Findings Of Fact At the time and place scheduled for final hearing, nobody appeared on behalf of petitioner and no evidence was adduced.
Recommendation It is, accordingly recommended that respondent dismiss petitioner's request for a formal administrative proceeding. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of November, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Thomas Herndon, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Vicki Weber, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Kevin J. O'Donnell, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Louise J. Allen, Esquire Stearns, Weaver, Miller, Weissler, Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A. 150 W. Flagler Street, Suite 2200 Miami, FL 33130
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this case are what amount of federal income tax expense is properly included as an expense in Premier's excessive profits filings for the years 2005-2007, and in light of that deduction, how much Petitioner must refund as excessive profits pursuant to section 627.215, Florida Statutes (2009)?
Findings Of Fact Premier is a foreign insurer authorized to write workers' compensation insurance in the State of Florida. As a workers' compensation insurer, Premier is subject to the jurisdiction of the Office. Premier began writing workers' compensation insurance coverage in Florida on January 1, 2005. The Office is a subdivision of the Financial Services Commission responsible for the administration of the Insurance Code, including section 627.215. Section 627.215(1)(a) requires that insurer groups writing workers' compensation insurance file with the Office on a form prescribed by the Commission, the calendar-year earned premium; accident-year incurred losses and loss adjustment expenses; the administrative and selling expenses incurred in or allocated to Florida for the calendar year; and policyholder dividends applicable to the calendar year. Insurer groups writing types of insurance other than workers' compensation insurance are also governed by section 627.215. Its purpose is to determine whether insurers have realized an excessive profit and if so, to provide a mechanism for determining the profit and ordering its return to consumers. Insurer groups are also required to file a schedule of Florida loss and loss adjustment experience for each of the three years prior to the most recent accident year. Section 627.215(2) provides that "[t]he incurred losses and loss adjustment expenses shall be valued as of December 31 of the first year following the latest accident year to be reported, developed to an ultimate basis, and at two 12-month intervals thereafter, each developed to an ultimate basis, so that a total of three evaluations will be provided for each accident year." Section 627.215 contains definitions that are critical to understanding the method for determining excess profits. Those definitions are as follows: "Underwriting gain or loss" is computed as follows: "the sum of the accident-year incurred losses and loss adjustment expenses as of December 31 of the year, developed to an ultimate basis, plus the administrative and selling expenses incurred in the calendar year, plus policyholder dividends applicable to the calendar year, shall be subtracted from the calendar-year earned premium." § 627.215(4). While the sum of the accident-year losses and loss adjustment expenses are required by the statute to be developed to an ultimate basis, the administrative and selling expenses are not. "Anticipated underwriting profit" means "the sum of the dollar amounts obtained by multiplying, for each rate filing of the insurer group in effect during such period, the earned premium applicable to such rate filing during such period by the percentage factor included in such rate filing for profit and contingencies, such percentage factor having been determined with due recognition to investment income from funds generated by Florida business, except that the anticipated underwriting profit . . . shall be calculated using a profit and contingencies factor that is not less than zero." § 627.215(8). Section 627.215 requires that the underwriting gain or loss be compared to the anticipated underwriting profit, which, as previously stated, is tied to the applicable rate filing for the insurer. Rate filings represent a forecast of expected results, while the excess profits filing is based on actual expenses for the same timeframe. The actual calculation for determining whether an insurer has reaped excess profits is included in section 627.215(7)(a): Beginning with the July 1, 1991, report for workers' compensation insurance, employer's liability insurance, and commercial casualty insurance, an excessive profit has been realized if the net aggregate underwriting gain for all these lines combined is greater than the net aggregate anticipated underwriting profit for these lines plus 5 percent of earned premiums for the 3 most recent calendar years for which data is filed under this section. . . Should the Office determine, using this calculation, that an excess profit has been realized, the Office is required to order a return of those excess profits after affording the insurer group an opportunity for hearing pursuant to chapter 120. OIR B1-15 (Form F) is a form that the Office has adopted in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-189.007, which was promulgated pursuant to the authority in section 627.215. The information submitted by an insurer group on Form F is used by the Office to calculate the amount of excessive profits, if any, that a company has realized for the three calendar-accident years reported. The terms "loss adjustment expenses," and "administrative and selling expenses," are not defined by statute. Nor are they defined in rule 69O-189.007 or the instructions for Form F. Form F's first page includes section four, under which calendar-year administrative and selling expenses are listed. Section four has five subparts: A) commissions and brokerage expenses; B) other acquisition, field supervision, and collection expense; C) general expenses incurred; D) taxes, licenses, and fees incurred; and E) other expenses not included above. No guidance is provided in section 627.215, in rule 60O-189.007, or in the instructions for Form F, to identify what expenses may properly be included in the Form F filing. There is no indication in any of these three sources, or in any other document identified by the Office, that identifies whether federal income taxes are to be included or excluded from expenses to be reported in a Form F filing. While the form clearly references taxes, licenses, and fees incurred under section 4(D), the instructions do not delineate what types of taxes, licenses, and fees should be included. The instructions simply state: "for each of the expenses in item 4, please provide an explanation of the methodology used in deriving the expenses, including supporting data." On or about June 30, 2009, Premier filed its original Form F Filing with the Office pursuant to section 627.215 and rule 69O-189.007. Rule 69O-189.007 requires that a Form F be filed each year on or before July 1. On March 19, 2010, the Office issued a Notice of Intent, directing Premier to return $7,673,945.00 in "excessive profits" pursuant to section 627.215. Premier filed a petition challenging the Office's determination with respect to the amount to be refunded, based in part on its position that federal income tax expense is appropriately included as an expense for calculation of excess profits. The parties attempted to resolve their differences over the next year or so. As part of their exchange of information, Premier subsequently filed three amendments to its Form F filing on December 11, 2009; on June 21, 2010; and on January 13, 2012. In each of its amended filings, Premier included the federal income tax expense attributable to underwriting profit it earned during the 2005-2007 period. These expenses were included under section 4(E). As reflected in the Preliminary Statement, Premier filed a challenge to the Office's policy of not allowing federal income taxes to be used as an expense for excess profits filings as an unadopted rule. On July 5, 2012, a Final Order was issued in Case No. 12-1201, finding that the Office's Policy regarding the inability to deduct federal income taxes as an expense for excess profits filings met the definition of a rule and had not been adopted as a rule, in violation of section 120.54(a). The Final Order in Case No. 12-1201 directed the Office to discontinue immediately all reliance upon the statement or any substantially similar statement as a basis for agency action. At this point, the parties have resolved their differences with respect to all of the calculations related to the determination of excess profits, with one exception. The sole issue remaining is the amount, if any, that should be deducted as an administrative expense for payment of federal income tax. The parties have also stipulated that, before any adjustment to federal income tax is made, Premier's underwriting profit for 2005 was $2,923,157 and for 2006 was $2,119,115. For 2008, Premier suffered an underwriting loss of $785,170. Premier's federal income tax rate for all three years was 35%. The maximum amount of underwriting profit that a company can retain is the net aggregate anticipated profit, plus five percent of earned premiums for the calendar years reported on workers' compensation business. For the 2005-2007 reporting years, Premier's maximum underwriting profit is stipulated to be $1,189,892. Anything over this amount is considered excessive profits which must be returned to policyholders. The parties also agree that, prior to any deduction for federal income tax paid by Premier, the amount of excess profit earned by Petitioner and subject to return to policyholders is $3,067,220. Premier has filed a fourth amended Form F, which incorporated all of the stipulations of the parties to date. The fourth amended Form F also includes an allocation of federal income tax expense based upon the statutory allocation methodology outlined in section 220.151, Florida Statutes (2009). Section 220.151 provides the statutory method for allocating federal income tax expenses for purpose of paying Florida corporate income taxes. This section directs that insurance companies shall allocate federal taxable income based on the ratio of direct written premium the insurance company has written in Florida for the relevant period, divided by the direct written premium anywhere. Premier paid its Florida corporate income tax based upon this statutory methodology. Consistent with the methodology in section 220.151, Premier allocated its federal taxable income to the State of Florida based upon the percentage of direct premium written on risks in Florida, and reduced the amount of its federal taxable income by the amount investment income reflected on its federal tax return. Premier then multiplied the Florida portion of its taxable income by its 35% federal tax rate, resulting in the federal income tax expense allocated to Florida. For the year 2005, Premier's federal taxable income according to its tax return is $7,614,512.89. After subtracting investment income listed on the tax return of $969,051.97, the taxable income attributable to premium is $6,645,460.92. For 2006, Premier's federal taxable income according to its tax return is $6,577,534.06. After subtracting investment income of $2,011,614.86, the taxable income attributable to premium is $4,565,919.20. For 2007, Premier's federal taxable income according to its tax return was $4,359,742.88. After subtracting investment income of $2,266,291.99, the taxable income attributable to premium is $2,093,450.89. For the three years combined, the federal taxable income was $18,551,789.83. The amount of investment income subtracted was $5,246,958.82, leaving a balance of taxable income attributable to premium as $13,304,831.01. For the years 2005 through 2007, Premier paid $2,665,079.51; $2,302,136.92; and $1,525,910.01 respectively, in federal income tax. During those same years, Premier wrote 58.8388%; 51.2514%; and 29.8536%, respectively, of its direct premium in Florida. Allocating a portion of Premier's federal tax income and income tax liability to Florida, consistent with section 220.151, results in a calculation of Florida's portion of taxable underwriting income. For 2005, this amount is $3,910,109.46; for 2006, $2,340,097.51; and for 2007, $624,970.45. The total amount of federal taxable income allocated to Florida for the three-year period of $6,875,177.42. The taxable income is then multiplied by the applicable tax rate of 35%, which results in a federal income tax expense allocated to Florida of $1,368,538.46 for 2005; $819,034.13 for 2006; and $218,739.45 for 2007, totaling $2,406,312.10 for the three-year period at issue. The undersigned notes that Premier only writes workers' compensation insurance. It does not write other lines of insurance, which makes the allocation of earned premium much simpler than it would be for a company writing multiple lines of insurance. Under the methodology described above, Premier determined that $2,406,312.10 is the appropriate amount of federal income tax expense to be deducted for calendar years 2005-2007, resulting in an excess profit pursuant to section 627.215, of $660,907. Mr. Hester, a certified public accountant and president of Premier, testified that this methodology was used by Premier in determining its Florida corporate income tax liability. The methodology described above uses the amounts that Premier actually paid in taxes, and therefore reflects the actual expense experienced by Premier. It is accepted as a reasonable method. According to Mr. Watford, the Office does not determine the methodology that must be used in allocating expenses. The insurance company provides the methodology and the data to support it, and then the Office determines whether, in a given case, the methodology is appropriate. Premier points out that the Office has provided no guidance on how to allocate federal income tax expense for excess profits reporting. That no guidance has been offered is understandable, inasmuch as the Office holds firmly to the belief that no allowance for federal income tax expense should be made. Nonetheless, the Office reviewed the method provided by Premier and did not find it to be reasonable. Premier included in its Form F filing for the years 2005-2007 a deduction for the portion of Florida corporate income tax expense not related to investment income. The Office accepted the Florida corporate income tax deduction, which is calculated using the same allocation method Premier used to allocate federal income tax expense. Indeed, the Office acknowledged at hearing that it has permitted the methodology of direct written premium in Florida divided by direct written premium written everywhere for the determination of other expenses for excess profits filings, and has only rejected the methodology on one occasion. However, it has not accepted this same methodology for determining the appropriate amount of federal income tax expense and does not believe it to be a reasonable methodology. The rationale for this distinction is that, in Mr. Watford's view, federal income tax is "a totally different type of expense." Mr. Watford did not consult an accountant or certified public accountant in making the determination that the methodology used was impermissible. Mr. Watford opined that in order to determine that a proposed methodology is reasonable, the insurance company would need to have an adjustment in the profit factor, i.e., submit a new rate filing for the years in question; have a projected tax expense that did not exceed the expense he calculated, based on the effect on future tax expenses caused by the return of excess profits; and submit a methodology that was "appropriate for the insurance company." This approach is rejected. First, the rate filing is supposed to be a forecast, and the Office cited to no authority for adjusting the forecast in light of actual events. Further, Mr. Watford admitted that in this instance, the profit and contingencies factor is already at zero for the years at issue, and section 627.125 provides that no factor less than zero can be used to determine excess profits. Second, the excess profits statute specifies that the deduction for administrative and selling expenses is for those expenses incurred in Florida or allocated to Florida for the current year. Unlike incurred losses and loss adjustment expenses, administrative and selling expenses are not developed to an ultimate basis, which appears to be what the Office is attempting to require. Administrative expenses are incurred by calendar year.1/ Other than the net cost of re-insurance, the Office has not permitted any expense that is to be valued at a date that is later than the end of the calendar year(s) at issue in the excess profits filing. The future effect of these expenses would be considered in the year that effect is realized. Third, allowing whatever is "appropriate for the insurance company" is simply too nebulous a standard, to the extent it is a standard at all, to apply.2/ As noted by Mr. Hester, federal income tax liabilities are governed by the Internal Revenue Code and its attendant regulations, and not tied specifically to underwriting gain or loss.3/ Similarly, Florida corporate income tax liabilities are governed by Florida's taxing statutes. The fact that their calculation is not governed by the Florida Insurance Code does not change the fact that they are administrative expenses borne by the insurance company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Office enter a Final Order finding that $2,406,312.10 may be deducted for federal income tax expense incurred or allocated to Florida for purposes of section 627.215, and that Premier must return $660,907.90 in excessive profits to its policyholders. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 2012.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner, Christopher B. Scott, as the managing member of PNC, LLC (PNC), is personally liable for a penalty equal to twice the total amount of the sales and use tax owed by PNC to the State of Florida.1/
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with administering and enforcing the laws related to the imposition and collection of sales and use taxes. PNC is a now-dissolved Florida limited liability company that did business under the name "CHEAP" at 309 South Howard Avenue, Tampa, Florida. PNC was registered as a business and filed its Articles of Organization with the Secretary of State on June 16, 2010. Until the company was dissolved by the Secretary of State in 2018 for failure to pay the 2017 annual filing fees, Mr. Scott served as its managing member and had administrative control over the collection and payment of taxes. Verna Bartlett was PNC's controller. PNC was registered with the Department as a dealer pursuant to section 212.18, Florida Statutes, and was issued Sales and Use Tax Certificate of Registration 39-8015401140-8. A certificate of registration requires the taxpayer to file sales and use tax returns and pay to the Department all taxes owed as they are received. After making numerous attempts to collect delinquent sales tax owed by PNC for tax reporting periods in 2013 and 2014, the Department filed this action seeking to impose a personal penalty assessment against Mr. Scott, the managing member of the company. Section 213.29, Florida Statutes, provides that any person who has administrative control over the collection and payment of taxes and who willfully fails to pay the tax or evades the payment of the tax shall be liable to a penalty equal to twice the amount of tax not paid. The penalty is based only on the taxes owed, and not the interest and fees that have accrued. The statute provides that if the business liability is fully paid, the personal liability assessment will be considered satisfied. On January 18, 2018, the Department issued a NAPL against Mr. Scott after PNC failed to pay the sales and use taxes owed the State for the reporting periods from February 2013 through October 2014. The outstanding taxes, exclusive of interest or penalties, total $79,325.75. The NAPL imposes a total penalty of $158,647.50, or twice the amount of sales tax owed by PNC. No payments have been made on the account since the issuance of the NAPL, and, PNC, now closed, currently has a total liability in excess of $200,000.00. During the relevant time period, Mr. Scott was personally responsible for collecting PNC's sales tax and remitting it to the Department; he had the authority to sign checks on behalf of PNC; he made financial decisions as to which creditors should be paid; he made the decision to use the sales tax collected for the business and for stipulation payments; and he made the decision not to remit the sales tax that was collected. This was confirmed by PNC's controller, Ms. Bartlett, who responded to the Department's Requests for Admissions. Mr. Scott also confirmed to a Department tax specialist that the admissions provided by Ms. Bartlett were accurate. Mr. Scott either never remitted payment or did not remit payment timely on behalf of PNC for the following reporting periods: February, April, and December 2013, and January through October 2014. Tax warrants were issued and judgment liens were recorded for the following reporting periods: February, April, and December 2013, and January, February, and April through October 2014. Resp. Ex. 5 and 6. All warrants and liens relate to reporting periods that fall within the personal liability assessment period. A Notice of Jeopardy Finding and Notice of Final Assessment (Notice of Jeopardy) dated June 18, 2014, was issued to PNC pertaining to the April 2014 reporting period. Resp. Ex. This notice was issued after Mr. Scott ceased making regular tax payments, the estimated deficiency was substantial, and the Department determined that collection of the tax would be jeopardized by further delay. A Notice of Jeopardy and Notice of Final Assessment dated August 7, 2014, also was issued to PNC pertaining to the April, May, and June 2014 reporting periods. Resp. Ex. 12. Because PNC reported more than $20,000.00 in sales tax each year, unless a waiver was obtained, Mr. Scott was required to file and pay PNC's sales tax electronically for all reporting periods within the personal liability period. See § 213.755(1), Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin. Code R. 12-24.003. Despite having obtained no waiver, Mr. Scott never filed returns or paid PNC's sales tax electronically. And even though he never remitted a payment electronically, Mr. Scott indicated on at least six sales tax returns during the relevant time period that sales tax for the reporting period was remitted electronically. The only conclusion to draw from this action is that Mr. Scott filed or directed the filing of these returns knowing them to be false. The record shows that, dating back to 2011, Mr. Scott has a long-standing history of failing to abide by the tax laws of the state as it relates to PNC. For example, on September 15, 2011, Mr. Scott was referred for criminal investigation by the state attorney for his failure to pay taxes. Also, numerous returns were filed without a payment. This is prima facie evidence of conversion of the money due. § 212.14(3), Fla. Stat. Respondent's Exhibit 1 summarizes numerous contacts by the Department's Tampa District Office with Mr. Scott regarding collection notices, telephone calls, emails, assessment letters, warrant letters, and the like in an effort to secure compliance with tax laws. It is fair to find that Mr. Scott willfully attempted to evade or avoid paying sales and reemployment taxes during the relevant period. To prevent its Sales and Use Tax Certificate of Registration from being revoked, PNC entered into a compliance agreement on July 10, 2013, to pay past due sales tax and reemployment tax totaling $65,789.25. The agreement required PNC to: (a) accurately complete all past due tax returns and reports no later than July 10, 2013; (b) remit all past due payments in accordance with the attached schedule, which required 11 monthly payments of $4,000.00 beginning on August 10, 2013, and a final balloon payment on July 10, 2014; (c) accurately complete and file all required tax returns and reports for the next 12 months; and (d) timely remit all taxes due for the next 12 months. A $15,000.00 down payment also was required to be paid on or before July 10, 2013. An addendum to the agreement (added by Mr. Scott) provided that "[a]ll payments, including the $15,000.00 down payment, shall first be applied to Sales and Use Tax." Although the down payment was made timely, the agreement was breached the first month (August) because Mr. Scott did not make the payment electronically. However, the agreement was not voided by the Department until October 12, 2013. Therefore, any payments made on or after October 12, 2013, were not considered compliance payments and are not subject to the addendum in the agreement. A somewhat confusing aspect of this dispute concerns Mr. Scott's contention, by way of cross-examination, that contrary to the addendum, the Department incorrectly applied his $15,000.00 down payment and subsequent compliance payments to the reemployment tax account, rather than the sales tax account, and that his sales tax liability should be reduced by that amount. As noted above, the addendum governs only the payments that predate October 12, 2013, which are the down payment ($15,000.00) and the August and September payments -- $4,000.00 each month. This issue was not raised by Mr. Scott until the Department issued a NAPL on April 13, 2017. The NAPL issued on April 13, 2017, indicated that the outstanding tax owed by PNC through October 31, 2014, was $90,808.17, and the personal assessment was twice that amount. In response to Mr. Scott's request, the Department acknowledged that it incorrectly applied the down payment to the reemployment account. Also, it took a second look at the two payments made in August and September, which predate the voiding of the agreement. The August installment payment consisted of two separate checks: $3,390.00 for sales tax and $610.00 for reemployment tax, and these amounts were applied in that manner. The September payment, $4,000.00, submitted in one check, was applied in the same manner as the August payment, with $610.00 going to the reemployment tax and the remainder to sales tax. Therefore, only $1,220.00 was incorrectly applied to the reemployment tax during those two months. On July 3, 2017, the Department reapplied a total of $16,551.00 from the reemployment tax account to the sales tax account for the relevant reporting periods. Mr. Scott contends the reapplication of the $16,551.00 to sales tax should reduce the amount of sales tax due by that amount. However, section 213.75(2) dictates that if a lien or warrant has been filed against the taxpayer, as is true here, the payment shall be applied in a priority order spelled out in the statute. Thus, the Department applied that amount in the following order: against the costs to record the liens against PNC; against the administration collection processing fee, if any; against any accrued interest; against any accrued penalty; and against any tax due. Under this priority order, the penalty/interest/fees categories totaled $5,066.58, while the tax liability category totaled $11,484.42. A detailed breakdown of this allocation is found in Respondent's Exhibit 29. Therefore, the total tax liability on the 2017 NAPL ($90,808.17) is reduced by $11,484.42, resulting in a total tax liability of $79,323.75, as shown on the updated 2018 NAPL. In the same vein, in his PRO, Mr. Scott argues that he was not given credit for payments of $9,110.24, $2,688.53, $178.28, and $1,321.80, which reduce his sales tax liability to $66,024.90 and the personal assessment to $132,049.80. See Pet'r Ex. 10. However, all of these payments (some of which are bank levies) were made after the compliance agreement was voided and do not apply to the reporting periods in this case. By way of cross-examination, Mr. Scott also contends that he was never given an accounting of what PNC owes despite "multiple requests" for the same. The record shows otherwise. On April 13, 2017, the 2017 NAPL was mailed to Mr. Scott, along with a ZT09, a computer-generated form which lists, in detail, a taxpayer's outstanding taxes owed by reporting period. A second copy of a ZT09 was faxed to him the following day. In his May 3, 2017, letter protesting the 2017 NAPL, Mr. Scott alleges that payments were not applied properly. In response, the Department sent a fax to Mr. Scott on May 10, 2017, listing checks that were not honored by the bank and requesting information concerning which payments PNC contends were not applied properly. In his response on May 12, 2017, Mr. Scott did not provide the requested information. On January 17, 2018, the 2018 NAPL was mailed to Mr. Scott, along with a ZT09. Finally, on April 12, 2018, per Ms. Bartlett's request, the Department mailed a ZT09 with the outstanding amounts due. Finally, in its PRO, the Department points out that after the hearing ended, it discovered that it made an error, in Mr. Scott's favor, in calculating his sales tax liability for the relevant reporting periods. Had it correctly calculated the amount of payments made by PNC, the sales tax liability for the relevant period would be increased from $79,323.75 to $84,444.35, which in turn would increase the personal assessment. However, the Department consents to the lower tax and assessed penalty amount, as reflected on the 2018 NAPL.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order determining that Petitioner, Christopher B. Scott, is liable to the Department for a penalty of $158,647.50. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 2019.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Carl R. Glass, d/b/a Osceola Forge located at 2749 North Orange Blossom Trail, Kissimmee, Florida 34744. Petitioner is engaged in the business of manufacturing and fabricating burglar bars, steel gates, decorative plastic ornamental castings and injection moldings. Petitioner built and erected one double sided billboard on his business property at 2749 North Orange Blossom Trail, Kissimmee, Florida. It is anchored by its owns supports into the ground as a permanent improvement to Petitioner's real property. The size of the billboard is approximately 12' x 38', plus an apron that runs along the length of the bottom of the billboard. Petitioner leases the face and apron of each side of billboard to customers who are generally required to supply their own labor and material to create an advertising message. The billboard was built to provide double-sided advertising for lanes of traffic going northbound or southbound past Petitioner's place of business. Petitioner has rented the billboard to various lessees for a monthly rental fee over the relevant period. Petitioner did not charge or collect sales and use taxes on the rental fee. Respondent conducted an audit of Petitioner's entire business, for the period May 1, 1986 through April 30, 1991. There was only one item assessed as a result of the audit which was on the lease of the billboard located on Petitioner's business property. Petitioner was assessed sales and use taxes, interest and penalties totalling $6,142.38, including taxes ($4,017.76) with a per diem interest rate of $1.32 to be computed from 10/3/91 to the present. Additional interest due, as of July 1, 1993, was calculated to equal $842.16 (638 days x $1.32). The sales tax assessment was based on invoices and other information provided by the Petitioner and followed the Department of Revenue routine procedures required for all audits. From January 1987 through February 1991, Petitioner, or his secretary, made five telephone calls from Osceola Forge to the Taxpayer Assistance Number of the Department of Revenue's regional office located in Maitland, Florida, requesting assistance. On each occasion, the Department's employee advised Petitioner or his employee that they could call the Department's Tallahassee 800 taxpayer assistance number. On at least one occasion, Petitioner's secretary or Petitioner was advised that the transaction was tax exempt, and need not be collected. Petitioner was aware of the 800 taxpayer assistance number in Tallahassee and tried to call the number. However, he was unable to get through, and called the local office only. On April 9, 1992, Petitioner personally telephoned the Titusville office of the Department of Revenue. On each occasion, Petitioner inquired whether or not sales or use taxes should be collected on the rental of the billboard. A free, updated Sales and Use Tax Rules Book is available to any tax payer upon request. In addition, a taxpayer could personally appear and bring documentation relating to any questions relating to the sales and use tax at any regional office. Petitioner did not obtain an updated rules book or personally appear at a regional office. On April 30, 1992, Petitioner filed a Protest Letter with Respondent challenging the abovementioned tax assessment. Respondent issued to Petitioner a Notice of Decision dated December 1, 1992. On January 8, 1993, Petitioner filed a Request for a Formal Administrative Hearing with Respondent. To date, Petitioner has not paid any of the contested taxes, interest, and penalties to Respondent. Petitioner relied on information provided by his secretary, his accountant, and brief phone conferences with the DOR's Maitland office to determine that the rental fees were tax exempt, and did not collect the sales tax from his customers. The DOR Audit Supervisor testified that there is a clear distinction between the taxable rental of a billboard and the nontaxable services of placing an advertising message on the billboard. The rental of the face of the billboard is a taxable transaction. On the other hand, if a person rents or leases a billboard, then hires a third party to place an advertising message on the billboard, this advertising service is tax exempt.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order upholding its sales and use tax assessment, waive penalties and interest accrued prior to October 2, 1991, and assess a tax of $4,017.76, plus interst from the date due. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 1993. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner. Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent are accepted except as noted below. Those proposed findings neither noted below nor included in the Hearing Officer's findings were deemed unnecessary to the conclusions reached. Rejected as argument: paragraphs 37, 38, 39 COPIES FURNISHED: Carl R. Glass 2749 North Orange Blossom Trail Kissimmee, Florida 34741 James McAuley, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact On January 22, 1986, American Aviation Resources, Inc., sold an airplane to Munur Yurtsever, a resident of Brazil. This aircraft was a Hansa jet model HFB-320 with U.S. registration number N71DL (the subject aircraft). On January 28, 1986, Mr. Yurtsever transferred title of the subject aircraft to Petitioner, Selcuk Yetimoglu. At the time of the transfer, the subject aircraft was in the State of Florida undergoing repairs. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Mr. Yetimoglu resided at 20530 Jacaranda Road, Cutler Ridge, Miami, Florida, in a residence owned by Mr. Yurtsever. The aircraft bill of sale dated January 28, 1986, reflects that Mr. Yetimoglu was the purchaser of the subject aircraft and that Mr. Yurtsever was the seller. The bill of sale recited that the consideration paid was $20.00 and other good and valuable consideration. While the bill of sale reflects that Mr. Yetimoglu resided in Miami, Florida, the bill of sale does not state that the sale occurred in the State of Florida. On January 29, 1986, Mr. Yetimoglu applied to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for the registration of the subject aircraft in his name. On March 13, 1986, Mr. Yetimoglu wrote to the FAA regarding the registration and stated, in pertinent part, as follows: Mr. Munur Yurtsever sold the aircraft to me on January 28, 1986, five days after he bought the aircraft from American Aviation Resources, Inc. when he found out that the government of Brazil did not give him a (sic) permission to import the aircraft and that he could not register the aircraft in the United States because he was not a citizen of the United States. By letter dated May 15, 1986, Mr. Yetimoglu provided the FAA proof that the subject aircraft had not been registered in Brazil. Mr. Yetimoglu was the record owner of the subject aircraft between January 28, 1986, and March 13, 1987. On March 13, 1987, Mr. Yetimoglu sold the subject aircraft back to Mr. Yurtsever. The bill of sale identifies the purchaser as being: Munur Yurtsever Rico Taxi Aereo Ltda. Av. Mal. Camara 160-GR. Rio de Janeiro - RJ Brazil On April 8, 1987, Mr. Yetimoglu wrote the FAA and stated, in pertinent part: ... I request cancelation of U.S. registra- tion for the aircraft ... because I sold the aircraft back to Rico Taxi Aereo Ltda. ... On January 11, 1988, Respondent issued to Petitioner a "Notice of Delinquent Tax Penalty and Interest Due and Assessed" (Notice of Assessment) based on the transaction involving Mr. Yetimoglu, Mr. Yurtsever, and the subject aircraft. The Notice of Assessment contained the following statement: "This Department has information that you purchased the following aircraft. However, there is no evidence of payment of Florida Sales and/or Use Tax". The Notice of Assessment reflected that Respondent had, pursuant to Section 212.12(5)(b), Florida Statutes, estimated the value of the aircraft as being $320,000 and assessed the following taxes, interest, and penalties: Florida State Sales/Use Tax 5% $16,000.00 (Estimated) Per 212.06(8), F.S. Penalty 5% per month; Maximum 25% of 4,000.00 (25%) Tax Due Per Section 212.12(2), F.S. Additional Penalty 11,840.00 (50%) Per 212.12(2)(a), F.S. Interest = 1% per month from date of 3,680.00 (23%) Purchase To Date of Payment Per Section 212.12(3), F.S. Less Tax Paid ----------------- TOTAL DUE WITH THIS NOTICE $35,520.00 Respondent requested that Mr. Yetimoglu provide it information and documentation as to the value of the aircraft. Mr. Yetimoglu contends that he paid Mr. Yurtsever nothing for the aircraft, that the title was transferred to him and registered in the FAA in his name so that the aircraft could be test flown after it was repaired, and that Mr. Yurtsever had paid $100,000 for the aircraft. There was no evidence as to the sales price that Mr. Yetimoglu paid for the aircraft other than Mr. Yetimoglu's testimony. Respondent estimated that the reasonable value of the subject aircraft on January 28, 1986, was $320,000. This estimate was based on an appraisal prepared for Respondent and assumed that the aircraft was in a scrapped or junked condition. Respondent generally uses a standard reference work on the value of aircraft to assist it in estimating the value of the subject aircraft. Because of its age and model, the subject aircraft is no longer listed in this standard reference. In support of his contention that Mr. Yurtsever paid $100,000 for the aircraft, Mr. Yetimoglu provided Respondent with a copy of a wire transfer of funds from Mr. Yurtsever to American Aviation Resources, Inc. in the amount of $100,000. However, there was no documentation provided that established that the $100,000 constituted the entire purchase price paid by Mr. Yurtsever. The dispute between the parties as to the value of the aircraft is resolved by finding, based on the greater weight of the evidence, that the reasonable value of the aircraft at the times pertinent to this proceeding was $320,000.00. In December 1986, while Mr. Yetimoglu was the record owner, the subject aircraft engaged in international flight between the Turks and Caicos Islands and the State of Florida. Respondent's Notice of Redetermination, dated February 26, 1990, upheld the Notice of Assessment on the basis that the underlying transaction was subject to use tax pursuant to Section 212.06(8), Florida Statutes. The issue to be resolved was framed by the Notice of Redetermination as being: "The only issue involved pertains to a use tax assessment upon an aircraft brought into this country". This determination was based, in part, upon a letter to Respondent from an attorney who was representing Mr. Yetimoglu at the time the letter was written. 1/ The letter implied that the aircraft was brought into Florida after the title was transferred to Mr. Yetimoglu, and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The transferor of the aircraft, Munur Yurtsever, is a nonresident alien. His inten- tion is to deliver the plane to a purchaser outside the country. Mr. Yurtsever advises that the F.A.A. will not allow the plane to be flown in this country unless it is owned by a U.S. resident. As it was imperative to fly the plane here in order to prepare it for its flight outside the country, Mr. Yurtsever transferred the plane to his partner, Selcuk Yetimoglu, who is a resident of the United States. ... At the formal hearing, Mr. Yetimoglu established that the aircraft was in Florida undergoing repairs at the time the title was transferred to him. Prior to and at the formal hearing, Respondent asserted the position that use taxes, interest, and penalties were due for this transaction. In its post- hearing submittal, Respondent, for the first time in this proceeding, contends that sales taxes, interest and penalties are due for this transaction.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered which withdraws the subject assessment. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 11th day of March, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1991.
Findings Of Fact Modern Tool and Die, (MTD), is a privately held corporation engaged in manufacturing equipment. In 1965 they started the manufacture of bumper guards which required electroplating. They entered into agreements with MPC pursuant to which MTD erected two buildings adjacent to their plant which they leased to MPC in which to do the electroplating of the bumper guards. MPC is also a privately held corporation and there is no common ownership of these two companies. The two buildings built for MPC's occupancy were partitioned, compartmented and wired as desired by MPC and at its expense. Florida Power Corporation supplied electricity to the complex through the main transformer of MTD. In 1965 and to a lesser extent now, electricity rates per kilowatt-hour (kwh) were lowered with increased usage of electricity. Since both MTD and MPC are large users of electricity they obtain a cheaper rate if all electricity used is billed from the master meter serving MTD. Accordingly, and at the recommendation of the power company, additional transformers and meters were placed at the two buildings occupied by MPC and read monthly at or about the same time the master meter is read by the power company. The kw used at the two buildings is forwarded by MPC to MTD each month. The latter, upon receipt of the power company bill, computes the cost of the power per kwh and in turn bills MPC for its portion of the bill based upon the usage forwarded by MPC to MTD. Upon the commencement of this working agreement between these two companies in 1965 MPC, pursuant to an oral lease, has paid rent to MTD monthly at the rate of approximately $2,400 per month. It has also paid to MTD its pro rata cost for the electricity used each month. The rent is invoiced each month on the first of the month as in Exhibit 3 and paid by the 10th by MPC. Sales tax is added to the rent and remitted to DOR. Electricity usage is also invoiced by MTD to MPC on or about the 20th of the month and paid by MPC on or about the first of the following month. (Exhibit 4). Sales tax on the electricity used is paid by MTD to Florida Power Company who presumably remits this to DOR. During the 15 years these two companies have shared the cost of electric power they have been audited numerous times; the arrangement was made known to the auditors; and no auditor, prior to the present, suggested that the cost of electricity was part of the rent paid by MPC upon which sales tax was due. Notice of Proposed Assessment (Exhibit 1) in the amount of $9,747.34 is based upon the cost of electricity billed to MPC during the period of the audit December 1, 1976 through November 30, 1979 multiplied by 4 percent sales tax plus penalties and interest. The parties stipulated to the accuracy of this amount. They differ only as to whether the tax is owed.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is liable for certain taxes and, if so, how much.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in Manatee County, Florida. Petitioner is in the printing business. Specifically, Petitioner produces, manufactures, assembles, and publishes telephone directories for mobile home parks in Florida. All of Petitioner's work in connection with these directories takes place in Florida. The directories list the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of residents of the mobile home park for which the directory is prepared. The directories also contain advertisements, which Petitioner solicits from merchants seeking to sell goods or services to the mobile home park residents. Following the production of the directories, Petitioner distributes them to the mobile home park residents, who maintain possession of the directories. However, Petitioner retains ownership of each directory, even after it is distributed. Petitioner is solely responsible for the manufacture and distribution of the directories. Petitioner owns accounts receivable reflecting monies owned it by entities for which Petitioner has performed work. Petitioner owns treasury stock. Following an audit, Respondent issued its Intent to Make Sales and Use Tax Audit Changes. The proposed changes assessed additional sales and use taxes of $44,151.77, intangible tax of $1297.08, and $194,75 of health care tax. The bases of proposed liability for the sales and use tax were for the publication and distribution of directories for which no sales or use tax had been collected and for the sale of advertising during the period of the service tax from July 1, 1986, through December 31, 1986, for which no sales tax on advertising had been collected. The basis of proposed liability for the intangible tax was for the failure to pay intangible tax on accounts receivable and treasury stock. The basis of proposed liability for the health care tax was for the failure to pay the Hillsborough County Health Care Tax and Discretionary Sales Surtax. On February 11, 1991, Petitioner protested the proposed assessments. On April 24, 1992, Respondent issued its Notice of Decision sustaining the proposed sales and use tax and intangible tax, but eliminating the proposed health care tax. On May 12, 1992, Petitioner filed a Petition for Reconsideration concerning the proposed sales and use tax. On November 24, 1992, Respondent issued its Notice of Reconsideration sustaining the proposed sales and use tax. On January 21, 1993, Petitioner timely filed its petition for a formal administration hearing. Subject to the accuracy of its legal position, Respondent's assessment is factually accurate. Petitioner will pay the assessed amount of sales and use tax, plus interest, if its position is not sustained following the conclusion of this proceeding, including judicial review.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered determining that, for each assessed period, Petitioner is liable for the assessed corporate intangible tax plus interest, the use tax on the cost price of the materials and other covered items plus interest, the sales tax on services on the advertising revenues, but not for any sales tax apart from the period covered by the sales tax on services. ENTERED on January 25, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on January 25, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: David M. Carr David Michael Carr, P.A. 600 East Madison Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Eric J. Taylor Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact Petitioner purchased a used car in Florida in May of 1983 and paid 5 percent sales tax. Petitioner did not title said car in the State of Florida. When Petitioner returned to Maryland, his state of residence, Maryland imposed a 5 percent tax on said car when Petitioner titled said car. Petitioner applied for a sales tax refund to the Department of Revenue in the amount of $225.00. Respondent issued a Notice of Intent to deny said refund application on December 1, 1983. From the exhibits to which the parties stipulated, additional facts are found by the Hearing Officer. A bill of sale indicates that Petitioner purchased a 1979 Buick Regal from Eddy Auto Sales on May 14, 1983. A temporary registration and receipt issued by the State of Maryland on June 17, 1983, shows that Petitioner paid a "title tax" of $222.50 to the State of Maryland. By letter dated January 27, 1984, Agnes Stoicos of the Maryland Department of Transportation indicates that the Maryland tax is a 5 percent excise tax upon the issuance of all original and subsequent certificates of title, and the tax is used primarily for the construction and the maintenance of the Maryland highway system.
The Issue The issue herein is whether the Department of Revenue's sales tax assessment against West Broward Chamber of Commerce as a result of the purchase of promotional books by the Chamber from Creative Public Relations and Marketing, Inc., is valid.
Findings Of Fact The West Broward Chamber of Commerce (Petitioner) entered into an oral contract with Mr. Randy Avon, a representative of Creative Public Relations, to purchase a promotional booklet pertaining to the West Broward area for distribution to the public. (Petitioner's Exhibit #1). Creative Public Relations in turn contracted with International Graphics to print the booklet. Mr. Bernard Fox, the Department of Revenue's (Respondent Area Manager in the Fort Lauderdale office and Mr. James W. Darrow, who worked with International Graphics during the time the transaction in question took place, testified and established that Mr. Randy Avon secured a sales tax number for the purchase of the promotional books in issue and presented the sales tax number to International Graphics. International Graphics sold the books to Mr. Avon for resale, without tax. The Department of Revenue issued an assessment against Petitioner for sales tax, penalty and interest due on the purchase of the books in question by Petitioner in the total amount of $1,307.56. Evidence reveals that said assessment was due as of December 20, 1978, and that since that time interest is accruing at a daily rate of $.31. This assessment was based on a total purchase price of $24,214.10, which, according to Mr. Fox and the statements contained in Respondent's Exhibit #1, was the price that Mrs. Gail Duffy, Petitioner's Executive Director informed the Respondent that the Chamber paid for the promotional booklets. Petitioner's treasurer, Helen Kerns, also testified that the total purchase price paid by Petitioner for the books was $22,104 and that part of the purchase price was paid directly to Creative Public Relations due to a dispute with an officer of the contracting entity, International Graphics. Mrs. Kerns testified that commissions were, however, paid by the Petitioner to Creative Public Relations, which commissions were not included in the purchase price as testified to by Mrs. Kerns. James W. Darrow, a witness who was allegedly privy to the agreement and understanding between the Petitioner and the seller, Creative Public Relations, testified that the oral contract price specifically included sales taxes on the transaction. Additionally, Mrs. Duffy testified that in her opinion, the sales taxes due on the purchase by Petitioner had been paid because she under stood that the total purchase price paid to Creative Public Relations by Petitioner included the sales tax. No sales invoices, receipt, or other tangible evidence of sales were offered into evidence at the hearing herein. Petitioner contends that the sales tax in question was included in the total purchase price. Based thereon, Petitioner contends that Creative Public Relations is now liable for the tax. Respondent, on the other hand, takes the position that the taxes from the sales transaction can be imposed on either the seller or the purchaser.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue's sales tax assessment against Petitioner be upheld. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of September 1979 in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: James T. Moore, Esquire 1265 Northwest 40th Avenue Lauderhill, Florida 33313 Cecil L. Davis, Jr., Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert A. White, Esquire 5460 North State Road #7, Suite 220 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33319
Findings Of Fact The facts in this case are largely undisputed. Petitioner is a joint venturer with two foreign corporations who subcontracted to perform the dredging portion of the contract to develop the port of Dammam in Saudi Arabia. The joint venture is called GLABVO and the joint venture agreement was admitted as Exhibit 1. The parties contributed capital and leased equipment to the joint venture while the latter paid for all supplies used by the parties in carrying out the subcontract. All of the equipment and materials purchased and which is the subject of the tax assessment here involved is personal property of a nature subject to sales and use tax, was ordered by Petitioner for GLABVO and shipped to Miami where it was loaded for shipment to Saudi Arabia. The property was purchased from both within and without the state. The nature of the operation, the urgency of the contract with respect to time of completion, and the lack of existing port facilities necessitated special shipping arrangements which involved a contract carrier in lieu of a common carrier. Accordingly the various dredges, workboats, barges and related equipment here loaded on a large barge which was towed from Ft. Lauderdale to Saudi Arabia. Lack of port facilities at Dammam necessitated the capability to unload being carried with the equipment so the larger elements transported wore floated onto the barge, and off the barge upon arrival, by sinking the barge. Most of the supplies were packaged for overseas shipment before being shipped to Miami where this material and equipment was marshalled at Petitioner's facility on Dodge Island at Miami, Florida. At this marshalling yard, which was the Florida shipping destination for materials purchased, the supplies were inventoried, repackaged, if necessary, for the barge shipment by placing in containers that could be floated off the barge and segregated into the three shipments that would be needed to move the equipment and supplies to Dammam. Petitioner used its tax registration number in purchasing the supplies on behalf of GLABVO and the vendors were relieved from collecting the sales tax. At the time the supplies were shipped to Petitioner there were no export declarations in connection with these items but much of the equipment was packaged for export and the shipping documents represented the material was shipped "for export". The contract carrier that had been engaged to provide the transportation had no facility that could be used as a marshalling yard and Petitioner did have such a facility. Due to the nature of the operation it was essential to assemble the supplies and equipment at a marshalling point for inventory and checking against the list of needed supplies before continuing the transportation to Saudi Arabia. Bills of lading and export declarations were made up where the material was placed on board the contract carrier's barge. On those items shipped from outside Florida Respondent assessed a use tax and on those items purchased in Florida Respondent assessed a sales tax. It is undisputed that all property on which the tax was assessed was purchased for use in Saudi Arabia and was shipped to Saudi Arabia; that the property had an initial Florida destination at Dodge Island, Florida; that the property was shipped from Florida to Saudi Arabia on bills of lading; and that export declarations were executed. For the purpose of this case no distinction exists with respect to the export nature of those shipments purchased from a supplier in Florida and those purchased from a source outside of Florida.