The Issue The Administrative Complaint presents essentially the same factual allegations in its various counts supporting different legal violations. These factual allegations are summarized as follow: Reinlie represented to Estelle Pitts that if she put up the earnest money deposit for her son, William Lambert, on the commercial property that Lambert wanted to purchase in the form of notes secured by mortgages on her house: (1) the mortgages and notes would not be a lien on her property; (2) the mortgages and notes would not be recorded; (3) the mortgages and notes would be returned to her when Lambert obtained financing for the property he desired to purchase; (4) the mortgages and notes merely showed good faith on Lambert's part regarding his offer to purchase; (5) Lambert's contract for purchase was contingent upon the sale of commercial property which he owned in South Florida; and (6) even if the sale to Lambert did not go through, Mrs. Pitts would not be responsible for the mortgages and notes. Contrary to his representations, Reinlie recorded the various mortgages and notes executed by Estelle Pitts. Contrary to his representations, Reinlie advised Estelle Pitts that she would be responsible for the mortgages and notes, and that if said notes were not satisfied "foreclosure proceedings would be initiated." Petitioner called Estelle Pitts, who testified concerning the representations made by Reinlie. Reinlie testified, denying that he had made said representations. William Lambert was the only other person present when most of these alleged representations were made. Lambert, who had suffered a physically debilitating stroke, could not attend the hearing, and his deposition was received into the record. Lambert's recollection of the events was wholly supportive of neither his mother's nor Reinlie's recollection of the events. None of the witnesses were disinterested: Reinlie's license was in jeopardy; Mrs. Pitts' home was in jeopardy; and Lambert is Mrs. Pitts' son. The conflicts in testimony can only be resolved from extrinsic facts and the credibility of the witnesses. Having considered the facts, the testimony of Reinlie is deemed more credible. Both parties submitted post hearing proposed findings of fact in the form of a proposed recommended order. To the extent the proposed findings of fact have not been included in the factual findings in this order, they are specifically rejected as being irrelevant, not being based upon the most credible evidence, or not being a finding of fact.
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are based upon the prehearing stipulation of the parties: At all times in question, the Respondent, James Reinlie, Jr., was a registered real estate broker in the State of Florida and is the holder of license number 0112757. The parties were duly noticed pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes (1981). William C. Lambert, Estelle Pitts' son, did not have the necessary money with which to furnish a deposit to the sellers of the Robin Hood Motel at the time the contract for sale and purchase and the addendums thereto were executed. A contract for sale and purchase was executed on August 11, 1979, and August 13, 1979, between Irene B. Smith, seller, and William C. Lambert, Sr., buyer, for the purchase of the Robin Hood Motel, located at 1150 North Atlantic Avenue in Daytona Beach, Florida. Respondent Reinlie was a co-broker on that contract. On August 13, 1979, an addendum to the contract for sale and purchase was executed between Irene B. Smith, seller, and William C. Lambert, Sr., buyer. On January 7, 1980, and January 8, 1980, a second addendum was executed under the original contract for sale and purchase between Irene B. Smith, Gilbert Brown and Liselotte M. Brown, sellers, and William C. Lambert, Sr., buyer. On August 13, 1979, a mortgage deed and mortgage note were executed by Estelle Pitts and Linda L. Smith (Mrs. Pitts' daughter) as mortgagor, to B.I.C. Realty, Inc., escrow account, as mortgagee, said note in the principal amount of $5,000 and secured by a first mortgage on 900 West New York Avenue, Deland, Florida, also known as: . . . the east 60' of the north 150' of Lot 1, Block I, Stetson Home Estates MB 10, page 79, Volusia County, Florida; Said property is the residential home of Estelle Pitts with title in the names of Estelle Pitts and Linda L. Smith. On October 16, 1979, a second mortgage was executed by Estelle Pitts and her daughter, Linda L. Smith, dated November 1, 1979, and secured by a mortgage note in the amount of $5,000 on the residential home of Estelle Pitts, said property being described in detail in paragraph 7 above. On October 16, 1979, a third mortgage was executed by Estelle Pitts and her daughter, Linda L. Smith, dated November 1, 1979, and secured by a mortgage note in the amount of $5,000 on the residential home of Estelle Pitts, said property being described in detail in paragraph 7 above. On August 17, 1979, Respondent Reinlie took the first mortgage deed and mortgage note to The Abstract Corporation and instructed that it be recorded in the public records of Volusia County, Florida, said first mortgage deed and mortgage note in the amount of $5,000 dated August 11, 1979, and executed August 13, 1979. On November 29, 1979, Reinlie took the second mortgage deed and note to The Abstract Corporation and instructed that it be recorded in the public records of Volusia County, said second mortgage deed and note in the amount of $5,000 dated November 1, 1979, and executed October 16, 1979. On December 4, 1979, Reinlie took the third mortgage deed and note to The Abstract Corporation and instructed that it be recorded in the public records of Volusia County, said third mortgage deed and note in the amount of $5,000 dated December 1, 1979, and executed October 16, 1979. On May 2, 1980, Estelle Pitts notified Reinlie that she wanted the aforesaid mortgages and notes returned to her immediately. On May 14, 1980, Reinlie notified Mrs. Pitts that he would not return the mortgages and notes and had been advised by the "former" owners of the Robin Hood Motel that they desired to pursue their full deposit, plus expenses, under the contract and, if necessary, would foreclose the mortgages and notes in order to enforce their legal rights. On May 19, 1982, Reinlie executed three satisfactions of mortgages on the three mortgages and notes referred to in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 above upon the advice of counsel. The following Findings of Fact are based upon testimony and evidence adduced at the hearing: Reinlie did not state to Mrs. Pitts that the mortgages would not be recorded and would not be a lien on her property. (See Lambert deposition, pages 11 and 12.) William Lambert was aware that the mortgages and notes were to be recorded and would be a lien on his mother's property. Mrs. Pitts did not understand the transaction and the terms thereof, although Lambert explained it to her. (See Lambert deposition, page 13.) The contract for purchase was not contingent upon the sale of Lambert's motel in Hollywood, Florida. Lambert signed the contract and was presumably aware of its terms. Reinlie did not represent to Mrs. Pitts that the contract for purchase was contingent upon the sale of her son's motel in Hollywood. (See transcript, page 20.) It was Lambert's intent to replace the mortgages on his mother's home with cash he would obtain from the sale of his motel in Hollywood. By substitution of the cash for the mortgages and notes, it was Lambert's understanding that his mother's home would not be "used," i.e., that her home was not in danger of foreclosure. However, Lambert realized that the money would have to be substituted for the mortgages and notes. Lambert felt that he could sell his Hollywood motel prior to the closing date on the Robin Hood Motel. Had Lambert sold his motel in Hollywood prior to said closing, the mortgages and notes on his mother's house would have been cancelled, i.e., "returned" to her. Lambert initially advised Reinlie that his mother owned her home free and clear. At that time, both Lambert and Reinlie were seeking the means for Lambert to come up with the earnest money deposit, which does show a "good faith offer." Reinlie suggested the use of Mrs. Pitts' home to secure the deposit. Lambert discussed this matter with his mother, who agreed and executed the various mortgages and notes. Reinlie did not make the primary approach to Mrs. Pitts, and it was Lambert who primarily explained the transaction to her. Both Lambert and Mrs. Pitts stated that they failed to understand the terms and effect of the mortgages and notes. The addendum to the contract provides that the buyer will provide the seller within five days of the date of the contract a mortgage title binder showing the $5,000 deposit mortgage to be a first mortgage. Their failure to understand the transaction was not due to any misrepresentations or lack of explanation to them by Reinlie. The original closing date was set for late October 1979. When Lambert was unable to sell his Hollywood motel, Reinlie arranged for extensions of the closing date, the first until early December, and the second until January 1980. The considerations for these two extensions were the second and third mortgages and notes. After these were prepared, without signatures, they were delivered to Lambert, who in turn returned each of the executed documents to Reinlie shortly before Reinlie recorded them. Reinlie was not present when said mortgages and notes were executed. Around Thanksgiving 1979, when it became evident that Lambert was having difficulty closing, Reinlie suggested that the contract, which was similar to an option, be sold. Although the contract would have had to be discounted, it would have reduced the potential loss. Reinlie attempted unsuccessfully to do this. Reinlie's suggestion of this course of action did not assure the sale of the contract. (See transcript, page 91.) By late January 1980, when Lambert could not close, Reinlie attempted to obtain an additional extension, which the sellers refused to grant. At that time, the contract for purchase was in default. In the spring of 1980, the sellers made demand upon Reinlie for their deposit money. Reinlie advised both Lambert and Mrs. Pitts of the sellers' demand and sought to obtain mortgage financing for Mrs. Pitts in lieu of initiating a foreclosure action. Mrs. Pitts did not elect to borrow the money. Lambert tendered $5,000 to Reinlie in order to settle the matter, which was rejected by the sellers. The sellers renewed their demand that Reinlie pay them their escrowed deposit. In a meeting with the sellers, Rein lie pointed out that if he foreclosed the mortgages there would be additional delay and legal costs. Because the notes had an interest rate of ten percent and were secured by the mortgages, Reinlie suggested that nothing be done during the life of Mrs. Pitts, but a claim be made against her estate. The sellers determined that this was a better approach than forcing Reinlie to foreclose on the mortgages. Thereafter, all of the parties determined that they desired to settle the matter. Reinlie advised the sellers that he would release the mortgages and notes to Mrs. Pitts if they, in turn, would release him from his obligation to pay them the escrowed money. This was finally done and the matter resolved on that basis.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the Respondent, James Reinlie, Jr., did not violate Sections 475.25(1)(b), (d) or (j), Florida Statutes, it is recommended that the charges filed against him in the Administrative Complaint be dismissed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 25th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: John G. DeLancett, Esquire James R. Mitchell, Esquire 801 North Magnolia Avenue, Suite 402 Post Office Box 6171-C Orlando, Florida 32853 Irving Gussow, Esquire Highway 17-92 Post Office Box 965 Fern Park, Florida 32730 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 William M. Furlow, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: On September 5, 1978, the Applicant submitted to the Department its application pursuant to Sections 665.031 and 665.704(2), Florida Statutes, for authority to organize a corporation for the purpose of conducting a savings and loan association business to be located at the intersection of Kanner Highway (Colorado Avenue) and Monterey Road, Martin County, Florida. Notice of receipt of the application was published in a Florida Administrative Weekly on September 8, 1978. After receipt of the application, the Department requested additional information after receipt of which the application was deemed complete and assigned a filing date of December 7, 1978. The application as originally filed proposed the name AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF MARTIN COUNTY for the proposed association. On September 22, 1978, Applicant amended the Petition to change the name of the proposed corporation to CENTRAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF FLORIDA. This change was noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly on October 6, 1978. As set forth above, the site of the proposed savings and loan association is at the intersection of Kanner Highway and Monterey Road, Martin County, Florida. The organizers of the Applicant obtained an option to purchase the property for the proposed site for $175,000. The option to purchase was obtained from Mr. Richard Geisinger, one of the proposed directors, with full disclosure to the other proposed directors. An MAI appraiser appraised the fair market value of the property for the proposed site at $210,000. The proposed site is directly on the corner of the subject intersection and represents 175 front feet on Kanner Highway and 300 front feet on Monterey Road. The applicants intend to build a freestanding building of approximately 6,400 square feet with two drive-in teller facilities. The total cost of land and building is projected at approximately $481,000 with an additional $85,514 to be spent for the purchase of fixtures and furniture. The applicant proposes to be capitalized at $1,000,000, with $500,000 of the total capital being held as paid in surplus. The capital will be raised from the issuance of 100,000 shares of common stock with a par value of $5.00 per share, selling at a price of $10.00 per share with a collection of an additional $.50 per share for an organizational expense fund. For the purposes of the application, 100 percent of the stock of the proposed association was subscribed to by the organizers. However, it is their intent to offer for sale approximately 46 percent of the stock of the association to the public prior to the opening of the proposed savings and loan association. Applicant's primary service area (PSA) incorporates most of the Northeast section of Martin County and includes the City of Stuart, Town of Sewalls Point and the communities of Palm City and Port Salerno. It is bounded on the north by the Martin-St. Lucie County line, on the west by the Sunshine State Parkway, on the south by the northern boundary of the Gomez Grant, and on the east by the Indian River. The PSA, as proposed, is the most densely populated area of Martin County, having approximately 38,400 residents. The per capita income for the residents of the PSA is above the state average. Both construction and sales of residential units within the PSA are increasing, with adequate room for future development. There is a high level of commercial activity in the PSA and the vacancy rate is low. The PSA contains the Monterey Shopping Plaza, which is directly opposite the proposed site, which shopping plaza opened for business in 1972, and which has expanded to over 100,000 square feet of gross leasable space. Within the PSA and directly across the street from the proposed site to the East, a 26 acre shopping mall is being developed. Downtown Stuart is less than one-half mile from the proposed site and in the PSA. The population of Martin County and the primary service area is a matter of dispute. The Martin County Planning and Zoning Department estimates the county's population at 61,692 residents. The University of Florida, Bureau of Economic and Business Research estimated the county population at 53,895 as of July 1, 1978. No annual estimates relating to census tracts or parts thereof are available from official U.S. or State of Florida sources in order to determine the population of the PSA. However, the trends of population changes in Martin County, Stuart, Sewalls point, Jupiter Island and Ocean Breeze Park and in the unincorporated areas of the county, which comprise much of the designated PSA should apply to the PSA. Relevant population data of these areas, compiled by the University of Florida, Division of Population Studies, are as follows: Martin 1970 County 28,035 1975 47,726 1976 48,496 1977 50,341 1973 53,895 1980 54,700 to 61,800 (projected) Stuart 4,280 8,787 8,479 8,520 8,942 NA Sewalls Point 298 741 791 829 1,025 Jupiter Island 295 349 352 353 355 Ocean Breeze Park 714 813 1,080 1,080 1,065 Unincorporated 21,908 36,936 37,794 39,559 42,468 NA Martin County population has risen dramatically since 1970, and that growth is expected to continue, essentially from in-migration. Since 1970 there has been a negative natural increase in population. The median age of the county population of 1977 was 45 years of age, with 26 percent of its residents 65 years or older. This is fairly representative of the PSA which includes the majority of the county's population. Within five miles of the site, there are four major shopping centers including Stuart Shopping Center with approximately 103,000 square feet, K-Mart Plaza with approximately 100,000 square feet, East Ocean Mall with approximately 100,000 square feet and Monterey Shopping Plaza referred to above. From 1971 to 1978, 17,088 housing units were built in Martin County. Permit activity in the county shows that there were $81,726,000 in permits issued in 1978. The proposed site is along a line of travel for a large number of commuters as well as shoppers who come to that area as a destination point. The latest unemployment data for Martin County shows an unemployment rate of 5.4 percent for November, 1978 (revised), and a 5.5 percent rate for December, 1978 (preliminary). This compares to a state average of 6.2 percent and 6.4 percent respectively. The per capita personal income for the county increased from $5,735 in 1975 to $6,156 in 1976. This was a 7.3 percent increase which was somewhat slower than the 7.6 percent state average. However, the county's absolute averages remained above the state average of $5,596 and $6,021 respectively for the same years. Commercial activity in Martin County is strong. There are presently eleven existing or approved savings and loan association offices within the proposed PSA. One of these is a main office and ten of these are branches or limited facilities. There are also four additional savings and loan association offices located outside the PSA, but within Martin County. There are nine commercial bank offices, including four main banking offices and five branches, within the PSA and another six hank and branch offices located outside the PSA, but within Martin County. There have been significant increases in savings deposits in Martin County. Significant factors in this increase is the in-migration of new residents and inflation. A continuation of this pattern will maintain the growth experience in recent years. The county summary for nine savings and loan offices indicates an increase of 27.1 percent in deposits between March 31, 1977 and March 31, 1978. This continues a similar growth rate achieved during 1976- 1977. A similar growth trend is being experienced by the commercial banks in the area. Savings and loan associations doing business in Martin County have total aggregate savings as of September 30, 1978 of $235,416,000. Commercial banks doing business in Martin County show total assets of $297,774,000 as of the same date. Only one savings and loan doing business in Martin County is headquartered in Martin County. All other savings and loans in Martin County are branches of institutions with headquarters outside Martin County. The Applicant expects to be competitive with the existing savings and loan offices in the PSA with regard to interest rates and breadth of services. Some of the services that the Applicant intends to offer to the community include the following: a mobile facility to serve the elderly and disabled, direct deposit of Social Security and other government checks, retirement plans such as IRA and KEOUGH, electronic funds transfer, Christmas Club and educational savings programs, certificate plans, and Saturday and extended Friday hours. With the exception of the mobile facility and Saturday hours, these services are currently offered by existing associations. The Applicant has not designated a chief managing officer. An informal offer and acceptance of employment exists with a capable individual having savings and loan experience. This individual did not assist in preparation of the pending application. The proposed Board of Directors is composed of nine members, all of whom are residents of the State of Florida and U.S. citizens. Although all of the proposed directors appear to be successful businessmen, none of them have any savings and loan experience. Six of the nine organizers are presently commercial bank directors and one is a former bank director. Mr. J. M. Brown is Director and Chief Executive Officer of American Bank of Martin County; Mr. Richard K. Carroll is a director of Jensen Beach Bank; Mr. John A. Darlson is a director of the American Bank of Martin County; Mr. Richard Geisinger is Chairman of the Board of Directors of American Bank of Martin County; Mr. Terry N. Keathley is a director of American Bank of Martin County; and Mr. Lawrence J. Timon is a director of American Bank of Martin County. Mr. Brown and Mr. Darlson do not intend to become directors of the proposed savings and loan association but do intend to held their stock in the proposed association. Those remaining proposed directors who also serve the Board of American Bank, Messrs. Geisinger, Keathley and Timen, have indicated their intent to resign their directorates in American Bank to serve on the Board of Directors of the proposed association in keeping with the requirements of the Financial Institutions Regulatory Act. The remaining proposed directors are Mr. Rockford H. Ern, Mr. Armando Farina, and Mr. John M. Fort. Mr. Brown, Mr. Carroll, Mr. Darlson, Mr. Geisinger, Mr. Keathley and Mr. Timon have each subscribed to more than 5 percent of the stock of the proposed savings and loan association and also presently own stock in a commercial bank in the PSA. All intend to retain that stock as well as their stock in the proposed savings and loan association. The Applicant has projected savings deposits at the end of the first, second and third years of operation to be $5,000,000, $10,000,000 end $15,000,000 respectively. The Applicant has presented a revised budget which projected net profit for the first three years of operation to be $55,000, $131,000, and $188,000 respectively. The Applicant has proposed that the new association bear the name CENTRAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF FLORIDA. No evidence was presented to show this name was confusing or misleading to the public. In accordance with the provisions of Section 120.57 (1)(a)(12), Florida Statutes, Conclusions of Law and a Recommendation are not included in this REPORT. Respectfully submitted and entered this 25th day of October, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHRIS H. BENTLEY, Director Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Karlyn Anne Loucks, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Barry E. Chapnick, Esquire 1666 Kennedy Causeway, Suite 700 Miami, Florida 33141 C. R. McDonald, Jr., Esquire Suite 200, Citizens Federal Bldg. 1600 South Federal Highway Ft. Pierce, Florida 33450 Frank Fee, III, Esquire Post Office Box 100 Ft. Pierce, Florida 33450 Richard J. Dungey, Esquire Post Office Box 288 Stuart, Florida 33494
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the incidents involved herein, the Respondent, Jerry L. Daniel, was licensed as a real estate broker in Florida under license number 365403. Petitioner, Division of Real Estate (Division), is and was the state agency charged with the responsibility for governing the conduct of real estate brokers in Florida. On August 19, 1984, and for several years prior thereto, Doteileen Mariner owned a three bedroom home located at 1260 Schenly Street, Port Charlotte, Florida. The property was encumbered by a first mortgage held by the First Federal Savings and Loan Association in Punta Gorda, Florida. Sometime during 1983 she decided to sell this property and made inquiries toward that end. She was first contacted by Roger King, a real estate agent, with a view toward purchasing her property and in August, 1984, Mr. King presented her with a contract to buy the property. King and the Respondent, who were purchasing it together, were to assume the existing first mortgage and give her a second, balloon, mortgage in the amount of $23,000.00 for five years with a $5,000.00 down payment and payment of interest only thereafter until the end of the period of the mortgage. Mrs. Mariner agreed to this proposal and signed a contract for sale which reflected a total purchase price of $69,500.00 on or about August 22, 1984. She was not given a copy of the contract at that time, however, and Petitioner's Exhibit 2, which purports to be a contract for the sale of the property, bearing her signature and that of the Respondent, dated August 22, 1984, reflects a total purchase price of $74,900.00 with $18,900.00 paid as deposit, and a new mortgage of $56,000.00. According to Mrs. Mariner, these were not the figures which appeared on the contract she signed. At the same time, Mrs. Mariner also signed an addendum to the original contract, dated August 21, 1984, one day prior to the contract which it purports to supplement, which is also signed by Respondent and Mr. King and which reveals that the existing first mortgage on $29,335.00 was to be paid at closing; that the seller, Mrs. Mariner, was to receive $5,000.00 in cash at closing; and that a second mortgage for $23,000.00 would be held for 60 months with interest payments at 10% per year to be made monthly in the amount of $191.67 each. Mrs. Mariner received the $5,000.00 down payment but did not receive the $18,900.00 deposit and, to the best of her recollection, did not agree to a new first mortgage being substituted for the existing first mortgage she had with First Federal. Respondent, on the other hand, indicates he made very clear to Mrs. Mariner, and the documentation which he admits to signing reflects, that the original first mortgage was to be paid off and a second first mortgage for a larger amount substituted therefor. Examination of the contract shows it has been modified by alteration of the figures thereon. When this is done is not known. Mrs. Mariner moved out of the property the next day after the contract was signed and at the closing, held in September, 1984, was given an envelope with certain documents in it which included a second mortgage on the property in the amount of $23,000.00 signed by both Respondent and Mr. King on September 24, 1984. This second mortgage included a clause which subordinated it to the new first mortgage on the property which was dated July 25, 1985, nine months subsequent to the date of the second mortgage. Mrs. Mariner did not examine the documents at that time but accepted her $5,000.00 down payment and left the area. She assumed the property was transferred and, in fact, received her monthly interest payments on time for several years. However, after a period of time, the payments stopped and after several months of trying unsuccessfully to reach Respondent, she finally contacted him and arranged to come back to Florida to meet with him. When she met with Respondent, he indicated he was having financial difficulties and was unable to make the monthly payments. However, he offered to deed her property back to her and to convey to her two other properties he owned, both of which were encumbered by substantial first mortgages. Both had some equity in them which, he claims, when added to the equity in her original property, would be adequate to make her whole and enable her to avoid any financial loss on her part. On July 10, 1986, Respondent executed a Quit Claim Deed to Mrs. Mariner for the property which she originally owned. This deed showed a first mortgage of $58,000.00 compared to the $29,355.00 first mortgage she originally had. Therefore, as a result of her dealings with the Respondent, she had her property back temporarily, had received $5,000.00 in cash, and had received some monthly payments of $191.67 each. She also had an indebtedness of approximately $30,645.00 more than she had when she met Respondent and because of her inability to make the payments on the new first mortgage, lost the property to foreclosure. Respondent and Mr. King arranged for interim financing on the Mariner property at a high rate of interest with a temporary lender until such time as they could arrange new first mortgage financing. This was done several months later and Respondent encumbered the property with a new mortgage in the amount of $58,400.00. That new first mortgage, dated June 25, 1985, was made payable to Standard Federal Savings and Loan Association and was recorded in the public records of Charlotte Count, Florida on July 2, 1985, prior to the recordation of the original second mortgage, dated September 24, 1984, which Respondent and King had given to Mrs. Mariner. It should also be noted that this second mortgage, dated September 24, 1984, reflects at the bottom of page 1, "subject to and inferior to that certain mortgage to Standard Federal Savings and Loan Association dated June 25, 1985 [sic], filed July 2, 1985 sic; recorded in Official Records Book 823, page 779 of the Public Records of Charlotte County, Florida in the original principal amount of $58,400.00." Respondent has not explained how a mortgage executed on September 24, 1984 can refer to as existing and legitimately be made subordinate to a first mortgage which did not come into existence until 9 months later. He claims total ignorance of how that happened. He assumed that since all documents were turned over to the title company at the time of closing, the second mortgage would be recorded at that time. This testimony is ingenuous and unbelievable. Mrs. Mariner received approximately $3,200.00 in interest payments from Respondent in addition to the $5,000.00 down payment. In the Spring of 1986, she was served with a summons for foreclosure of the first mortgage on her property. She has now lost the property and the difference between her equity in it at the time of sale to Respondent and the Deposit she received. Petitioner has alleged that Mrs. Mariner's loss was approximately $39,000.00. The exact amount of loss is irrelevant. What is pertinent is not the loss to Mrs. Mariner but whether Respondent's conduct here constitutes misconduct and it obviously does. Respondent denies any responsibility for this situation. He claims he was approached by Roger King in 1984 with the opportunity to buy Mrs. Mariner's property. At the time, he was involved in investing in family homes owning two or three at that time and up to twenty to thirty thereafter. At the time of this transaction, he had had only one other deal with Mr. King who had done the negotiations for the purchase of the Mariner property and drafted the documents. Respondent, however, is the only buyer listed on the contract though King appears as a mortgagor on the second mortgage. Mr. Daniel claims he saw Mrs. Mariner first at the closing at Federal Title Insurance Company on September 24, 1984. He relates that the contract for the purchase of the property and the addendum were signed prior to closing and he was not present at the time Mrs. Mariner signed them. He claims not to know who got her to sign them. Respondent claims, however, that he explained all the provisions of the transaction to Mrs. Mariner prior to the closing including the fact that her existing first mortgage would be paid off; that a new first mortgage in a higher amount would be placed on the property; and that the mortgage she was holding would be subordinate to the new first mortgage. She denies this. He asserts that he took out 90 day interim financing arrangement with Family Credit at a higher interest rate for the sole purpose of allowing the deal to close so that Mrs. Mariner could be on her way to Delaware. His assertions of concern for Mrs. Mariner's welfare are not believable. Respondent claims he told Mrs. Mariner at closing that her second mortgage would not be recorded until after permanent financing through a new first mortgage was secured and that the new institutional mortgage would be superior to hers. She does not recall this, however, but her testimony was so indefinite, vague, and unsure, it is difficult to determine what Mrs. Mariner was told. As was found before, his contention is unworthy of belief. Respondent also contends that the rental income from the property was supposed to be between $700.00 and $800.00 per month which would have been sufficient to pay not only the monthly payment on the first mortgage but also the interest payment on the second mortgage. However, these expectations were not realized and he received only rental income of $550.00 per month which was sufficient to pay only the first mortgage. Because of financial reverses he was having at the time with some of his commercial properties, which put him in a poor cash flow position, he stopped making payments on both the first and second mortgages early in 1986 and subsequently lost Mrs. Mariner's property to foreclosure. Respondent overlooks the fact that the lower rental he obtained, $550.00 per month, was more than sufficient to cover the $191.67 per month owed to Mrs. Mariner and still return him a substantial return on his investment of $5,000.00 if he had been a legitimate investor in rental property. It is obvious from the evidence that Respondent had far more in mind than that reasonable return. Respondent contends it was never his intention not to pay Mrs. Mariner. However, Respondent bought a piece of property which had a current first mortgage of $29,335.00. He replaced that with a new first mortgage of $58,400.00 which gave him a cash surplus of approximately $27,000.00. The second mortgage which he owed to Mrs. Mariner was for $23,000.00, well below the amount he had received in cash as a result of the refinancing. It is clear that Respondent took this money and failed to pay Mrs. Mariner even though there were adequate funds available from the refinancing to do so. It is clear that he intended for her to be in a subordinate position and that he intended to make, and did make, a substantial amount of money out of the transaction. He tried to deed Mrs. Mariner's property back to her, along with two other properties in which he had equity, to reduce her loss, but she refused his offer. His financial difficulties resulted in his going into bankruptcy through which he lost his entire financial base. Since his bankruptcy, Respondent has been employed as a broker/manager at the Bee Ridge office of Schlott Realtors and as a part of his duties, is responsible for hiring, training, and supervising sales associates. Larry D. Romito, manager and president of the Florida division of Schlott Realty, learned of the Respondent from two or three of his existing sales associates who spoke highly of him. As a result of their recommendations, Mr. Romito sought Respondent out and spent a substantial amount of time with him before offering him a job with the company. During more than fifteen hours of interview time, Respondent spoke quite frankly about his financial difficulties and their effect on him as well as what led up to them. Since Respondent has come with the company, his performance has been exemplary. He has been involved in excess of one thousand transactions and his leadership has been remarkable. There are nine managers in the company and Respondent is to be recognized as the number one manager of all divisions at the next award period. Mrs. Romito has found Respondent to be very objective and reliable and has had no questions with regard to Respondent's honest or integrity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Respondent's license as a real estate broker be revoked and that he pay an administrative fine of $1,000.00 but that the revocation be suspended for a period of three years under such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the Commission. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of March, 1989 at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4573 The following constituted my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER; Accepted and incorporated herein Rejected. At the time in issue, Respondent's license was issued c/o Jerry Daniels Realty, not Schlott Of Florida. Accepted and incorporated herein Accepted and incorporated herein Accepted and incorporated herein Accepted and incorporated herein except for that statement that the new first mortgage was concealed from Federal Savings and Loan Association of Punta Gorda. Rejected as a restatement of testimony which is accurately recited. Accepted and incorporated herein Accepted and incorporated herein Accepted and incorporated herein FOR THE RESPONDENT; Accepted in so far as it indicates the contract was drafted by someone other than Mrs. Mariner and that the contract and addendum were signed at her house. Accepted and incorporated herein Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. Mrs. Mariner denies being told recording her mortgage was being withheld. Rejected as a restatement of testimony. Accepted and incorporated herein Accepted and incorporated herein First sentence accepted and incorporated herein. Second sentence not a Finding of Fact but a restatement of the testimony. Accepted and incorporated herein COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Dana J. Watts, Esquire 700 Sarasota Way Sarasota, Florida 34236 Kenneth A. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Robert Marriott has been a licensed real estate broker/salesman under the laws of the State of Florida, trading as Marriott Realty. In February of 1980, in his capacity as a real estate broker/salesman, Respondent obtained an offer to purchase commercial property in Miami from Orlando Villacis, a resident of Ecuador, as purchaser, for a total purchase price of $500,000. In conjunction with the offer, Villacis paid a $20,000 earnest money deposit to be held by Marriott Realty in escrow under the terms of the offer. Villacis' deposit check in the amount of $20,000 was deposited into the Marriott Realty escrow account on February 22, 1980. By March 11, 1980, Villacis' $20,000 had been withdrawn, leaving an escrow account balance of $40. This fact was never reported to Villacis. Having heard nothing definite from Respondent with regard to the offer, and because he spent most of his time out of the country, Villacis engaged the services of attorney Rafael Penalver. Prior to July 1980, Penalver contacted the Respondent and inquired as to the status of the offer. Each time, Respondent told him that the seller was still considering the offer. In July of 1980, Respondent told Penalver that the $500,000 offer had been rejected by the seller and recommended that Villacis present an offer for $570,000. Penalver prepared the offer in the amount of $570,000, again calling for a $20,000 earnest money deposit, which Penalver and Villacis assumed was still in the Marriott Realty escrow account. Receiving no response from Respondent on the second offer, Penalver attempted to contact Respondent by telephone on numerous occasions. When Penalver was successful, Respondent told him that the seller was reviewing the offer. In early September 1980, Respondent advised Penalver that the $570,000 offer had been rejected by the seller. By letter dated September 11, 1980, Penalver raised the offer to $600,000, set a deadline of September 19 for the acceptance of the offer, and directed Respondent to return the $20,000 immediately should the offer not be accepted. After September 19, having heard nothing from the Respondent, Penalver called him, at which time Respondent advised that the offer was being considered by the seller. Penalver then wrote a letter dated October 7, 1980, to Respondent demanding that Respondent deposit the $20,000 into Villacis' account. Again hearing nothing from Respondent, Penalver on numerous occasions attempted to contact him by telephone in order to again demand the immediate return of the $20,000 deposit. Being unsuccessful, Penalver wrote the Respondent on November 20, 1980, and January 22, 1981, both times demanding the return of the $20,000 earnest money deposit. After the letter of January 22, 1981, Respondent agreed to meet with Penalver in Penalver's office. On February 2, 1981, the Respondent and his wife met with Penalver. During that meeting, Respondent advised Penalver that the $20,000 was no longer available and that he and his wife had used the money to make mortgage payments and cosmetic improvements on their personal residence. Respondent challenged Penalver to sue him to get the money back. After discussing Respondent's position with Villacis, Penalver filed a civil action for return of the $20,000. In his Answer to the Complaint filed in that litigation, Respondent admitted that he had used the $20,000 deposit for mortgage payments and other personal household expenses and for payment of his IRS tax deficiency. Villacis obtained a Final Judgment in the civil action in the amount of $20,000 plus interest and costs on October 6, 1982. Respondent testified that he did not return the $20,000 earnest money deposit because, in approximately October 1980, Villacis verbally agreed to loan the $20,000 to Respondent. Villacis strongly denied making any offer of a loan to Respondent. The purported loan agreement would have occurred after Penalver had twice written Respondent regarding immediate return of the $20,000 and seven months after the $20,000 had disappeared from the escrow account. Further, after Penalver sent his November demand letter, Respondent wrote Villacis in December of 1980 asking that Villacis consider loaning Respondent the $20,000 in exchange for an unrecorded mortgage on Respondent's personal residence. Clearly, Respondent's testimony is not credible. As of the date of the formal hearing in this cause, the Final Judgment in favor of Villacis and against Respondent remained unpaid and Respondent had still not returned to Villacis the $20,000 earnest money deposit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained within the Administrative Complaint filed against him and revoking his license as a real estate broker/salesman. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 30th day of April, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Tina Hipple, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 David I. Schlosberg, Esquire 525 North 27th Avenue, Suite 100 Miami, Florida 33125 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801
Findings Of Fact Primary Service Area (PSA) The proposed association will be located in the Paddock Plaza adjacent to the Paddock Mall Regional Shopping Center, both of which are currently under construction. The site is in the vicinity of the intersection of Southwest 27th Avenue and State Road 200 in the southwest portion of Marion County. The PSA encompasses the southwestern portion of Marion County, including a part of Ocala which is a concentrated residential community. Beyond the city limits, there are schools, recreational areas, an airport, horse farms, a community college, and light industrial type firms in the surburban area. The proposed site is located in the northeastern part of the PSA. The PSA is in a developmental stage with current plans of residential and commercial development which should make the area the fastest growing sector in Marion County. The home offices of Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association and Midstate Federal Savings and Loan Association, and a satellite office of the latter association are located near the northeast boundary of the PSA some three miles from the proposed site. The northern and eastern boundaries of the PSA follow well-defined highways. The southern boundary follows the Marion County line, and the western boundary is drawn due north from the intersection of State Road 200 and the Marion County line. (Testimony of Starke, Exhibit 1) Standards (a) Public convenience and advantage. One commercial banking facility, the main office of Citizens First Bank of Ocala, is located in the northeast corner of the PSA approximately two and one-half miles from the proposed site. It provides full banking services to its customers. Two savings and loan associations have received approval to operate in the PSA. One will be a branch of Midstate Federal Savings and Loan Association which will be located at the Paddock Mall adjacent to the proposed site. The other will be a limited facility of the First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Mid-Florida (Volusia County) which will he situated approximately 11.3 miles south of the proposed site in a residential community. Neither of these approved institutions have commenced operations. The proposed site is readily accessible from all sectors of the market area. State Road 200 is a primary artery for northeast/southwest travel. Southwest 27th Avenue is a primary north/south thoroughfare. There are numerous other feeder streets which connect with those two roads to bring traffic to the new mall and plaza area. In addition, Interstate Highway 75 intersects State Road 200 approximately one mile southwest of the proposed site. An extension to Southwest 17th Street is currently proposed which would provide direct access from the northeast to the proposed site. The location of the proposed association at a large regional shopping center will provide an opportunity for residents of the PSA to combine shopping and financial business. This will be facilitated through the utilization of a drive-in facility at the site. Ample parking will be provided in the plaza area, and the network of roads in and around the shopping center will facilitate use of the applicant's services. It will provide a convenient location to conduct savings and loan business for residents and businessmen in the southwestern portion of the county without the necessity of traveling to the more congested downtown area of Ocala. The fact that the proposed association will be a home office rather than a branch office will tend to attract a greater number of individuals within the PSA than a satellite office, and undoubtedly will induce persons outside the PSA to use the institution's services. In 1960, the City of Ocala had a population of 13,598. It increased 66.1 percent to 22,583 by 1970. The 1978 city population was estimated to be 32,652, a 44.6 percent increase over 1970. An April 1, 1979 estimate placed the population at 34,034. In 1960, Marion County had a population of 51,616. It increased 33.7 percent to 69,030 in 1970 and was estimated at 102,722 in 1978, an increase of 48.8 percent over 1970. The population was estimated to be 106,852 in April 1979 and is scheduled to reach 164,400 by 1990. It is estimated that the population of the PSA was about 7,700 in 1960 and increased to 10,500 or 36.4 percent by 1970. It is now estimated to be some 17,000 and projected to reach over 19,000 by 1982. This projection is based on the area's recent growth history, current housing developments in the area, and projected growth within Marion County. The 45 to 64 year group of the population of Marion County has shown a modest increase since 1960 from 21 percent to 22.6 percent in 1978. At that time, the state percentage was 22 percent. Those 65 years of age and over in Marion County increased from 10.6 percent in 1960 to 15.7 percent in 1978. This was lower than the statewide average of 17.5 percent in that category. It is anticipated that those 45 years and older will continue to show a steady increase in the future due to the fact that most of the county increase in population has been due to continuing in-migration of retirees. These individuals normally bring cash assets which are available for deposit in savings and loan associations, and they ordinarily would have no prior connection with other banks or savings and loan associations in the immediate area. The per capita personal income in Marion County in 1969 was $2,646 and increased to $5,157 in 1977. Per capita personal income in Florida in 1977 was $6,697. In 1969 the mean family income of residents of Ocala was $9,775, as compared with $8,062 in Marion County and $10,120 throughout the State of Florida. It is estimated that the current mean family income in Ocala is approximately $17,506, as compared to $14,438 in the county and $18,123 in the state. The unemployment rate in Marion County in January 1980 was 6 percent whereas the rate in the State of Florida was 5.2 percent. Residential building permits issued in the City of Ocala in 1975 rose from 156 units for a total of 3.5 million dollars to 511 permits in 1979 for a total of 10.7 million dollars. For Marion County, 872 permits were issued in 1975 for a total of 14.3 million dollars and 1,706 in 1979 for a total of 44.5 million dollars. It is currently estimated that the median value of owner occupied housing units in Ocala is $32,775 and $26,173 in Marion County. Local Conditions There are seven commercial banks with approval to operate a total of 18 offices in Marion County. In June 1975, the commercial banks headquartered in Marion County held combined time and savings deposits of some 104 million dollars and by mid-1979, such deposits totaled over 176 million dollars, an increase of about 69.5 percent. From December 1978 to December 1979, time and savings deposits in those banks rose from 161.4 million dollars to 199.8 million dollars, an increase of 23.8 percent. Total deposits in all Marion County Banks increased from 204.8 million dollars in 1975 to 304.9 million in 1979, a 48.9 percent increase. There are currently 16 savings and loan association offices approved for operation in Marion County. Three of the associations have their home office in Ocala. These are Fidelity Federal, Mid-State, and United Federal of Ocala. Fidelity Federal operates a total of five offices within the county, one of which is not yet open. Mid-State Federal has seven offices approved within the county and its office in the PSA is not as yet open. United Federal, an association which opened in January 1979, has its only office within the county. Both First Family Federal (Lake County) and First Florida Federal Savings and Loan Association (Alachua County) have recently received approval to operate branch offices within Marion County. First Federal of Mid-Florida (Volusia County) has received approval to operate an office in the southern part of the PSA but has not yet opened. In 1975, savings and loan associations headquartered in Marion County reported combined savings of $162,177,000. By the end of June 1979, their combined savings totaled $312,508,000, an increase of 92.7 percent. The combined savings accounts of the three Marion County associations totaled $312,508,000 in midyear 1979, as compared to June, 1975 savings of $162,177,000, representing an increase of $150,331,000 or 92.7 percent, during the subject four-year interval. Mid-State Federal, with an office approved at the Paddock Mall, held June, 1979 savings of $207,770,000, and those accounts represented an increase of $96,475,000, or 86.7 percent, over its savings reported June, 1975. First Federal of Mid-Florida, a Volusia County association with an office approved in the PSA, had June, 1975 savings of $199,843,000, and those savings increased by $150,637,000, or 75.4 percent, to reach a total of $350,480,000 in June, 1979. The smallest savings and loan association in Marion County is United Federal, which opened in 1975. In June, 1975, it reported savings of $6,881,000, and its midyear 1979 statement showed savings of $27,830,000. United Federal, operating only one office in Ocala, had growth in savings of $20,949,000, or 304.5 percent, during the stated interval. In the opinion of the applicant's economic consultant, approval of the applicant's application would not have an adverse effect on the other financial institutions in the area due to the steady growth of the community and anticipated growth in the future. He further is of the opinion that the proposed savings and loan association will be able to successfully operate in the PSA in view of the presence of the Paddock Mall and the general growth of population and business establishments in the area. He feels that the current national economic situation will not have a great impact on a new institution which will be able to obtain variable interest rates. He further sees an advantage to the fact that the proposed association will be the first state chartered capital stock form of organization in Marion County, and that it will provide an opportunity for public purchase of shares in the association. During the first three years of operations, the applicant projects its net profits at $75,648 for the first year, $88,335 for the second, and $103,340 for the third. These amounts were arrived at by including known cost items and estimating various income and expense amounts. The applicant anticipates acquiring accounts from new residents of the PSA and those current residents who may wish to transfer savings accounts from commercial banks in the Ocala area due to convenience and the higher rate of interest paid by savings and loan associations. The applicant does not anticipate the acquisition of a significant number of customers from existing savings and loan associations in the area. It also will look to employees at the new shopping mall who may utilize the conveniently located new institution for savings transactions. The applicant intends to compete vigorously for new business with these individuals and from those who presently do not have accounts in any existing associations. The applicant estimates that the institution will attain savings of five million dollars at the end of the first year, $9,500,000 at the end of the second year, and $14,500,000 at the end of the third year of operation. In arriving at those estimates, consideration was given to past experience of existing association offices in the Ocala area, and that of established associations in similar competitive situations. The eight organizers of the proposed association will also serve as the directors. They represent a diversity of occupations, including businessmen, attorneys, real estate broker, a physician, and a dentist. All but three reside in the Ocala area. All have been residents of Florida for over a year and none has been adjudicated a bankrupt or convicted of a criminal offense involving dishonesty or breach of trust. Their employment and business histories show responsibility in the handling of financial affairs. One of the proposed directors has served as an attorney to a large savings and loan association in Miami Beach, and is a member of the board of directors of Barnett Bank of Miami. Another serves as legal counsel for a local bank in Ocala. The proposed officers of the association have not been named as yet. The proposed association will be capitalized at $2,000,000. This capital will be divided into common capital of $1,000,000 in surplus and reserves of $1,000,000. The association intends to issue 200,000 shares of stock with a par value of $5.00 and the selling price of $10.25, plus a $.25 share organizational expense fund contribution. The proposed directors of the association have subscribed to 25,000 shares each. This is a preliminary stockholder list and it is the intention of those individuals to redistribute the stock to a minimum of 400 persons in accordance with FSLIC requirements. It is the organizers' intention to acquire pledges from 700 persons for the deposit of $1,000,000 in withdrawable savings accounts. It is intended that the majority of the stock will be sold to persons residing in Marion County, and the organizers anticipate no difficulty in this respect. (Testimony of Starke, Hastings, Bitzer, Berman, Casse, Hicks, Williams (Deposition - Exhibit 5), Broad (Deposition - Exhibit 6), Carter, Exhibits 1-3) Name As heretofore found above, the applicant amended its application to change the proposed name to Allstate Savings and Loan Association. Although the descriptive word "Allstate" is not used in the corporate name of any other savings and loan association in this state, the Office of the Comptroller received a letter, dated February 22, 1980, from Allstate Savings and Loan Association, Glendale, California, an affiliate of Sears Roebuck and Company, objecting to the use of the word "Allstate" in that the public may be misled to believe that the proposed association is in some way affiliated with Sears Roebuck and Company. (Testimony of Starke, Exhibit 1) Site and Quarters. As heretofore found, it is the organizers intention to locate the proposed association in the Paddock Plaza, adjacent to the Paddock Mall, a new shopping center to be constructed in Ocala. The applicant has an option to lease 5,000 square feet of space for a period of fifteen years for a rental price of $12.00 per square foot for 2,000 square feet and $10.00 per square foot for 3,000 square feet, plus common area maintenance. The option provides that on the fifth year of tenancy, the total annual rental will be increased by the cost of living as determined by the consumer price index. The leased area will include a two-car drive-in facility. There will be adequate parking at the site. The applicant plans to sublease 2,000 square feet of the leased premises on a short-term basis to reduce operating costs in the initial years of operation. An appraisal of the proposed association quarters establishes that the proposed leased premises are suitable for a savings and loan association and that the lease price compares favorable to current leasing arrangements for similar business property. (Testimony of Starke, Exhibit 1) Proposed Findings of Fact filed by the parties have been fully considered and those findings which have not been adopted herein are considered to be either unnecessary, or unsupported in fact and are specifically rejected. Some of the proposed findings state conclusions which properly should be considered by the Comptroller. Pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)(12), Florida Statutes, this REPORT does not include conclusions of law and recommendations. DONE and ENTERED this 25 day of April, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Gerald A. Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William L. Lyman, Esquire Assistant General Counsel The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Daniel Hicks and Randolph Tucker, Esquires Post Office Drawer 1969 Ocala, Florida 32670 Merritt C. Fore, Esquire Post Office Box 1507 Ocala, Florida 32670
The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether Respondents, Samuel T. Henson and DuPont Funding Corporation, committed multiple acts in violation of applicable statutes and administrative rules and, if so, what, if any, penalties should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the administrative agency charged with responsibility for administering and enforcing the provisions of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes.3 Respondent, DuPont Funding Corporation ("DuPont") is a Florida corporation engaged in the mortgage brokerage business at a single location at 7300 West Camino Real Drive, Boca Raton, Florida 33442. DuPont is registered with Petitioner under registration number HB 592710662. Respondent, Samuel T. Henson, ("Henson"), is the principal mortgage broker for DuPont. Henson is licensed by Petitioner as a mortgage broker pursuant to license number HA 247542864. As the mortgage broker for DuPont, Henson is responsible for his compliance with Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, as well as that of DuPont. Petitioner examined and investigated Respondents in response to five complaints received by Petitioner. The investigation involved events allegedly occurring between January 1, 1989 through August 31, 1990. Misuse And Misapplication Of Deposits The Smith Transaction Respondents failed to refund a deposit in the amount of $1,493.00 to Mr. J. W. Smith (the "Smith transaction"). Mr. Smith deposited $1,493.00 with Respondents to pay the costs of a mortgage applied for by the purchaser of commercial property owned by Mr. Smith. According to the terms of the Mortgage Loan Agreement and Application, the deposit was refundable if Respondents were unable to obtain financing for the proposed transaction. After Respondents were unable to obtain the financing applied for, they refused to refund Mr. Smith's deposit. Mr. Smith owned the Esmeralda Inn in Chimney Rock, North Carolina (the "Inn"). The Inn was listed for sale with Daniel Murr of First Commercial Brokers in Asheville, North Carolina, in the amount of $650,000.00. In October, 1989, Mr. Smith received a full price offer to purchase the Inn from Mr. and Mrs. William C. Robeck. Mr. and Mrs. Robeck were represented by a Mr. Castaldi as the their agent. The terms of the offer required Mr. and Mrs. Robeck to pay $25,000.00 and for Mr. Smith to carry a second mortgage in the amount of $185,000.00. The balance of the purchase price was to be paid in the form of a first mortgage in the amount of $440,000.00. Mr. Smith did not accept the offer of purchase from Mr. and Mrs. Robeck because he considered the amount of the cash invested by the purchasers to be insufficient. Sometime in December, 1989, Mr. Smith received a full price offer to purchase the Inn from Mr. Andrew Okpych. The terms of the offer required Mr. Okpych to pay $100,000.00 and for Mr. Smith to carry a second mortgage in the amount of $200,000.00. The Branch Bank and Trust Company in Asheville, North Carolina agreed to provide a first mortgage in the amount of $350,000.00. Mr. Smith wanted to minimize the amount of his second mortgage. He was advised by Mr. Daniel Murr that Respondents had represented to Mr. Murr that they could obtain a first mortgage for the purchase in the amount of $440,000.00 to finance the Smith-to-Okpych transaction. This financing proposal would reduce the second mortgage held by Mr. Smith to $110,000.00. Mr. Smith authorized Mr. Murr to contact Respondents. Henson contacted Mr. Smith by telephone to discuss the proposed financing in the amount of $440,000.00 on or about December 19, 1989. During that telephone conversation, Henson represented to Mr. Smith that Henson had located a lender which had already approved the needed $440,000.00 loan. Henson refused repeated requests by Mr. Smith to identity the lender. Henson insisted that Mr. Smith sign an agreement to pay the costs of the loan transaction and deposit $1,500.00 with Respondents before Henson would identify the lender which had pre-approved the loan in the amount of $440,000.00. Mr. Smith and Mr. Okpych signed a Mortgage Loan Agreement and Application (the "agreement") with Respondents on January 5, 1990. Mr. Okpych signed the agreement as borrower and Mr. Smith signed as the person responsible for all expenses incurred in connection with the agreement. The agreement was signed by Henson on January 5, 1992, and sent by facsimile to Mr. Smith and Mr. Okpych from the office of Mr. Smith's attorney. Mr. Smith and Mr. Okpych made several changes to the agreement and initialed the changes. One such change made the deposit from Mr. Smith a refundable deposit by deleting the prefix "non-" from the word "non-refundable" in the typed form of the agreement. Mr. Smith and Mr. Okpych sent the modified agreement to Henson by facsimile on the same day. Mr. Smith telephoned Henson on January 5, 1992, to advise Henson that the modified agreement had been sent by facsimile. Henson stated that he had received the agreement and stated that the modifications were acceptable. Henson directed Mr. Smith to wire transfer the $1,500.00 deposit. Mr. Smith wired $1,500.00, less the $7.00 charge for the wire transfer, on January 10, 1990. The wire transfer in the amount of $1,493.00 was sent to the account of Dupont Funding Corporation, account number 3601345943, NCNB, Deerfield Beach, Florida. Henson notified Mr. Smith by telephone on or about January 15, 1992, that he could not procure the needed financing. The reason given by Henson was that the lender did not want to make the loan because the property was located in North Carolina. Henson still refused to identify the lender to Mr. Smith, but suggested that the needed financing may be obtainable from "General Electric." See Exhibit 12 at 24. The next day, Henson telephoned Mr. Smith and stated that the loan was not available from any lender and that the deposit of $1,493.00 would be refunded to Mr. Smith later in the week. After repeated requests and written demands, Mr. Smith's deposit in the amount of $1,493.00 has not been refunded. The Robeck Transaction Respondents failed to refund a deposit in the amount of $2,500.00 to Mr. and Mrs. William C. Robeck (the "Robeck transaction"). Mr. and Mrs. Robeck deposited $2,500.00 with Respondents when the Robeck's applied for a mortgage in the amount of $440,000.00 on October 11, 1989, in their unsuccessful attempt to purchase the Inn from Mr. Smith. When Mr. Robeck questioned whether the deposit was refundable, Henson changed the typed form of the Mortgage Loan Agreement and Application (the "loan application") by deleting the prefix "non-" in the typed word "non-refundable". The modified loan agreement was signed by the Robeck's and Henson. Respondents were unable to obtain financing for the proposed transaction. After the Robecks were unable to obtain financing, Respondents refused to refund the Robeck's deposit. Mr and Mrs. Robeck made an offer to purchase the Inn from Mr. Smith sometime in October, 1989. The offer was rejected, and the Robeck's asked Henson to refund their deposit sometime in January, 1990. Henson refused to refund the deposit and told Mr. Robeck to find another bed and breakfast inn. Mr. Robeck found another bed and breakfast inn for sale in Franklin, North Carolina. He offered to acquire the inn by lease-purchase. His offer was accepted, but Mr. Robeck later found approximately $1,000,000.00 in stolen property on the premises. The owner was arrested, and the lease-purchase transaction was not consummated. Mr. Robeck again requested the refund of his deposit, and Henson again refused the request. Mr. Robeck has never been refunded any portion of his deposit. The Shuster Transaction Respondents failed to refund a deposit in the amount of $2,500.00 to Mr. Sanford Shuster (the "Shuster transaction"). Mr. Shuster deposited $2,500.00 with Respondents when he applied for a mortgage in the amount of $3,500,000.00 on February 8, 1990, to finance the acquisition of an Assisted Care Living Facility ("ACLF"). Henson changed the typed form of the Mortgage Loan Agreement and Application (the "mortgage application") by deleting the prefix "non-" in the typed word "non-refundable". The modified mortgage application was signed by Mr. Shuster and Henson. Mr. Shuster was unable to obtain financing, and Respondents refused to refund Mr. Shuster's deposit. Mr. Shuster made repeated attempts to obtain his refundable deposit from Respondents including several telephone conversations with Henson and two written demands for payment on April 10, 1990, and on June 2, 1990. In every instance, Henson agreed to refund the deposit but never did so. Mr. Shuster and Henson entered into a compromise agreement on September 10, 1990. Pursuant to the terms of the compromise agreement, Henson agreed to pay Mr. Shuster $2,000.00 in full settlement of the $2,500.00 claim by Mr. Shuster. Henson paid none of the $2,000.00 required under the settlement agreement with Mr. Shuster. Mr. Shuster sued Henson in Palm Beach County Court and obtained a Final Judgment against Henson on January 31, 1992, in the amount of $2,058.75. On May 7, 1991, Henson paid Mr. Shuster $100.00 toward the amount due under the Final Judgment, but made no other payments. Mr. Shuster has never received the balance of the deposit owed to him and has a claim pending with the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund. The Linker Transaction Respondents failed to refund deposits totaling $22,500.00 to Mr. Gerald Linker (the "Linker transaction"). Mr. Linker deposited $22,500.00 with Respondents when he applied for a mortgage in the amount of $1,250,000.00 in May, 1990, to finance the acquisition of an alcohol and drug abuse center (the "center"). Henson obtained a written loan commitment from Nationwide Funding, Inc. ("Nationwide"), on May 23, 1990. Neither Nationwide nor Respondents performed in accordance with the terms of the commitment. Mr. Linker never received his loan and never received his deposits. Mr. Linker's attorney made repeated attempts to have Mr. Linker's deposits refunded to him. Mr. Linker's attorney filed suit in the Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit in Palm Beach County, Florida, and obtained separate judgments against Henson and Dupont in the respective amounts of $69,023.01 and $69,520.78. Respondents paid none of the $138,543.79 owed to Mr. Linker. Mr. Linker has a claim pending with the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund. The Barth Transaction Respondents failed to return a refundable deposit in the amount of $10,000.00 to Mr. Andrew J. Barth (the "Barth transaction"). Mr. Barth deposited $10,000.00 with Respondents when he applied for financing in connection with the purchase of the Cardinal Retirement Village in Bradenton, Florida, on November 17, 1989. Mr. Barth was to assume an existing mortgage of approximately $9,800,000.00 in the transaction. Respondents agreed to arrange the assumption. The owners of the Cardinal Retirement Village refused to proceed and Respondents never refunded Mr. Barth's deposit. The agreement between Mr. Barth and Respondents provided in relevant part: The deposit will be refunded no later than thirty (30) days from this date if this real estate and mortgage transaction is not successfully completed and closed. Mr. Barth made repeated attempts to have his deposit refunded to him. In May, 1990, Mr. Barth's attorney negotiated a Pay Back Agreement with Respondents in which Respondents agreed to pay $1,500.00 a month to Mr. Barth to refund the deposit with interest. Respondents paid only $3,000.00 to Mr. Barth. Mr. Barth has never received the balance owed to him for his refundable deposit. Failure To Maintain Escrow Accounts Respondents failed to maintain an escrow account during 1988 and 1989 and failed to place deposits in escrow. Respondents failed to place deposits in escrow for the Smith, Robeck, Shuster, Linker, and Barth transactions. The accounts to which the monies were deposited by Respondents were not escrow accounts. Respondents failed to place deposits from numerous other transactions in escrow. Respondents failed to deposit in escrow the following amounts: an appraisal fee of $250.00 and a credit report fee of $150.00 collected from Mr. Eric Jason prior to closing a mortgage for $101,650.00 on November 30, 1989; an appraisal fee of $250.00 and a credit report fee of $50.00 collected from Francis J. and Barbara A. Lynch prior to closing a mortgage for $50,000.00 on February 5, 1990; a deposit of $2,000.00 in part payment of the brokerage fee collected from Mr. Nicholas A. Paleveda and Ms. Marjorie Ewing prior to closing a mortgage for $356,400.00 on April 20, 1990; a deposit of $350.00 collected from Mr. Richard L. Trombley prior to closing a mortgage for $40,000.00 on November 2, 1990; and a deposit of $350 collected from the Sun Bay Development Corporation prior to closing a mortgage for $292,500.00 on February 6, 1990. Excessive, Duplicate, And Undisclosed Charges Respondents imposed excessive, duplicate, or undisclosed charges in numerous mortgage transactions. The costs itemized and collected from borrowers in these transactions were not supported by actual expenditures. Respondents collected $625.00 from Mr. and Mrs. Ernest L. Sego for an appraisal that cost $250.00. Mr. and Mrs. Sego paid $325.00 for an appraisal report at the time they executed a Mortgage Brokerage Agreement on August 17, 1988, for a mortgage in the amount of $151,000.00. At the closing on April 7, 1989, Mr. and Mrs. Sego were charged an additional $300.00. Respondents collected $50.00 from Mr. and Mrs. Sego for a credit report at the time the Mortgage Brokerage Agreement was executed. At the closing, Mr. and Mrs. Sego were charged an additional $45.00 for a credit report. Respondents underestimated the closing costs for: Mr. Jason in the amount of $590.00; The Lynch's in the amount of $492.50; and Mr. and Mrs. Sego in the amount of $1,140.00. Failure To Disclose Respondents failed to disclose costs incurred by numerous borrowers. Respondents failed to disclose changes in the cost of title insurance which occurred between the time the borrowers signed Good Faith Estimate forms and the time the mortgage transactions closed. The estimated cost for title insurance for the Lynch's was $460.00 while the actual cost was $637.50. The estimated cost of title insurance for Mr. and Mrs. Sego was $200.00 and the actual cost was $263.00. The Mortgage Brokerage Agreement/Good Faith Estimate was not signed by two borrowers in separate transactions. Neither Mr. and Mrs. Knowlton nor Mr. Trombley signed those documents. Respondents failed to disclose payments made to a co- broker in two separate transactions. Mr. Nicholas Cancel was hired by Respondents to process loans. Loan processing is limited to preparing the documentation necessary to close a loan. Mr. Cancel is a licensed mortgage broker who was employed by a broker other than Respondents. Respondents failed to disclose payments made to Mr. Cancel in his capacity as an independent broker in the mortgage loans to the Lynch's and Mr. Jason. Failure To Maintain Books And Records And Failure To Cooperate Respondents failed to maintain books and records at the principal place of business. Respondents maintained only one business location. When Petitioner's investigator visited Respondents' office and asked for the books and records, Henson told the investigator that there were no books and records at the office. Petitioner subsequently served Respondents with a subpoena to produce Dupont's books and records. Respondents produced 57 mortgage files and some banking records. The files produced by Respondents were incomplete. Most contained only brochures. No files were produced on the Shuster and Linker transactions. During the investigation Henson represented to the investigator that he was neither president nor a corporate officer of Dupont. However, Henson repeatedly signed loan application and loan closing documents as president of Dupont including the Smith, Robeck, and Shuster transactions. Henson also entered into numerous co-brokerage arrangements as president of Dupont including arrangements with Mr. Cancel and Ms. Patricia Towers, president of Towers Mortgage Corporation, 6971 North Federal Highway, Boca Raton, Florida 33487. Fraud, Deceit, Misrepresentation, And Gross Negligence Respondents' intent to defraud and deceive the public is evidenced by a consistent pattern and practice of incompetence, gross negligence, misrepresentation, and failure to disclose material facts in multiple transactions over an extended period of time. Respondents knew or should have known that the acts committed by them constituted violations of law. Respondents violations resulted in financial loss to numerous individuals and to the public generally. Respondents failed to comply with agreements voluntarily executed by them and failed to pay amounts due under judgments duly entered against them by Florida courts. Respondents failed to cooperate with state investigators and failed to maintain books, records, and escrow accounts required by law.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner issue a final order revoking the license of Respondent, Henson, and revoking the registration of Respondent, Dupont. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of September 1992. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September 1992.
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not the Respondents' retention of and failure to deliver an earnest money deposit constitutes conduct violative of Section 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and thereby failed to account and deliver monies which came into their possession and was converted in contravention of Section 475.25(1)(c), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Pursuant to an administrative complaint filed approximately April 25, 1980, the Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Real Estate, seeks to suspend, revoke or otherwise discipline the Respondents as licensees based on conduct which will be set forth hereinafter in detail. Respondent, Richard A. Anglickis, is a registered real estate broker and is issued license number 00018669. Respondent, American Heritage Realty, Inc., is a registered corporate real estate broker, having been issued license number 169478. Respondent Anglickis is registered with Petitioner as the active firm member broker of and for Respondent, American Heritage Realty, Inc. On March 1, 1979, Michael T. and Louise E. Keating of Pineola, North Carolina, entered a contract for purchase and sale of real property from Mr. and Mr. Aubrey of Springfield, Ohio, for a total sales price of $23,900.00. The transaction was scheduled to close on or before May 15, 1979. The contract was contingent upon the purchasers obtaining a $19,000.00 new purchase money mortgage for which application was made with First Federal of DeSoto in Lehigh, Florida. Respondent, through its sales agents, assumed the task of obtaining purchase money financing for the Keatings. Upon entering the contract, purchasers gave Respondents a $900.00 earnest money deposit in the form of a check payable to Respondent, American Heritage Realty, Inc., which was to be held in escrow according to the terms of the contract. The Keatings also tendered to Respondent, American Heritage Realty, Inc., an additional deposit of $4,000.00 in the form of a check which was also to be held in escrow until the transaction closed on May 15, 1979. By letter dated May 8, 1979, First Federal of DeSoto advised Respondent and the Keatings that their application for a $19,000.00 purchase money first mortgage financing could not be approved since "their debt ratio of 44 percent far exceeded First Federal's guidelines of a 33 percent debt ratio". (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit B.) Robert Campbell, a mortgage broker for Lee County Mortgage and Title Company, presented the application to secure financing for the Keatings. Mr. Campbell did not submit any application for mortgage financing for the Keatings other than the application submitted on behalf of the Keatings to First Federal of DeSoto. On May 11, 1979, during a telephone conversation with Mrs. Keating, Mr. Campbell advised Mrs. Keating that her loan application for mortgage financing had been rejected and inquired if the Keatings were willing to make an additional down payment in the amount of $7,000.00. The Keatings advised Mr. Campbell that they would consider making the larger down payment but declined to do so inasmuch as Mr. Keating had become ill and they were of the opinion that they needed to retain as much ready cash as possible until such time as they sold their home in North Carolina. The Keatings made it clear to Messrs. Campbell and Respondent, Richard A. Anglickis, that they were not interested in closing the transaction if it required making an additional down payment of $7,000.00. (See Petitioner's Exhibit D.) Also, the Keatings were of the opinion that they were receiving a refund of $4,775. which amount represented the total down payment less the maximum amount of forfeiture of $125.00 as provided for in paragraph two (2) of the contract. (Petitioner`s Exhibit A.) Paragraph two (2) under "Terms and Conditions of Sale" provides in pertinent part that: "In the event PURCHASER'S application for mortgage financing is not approved within 120 days from date hereof, all monies receipted for, less an amount not to exceed $125.00 to reimburse BROKER for costs and expenses incurred, will he returned to the PURCHASER and this contract will be null and void." In this regard, Petitioner stipulated that the amount which should have been withheld as a forfeiture should not have exceeded the maximum amount of $125.00. The Keatings maintained throughout that they considered that they would be getting a refund of approximately $4,775.00. At no time did the Keatings indicate to Respondents' agents that they were agreeing to forfeit the $900.00 deposit if the transaction did not close. In this regard, the Keatings testified that they preferred to lose 900.00 as opposed to the entire down payment of $4,900.00; however, they at no time agreed to a forfeiture of any of the deposit since the transaction did not close. The Keatings received a refund of $4,000.00 from Respondent, Richard A. Anglickis, on approximately May 21, 1979. (Petitioner's Exhibit C.) By letter of same date, Respondent Anglickis advised the Keatings that the tender of the $4,000.00 represented a "full refund of the cancellation of your contract number R-1981". Respondent Anglickis added that that payment confirmed an agreement and understanding between the Keatings and a Mr. Marciano of Respondent's staff. RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE Respondents urged that the Keatings anticipatorily breached the purchase contract on approximately May 18, 1979. In support of this position, Respondent points to the position that when the Keatings advised that they were no longer interested in pursuing the matter further if additional monies were paid, that there was still remaining approximately seventy-five (75) days within which Respondent had time to secure or otherwise arrange financing for the Keatings. However, Respondent Anglickis and mortgage broker Campbell conceded that the mortgage financing application submitted to First Federal of DeSoto was the only mortgage application submitted on behalf of the Keatings. Respondent Anglickis considered that the Keatings underwent what is commonly referred to as "buyer's remorse" and wanted to cancel the contract based on his understanding of the conversations between the Keatings and Mr. Marciano of his staff. (Testimony of Richard A. Anglickis and Robert Campbell.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Respondents, Richard A. Anglickis and American Heritage Realty, Inc., be ordered to return the entire nine hundred dollar ($900.00) earnest money deposit paid by the Keatings under the Contract of Purchase and Sale of Real Property from Mr. and Mrs. Aubrey of Springfield, Ohio, within thirty (30) days of the rendition of the Petitioner's final order in this administrative proceeding. That in the event Respondents fail to refund to the Keatings the full deposit, their licenses, numbers 0018669 and 169478, be suspended for a period of one (1) year. That upon full refund to the Keatings of their entire earnest money deposit, the Respondents be issued a written reprimand cautioning them against further violations of Section 475.25, Florida Statutes. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of September, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 1980.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Respondent Ronald E. Clampitt is the President of Respondent Action Mortgage Corporation and is the person designated to act on behalf of said corporation under the provisions of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. Action Mortgage Corporation currently holds a mortgage brokerage license. The individual mortgage broker license issued to respondent Clampitt expired on August 31, 1980, and has not been renewed. Respondent Joseph W. Langford currently holds a license as a mortgage solicitor for and on behalf of Home Mortgage Investment Corporation. His prior individual mortgage broker license expired on August 31, 1980, and has not been renewed. COUNT I The respondents were counter codefendants in a civil suit filed in the Circuit Court of Sixth Judicial Circuit of the State of the Florida in and for Pinellas County, which case was numbered 78-12033-18 and styled Action Mortgage Corporation, etc., et al., Plaintiffs, vs. Denture Services, Inc., etc., et al., Defendants. On February 8, 1980, a Final Judgment was entered in that proceeding by Circuit Court Judge David Seth Walker. Judge Walker found, as a matter of fact, that a limited confidential/fiduciary relationship existed between Langford and the counter-plaintiffs, and opined that certain activities on the part of the individual counter-defendants were "bedecked with the badge of fraud." The Court, inter alis, awarded the counter-plaintiffs Final Judgment in the nominal sum of $1.00, plus costs. It was noted that the claim of the counter-plaintiffs for punitive damages had previously been denied. Subsequent to the Final Judgment enteed in Case No. 78-12033-18, the counter-plaintiffs filed a Motion for Rehearing on the matter of punitive damages, since the Court had noted in its Final Judgment that the activities of the counter-defendants were "bedecked with the badge of fraud." The counter- defendants (respondents herein) also moved the Court to alter or amend its Final Judgment so as to remove the fraud language quoted above. By Order filed on March 10, 1980, both motions were denied by Judge Walker. Judge Walker's deposition was taken on August 22, 1980, and was received into evidence in this proceeding as petitioner's Exhibit 9. Referring to the language in the Final Judgment "bedecked with the badge of fraud," Judge Walker makes the following comments: "I do not interpret that as a finding of fraud absolute, but just that there were indicia of fraud." (p.4) "But I did not consider this to be an absolute finding of fraud. I think I mentioned that on one of the motions that the counter-plaintiffs made to reconsider the judgment of $1.00 or the refusal to grant punitive damages. I reiterated at that hearing that I found that it was an indicia, but I did not go so far in my own mind as to specifically find fraud." (p. 4) "If I had wanted to find specifically that they were in fact guilty of fraud, I would have said as much. The phrase, in my mind, 'bedecked with a badge of fraud,' is meant to suggest the indicia of fraud. Fraud is a legal conclusion that must be based upon several legally accepted circumstances. And in law school we learned the term, 'badges of fraud.' But a badge of fraud does not per se constitute fraud. I didn't feel that I needed to go too deeply in the questions, because of my finding that the counter-plaintiffs had not in fact suffered any real damage." (pp. 7 and 8) "I listed a certain series of circmustances and activities which had taken place, rather specifically. And I found that these activities and circumstances were bedecked by the badge of fraud which is admittedly a little bit flowery for normal language, but that's what I said. I did not specifically find fraud. Fraud always carries with it the badges of fraud in and of it- self does not collaterally, and on the other hand mean that fraud exists. I did not go that far in this particular judgment. I did not feel I had to." (pp. 18 and 19) "I did not feel that it was necessary for the Court to delve into the ultimate determination of fraud." (p. 20) "I do not perceive that my final judgment made an absolute finding of fraud. Again, the phrase, 'badge of fraud,' simply menas to me an indicia of fraud, and I'm confortable with the finding that that indicia is there. But as far as a finding of fraud is concerned, I did not proceed to that point, and it's not there." (pp. 20 and 21) COUNT II In 1978, Dorothy L. Jones and Byron A. Jones were the owners of real property located at 2656 Granada Circle East in St. Petersburg, Florida. The first mortgage on that property held by Molten, Allen and Williams, Inc. or the Mortgage Corporation of the South, was in default and a foreclosure action, and is pendens against the property had been filed. The monthly mortgage payments were approximately $225. At that time, Dorothy Jones was separated from her husband, lived in the home with her five minor children and was having financial difficulties. Having seen a newspaper advertisement, Dorothy Jones contacted the Respondents in an effort to obtain a second mortgage or additional funds with which to pay her debts and preserve her homestead. Neither of the Respondents agreed to make a second mortgage loan to Mrs. Jones. Instead, they agreed to make an outright purchase of the Jones's residence and lease the property back to Dorothy Jones at a monthly payment which approximated her prior monthly mortgage payment. The lease payments were later increased to $275 per month due to the loss of homestead exemption on the property. It was Mrs. Jones' understanding that she would be given the opportunity to repurchase the home at less than fair market value though she may have to pay a down payment and higher monthly payments. No appraisal was performed on the property. The closing of the transaction took place at a title company, independent of the Respondents. Mrs. Jones understood that she was signing a deed to the property and other documents transferring title to Respondents. The property was purchased by the Respondents in February of 1978 for $23,656.54 and the transfer was made subject to the mortgage to Molten, Allen and Williams, Inc., in the amount of $21,848.44. No funds were paid to Mr. or Mrs. Jones at the time of closing. During the months which followed, Dorothy Jones fell far behind in her lease payments to the Respondents. In May of 1979, Respondent Langford notified Mrs. Jones that the property owners had elected to sell the property in the near future, and advised her to contact his office if she was still interested in purchasing the property. In July of 1979, Dorothy Jones filed a Complaint against the Respondents in the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County seeking a declaratory decree as to her rights under the aforementioned deed, lease and oral agreement to repurchase the property. (Civil No. 79-7307-17). Mrs. Jones was represented by an attorney in that action. By Order filed on July 29, 1980, the Circuit Court approved the terms and conditions of a Stipulation entered into by the Respondents and Mrs. Jones whereby Mrs. Jones was given the opportunity to purchase the subject property from the Respondents for $32,000 within 90 days, and was also required to pay back rental payments to the Respondents. For some reason not clear from the evidence adduced in the proceeding, Mrs. Jones did not repurchase the property from the Respondents. By Final Judgment filed on October 15, 1980, Mrs. Jones' claim against the Respondents was dismissed with prejudice and Respondents were awarded a judgment against Mrs. Jones in the amount of $2,887.50. Apparently, an eviction action in the County Court for Pinellas County resulted in the award of possession of the home to the Respondents. Mrs. Jones vacated the subject property in October of 1980. In April of 1981, Respondents sold the subject property to Harold and Peralita Odlam for a purchase price of $41,7000. COUNT III Respondent Clampitt was licensed as an individual mortgage broker for the years 1978 and 1979. His 1979 license expired on August 31, 1979, as did the license of Action Mortgage Corporation. Mr. Clampitt made an attempt to renew his individual mortgage broker license on October 16, 1979. The renewal license for Action Mortgage Corporation also bears the date of October 16, 1979. During the period of time between August 31, 1979 (the date upon which his individual mortgage broker license expired) and October 16, 1979 (the date upon which said renewal license was issued), respondent, Clampitt, as an individual mortgage broker, received at least three mortgage brokerage fees or commissions. A broker is considered to be licensed by the petitioner when a completed application form accompanied by the correct fee is received by the petitioner. It is the petitioner's practice to mail out renewal application to its approximately 6,500 licensees on July 15 of each year with the request that they be returned by August 15. All licenses expire on August 31 and are reissued for the following year to be effective from September 1 to August 31. Those applications which are received by the petitioner after August 31 bear a different license date. The correct amount to be remitted for the renewal of respondent Clampitt's individual license was $125-- a $75 license fee and a $50 guaranty fund fee. The $190 check received by the petitioner from the respondent on or before August 31, 1979, was accompanied by three renewal application cards. The petitioner did not apply $125 of the $190 to the renewal of respondent Clampitt's individual license because petitioner could not ascertain how the respondent desired to have the funds applied. Although a small minority of licensees do not renew their licenses in a timely fashion, it is not the practice of the petitioner to directly notify a licensee that his license has expired. Respondent Clampitt did hold a license with an effective date of September 13, 1979, as an additional broker for Fickling and Walker, Inc. in Winter Park, Florida. Under this license, respondent Clampitt would have no authority to act individually or on behalf of anyone other than Fickling and Walker, Inc. COUNT IV Respondent Clampitt arranged for a loan to a Mr. and Mrs. Fink. When examining the respondent's books, petitioner's financial examiner was unable to account for an apparent overcharge of $13.80 for credit life insurance on the loan. The examiner did not examine the loan closing documents with regard to this transaction. The evidence establishes that there had been a clerical error in the respondent's office concerning this transaction, that the cost of the credit life insurance had been miscalculated and that respondent Clampitt was entitled to the $13.80. COUNT V It is the practice of the respondent Clampitt to interview his clients over the telephone, look at the involved property and then, if he agrees to make a loan, send the client to a title insurance company to sign the necessary papers. These papers include a loan closing statement, the required RESPA statement and a recision notice which allows the customer to cancel the transaction within 72 hours without cost or obligation. Thereafter, generally five to seven days later, the customer returns to the title company to receive the loan proceeds. Respondent Clampitt does not take deposits and most often does not even meet this clients on a face-to-face basis. All borrower disclosures and rights required by law are provided respondent's clients by the title insurance company.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED THAT: The Administrative Charges and Complaint filed on March 23, 1981, against Joseph W. Langford be DISMISSED; The Administrative Charges and Complaint filed on February 3, 1981, against Action Mortgage Corporation be DISMISSED; Counts I, II, IV and V of the Administrative Charges and Complaint filed against Ronald E. Clampitt on February 3, 1981, be DISMISSED; and Respondent Ronald E. Clampitt be found guilty of accepting fees at a time when his individual license had expired, but, because of the unintentional violation of the pertinent statutory provisions, no disciplinary action be imposed for this offense. Respectfully submitted and entered this 27th day of July, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Walter W. Wood Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Suite 1302 - The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John C. Dew and Jay Emory Wood Harris, Barrett and Dew Post Office Drawer 1441 600 Florida National Bank Building St. Petersburg, Florida 33731 Comptroller Gerald A. Lewis State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact In his application for registration as a mortgage broker (Exhibit 2), David Stain, Petitioner, in response to question 7 "Have you any judgments against you?" answered "No". By letter dated May 12, 1980 (Exhibit 1), Respondent advised Stein that background investigation revealed numerous judgments against him and stated it would he necessary for Stein to advise why he chose to answer question 7 in the negative. After receiving no response from Stein, Respondent, on 2 July 1980, entered a Final Order denying Stein's application for registration as a mortgage broker. Grounds given in this Order were based upon numerous unsatisfied judgments entered against Stein in Pennsylvania. Exhibit 3, a composite exhibit of court records from Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, shows judgements entered against David Stein and in favor of: Pennsylvania Department of Revenue (2), Diner's Club, Ford Motor Credit Company, Charles Arnold, Alan Shaffer, Carl Kronander, and CNA Financial Corporation.
The Issue The Respondents have been charged with multiple violations of Chapter 494, (1987), the Florida Mortgage Brokerage Act, and administrative rules promulgated pursuant to the act. The violations, described in an amended administrative complaint dated April 16, 1990, are as follows: Rule 3D-40.006(5), F.A.C.: Respondents failed to issue a statement signed by both parties, when receiving a deposit on a mortgage loan, regarding disposition of the deposit and other matters. Section 494.08(10), F.S. and Rule 3D-40.091(2), F.A.C.: Respondents failed to provide a written statement with a summary of limits and conditions for recovery from the Mortgage Broker Guaranty Fund. Section 494.055(1)(b), F.S. and Rule 3D-40.008(1), F.A.C.: Respondents assessed fees for credit reports, phone calls, appraisals and courier services, which fees were not supported by the files. Section 494.055(1)(0), F.S. and Rule 3D-40.006(4), F.A.C.: The department had to issue a subpoena for compensation records. Section 494.055(1)(g) and (p), and Section 494.08(5), F.S.: Borrowers were required to pay higher closing costs than were disclosed on the good faith estimate form. Section 494.08(5), F.S.: Respondents failed to secure executed modified mortgage loan applications from the borrowers or to return excess monies to the borrowers. Section 494.08(5), F.S. and Rule 3D-40.091(1), F.A.C.: Respondents accepted deposits from loan applicants but failed to obtain executed mortgage broker agreements which would disclose the cost of the loans. Sections 494.055(1)(b) and (g), and Sections 494.093(3)(a), (b), (c), and (4), F.S.: Respondents failed to disclose that they would retain both origination fees and discount points as their compensation, and failed to disclose compensation received from the lender in addition to brokerage fees assessed the borrowers on the closing statements. Section 494.055(1)(b), F.S., Section 494.08(5), F.S. and Sections 494.093(3)(a), (b), (c) and (4), F.S.: Respondents collected a servicing release fee from the borrowers when the Respondents were not the lender, and failed to disclose the collection. Section 494.055(1)(e), F.S. and Rule 3D-40.006(b)(a), F.A.C.: Respondents failed to maintain an escrow account.
Findings Of Fact Inlet Mortgage Company, Ltd. ("IMC") is a mortgage brokerage business operating under license #HB65002147500. Its place of business is 700 Virginia Avenue, Suite 105, Ft. Pierce, Florida 34982. John Davis is the principal mortgage broker of Respondent IMC, operating under license #HA246700273. He has been licensed in Florida since approximately 1987, and opened his business in February 1988. As authorized by Section 494.065(1), F.S. (1987), the Department of Banking and Finance ("department") conducted an examination of the affairs of the Respondents for the time period February 1988 through June 1, 1988. The examination was completed on July 5, 1988, with a written report. At the time of the examination Respondents had closed only four loans and had another six in progress. The audit was conducted because a loan processor working for IMC had applied for her mortgage broker license, and her application seemed to imply that she was already practicing mortgage brokering. The audit cleared up this question and the processor was not found to be operating improperly. However, Timothy Wheaton, the department examiner, found other violations by IMC. When an audit or review is conducted by the department, the agency staff first interviews the person in charge to explain the review and to learn about the company. The staff then looks at the licenses, reviews files of closed and active loans, and examines books and accounts, payroll records, and the like. Generally, a sampling of loan files is selected from the broker's loan log, but in this first review all loans were reviewed, as so few existed. The staff writes a preliminary report and conducts an exit interview to let the broker know its findings. Later, a formal report is completed and provided to the broker, who has thirty days to respond. Timothy Wheaton conducted his review of IMC and John Davis at the company office in Ft. Pierce on June 3, 1988 and June 7, 1988. At some point on June 3rd, Wheaton was reviewing compensation records to determine how the broker, his partner and the loan processor were paid. Davis had checkbooks available, but the accountant had not prepared his books as the office had just opened. Wheaton had questions as to whether the checkbooks were all that was available; when he asked for the payroll records, Davis told him he would have to subpoena them. Wheaton returned on Monday with a subpoena and was given the same records as before. Davis admits that he made the demand for the subpoena. He was piqued because he was very busy when the audit staff arrived, and when he suggested they return later, he felt they wrongfully impugned his motives and accused him of hiding something. Respondent Davis has admitted to several "technical" violations or oversights in the loan files at the time of the first review. A summary of the limits and conditions of recovery from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund was not being provided, but has been provided since the first audit. Deposits for credit report, appraisal fees and other costs were collected from the borrowers, but the files did not include a statement, signed by the borrowers, describing disposition of the funds in the event that the loan was not consummated, or the term of the agreement. After the first audit Davis has provided such a form statement and has included it in each file. On three closed loans, and one that was still pending, the files did not include documentation to support minimal (i.e., $25.00, $10.00, $6.56) fees for phone calls and courier fees, or fees were collected which exceeded the documentation in the file. Davis explained that these are charges made by the closing attorney, and the files now document those expenses. The difference between what was collected for a credit report and what was spent was returned to the borrower. (For example, $20.30 was returned to borrower, G. Stewart). In three loans closed at the time of the first audit, Davis and IMC received as compensation both the origination fee and a portion of the discount points. In the McCurdy loan, IMC received its 1 percent origination fee ($600.00), plus one half of the 1 percent discount fee ($300.00). In the Alexander loan, IMC received its 1 percent origination fee ($469.00), plus a .75 percent discount fee ($351.75). In the Stewart loan, IMC received its 1 percent origination fee ($612.00), plus 1/2 percent discount fee ($306.00). In each case, the Good Faith Estimate form provided to the borrowers disclosed the fees separately and did not break out which portion of the loan discount would be paid to the lender and which portion would be paid to IMC. The origination fee is sometimes called the broker's fee, although some banks also collect the fee when a mortgage broker is not involved. Discount points are a one-time payment to a lender to increase its yield on the loan. They are a percentage of the loan, paid up front, to reduce the interest rate over the term of the loan. These are distinctly different forms of charges to the borrower. Davis claims that he explained orally to each borrower how much compensation he would receive. The borrowers do not remember the specifics of that explanation, but rather consider the total origination fee and discount fee as their cost of the loan. They knew that the broker was going to be compensated for his services and understood that compensation would come from those fees in some unspecified manner. Davis claims that he checked with some lenders who told him that it was standard practice for part of the broker's compensation to be called a "discount" fee. He considered it a tax advantage to the borrower, as discount fees could be deductible, just as interest is deductible. During the audit, Davis discussed his compensation practice with the agency staff, who explained that, whatever it is called, the broker's compensation had to be fully disclosed to the borrower at the time of application on the Good Faith Estimate form. Between June 3rd and June 7th, Davis attempted to redisclose his compensation to the borrowers, but this resulted in unsigned disclosure forms in the file when the agency review staff returned on June 7th to complete the audit. At the time of the first audit, Davis and IMC maintained an escrow account for the deposits received from applicant/borrowers for audit reports, appraisal fees and other costs. Davis later closed his escrow account because he felt it was costing him money and because he did not consider the funds he received at the time of application to be escrow deposits. In most cases, the credit report and appraisal and other relevant services were ordered the same day as the loan application. Whether the loan was eventually consummated, the customer was still responsible for paying the charge if the services were provided. This is disclosed in a statement at the bottom of the Good Faith Estimate form and in a separate "Notice to Borrower", signed by the applicant which, since the first audit, is maintained in the loan file. According to the Notice to Borrower, if the loan is cancelled or denied, and the services have not been performed, the funds will be returned to the customer, less any cancellation charge by the appraisal or credit firm. These funds are deposits. When the escrow account was closed, Davis deposited the money for appraisals and credit report in his operating account. After services were rendered and an invoice received, he would pay the bill. Barbara Janet (Jan) Hutchersien, conducted the department's second audit of IMC in January 1990. This review covered the period from July 1, 1988 through December 31, 1989. John Davis provided the boxes of loans and bank records and loan log. The auditor used the logs to review a sample of loans from each lender with whom IMC works. The bank records were used to trace funds reflected in the loan files. Ms. Hutchersien found, and noted in her examination report, that no escrow account was maintained, although deposits were received in a sample of loan applications. In the Fishman loan, which closed on 4/11/89, closing costs were disclosed by IMC as $1,822.00 on the Good Faith Estimate form dated 1/12/89, yet those costs actually amounted to $2,075.00, disclosed at closing on the U.S. Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Settlement form, for a difference of $253.00. In determining consistency between a good faith estimate and actual closing costs, the agency staff looks at items which are predeterminable costs. In the Fishman case, the estimate for survey was $225.00, but the actual cost was $400.00, due, according to John Davis, to an oddly-shaped lot. In two loans financed by Greentree Mortgage Corporation, IMC received a substantial fee from the lender, which fee was not disclosed on the Good Faith Estimate form, on the HUD Settlement form, or anywhere in writing to the borrower. File documents call these fees "discount for pricing". In the Meslin loan, closed on 8/11/89, the fee from the lender to broker was $432.00; in the Krueger loan, closed on 7/21/89, the payment was $820.00. These paybacks are called "par plus pricing", a relatively new (within the last five years) form of loan pricing. Par plus pricing allows a borrower who does not wish to pay cash at closing, but who would qualify for a higher interest rate in terms of monthly payments, to avoid paying discount points fee at closing. Instead, the lender pays the points to the broker, and the borrower gets a higher interest rate. This is contrasted with the discount point system where the borrower pays cash points at closing in return for a lower interest rate. Par plus pricing can work to the advantage to all parties: The borrower avoids a large cash outlay at closing, the lender enjoys a higher interest rate over the term of the loan, and the broker receives his money from the lender. The borrower, however, should understand his options, including the option to pay cash at closing for a lower interest rate. Davis did not disclose the payback from the lender in writing because that is the way he says he was told to handle the loan by Greentree's representative. Davis told the borrowers that he was getting his money from the lender. He did not, however, explain that the borrower would be paying a higher interest rate in return, and Roger Krueger did not understand why his loan was at 10 1/4 percent, rather than 9 3/4 percent, which he thought was the going rate at the time of closing. IMC also received funds from the lender in the Barnes loan, closed on 12/30/88. Cobb Financial Partners was the original lender, yet they paid IMC a service release fee ordinarily paid by one lender to another for release of servicing a loan. Although the fee from Cobb to IMC was not disclosed in writing to the borrowers, the Barnes' were told that the fee for IMC's services would come from the lender, rather from them. They were told, and it is disclosed on the Good Faith Estimate form, and on the HUD Settlement Form, that Cobb Partners Financial was paid $900.00 (1.25 percent loan discount) by the borrowers. Of this, $810.00 was returned by Cobb to IMC. John Davis concedes that Cobb, not IMC, was the lender and was not "comfortable" with how Cobb told him to handle his fee. He has not done business with Cobb since this loan and was simply trying to avoid having to charge his fee to Barnes, who had just arrived in town to become the newspaper editor. The borrowers who were the subject of the files in which the agency found violations generally did business with Davis and IMC because they thought he would get the best deal for them. They were financially unsophisticated and trusted him to represent them. They understood that he was being paid for his services and felt that he should be paid. Except for Mr. Krueger, they were generally satisfied with their mortgage rates. The mortgage broker's fiduciary responsibility is to the borrower, rather than the lender, although he must deal fairly and honestly with the lender. The service that the broker provides to the borrower is his knowledge and his ability to shop for the best product. Par plus pricing and other mechanisms by which the broker receives his fee in whole or part from the lender are not considered by the department to be a violation of standards governing the practice of mortgage brokerage, so long as the customer is fully apprised of his options and is informed of the role of those payments in the product or service they are receiving. The Barnes' and Kruegers clearly were not so apprised, nor does the record establish that the Meslins were informed, although they did not testify. Categorizing brokerage fees or compensation as "discount points" is patently misleading, as discount points are used to buy down an interest rate. When the points are diverted instead to the broker, the consumer does not receive the loan for which he has paid. John Davis admits certain technical violations, but unequivocally denies that he wilfully misled his customers or committed fraud. Since the second audit, he has restored his escrow account. He now discloses his compensation as brokers fees rather than discount points, and has learned how to disclose in writing the par plus pricing loans. In considering certain violations as "technical", and in recommending a penalty in this case, the undersigned has considered Respondents' willingness to correct the errors addressed by the department and Respondents' inexperience at the time of the first audit. Although he was involved in banking, insurance, and accounting, John Davis had not practiced mortgage brokering before moving to Florida and starting his business. In his early practice, as evidenced by his own testimony, he was willing to rely on the advice of lenders, rather than to seek guidance from his licensing authority. He misconceived his role as being jointly responsible to the borrowers and lenders with whom he worked, rather than a primary fiduciary duty to the borrowers, his clients. Although the concealment of compensation as discount points was a willful misrepresentation, the record establishes a pattern of ignorance, albeit inexcusable, rather than fraud.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED That a Final Order be entered, finding that Respondents violated Sections 494.055(1)(e), (o), and (q), F.S. (1987); Sections 494.08(5) and (10), F.S. (1987); and Section 494.093(4), F.S. (1987), and imposing a penalty of $1,000.00 fine, and one year probation, with the conditions that Respondent Davis successfully complete a specified amount and type of professional short course work and undergo periodic review and supervision by the agency. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 30th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Facts Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraphs 3 and 6. Adopted in paragraphs 5 and 6. Rejected as redundant. - 8. Rejected as unsupported by the weight of evidence except as found in paragraph 6. The department was required to obtain a subpoena due to Respondents' feigned or real refusal to produce certain records. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 13. Adopted in substance in paragraph 7. Adopted in substance in paragraph 7. - 18. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in summary in paragraph 8. Rejected as immaterial. The telephone charges were incurred by the closing agent, not Respondents. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in summary in paragraph 7. and Rejected as unnecessary and - 48. Adopted in summary in paragraph 8. 49. - 52. Adopted in summary in paragraph 14. Adopted in paragraph 15. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 13. and Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraphs 16 and 20. 59 - 74. Adopted in summary in paragraphs 16-19. Rejected as unnecessary. The conclusion that the handling of "par plus pricing" was fraudulent is rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 77. - 81. Adopted in summary in paragraphs 20 and 21. 82. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 83. Adopted in paragraphs 10 and 12. 84. Adopted in paragraph 10. 85. - 89. Rejected as unnecessary. 90. Adopted in paragraph 22. 91. - 93. Rejected as unnecessary. 94. Adopted in part in paragraph 26. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted in paragraphs 1 and 2. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 6. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 13. - 9. Adopted in summary in paragraph 7. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Liability for payment occurs when the service is rendered, as reflected in Respondent's "Notice to Borrower". Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 12. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. Rejected as unnecessary. - 19. Adopted in summary in paragraph 8. 20. - 22. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 14. Adopted in substance in paragraph 13. Adopted in substance in paragraph 16. Adopted in substance in paragraph 19. Rejected as unnecessary. - 29. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Included in conclusion of law number 9. Rejected as immaterial. - 33. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. The terms implied that the loans would be at a discounted rate, but were not, because the "discount" (partial) went to the broker. Adopted in paragraphs 19 and 20. Rejected as immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: Elise M. Greenbaum, Esquire Office of the Comptroller 400 W. Robinson St., Suite 501 Orlando, FL 32801 John O. Williams, Esquire Renaissance Square 1343 East Tennessee St. Tallahassee, FL 32308 Hon. Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel Dept. of Banking & Finance The Capitol Plaza Level, Rm. 1302 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 =================================================================
