $500.00 fees for Units 4 through 6 as a charge for the sewer service available in those Units. The only difference between the homes in Units 1 through 3 and the homes in Units 4 through 6 was the presence of the sewer system in the latter as opposed to septic tanks in the former. Between 1969 and 1974, the petitioner sold 634 homes which included the $500.00 (or in some instances $1,000.00) premium for sewer service. Assuming a $500.00 fee from each purchaser, the total premiums collected amount to $317,000.00. The petitioner paid federal income taxes on all such $500.00 fees collected with the exception of the $84,500.00 collected in 1969 and 1970. Due to the three-year statute of limitations on refunds, the petitioner cannot now recover or recoup the taxes paid on that income. The imputation of CIAC to funds which petitioner has treated in the past for Internal Revenue purposes as income will substantially reduce petitioner's future sewer rate base and will reduce the petitioner's cash flow potential. If CIAC is imputed to these $500.00 premiums, it is estimated that the petitioner's sewer operation would offer revenue reductions in the approximate amount of $25,000.00 per year. Prior to December of 1973, no governmental agency regulated petitioner's water and sewer rates. The petitioner came under the jurisdiction of the Florida Public Service Commission in December of 1973. Although the petitioner did not produce the revenue agent's report which allegedly required the $500.00 fees to be reported as income, the testimony of petitioner's expert witness was that only a regulated utility could report tax-free Contributions- in-aid-of-construction. For federal income tax purposes, the CIAC of an unregulated utility was treated as ordinary taxable income. The assets represented by such funds can be depreciated for income tax purposes.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the issues in dispute between the parties be resolved as follows: The quality of service provided by the petitioner to its water and sewer customers be found adequate; A delinquent account charge he set at $10.00 if service must be disconnected and $2.20 if only a delinquent notice must be mailed; The petitioner's request to change from a quarterly to a monthly billing cycle be granted; Rate case expenses in the amount of $73,000.00 be approved, said amount to be amortized over a three-year period; and The $500.00 premiums collected between 1969 and 1974, in the total amount of $317,000.00, be treated as contributions-in-aid-of-construction and the petitioner's sewer rate base be accordingly reduced. Respectfully submitted and entered this 14th day of July, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: R.M.C. Rose and Martin Friedman 1020 East Lafayette Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Marta M. Suarez-Murias and Paul Sexton, Staff Counsel Florida Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Suzanne Brownless and Steven Burgess Office of Public Counsel Room 4, Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steve Tribble, Clerk Florida Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Charles E. Lertora, Jr. Beverly Hills Civic Association, Inc. Post Office Box 23 Beverly Hills, Florida 32665
The Issue The issue in this case is the amount of attorney's fees and costs Petitioner, Florida Cities Water Company, should be awarded pursuant to Section 120.595(5), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996).
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, Florida Cities Water Company (hereinafter referred to as "Florida Cities"), is a utility providing water and wastewater service to two communities in Florida. Respondent, the Florida Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "PSC"), has exclusive jurisdiction over water and wastewater service utility providers in Florida, including the determination of rates that utility providers may charge for their services. Section 367.011, Florida Statutes (1995). Florida Cities' 1992 Approved Rate. In arriving at an allowable rate which a water and wastewater service utility may charge, the PSC must determine, among other things, the amount of a utility's plant that is considered "used and useful." Section 367.081(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995). In determining the amount of Florida Cities' plant that was considered "used and useful" in 1992, the PSC determined the amount of investment costs in its North Fort Myers, Florida, plant which was potentially recoverable. Recoverable costs are limited to those expenditures which are considered to be for the public benefit. Florida Cities' recoverable costs as of 1992 were determined to total $6,343,868.00. The amount of Florida Cities' recoverable costs was then multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which was the average daily flow of the plant (calculated on a peak month basis) and the denominator of which was the capacity of the plant (this fraction is hereinafter referred to as the "Capacity Ratio"). In 1992, the average daily flow of the plant on a peak month basis was determined to be in excess of 1.0 million gallons per day (hereinafter referred to as "MGD"), and the capacity of the plant was determined to be 1.0 MGD. Therefore, the Capacity Ratio was determined to be 100 percent and Florida Cities' recoverable costs of $6,343,868.00 was determined to be 100 percent "used and useful." Florida Cities' "rate base" for 1992 was, therefore, determined to be $6,343,868.00. Florida Cities' 1995 Application for Rate Increase and the PSC's Reduction of Rate Base. Subsequent to the determination of Florida Cities' rate base and its approved utility rates in 1992, Florida Cities was required by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (then known as the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation)(hereinafter referred to as "DEP"), to expand its North Fort Myers plant. As a result of DEP's action, Florida Cities incurred additional plant costs of approximately 1.6 million dollars. As a consequence of having incurred additional plant costs, Florida Cities requested that the PSC treat the additional costs, plus other costs incurred by Florida Cities since 1992, as recoverable costs and as an addition to its rate base. Florida Cities' application was filed in 1995. After consideration of Florida Cities' application for rate increase, the PSC issued a Notice of Proposed Agency Action Order Granting Final Rates and Charges on November 2, 1995. In this order the PSC essentially determined that all additional plant expansion costs incurred by Florida Cities constituted recoverable costs. The PSC also determined that Florida Cities' Capacity Ratio was 100 percent and, therefore, all of its recoverable costs was treated as "used and useful." The decision of the PSC resulted in an increase of Florida Cities' utility rate of approximately 17.89 percent. The proposed decision of the PSC was, however, challenged and proceeded to hearing before the PSC. On September 10, 1996, the PSC entered a Final Order Denying Application for Increased Wastewater Rates, Reducing Rates, Requiring Refund and Requiring Reports (hereinafter referred to as the "PSC Final Order"). In the PSC Final Order, the PSC treated all of the 1.6 million dollars in costs associated with the expansion of the plant required by the DEP as recoverable costs. The PSC, however, reduced the Capacity Formula to 65.9 percent. This resulted in a reduction in Florida Cities' rate base of approximately 2.4 million dollars. The reduction in the Capacity Formula to 65.9 percent was caused, in part, by the manner in which the PSC determined the numerator of the Capacity Formula. The PSC modified the manner in which it calculated the numerator of the Capacity Formula: Instead of using the average daily flow calculated on a peak month basis, it used the average daily flow calculted on an annual basis (to which it added a "reserve" of 4.58 percent) . . . . The reduction in the Capacity Formula from 1992 to 1995 was also caused by the plant capacity figure used by the PSC. The PSC used a permitted capacity of 1.5 MGD instead of the actually designed and built capacity of 1.25 MGD. Florida Cities had urged use of the 1.25 MGD actual capacity figure. As a result of the PSC's conclusion that only 65.9 percent of the amount of recoverable costs was used and useful, Florida Cities' rate base was reduced to $5,525,915.00, a decrease of Florida Cities' used and useful plant as determined in 1992 of over $800,000.00. Although the PSC included the additional costs incurred by Florida Cities in order to comply with DEP regulations, the PSC's use of a Capacity Ratio of 65.9 percent to determine the amount of the recoverable costs considered used and useful had a net effect of disallowing approximately 2.4 million dollars in proposed rate base (1.6 million dollars incurred to meet DEP regulations plus the $800,000.00 reduction of 1992 rate base). Florida Cities' Appeal of the PSC's Final Order. Florida Cities appealed the PSC Final Order to the District Court of Appeal, First District (hereinafter referred to as the "First District Court"). Florida Cities Water Company v. Florida Public Service Commission, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D238 (Fla. 1st DCA January 12, 1998). On appeal, Florida Cities raised two grounds for reversal of the PSC's Final Order: The Capacity Ratio used by the PSC to determine the amount of its recoverable costs which was considered used and useful was flawed. Florida Cities urged the First District Court to increase its Capacity Ratio to 100 percent; and The PSC should have included all costs Florida Cities had incurred in order to comply with DEP regulations as part of its rate base without regard to the Capacity Ratio. Florida Cities argued that the 1.6 million dollars it had incurred to comply with DEP regulations should be included as part of its rate base without regard to what the Capacity Ratio was determined to be. Florida Cities' challenge to the Capacity Ratio used by the PSC was based upon two alleged errors: The PSC's use of permitted capacity of 1.5 MGD was improper. Florida Cities argued that the PSC should have used actual plant capacity of 1.25 MGD; and The method elected by the PSC to determine the average daily flow of the plant was a novel and unexplained deviation from past PSC policies. Florida Cities argued that the PSC should have continued to determine average daily flows based upon a peak month basis rather than an annual basis. As to the 1.6 million dollars in costs Florida Cities sought to have included in its rate base, Florida Cities' two arguments were alternative theories advanced to support the same end: 100 percent inclusion of the 1.6 million dollars it had incurred as a result of meeting DEP regulations. While the two arguments were interrelated with regard to the starting point (it had spent 1.6 million dollars on plant) and the result Florida Cities was attempting to achieve (inclusion of 1.6 million dollars in rate base), the two arguments involved different methods of reaching the desired result: (a) direct inclusion; or (b) inclusion through an increase in the Capacity Ratio. As to the remaining $800,000.00 reduction in Florida Cities' rate base, only one of the arguments raised by Florida Cities applied to this amount: the argument that the Capacity Ratio utilized by the PSC was flawed. The First District Court's Decision. The First District Court agreed with Florida Cities' contention that the Capacity Ratio used by the PSC was flawed. The First District Court found that both the calculation of the numerator and the denominator of the Capacity Ratio by the PSC was in error. With regard to the numerator, the First District Court concluded that the PSC's determination of average daily flows by using annual flows constituted a shift in agency policy which was "'unsupported by expert testimony, documentary opinion, or other evidence appropriate to the nature of the issue involved.'" The First District Court remanded the matter to the PSC to "give a reasonable explanation, if it can, supported by record evidence (which all parties must have an opportunity to address) as to why average daily flow in the peak month was ignored." With regard to the denominator, the First District Court opined that "no competent evidence of any substance supports the PSC's determination" of plant capacity. The First District Court concluded that the denominator should be 1.25 MGD. The First District Court rejected Florida Cities' contention that amounts it had expended to comply with DEP regulations should be included in its rate base without regard to the Capacity Ratio. The First District Court concluded that the 1.6 million dollars spent to comply with DEP regulations could be included in rate base "only to the extent the improvements they effect or the facilities to which they relate are 'used and useful in the public service.'" The ultimate impact of the First District Court's decision depends upon what action the PSC takes on remand with regard to determine the appropriate numerator for the Capacity Formula. The PSC issued an Order of Remand on April 14, 1998. In the Order of Remand, the PSC indicated its position that the decision of the First District Court regarding flows was "an invitation" to take additional testimony and evidence on the issue. The PSC, therefore, reopened the record and scheduled a second evidentiary hearing to determine how average daily flows should be calculated. Florida Cities filed a Motion to Stay the PSC's second evidentiary hearing, pending resolution of an appeal of the PSC Order of Remand. Until a final determination is made concerning the intent of the First District Court in remanding the matter to the PSC, it cannot be absolutely concluded what the "result obtained" in this case will be. The parties have, however, assumed for purposes of the matter that the Capacity Ratio should be approximately 98.6 percent. That is the best "result" which can be obtained by Florida Cities in this matter. Florida Cities' Motion for Attorney's Fees. As part of its appeal, Florida Cities also filed a Motion for Attorney's Fees. Florida Cities sought an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Section 120.595(5), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). In particular, Florida Cities requested that the First District Court: Grant attorneys [sic] fees to Appellant for this appeal; Remand this case to the Division of Administrative Hearings to determine attorneys fees; and Grant such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate. The First District Court entered the following order on Florida Cities' Motion for Attorney's Fees: The motion by appellant for attorney's fee is granted. If the parties are unable to agree on an amount of attorney's fees, the question should be referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Parties' Effort to Agree. Florida Cities submitted copies of invoices to the PSC documenting the attorney's fees and costs incurred by it in connection with the appeal of the PSC's Final Order. Florida Cities proposed several findings of fact, which are hereby accepted by reference, relating to the manner in which it determined attorney's fees and costs. Those findings of fact include paragraphs 27 through and including 32. The PSC reviewed the invoice copies submitted by Florida Cities and stipulated and agreed that the number of hours and the hourly rates attributable to the appeal of the PSC Final Order were reasonable. The parties stipulated that the total amount of attorney's fees and costs incurred by Florida Cities on the appeal of the PSC Final Order amounted to $74,648.14. On March 18, 1998, the PSC and Florida Cities filed a Joint Petition for Resolution of Attorney's Fees with the Division of Administrative Hearings. The parties stipulated in the joint petition that they had negotiated in good faith but were unable to agree on the amount of attorney's fees which should be paid to Florida Cities. The parties stipulated and agreed that $74,648.14 is the appropriate lodestar figure. The parties were unable to agree, however, whether the lodestar figure should be adjusted in light of the "results obtained" by Florida Cities on appeal. Therefore, consistent with the order of remand from the First District Court, the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the limited purpose of determining whether the agreed upon lodestar figure of $74,648.14 should be reduced based upon the "results obtained" by Florida Cities on appeal. The "Result Obtained" on Appeal. On appeal, Florida Cities argued that it was entitled to a total increase in its rate base of approximately 2.4 million dollars: (a) the 1.6 million dollars it expended to comply with DEP regulations; and (b) the $800,000.00 reduction in rate base which resulted from the PSC's modification of the Capacity Ratio. In effect, Florida Cities argued that it should be allowed to treat 100 percent of its recoverable costs as its rate base. As a result of the First District Court's decision and assuming a Capacity Ratio of 98.6 percent will be achieved, Florida Cities was successful on appeal in increasing its rate base by approximately 2.2 million dollars. Of this amount, approximately $879,000.00 was attributable to the First District Court's conclusion that the PSC had used the incorrect plant capacity. The remaining 1.3 million dollars was attributable to the First District Court's conclusion that the methodology used by the PSC to determine average annual daily flows was a policy change which was unsupported by the record. Had Florida Cities succeeded on both issues it raised on appeal, it would not have resulted in any appreciable increase in Florida Cities' rate base over the increase in rate base allowed by the First District Court. A utility plant cannot be treated as used and useful in excess of 100 percent of its costs. The two issues Florida Cities raised on appeal, at least as to the 1.6 million dollars it was required to expend to meet DEP regulations, were alternative theories for achieving the same result: total inclusion of the 1.6 million dollars in its rate base. Florida Cities contended that the 1.6 million dollars should have been included directly in its rate base because it was required to make the expenditure by a government agency. In the alternative, it argued that the Capacity Ratio used to determine the amount of recoverable costs considered used and useful should have been increased to 100 percent. This alternative argument would also have resulted in inclusion of the 1.6 million dollars in its rate base. Regardless of which argument was accepted by the First District Court or whether the First District Court had accepted both arguments, Florida Cities could not have achieved any substantially greater result than it did. As to the remaining $800,000.00 reduction in 1992 rate base, Florida Cities' argument concerning the direct inclusion of amounts required to be expended to comply with DEP regulations did not relate to this amount. Only Florida Cities' two-pronged argument concerning the Capacity Ratio supported Florida Cities' argument that its rate base should be increased by this amount. Florida Cities' arguments concerning this amount was successful. I. The Consequences of Florida Cities' Failure to Prevail on All Issues. Had Florida Cities prevailed in its contention that costs incurred as the result of meeting government requirements should be included directly in rate base, such a decision would have had significant consequences to most, if not all, utilities in Florida. Such a decision would also have probably had an impact on future rates approved for Florida Cities. Having failed to prevail on this issue, however, prevented the application of this theory by other utilities in Florida to the determination of their rate bases and to the determination of the appropriate rate base for Florida Cities in the future. The loss of the benefit to other utilities and Florida Cities in future rate cases, which would have occurred had Florida Cities prevailed, did not have any impact on the "results obtained" by Florida Cities in the immediate proceedings. While the failure of the argument and the avoidance of the impact on rate-making, which would have resulted had Florida Cities prevailed, was of great consequence to the PSC, the rejection of the argument by the First District Court did not reduce the result Florida Cities hoped to have obtained on appeal. J. Attorney's Fees and Costs of Proceedings Before the Division of Administrative Hearings. Florida Cities incurred attorney's fees and costs in the instant proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings. Florida Cities has sought recovery of those fees and costs. The parties have not agreed upon the appropriateness of the inclusion of such fees and costs. Mr. Schiefelbein acted as lead counsel during the attorney's fees phase of this matter. As of April 23, 1998, four days before the hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Cities had incurred the following attorney's fees during the attorney's fees phase of this matter: Attorney Hourly Rate Total Fees Mr. Schiefelbein $150.00 $6,135.00 Mr. Gatlin $175.00 490.00 Ms. Cowdery $150.00 37.50 Total $6,662.50 It was estimated that an additional 22 hours of Mr. Shiefelbein's time would result in an additional $3,300.00 of fees attributable to completion of the attorney's fees phase of this proceeding "through a Final Order of the Administrative Law Judge." This estimate was based upon 4 hours for witness preparation, 4 hours for other hearing preparation, 4 hours to attend the hearing, and 10 hours for review of the hearing transcript and submittal of a proposed order. The hourly rate charged by counsel for Florida Cities for the attorney's fees phase of this proceeding was reasonable and a combined total of 66 hours to complete this phase of the proceeding was a reasonable number of hours to pursue this matter. Mr. Melson, an expert witness for Florida Cities in this proceeding, charged $220.00 per hour for his preparation for and attendance at the hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings. Mr. Melson spent 2.6 hours preparing for the hearing and 2.5 hours attending the hearing. Mr. Melson's fee amounted to $1,122.00. Mr. Seidman, another expert witness for Florida Cities, charged an hourly rate of $90.00 and spent 20.75 hours in preparing for and attending the hearing. It was stipulated that Mr. Seidman's total fee of $1,867.50 was reasonable. Although Florida Cities did not argue that all fees and costs incurred by it during the attorney's fees phase of this proceeding should be recovered, it did seek recovery of the foregoing fees and costs. Those fees and costs totaled $12,952.00.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner proved the elements necessary to demonstrate that she was subject to an unlawful employment practice as a result of Respondent, Bradford County Farm Bureau, maintaining a sexually-hostile work environment.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner was employed by Respondent, Bradford County Farm Bureau (BCFB or Respondent). She worked for the BCFB from December 15, 2006 until January 1, 2012. The BCFB is an organization created to work for and provide support to farmers in Bradford County. The BCFB has its office in Starke, Florida. At all times relevant to this proceeding, James Gaskins was the President of the BCFB Board of Directors. He served in that capacity as an unpaid volunteer. The alleged actions of Mr. Gaskins towards the Petitioner form the basis for her claim of employment discrimination. Section 760.10(1), provides that: It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer: To discharge or to fail or refuse to hire any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual?s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. To limit, segregate, or classify employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or adversely affect any individual?s status as an employee, because of such individual?s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. Section 760.02(7) defines "employer" as follows: „Employer? means any person employing 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person. The threshold issue in this proceeding is whether the BCFB had the requisite number of employees to bring it under the jurisdiction of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 as Petitioner?s “employer.” If Petitioner fails in her proof of that issue, any discussion of acts that may have constituted sexual harassment or resulted in the creation of a sexually- hostile work environment become superfluous and unnecessary. Facts Regarding the BCFB as an “Employer” At all times relevant to this proceeding, the BCFB had two paid employees. Ms. Griffith was the office manager and bookkeeper. Ms. Linzy was a part-time secretary and receptionist, although she worked full-time when Ms. Griffith was out. Ms. Linzy retired in October, 2012. In addition to the foregoing employees, the BCFB has a five-member board of directors. Although Mr. Gaskins, who was a member of the Board, served as an unpaid volunteer, there was no evidence as to whether the remaining members were paid for their services. For purposes of this Recommended Order, it will be presumed that they were. Based solely on the number of its employees, BCFB is not an “employer” as defined by section 760.10. Therefore, in order to prove the threshold element of her claim for relief, Petitioner must establish that employees of other entities should be imputed to the BCFB due to integrated activities or common control of BCFB?s operations or employees. Petitioner presented evidence of the relationship between the BCFB, the Florida Farm Bureau, and the Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Company (FFBIC) to establish the requisite integration or common control necessary to impute their employees to the BCFB. Florida Farm Bureau The Florida Farm Bureau has more than 15 employees. The Florida Farm Bureau has a mission similar to that of the BCFB of providing goods, services, and other assistance to farmers, though on a state-wide basis. Each county in Florida has an independent county farm bureau. The Florida Farm Bureau has no common corporate identity with the BCFB. The BCFB is incorporated as a legal entity unto itself. The Florida Farm Bureau and the BCFB have no common officers, directors, or employees. The Florida Farm Bureau does not share or comingle bank accounts with the BCFB. The BCFB maintains its own finances, and has a bank account with the Capital City Bank Group. The Florida Farm Bureau has no operational control over the BCFB. The BCFB Board of Directors makes all employment decisions for the BCFB, has exclusive authority to hire and fire employees of the BCFB, and has exclusive control over the pay and the terms and conditions of BCFB employees. Employees of the BCFB are paid by the BCFB, and not by the Florida Farm Bureau. The Florida Farm Bureau has the telephone numbers of all of the county farm bureaus, and can transfer calls received by the Florida Farm Bureau to any of the county farm bureaus. Other than that, as stated by Ms. Linzy, the county farm bureaus “are all on their own.” Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Company The Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Company is affiliated with the Florida Farm Bureau. The nature and extent of the relationship between those entities was not established. The relationship between those two entities does not affect their relationship, or lack thereof, with the BCFB. Petitioner introduced no evidence as to the FFBIC?s total number of employees. The FFBIC has no common officers or directors with the BCFB, nor do they share or comingle bank accounts. Brent Huber and Travis McAllister are insurance agents authorized to transact business on behalf of the FFBIC. They are self-employed independent contractors. Mr. Huber does business as “Brent Huber, Inc.” Neither Mr. Huber nor Mr. McAllister is an employee of the FFBIC. Mr. Huber is not employed by the BCFB, and does not perform duties on behalf of the BCFB. The evidence suggests that Mr. McAllister?s status, vis-à-vis the BCFB, is the same as that of Mr. Huber. Local FFBIC agents are selected by the FFBIC. Given the close relationship with local farmers/customers, the FFBIC selection of a local agent must be ratified by the county farm bureau in the county in which the agent is to transact business. Once ratified, an FFBIC agent cannot be terminated by the county farm bureaus. Mr. Huber and Mr. McAllister, having been appointed to transact business in Bradford County as agents of the FFBIC, maintain an office at the BCFB office in Starke. There being only four persons in the office, the relationship among them was friendly and informal. Mr. Huber described the group as “tight-knit” and “like a family.” Mr. Huber had no supervisory control over Petitioner or her work schedule. Due to the small size of the BCFB office, and limited number of persons to staff the office, Ms. Griffith?s absences would cause problems for the office as a whole. However, Mr. Huber never evaluated Ms. Griffith?s performance and never disciplined Ms. Griffith. The FFBIC provided sexual harassment, employment discrimination, workers? compensation, and minimum wage informational signs that were placed in the BCFB office break room. Those signs were “shared” between the Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Company and the BCFB. Thus, the BCFB did not maintain a separate set of signs. The BCFB office has a single telephone number, and calls are routed internally. If Mr. Huber was out of the office, Petitioner or Ms. Linzy would take messages for him. If Mr. Huber was alone in the office, he would answer the telephone. Petitioner or Ms. Linzy would occasionally make appointments for Mr. Huber, and assist him when clients visited the office. Mr. Huber did not pay Petitioner or Ms. Linzy for those services. At some point, Mr. Huber and Ms. Griffith determined that it would be mutually advantageous if Ms. Griffith were allowed to speak with FFBIC customers about insurance when Mr. Huber was out of the office. To facilitate that arrangement, Ms. Griffith, at Mr. Huber?s suggestion, obtained a license as a customer service representative, which allowed her to sell policies under Mr. Huber?s insurance agent license. The customer service representative license was not a requirement of Ms. Griffith?s position with the BCFB. Ms. Griffith would sell insurance policies only when Mr. Huber was out of the office. Mr. Huber compensated Ms. Griffith for writing insurance policies through “Brent Huber, Inc.” Ms. Griffith continued to be paid as a full-time employee of the BCFB because she thought the BCFB “would be OK with it.”
Recommendation Upon the consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations that, based upon Petitioner's failure to meet her burden of proof to establish that Respondent, Bradford County Farm Bureau, is an “employer” as defined in section 760.02(7), the Employment Complaint of Discrimination be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert E. Larkin, III, Esquire Allen, Norton and Blue, P.A. Suite 100 906 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Jamison Jessup 557 Noremac Avenue Deltona, Florida 32738 Cheyanne Costilla, Interim General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Conclusions An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) of the Division of Administrative Hearings has entered an Order Closing File which relinquishes jurisdiction to the Department of Community Affairs (“Department”) of all of the issues raised in the Petition. A copy of the Order is attached to this Final Order as Exhibit A.
Findings Of Fact Pal-Mar has filed application No. 29454 pursuant to Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, requesting approval for a surface water management system known as Phase III of Pal-Mar Water Management District, to serve approximately 3,600 acres of residential land in Martin County, Florida. The project discharges to C-44, the St. Lucie canal. SFWMD's staff report recommends approval be granted for the proposed water management system based on considerations of water quality, rates of discharge, environmental impact and flood protection. Approval is subject to certain conditions which are not material to the instant cause. As background material to the staff report, the staff makes reference to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers report entitled "Survey-Review Report of Central and Southern Florida Flood Control Project, Martin County," dated September 22, 1967. The Corps of Engineers' report was not used in the decision-making process but rather was included in the staff report to provide a comprehensive overview. Whether the Corps of Engineers' plans were ever implemented would not affect the recommendations of the staff. The land in question is currently zoned "IZ" (interim zoning) according to Martin County's zoning regulations. In this category, if the neighborhood is predominantly one classification of usage, then the zoning director is to be governed by the regulations for that class of usage in determining the standard zoning regulations to be applied to the interim zoning district. If no trend of development has been established in the neighborhood, the minimum standards of the R2 single family zoning district are to be complied with. Rule 16K-4.035, Florida Administrative Code, entitled Basis of Review of Applications for Construction of Works, provides in Section (2) that all applications such as the instant one shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of the district's "Basis Of Review For Construction Of Surface Water Management Systems Serving Projects With Two Or More Acres Of Impervious Area Within The South Florida Water Management District - December, 1977." The Basis of Review provides in Part VI that before an application will be considered for the issuance of a permit, the proposed land use must be "compatible with the applicable zoning for the area." The evidence indicates that the land in question has a history of agricultural use. However, the evidence also discloses that far from being a trend towards agricultural use there is a trend away from it. A major portion of the neighboring lands will be devoted to Phases I, II, IV and V, of the Pal-Mar Water Management District. According to Florida Land Sales Board registrations, the land in question is subdivided into one-half acre, one acre, 1.4 acre and two acre lots. The average project density is one lot per acre. In addition, there is some mobile home usage within neighboring areas. If there is a trend, it is toward R2 zoning type usage. SFWMD's staff concluded that the proposed land use was compatible with the applicable zoning for the area. Martin County has failed to establish that such compatibility does not exist. In the Redraft of Order Permitting Change of Plan of Reclamation and Change of Name dated November 4, 1969, the Honorable C. Pfeiffer Trowbridge, Circuit Court Judge of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Martin County, observes that the Petitioner in that case (herein Pal-Mar) "permanently and irrevocably withdrew its application to drain into the St. Lucie canal thereby removing all reasons for objections" to the proceedings in Circuit Court. However, there is no evidence to indicate that there exists a prohibition against drainage into the St. Lucie canal or that Judge Trowbridge's order is intended to preclude approval of Pal-Mar's present application.
The Issue Whether the South Florida Water Management District’s (“District”) intended award of a contract for aerial spraying services, granular application services, and aerial transport services, to Coastal Air Services, Inc. (“Coastal”), is contrary to the District’s governing statutes, rules, policies, or the bid specifications; and, if so, whether the decision was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The District is an independent taxing authority created pursuant to section 373.069, Florida Statutes, with the authority to contract with private entities to maintain real property controlled by the District. See § 373.1401, Fla. Stat. HAI is a Florida corporation duly authorized to do business in the State of Florida with a business address of 1090 Airglades Boulevard in Clewiston, Florida. Coastal is a Florida corporation duly authorized to do business in the State of Florida with a business address of 7424 Coastal Drive in Panama City, Florida. The RFB On February 7, 2018, the District issued the RFB, soliciting bids for qualified respondents to provide the following: [F]urnish all labor, equipment, perform data entry and perform all operations for spraying of aquatic, ditchbank and invasive vegetation by helicopter and provide aerial flight services for site inspection and plant surveys. Both HAI and Coastal submitted timely bids, which the District deemed responsive and responsible under the terms of the RFB. The District deemed Coastal the lowest responsive and responsible bidder for aerial spraying, granular application, and aerial transport services. The District deemed HAI the lowest responsive and responsible bidder for spot spraying services. On May 11, 2018, the District posted its Notice of Intent to Award the respective contracts to Coastal and HAI. HAI challenges the award to Coastal because it is not a responsible bidder under the terms of the RFB. HAI’s challenge focuses on two items required to document the bidder’s responsibility to perform the requested services. First, the RFB requires the bidder to provide at least two helicopters certified pursuant to 14 CFR Part 133, Rotocraft External-Load Operations; and 14 CFR Part 137, Agricultural Aircraft Operations (Part 137 Certificate). Second, the RFB requires the bidder to demonstrate its ability to obtain required insurance coverage. Part 137 Certificate HAI contends that Coastal’s bid does not meet the responsibility provisions of the RFB because it did not include sufficient Part 137 Certificates for its subcontractor, HMC Helicopters (“HMC”). HAI contends the Part 137 Certificates are required to expressly state that aircraft are certified to dispense economic poisons. Petitioner’s argument fails for three reasons. First, the RFB does not require the bidder’s Part 137 Certificate to expressly endorse aircraft to dispense economic poisons.3/ Second, assuming the express endorsement was required, the requirement does not apply to HMC. The RFB defines the term “Bidder” and “Respondent” as “[a]ll contractors, consultants, organizations, firms or other entities submitting a Response to this RFB as a prime contractor.” (emphasis added). In its bid, Coastal is listed as the prime contractor, and HMC as a subcontractor. The RFB requires each Respondent to list at least two aircraft which are Part 133 and 137 certified. The requirement applies to Coastal as the primary contractor, not to its subcontractor. Coastal’s bid listed five aircraft with both Part 133 and 137 Certificates, actually exceeding the requirement for two such certified aircraft. Third, assuming an express endorsement for dispensing economic poisons was required, and that the requirement applied to HMC, HMC’s Part 137 Certificate documents HMC’s authority to dispense economic poisons. Pursuant to 14 CFR 137.3, “Agricultural aircraft operation” is defined as follows: [T]he operation of an aircraft for the purpose of (1) dispensing any economic poison, (2) dispensing any other substance intended for plant nourishment, soil treatment, propagation of plant life, or pest control, or (3) engaging in dispending activities directly affecting agriculture, horticulture, or forest preservation, but not including the dispensing of live insects. To obtain a Part 137 Certificate, the operator must pass a knowledge and skills test, which includes the safe handling of economic poisons and disposal of used containers for those poisons; the general effects of those poisons on plants, animals, and persons and precautions to be observed in using those poisons; as well as the primary symptoms of poisoning in persons, appropriate emergency measures in the case of poisoning, and the location of poison control centers. See 14 CFR § 137.19. However, if the operator applies for a Part 137 Certificate which prohibits dispensing of economic poisons, the applicant is not required to demonstrate the knowledge and skills listed above. See Id. HMCs’ certificates do not contain an express prohibition against dispensing economic poisons. The authorization for HMC’s aircraft to dispense economic poisons is inherent in its Part 137 Certificate. Coastal’s bid meets the solicitation requirement for at least two aircraft with Part 137 Certificates. Insurance Requirements The RFB requires each Respondent to “provide evidence of the ability to obtain appropriate insurance coverage.” Respondents may meet the insurability requirement by having their insurance agent either (1) complete and sign an insurance certificate which meets all of the requirements of Exhibit H to the RFB; or (2) issue a letter on the insurance agency’s letterhead stating that the Respondent qualifies for the required insurance coverage levels and that an insurance certificate meeting the District’s requirements will be submitted prior to the execution of the contract. In response to this requirement, Coastal submitted a letter from Sterlingrisk Aviation, dated March 6, 2018, stating, “All required coverage amounts are available to Coastal Air Service, Inc. to fulfill the requirements of this contract.” In the Re: line, the letter refers to the specific RFB at issue in this case. Coastal also submitted a certificate of insurance from Sterlingrisk Aviation demonstrating the levels of insurance coverage in effect at the time the bid was submitted, although the coverages are less than the amounts required under the RFB.4/ HAI takes issue with Coastal’s evidence of ability to obtain the required coverage because the letter from Sterlingrisk does not state “an insurance certificate reflecting the required coverage will be provided prior to the contract execution.” Based on the totality of the evidence, the undersigned infers that Sterlingrisk’s letter omits the language that a certificate “will be provided” prior to contract execution, because Sterlingrisk will issue an insurance certificate only when Coastal applies, and pays the premium, for the increased coverage limitations. The letter from Sterlingrisk substantially complies with the insurance requirements of the RFB, and constitutes competent, substantial evidence of Coastal’s ability to obtain the required insurance coverage. HAI introduced no evidence that Coastal obtained an economic advantage over HAI by failing to include language from its insurance agent that “an insurance certificate reflecting the required coverage will be provided prior to the contract execution.” Instead, HAI argued that by failing to enforce that provision of the RFB, the District cannot ensure the winning bidder will be responsible to undertake the contract. HAI argued that the District’s failure to adhere to this RFB requirement may create inefficiencies that “would result in the event that Coastal were unable to obtain the required insurance coverage” before execution of the contract. Coastal’s bid documents its eligibility for insurance coverage in the amounts required by the RFB. If Coastal does not provide said certificates, it will not be qualified for final execution or issuance of the contract.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Southwest Florida Water Management District enter a final order dismissing Helicopter Applicator, Inc.’s Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2018.
The Issue The ultimate issue to be resolved at this stage of the proceedings is whether the petition for hearing submitted by RCID was filed in a timely manner. RCID contends that it was entitled to receive actual notice of the application proceeding and to be afforded a point of entry into a formal administrative proceeding. RCID asserts that its petition for formal hearing was filed within the specified period following actual receipt of notice. CFU and the Department contend that actual notice was not required. To the extent that RCID was entitled to actual notice, they contend that it was provided. CFU and the Department assert that the petition for hearing was not filed within the specified time period following receipt of constructive or actual notice.
Findings Of Fact On or about August 2, 1982, CFU filed a permit application with the Department. CFU is seeking a permit that would allow it to modify an existing sewage treatment facility and to discharge effluent from the facility into Bonnet Creek. The proposed facility would be located west of the town of Kissimmee in Osceola County, Florida. RCID is a special tax district. Its boundaries include portions of Osceola and Orange Counties. The facility proposed by CFU is not located within the boundaries of RCID. The point where effluent would be discharged, however, is within the boundaries of RCID. On September 30, 1976, RCID and the Department entered into a Local Program Agreement. The agreement designates RCID as an officially approved local program of the Department in accordance with the provisions of Section 403.182, Florida Statutes. The agreement has remained in effect since its execution. Paragraph 1.4 of the agreement provides: The local programs shall be advised of all applications submitted within the District and drainage areas shown in the Exhibit 1 attached hereto for federal grant assistance, construction, modification, or expansion of any pol- lution control or wastewater treatment system and may submit on a timely basis to the department appropriate recommendations concerning such appli- cations. In Paragraph 2.0, the agreement provides that RCID shall participate in the administration of the Department's permit system within the District's boundaries by, among other things, submitting comments regarding the construction and operation of any domestic or solid waste treatment facilities. Prior to the filing of its application, CFU engaged in lengthy negotiations with Department personnel and filed at least one "Preliminary Application." RCID officials became aware of these negotiations and on July 21, 1981, submitted a letter to the Department specifically requesting that it be notified of any applications to discharge into waters lying within the District. In its letter, RCID Specifically expressed concern about CFU's plans which were being prepared by Boyle Engineering Corporation. During February and March, 1982, representatives of RCID discussed the CFU proposals with CFU and Boyle Engineering representatives. On April 1, 1982, RCID representatives met with personnel of the Department, expressed continued concern about CFU's plans, and specifically requested to be notified if CFU filed a formal application with the Department. After CFU submitted its formal application, the Department requested further data, and on or about September 23, 1982, issued a letter giving notice of the Department's intent to issue the permit. In its letter, the Department directed CFU to publish a "Notice of Proposed Agency Action" in the legal advertisement section of a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the proposed activity is located. The notice of intent letter was directed to CFU, and copies were sent to the Department's Office of General Counsel, the Osceola County Engineer, the Osceola County Health Department, an engineer with Boyle Engineering Corporation, RCID, and the director and general manager of RCID. Copies of the notice of intent letter were sent to all of these persons on September 23, 1982. Each of these persons, except RCID and the director and general manager of RCID, received copies of the intent letter shortly after September 23, 1982. Copies of the intent letter that were forwarded to RCID and to the director and general manager of RCID were forwarded to Post Office Box 36, Lake Buena Vista, Florida. The notices were not returned to the Department. Insufficient evidence was offered to rebut the presumption that the notice that was mailed to RCID was delivered to that post office box. Mail that is delivered to the RCID post office box in Lake Buena Vista is picked up by a person who is a joint employee of RCID and Walt Disney World, the principal landowner within RCID. This person is responsible for delivering mail to the RCID offices. The mail is placed on the desk of the RCID receptionist. The receptionist then directs mail to the appropriate addressee. The notice of intent letter was not received by the RCID receptionist. There was no evidence, however, as to the practices of the person or persons who pick up mail at the Lake Buena Vista post office box and deliver it to the RCID offices. The law indulges a presumption that items placed in the mail are delivered. It is thus presumed that the intent letters forwarded to RCID by the Department were delivered to the Lake Buena Vista post office box. There is no evidence from which it could be concluded what then happened to the notices other than that they did not ultimately reach RCID's office. CFU published the "Notice of Proposed Agency Action" as instructed by the Department in a newspaper of general circulation in Osceola County, Florida, on September 29, 1982. The notice, as appended to the intent letter, provided that substantially affected persons could request a hearing and that the request should be filed in the Office of General Counsel of the Department within fourteen days of publication of the notice. No such requests were filed, and the Department accordingly issued the permit to CFU on October 15, 1982. A copy of the permit was forwarded to RCID and received at the RCID offices on or about October 20, 1982. RCID filed a request for hearing within fourteen days of receiving a copy of the permit. The request for hearing was filed, however, more than fourteen days after the date that the intent letter was delivered to the RCID post office box in Lake Buena Vista, and more than fourteen days after the notice of proposed agency action was published in the newspaper.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Central Florida Utilities, Inc. for a construction permit as described in the agency's proposed action dated March 29, 1984, be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of January, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 1985.
