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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs ADRIAN HOLBEIN BRIGANTE, 01-003016PL (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jul. 25, 2001 Number: 01-003016PL Latest Update: Jan. 08, 2025
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs JIBRI KHALEID KNIGHT, 06-003671PL (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 25, 2006 Number: 06-003671PL Latest Update: Jul. 05, 2007

The Issue Should discipline be imposed by Petitioner against Respondent's insurance agent licenses, life including variable annuity (2-14), and general lines (2-20), pursuant to Chapters 624 and 626, Florida Statutes (2004)?

Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts Respondent is licensed by Petitioner as a life including variable annuity (2-14) and a general lines (2-20) insurance agent and has been issued license D029506. During the time referenced in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was licensed as a customer representative (4-40) and a life including variable annuity (2-14) agent. The Department has jurisdiction over Respondent's insurance licenses and appointments. At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referenced in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was employed or affiliated with Direct General Insurance Agency, Inc., a Tennessee corporation, doing business in Florida as Florida No-Fault Insurance Agency (Cash Register). Additional Facts: At times relevant to the case Respondent held his life including variable annuity license (2-14) under an appointment with Direct Life Insurance Company. At times relevant to the case Respondent had a customer representative license (4-40) under appointment with Direct General Insurance Agency, Inc. At present Respondent continues to hold the life including variable annuity license (2-14) under an appointment with Direct General Life Insurance Company. At present he has a general lines license property and casualty license (2-20) under appointments with Direct General Insurance Company and American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida. On February 8, 2005, Brandi Dean called Cash Register to receive a quote for the purchase of basic automobile insurance coverage. She was provided a quote at that time. On February 8, 2005, Brandi Dean, went to the Cash Register to purchase basic automobile insurance coverage. She had done business with the insurance agency before. Her policy with Direct General Insurance Company was Policy No. FLCR162714439, as reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 15, with a scan cover sheet entitled "Renewal Auto." On February 8, 2005, Ms. Dean purchased automobile insurance coverage that would be effective from February 10, 2005 through February 10, 2006. She was charged $316 for property damage liability (PD) and $216 for basic injury protection (PIP) for a total of $532, with a $25 policy fee. The application information within the exhibit reflects the customer's name, signature, and initials in various places. On February 8, 2005, Ms. Dean was provided another form referred to as an Explanation of Policies, Coverages and Cost Breakdown (including non-insurance products). Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 16. She signed that document. It reflected the auto policy coverage information. It also set forth under a category referred to as optional policies, the purchase of Lloyd's Accident Medical Protection Plan for $110. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 17 is additional information concerning the Accident Medical Protection Plan application by the customer signed by her. It details a $110 annual premium for individual coverage of $1,000 medical expense, and 125/day-365 day hospital coverage. Within that same exhibit there is a form signed by the customer titled 100% certain underwriters @ Lloyd's/London (DB/33) Accident Medical Protection Plan. This reflects $110 cost, $125 daily coverage and the total annual benefit of $45,625. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 18 is a scan cover sheet entitled Renewal Finance with Premium Finance Agreement Information in association with Direct General Financial Services, Inc., in which the customer Ms. Dean paid $69.63 down, financed $599.82, with a total price of $748.61 when considering the annual percentage rate for financing. This document in totality was initialed and signed by Ms. Dean. Ms. Dean was provided a receipt for her cash down-payment on the purchase. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 14. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 19 is an Insurance Premium Financing Disclosure Form signed by the customer, reflecting the cost of the automobile insurance and the hospital indemnity plan, the amount of total cost and includes the policy fee for the automobile insurance, document stamp tax, the down payment, and the total amount financed $599.82. Ms. Dean was left with the impression that she had only purchased automobile insurance. She believed that the monthly payments for the financing were only in relation to automobile insurance. Ms. Dean does not recall having the accidental medical protection plan explained to her as to its terms. She does not recall anyone explaining that it was an optional plan unassociated with automobile insurance. She told the agent that she dealt with that she was only interested in purchasing the state-required automobile insurance coverage. Had she realized that she was purchasing optional accident medical protection, not part of the automobile insurance purchase, she would have declined the optional policy. Ms. Dean does recall that the agent she dealt with made some brief explanation about the documents involved in the transaction but not every page was explained. Ms. Dean recalls explanations about the automobile policy but nothing about optional coverage. Ms. Dean glanced over the documents but did not read every word included in the documents. Ms. Dean does not recall whom she dealt with on February 8, 2005. Otherwise, the record does not reflect the person who sold the automobile insurance and accidental medical protection plan to her at that time. At times relevant, Denise Daley Turnbull worked at Cash Register. She was a customer representative license (4- 40), appointed by Direct General Insurance Agency, Inc. On March 24, 2005, William L. Green, Jr., came to Cash Register to purchase automobile insurance. He dealt with Ms. Turnbull. He made a $170.02 down payment for his purchases, as reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 4, which is a receipt provided to Mr. Green. A scan cover sheet related to an auto policy purchased, together with the application information for the automobile insurance purchased through Direct General Insurance Company is found within Petitioner's Exhibit numbered Mr. Green purchased automobile insurance for property damage liability (PD) in the amount of $590 and basic personal injury protection (PIP) for $370, with a $25 policy fee, totaling $985. He signed and initialed parts of the forms in association with the automobile insurance. Ms. Turnbull also signed forms in association with the automobile insurance. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 6 is an explanation of policies, coverages and cost breakdown (including non-insurance products) reflecting the overall purchases by Mr. Green. He signed that form. It relates the automobile insurance purchase. It also relates the purchase of an American Bankers Travel Protection Plan for $60, a Lloyd's Accidental Medical Protection Plan for $110 and life insurance of $98. With fees and other costs the total purchase was $1270.99. Of relevance here, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 9 is a scan cover sheet in relation to the life policy signed by Ms. Turnbull. It also includes application information to Direct Life Insurance Company with certain questions reflected that were initialed by the purchaser. Mr. Green signed the application. Respondent also signed the application, as well as printing his name and insurance license number on the form. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 10 is a scan cover sheet for a New Finance with Direct General Financial Services, Inc., which reflects a $162.03 down-payment, $1105.17 in amount financed, with a $129 finance charge. The total sales price for all purchases was $1396.20, to include the life insurance with Direct Life Insurance Company. Mr. Green signed the premium finance agreement. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 11 is a copy of the Insurance Premium Finance Disclosure Form signed by Mr. Green. Ms. Turnbull has no recollection of the Respondent's participation in the sale of the life insurance policy to Mr. Green. She does recall that Respondent was in the insurance agency office when the life insurance was purchased. She recognizes Respondent's signature in association with the life insurance application and purchase. Mr. Green had no intention of purchasing life insurance when he went to Cash Register on March 24, 2005. He recalls dealing with Ms. Turnbull. No one else sat with Mr. Green and explained policy information to him. Specifically, Respondent did not sit with Mr. Green and offer explanations about the policy. Mr. Green did not see Respondent sit with Ms. Turnbull and Respondent remained silent while she sold the life policy. Had Mr. Green realized that he was purchasing life insurance he would have declined the opportunity.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order finding a violation under Count I as set forth in the conclusions of law, dismissing Count II and suspending Respondent's license for six months for the violation. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: William Gautier Kitchen, Esquire Gregg Marr, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 L. Michael Billmeier, Jr., Esquire Galloway, Brennan and Billmeier, P.A. 240 East Fifth Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Michael L. Rothschild, Esquire Larry S. Davis, P.A. 1926 Harrison Street Hollywood, Florida 33020 Honorable Alex Sink Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Sumner, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307

Florida Laws (19) 120.569120.57624.11624.15624.462624.4621626.015626.112626.611626.621626.681626.691626.951626.9521626.9541626.9561626.9651775.082775.083 Florida Administrative Code (2) 69B-213.05069B-213.110
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs THE ADMINISTRATORS CORPORATION AND CHARLES N. ZALIS, 89-005981 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Nov. 02, 1989 Number: 89-005981 Latest Update: Jul. 09, 1990

The Issue Whether Respondents violated various provisions of the Florida Insurance Code, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against them, if any.

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent The Administrators Corporation (hereinafter "TAC") has been an authorized administrator, and Respondent Charles N. Zalis (hereinafter "Zalis") has been licensed or eligible for licensure as a life insurance agent, a life and health insurance agent, and a legal expense insurance sales representative in the State of Florida. Zalis is the chief executive officer of TAC. TAC is not licensed in Florida as an insurer. An authorized administrator in Florida may engage in the solicitation, negotiation, transaction and/or sale of insurance in Florida if such activity takes place pursuant to an agreement between the authorized administrator and an authorized insurer. Life and Health Insurance Company of America (hereinafter "Life & Health"), which is not a party to this administrative proceeding, is an authorized insurer in Florida. On April 13, 1988, TAC entered into a contract with Life & Health to market and service group health insurance. The term of that contract was for four years and one month. Life & Health attempted to terminate its Administrator Agreement with TAC by letter dated March 16, 1989, effective immediately. The date on which the responsibilities under that Administrator Agreement terminated, if ever, is an issue in dispute between Life & Health and TAC. The Department takes no position on that issue. That issue is the subject of a civil lawsuit filed in Broward County, between Life & Health and TAC, which is currently being litigated. Although Life & Health's original position was that the contract between it and TAC terminated as of March 16, 1989, that position apparently changed because Life & Health continued paying claims up to July 1, 1989. TAC's position was that Life & Health's responsibilities under that contract did not terminate until September 26, 1989, when George Washington, an authorized group health insurance carrier in Florida, agreed to assume the risk for the block of business retroactive to July 1, 1989. TAC could have obtained a replacement carrier earlier than September 26, 1989, if the Department had advised TAC and Zalis as to the procedure involved to allow Summit Homes, an authorized property and casualty insurer, to broaden the scope of its certificate of authority to include group health insurance. The simple procedure could have been accomplished in as little as 24 to 48 hours. A group health insurance carrier remains on the risk to its policyholders until there has been a valid cancellation or termination of that coverage. In the pending Circuit Court litigation between Life & Health and TAC, the validity of the termination or cancellation and the date of same are ultimate issues in that law suit and have not yet been determined by the Court. On March 27, 1989, Life & Health sent a letter to agents informing them of its termination of its relationship with TAC and that it would not accept any new business written after March 16, 1989. The evidence in this cause, however, indicates that Life & Health did continue to accept new business after that date. The Department became aware of the dispute between Life & Health and TAC on June 8, 1989. The Department knew as of July 12, 1989, that TAC was continuing to write business on Life & Health "paper." At some point after the attempted March 16, 1989, termination of the contract by Life & Health, TAC and Life & Health informally agreed to a July 1, 1989, date after which Life & Health would no longer be responsible for any claims and TAC would have a replacement insurer in place to take over the block of business. That agreement was based upon TAC and Life & Health each agreeing to cooperate with each other and to take certain actions to facilitate the transfer of the book of business. Both the Department and the Circuit Court were aware of the informal agreement whereby Life & Health agreed to remain on the risk for the block of business at least through July 1, 1989, and Zalis and TAC would issue no further policies on Life & Health "paper" and would not remain involved in the processing or payment of claims after July 1, 1989. Prior to July 12, 1989, those matters required to take place in connection with the July 1, 1989, "cutoff" date had not been accomplished, and Zalis and TAC continued writing new business on Life & Health "paper" believing that Life & Health was still legally responsible. Zalis informed the Department's investigator on July 12, 1989, that he was writing and that he intended to continue to write new business on Life & Health "paper." No evidence was presented to show that the Department notified Zalis or TAC that they could not do so, and the Department took no action to stop that activity. Additionally, Life & Health took no action to enjoin TAC or Zalis from writing new business on Life & Health "paper." The evidence does suggest that Life & Health may have continued to accept the benefits and liabilities. The premiums for policies written by TAC on Life & Health "paper" after July 1, 1989, were not forwarded to Life & Health; rather, they were retained by TAC in a trust account. Zalis and TAC offered to deposit those monies with the Circuit Court in which the litigation between TAC and Life & Health was pending or to transmit those monies to the Department to insure that the monies would be available for the payment of claims. Pursuant to an agreement with the Department, the monies representing those premium payments were transmitted to the Department On September 26, 1989, George Washington Insurance Company, an authorized health insurance company in the State of Florida, agreed to take over the block of business from Life & Health, retroactive to July 1, 1989. Life & Health, however, had not yet signed the assumption agreement to transfer its responsibility to George Washington Insurance Company as of the time of the final hearing in this cause. TAC and Zalis did not place any Florida insurance business with any companies not authorized to do business in Florida. Respondent Zalis has been in the insurance business for 26 years and enjoys a good reputation for honesty and integrity. Zalis and TAC have never had prior administrative action taken against them. As of the date of the final hearing in this matter, there had been no Circuit Court determination of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of Life & Health's termination of the Administrators Agreement nor of the date of that termination, if any.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondents not guilty of the allegations contained in the Order to Show Cause and dismissing the Order to Show Cause filed against them. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of July, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 89-5981 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3, 6-9, 14-17, 20, 21, and 25-27 have been adopted either in substance or verbatim in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 4 and 5 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law or argument of counsel. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 10, 11, 13, and 22 have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 12 and 19 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 18, 23, and 24 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 1-17 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter D. Ostreich, Esquire Office of Treasurer and Department of Insurance 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Jerome H. Shevin, Esquire Wallace, Engels, Pertnoy, Martin, & Solowsky, P.A. CenTrust Financial Center 21st Floor 100 Southeast 2nd Street Miami, Florida 33131 William M. Furlow, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Davis, Marks & Rutledge, P.A. Post Office Box 1877 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1877 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (9) 120.57624.10624.401626.611626.621626.882626.891626.901626.9521
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OFFICE OF THE TREASURER, DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs. HOWARD PAUL HAUSER, 89-001226 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-001226 Latest Update: Jul. 21, 1989

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding Respondent, HOWARD P. HAUSER, was eligible for licensure and licensed in this state by the Florida Department of Insurance as a Life and Health Insurance Agent; General Lines Insurance Agent - Property, Casualty, Surety, and Miscellaneous Lines; and Legal Expense Insurance Agent. At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent was the registered agent and an officer or director of Hauser and Associates Insurance Agency, Incorporated of 7770 Davie Road Extension, Hollywood, Florida. Beginning on or about January 1, 1986, and continuing through August 31, 1987, Respondent represented to one of his clients that he had obtained insurance coverage for that client's three restaurants. This representation of coverage was false. Respondent received from the client insurance premium payments of $56,550.00, more or less, for the insurance of the client's three restaurants. These funds were obtained by Respondent under false pretenses. Respondent provided the mortgagee of one of the restaurants owned by his client with a document purporting to be a certificate of insurance on that restaurant from Scotsdale Insurance Company insuring the restaurant for the period December 11, 1985, to December 11, 1986. Respondent further provided the mortgagee with a declaration sheet stating that Protective Insurance Company would insure the restaurant from January 1, 1987, to January 1, 1990. Respondent falsified these declaration sheets. Respondent's client suffered no loss, other than the loss of his premium dollars, because of Respondent's misrepresentations as to coverage. Respondent was charged with one count of Grand Theft of the Second Degree, a second degree felony, based on the dealings with his client. Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of Grand Theft of the Second Degree. The Circuit Court, in and for Broward County, Florida, placed Respondent on probation for a period of three years and withheld adjudication of guilt. As a condition of the Order of Probation, the court required that Respondent make restitution to his client in the amount of $56,550.00 and further required that $15,000.00 be paid toward restitution on October 24, 1988, the date Respondent entered his plea of nolo contendere and the date the court entered the Order of Probation. Respondent made a restitution payment of $15,000.00 on October 24, 1988. Respondent has been licensed by Petitioner since April 1972. Although Petitioner has received other complaints about Respondent, no formal action has been previously taken against him. Respondent has been a good citizen, except for this misconduct, and a good family man. Respondent regrets his misconduct. Respondent timely requested a formal hearing after the Administrative Complaint was served upon him.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final order which revokes all licenses issued by the Department of Insurance to Respondent, Howard Paul Hauser. DONE and ENTERED this 21st of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 1989. APPENDIX The proposed findings addressed as follows: of fact submitted on behalf of Petitioner are 1. Addressed in paragraph 1. 2. Addressed in paragraph 2. 3. Addressed in paragraph 6. 4. Addressed in paragraph 3. 5. Addressed in paragraph 4. 6. Addressed in paragraphs 3-4. The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Respondent are addressed as follows: Addressed in paragraph 9. Addressed in paragraph 6. Addressed in paragraph 6. Rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 7. Addressed in paragraph 5. Addressed in part in paragraph 7. Rejected in part as being speculative. Rejected as being a conclusion of law and not a finding of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert G. Gough, Esquire, (at the hearing) and Charles Christopher Anderson, Esquire, (on the proposed recommended order) Office of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Gary D. Weiner, Esquire, Glendale Federal Building Suite 209 901 Southeast 17th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300

Florida Laws (2) 120.57626.611
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PAUL L. KORNYA vs DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER, 91-002327 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 16, 1991 Number: 91-002327 Latest Update: Mar. 27, 1992

The Issue Whether the Petitioner's application of January 11, 1991, for examination as a general lines agent should be granted.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Paul L. Kornya was licensed in 1974 as a general lines insurance agent in the State of Florida. Prior to 1984, Respondent Department of Insurance had taken no formal disciplinary action against the Petitioner. In 1983, while licensed as an insurance agent and employed in the capacity of office manager for the Milton Carpenter Insurance Agency, Petitioner established a demand deposit account in the name of "Atlantic Association Insurance" and listed himself as the sole signatory and beneficiary on the account. Petitioner thereafter wrote four unauthorized checks on the Milton Carpenter Agency Account totaling $47,132.14 made payable to Atlantic Association Insurance and deposited them into his demand deposit account. In order to conceal his activity, the Petitioner altered the payee of the checks. In a prior administrative case (Case No. 84-L-4085F), Petitioner admitted misappropriating and converting the funds. In 1983, while licensed as an insurance agent and employed in the capacity of office manager for the Milton Carpenter Insurance Agency, Petitioner wrote two unauthorized checks on the Milton Carpenter Agency Account totaling $3,455 made payable to Blinder, Robinson and Co., Inc., Investment Bankers. In order to conceal his activity, the Petitioner listed an agency account code designated for miscellaneous companies on said checks. In a prior administrative case (Case No. 84-L- 4085F), Petitioner admitted misappropriating and converting the funds which were used for Petitioner's personal stock purchases. In 1984, a judgement in the amount of $52,013.35 was entered against Petitioner in the case styled Milton Carpenter Insurance, Inc., a Florida Corporation, and Cincinnati Insurance Company vs. Paul L. Kornya, Case No. 84-3235 CA(L)A, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Palm Beach County, Florida. On October 31, 1985, the Department entered a Final Order revoking Petitioner's license qualifications and eligibility for licensure for a period of two years, based upon the misappropriation and conversion of said funds. By application signed December 16, 1987 and filed December 28, 1987, Petitioner submitted an application for examination as a general lines insurance agent. By Insurance Commissioner Bill Gunter's letter to the Petitioner of February 29, 1988, the Department requested that the Petitioner submit certain certificates of employment to verify his prior experience. The letter stated that, "[t]o qualify for this examination through experience you must have completed within the past 4 years, at least 1 year of substantially full-time responsible duties as the bona fide employee of an agent or insurer. Your duties during this time must have been in all lines of property, casualty, surety, health and marine insurance. ... One certificate should be completed by you and the other by your employer." The Petitioner claims to have submitted said employment certificates shortly following the Department's request. However, the Department's files do not contain the documents or any other response to the letter, and there is no evidence beyond Petitioner's testimony to support the claim. By letter of March 17, 1988, Department representative Franklin Thompson again requested the experience information cited in the February 29 letter or in the alternative, that Petitioner submit proof that a course of education had been completed. The letter further stated that "we will need a statement from Milton Carpenter Insurance Inc. Agency of Belle Glade, Florida stating that any and all indebtedness you may have had relative to their firm has been satisfied". Both the February 29 and March 17 letters provided that failure to file the information within 30 days from the date of each letter is grounds for denial of the application. Three months passed following the March 17 letter to the Petitioner. According to the records of the Department, no response to either letter was received. On June 17, 1988, the Petitioner's December 1987 application was closed by the Department based upon the failure of Petitioner to submit the previously requested information. By letter of June 23, 1988, the Petitioner advised the Department that the indebtedness was not to the Milton Carpenter Insurance Agency, but was to Cincinnati Insurance Company, which had insured the Carpenter agency against such losses. The letter further stated that approximately $5,000 had been repaid to the Cincinnati Insurance Company. By letter of August 3, 1988, Department representative Thompson wrote, "[t]he information you have furnished has been thoroughly reviewed. It appears that your indebtedness with Milton Carpenter Insurance has been assigned to Cincinnati Insurance Company. Please request that Cincinnati Insurance Company furnish us with a statement indicating that all of your indebtedness to their company has been satisfied". The letter stated that failure to respond within 30 days from the date of the letter was grounds for denial of the application. The evidence does not explain the reason for Mr. Thompson's letter of August 3, 1988. Given the June 17 closure of the pending application based upon the Petitioner's failure to supply additional information, the information furnished apparently consisted of the Petitioner's untimely filed letter of June 23. As of August 3, no pending application existed. In any event, the Petitioner did not respond to the August 3 request. By second application signed October 31, 1989, and filed November 3, 1989, Petitioner submitted an application for examination as a general lines insurance agent. By undated letter, Department representative Thompson again requested Petitioner to submit either certificates of employment to verify his prior experience or proof of completion of certain educational requirements, and further requested a reply to the letter of August 3, 1988 seeking statement from Cincinnati Insurance Company indicating that "all of your indebtedness to their company has been satisfied". Again the letter provides that failure to furnish the requested information within 30 days would result in the file being closed. 1/ The Petitioner, subsequent to the undated letter and prior to February 2, 1990, submitted said certificates of employment. Early in 1990, the Petitioner's application file was assigned to Department representative, Patricia Lehman. On February 2, 1990, Ms. Lehman informed that Petitioner that his certificates of employment were not acceptable, and that he would be required to complete a 240 hour educational requirement. Further, Ms. Lehman's letter provided that, "[i]n addition, you will need to furnish us with a certified letter from Cincinnati Insurance Company that you have made full restitution or a certified copy of the written agreement between you and the party(s) involved that you are making restitution satisfactory to all parties concerned. The information you sent to us is not certified and reflects no signatures". Beginning February 26, 1990, Mr. Kornya took and completed the 240 hour insurance course as identified in the Department's previous communications. The $595 course met for six weeks, five days each week, from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. On September 17, 1990, the pending application was closed by the Respondent based upon the failure of Petitioner to submit the previously requested information. There is no evidence that Petitioner submitted evidence of completing the educational requirement. On or about January 8, 1991, Petitioner entered into an restitution agreement with Cincinnati Insurance Company setting forth a payment schedule which requires that Petitioner make a payment of $300 each month to the Cincinnati Insurance Company in order to eventually satisfy the entire $52,013.35 judgement against him. By application signed January 11, 1991, and filed January 16, 1991, Petitioner submitted an application for examination as a general lines agent. By memorandum of February 18, 1991, to her superior, Bob Stewart, Ms. Lehman recommended that the Petitioner's application be denied. Specifically, her memo provides as follows: Mr. Kornya's license qualification and eligibility for licensure were revoked by the Department in 1985 for the mishandling of funds in a fiduciary capacity. It does not appear Mr. Kornya attempted to make restitution until the signed Agreement in 1991. He has demonstrated lack of fitness and trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance. Therefore pursuant to Sections 626.611(1) (7) , [sic] 626.641(2) and 626.731(1), I recommend his application be denied. Although Ms. Lehman's memo states that "[i]t does not appear Mr. Kornya attempted to make restitution until the signed Agreement in 1991", prior to the January 8, 1991 execution of the restitution agreement, the Petitioner had paid $12,237.94 to Cincinnati Insurance Company realized from the sale of vehicles and real estate. The executed copy of the restitution agreement reflects that such funds were paid, although the agreement fails to indicate when the payment was made. The payment was applied towards interest which had accumulated on the judgement, not towards the $52,013.35 principle judgement amount. At the time of the hearing, the restitution payments were current (although Petitioner did not make the $300 payment due in April, but paid $600 in May.) As of the date of hearing, approximately $49,913 remained to be paid to Cincinnati Insurance Company to satisfy the judgement. Although at the time of the hearing, a letter allegedly from Cincinnati Insurance Company indicated that they had not received documentation of Petitioner's compliance with paragraph five of the restitution agreement (a requirement that Petitioner purchase a life insurance policy naming the insurer as irrevocable beneficiary), said policy was purchased on January 9, 1991. By letter of March 1, 1991, the Department denied the application, based on an application of the statutory sections cited in Ms. Lehman's memo. On June 21, 1991, the Department issued an amended letter of denial. 2/ In the amended letter of denial, the Department cites the prior misappropriation of funds, the unsatisfied judgement, and the 1985 revocation of licensure and eligibility for licensure, which "circumstances surrounding that revocation still exist". The letter cites Sections 626.611(1), (4), (7), (9), (10) and (13), section 626.641(2), and section 626.731(1) Florida Statutes, as the statutory basis for the denial. The evidence fails to establish that any representative of the Department of Insurance, at any time, informed or assured the Petitioner that, upon his completion of the course of education and upon the execution of the restitution agreement between Cincinnati Insurance Company and the Petitioner, his application for examination for licensure as a general lines insurance agent would be approved. The Petitioner has been acquainted with his current employer, Samuel Jokich, for approximately six years. Mr. Jokich employs the Petitioner as a "Colorado Prime" freezer beef salesman. According to Mr. Jokich, the Petitioner is "extremely trustworthy" and of good character. The Petitioner had not disclosed to Mr. Jokich, and Mr. Jokich was not otherwise aware, that the Petitioner had taken approximately $52,000 from the Milton Carpenter Insurance Agency. Mr. Jeffrey Hooker, an independent insurance agent in Belle Glade and childhood friend of the Petitioner's, is aware of the Petitioner's misappropriation and conversion of approximately $52,000 from the Milton Carpenter Insurance Agency. However, Mr. Hooker stated that he would trust the Petitioner and "try to help him any way I could". Mr. Hooker desires to become partners with the Petitioner in a proposed insurance agency in Ft. Myers. Mr. Kenneth Snyder, a field representative for CNA Insurance Company, has known the Petitioner for approximately eight years. He believes the Petitioner to be of "good character" with "solid morals". Although Mr. Snyder was aware that the Petitioner had taken some funds from the Milton Carpenter Insurance Agency, he was unaware of the amount of said funds. Mr. Snyder stated that he would be willing to enter into a business relationship were the Petitioner to become licensed as a general lines agent.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order denying the application of Paul L. Kornya to sit for examination for licensure as a general lines insurance agent. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 1992.

Florida Laws (6) 120.57120.68132.14626.611626.641626.731
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs HOWARD IRVIN VOGEL, 03-004850PL (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Dec. 24, 2003 Number: 03-004850PL Latest Update: Sep. 10, 2004

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of transacting insurance business in violation of Sections 626.611 and 626.621, Florida Statutes, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is licensed as a general lines insurance agent, holding license number A274461. He has been so licensed for over 20 years. The record discloses no previous discipline. Respondent bought L.N.V., Inc., d/b/a Federal Insurance (Federal Insurance), when he first became licensed in Florida. Respondent has retained ownership control of Federal Insurance since its purchase, except for a one-year period starting in June 2002, when Federal Insurance sold its assets to an unrelated party. However, after the party defaulted on its purchase obligations, Federal Insurance recovered the assets. Prior to June 2002, Respondent was, at all material times, the sole shareholder, the president, and a director of Federal Insurance. The acts and omissions alleged in Counts I, II, IV, and VII took place during this time period. After June 2003, Respondent's formal roles with Federal Insurance became less clear, although he continued to run the daily operations of the business and control the corporation. At minimum, though, Respondent was the Agency Owner from May 20, 2003, through November 7, 2003, and November 25, 2003, through December 29, 2003, according to the Agency Location Report, which is part of Petitioner Exhibit 2. The acts and omissions alleged in Counts V and VI took place, at least in part, during these time periods. Without doubt, regardless of his formal roles after June 2003, Respondent personally committed the acts and omissions that are the subject of Counts V and VI. Michael Smith is a licensed property and casualty insurance agent. He is also licensed to sell life and health insurance. He has held insurance licenses since 1983. Mr. Smith has been employed by Federal Insurance twice: from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s and 1999-2001. At all material times, Nicholas Polyviou, d/b/a Polyviou Corporation, was a self-employed manufacturer of office furniture. Mr. Polyviou did his insurance business at Federal Insurance where he dealt with Michael Smith. On October 13, 1999, Mr. Polyviou visited Michael Smith at Federal Insurance to purchase workers' compensation and liability insurance. Mr. Polyviou completed an application for workers' compensation insurance and delivered four Notices of Election to be Exempt, which had already been filled out and signed by Mr. Polyviou and the other three employees who were the subjects of the notices. The notices represented elections by qualified persons not to be covered by workers' compensation. To process the Notices of Election to Be Exempt and file them with the Division of Workers' Compensation, Federal Insurance charged Mr. Polyviou $75 per form, for a total of $300. The $75 fee per form consisted of a $50 fee charged by the Division of Workers' Compensation to file the notices and a $25 fee charged by Federal Insurance to process the notices and send them to the Division of Workers' Compensation. However, Federal Insurance never sent these notices to the Division of Workers' Compensation. Eventually, following an audit, Mr. Polyviou was assessed about $20,000 in unpaid workers' compensation premiums for these four individuals. Mr. Polyviou's injury was considerably less than $20,000 because the other three employees were ineligible to elect out of coverage in the first place. At all material times, David Wagner was self-employed in landscape maintenance. On August 21, 2000, Mr. Wagner visited Mr. Smith at Federal Insurance to purchase workers' compensation insurance. Mr. Wagner completed an application for workers' compensation insurance and delivered a Notice of Election to be Exempt, which had already been filled out and signed by Mr. Wagner. Respondent notarized the Notice of Election to be Exempt. To process the Notice of Election to Be Exempt and file them with the Division of Workers' Compensation, Federal Insurance charged Mr. Wagner $75. The $75 fee consisted of a $50 fee charged by the Division of Workers' Compensation to file the notice and a $25 fee charged by Federal Insurance to file the notice. However, Federal Insurance never filed the notice with the Division of Workers' Compensation. Eventually, an audit uncovered the absence of a filed notice, but the workers' compensation insurer and Petitioner were able to give effect to the notice, as of the date that it should have been filed, so that Mr. Wagner was not subject to any fines, fees, or penalties. Mr. Smith and other Federal Insurance employees described the office procedures at the time of the Polyviou and Wagner transactions. After completing the applications and notices and collecting the customers' checks, Mr. Smith typically placed the documents and checks in a basket where employees not performing other tasks would process the notices and payments, prepare checks for deposit, prepare money orders, and mail completed packages to the Division of Workers' Compensation. Because the Division of Workers' Compensation required the payment of filing fees by money order, not corporate check, Federal Insurance would not know if the Division of Workers' Compensation had received a package. On August 28, 2000--one week after the Wagner transaction--Evelyn Grenyer visited Mr. Smith at Federal Insurance to purchase renter's insurance. She informed Mr. Smith that all correspondence had to be mailed to a post office box, not her street address. Mr. Smith agreed to do so. Ms. Grenyer paid Federal Insurance a premium of $242.17. Over the next several days, Mr. Smith called Ms. Grenyer with questions about her residence, but he consistently assured her that she had insurance. In May 2001, Ms. Grenyer's home was robbed of property worth $2000. When she called Federal Insurance, she learned that she had not been insured because they had been unable to find her residence. Someone at Federal Insurance explained that they had sent mail to her residence, rather than, as instructed, her post office box, and the mail had been returned. Mr. Smith testified that Federal Insurance submitted the premium of $202.64 to the renter's insurance company. He thought that the difference may have been a charge to inspect the house. When the insurer required additional information, Federal Insurance attempted to contact Ms. Grenyer through her street address, rather than, as instructed, by her post office box. When she did not respond, the insurer canceled coverage, as of October 18, 2000, and refunded $149.53 of the premium to Federal Insurance, by check dated November 14, 2000. Federal Insurance deposited the check to its account. Only after Ms. Grenyer contacted Federal Insurance about the loss did it issue a check, in the same amount and dated May 10, 2001, to Ms. Grenyer. Obviously, no one at Federal Insurance visited the residence or tried calling Ms. Grenyer, whose phone number had not changed for five years and was in the records of Federal Insurance. Ms. Grenyer never recovered any insurance proceeds for the $2000 loss that she suffered. From 1995-1998, Federal Insurance employed Juan C. Montoya as an insurance agent. On January 22, 1998, Federal Insurance designated Mr. Montoya as the primary agent of Federal Insurance. In May 1998, Mr. Montoya's employment with Federal Insurance terminated. Federal Insurance failed to designate a new primary agent until July 9, 2001. For nearly three years, Federal Insurance operated without a designated primary agent. A few months after selling the insurance business, Respondent filed a notice with Petitioner, on September 25, 2002, identifying JEMS Services, 4207 Lake Avenue, West Palm Beach, as his new principal business address. When filing the notice, Respondent knew that he did not intend to transact insurance business at the JEMS Services address. In fact, Respondent used the JEMS Services address without the consent of the insurance agent conducting insurance business at that address. JEMS Services is an insurance agency owned by Janet Travieso-Otero, a friend of Respondent and his wife. Ms. Travieso-Otero never gave Respondent permission to use her address as his principal business address. Respondent has never been employed by JEMS Services, nor has he ever transacted business from this address, which has never been the principal business address of Respondent or any insurance business that he has owned or operated. Respondent accused Ms. Travieso-Otero of lying when she testified that she had never told Respondent that he could use her business as his principal place of business. To the contrary, Respondent is lying, and, even if he were not lying, Respondent intentionally provided Petitioner an incorrect business address. With Mr. Montoya and Ms. Travieso-Otero, Respondent has used friends and business associates, without their knowledge, to satisfy regulatory requirements. At all times during which Mr. Montoya was designated as the primary agent, including while he was employed by Federal Insurance, Respondent was the primary agent because Respondent, not Mr. Montoya, was responsible for the supervision of the insurance agents and their hiring and firing. The common thread in both situations is that Respondent, not someone on his behalf, has intentionally filed false information with Petitioner. Petitioner's expert witness, Wilford Ghioto, testified about Respondent's obligations. Mr. Ghioto, who has considerable relevant experience in the retail property-and- casualty insurance business, described the procedures that his office followed when processing and filing Notices of Election to be Exempt from workers' compensation insurance coverage. In particular, the insurance agent, but not the supervising agent, was responsible to ensure that the completed package was mailed to the proper location, and the supervising agent, if aware of any problems with an insurance agent, opened all of the insurance agent's mail to discover any problems. The supervising agent also ensured that the office routinely ran account receivable reports to find any money due an insured.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order dismissing Counts I-IV, finding Respondent guilty of Counts V-VII, imposing an administrative fine of $1250, and suspending Respondent's license for six months. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregg S. Marr David J. Busch Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Orrin R. Beilly Law Office of Orrin R. Beilly Citizens Building, Suite 705 105 South Narcissus Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capital, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capital, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57624.11626.551626.611626.621626.734
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs GARY LEE BAKER, 93-004569 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Aug. 18, 1993 Number: 93-004569 Latest Update: May 12, 1994

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, and at the time of the hearing, Gary Lee Baker ("Respondent") was licensed in Florida as a life and variable annuity agent, health and variable annuity agent, life agent, life and health agent, general lines agent, and health agent. The Respondent was a stockholder and officer in the "Murdock Insurance Agency, Inc.". Pete and Debi Valencia are the owners of the "Growing Concern," a floral shop. In 1991, the Growing Concern had obtained workers compensation (WC) coverage through Allstate Insurance. According to the Allstate policy, the coverage was effective from July 18, 1991 to July 18, 1992. The premium for the policy was $1,235.00. As of November, 1991, Mr. Valencia believed that Allstate Insurance was going to terminate his WC insurance coverage. The belief apparently was based on local gossip. There is no evidence that, absent payment of premium, Allstate intended to cancel the Valencia's WC insurance coverage prior to the expiration date set forth in the policy. Mr. Valencia contacted the Respondent, who was a business acquaintance of Mrs. Valencia, to discuss WC coverage. At the time of the initial meeting, Mr. Valencia offered to place all his insurance business with the Respondent if the Respondent could obtain satisfactory WC insurance rates for the Valencia's business. Mr. Valencia provided a copy of the then-current Allstate policy to the Respondent. Based on information provided by Mr. Valencia, the Respondent completed portions of a WC insurance application on behalf of Growing Concern on November 21, 1991. The application was to be submitted to the National Council of Compensation Insurance (NCCI) Atlantic Division upon receipt of additional information from Mr. Valencia and upon the lapse of the Allstate coverage. Among the information required by the NCCI was a copy of a Growing Concern quarterly tax filing (Form 941) from Mr. Valencia. The form is used by NCCI to verify the Growing Concern payroll, the basis of calculation of the WC premium. Pursuant to this meeting, Mrs. Valencia provided a check dated November 21, 1991, numbered 3737, for $360.00 as an initial payment on the WC premium. The Respondent deposited the check into his trust account and awaited receipt of the additional documentation. By January, 1992, the Respondent had not received the additional information. He contacted Mr. Valencia to obtain the copy of Form 941 and to obtain an additional premium payment of $121.00. On several occasions during January and February, 1992, the Respondent and his assistant attempted to contact Mr. Valencia to obtain the premium payment and information. Neither the information nor the payment was forthcoming. On March 8, 1992, Mrs. Valencia submitted a check numbered 3948 for $121.00 as payment of the additional premium. However, the Valencia's still failed to submit a signed copy of the Growing Concern's most recent Form 941. Although the Respondent assumed that the application would be rejected for the failure to include all the required information, the Respondent submitted the application on March 31, 1992 (without the required Form 941) to NCCI. A check on the account of Murdock Insurance Agency dated March 31, 1992, numbered 144, for $962.00 accompanied the application as payment of the premium due at that time. Although he had yet to collect such an amount from the Valencias, he believed their relationship was such that he could "front" the premium payment on their behalf. By letter dated April 24, 1992, NCCI informed the Respondent that the application would not be processed without the form which would permit verification of the payroll. On May 20, 1992, Mr. Valencia provided a signed copy of the Form 941 to the Respondent. By letter dated May 26, 1992, NCCI informed the Respondent that an additional premium payment of $423.00 was required. The total premium for the Growing Concern WC policy was $1,385.00 The Respondent contacted Mr. Valencia and requested the additional premium payment. Mr. Valencia directed the Respondent to void the transaction and to return the premium paid by the Growing Concern. The premium was returned by NCCI to the Respondent. Immediately upon receipt of the premium, the Respondent refunded $481.00, the amount paid by the Growing Concern, to Mr. Valencia on June 4, 1992. At all times, Mr. Valencia's premium funds were maintained in the Respondent's trust account until such time as they were submitted to NCCI. At no time did Mr. Valencia inform the Respondent that the Growing Concern's Allstate WC coverage had lapsed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order dismissing the administrative complaint filed against Gary Lee Baker. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 4th day of January, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of January, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-4569 The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order, except as follows: Rejected, contrary to the greater weight of the evidence which establishes that the delay in submission of the application was based on the insured's failure to provide the requested information. The premium was refunded to the insured on June 4, 1992, (not January 4, 1992) immediately upon the receipt by the Respondent. Rejected, immaterial. The Allstate policy lapsed through no act by the Respondent, who was never informed of such lapse. Respondent The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 9. Rejected, hearsay uncorroborated by other competent evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Office of State Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Joseph D. Mandt, Esquire Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Carl Joseph Coleman, Esquire Smith, Geraghty & Coleman Post Office Drawer 8 Fort Myers, Florida 33901

Florida Laws (9) 120.57120.68626.561626.611626.621626.951626.9521626.9541626.9561
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs RALPH EDWARD CARTER, 89-006117 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Nov. 08, 1989 Number: 89-006117 Latest Update: Mar. 13, 1990

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Ralph Edward Carter, was licensed and eligible for licensure as a life and health insurance agent and general lines agent - property, casualty, surety and miscellaneous lines by petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department). When the events herein occurred, respondent was licensed as a property and casualty insurance agent for Bankers Insurance Company (BIC) and Underwriters Guarantee Insurance Company (UGIC). In March 1987 respondent purchased an insurance franchise and began operating an insurance firm under the corporate name of Mr. Auto of South St. Petersburg, Inc. Records on file with the Department of State reflect that effective June 25, 1988 the name of the corporation was changed to Reliable Insurance of South St. Petersburg, Inc. Since February 1989 the business has been located at 3135 18th Avenue, South, No. C- 3, St. Petersburg, Florida. The corporation was primarily engaged in doing business as a general lines insurance agency. Respondent has been licensed as an agent since 1968, and during his tenure as an agent, has worked in sales with several large insurance companies. In January 1988 Betty Andrews purchased from respondent liability and property damage coverage on her two automobiles, a 979 Ford station wagon and a 1980 Chrysler. The insurance was written through UGIC and was effective for the year beginning January 8, 1988. Shortly after May 16, 1988 Andrews received a notice from UGIC reflecting that she owed an additional $38.90 on her policy. For some undisclosed reason, Andrews did not pay the additional premium owed. On July 6, 1988 Andrews visited respondent's office for the purpose of adding comprehensive and collision coverage on her two automobiles. After respondent quoted a rate, she agreed to purchase the additional coverage, filled out an application, and gave respondent two checks totaling $166. These monies were deposited into respondent's business account. The balance was to be paid in three monthly payments of approximately $55 each month through a finance company. Respondent gave Andrews a document entitled "Receipt and Binder Certificate" reflecting she had comprehensive and collision coverage with "Bankers" effective from July 6, 1988 to January 6, 1989. "Bankers" was in fact Bankers Insurance Company. When Andrews did not receive a policy from BIC, she attempted to contact respondent on several occasions to ascertain its whereabouts. Andrews could not recall when or how many times she telephoned respondent's office but indicated she was never able to reach him. This was probably because respondent operated a one-man office with no clerical help and was frequently absent from his office. In late August 1988 Andrews received a notice from UGIC advising that UGIC intended to cancel her policy effective September 7, 1988 because she failed to pay the $38.90 premium still due. At about this same time Andrews' husband sold the station wagon and purchased a truck. Accordingly, Andrews needed to transfer her insurance to the new vehicle. She went to respondent's office in early September 1988 and asked him why she had never received the new policy. She also asked him to find out why her existing policy was being cancel led and requested him to transfer coverage from the station wagon to the new truck. In Andrews' presence, respondent made a telephone call to UGIC and learned that Andrews' husband had failed to disclose on the insurance application that he had received a traffic ticket. This in turn caused a $38.90 increase in the annual premium, and because that amount had not been paid, the policy was being cancelled. Respondent attempted to persuade UGIC to reinstate the policy but was unsuccessful. Dissatisfied, Andrews told respondent she intended to file a complaint with the Department of Insurance. Respondent then wrote her a check for $166 which represented a full refund of her monies. There is no evidence to establish that respondent intended to defraud Andrews or to evade the requirements of the insurance code. Despite the fact that Andrews did not receive a policy, she was covered until September 1988 by her original policy and respondent's errors and omissions policy. Through testimony by an underwriting manager for BIC, David R. Wardlow, it was established that respondent had entered into a correspondent agreement with an agent of BIC. Wardlow's review of BIC's records reflected that BIC had never received Andrews' application and premium nor was a policy written on her behalf. However, there was no evidence to establish how promptly respondent was required to remit a new application and premium to BIC or whether respondent violated BIC policy by retaining the application and monies for some sixty days until he learned that the existing policy had been cancel led. Respondent readily conceded that he never forwarded the application and premium monies to BIC. He explained his actions by pointing out that after Andrews left his office he decided to secure the coverage from UGIC rather than BIC in order to have the entire coverage with one company at a cheaper rate. When he later learned that UGIC intended to cancel Andrews' policy for nonpayment of premium, he thought he might be able to persuade UGIC to reinstate the policy but was unsuccessful. He offered no excuse except inadvertence as to why he had not promptly followed up on Andrews' application. Petitioner also presented the testimony of Johnnie Ruth Bell who purchased automobile insurance from respondent in October 1988. Although Bell's testimony was often vague and confusing, the following facts were established. On or about October 1, 1988 Bell went to respondent's office to purchase full insurance coverage on her 1987 Toyota Corolla. After discussing various options with respondent, Bell agreed to purchase a policy issued through Redmond-Adams, a Sarasota underwriter for UGIC. Bell gave respondent a check in the amount of $227 as a down payment and agreed to finance the balance through a finance company at a rate of $78 per month for eight months. These monies were deposited into respondent's bank account. Respondent issued a "Receipt and Binder Certificate" reflecting coverage with "Underwriter - Redmond Adams". Because Bell had financed the car with a local bank, it was necessary for respondent to furnish the bank with evidence of insurance. Through inadvertence, but not intentionally or willfully, respondent misplaced the application and never forwarded the application and premium to the insurance company nor did he notify the bank of Bell's insurance coverage. However, Bell was covered during this period of time by respondent's errors and omissions policy. After Bell did not receive a copy of her policy from Redmond-Adams, but received a number of telephone calls and notices from her bank, she met with respondent around December 2, 1988. Respondent accepted an additional $156 in cash from Bell and issued her a new binder effective that date which was identical to the first binder except for the date. It is unknown why the additional money was collected. He then tore up the first binder. When Bell had still not received her policy by April 1989, she filed a complaint with petitioner. After respondent learned that Bell had filed a complaint, he contacted her in May 1989 and refunded all of her monies. There was no evidence to establish how promptly respondent was required to submit applications and premiums to UGIC or how that company construed the term "in the regular course of business" in the context of agents remitting applications and premiums. Respondent blamed his problems on the fact that he is the sole employee of his office and, according to his estimate, services some 500 active clients per year and more than 1,500 accounts. He desires to continue in the insurance profession and points to the fact that, of the many insurance transactions handled by him over the last twenty-two years, the Andrews and Bell transactions are the only two that have spawned any significant problems. Moreover, he has never been disciplined by petitioner during his tenure as an agent. Respondent asks that any penalty be limited to a period of probation during which time he can have the opportunity to improve his management and bookkeeping skills. There was no evidence to establish whether respondent's conduct demonstrated a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the insurance profession. As to respondent's knowledge and technical competence to engage in the transactions authorized by his licenses, he conceded he lacks training in bookkeeping and management skills, both needed for a general lines agent, but denied that he lacks the necessary skills in the sales part of the business. This was not contradicted. Finally, respondent has taken curative steps to insure that applications are not misplaced and the customer receives the requested insurance.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating sections 626.611(8) and 626.734 and that his general lines license be suspended for thirty days. All other charges should be dismissed with prejudice. DONE AND ORDERED this 13 day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13 day of March, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner: 1-4. Partially adopted in finding of fact 1. 5-7. Partially adopted in finding of fact 3. 8-11. Partially adopted in finding of fact 6. Note - Where a finding has been partially adopted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, cumulative, subordinate, not supported by the evidence, or a conclusion of law. Respondent: A Partially adopted in findings of fact 5 and 6. Rejected as being irrelevant. Partially adopted in finding of fact 3. Partially adopted in finding of fact 5. Partially adopted in finding of fact 6. Rejected since respondent did not move his office until February 1989. Partially adopted in finding of fact 4. Partially adopted in finding of fact 6. I. Partially adopted in findings of fact 3 and 8. Partially adopted in findings of' fact 7 and 8. Partially adopted in findings of fact 6 and 7. Partially adopted in finding of fact 10. Partially adopted in finding of fact l. Partially adopted in finding of fact 10. Partially adopted in finding of fact 1. Note - Where a finding has been partially used, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, cumulative, unnecessary, subordinate, not supported by the evidence or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Insurance Commissioner Plaza Level, The Capital Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Willis F. Melvin, Jr., Esquire 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Richard J. DaFonte, Esquire O. Box 41750 St. Petersburg, FL 33743-1750 Donald A. Dowdell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 =================================================================

Florida Laws (8) 120.57120.68626.561626.611626.621626.641626.651626.734
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs CLARENCE KEITH LAMONDA, 01-003046PL (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jul. 30, 2001 Number: 01-003046PL Latest Update: Jan. 08, 2025
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs. TERESA WATSON, 84-000188 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-000188 Latest Update: Dec. 27, 1985

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Teresa Jean Watson, at all times material to this proceeding was licensed as an ordinary life agent, a disability insurance agent and a general lines insurance agent. She was the only general lines agent licensed to sell insurance at the T. J. Watson Insurance Agency, Inc. and all insurance sold by that firm at times pertinent hereto was sold and issued under authority of her license. During times material to this proceeding, Teresa Jean Watson sold insurance coverage under authority of her general lines license either as direct agent for various insurance companies for whom she was general agent or, on behalf of MacNeill and Son, Inc. (MacNeill), her managing agency, which represented various insurance companies for whom the Respondent wrote coverage. Between February 1st and February 15, 1982, a homeowner's insurance policy was sold to Tony and Martha Williams by the Respondent's agency under the authority of the Respondent's general lines insurance agent's license. That homeowner's policy required a premium of $211.00. The policyholder, Tony Williams, wrote two checks to the T. J. Watson Agency dated January 22, 1982 and February 12, 1982. Those two checks totalled $174.00. The checks were cashed by the Respondent's agency on January 26, 1982 and on February 6, 1982. The Independent Fire Insurance Company issued the policy to Tony and Martha Williams and on August 4, 1982 a representative of the Independent Fire Insurance Company wrote the Respondent to advise her that she owed that company a balance of $179.35, as of May 1982. Petitioner asserts that the $179.35 represents the amount of Tony Williams' premium owed to the insurer, less the Respondent's commission, which if added together would equal the $211.00 premium on the Williams' policy. Although it was established that $179.35 was owed by the Respondent to the Independent Fire Insurance Company, and never paid, it was not established that it represented the premium due specifically for the Williams' policy as was charged in count 1 of the Administrative Complaint. For instance, the checks paid by the Williamses to the Watson Agency total $174.00 and therefore there is a discrepancy between the total of those checks and the $179.35 amount Independent Fire Insurance company was owed by the Respondent. This fact coupled with the fact that the dates on the checks from the Williamses (January and February) substantially predate the May 1982 billing date to Respondent from Independent Fire, renders it unproven that the checks written to the Watson Agency which Respondent negotiated and retained the benefit of, related to the amount of unremitted premium owed by Respondent to the Independent Fire Insurance Company. In short, it was established that $174.00 was paid the Respondent and her agency by the Williamses. But, it was not established that the premium paid by the Williamses became misappropriated fiduciary funds converted by the Respondent to her own use and benefit. It was merely established that as of May 1982 the Respondent owed the Independent Fire Insurance Company $179.35 as a past-due account It was not established that the Williamses ever suffered a lapse of insurance coverage or were otherwise harmed by the Respondent's failure to pay Independent Fire the $179.35. Indeed, the $179.35 figure was not proven to be more than a mere debt owed by Respondent to Independent Fire Insurance Company. The figure was not shown to have been related to any particular policy. The Respondent and her insurance agency in the regular course of business wrote insurance coverage for companies represented by MacNeill and Son, Inc., the Respondent's managing agency. The regular business practice between the Respondent and MacNeill was for the Respondent to write coverage on behalf of insurers represented by MacNeill and to remit on a regular open account" basis insurance premiums due MacNeill on behalf of its insurance company principals on a monthly basis. The Respondent became delinquent in submitting premiums to MacNeill and Son in November 1981. After unsuccessful efforts to collect the delinquent premium funds from the Respondent, MacNeill and Son, Inc. suspended T. J. Watson Insurance Agency and the Respondent from writing further coverage for companies they represented in January 1982. The Respondent purportedly sold her agency to one Thomas Zinnbauer in December 1981, but had already fallen into a pattern of failing to remit insurance premiums over to MacNeill before that time. In any event, the purported sale to Thomas Zinnbauer was a subterfuge to avoid collection of delinquent premiums inasmuch as the Respondent held herself out, in correspondence with MacNeill, (See Petitioner's Exhibit 4) to be the president of the agency at least as late as April 1982 and, at that time and thereafter, the agency continued to sell insurance under the aegis of the Respondent's license. After the Respondent made up the delinquency in premium remissions to the MacNeill Agency that agency restored her underwriting authority in January 1982. Shortly thereafter however, the Respondent and the T. J. Watson Agency again became delinquent in remitting insurance premiums to the MacNeill Agency and followed a quite consistent pattern of failing to forward these fiduciary funds to MacNeill for some months. Ultimately the Respondent and her agency failed to forward more than $6500.00 in premium payment funds to MacNeill and Son, Inc. as was required in the regular course of business. MacNeill and Son, Inc. made repeated futile attempts to secure the misappropriated premium payments from the Respondent and her agency. MacNeill made several accountings of the amount of the acknowledged debt to the Respondent. The Respondent communicated with MacNeill concerning the delinquent premium payments and acknowledged the fact of the debt, but sought to reach an amicable arrangement for a repayment schedule. Re- payment was never made, however, and ultimately the Petitioner agency was informed of the deficiencies and prosecution resulted. The Respondent knew that the premiums had been collected by herself and her agency and had not been forwarded to those entitled to them. She knew of and actively participated in the improper withholding of the premium payments. This withholding and diversion of premium payments from the agency and companies entitled to them was a continuing pattern of conduct and Respondent failed to take action to halt the misappropriation of the premium payments. Further, it is established by the testimony of Matthew Brewer, who investigated the delinquent premium accounts for MacNeill, that Ms. Watson failed to advise MacNeill of the purported sale of her agency until November of 1982, almost a year after it is supposed to have occurred and then only in response to Brewer's investigation. When confronted by Mr. Brewer concerning the ownership of her agency Ms. Watson refused to tell him to whom she had sold the agency. When Mr. Brewer learned that Thomas Zinnbauer had apparently bought the agency from the Respondent Mr. Brewer conferred with him and he refused to release the agency records unless Ms. Watson gave her permission. This fact, together with the fact that Ms. Watson held herself out as president of the agency some four months after she had purportedly sold the agency to Zinnbauer, establishes that Respondent, by representing to Brewer and other personnel of MacNeill and Sons, Inc. that she had sold her agency, was attempting to evade liability for failure to forward the fiduciary premium funds obtained under the authority of her agent's license. As a result of the failure to forward the above- mentioned premium payments some of the insureds who had paid those premiums suffered lapses in coverage and cancellations of policies because MacNeill and Company and the insurers they represented believed that no premiums had ever been paid. Ultimately, MacNeill and Company learned that the premiums had been paid by the policyholders, but not remitted by the Respondent and her agency and undertook steps to reinstate coverage, but those policyholders in some instances had substantial periods of time when their coverage was lapsed due to the Respondent's failure to remit the premium funds to the managing agency and the insurance companies involved. MacNeill and Company ultimately reimbursed the appropriate insurers and insureds at its own expense, incurring substantial financial detriment as a result of the Respondent's failure to have premium payments obtained under her licensed authority properly forwarded. Had the insureds who had their policies cancelled suffered losses for which claims could have been filed during the period of the lapses of coverage, they could have encountered substantial financial difficulty.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore recommended that the General Lines Insurance Agent's license of Respondent Teresa Jean Watson be revoked. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of December, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 1985. APPENDIX RULING OF PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Accepted. Accepted, although the amount represented by the two subject checks totalled $174.00 instead of $175.00. Accepted. Rejected as not comporting with the competent, substantial credible evidence adduced. Rejected inasmuch as it was not established that the amount of $179.35 owed the Independent Fire Insurance Company represented the premium on the Williamses' insurance policy. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted, although the last sentence in that Proposed Finding constitutes, in reality, mere argument of counsel. Accepted. Rejected as not comporting with the competent, substantial credible testimony and evidence actually before the Hearing Officer. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. RULINGS ON RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Respondent submitted a post-hearing document entitled "Proposed Findings of Fact." There are few actual Proposed Facts in that one-and-a-half page pleading which is interlaced throughout with argument of counsel. However, to the extent the six paragraphs of that document contain Proposed Findings of Fact they are ruled on as follows: This Proposed Finding is rejected, but for reasons delineated in the above Conclusions of Law, Count 1 has been recommended to be dismissed anyway. This Finding is accepted but is immaterial and irrelevant to, and not necessary to, the Findings of Fact reached herein and the Conclusions of Law based thereon. Paragraph Number 3 does not really constitute a Proposed Finding of Fact or even multiple Proposed Findings of Fact in the same paragraph. In reality, it constitutes argument of Respondent's counsel concerning admissibility of certain documents into evidence which have already been ruled to be admissible by the Hearing Officer during the course of the hearing. To the extent that the last two sentences in the third paragraph of the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are proposed findings of fact, they are accepted, but are immaterial, irrelevant and unnecessary to the findings of fact made herein and the conclusions predicated thereon and recommendation made herein. Rejected as not being in accordance with the competent, substantial credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as constituting mere argument of counsel and not being in accordance with the competent, substantial, credible evidence adduced. Rejected as not in accordance with the competent, substantial, credible evidence presented as to Count 2. In reality, counsel obviously intended to refer to the two checks referenced in Count 1 of the complaint which has been recommended to be dismissed anyway. COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis Silverman, Esquire Department of Insurance 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark A. Steinberg, Esquire Post Office Box 2366 Ft. Myers, Florida 33902 Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (4) 120.57626.561626.611626.621
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