The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is the amount of replacement housing payment that the Petitioners should receive as a result of their being displaced by a highway construction project. The parties agree that Petitioners are entitled to benefits, but disagree as to the appropriate amount.
Findings Of Fact In 1979, Petitioners owned and lived on property located in Hillsborough County, Florida. The property included slightly more than two acres of land and a one-story frame dwelling. The dwelling contained three bedrooms, a living-dining room, a kitchen, and two open porches. Petitioners' property was condemned by the Florida Department of Transportation in order to obtain right-of-way for Interstate Highway 75. The value of the land and dwelling structure was $60,950, and Petitioners were awarded this amount through a Final Judgment entered in a condemnation proceeding. The value of the Petitioners' dwelling structure was approximately $33,794, and the value of their property was approximately $27,206. The fact that these amounts do not coincide with the condemnation award is not material. Department of Transportation personnel located a comparable piece of property that included a dwelling structure. This dwelling structure was slightly larger and included some amenities that the Petitioners' condemned dwelling structure did not include. The structure was on three acres of land, more than the land included in the condemned parcel. The selling price of this comparable property and structure was $70,500. Petitioners decided against purchasing the comparable property and structure located by the Department. Instead, Petitioners decided to purchase property located near to Live Oak, Florida, and to build a new dwelling structure on the property. The parcel that Petitioners purchased is 41 acres in size and includes frontage on the Suwannee River. The Petitioner Mrs. Fred Anderson has contracted to construct a dwelling structure on a portion of the purchased property. The price of the dwelling is $35,000. The structure which Mrs. Anderson has contracted to build contains some amenities beyond those that were included in the condemned dwelling structure. Nonetheless, the Department has conceded that the structure, now under construction, is comparable to the condemned structure. The Department has conceded that Petitioners are entitled to receive the difference between the value placed on the condemned structure and the cost of building the new, comparable structure as a part of their replacement housing payment. This amounts to $1,206 ($35,000 minus $33,794) In making a determination as to the amount of replacement housing payment that Petitioners are entitled to receive in connection with their property acquisition, the Department determined to place a value on three acres of the 41-acre tract that Petitioners purchased. Three acres were chosen because the comparable property located by the Department included three acres. The Department's personnel concluded that the three acres surrounding the dwelling structure site had a value of $8,597 per acre. The total value of the three-acre homesite was thus placed at $25,791. This amount is less than the $27,206 that was determined to be the fair value of the Petitioners' condemned land. The Department's personnel therefore concluded that Petitioners were entitled to no relocation assistance benefits for the property acquisition since they had received more money in the condemnation proceeding than the value of the three-acre homesite. In determining a fair value to be placed on the property purchased by Petitioners near Live Oak, it is not appropriate to consider the price of the entire 41-acre tract. The 41-acre tract cannot fairly be compared to the condemned tract that was less than three acres in size. Petitioners should receive compensation only for a comparable tract. Petitioners paid a total of $58,000 for the 41-acre tract. It would not be appropriate to place a value on the three acres surrounding the Petitioners' dwelling under construction by simply dividing 41 into the total purchase price. The three acres surrounding the homesite includes river frontage. It is the most valuable portion of the 41-acre tract. While the three acres surrounding the dwelling structure under construction include amenities that the Petitioners' condemned land did not include, it is fairly comparable. The fair value of the three acres is $10,782 per acre, or a total of $32,346. It thus cost the Petitioners more than the amount they received for their condemned land ($27,206) to obtain a comparable homesite. The Department's calculations which led to a value of $8,597 per acre were erroneous. During the course of negotiations between the Petitioner Mrs. Anderson and personnel of the Department of Transportation, Mrs. Anderson came to an understanding that she would receive $9,550 (the difference between the price of the comparable property located by the Department and the Petitioners' condemned property) in replacement housing payments. She relied on this understanding in contracting to have a dwelling structure constructed on her newly acquired property. The new dwelling structure has not been completed because Mrs. Anderson was relying upon receipt of the replacement housing payments to pay for construction. While it is clear that Mrs. Anderson had this understanding, it does not appear that the Department misrepresented any facts so as to lead her to that conclusion. Communications forwarded by the Department to Petitioners advised them that the maximum benefits they could receive would be determined by subtracting the value of their property as determined in a condemnation proceeding from the cost of comparable property. Petitioners concede that that amount is $9,550. The Department's communications clearly indicated that if Petitioners decided to purchase other property or to build a new dwelling structure, other compensation formulas would be utilized, but that the maximum possible benefit would remain $9,550. While Mrs. Anderson's new dwelling structure was being constructed, she had difficulty contacting the Department's officials, who were located in Tampa and Bartow. The difficulty in communication was in part the fault of Mrs. Anderson and in part the fault of the Department's officials. Mrs. Anderson went to a Department office near Live Oak and discussed the matter. The Live Oak officials, of course, had no knowledge of the details of the matter, but helped to communicate with officials in Tampa and Bartow. During these discussions, the officials in Live Oak assumed that Mrs. Anderson was entitled to receive the amount that she related to them ($9,550). No representations were made to her, however, that would properly lead her to a conclusion that she was entitled to receive that amount. The contractor who was building Mrs. Anderson's dwelling structure also contacted Department personnel. He, too, came to the conclusion that Mrs. Anderson would be receiving $9,550. Based on that understanding, he engaged in construction activities that Mrs. Anderson could not afford. While it is apparent that the contractor reached this understanding, it does not appear that anyone at the Department directly represented to him that Mrs. Anderson would be receiving $9,550 in replacement housing payments.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Michael N. Kuvin (Kuvin), was at all times material hereto a certified general contractor in the State of Florida, having been issued license numbers CG CB07136 and CG C007136. Kuvin, under license number CG CB07136, was the qualifying agent for Gerald S. Krigel Corporation (Krigel Corp.). During the years 1904 and 1985, Krigel Corp. acted as the general contractor for Lomar Communities Inc. (Lomar), the owner/developer of Sugarwood and Heritage Park subdivisions, Dade County, Florida 1/ Gerald Krigel was the president of Krigel Corp. and Lomar. While the Sugarwood and Heritage Park subdivisions were under development, Kuvin did not supervise, direct, manage, or control the contracting activities of Krigel Corp., nor did he supervise, direct, manage, or control any of its construction activities in the subdivisions. He did, however, meet with Mr. Krigel twice a year, at which times he signed and delivered to Mr. Krigel an indeterminate number of blank building permit applications. On each occasion, Kuvin was paid $1,500. 2/ In mid-December 1985, Lomar and Krigel Corp. closed their offices. In January 1986, Lomar filed a petition in bankruptcy. The Freedman Residence On January 8, 1984, Marc Freedman and his wife entered into an agreement with Lomar for the purchase and sale of a single family residence in the Sugarwood subdivision. The agreement, as subsequently modified on May 11, 1984, called for Lomar to build the house in accordance with an agreed floor plan and deed it to the Freedmans in exchange for an agreed price of $106,337.50. On June 7, 1984, a building permit application was submitted to the Dade County Building and Zoning Department (Dade County) to construct the Freedman house. The application listed Lamar as the owner, Krigel Corp. as the contractor, and was signed by Kuvin. The requested permit was issued July 10, 1984, and a certificate of completion was issued on October 3, 1984. A closing was held on the Freedman purchase in late October 1984. Certain construction deficiencies existent on closing or subsequently discovered have not, however, been rectified despite demand of Lamar and Kuvin. 3/ The deficiencies include a backyard which is prone to flooding because of poor drainage, a pool deck area which has cracked into 14 separate pieces because not scored and which floods because not graded; interior dry wall which has cracked and buckled, and cracked tiles in the bathroom. The Florez Residence On February 23, 1985, Maria Florez entered into an agreement with Lomar for the purchase and sale of a single family residence in the Heritage Park subdivision. The agreement called for Lomar to build the unit in accordance with an agreed floor plan and deed it to Ms. Florez in exchange for an agreed price of $69,500. Under the terms of her agreement with Lomar, Ms. Florez was obligated to pay an initial deposit of $1,000, and an additional deposit of $2,500 upon approval of her application for a mortgage loan. Ms. Flores paid Lomar the initial deposit of $1,000, the $2,500 deposit upon approval of her application for financing with Pan American Bank, as well as the additional sum of $1,136 to add an air vent in the bathroom and to upgrade the carpeting. On June 25, 1985, a building permit application was submitted to Dade County to construct the Florez unit. The application listed Lomar as the owner, Krigel Corp. as the contractor, and was signed by Kuvin. The requested permit was issued July 5, 1985, and construction apparently completed in November 1985; however, Dade County has not yet issued a certificate of completion. No closing was ever scheduled for the Flarez unit. Upon learning of Lomar's bankruptcy, Ms. Florez filed a claim in the bankrupt's estate. To date, that claim has not been resolved. The Cevallos Residence On March 13, 1985, Pedro Cevallos and his wife entered into an agreement with Lamar for the purchase and sale of a single family residence in the Heritage Park subdivision. The agreement called for Lomar to build the unit in accordance with an agreed floor plan and deed it to the Cevallos in exchange for an agreed price of $69,900. Under the terms of the Cevallos' agreement with Lamar, they were obligated to pay an initial deposit of $500, and an additional deposit of $3,000 upon approval of their application for a mortgage loan. The Cevallos paid the deposits of $3,500, as well as an additional $190 to add an air vent in the bathroom. On June 6, 1985, a building permit application was submitted to Dade County to construct the Cevallos unit. The application listed Lomar as the owner, Krigel Corp. as the contractor, and was signed by Kuvin. The requested permit was issued June 13, 1985, and a certificate of completion was issued on November 14, 1985. The Cevallos had a walk through inspection of their unit and noted no deficiencies. A closing never occurred, however, because of Lamar's bankruptcy. The Cevallos are a claimant in the bankrupt's estate, but that claim has not been resolved. The Sujansky Residence On October 21, 1934, James Sujansky and his wife entered into an agreement with Lomar for the purchase and sale of a single family residence in the Heritage Park subdivision. The agreement called for Lomar to build the unit in accordance with an agreed floor plan in exchange for an agreed price of $64,900. On April 12, 1935, a building permit application was submitted to Dade County to construct the Sujansky unit. The application listed Lomar as the owner, Krigel Corp. as the contractor, and was signed by Kuvin. The requested permit was issued on April 26, 1985, and a certificate of completion was issued on October 9, 1985. On October 22, 1985, a closing was held on the Sujansky unit. At closing, the Sujanskys received a no-lien affidavit, a builder's warranty from Lomar, and Lomar's assurances that the deficiencies noted on the punch list would be corrected. Lomar failed or refused to correct the following deficiencies: the yard was prone to flooding because of poor drainage, cracked tiles were noticeable in both bathrooms and the kitchen, the dry wall was not sanded or painted, the exterior walls contained cracks in the stucco finish, the window trim rattled, the front door had gaps around it, the kitchen cabinets had missing or unsecured handles, and the formica was peeling off the kitchen counter. Subsequent to closing, the Sujanskys received a claim of lien against their property from GDG Services, Inc., B.Q. Interiors Contractors, and Bird Plumbing Corp. These companies claimed monies owed for materials and services furnished to the property under a contract with Lomar or Krigel Corp. The proof established that B.Q. Interiors was owed the sum of $390, but failed to establish the validity or amount of the remaining claims. The Frisby Residence On March 25, 1985, Thomas Frisby and his wife entered into an agreement with Lomar for the purchase and sale of a single family residence in the Heritage Park subdivision. The agreement called for Lomar to build the unit in accordance with an agreed floor plan in exchange for an agreed price of $69,000. On June 6, 1985, a building permit application was submitted to Dade County to construct the Frisby unit. The application listed Lomar as the owner, Krigel Corp. as the contractor, and was signed by Kuvin. The requested permit was issued on June 13, 1985, and a certificate of completion was issued on December 31, 1985. On November 3, 1985, a closing was held on the Frisby unit. At closing, the Frisbys received a no-lien affidavit and a builder's warranty from Lomar. Subsequent to closing, the Frisbys noted numerous deficiencies which Lomar failed or refused to remedy. These deficiencies included a back yard prone to flooding because of poor drainage, a bedroom wall that leaked and caused the wall and carpet to mildew, chipped and cracked sidewalks, and an uneven livingroom floor. Additionally, the Frisbys received a claim of lien against their property from B.Q. Interiors Contractors, S&R Industries, Inc., and Val's Air Conditioning, Inc. These companies claimed monies owed for materials and services furnished to the property under a contract with Lomar or Krigel Corp. The proof established that B.Q. Interiors was owed the sum of $390 and that S&R Industries was owed the sum of $632.50, but failed to establish the validity or amount of the lien claimed by Val's Air Conditioning.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Michael N. Kuvin's certification as a general contractor, license numbers CG CB07136 and CG C007136, be REVOKED. DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of April, 1937, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 1987.
The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not Respondent failed to fulfill contractual obligations; willfully or deliberately disregarded and violated applicable local building codes and made misleading representations by issuing a warranty which he later refused to honor in violation of Section 489.129(1)(c), (d) and Section 455.277(1)a, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant findings of fact: By its Administrative Complaint filed herein, Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against Respondent, as licensee and against his license to practice contracting in the state of Florida. Respondent is a certified general contractor having been issued license number CBC006481. On June 6, 1981, Respondent, as qualifier for Behr Contracting, Inc., entered into a contract with Mrs. Susan Fuller to reroof her home at 811 Santiago Street, Coral Gables, Florida. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) Respondent guaranteed to Mrs. Fuller that all materials furnished by Behr Contracting would be of standard quality, type and condition, free from defects, and that said labor and materials would be guaranteed against structural and material defects. Respondent pulled the required building permit and commenced the reroofing off Mrs. Fuller's residence on June 11, 1981. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2) During the course of construction, several defects became apparent. As example, the tile was installed approximately two months after the contract was entered (August, 1981) and during the next month, September, 1981, leaks started which damaged the ceiling, pecky cypress, plaster in the dining and bedrooms, the kitchen walls, and other interior furnishings of the Fuller residence. When Mrs. Fuller observed the leaks in the roof, she immediately notified the Respondent that there was a problem with the roof and requested that he return to the site to inspect the roof and to correct same. Despite repeated demands, Behr refused to repair the interior damage to Mrs. Fuller's residence. During approximately June, 1982, Behr installed a solar system on the Fuller's residence. Respondent guaranteed the roof on the Fuller residence for a period of fifteen years including the texture coating to the roof and the slide of the residence. Respondent also agreed to abide by all ordinances, rules and regulation of the Building Department of the City of Coral Gables, Florida. Mrs. Fuller filed a formal complaint against Respondent on approximately May 24, 1982. Following the installation of the roof on the Fuller residence, several leaks lasted for extended periods of time and the Fullers including her roommate, Heather Stever, had to repeatedly place buckets in and around the Fuller residence to attempt to contain water which was entering the roof through various cracks in the roof. Evidence of the leakage was evident in at least three rooms of the Fuller residence. (Testimony of Robert Harvilla and Heather Stever) The Respondent contends that there was no defective workmanship or materials used or performed by him in the reroofing of the Fuller residence and that the cause of the leakage in the Fuller residence was precipitated by nuts, bolts and other foreign materials which were strewn over the roof when the solar system was installed. Respondent contends that the foundation of the roof was penetrated by the solar system which destroyed the integrity of the roof. In this regard, it is found herein that the leakage to the Fuller residence occurred immediately after the Respondent installed the new roof to that residence and that the leakage persisted until it was corrected months later after Mrs. Fuller had her home reroofed in December of 1982. Evidence adduced herein failed to establish that the leakage to the Fuller residence which ultimately caused damage to the interior of their residence, was a result of foreign matter attributable to any cause other than the installation of the new roof by Respondent. Finally, Respondent refused to complete other items he specifically contracted to perform for Mrs. Fuller including painting of the interior trim and to completely texture coat the exterior of the Fuller residence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Respondent's certified general contractor's license number CBC006481 be suspended for a period of one (1) year. 2/ DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of November, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 1983.
The Issue This is an appeal from Resolution No. P60-99 of the Monroe County Planning Commission ("Planning Commission"), in which the Planning Commission approved the decision of the Monroe County Planning Department ("Planning Department") denying two applications for building permits submitted by the Appellants, Robert and Ruth Stoky ("the Stokys"). One application requested a building permit to reconstruct a screened porch and to build an elevated deck in the rear of the Señor Frijoles/Cactus Jack's restaurants, which are located at 103900 Overseas Highway, Key Largo, Florida; this application was assigned building permit number 99-3-857 ("permit number 99-3-857"). The second application requested a building permit to reconstruct a trellis as a separate structure associated with the Sundowner restaurant, also located at 103900 Overseas Highway, Key Largo, Florida; this application was assigned building permit number 99-3-858 ("permit number 99-3-858"). The instant appeal was forwarded by the Planning Commission to the Division of Administrative Hearings pursuant to Article XIV, Monroe County Code, the Hearing Officer Appellate Article, and Monroe County ("the County") has appeared as Appellee in this case. In their Initial Brief, the Stokys abandoned their appeal of the decision of the Planning Commission approving the Planning Department's denial of their application for permit number 99-3-858; therefore, the ultimate issue presented in this appeal is whether the Planning Commission's Resolution No. P60-99 should be affirmed, reversed, or modified with respect to the its decision approving the Planning Department's denial of the Stokys' application for permit number 99-3-857.
The Issue Whether Respondent properly denied Petitioner a standard developmental disability group home license because her facility is a "mobile home" as defined in Section 320.01(2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner decided that she wanted to operate a group home for developmentally disabled clients. She wanted to locate the home on property that she owns at 630 South East 10th Street, Williston, Florida. Petitioner conferred with Respondent's staff before deciding whether to construct a site-built home or an off-site built home on the property. Respondent's licensing specialist referred Petitioner to Respondent's fire inspector. Respondent's fire inspector recommended that Petitioner consider using a Palm Harbor Home with certain improvements to the windows, floors, and roof. Specifically, the improvement included special strengthened roofing, special strengthened flooring, wallboard rather than plastic walls, fire alarms and detectors in every room, as well as wider windows. Petitioner decided to buy a four-bedroom/two-bath unit with over 2,000 square feet from Palm Harbor Homes. The home was manufactured by Palm Harbor Homes at its Plant City, Florida, factory in 2001. Each section of the home had a seal certifying that it was built in compliance with the Federated Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standard Act. With the upgrades that Petitioner requested, the home cost Petitioner approximately $80,000. The home complies with or exceeds the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development standards. Petitioner took the house plans and pictures of the home to Respondent's licensing specialist who approved the home. The supervisor of the licensing specialist concurred because he was under the impression that the home was a "Jim Walter-type" modular home that met the criteria for group homes. Petitioner's fire inspector also approved the home. The fire inspector concluded that the home meets the high standards of the 2001 Fire Protection Code. In the meantime, Petitioner followed through with completing the paperwork for her application. Petitioner, with the help of Respondent's staff, proceeded to develop the required budget and paperwork for a Medicaid waiver. Petitioner's licensing specialist and fire inspector approved Petitioner's home, finding that it was suitable as a group home. Respondent granted Petitioner a conditional license on June 1, 2001. This license allowed Petitioner to operate for six months. In July 2001, Petitioner's first client moved in the home. Petitioner received several more client referrals. In September 2001, a second licensing specialist inspected Petitioner's group home. The second licensing specialist, who was not involved in issuing Petitioner's conditional license, conducted the routine inspection in anticipation of Petitioner receiving a standard developmentally disabled group home license. The licensing specialist concluded that the home was in fact a "mobile home," which cannot qualify as an approved structure for a group home. The licensing specialist took pictures of the home and of the State of Florida Installation Certification Label attached to the home. This label certifies as follows: [T]hat the installation of this mobile home to be in accordance with Florida Statutes 320.8249, 320.8325 and Rules of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Bureau of Mobile Home and Recreational Vehicle Construction. Respondent's staff sought clarification from Respondent's headquarters regarding the status of Petitioner's home. By letter dated September 18, 2001, Respondent advised Petitioner that "mobile homes" as defined by Section 320.01(2), Florida Statutes, shall not be used for group home facilities. Respondent did not issue a standard license to the Petitioner. Petitioner's home, although a very high quality "manufactured home," still is a type of mobile home under Section 320.01(2), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's home meets all other licensing standards for developmental disability group homes except for the standard at issue in this case. On or about December 20, 2001, Respondent's district office staff requested a one-year waiver for Petitioner's group home. The written request indicates that Respondent's staff intended to seek a waiver for this home annually until a proposed rule allowing licensing of manufactured homes was promulgated. Respondent granted Petitioner the waiver on or about January 8, 2001. The waiver is valid through the 2002 licensure period. However, there is no guarantee that the Department headquarters will always grant the waiver.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner a standard developmental disability group home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Samuel Mutch, Esquire Mutch & Brigham, P.A. 2114 Northwest 40th Terrace Gainesville, Florida 32605 Lucy Goddard, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 390, Mail Stop 3 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Peggy Sanford, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been a registered residential contractor having been issued license number RR 0040275. In approximately 1980, Respondent entered into a contract to erect a screen room for a Mr. Lewis. Under the terms of the contract, Respondent was to obtain the necessary building permit. After the contract had been signed, Respondent's grandfather died, and Respondent therefore went to New Jersey. He left the permit application with his qualifying agent to sign and process through the building department. When Respondent returned from New Jersey approximately 30 to 35 days later, he went to the Lewis job site and found the project almost completed. Respondent did not check to ascertain if the permit had been obtained, but rather completed the screen room himself. Lewis subsequently contacted Respondent to say that he had received a notice of violation from the building department for erecting a screen room without a permit. Respondent contacted the building department and advised that it was not Lewis's fault, but rather that it was Respondent's responsibility to pull the permit. Respondent was charged with unlawfully erecting a screen room without a permit; he appeared in court and pled guilty; and he paid a $250 fine pursuant to the adjudication of guilt entered on April 20, 1981, in the County Court in and for Dade County, Florida, in Case No. 81-50438. On June 24, 1981, Respondent submitted to the Construction Industry Licensing Board a Contractor's Registration application. On that application, Respondent answered in the negative the following question: "Has any person named in (i) below ever been convicted of any offense in this state or elsewhere other than traffic violations?" At the time Respondent gave that answer, he believed it to be true. He understood the question to call for information on criminal acts and did not comprehend the "screen room" charge to have been criminal conduct. Since Respondent answered that question in the negative, his application for registration was processed in accordance with normal procedures. Had Respondent answered that question in the affirmative, his application would not have gone through normal processing but rather would have been presented to the Construction Industry Licensing Board for the Board's determination of whether to approve the application based upon a consideration of the facts. On November 22, 1982, Respondent contracted with Naomi Blanton to construct an addition to Blanton's home located in the City of Miami, in Dade County, Florida, for a contract price of $11,250. When Respondent had first met with Blanton several months earlier, he had told her he could guarantee completion of the project within 45 days. No contract was entered into at that time, however, since Blanton had not obtained the financing she needed in order to construct an addition. When the contract was signed on November 22, Respondent told Blanton he would start the job when he finished the Chamber of Commerce building he was con structing but that he was starting a 12-unit duplex project around Christmas and would not be able to guarantee any 45-day completion deadline. Accordingly, when the contract was signed, no completion date was included in the terms of that written contract, since Respondent did not know when he could guarantee completion. The Blanton contract written by Respondent specifically provided that Respondent would obtain the building permit. On December 22 and 23, 1982, two of Respondent's employees arrived at the Blanton job site, dug a trench, knocked down the utility room, and moved Mrs. Blanton's washing machine. No further work was done until January 1983. Since Respondent knew that he was required to obtain the building permit before commencing any construction work, Respondent submitted his plans and permit application to the City of Miami Building Department. After the plans had been there about a week, he was advised that his plans would not be accepted unless they were drawn by an architect, although that is not required by the South Florida Building Code. After attempting several more times to obtain approval from the City of Miami Building Department, Respondent hired an architect to redraw the plans and secure the building permit. By this time, Respondent found himself unable to concentrate on operating his business efficiently, since he was preoccupied with spending time with his father who was dying of cancer. Also by this time, Blanton had commenced telephone calls to Respondent on an almost daily basis as late as 11:00 p.m. at his office, at his home, at his mother's home, and at his father's home. Respondent offered to return Blanton's deposit, but she refused to cancel the contract and threatened Respondent that she would sue him if he did not comply with that contract. Respondent commenced working on the Blanton job, although no permit had yet been obtained. The contract on the Blanton job called for payments at certain stages of the construction. By January 27, 1983, Respondent had completed a sufficient amount of the work under the contract so that Blanton had paid him a total of $8,270 in accordance with the draw schedule contained in the contract. Respondent ceased working on January 27, 1983, and advised Blanton and her attorney that he would do no further work until he could obtain the building permit, which he had still not been able to obtain. Although he told them his work stoppage was due to his continued inability to obtain the permit, he also stopped work due to his father's illness and his continued inability to get along with Mrs. Blanton. A delay occurred with the plans being redrawn by the architect Respondent hired to obtain the Blanton building permit, since the architect needed information from Blanton and she was out of town. After Blanton returned, the architect made unsuccessful attempts to obtain the building permit. Respondent and his architect were finally able to speak to one of the top personnel in the City of Miami Building Department about the problems they were experiencing in obtaining a building permit, and, at about the same time, Blanton contacted that same individual to complain that Respondent had no permit. On May 4, 1983, the building department finally accepted the second permit application together with the plans drawn by the architect, and the building permit was issued on May 4, 1983. No work was performed on the Blanton job between January 27, 1983, when Blanton paid Respondent the draw to which he was entitled by that date, and May 4, 1983, when the building permit was finally issued by the City of Miami. Respondent immediately resumed work and quickly completed the next stage of construction called for under the Blanton contract. Upon completing that next stage, he requested his next draw payment; however, Blanton decided not to pay Respondent for the work completed and had her attorney advise Respondent not to return to the job site. Blanton then had a friend of her son come to Miami from Wisconsin to complete the addition to her home. At all times material hereto, Respondent held a certificate of competency issued by Metropolitan Dade County.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(d), Florida Statutes, by willfully and deliberately violating Section 301(a) of the South Florida Building Code; imposing an administrative fine against Respondent in the amount of $2,000 to be paid by a date certain; and dismissing the remaining charges contained in the Administrative Complaint, as amended, against Respondent. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of April, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of April, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas A. Shropshire, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Joseph F. Scioli, Jr. 246 North Krome Avenue Florida City, Florida 33034 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James Linnan, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulation of the parties and on the evidence presented at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact. The Respondent was issued a certified residential contractor's license to qualify Towne & County Homes, Post Office Box 11, Flagler Beach, Florida 32306, and License No. CRCO11317 was issued to qualify said entity together with License No. RG0024736. The Respondent was also issued a Class B pool contractor's license, License No. CPC023590 to qualify Mullen Pools, Inc., 2100 South Flagler Avenue, Flagler Beach, Florida 32036. The Respondent presently maintains three current licenses issued by the Petitioner, which are as follows: Registered General Contractor, License No. RG0024736 Certified Residential Contractor, License No. CRCO11317 Certified Pool Contractor, Class B, License No. CPC023590 On September 8, 1986, the Respondent entered into a contract with Mr. and Mrs. Richard Davis to construct a single family residence in the City of Flagler Beach, Florida. The construction site was located in an area of the city zoned for single family residences only. On October 3, 1986, the Respondent submitted an application to the City of Flagler Beach to obtain a building permit, together with plans and specifications upon which a building permit was to be issued. On February 18, 1987, during an inspection, the building official, Mr. R. A. Law, observed that the Respondent had made some changes in the construction of the residence which deviated from the plans and specifications. The specific changes noticed on this occasion were (a) some rough plumbing had been stubbed in on the first floor where none was indicated on the plans, (b) an additional door had been cut into the rear of the first floor, and (c) a door on the plans between the first and second floors had not been cut in. The building official thought that the foregoing changes constituted an effort to violate the zoning law by building a two-family residence in a one-family zone. Accordingly, he issued a stop work order. After the stop work order of February 18, 1987, was posted, the Respondent removed the additional plumbing and installed a doorway between the first and second floors so that the residence complied with the approved plans and specifications. The building official removed the stop work order. On or about March 24, 1987, the building official, Mr. R. A. Law, was back on the construction site. On this occasion he observed a double electric meter can installed on the residence. This observation caused the building official to again suspect that the Respondent was attempting to violate the zoning law by building a two-family residence in a one-family zone, because he assumed that the meter can had been added to the residence since his February inspection. Actually, the double meter can had been in place since the electrical rough in was done and was simply overlooked during the February inspection. The building official wrote to the Respondent advising him that it appeared that he was "installing an extra apartment on the first floor," and ordering the Respondent to remove the double electric meter can from the house. The Respondent wrote back to the building official stating, among other things, that such was not his intent and that he did not have a contract to finish the first floor of the residence. No electrical service was ever installed to the first floor and, in any event, the power company would not have connected the second service without a second certificate of occupancy from the City. Consistent with the Respondent's contentions that he did not intend to build a two-family residence is the fact that written across the face of the plans submitted to the city were the words "Entire first floor is future area, rough in plumbing only." The Respondent's work orders to subcontractors also support his contention that he did not intend to construct a two-family dwelling. At the time of the inspections noted above, Mr. R.A. Law had only recently assumed the position of building official. There had been prior inspections by the predecessor building official at which no objection was made to the changes that Mr. Law objected to.
Recommendation For all of the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a final order in this case dismissing all charges against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 87-5040 The following are my specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Findings proposed by the Petitioner: All of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner have been accepted in substance, except as specifically set forth below. Paragraph 6: The portion of this paragraph that states or implies that there was an effort to convert a single family residence to a two-family residence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (The building official suspected such an effort, but there was no such effort by the Respondent.) Paragraph 8: The portion of this paragraph that describes the Respondent's intent is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 10: This paragraph is rejected as in part redundant and in part irrelevant, in view of the fact that the changes were minor and were not for the purpose suspected by the building official. Findings proposed by the Respondent: All of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent have been accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: John O. Williams, Esquire Lindsey & Williams, P.A. Renaissance Square 1343 East Tennessee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Stephen P. Sapienza, Esquire P. O. Box 159 Flagler Beach, Florida 32036 Fred Seely, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 William O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
