Findings Of Fact On October 15, 1985, Petitioner, Mercy Hospital, Inc. (Mercy), filed an application with Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Department) for a certificate of need (CON) to convert 29 medical/surgical beds into 29 long-term substance abuse beds. On February 27, 1986, the Department denied Mercy's application, and Mercy timely petitioned for formal administrative review. Mercy is a 538-bed acute care hospital located in Miami, Dade County, Florida. Due to a declining patient census, Mercy is, however, operating only 360 of its 530 licensed beds. Mercy currently offers services in medicine, surgery, psychiatry, obstetrics, gynecology, emergency medical services and outpatient services. Need The predicate for the Department's denial of Mercy's application was a perceived lack of need for long-term substance abuse beds in District XI (Dade and Monroe Counties), and the impact such lack of need would exert on the other statutory and rule criteria. Resolution of the need issue is dispositive of Mercy's application. There currently exists no numeric need methodology for determining the need for long-term substance abuse beds. The Department has, however, adopted Rule 10-5.11(27)(h)1, Florida Administrative Code, which establishes the following occupancy standard: No additional or new hospital inpatient substance abuse beds shall normally be approved in a Department service district unless the average occupancy rate for all existing hospital based substance abuse impatient beds is at or exceeds 80 percent for the preceding 12 month period. District XI has 190 approved long-term hospital impatient substance abuse beds; however, only 30 of those beds are currently licensed. The licensed beds are located in Monroe County at Florida Keys Memorial Hospital (Florida Keys), and are operating well below the 80 percent occupancy standard established by rule. 1/ The remaining beds are to be located in Dade County where Intervenor, Management Advisory and Research Center, Inc., d/b/a Glenbeigh Hospital (Glenbeigh) holds a CON for a 100-bed unit and Mount Sinai Medical Center (Mount Sinai) holds a CON for a 60-bed unit. Glenbeigh's facility is currently under construction, and Mount Sinai is seeking licensure. While not licensed, Mount Sinai has operated its 60-bed unit under its acute care license, and for the first three quarters of 1985 reported occupancy rates of 49.7 percent, 62 percent, and 48.9 percent. While the beds approved for District XI do not demonstrate an 80 percent occupancy rate, only one unit, Florida Keys, is licensed and operational. That unit is located in Key West, serves the middle and lower keys, and is not accessible to Dade County residents. The remaining units are not licensed, and their occupancy figures are not representative of a functional substance abuse unit. Accordingly, a failure to demonstrate compliance with the 80 percent occupancy standard is not necessarily dispositive of the question of need. There currently exists, however, no recognized methodology to calculate need for long-term substance abuse services. Accordingly, to demonstrate a need in 1990 for such services, Mercy relied on a numeric need methodology devised by its health planning expert, Daniel Sullivan 2/ (Petitioner's exhibit 4). Sullivan's methodology was not, however, persuasive. The First Step in Sullivan's Methodology The first step in Sullivan's methodology was to derive an estimate of the number of substance abusers in District XI who would seek treatment in an inpatient setting. The figure he calculated (a,170) was derived-through a four- stage refinement process. Initially, Sullivan estimated the number of problem drinkers within the district for the horizon year by applying the Marden methodology. That methodology, routinely relied upon by health planners, identifies the number of problem drinkers in a given population by multiplying a probability factor to age and sex groupings. By applying the Marden methodology to the age and sex demographics of District XI, Sullivan calculated that an estimated 148,541 problem drinkers would reside within the district in 1998. Sullivan then strove to estimate the number of problem drinkers who would seek treatment in some formal setting (network treatment). To establish that estimate, Sullivan relied on a report prepared for the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA) entitled "Current Practices in Alcoholism Treatment Needs Estimation: A State-of-the-Art Report". According to Sullivan, that report estimates the percentage of problem drinkers who will seek network treatment to be 20 percent. Therefore, he calculated that an estimated 29,788 problem drinkers in District XI would seek such treatment in 1990. Sullivan then strove to estimate the number of problem drinkers who would seek treatment in an inpatient setting. To establish that estimate, Sullivan relied on a survey conducted in 1982 by the NIAAA entitled National Drug and Alcoholism Treatment Utilization Survey". According to Sullivan, that survey indicated that approximately 78 percent of all problem drinkers who sought treatment did 50 on an outpatient basis. Therefore, using a factor of 22 percent, he calculated that an estimated 6,536 problem drinkers in District XI would seek such treatment in 1990. Sullivan's methodology, at stage two and three of his refinement process, was not persuasive. While Sullivan relied on the factors presented in the reports, there was no proof that health planning experts routinely relied on the reports. More importantly, there was no evidence of the type of survey conducted, the reliability of the percentage factors (i.e.: + 1 percent, 10 percent, 50 percent, etc.), or their statistical validity. In sum, Sullivan's conclusions are not credited. The final stage at step one of Sullivan's methodology, was to estimate the number of substance abusers (alcohol and drugs) who would seek treatment in an inpatient setting. To derive that estimate, Sullivan relied on a report prepared by the Department's Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Metal Health Office, contained in a draft of its 1987 state plan, which reported that 80 percent of substance abusers abuse alcohol and 20 percent abuse other drugs. Applying the assumption that 80 percent of substance abusers abuse alcohol, Sullivan estimated that 8,170 substance abusers in District XI would seek inpatient treatment in 1990. Sullivan's conclusion is again not persuasive. To credit Sullivan's methodology, one must assume that substance abusers (alcohol and drugs) seek treatments at the same rate as alcohol abusers. The record is devoid of such proof. Accordingly, for that reason and the reasons appearing in paragraph 12 supra, Sullivan's conclusions are not credited. The Second Step in Sullivan's Methodology. The second step in Sullivan's methodology was to estimate the number of hospital admissions, as opposed to other residential facility admissions, that would result from the need for substance abuse services. To quantify this number, Sullivan relied on one 1982 survey conducted by NIAAA. According to that survey, the distribution of inpatient substance abuse clients by treatment setting in 1982 was as follows: Facility Location Number Percent of Total Hospital 17,584 34.1 Quarterway House 1,410 2.7 Halfway Housed/ Recovery Home 14,648 28.4 Other Residential Facility 15,980 31.0 Correctional Facility 1,985 3.8 TOTAL 51,607 100.0 percent Therefore, using a factor of 34.1 percent, Sullivan estimated the number of substance abuse hospital admissions to be 2,784 for 1990. For the reasons set forth in paragraph 12 supra, Sullivan's conclusions are, again, not credited. The Third and Fourth Steps in Sullivan's Methodology. The third step in Sullivan's methodology was to estimate the number of substance abuse hospital admissions that would require long-term, as opposed to short-term, services. To derive this estimate, Sullivan calculated admissions to short-term beds by applying a 28-day length of stay and an 80 percent occupancy standard to the Department's short-term bed need methodology (.06 beds per 1,000 population) contained in Rule 10-5.11(27)(f)1, Florida Administrative Code. Sullivan then subtracted that number (1,182) from the estimated number of substance abuse hospital admissions for 1990 (2,784), and concluded that the estimated number of hospital admissions in 1990 that would result from the need for long-term substance abuse services would be 1,602. The final step in Sullivan's methodology was to calculate the need for long-term hospital substance abuse beds. To derive this estimate, Sullivan multiplied the estimated number of long-term substance abuse admissions (1,602) by an average length of stay of 37 days, and divided that total by an occupancy standard of 292 days (80 percent of 365 days). Under Sullivan's methodology, a gross need exists for 203 long-term substance abuse beds in District XI. To establish net need, Sullivan would reduce the 203 bed district need by the 160 beds approved for Dade County, but ignore the 30-bed unit at Florida Keys because of its geographic inaccessibility. By Sullivan's calculation, a net need exists for 43 beds in Dade County. Sullivan's analysis, at steps three and four of his methodology, is not credited. Throughout his methodology Sullivan utilized District XI population figures (Dade and Monroe Counties) to develop a bed need for Dade County. Although Monroe County accounts for only 4 percent of the district's population, the inclusion of that population inflated Dade County's bed need. More demonstrative of the lack of reliability in steps three and four of Sullivan's analysis are, however, the methodologies by which he chose to calculate short- term admissions and long-term substance abuse bed need. Sullivan calculated admissions to short-term beds by applying a 28-day length of stay and an 80 percent occupancy standard to the Department's short- term bed need methodology (.06 beds per 1,000 population) contained in Rule 10- 5.11(27)(f)1, Florida Administrative Code. 3/ By using a 28-day length of stay, the maximum average admission permitted for short-term beds, as opposed to the district's demonstrated average of 24-days, Sullivan inappropriately minimized the number of estimated short-term admissions and maximized the number of estimated long-term admissions. 4/ Sullivan sought to justify his use of a 28-day standard by reference to testimony he overheard in a separate proceeding. According to Sullivan, a Department representative testified that the 28-day standard was used in developing the Department's .06 short-term beds per 1,000 population rule. Sullivan's rationalization is not, however, persuasive. First, Sullivan's recitation of testimony he overheard in a separate proceeding was not competent proof of the truth of those matters in this case. Second, Sullivan offered no rational explanation of how a 28-day standard was used in developing the rule. Finally, the proof demonstrated that the average short-term length of stay in District XI is 24 days, not 28 days. The difference between a 24-day and 28-day average short-term length of stay is dramatic. Application of Sullivan's methodology to the population of Dade County, and utilizing a 24-day average, would demonstrate a need for 170 long-term beds, as opposed to Sullivan's calculated need of 203 beds. In addition to the average short-term length of stay factor, long-term bed need is also dependent on an average length of long-term admissions factor. Under Sullivan's approach, the higher the average, the higher the bed need. Accordingly, to derive a meaningful bed need requires that a reliable average length of stay be established. The data chosen by Sullivan to calculate such an average was not, however, reliable. Sullivan used a 37-day average length of stay to develop his long-term bed need. This average was developed from the CON applications of Mercy, Glenbeigh and Mount Sinai. In the applications, Mercy estimated an expected length of stay of 30-37 days, Glenbeigh 36-38 days, and Mount Sinai 28-49 days. Use of a simple average, of the expected lengths of stay contained in Mercy's, Glenbeigh's and Mount Sinai's applications, to develop an average long- term length of stay is not persuasive. The figures contained in the applications are "expected length of stay", a minimum/maximum figure. Mercy failed to demonstrate that a simple average of those figures was a reliable indicator of average length of stay. Indeed, Mercy presented evidence at hearing that its average length of stay would be 30-31 days; a figure that is clearly not a simple average of the 30-37 day expected length of stay contained in its application. Mercy's failure to demonstrate a meaningful average length of stay renders its calculated bed need unreliable. Sullivan's Methodology - An Overview Each step of Sullivan's methodology was inextricably linked to the other. Consequently, a failure of any step in his analysis would invalidate his ultimata conclusion. Notwithstanding this fundamental fact Mercy, with the exception of the Marden methodology, failed to present a reasonable evidentiary basis to demonstrate the reliability and validity of Sullivan's methodology or any of its parts. Since his methodology was not validated, or each of its inextricably linked parts validated, Sullivan's conclusions are not persuasive or credited. Other Considerations If Mercy receives a CON, it will enter into a management contract with Comprehensive Care Corporation (CompCare) to operate the substance abuse unit. The parties anticipate that Mercy will provide its existing physical plant, custodial services, support services, dietary services, complimentary medical services, medical records and pharmacy services, and that CompCare will provide the treatment team, quality assurance, public information, promotion and operational management. Under its proposed agreement with CompCare, Mercy would pay CompCare on a per patient day basis. This fee was not, however, disclosed at hearing nor were the other expenses for patient care established. 5/ Consequently, Mercy failed to establish that its proposal was financially feasible on either a short or long term basis. Mercy also proposes to provide bilingual staff, and dedicate a portion of its patient days to indigent and Medicaid patients. There was no competent proof to establish, however, that such needs were not met, or would not be met, by the existing facilities.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the application of Mercy for a certificate of need to convert 29 medical/surgical beds to 29 long-term substance abuse beds be DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED this 4th day of February, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 1987.
The Issue Whether there is a need for an additional 31 short-term psychiatric beds for Broward County?
Findings Of Fact I. General. History of Case. In June of 1984, the Petitioner filed an application with the Respondent for a certificate of need to add 31 short- term psychiatric beds to its existing facility. The certificate of need sought by the Petitioner was assigned certificate of need #3372 by the Respondent. The Respondent denied the Petitioner's application for certificate of need #3372. On October 25, 1984, the Petitioner filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing with the Respondent challenging its proposed denial of the Petitioner's application. The Petition was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Respondent and was assigned case number 84-4037. Biscayne, Memorial and Charter were granted leave to intervene by Orders dated January 28, 1985, April 26, 1985 and July 9, 1985, respectively. The final hearing was held on November 19 and 21, 1985 in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida and February 24 and 25, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. The Petitioner's Proposal. The Petitioner originally sought to add 31 short-term psychiatric beds to its existing facility. If approved, the additional beds would have increased its current licensed beds from 334 to 365 beds. The Petitioner proposed to meet projected need for short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County for 1989. In its original application, the Petitioner proposed to provide services to children, adolescents, adults and the elderly. No distinct psychiatric units were proposed. The total cost of the original proposal was estimated to be $209,368.00. At the final hearing, the Petitioner proposed to relinquish 31 medical/surgical beds and to add 31 short-term psychiatric beds to meet projected need for short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County for 1989. The Petitioner will end up with a total of 334 licensed beds, the same number it now has, if its application is approved. The total cost of the proposal presented at the final hearing was $337,169.00, which is accurate and reasonable. The 31 proposed beds will be divided into a 15-bed dedicated adolescent unit and a 16-bed dedicated geropsychiatric unit. Adults will generally not be treated by the Petitioner. Involuntary admissions will be treated by the Petitioner, although there was some evidence to the contrary. The sixth floor of the Petitioner's existing facility will be converted into space for the new psychiatric units. The Petitioner changed the estimated staffing for its proposal between the time it filed its original application and the final hearing. The changes were not significant. During the 1985 legislative session, the Florida Legislature enacted Section 394.4785(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985). This,, Section requires that most adolescents be separated from other patients for purposes of psychiatric treatment. Some of the modifications of the Petitioner's application which were made at the final hearing were made in order to conform with this Section. The changes in the Petitioner's proposal which were made between the time it filed its original application with the Respondent and the time of the final hearing are not substantial enough to require that the Petitioner's application, as modified, be remanded to the Respondent for further consideration. The Parties; Standing. The Petitioner is a 334-bed, for-profit, general acute-care hospital. The Petitioner is a full service hospital providing general medical services. The Petitioner has a medical staff of more than 400 physicians, including a department of psychiatry. The Petitioner is owned by National Medical Enterprises, one of the largest health care providers in the country. The Petitioner is located in Hollywood, Florida, which is located in the southern portion of Broward County, Florida. Broward County is the only County in the Respondent's service district 10. The Petitioner's primary service area consist of the southern portion of Broward County from State Road 84 in the North to the Broward-Dade County line in the South. Memorial is a not-for-profit general acute care hospital located in southern Broward County. Memorial holds License #1737, issued on June 1, 1985, which authorizes Memorial to operate 74 short-term psychiatric beds. This license is valid for the period June 1, 1985 to May 31, 1987. Memorial was also authorized to operate 74 short-term psychiatric beds in its license issued for the 2-year period prior to June 1, 1985. Memorial is located a short distance from where the Petitioner is located in southern Broward County. Memorial and the Petitioner share the same general primary service area. Most of the physicians on the staff at Memorial are also on the Petitioner's staff. Memorial is subsidized by tax revenues for providing indigent care for southern Broward County. About 17 percent of Memorial's revenue is attributable to bad debt and indigent care. If the Petitioner's application is approved it is likely that the Petitioner will take patients from Memorial. It is also likely that the patients taken from Memorial will be other than indigent patients. If the Petitioner were to achieve a 75 percent occupancy rate and 50 percent of its patients come from Memorial, Memorial would lose a little over $1,000,000.00 in terms of 1985 dollars. It is unlikely, however, that the Petitioner will achieve an occupancy rate of 75 percent and, more importantly, it is unlikely that 50 percent of the Petitioner's patients will come from Memorial. The loss of patients from Memorial which would be caused by approval of the Petitioner's application will, however, result in a financial loss to Memorial which may effect its ability to provide quality care. Additionally, the loss in paying patients could increase the percentage of indigent patients at Memorial and, because a portion of the cost of caring for indigents is covered by paying patients at Memorial, could result in a further loss in revenue and an increase in tax support. The public may have difficulty accepting a public hospital, such as Memorial, as a high-quality hospital if the public hospital is perceived to be a charity hospital. It is therefore important for a public hospital to attract a significant number of paying patients to its facility to avoid such an image. It is unlikely that the number of patients which may be lost to the Petitioner by Memorial is sufficient to cause the public to perceive that Memorial is a charity hospital. Biscayne is a 458-bed, general acute-care hospital located on U.S. 1 in northern Dade County, Florida, just south of the Broward County line. Biscayne's facility is located within about 5 miles of the Petitioner's facility. Biscayne is about a 5 to 10 minute drive from the Petitioner. Dade County is not in service district 10. It is in service district 11. Of the 458 licensed beds at Biscayne, 24 are licensed as short-term psychiatric beds and 24 are licensed as substance abuse beds. The rest are licensed as medical/surgical beds. Ten of the medical/surgical beds at Biscayne are used as a dedicated 10-bed eating disorder (anoxeria nervosa and bulimirexia) unit. These 10 beds are not licensed for such use. A separate support staff is used for the 10-bed eating disorder unit. Approximately 60 percent of Biscayne's medical staff of approximately 400 physicians are residents of Broward County. Most of these physicians are also on the medical staff of other hospitals, principally the Petitioner, Memorial and Parkway Regional Medical Center, which is located in northern Dade County. Most of its staff have their business offices in southern Broward County. Biscayne's service area includes southern Broward County and northern Dade County. Approximately 60 percent of Biscayne's patients are residents of southern Broward County. Biscayne markets its services in southern Broward County. Eighty percent of Biscayne's psychiatric patients are elderly. Many types of psychotic and psychiatric disorders are treated at Biscayne. Biscayne offers psycho-diagnostic services, crisis stabilization services, shock therapy services, individual therapy services and group therapy services. Biscayne has had difficulty in recruiting qualified staff for its psychiatric unit. Biscayne currently has 4 vacancies for registered nurses, 4 vacancies for mental health assistants and 1 vacancy for an occupational therapist in its psychiatric unit. Biscayne recruits nurses who are certified in mental health nursing. They have not always been successful in finding such nurses. Therefore, Biscayne provides educational programs to help train its nursing staff. These programs are necessary because of the unavailability of experienced nurses for its psychiatric unit. The Petitioner has projected that most of its patients for its proposed psychiatric units will come from southern Broward County, where Biscayne gets approximately 60 percent of its patients. The Petitioner plans to try to convince psychiatrists currently using existing providers, except Hollywood Pavilion, to refer their patients to the proposed psychiatric units. Since Biscayne and the Petitioner share some of the same physicians, it is likely that many of the patients cared-for by the Petitioner will come form Biscayne and other providers in southern Broward County, including Memorial. The loss of patients at Biscayne, if the Petitioner's proposal is approved, will result in a loss of revenue to Biscayne which may affect its ability to provide quality care. Charter was an applicant for a certificate of need to construct a free-standing psychiatric facility in Broward County. In its application Charter sought approval of long-term and short-term psychiatric beds. Charter's application was filed with the Respondent in August of 1983. It was filed for review by the Respondent in a batching cycle which preceded the batching cycle in which the Petitioner's application was filed. In December of 1983, the Respondent proposed to approve Charter's application and authorize a project consisting of 16 short-term adolescent psychiatric beds, 16 long-term adolescent psychiatric beds, 16 long-term substance abuse beds and 12 long-term children's psychiatric beds. The Respondent's proposed approval of Charter's application was challenged. Following an administrative hearing, it was recommended that Charter's application be denied. Final agency action had not been taken as of the commencement of the hearing in this case. Subsequent to the date on which the final hearing of this case commenced, the Respondent issued a Final Order denying Charter's certificate of need application. This Final Order is presently pending on appeal to the First District Court of Appeal. Charter does not have an existing facility offering services similar to those proposed by the Petitioner in Broward County or anywhere near the Petitioner's facility. When the Orders allowing Memorial, Biscayne and Charter to intervene were issued by Hearing Officer Sherrill, Mr. Sherrill determined that if the Intervenor's could prove the facts alleged in their Petition to Intervene they would have standing to participate in this case. Memorial and Biscayne have in fact proved the allegations contained in their Petitions to Intervene. Based upon all of the evidence, it is therefore concluded that Memorial and Biscayne have standing to participate in this proceeding. Both Memorial and Biscayne will probably lose patients to the Petitioner if its proposal is approved resulting in a loss of revenue. This loss could affect quality of care at Memorial and Biscayne. Also, it is possible that both would lose some of their specialized nursing personnel to ;the Petitioner to staff its proposed psychiatric units. Charter has failed to establish that it has standing to participate in this proceeding. The potential injury to Charter is too speculative. II. Rule 10-5.11(25), F.A.C. A. General. Whether a certificate of need for short-term psychiatric beds should be approved for Broward County is to be determined under the provisions of Section 381.494(6)(c), Florida Statutes (1985), and the Respondent's rules promulgated thereunder. In particular, Rule 10-5.11(25), F.A.C., governs this case. Under Rule 10-5.11(25)(c), F.A.C., a favorable determination will "not normally" be given on applications for short-term psychiatric care facilities unless bed need exists under Rule 10-5.11(25)(d), F.A.C. B. Rule 10-5.11(25)(d) , F.A.C. Pursuant to Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)3, F.A.C., bed need is determined 5 years into the future. In this case, the Petitioner filed its application with the Respondent in 1984, seeking approval of additional short-term psychiatric beds for 1989. The Petitioner did not change this position prior to or during the final hearing. Therefore, the planning horizon for purposes of this case is 1989. Under Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)3, F.A.C., bed need is determined by subtracting the number of "existing and approved" beds in the service district from the number of beds for the planning year based upon a ratio of .35 beds per 1,000 population projected for the planning year in the service district. The population projection is to be based on the latest mid-range projections published by the Bureau of Economic and Business Research at the University of Florida. Bed need is determined under the Respondent's rules on a district-wide basis unless the service district has been sub- divided by the Respondent. District 10 has not been subdivided by the Respondent. Therefore, bed need for purposes of this case under Rule 10-5.11(25)(d), F.A.C., is to be determined based upon the population projections for all of Broward County for 1989. The projected population for Broward County for 1989 is 1,228,334 people. Based upon the projected population for Broward County for 1989, there will be a need for 430 short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County in 1989. The evidence at the final hearing proved that there are currently 427 licensed short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County. During the portion of the final hearing held in November of 1985, evidence was offered that proved that there were also 16 approved short-term psychiatric beds for Broward County. These short-term beds were part of the application for the certificate of need sought by Charter. Subsequently, however, a Final Order was issued by the Respondent denying Charter's application. Therefore, the 16 short-term psychiatric beds sought by Charter do not constitute "existing and approved" short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County for purposes of this case. Subsequent to the conclusion of the final hearing in this case, the First District Court of Appeal reversed a Final Order of the Respondent denying an application for a certificate of need for a free-standing 10 -bed psychiatric facility, including 80 additional short-term psychiatric beds, for Broward County. Balsam v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, So.2d (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). As indicated in Finding of Fact 23, Memorial is licensed to operate 74 short-term psychiatric beds. Memorial is in fact operating all 74 of these licensed beds. Memorial filed an application with the Respondent for certificate of need #1953 in October of 1981 in which Memorial indicated that it planned to reduce the number of short-term psychiatric beds it had available by 24 beds. Memorial's certificate of need application involved an expenditure of capital and did not specifically involve an application for a change in bed inventory at Memorial. Memorial also represented that it would reduce the number of its available short-term psychiatric beds by 24 in a bond prospectus it issued in September of 1983. The Respondent approved Memorial's certificate of need application. Despite Memorial's representations that it would reduce its short-term psychiatric bed inventory, the beds are still in use in Broward County. Memorial has no plans to close any beds and the Respondent does not plan to take any action against Memorial to require it to stop using 24 of its short-term psychiatric beds. Hollywood Pavilion is licensed to operate 46 short- term psychiatric beds in Broward County. In 1985, 475 patients were admitted to Hollywood Pavilion and its occupancy rate was 62.3 percent. In fact, Hollywood Pavilion had more admissions than Florida Medical Center had to its psychiatric unit. It therefore appears that other physicians find Hollywood Pavilion acceptable. Hollywood Pavilion is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. The Petitioner presented the testimony of a few physicians who questioned the quality of care at Hollywood Pavilion. These physicians indicated that they did not use Hollywood Pavilion. At least one of the physicians indicated, however, that he did refer patients to other physicians whom he knew admitted patients to Hollywood Pavilion despite his feeling that the quality of care at Hollywood Pavilion was poor. This action is inconsistent with that physician's opinion as to the lack of quality of care at Hollywood Pavilion. His opinion is therefore rejected. The other physicians' opinions are also rejected because very little evidence was offered in support of their opinions and because of the contrary evidence. Based upon a consideration of all of the evidence concerning the quality of care at Hollywood Pavilion, it is concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the 46 short-term psychiatric beds licensed for use and available for use at Hollywood Pavilion should not be counted as existing short- term psychiatric beds in Broward County. Coral Ridge Hospital is licensed to operate 74 short- term psychiatric beds in Broward County. The average length of stay at Coral Ridge Hospital during 1984 and 1985 was almost 80 days. The average length of stay at Coral Ridge Hospital has been in excess of 40 days since 1980 and in excess of 60 days since 1983. The average length of stay at Coral Ridge Hospital is in excess of the average length of stay for which short-term psychiatric beds are to be used under the Respondent's rules. Rule 10-5.11(25)(a), F.A.C., provides that short-term beds are those used for an average length of stay of 30 days or less for adults and 60 days or less for children and adolescents under 18 years of age. Rule 10-5.11(26)(a), F.A.C., provides that long-term beds are those used for an average length of stay of 90 days or more. The psychiatric beds at Coral Ridge Hospital, based upon an average length of stay for all of its beds, falls between the average length of stay for short-term beds and long-term beds. The occupancy rate at Coral Ridge Hospital for 1985 was between 40 percent and 50 percent. Therefore, it is possible that a few patients at Coral Ridge Hospital with a very long length of stay could cause the overall average length of stay of the facility to be as long as it is. Coral Ridge Hospital will probably take short-term psychiatric patients because of its low occupancy rate. Therefore, there are at least 29 to 37 short-term psychiatric beds available for use as short-term psychiatric beds at Coral Ridge Hospital. The Petitioner failed to prove how many of the licensed short-term psychiatric beds at Coral Ridge Hospital are not being used for, and are not available for use by, short-term psychiatric patients in Broward County. It cannot, therefore, be determined how many, if any, of the licensed short-term beds at Coral Ridge Hospital should not be treated as existing short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County. Based upon the foregoing, the 427 licensed short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County should be treated as "existing" beds for purposes of determining the need for short- term psychiatric beds under Rule 10-5.11(25)(d), F.A.C. There is a net need for short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County for 1989 of only 3 additional beds under Rule 10- 5.11(25)(d)3, F.A.C. If the 80 short-term psychiatric beds approved by the First District Court of Appeal in Balsam are taken into account, there will be a surplus of 77 short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County for 1989 under Rule 10- 5.11(25)(d)3, F.A.C. Based upon an application of Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)3, F.A.C., there is no need for the additional 31 short-term psychiatric beds sought by the Petitioner. Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)1, F.A.C., provides that a minimum of .15 beds per 1,000 population should be located in hospitals holding a general license to ensure access to needed services for persons with multiple health problems. Some patients who need psychiatric care also need other medical services which can better be obtained in an acute care hospital. This fact is taken into account by the requirement of Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)1, F.A.C. Based upon the projected population for Broward County in 1989, there should be a minimum of 184-short-term psychiatric beds in hospitals holding a general license in Broward County. There are currently 243 short-term psychiatric beds in hospitals holding a general license in Broward County. Therefore, the standard of Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)1, F.A.C., has been met without approval of the Petitioner's proposal. There is no need for additional short-term psychiatric beds in general hospitals in Broward County for 1989. Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)4, F.A.C., provides that applicants for short-term psychiatric beds must be able to project an occupancy rate of 70 percent for its adult psychiatric beds and 60 percent for its adolescent and children's psychiatric beds in the second year of operation. For the third year of operation, the applicant must be able to project an 80 percent adult occupancy rate and a 70 percent adolescent and children's occupancy rate. The beds sought by the Petitioner will be managed by a professional psychiatric management company: Psychiatric Management Services (hereinafter referred to as "PMS"). PMS is owned by Psychiatric Institutes of America, a subsidiary of National Medical Enterprises. Because of the lack of need for additional short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County, it is doubtful that the Petitioner can achieve its projected occupancy rates as required by Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)4, F.A.C. Rules 10-5.11(25)(d)5 and 6, F.A.C., require that certain occupancy rates normally must have been met in the preceding 12 months before additional short-term psychiatric beds will be approved. The facts do not prove whether the occupancy rates provided by Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)5, F.A.C., have been met because the statistics necessary to make such a determination are not available. The evidence failed to prove that the occupancy rates of Rule 10- 5.11(25)(d)6, F.A.C. have been met. The average occupancy rate for short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County for 1985 was between 64.8 percent and 68.4 percent. Occupancy rates in Broward County for short-term psychiatric beds have not reached 71 percent since 1982. These rates are well below the 75 percent occupancy rate provided for in Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)6, F.A.C. This finding is not refuted by the fact that Florida Medical Center added 59 beds in 1984 and the fact that occupancy rates at most general hospitals exceeded 75 percent in 1985. Based upon the average occupancy rate in Broward County for 1985, there were approximately 100 empty short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County on any day. Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)7, F.A.C. requires that short-term psychiatric services provided at an inpatient psychiatric hospital should have at least 15 designated beds in order to assure specialized staff and services at a reasonable cost. The Petitioner's proposal to add 31 short-term psychiatric beds meets this requirement of the rule. C. Rule 10-5.11(25)(e), F.A.C. Rule 1O-5.11(25)(e)1, F.A.C., requires that an applicant prove that its proposal is consistent with the needs in the community as set out in the Local Health Council plans, local Mental Health District Board plans, State Mental Health Plan and needs assessment data. The Petitioner has failed to meet this requirement. The Petitioner's proposal is inconsistent with the District 10 Local Health Plan, the Florida State Health Plan and State and Local Mental Health Plans. In particular, the Petitioner's proposal is inconsistent with the following: The District 10 Local Health Plan's recommendation that applications not be approved if approval would result in an excess number of beds under the Respondent's bed need methodology; The District 10 Local Health Plan's recommendation concerning occupancy standards for the district (75 percent during the past 12 months); The position of the Florida State Health Plan that inpatient psychiatric services are a setting of last resort; The recommendation of the District 10 Mental Health Plan that alternatives to hospitalization for psychiatric services should be encouraged; and The recommendation of the Florida State Mental Health Plan that less restrictive treatment alternatives should be encouraged. Rule 10-5.11(25)(e)3, F.A.C., requires that applicants indicate the amount of care to be provided to underserved groups. The Petitioner's representations concerning its plans to provide indigent care contained in its application are misleading, in that the Petitioner represented that it would not turn away indigents. At the final hearing, the Petitioner indicated that it will generally provide care to indigents only on an emergency basis. Patients who need indigent care on a non-emergency basis will be referred to Memorial. Also, once an indigent patient who needs emergency care has stabilized, that patient will be transferred to Memorial for care. The Petitioner accepts few Medicaid and indigent patients. During 1985, the Petitioner treated 21 Medicaid patients out of a total of 6,800 patients. Only 1.5 percent of its total revenue was for uncompensated care. During 1984, the Petitioner treated 22 Medicaid patients out of a total of 7,321 patients. Only 1.2 percent of its total gross revenue was for uncompensated care. Memorial is subsidized by tax revenues for providing indigent care, or southern Broward County. Because Memorial provides indigent care, indigent patients are usually referred to Memorial if they do not need emergency care or are transferred to Memorial after they stabilize if they do need emergency care. There are other hospitals in northern Broward County which provide similar indigent care. It is therefore common practice to refer patients to those hospitals. Rule 10-5.11(25)(e)5, F.A.C., provides that development of new short- term psychiatric beds should be through the conversion of underutilized beds in other hospital services. The Petitioner's proposal to convert 31 medical/surgical beds for use as short-term psychiatric beds meets this provision. Rule 10-5.11(25)(e)7, F.A.C., provides that short- term psychiatric services should be available within a maximum travel time of 45 minutes under average travel conditions for at least 90 percent of the service area's population. There is no geographic access problem in Broward County. At least 90 percent of the population of Broward County is within a maximum of 45 minutes driving time under average driving conditions to existing short-term psychiatric services in Broward County. The Petitioner's proposal will not significantly enhance geographic access in Broward County. III. Statutory Criteria. Need for Services. The Respondent has approved two certificates of need authorizing the addition of a total of 135 long-term psychiatric beds for Broward County. The addition of 135 long-term beds probably means that additional short-term beds in Broward County which have been used for patients requiring longer treatment will be available. If the additional long-term beds free up short-term beds, the occupancy rate of short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County would be even less than it has been during the past 12 months, if other things remain equal. Both Memorial and Florida Medical Center have been using short-term psychiatric beds for the care of long-term patients. Once the new long-term psychiatric beds are operational, more short-term psychiatric beds will be available in Broward County. Existing Providers. In addition to the short-term psychiatric beds available at Coral Ridge Hospital and Hollywood Pavilion, short- term psychiatric beds are available at the following existing facilities in the service district: Ft. Lauderdale Hospital: 64 beds Florida Medical Center: 74 beds Imperial Point: 47 beds Broward General Medical Center: 48 beds There is no geographic distribution problem in district 10. Generally, the Petitioner did not prove that existing short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County are not available, efficient, appropriate, accessible, adequate or providing quality of care. The Petitioner also did not prove that existing facilities are over-utilized. No new services are proposed by the Petitioner. The evidence did prove that there is usually a waiting list for short-term psychiatric beds at Memorial and that physicians have resorted to various devices to get their patients into short-term psychiatric beds at Memorial. Specialized adolescent psychiatric services are available in the service district at Ft. Lauderdale Hospital and at Florida Medical Center. Ft. Lauderdale Hospital has 24 short- term psychiatric beds dedicated to the treatment of adolescents. Florida Medical Center has 20 short-term psychiatric beds dedicated to the treatment of adolescents. Broward General Medical Center and Imperial Point also provide children/adolescent services. Treatment for eating disorders is provided and available at Imperial Point and Florida Medical Center. Florida Medical Center solicits patients from all parts of the service district. Geropsychiatric short-term psychiatric beds are available in the service district at Hollywood Pavilion, Imperial Point and Ft. Lauderdale Hospital. Florida Medical Center has a closed adult psychiatric unit and often treats persons over 60 years of age. It also has a 26-bed adult short-term psychiatric unit with 2 specialized treatment programs: one for eating disorders and the other for stress and pain management. The Petitioner has proposed to provide a dedicated geropsychiatric unit to meet the needs of geriatric patients which are different from those of adults generally. Although there are no such dedicated geropsychiatric units in the service district, the Petitioner failed to prove that geriatrics are not receiving adequate care from existing providers. Quality of Care. The Petitioner is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. The Petitioner has established adequate quality control procedures, including educational programs and a quality assurance department. These quality control procedures will also be used to insure quality of care in the proposed psychiatric units. The psychiatric units will be managed by PMS. PMS specializes in the management of psychiatric units in acute care hospitals. PMS has programs for adolescents and geriatrics. These programs will be available for use in the proposed psychiatric units. PMS also has a large variety of programs, services and specialists available to establish and maintain quality of care at the Petitioner. The Petitioner will be able to provide quality of care. Alternatives. The Petitioner did not prove that available and adequate facilities which may serve as an alternative to the services it is proposing do not exist in Broward County. Economies of Scale. The Petitioner's parent corporation, National Medical Enterprises has purchasing contracts available for use by the Petitioner in purchasing items needed for the proposed psychiatric units. These contracts can result in a reduction of costs for the proposed project. Staff Resources. PMS will help in recruiting staff for the proposed psychiatric units. Recruiting will be done locally but the Petitioner also has the ability to recruit specialized staff on a broader geographic scale. There is a shortage of nursing personnel for psychiatric services in southern Broward County and northern Dade County. Since the Petitioner plans to recruit locally, this could cause existing providers to lose specialized nursing personnel to the Petitioner. If the Petitioner causes vacancies at existing facilities, this could adversely affect quality of care. Financial Feasibility. The total projected cost of the project ($337,169.00) can easily be provided by National Medical Enterprises, the parent corporation of the Petitioner. The Petitioner's financial projections are unrealistic to the extent of the projected utilization and revenue for the proposed psychiatric units. Based upon the projected need of only 3 short-term psychiatric beds (or possibly a surplus of 77 beds) for 1989, the Petitioner's projected utilization and revenue for its proposal is rejected. The Petitioner has proved immediate financial feasibility but has failed to prove the proposal is financially feasible in the long-term. Impact of Proposal. The Petitioner's proposal could adversely effect the costs of providing health services in Broward County. This is especially true in light of the lack of need for additional short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County. Because of the high quality of the services the Petitioner proposes to provide, competition in Broward County could be enhanced and ultimately benefit consumers, if there was a need for the proposed additional beds. If a hospital has an image of being a charity hospital serving the needs of underserved groups, the hospital can experience difficulty in attracting paying patients and have difficulty in getting consumers to accept the high quality of the services of the hospital. Although it is likely that the Petitioner will take paying patients away from Memorial, it is unlikely that the number of patients lost could substantially affect the public's image of Memorial. The effect the Petitioner's proposal will have on Memorial is limited by the fact that the Petitioner is only seeking 31 beds and they are only short-term psychiatric beds. Memorial provides a variety of services and psychiatric services are only a small part of those services. I. Construction. It the Petitioner's proposal is approved, 11,500 square feet on the sixth floor of the Petitioner's hospital will be renovated and converted for use for the two proposed psychiatric units. The renovations can be made quickly. There will be space for 16 beds in a geropsychiatric unit and 15 beds in an adolescent unit. There will be a separate lobby for the psychiatric units and the elevators to the lobby will be strictly controlled. The two units will be separated and adequate security precautions will be taken to keep the two units separate. The ceilings in both units will be modified to insure security. Nurse stations will be provided for both units. Visibility from the nurse stations will be fair. Space is provided for a dayroom for each unit and there will be a class room and four rooms for therapy. These spaces will barely be adequate to meet the various needs of patients. With adequate planning and coordination, patients' needs can be met. There is inadequate space in the proposed facility for physical activities for patients.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the certificate of need application filed by the Petitioner for certificate of need #3372 should be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of May, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Glazer, Esquire AUSLEY, McMULLEN, McGEHEE, CAROTHERS & PROCTOR Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Lesley Mendelson, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Building One, Suite 407 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James C. Hauser, Esquire MESSER, VICHERS, CAPARELLO, FRENCH & MADSEN Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Kenneth G. Oertel, Esquire Eleanor A. Joseph, Esquire OERTEL & HOFFMAN, P.A. Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32313-6507 Cynthia S. Tunnicliff, Esquire CARLTON, FIELDS, WARD, EMMANUEL SMITH & CUTLER, P.A. Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mr. William Page, Jr. Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent's license to practice medicine should be suspended or revoked, or the licensee otherwise disciplined, for alleged violations of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint, dated April 17, 1981, and Administrative Complaint, dated September 15, 1981, as amended on January 15, 1982. This proceeding commenced with Petitioner's filing of an Administrative Complaint on April 17, 1981, alleging that Respondent should be disciplined under Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, (1975)(1979) as a result of his alleged misconduct in 1974-75 whereby he engaged in sexual intercourse with one Sally Burton which resulted in her pregnancy and subsequent abortion. The Complaint also contained eleven counts involving the alleged prescribing of Schedule II controlled substances in 1980 by Respondent without a DEA registration certificate authorizing him to do so. Additionally, one count involved the alleged issuance by Respondent of a prescription to himself for a Schedule II controlled substance. Respondent thereafter requested an administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, and the case was referred to this Division for appointment of a Hearing Officer. Notice of Hearing was issued on July 14, 1981 for a hearing to be held on September 22-23, 1981 at Tampa, Florida. Petitioner filed a motion for continuance of the hearing on the ground that a second administrative complaint had been issued against the Respondent on September 16, 1981, and that the two complaints should be consolidated for the purpose of hearing. The motion was granted and the hearing indefinitely continued. Petitioner filed its Second Administrative Complaint, dated September 15, 1981, with the Division on October 22, 1981, together with a motion to consolidate the two complaints. Respondent requested a Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing as to the matters alleged in the complaint. The cases were consolidated by Order, dated November 13, 1981, pursuant to Rule 28-5.106, Florida Administrative Code. Notice of Hearing for the consolidated cases was issued on November 13, 1981 for a hearing to be held on February 15-16, 1982 at Tampa, Florida. Thereafter, Petitioner moved to amend Counts IV and VI of the Second Complaint and said motion was granted by Order dated February 5, 1982. As amended the Second Complaint alleged violations of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, during various periods from 1967 to 1981. In general terms, it was alleged that Respondent had provided improper treatment to a patient suffering from alcoholic depression and anxiety, and that he employed the patient as a "co-therapist" in group sessions which had a negative impact on the patient's mental health as well as members of the group. The complaint further alleged that Respondent had engaged in activities of a sexual nature with a female patient, Emily Garrett, in 1968 which resulted in her emotional upset and harm. Finally, discipline was sought against Respondent as a result of his conviction in the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County, Florida on June 10, 1981 of manslaughter pursuant to Section 482.07, Florida Statutes, in connection with the death of Sally Burton. On February 5, 1982, Respondent filed a Motion for Continuance of the hearing due to a conflict in the schedule of one of his legal counsel, and due to the then pending appeal of Respondent's conviction before the Second District Court of Appeal. The motion was orally denied prior to hearing, but was renewed at the commencement of hearing on February 15, 1982. At that time, Respondent gave consent to the withdrawal of his current counsel, and a conditional appearance was entered by Frank Ragano, Esquire who conditioned such appearance on having an opportunity to familiarize himself with the facts and law of the case. The renewed motion was denied for lack of good cause, but Respondent was afforded the opportunity to proceed with his counsel who was then present, William S. Lancaster, Esquire, during presentation of Petitioner's case, at which time a continuance would be granted to afford additional time for Mr. Ragano to assist in preparing Respondent's defense. Mr. Lancaster requested that he be permitted to withdraw due to his stated inability to fully represent the Respondent at the hearing. Respondent consented to the withdrawal, and declined to proceed in the manner suggested by the Hearing Officer, and thereupon left the hearing room. Accordingly, the proceeding commenced in the absence of Respondent and his counsel. After the testimony of seven witnesses of Petitioner had been received, Respondent and Mr. Lancaster reentered the hearing room and agreed to participate in the proceeding provided a continuance would be granted at the conclusion of Petitioner's case. Respondent's counsel then cross-examined three of the witnesses who had previously testified. The hearing was continued on February 16, 1982 until April 20, 1982, and was concluded on April 22, 1982, except for the submission of late-filed exhibits in the form of depositions of four rebuttal witnesses and letter from the Drug Enforcement Administration. At the hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of thirteen witnesses, including the Respondent. Respondent called thirty-three witnesses and testified in his own behalf. Petitioner submitted twenty-two exhibits in evidence. Those exhibits which were received provisionally at the hearing are now admitted. Respondent submitted nine exhibits, but withdrew Respondent's Exhibit 3, and Respondent's Exhibit 6 was rejected. Respondent's Exhibit 9 "A Guide for the Individual and Group Psychotherapy" was erroneously stated at the hearing to be Respondent's Exhibit 8, and has been renumbered. Late filed exhibits consisted of a letter from the Drug Enforcement Administration (Respondent's Exhibit 11), and the depositions of Dr. Joseph Lupo (Respondent's Exhibit 8), Shirley Heflin (Respondent's Exhibit 10) Emily Garrett (Petitioner's Exhibit 23), Captain R. W. Poindexter (Petitioner's Exhibit 24), and Janice Simmons (Petitioner's Exhibit 25) A Proposed Recommended Order filed by Petitioner has been fully considered, and those portions thereof not adopted herein are considered to be unnecessary, irrelevant, or unsupported in law or fact. Respondent has requested that this Recommended Order be delayed pending action by the Supreme Court of Florida on Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the criminal proceeding. This request is denied.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Louis John Tsavaris has been licensed to practice medicine in Florida since August 15, 1956. He received his medical degree at the University of Miami School of Medicine in 1956, interned at the Cornell Medical Center, and attended the University of Michigan where he was an Assistant Resident and Junior Clinical Instructor. He began his practice as a psychiatrist at Tampa in 1962 and has continuously practiced in that capacity. (Testimony of Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 19). Pierce H. Brereton, Jr. became a patient of Respondent in 1967. He was a homosexual who suffered from depression and a severe character disorder, together with an alcohol and drug problem. Brereton had had several prior hospitalizations for schizophrenia. Respondent prescribed Antabuse for the patient to control his drinking, but Brereton discontinued its use after several months. He participated in group therapy sessions conducted by Respondent until 1978 when he terminated his patient relationship. Although Brereton soon resumed his drinking habits after discontinuing Antabuse, he attempted to hide the fact from Respondent. As early as 1974, and off and on throughout the following years, Respondent prescribed Valium for Brereton's depression and anxiety. About 1974, Respondent opened another office in Siesta Key and employed Brereton to run errands and to do janitorial work at that location. Respondent then utilized Brereton as a "co-therapist" in psychiatric group therapy sessions for a fee of approximately $100 per week. Brereton had had no formal training or qualification as a therapist, but several years later commenced graduate courses in Gestalt therapy at the University of South Florida. Another "co- therapist", Kathryn Von Schmidt, who had been a patient of Respondent since 1973, was employed by him to assist at group sessions commencing in 1974. She was unqualified at the time, but received a Master's Degree in Counselling in December, 1975. She continued in her capacity as a co-therapist until the end of 1976. Also, Marian Klein, who held a Master's Degree in Psychology and had been Respondent's patient since 1973, became a co-therapist from 1975 to 1979. Brereton worked as co-therapist with both Von Schmidt and Klein during) the period 1974-1978. Klein found that his ability as a therapist varied from excellent to disruptive. Breretons appearance and general manner improved substantially during the years that he served as a co-therapist. Several of the group patients testified at the hearing that his presence caused a deterioration in their condition because he was unqualified to conduct therapy sessions. However, a number of other patients who attended the sessions seemed unaware that Brereton actually had any kind of "official" capacity, and regarded him merely as loquacious and as a "roll-taker". Respondent was either present or readily available during virtually all of the sessions in which co-therapists were assisting in the conduct of group sessions. Respondent employed Brereton as a co-therapist ostensibly to provide him with a reference for future employment and in the belief that such activity would be therapeutic for him. Brereton testified that his drinking had continued during the years when he was employed by Respondent, and that Respondent frequently drank alcoholic beverages with patients, including Brereton, before and after therapy sessions. He claimed that Respondent frequently came to his (Brereton's) residence with a bottle of liquor which they drank. The weight of the evidence shows that Brereton hid his drinking from Respondent and other patients, and that they were virtually unaware of his continuing alcohol problem. Respondent occasionally would join a group for dinner at a restaurant and have a drink with them, but did not make a practice of it. The evidence is insufficient to show that he either drank frequently with Brereton or otherwise made liquor available to him. In 1978, Brereton became irrational and abusive and came to therapy sessions on occasion when he had been drinking. At such times, Dr. Klein would send him home. She finally informed Respondent about his actions on one occasion. Respondent then warned Brereton of the dangers of taking Valium when he had been drinking. The patients in the groups were aware of his drinking in 1978 and were disturbed by his conduct. Brereton had considered Respondent to be "as infallible as the Pope" during his early years as a patient, but after the death in 1975 of Cassandra "Sally" Burton, who had been another of Respondent's patients, and Respondent's subsequent indictment for her death with consequent publicity of that fact, Brereton harbored hostile feelings against Respondent. He has filed a malpractice suit against Respondent and urged other patients to do so. Expert opinion holds that, although a "co-therapist" or other assistant at group therapy sessions should have appropriate credentials in counselling or psychology, an unqualified patient's presence in come leadership capacity would not necessarily impair his or her mental health, or that of the other patients if the group is structured with a qualified therapist or psychiatrist present at the sessions. It is found that insufficient evidence has been presented to establish that Brereton's activities as a co-therapist had a negative or deleterious impact on either his mental health or that of other patients. (Testimony of Respondent, Brereton, Crumpler, Speck, Ramirez, Burdette, Gonzalez, Stenberg, Prince, Adams, Putney, Melton, Albano, Brown, Barker, Burns, Von Schmidt, Buckman, Wheatley, Silverman, Jones, Carlton, Gardner, Arrifaht, Lancaster, Klein, Petitioner's Exhibits 4-5, 7-8). In 1962, Emily Garrett, then approximately 15 years old, became a patient of Respondent for several months. She suffered from depression and was autistic. She returned for treatment with Respondent in 1965 or 1966 and continued as a patient until 1970. She testified by deposition at the hearing that on either April 6 or 13, 1968, Respondent requested that she come in his office after a group therapy session where he proceeded to unbutton her blouse and fondle her breasts, and sought to have her perform an oral sex act upon him. She claimed that her depression was increased as a result of Respondent's sexual advances, thus precipitating a suicide attempt on April 19th by taking a large quantity of Valium prior to a group therapy session. After the session, when Respondent learned of her ingestion of the drug, he had several of the group members take her to the hospital where her stomach was pumped out. She returned home and then took some other drugs and was returned to the hospital where she remained for several days. Garrett further testified that on May 28, 1968, Respondent again fondled her breasts in his office after a group session had terminated. Garrett continued as Respondent's patient until October, 1970 when she changed psychiatrists and became a patient of a Dr. Vesley. This was due to the fact that she was unable to continue private sessions with Respondent because he was commuting between Tampa and New Jersey in order to teach at a medical college. In April, 1981, she became aware of publicity surrounding Respondent and voluntarily contacted Petitioner's investigators, at which time she related to them her allegations concerning Respondent's misconduct. Although she testified that she had told her sister about the incidents several years after they had occurred, and had also related them to Dr. Vesley, neither of those individuals testified at the hearing. Garrett testified that she did not report or otherwise complain about Respondent at an earlier time because of her feelings of dependence and sense of loyalty to him. Respondent denied Garrett's allegations and claimed that she had come to his office several times after her discontinuance as a patient and wanted him to become romantically involved with her. Although experts in the field of psychiatry agree that it is clearly unethical and a deviation from acceptable standards of practice for a psychiatrist to have sexual contact with a patient, it is also common for female patients to fantasize about their relationships with their psychiatrist. It would be unusual for a patient to continue treatment with a psychiatrist after he had committed a sexual assault against her. It is found that insufficient credible evidence has been presented to establish that Respondent committed the acts alleged by Garrett. (Testimony of Garrett (Depositions-Petitioner's Exhibits 17-18, 23), Respondent, Gonzalez, Warren, Afield, Gardner). Cassandra "Sally" Burton became a patient of Respondent in 1974. He diagnosed her condition as paranoid schizophrenia in partial remission with a drug addiction problem. She had previously been treated by psychiatrists and had been hospitalized. She had been a patient of Dr. Joseph Lupo, a Tampa psychiatrist, in 1969 when she was 18 years old. His tentative diagnosis of her condition was depression. After several months treatment in the fall of 1969, he admitted her to the psychiatric unit of Tampa General Hospital in January, 1970 based on her stated intention to commit suicide by overdosing on medication. He found her to be manipulative in her personal relationships and seductive in nature. She was discharged from the hospital after six days confinement at the insistence of her father. Dr. Lupo recommended to him at the time that she be continued in psychotherapy because she needed long-term treatment. She had shown signs of a manic depressive disorder. Such a disorder is a form of psychosis, which means loss of touch with reality and disorganization of thoughts, with impaired judgment. Based on psychological testing and observation, Dr. Lupo found that she was inclined to dramatize events in order to get attention, or as a manner of looking for help and being rescued. It was his opinion that she was capable of fabricating a story about having sexual intercourse, or a sexual affair with her treating psychiatrist. At the time that Burton became Respondent's patient, she told him that she had had syphilis and herpes. He treated her for gonorrhea and referred her to a gynecologist. In 1972, she had been hospitalized for several weeks for herpetic vaginitis. In August, 1974, Respondent referred the patient to Dr. Lawrence H. Ricker, a clinical psychologist, for testing and evaluation. He found that she was sexually disturbed with a severe personality disorder involving hysterical personality with underlying paranoid schizophrenic tendencies. His recommendation was a conservative therapeutic approach which considered her to be psychotic with support reality testing in the present rather than exploring the past. He further found that she had a propensity for self dramatization and tended to exaggerate, which exhibited a need for attention. Cassandra Burton was employed with A law firm as a legal secretary in Tampa in the fall of 1974. According to Jennifer Ross, a fellow employee, Respondent telephoned Burton at her office several times a week at which times they discussed when they were next going to see one another. The only time Ross saw Respondent and Burton together was at a dinner party at Ross' boy friend's house. On that occasion, Respondent and Burton arrived separately. Two of Respondent's former patients testified that they had had sexual relations with Burton. In one of these instances, the patient met Burton at Respondent's office and she asked him to take her home. This occurred about December, 1974. The other patient testified that he had observed her in bed with other men on several occasions. On March 5, 1975, Dr. Charles Mastin of Indian Rocks Beach performed an abortion on Burton. Respondent accompanied her to Mastin's office. After the abortion was performed, Burton embraced Respondent and they left the office together. The last charge made to Burton by Respondent's office for professional services was in December, 1974. Although she did not thereafter participate in group therapy sessions, Respondent's office records show that she made approximately 51 telephone calls to Respondent at his office from December, 1974 through April, 1975. On one occasion, she was involved in an automobile accident and came to Respondent's office where he examined her and referred her to an orthopedist. On April 19, 1975, at 11:24 p.m. Deputy Sheriff William Daggett of the Hillsborough County Sheriff's office was dispatched to assist fire and rescue personnel at Burton's residence in the Castellano Apartments. When he arrived at the apartment, rescue personnel were working on Cassandra Burton who was unconscious. Another Deputy Sheriff and Respondent were also present. Daggett proceeded to obtain information concerning the matter from Respondent, who was not under suspicion at the time. Respondent said that Burton had called him at 10:50 p.m., and told him that she had fallen down in the bathroom and was not feeling well. At that point, according to Respondent, the phone went dead as if it had been dropped. He decided to go to her apartment and arrived there about 25 minutes later, after stopping to purchase and eat an ice cream cone. He related that when he arrived at the apartment he found Burton sitting in a chair with the telephone cord around her throat area and that he could not tell whether she was breathing. He then called fire/rescue for assistance and commenced giving her artificial respiration. Respondent told Deputy Sheriff Daggett that although he had been Burton's doctor approximately a year before, he was presently seeing her only socially. A few days after Burton's death, Respondent called Jennifer Ross and said that he wanted to explain what had happened to Sally Burton. He told her that she had died from fibrillation of the heart, which was connected with some diuretic pills that she had been taking. Ross asked him if her death had anything to do with the abortion and he said "no". He asked her not to mention the abortion or his "relationship" with Burton to the police. On June 25, 1975, Respondent was indicted in the Hillsborough County Circuit Court for the premeditated murder of Cassandra (sic) Ann Burton, a/k/a Sally Burton, on April 19, 1976, by strangling her to death by means unknown, contrary to Florida Statutes, 782.04. On June 10, 1981, Respondent was found guilty of the crime of manslaughter and sentenced to imprisonment for fifteen years. Respondent testified at the hearing that he had terminated his physician-patient relationship with Burton in December, 1974 when he determined that she was seriously ill, not functioning well in group therapy, and needed long-term treatment. He recommended that she secure inpatient treatment and suggested that she see Dr. Arturo D. Gonzalez for this purpose. However, she did not wish to do so. On several occasions in 1975, Respondent let Burton borrow his car while he was out of state. He conceded that he had seen her after terminating her as a patient and decided to talk to her on occasions. He testified that he had induced her to attend a Bible class that he had been attending since the early 60's and that he would speak to her briefly once a week before the class. He denied ever having sexual intercourse with her and said that one of the reasons for his terminating her as a patient was due to the fact that she had vaginal herpes, which was always contagious in his opinion, and that he had had to treat several of his male patients who had been involved with her for urethral discharge. He claimed that she would pick up these patients at his office, and take them home with her. Respondent further testified that although he had arranged for Burton's abortion and accompanied her to the doctor's office for that purpose, he had not caused the pregnancy and did not pay for the abortion. Periodically in the past, he had referred patients who became pregnant to physicians in the locality for abortions and maintained an office file listing physicians who performed this procedure. Respondent testified that on the evening of April 19, 1975, he was conducting a group therapy session in his office and finished about 10:50 p.m. He later received several telephone calls from Burton from which he gained the impression that she might have taken some medication and could be physically ill, or that she was trying to get him over to her place to try to seduce him. He asked another patient, Christine Carlton, to accompany him to Burton's apartment to ascertain her condition, but she declined to go with him at that time. Respondent testified that he had asked Burton to call a cab or an ambulance, but she insisted that he come over to her apartment, stating that she was "too dizzy" to drive out herself. He testified that he then proceeded to her apartment after stopping to buy an ice cream cone, since he had not eaten all day. He did not believe there was a genuine emergency because of Burton's history of "rescue" fantasies and, in any event, thought he would have several hours if she had actually taken an overdose of drugs. When he arrived at Burton's apartment, he found her in a chair facing the door, and she did not respond to his greeting. He saw blueness in her legs and took her pulse, and patted her on the face. He picked her up, put her on the couch and checked her corneal reflex, and then started artificial respiration. He called the emergency squad while administering artificial respiration. He testified that when he heard the approaching sirens of the rescue squad, he went out on the apartment landing and saw a man ducking behind the bushes. He also testified that he had seen someone running down the stairs when he first arrived at the apartment. He denied strangling Burton. Dr. Joan Wood, Deputy Chief Medical Examiner for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, testified that, although the medical examiner, Dr. Feegel, had originally determined that Burton's death was caused by strangulation, he modified his opinion in his testimony at Respondent's trial to include the possibility of accidental death. Dr. Wood has reviewed all of the medical reports concerning thee deceased, and is of the opinion that the pathological studies and reports are insufficient upon which to determine the cause of death within a reasonable medical certainty. As a result of the foregoing findings, the following additional findings are made: Insufficient competent evidence was presented to establish that Respondent had a sexual relationship with Cassandra Burton and that he caused her pregnancy. Although the evidence shows that Respondent's association with Burton was of such a nature as to greatly exceed the bounds of a normal psychiatrist-patient .relationship, it was generally in keeping with his compulsive personality which, as described by Dr. Warren, the examining psychiatrist, involved a tendency to try and please women, particularly hysterical ones. Other expert and lay testimony showed him to be an individual who became excessively involved with his patients. At the time of the death of Cassandra "Sally" Burton on April 19, 1975, for which Respondent was thereafter found guilty of manslaughter, Respondent was acting in the role of a psychiatrist or physician, as evidenced by the deceased's request to him for medical assistance and his attempted response thereto in such capacity. (Testimony of Respondent, Burdette, Freeman, Daggett, Ross, Adams, Wood, Silverman, Jones, Carlton, Mezrah, Thomas, Gardner, Ricker, Petitioner's Exhibits 12-16, 21, Respondent's Exhibits 4-5, 8). It was the practice of Respondent to have his secretary, Jean Jones, prepare his yearly applications to the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, for renewal of his registration to dispense controlled substances pursuant to Federal law and regulation. She customarily prepared the application which was signed by Respondent and, in years prior to 1980, he had obtained registration to dispense Schedule II through V controlled substances. His application for renewal of registration which expired on November 30, 1979 was prepared by a different secretary due to Jones' absence, and the application signed by Respondent inadvertently reflected a request for renewal of authority to dispense only Schedule III and IV substances. Respondent was unaware that his registration renewal did not include authority to dispense Schedule II drugs. During the period March 6 through October 31, 1980, Respondent prescribed Class II controlled substances without proper registration to Lileen Dunn for Mepergan Fortis and Percodan, Anne Pizzo for Dexedrine, William Gray for Ritalin, Nick Douzanis for Desoxyn, Patty Crist for Amytal, Elio Alvarez, Jr. for Quaaludes, John Adams for Dexedrine, Harold Wyatt for Quaaludes, Karen Berrian and Janet Anifant for Dexamyl. On October 2, 1980, Respondent prescribed Noctec for himself which was filled at a Tampa pharmacy. Noctec is a Schedule IV controlled substance. Thomas Rowley had taken his wife to Respondent for treatment in the summer of 1980 and such treatment continued into December of that year. Although Respondent had provided Rowley with some samples of Noctec for his wife, and prescribed medicine for her in Rowley's name to prevent Mrs. Rowley from taking an overdose of medicine, Rowley had never received or obtained Noctec on a prescription which named Respondent as the patient. Respondent's registration to dispense controlled substances has included Schedule II drugs for 1981 and 1982. (Testimony of Jones, Dodd, Paige, Rowley, Petitioner's Exhibits 1-3, Respondents Exhibits 2, 7). Respondent's driver's license was suspended for driving infractions in October, 1976 and reinstated in June, 1978. After Respondent returned a car he had borrowed from a patient, Pierce Brereton found a Florida driver's license in the glove compartment in the name off Albert Bela Klein, but bearing a photograph of Respondent. Kein had died on June 24, 1972, but records of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles show that three speeding Violations were charged against his license in 1977-78. (Testimony of Brereton, Petitioner's Exhibits 9-11) Pursuant to an Order issued by the Secretary, Department of Professional Regulation, on June 11, 1981, under subsection 458.331(1)(s), Florida Statutes, Respondent submitted to a psychiatric evaluation by Dr. George L Warren of Clearwater, Florida during the period July 31--August; 17, 1931. In addition, psychological testing of Respondent was performed by Dr. Richard N. Fran on August 7, 1981 As a result of the examination and testing, Dr. Warren concluded that Respondent suffered from a mild degree of impairment, most likely due to alcohol abuse which had caused some degree of brain damage, and a compulsive personality disorder. However, he did not feel that Respondent was suffering from a sufficient mental or emotional impairment which would adversely impact on his ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients. When he testified at the hearing, Dr. Warren disclosed that Respondent had contacted him the night before and disclosed that he had "borrowed" a driver's license during the pendency of criminal charges against him. Respondent had not disclosed this information to Warren during the previous psychiatric examination Dr. Warren testified on direct examination that the possession and use of the false driver's license by Respondent constituted antisocial behavior and than as a result of Respondent's disclosure, he would modify his opinion to find that Respondent was not able to practice medicine with skill and safety to patients. However, upon cross-examination, he stated that that fact alone would not change his opinion, but that he would have to reevaluate the case based on the factual correctness of matters contained in various hypothetical questions posed to him which were based upon the other charges in the Administrative Complaints. (Testimony of Warren, Petitioner's Exhibit 22, Respondent's Exhibit 1). Respondent has been treated by a psychiatrist during the past year and, in his opinion, Respondent is a highly intelligent, well qualified psychiatrist who is competent to practice his profession. Additionally, several psychiatrists who have known Respondent in the past are of the same opinion. (Testimony of Afield, Gardner, Silverman, Thomas, Respondent's Exhibit 9).
Recommendation That Petitioner Board of Medical Examiners revoke the license of Respondent Louis J. Tsavaris to practice medicine pursuant to Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of August, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of August, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah J. Miller, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Grover C. Freeman, Esquire 4600 West Cypress, Suite 410 Tampa, Florida 33607 William S. Lancaster, Esquire 1715 Tampa Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Frank Ragano, Esquire 620 East Twiggs Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael Schwartz, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact GENERAL In November 1983, Pasco filed an application with DHRS to build and operate a freestanding psychiatric and substance abuse facility in Pasco County. Pasco is a Florida corporation and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Florida Health Facilities, Inc., which is a wholly owned subsidiary of United Medical Corporation (UMC). DHRS' initial notice of intent to deny Pasco's application was issued on April 13, 1984. On May 3, 1984, Pasco timely filed its petition for formal administrative hearing. (DOAH Case No. 84-1933). Thereafter, DHRS reconsidered its initial decision, and on November 20, 1984, DHRS and Pasco entered into a Stipulation, and DHRS issued CON No. 3053 to Pasco in February 1985. (DOAH Case No. 84-1933 was subsequently, dismissed as the result of this reconsideration.) Following publication of DHRS' decision to issue the CON, petitions for formal hearing were filed by Horizon and Hernando, UPC, CHNPR, and Harborside Hospital, Inc., and petitions to intervene were filed by Community Care, Morton Plant and PIA Medfield, Inc., d/b/a Medfield Center. The petitions were consolidated and resulted in the cases at bar--DOAH Consolidated Case Nos. 85-0780, 85-1513 and 85-2346. Harborside Hospital, Inc., Petitioner in Case No. 85-2392, and PIA Medfield, Inc., d/b/a Medfield Center, Intervenor in Case No. 85-0780, subsequently voluntarily dismissed their petitions and are not parties to this proceeding. Horizon is a freestanding psychiatric facility located at 11300 U.S. 19 South, Clearwater, in Pinellas County, in District V. Hernando is an approved, as of September 1984, but as yet unopened 50-bed freestanding psychiatric facility to be located at the intersection of S.R. 50 and Clay Street in Brooksville, Hernando County. Hernando County is in District III. Hernando's bed complement will consist of 35 short-term psychiatric beds, 15 short-term substance abuse beds and a 10-bed crisis stabilization unit. UPC is an approved but yet unopened 114-bed psychiatric teaching facility to be located on the campus of the University of South Florida in Hillsborough County, in District VI. Its bed complement does not include licensed substance abuse beds. CHNPR is a 414-bed acute care hospital located in Pasco County, Florida, in District V. As part of its bed complement, the hospital operates a 46-bed psychiatric unit. Its complement does not include licensed substance abuse beds. Morton Plant is a 745-bed acute care hospital located in Pinellas County, District V. As part of its bed complement, the hospital operates a 42-bed psychiatric unit. Its bed complement does not include licensed substance abuse beds. Community Care is an approved but as yet unopened 88-bed psychiatric facility to be located in Citrus County in District Its bed complement includes 51 short-term psychiatric beds and 37 long-term substance abuse beds. Its bed complement does not include licensed short-term substance abuse beds. Pasco originally proposed to construct and develop an 80-bed short-term psychiatric and substance abuse facility, composed of 60 general adult beds, 10 adolescent beds and 10 substance abuse beds (Exhibit 4). As a result of negotiations with DHRS, Pasco revised its proposal to a 72-bed facility composed of 35 general adult beds, 20 adolescent beds and 17 substance abuse beds (Exhibit 4, paragraph 1; Exhibit 11). As a condition to DHRS' agreement to grant the Certificate of Need, Pasco has agreed to provide at least 10 percent of its patient days to residents of Pasco County eligible under the provisions of the Baker Act or who are indigent, and to locate its facility no less than five miles east of the intersection of U.S. Highway 19 and County Road 587 (Exhibit 4, paragraphs 3, 4). The revised project cost, excluding working capital, totals $6,328,981.00 (Exhibit 6). BED NEEDS Applications for certificates of need must be consistent with criteria contained in Section 381.494(6)(c) as well as applicable rules of the agency. Subsection 1 of Section 381.494(6)(c) requires DHRS determine the proposal is consistent with: The need for the health care facilities and services and hospices being proposed in relation to the applicable district plan and State Health Plan adopted pursuant to Title XV of the Public Health Service Act except in emergency circumstances which pose a threat to the public health. The State Health Plan adopted addresses need through the year 1987, which is not the target year applicable to this case. The Plan indicates the need for short-term psychiatric and substance abuse beds should be determined based on the need methodologies found in Chapter 10-5.11(25) and 10-5.11(27) (Exhibit 27, page 6). DHRS' rules establish specific criteria to be used in evaluating and acting on CON applications for psychiatric and substance abuse services and facilities. Chapter 10-5.11(25) and 3-5.11(27), Florida Administrative Code. Psychiatric Bed Need In District V Rule 5-11.25, Florida Administrative Code, allocates .35 beds per 1,000 population in each district for psychiatric beds. Of those, not less than .15 per 1,000 population may be allocated within acute care general hospital settings and no more than .20 per 1,000 population may be located in freestanding psychiatric facilities. The differentiations recognize Medicaid reimburses facilities for psychiatric services provided in the acute hospital setting, but not in the freestanding setting, assuring at least some financial access to services for Medicaid patients and allows the agency, from a policy standpoint, to weigh the cost and benefits of building new facilities on one hand against adding additional beds at existing facilities (Exhibit 26, page 3). The Office of Comprehensive Health Planning, under the signature of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Health Planning and Development, has published the agency's Short-Term Psychiatric Bed Counts and Projected Bed Needs for 1990. On a district wide basis, the agency's document indicates a total gross need for 401 beds. There exist 372 licensed beds and no CON approved but unlicensed beds in District V. Morton Plant received preliminary approval for 22 beds but its application was subsequently denied by Final Order. See, Morton F. Plant Hospital Assn., Inc. v. DHRS, DOAH Case No. 83-1275, Final Order Oct. 8, 1985. Therefore, there currently exists a net projected need for 29 short-term psychiatric beds in District V for 1990. Final approval of the application here would result in a district surplus of 26 beds, an increase in beds of less than 7 percent over the projected 1990 numerical need. This 26-bed surplus would replace the 29-bed need after the 55 beds granted to Pasco are considered (Exhibit 27, pages 15-16). The projected numerical surplus for psychiatric beds in District V is due to an excess of 114 beds located in South Pinellas County. However, access problems to Pasco residents may, in fact, be one of the reasons for this excess (Exhibit 10, page 3). Rule 10-5.11(25) projects the need at the district level, leaving the specific allocation to the agency and to the Local Health Council by identifying particular areas within the district that may need additional beds through use of the Local Health Plan (Exhibit 26, page 3). The Local Health Council's 1985 plan projects needed beds to the target year 1990 and projects need by subdividing District V on a geographic basis of East and West Pasco and North and South Pinellas Counties (Exhibit 8, page 110, Tables 8 and 11; Exhibit 10, page 2). The Plan establishes subdistricts identical to those subdistricts which have been designated for acute care beds (Exhibit 8, page 110, Tables 8 and 11; Exhibit 10, page 2; Exhibit 27, page 8). The subdistrict concept evidences a rational division of the District's population and healthcare communities (Exhibit 10, page 2; Exhibit 27, page 8). In view of the poor transportation situation in Pasco County as well as traffic congestion along U.S. Highway 19, especially during the tourist period, an access problem exists for patients and their families seeking psychiatric and substance abuse inpatient services (Exhibit 10, page 2). In 1990, Pasco County's population will reach 286,488. This total is broken down into East and West Pasco County, with population projected to be 88,811 and 197,677, respectively. Application of the numerical need methodology to the Pasco population indicates a projected need for 101 psychiatric beds in Pasco County, allocating 70 beds to West Pasco and 31 beds to East Pasco, to insure adequate services are provided to all residents of the County (Exhibit 26, page 3). Recognizing the existence of 46 psychiatric beds at Community in West Pasco, there remains a projected need for 24 psychiatric beds in West Pasco County. With no existing psychiatric beds being located in East Pasco County, between the two areas there is an estimated need for 55 psychiatric beds in the County as a whole, the precise number of short-term psychiatric inpatient beds sought for approval by Pasco (Exhibit 26, page 3). Applying the allocation portion of the rule for freestanding facilities to Pasco County residents, there is indicated a net need for beds in freestanding settings of 58 beds by the year 1990. The grant of 55 beds to the applicant in this case is, therefore, consistent with the provision of the rule (Exhibit 26, pages 3, 4). Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)7 recognizes that an applicant proposing to build a new but separate short-term psychiatric facility should have a minimum of 50 beds. There is no practical manner within which to approve a facility in East Pasco County at the present time, based solely on the East Pasco population, since the numerical need is only 31 (Exhibit 26, page 3). From a health planning standpoint, it is practical to build a facility in the middle of the County, as proposed here. The impact upon existing providers is lessened by its location while at the same time the facility has the ability to obtain patients from all portions of the County. A facility located farther east would not be financially feasible as a result of the low base population (Exhibit 26, page 3). According to Rule 10-5.11(25)(e)7, "short term inpatient hospital psychiatric services should be available within a maximum travel time of 45 minutes under average travel conditions for at least 90% of the service area's population." Conversely stated, not more than 10% of the Pasco service area population should be outside this time/travel standard. The Pasco proposed project meets the objectives of this criterion and improves geographic access to psychiatric care for Pasco County residents (Exhibit 28, page 3). Unlike a psychiatric unit in a general acute care medical hospital, it is not possible for the psychiatric beds proposed here to be used for acute medical purposes. The concept of a focused, single-purpose facility is also in keeping with the goal of the District Mental Health Board Plan which indicates the need to develop centralized inpatient services in Pasco County. Rule 10-5.11(25) (e)1 (Exhibit 28, page 5). The Local Health Plan notes that it would be cost effective to apply a 75 percent average occupancy threshold for psychiatric and substance abuse services within the service area when considering additional inpatient facilities or services of this type. It also indicates that facts such as patient origin and accessibility should be considered within the need for beds. The plan notes that individuals from Pasco County have had to seek Baker Act services outside of the County and even the District. Thus, access to inpatient care for the indigent psychiatric patient is recognized to be a problem in Pasco County (Exhibit 8; Exhibit 27, pages 11-12; TR-84, lines 16-25; TR-85, lines 16-25; TR-93, lines 23-25; TR-94, line 1). According to the-plan, Baker Act and indigent residents of Pasco County must travel to facilities in District VI to obtain these services. Additionally, with respect to the need for beds, the Local Health Plan indicates that if the subdistrict analysis is accepted, then the need for psychiatric and substance abuse beds is greatest in Pasco County. The plan also notes that while past utilization of the psychiatric unit which exists in West Pasco County would seem to suggest low demand in the County, the low utilization stems in part from the restriction of access to private pay and involuntary patients (Exhibit 27, page 12). According to the plan, services are only being provided to private pay, voluntary patients; consequently, indigent patients are not being served. Baker Act patients who are involuntarily admitted have not been served (Exhibit 27, pages 12-13; TR-374, lines 2-25; TR-376, lines 21-25; TR-377, lines 1- 11). The applicant is proposing to allocate a combined total of at least 10 percent of its patient days to Baker Act and indigent patients, clearly assisting in meeting this need (Exhibit 27, pages 17-18). The Local Health Plan represents local statements and input addressing the needs within the community. The application meets and is consistent with the standards noted in the existing and approved Local Health Plan for District V (Exhibit 10, page 3), a specific requirement of Rule 10-5. 11(25 (e) 1. The applicant initially projected an occupancy rate of 71 percent of the second year and approximately 83 percent of the third year of operation satisfying the criterion contained in Rule 10-5.11.(25)(d), Florida Administrative Code. Subsection (d)(5) recommends that a project would normally not be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing short- term inpatient psychiatric beds in the district is at or exceeds 75 percent for the preceding 12-month period. DHRS has interpreted this to be the average annual occupancy rate for all facilities for the short-term psychiatric beds within the service district, because the rule refers to the annual occupancy rate for existing beds in the service district, rather than to facilities (Exhibit 27, page 16). During the 12-month period July 1, 1984 through June 30, 1985 the existing short-term psychiatric facilities in District V reported an average of 75 percent occupancy level (Exhibit 27, page 17). Rule 10-5.11(25), Florida Administrative Code, indicates that a favorable determination may be made even when criteria other than those specified in the numeric need methodology, as provided further in Subsection (e) of Chapter 10- 5.11(25), are not met. This would also be true when applying the other criteria utilized in Section 381.494(6)(c) (Exhibit 27, page 13). Considering all these factors and the benefits that the proposed project would bring, there is a projected need for the 55 proposed short-term psychiatric beds shown under Rule 10- 5.11(25) (Exhibit 27, pages 22-23). Substance Abuse Bed Need In District V Rule 10-5.11(27) establishes a bed-to-population ratio of .06 beds per 1,000 population for the projected year in question (Exhibit 26, page 4). The need methodology, as applied to District V for 1990, shows a total need for 69 short-term substance abuse beds in District V. There are presently 74 licensed short-term substance abuse beds in District V and no additional CON approval. This results in a surplus of five beds in the district, without including the 17 beds approved for Pasco Psychiatric Center. (Exhibit 10, page 3, Exhibit 27, pages 23- 24). The Local Health Council has projected a need through 1990 for 17 substance abuse beds, using the State's formula contained in Rule 10-5.11(25) and 10.5.11(27) and applying the formula on a subdistrict basis (Exhibit A, page 118, table 11; Exhibit 10, page 2). Subsection (h)(l) contains a suggested standard of 80 percent occupancy rate in the District for the past 12 months. During the period from July 1, 1984 through June 30, 1985 reporting substance abuse bed facilities reported an average occupancy level of 88 percent. DHRS has determined there exist 22 short-term substance abuse beds at Horizon Hospital. However, Horizon does not report its utilization of those beds separately, but includes them within its reported short-term psychiatric beds (Exhibit 27, page 25). Much in the same manner as the short-term psychiatric rule, Rule 10-5.11(27)(h)3 refers to the Local Health Plan and consistency with local need determinations. According to the plan, there is a projected need in the two Pasco subdistricts for 17 short-term substance abuse beds by application of the numerical methodology .06 beds per 1,000 population to Pasco County. There are no short-term substance abuse beds available or approved in the Pasco County subdistricts (Exhibit 27, pages 11, 25-26). Rule 10-5.11(27)(h)4 establishes a minimum unit size of 10 designated beds. Additional calculation reveals that the numerical need for 17 beds is broken down into 12 beds in the . West Pasco area and five in East Pasco. Because of the minimum size requirement, there is no reasonable way for a unit to be built solely based on the East county portion of the numerical need. Consequently, a proper health planning alternative is to approve the 17-bed unit, which will be centrally located to serve both portions of the County (Exhibit 26, page 4). A Certificate of Need may be approved where need is determined through criteria other than the numeric need methodology. For example, criteria in Section 381.494(6)(c) and in subparagraph (f) of Rule (27) may indicate that need is demonstrated for the project beyond the numerical formula (Exhibit 27, page 23). Upon analysis of all the factors contained within the rule, the applicant meets the need for the Pasco subdistricts. AREAS OF CONSIDERATION IN ADDITION TO BED NEEDS A. Availability, Utilization, Geographic Accessibility And Economic Accessibility The availability, quality of care, efficiency, appropriateness, accessibility, extent of utilization and adequacy of like and existing health care services and hospices in the service district of the applicant. Section 381.494 (6) (c) 2 A number of hospital facilities serve District V's residents in need of psychiatric and substance abuse health care services (Exhibit 10, page 16 and 17, tables 9 and 10). Of these, Anclote Manor's patients have an average length of stay of more than two years. Anclote is licensed as a long-term care facility (Ibid., Exhibit 28, page 3) St. Anthony's Hospital, Mease Hospital and Suncoast Hospital have not contested the agency's initial decision to grant this application, leaving only Morton Plant and Horizon in Pinellas County and CHNPR in Pasco County as District V parties objecting to the application. CHNPR's patients are predominantly geriatric (Exhibit 28, page 3). During 1984 the utilization of psychiatric beds at Morton Plant was 137 percent. Hospitals in North Pinellas County show an average 100 percent utilization of their psychiatric beds for the period (Exhibit 35, pages 10 and 11). However, for the same period, utilization of CHNPR's psychiatric unit was 50 percent. Ibid. During the last available 12-month period of information (July 1, 1984 through June 30, 1985), the existing short-term psychiatric facilities in District V reported an average occupancy level of 75 percent (Exhibit 27, pages 16-17). Based upon utilization of less than 75 or 80 percent, there may exist underutilized beds for psychiatric services at Horizon Hospital (TR-798, lines 19-20). However, this conclusion is based upon the assumption that Horizon is licensed for 200 psychiatric beds (TR-798, lines 21-23). DHRS however, considers that Horizon is licensed (License 1809) for 178 psychiatric beds (TR-800, lines 10-15). Consequently, the number of licensed psychiatric beds affects the occupancy rates at Horizon. In order to determine access or demand within a community, factors besides utilization must be looked at (TR-887, lines 13-21). A number of other factors may and in this case do, in fact, affect occupancy rates (TR-887, lines 13-21). In addition to location, the existence of semi-private rooms, sex and age segregation policies adopted by various facilities, and corporate decisions artifically impede access and thus affect utilization and occupancy rates (TR-431, lines 9-13; TR-883, lines 12-24, 25; TR-884, lines 1-10). CHNPR's low occupancy rates are affected by the facility's location, lack of a commitment to indigents medically underserved patients, as well as its lack of segregation of psychiatric beds between adults and children (TR-392, lines 24- 25; TR-393, lines 1-9; TR-397, lines 13-19; TR-398, lines 4- 10).and 13; TR 883, lines 12-24, 25; TR-884, lines 4-10). Pasco residents have been forced to seek inpatient psychiatric and substance abuse services outside the County for years (Exhibit 21, page 1). The location of CHNPR in the western part of the county makes services inaccessible to residents of the eastern part of the county (TR-397, lines 1319; TR-398, lines 4-10). No facility exists in Pasco County that contains the proper housing for adolescents who need psychiatric services (Exhibit 21, page 2). Rainbow House, an adolescent residential care center in Dade City, can accommodate a very limited number of children and is not prepared to handle acutely ill children (TR-399, lines 5- 9). While CHNPR's psychiatric unit is designated for 46 beds, only 26 beds are available for psychiatric services. The dramatic changes in occupancy at Community Hospital of New Port Richey from 80 percent to 40 percent indicate the psychiatric beds are used for acute medical purposes (Exhibit 22, page 2). Without a public transportation system in Pasco County, travel time for Pasco residents and their families is a problem (TR-401, lines 14-25; TR-402, lines 1-23). A major portion of Pasco residents who have been provided inpatient services are provided those services by facilities located one hour away (Exhibit 22, page 2; Exhibit 23, pages 1-2; TR-397, lines 7-16). The access problem is more acute for the elderly, which comprise 32.7 percent of Pasco's population compared to 19.3 percent for all of Florida projected to 1990 (Exhibit 26, page 2). The distance to facilities serving Pasco County residents is sufficiently great as to make follow-up care very difficult, preventing family involvement, and making treatment inefficient (TR-325, lines 7-25; TR-408, lines 1-8; TR-436, lines 12-25). Based upon a July 1985 population of 240,204 approximately 13 percent of Pasco County residents are not within a 45-minute total travel time to a psychiatric facility in District V. This number is expected to increase to 19 percent of the County's population by 1990 (Exhibit 18, page 17, figures 10 and 11; page 14 and figure 13, page 15). United Medical Corporation (UMC), which owns Pasco, has a history of providing services to indigents and medically underserved (Exhibit 13, page 2) and in particular to residents of Pasco County. Ibid. This is based upon UMC's former ownership of Tampa Heights Hospital. At that time it was the facility that admitted Baker Act patients from Pasco County (Exhibit 10, page 3; Exhibit 13, page 2). CHNPR's recent corporate decision to take Baker Act patients is not persuasive as to the issue of access to indigents and medically under served (Exhibit 27, pages 19-20). The timing of the agreement with the Pasco and Hernando Human Development Councils during the pendency of these proceedings indicates, at a minimum, that the application here has already favorably affected access to these citizens. CHNPR's policy with respect to indigents, Medicaid and the medically underserved residents reduces the accessibility of these patients to its facility. See Turro v. DHRS and CHNPR v. DHRS, DOAH Case Nos. 83-005 and 83- 092, Recommended Order September 7, 1983, Final order October 25, 1983, 6 FALR 336, et seq. The proposed project will be accessible to residents in need of psychiatric and substance abuse services in District V. NEED FOR SPECIAL EQUIPMENT The need in the service district of the applicant for special equipment and services which are not reasonably and economically accessible in adjoining areas. Section 381.494 (6) (c) 6. Although an issue in this proceeding, no evidence was presented as to the applicability of this criterion or the applicant's consistency or inability to meet this criterion. It is thus specifically found that this criterion is not applicable. NEED FOR RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES The need for research and educational facilities including but not limited to institutional training programs and community training programs for health care practitioners and for doctors of osteopathy and medicine at the student internship and residency training level. Section 381.494(6)(c)7,. Although an issue in this proceeding, no evidence was presented as to the applicability of this criterion or the applicant's consistency or inability to meet this criterion. It is specifically found that this criterion is not applicable. AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES The ability of the applicant to provide quality of care. Section 381.494(6) (c)3. The availability of resources including health manpower, management personnel and funds for capital and operating expenditures for project accomplishment and operation; the effects the project will have on clinical needs of health professional training programs in the service district; the extent to which the services will be accessible to schools for health professions in the service district for training purposes if such services are available in the limited number of facilities; the availability of alternative uses of such resources for the provision of other health services; and the extent to which the proposed services will be accessible to all residents of the service district. Section 381.494 ( 6) (c) 8. Management and Quality of Care UMC, the parent corporation, has at its disposal management personnel and will be able to obtain health manpower to accomplish the project (Exhibit 12, page 2; Exhibit 13, pages 1-2). UMC presently owns and operates three psychiatric hospitals (Exhibit 11, page 1). The facility will have at its disposal UMC's services in the areas of management and recruitment. UMC has successfully recruited physicians and other health care providers in the past (Exhibit 13, page 1) lines 1-5; TR-332, lines 19-21). The applicant will be able to adequately staff and, manage the facility and provide quality care to its patients in the service area. Funds for Capitol and Operating Expenditure UMC has obtained a commitment from Freedom Savings & Loan Association to finance the project (Exhibit 14, page 2) and will therefore be able to obtain the financing necessary to build and operate the facility. No evidence was presented to show the project will have a detrimental effect on clinical needs of health professional training programs in the district for training. Financial Feasibility The facility will be financed through a construction loan with a 5-year permanent financing package at a rate of prime plus one and one-half percent floating and a two percent fee (Exhibit 14, page 1). The projections contained in Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 5 as well as the underlying assumptions indicate the figures represent reasonable and accurate estimates of income and expenses that will be incurred in the event the Certificate of Need is issued (Exhibit 9, page 1; Exhibit 11, pages 2-3; Exhibit 12, pages 1-2; Exhibit 13, pages 1-2; Exhibit 15, page 2; Exhibit 17, pages 1-2; Exhibit 25, pages 6-9). Note: See also, Hoefle's testimony. CHNPR contends that the projected ALOS should be considered at CHNPR's level. However, the ALOS at CHNPR's psychiatric unit is directly affected by the influx of Baker Act patients and contractual limitations (TR-921, lines 19-25; TR- 922, lines 1-2; TR-452, lines 14-17; TR-453, lines 5-12). In the final analysis the financial feasibility of the proposal will depend to a large degree on whether physicians will admit patients to the facility. Doctors Vesley and Rudajev will support the facility when built and their projections as to the numbers of patients and ALOS are reasonable (TR-292, lines 17-18; TR-293, lines 4-7; TR-293, lines 12-15; TR-295, line 16; TR-317, lines 19-24; TR-324, lines 13-24; TR-325, lines 1-2; TR-336, lines 19-22; TR-332, lines 19-21). It is reasonable that other physicians in Pasco County will locate in the area surrounding the hospital and will support the facility once it is opened (TR- 413, lines 7-17; TR-792, lines 2-9). The needs and circumstances of those entities which provide a substantial portion of their services or resources or both to individuals not residing in the service district in which the entities are located or in adjacent service districts. Such entities may include medical and other health professions, schools, multi-disciplinary clinics and specialty services such as open-heart surgery, radiation therapy and renal transplantation. Section 381.494 (6) (c) 11. No evidence was presented indicating the applicability of this criterion or the applicant's ability or inability to meet this criterion. I find this criterion not applicable. AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH CARE ALTERNATIVES The availability and adequacy of other health care facilities and services and hospices in the service district of the applicant, such as outpatient care and ambulatory or home care services which may serve as alternatives for the health care facilities and services to be provided by the applicant. Section 381.494 (6) (c) 4. At the time of hearing, no alternatives to the application proposed were presented. Nor was other evidence presented to indicate alternatives to the proposed facility and services are, in fact, available at the time of this proceeding. Other than CHNPR no facilities located in Pasco County provides inpatient psychiatric services (TR-400, lines 21 25; TR- 4 01, lines 1-3). Probable economies and improvements in service that may be derived from operation of joint, cooperative or shared health care resources. Section 381.494 (6) (c) 5. The facility will share resources with other facilities owned or operated by UMC such as common training and joint purchasing (Exhibit 11, page 1); financial management (Exhibit 12); financing (Exhibit 14); and recruitment and marketing (Exhibit 13). These shared resources will provide economies and improve services presently available in District V. IMPACT UPON EXISTING FACILITIES AND COSTS AND COMPETITION The probable impact of the proposed project on the cost of providing health services proposed by the applicant upon consideration of factors including but not limited to the effects of competition on the supply of health services being proposed and the improvements or innovations in the financing and delivery of health services which foster competition and service to promote quality assuance and cost effectiveness. Section 381.494 (6) (c) 12. Two hospitals in Pasco County in relatively close proximity to each other are owned by Hospital Corporation of America--Community Hospital of New Port Richey and Bayonet Point Medical Center--giving HCA 86 percent of all hospital beds in the West Pasco service area. The applicant's expert, Dr. Scott, compared statewide HCA hospital averages and daily pre-tax profits based on adjusted patient days with those at CHNPR and Bayonet Point, using 1982 actual hospital data reported to the Hospital Cost Containment Board. The data indicates a much higher than HCA average operating margin, total margin, daily gross revenues and daily pre-tax profits. In Pasco County, HCA shows profitability roughly double that of its statewide averages (Exhibit 25, pages 3-4). HCA has now acquired the nearby freestanding psychiatric hospital at the University of South Florida (Exhibit 25, pages 3-4; TR-854, lines 14-18). Without competition, HCA will not be required to compete in Pasco County for price or quality of care. Approval of the application should significantly reduce HCA's share of the Pasco-Hillsborough market in terms of beds and would positively affect competition and the delivery of health care services (Exhibit 25, page 5; Exhibit 27, pages 29-30). In 1985 CHNPR psychiatric unit's occupancy rate was 41 percent (Exhibit 41, page 4). Following execution of its Baker Act agreements, occupancy rose to 49.7 percent (TR-921, pages 5- 18). CHNPR is a large institution which grossed more than $1 million in pre-tax income based on 50 percent utilization (TR-998, lines 21-25). CHNPR projects that in 1987, 1988 and 1989 only 1 percent of its revenues will be derived from Medicaid patients and .9 percent will be derived from indigents (TR-915, lines 18- 25; TR-916, lines 1-5). Left without competition, HCA will continue to dominate the health care delivery system in Pasco County, a situation which should not be continued. (TR-620, lines 24-25; TR-621; TR- 622). Morton Plant's witness agreed there exists a need for additional psychiatric and substance abuse beds in Pinellas and Pasco Counties in District V (TR-829, lines 15-25; TR-833, lines 3-6). In 1984, approximately 4 percent of Morton Plant's psychiatric patients resided in Pasco County (TR-837, lines 14- 17). Morton Plant's psychiatric unit's occupancy rates have consistently exceeded 100 percent (TR-838, lines 3-6) and there is a waiting list at Morton Plant's adolescent unit (TR-843, lines 2-4). Morton Plant presented no evidence that issuing this CON to Pasco would substantially affect its psychiatric unit (TR- 826, line 25; TR-827, lines 1-25; TR-828, lines 1-9). UPC, now owned by HCA, is located outside District V. UPC, as a university hospital, is different from any other in Florida (TR-860, lines 17-24). It was UPC's mission as a research and teaching facility, and its regional concept of .referrals extending over 17 counties, that led to the grant of its application by DHRS (TR-860, line 25; TR-861, lines 1-21). UPC projected 30 percent of its patients would be referred from outside the area including Pasco County (TR-856, lines 6-11). This limitation was not considered by Dr. Fernandez in concluding that UPC would be adversely affected by the grant of the CON to Pasco. The effect upon UPC is further lessened when one considers the general availability of UPC's facility to the Pasco/District V community. In order to admit patients to the UPC facility, physicians must be members of the UPC faculty (TR- 857, lines 5-11). Eight of UPC's beds will be subject to admissions restricted to only two physicians (TR-857, line 25; TR-858, lines 1-25; TR-859, lines 1-20). Horizon and Hernando are owned by PIA. Horizon receives approximately 5 percent of its patients from Pasco County (TR-787, lines 23-25; TR-788, lines 1- 2). Approval of the Pasco facility may cause Horizon to lose 80 to 90 percent of its total 137 admissions from Pasco--109 to 123 admissions; however, this loss may occur with or without approval of this application (TR-792, lines 17-25; TR-793, lines 1-9). Horizon's expert's testimony regarding utilization was based upon Horizon being licensed for 200 psychiatric beds (TR- 798, lines 1-24); however, DHRS considers Horizon licensed for 178 (TR-798, lines 25; TR-799, lines 1-25; TR-800, lines 1-25; TR-801, lines 1-4). Hernando, located in District III, relied upon a need argument based solely on District III, not District V, in pursuing its CON application (TR-770, lines 18-25; TR-771, line 1). Hernando has previously defined its primary service area as only including Citrus and Hernando Counties, both in District III, and did not include Pasco County within its secondary service area, or for purposes of projecting its admission rates or feasibility (TR-771, lines 14-22; TR-772 lines 10-15; TR-775, lines 20-25; TR-776, lines 1-2; TR-777, lines 5- 16). Community Care has not determined a site for its facility in Citrus County (Exhibit 29, page 6, lines 9-11). Community Care opposes the application because its main concern is the reduction in market share that may be available to its facility (Exhibit 29, page 27, lines 2-6). In its CON application in 1983, Community Care relied only upon District III as its population base (Exhibit 29, page 8, lines 18-21; page 9, lines 19-25). Community Care relief upon the Local Health Plan in District III in establishing need (Exhibit 29, page 10, lines 1- 10) and relied solely upon Citrus and District III population growth as its patient base (Exhibit 29, page 10, lines 10-15). Community Care will not provide short-term substance abuse services (Exhibit 29, page 20, lines 12-18; page 25, lines 11-25). Approval of the Pasco facility will not increase the cost of health services in District V and will favorably affect present services, promoting more efficiency in the health delivery system. The effect of the approval, with its related conditions, will assure access to underserved residents who otherwise will continue at the mercy of the HCA facilities. 110. Approval will not substantially adversely affect providers within or outside District V. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE PROPOSALS The costs and methods of proposed con- struction, including the costs and methods of energy provision and the availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of construction. Section 381.49 (6) (c)13. In cases of capital expenditure proposals for the provision of new health services to inpatients, the department shall also reference each of the following its findings of fact: That less costly, more efficient, or more appropriate alternatives to such inpatient services are not available and the development of such alternatives has been studied and found not practicable. That existing inpatient facilities providing inpatient services similar to those proposed are being used in an appropriate and efficient manner. In the case of new construction, for example, modernization or sharing arrangements, have been considered and have been implemented to the maximum extent practicable. That patients will experience serious problems in obtaining inpatient care of the type proposed, in the absence of the proposed new service. Section 381.494 ( 6) (d) 1-4. The evidence indicates the costs and methods of the proposed construction are reasonable. The normal percentage of architectural and engineering fees are in the range of 5 percent to 7 percent of construction costs; in this case the architectural and engineering fees are approximately 6 percent. The construction costs of approximately $78 to $80 per square foot are reasonable for this type facility (Exhibit 15, page 2; Exhibit 17, pages 1-2). See also footnotes to paragraphs 86 and 87. Less costly, more efficient or more appropriate alternatives to the services proposed here are not available. No existing facility or applicant has filed an application seeking to provide services similar to those sought to be provided by this applicant for the target population year 1990. Existing inpatient facilities providing services similar to those proposed are being used in an appropriate and efficient manner. Utilization rates at existing district facilities when considered in light of accessibility including artificial barriers, indicate the facilities are being used in an appropriate and efficient manner. As noted earlier, alternatives to the project here at issue are not present. The lack of access, geographical, financial and artificial, to residents of Pasco County in need of psychiatric and substance abuse services, as well as the numerical need evidenced by application of the state-mandated need methodologies indicate that, absent the proposed service, patients will experience serious problems in obtaining psychiatric and substance abuse inpatient care.
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner timely filed his Petition for Relief, and if so, whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment act against Petitioner in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a white male. According to Respondent's unilateral Prehearing Stipulation, Petitioner began working as a correctional officer for Respondent in 1982 and was 56 years old when Respondent terminated his employment. Petitioner earned a bachelor-of-arts degree, with a major in criminal justice, from the University of Central Florida in 1994. Petitioner's undergraduate degree and his performance evaluations, which were entered into evidence, indicate that he had the necessary training and experience to work as a correctional officer. Respondent discovered that Petitioner was asleep on duty for the first time in 1989. This incident occurred while Petitioner was working the graveyard shift. Respondent subsequently suspended Petitioner from work for five days for this offense. Obstructive sleep apnea is a debilitating disease in which a person stops breathing for a prolonged period of time during sleep. It can affect a person's blood pressure and can ultimately result in death. The condition is aggravated by the patient's consumption of alcohol. In March 1995, Dr. W.W. Wahba, a chest disease specialist, wrote a letter entitled Letter of Medical Necessity. The letter states that Petitioner was first seen on March 9, 1995, that he had symptoms of obstructive sleep apnea, which needed diagnosis and treatment, and that he needed a polysomnogram and multiple sleep latency tests. In June 1995, Respondent's personnel department sent a letter to Petitioner, stating that there would be no exception to the employee health benefit plan's exclusions of coverage for a polysomnogram and multiple sleep tests. The letter advised Petitioner that if a doctor actually diagnosed him with sleep apnea, the health plan would cover expenses related to the treatment of that condition. Dr. John H. Krouse and Dr. Michael A. Munier are ear, nose, and throat surgeons. One of them gave Petitioner an in- office sleep apnea test and diagnosed him with obstructive sleep apnea. The test was not a polysomnogram. Dr. Hindrik Dinkla is a neurologist who specializes in sleep disorders. Dr. Dinkla prescribed and Respondent's employee health benefit plan provided a continuous positive applied pressure (CPAP) machine for Petitioner. A patient uses a CPAP machine when sleeping. The machine forces air into the lungs when the patient stops breathing. The CPAP machine is usually effective in controlling an obstructive sleep apnea problem. When a patient can tolerate the machine, its success is guaranteed. Petitioner, like some patients, was unable to successfully tolerate the CPAP machine. However, there is no record evidence that a doctor ever provided Respondent's employee health plan administrator with documentation to that effect. In June 1995, Dr. Krouse discussed with Petitioner the value of possible surgery versus continued use of the CPAP machine. Dr. Krouse informed Petitioner that the proposed surgery was not guaranteed to be 100 percent successful and that Petitioner might still be required to use the CPAP machine. A July 14, 1995, handwritten note from a nurse in Drs. Krouse and Munier's office is addressed "to whom it may concern." The note states that the office was waiting for approval of coverage of surgery from Petitioner's insurance company. A July 17, 1995, letter from the office of Drs. Krouse and Munier informed Petitioner that their office had contacted his insurance company for approval of proposed surgery. During the hearing, Petitioner testified that, on July 19, 1995, Respondent refused to accept a letter from Dr. Dinkla. According to Petitioner, Respondent advised Petitioner that he needed a letter from another doctor. However, the record does not contain a copy of the letter from Dr. Dinkla, the subject of which is unknown. Petitioner applied for a medical leave of absence for treatment of obstructive sleep apnea beginning July 17, 1995. Respondent approved this leave. This is the only accommodation for obstructive sleep apnea that Petitioner ever requested from Respondent. A letter dated August 11, 1995, from Dr. Hendrik Dinkla, states that Respondent had obstructive sleep apnea, which put him at risk occupationally and while driving, and that Petitioner should not work in dangerous surroundings until treated. At some point in time, Dr. Robert Merrell, who is an ear, nose, and throat surgeon, performed a surgical procedure on Petitioner's nasal passage to improve his airway. The operation was approved and paid for by Respondent's employee health benefit plan. Dr. Hendrik Dinkla sent Respondent a letter dated September 1, 1995. The letter informed Respondent that Petitioner was being treated for obstructive sleep apnea and that he appeared to be doing well. The letter concluded that it was appropriate for Petitioner to return to work and to driving. The letter does not state that Petitioner had any work restrictions. The record contains no competent evidence subsequent to September 1, 1995, indicating that Petitioner was not fit for duty. In March 1996, the Respondent's employee health benefit plan approved a CPAP machine for Petitioner for the second time. Additionally at or about the same time, Dr. Merrell determined that the operation on Petitioner's nasal passage had not cured or improved Petitioner's problem. However, there is no evidence that Dr. Merrell or any other doctor provided Respondent with information relating to Petitioner's continuing problems with obstructive sleep apnea. Dr. Richard Gaines is an oral and maxilla facial surgeon. Dr. Gaines first saw Petitioner on a referral from Dr. Merrell on March 21, 1996. Pursuant to Dr. Merrell's request, Dr. Gaines evaluated Petitioner to determine whether surgery to advance his upper and lower jaws would improve his airway. Such surgery is usually the last resort to attempt a correction of obstructive sleep apnea. The proposed jaw surgery would have required a three-day hospitalization and would have cost in excess of $20,000. During the hearing, Dr. Gaines testified that there was no guarantee that the proposed jaw surgery would correct or improve Petitioner's obstructive sleep apnea. In a letter dated April 19, 1996, Respondent's employee health plan administrator responded to Dr. Gaines's request for approval of the proposed jaw surgery. The letter states that coverage for the surgery was denied. The letter states that there was no clinical data documenting a trial of CPAP since the nasal repair and no abstinence from alcoholic beverages. Therefore, according to the letter, medical necessity for surgery for the obstructive sleep apnea was not established. The letter advised that Petitioner needed to provide documentation of intolerance of CPAP for at least one month after the nasal surgery plus abstinence from alcoholic beverages before surgical correction could be reconsidered for UPPP (not LAUP) and/or hyoid myotomy suspension. The letter states that only then could osteotomy be considered. There is no evidence that Dr. Gaines's request to the employee health benefit plan administrator for approval of a surgical procedure for Petitioner was ever communicated directly to Respondent. Dr. Gaines did not provide Respondent or Petitioner with information indicating that Petitioner was not fit for duty. Therefore, Respondent had no knowledge that Petitioner continued to suffer the effects of obstructive sleep apnea. In fact, the record reflects that Dr. Gaines provided Respondent with documentation, erroneously or not, indicating that the CPAP machine had been successful in Petitioner's case. In July 1996, Tim Rowand was a correctional officer who occasionally worked with Petitioner on Unit 10, the juvenile block. Mr. Rowand was aware that Petitioner was having problems of an unspecified nature. Mr. Rowand made an effort to relieve Petitioner to give him a break whenever it was possible to do so. During the first week of August 1996, Respondent discovered Petitioner asleep on the job for the second time. This incident occurred around noon on the day in question. On August 8, 1996, Respondent gave Petitioner written notice of Respondent's intent to terminate Petitioner's employment. The proposed action was based on Petitioner's being found asleep for the second time while on duty. Respondent's written notice of intent to terminate employment was not entered into evidence. Petitioner wrote a letter dated August 12, 1996, to Respondent's Director of Public Corrections. The letter discusses Petitioner's history of obstructive sleep apnea and requests a leave of absence, rather than termination, until after Petitioner had surgery and a chance to convalesce. Even this letter did not request an on-the-job accommodation. An August 15, 1996, letter from Dr. Robert A. Merrell was directed to Respondent's Director of Public Corrections. The letter states that Petitioner was under the care of multiple physicians for a sleep disturbance problem related to obstructive sleep apnea, that he was waiting for authorization of a surgical procedure to improve or eliminate the problem and to relieve his abnormal drowsiness, and that he had already had one surgical procedure and other attempts at medical treatment to help him with his problem. On September 5, 1996, Respondent issued a letter of dismissal, terminating Petitioner's employment, but giving him the right to appeal the decision. The letter of dismissal was not entered into evidence. Between the time that Dr. Dinkler gave Petitioner permission to return to work on September 1, 1995, and the time that Petitioner fell asleep on the job for the second time in August 1996, Petitioner never requested an on-the-job accommodation or a second medical leave of absence for his obstructive sleep apnea from a person on Respondent's staff in a supervisory, managerial, or administrative position. Petitioner never provided Respondent with documentation from a doctor indicating that Petitioner was not fit for duty between those two dates. Even if Petitioner had requested an on-the-job accommodation for his obstructive sleep apnea, it would have been impossible to place him exclusively in a low-risk position as a correctional officer. This is true because the primary job of correctional officers is the care, custody, and control of inmates. Therefore, correctional officers must be capable of working all posts and all shifts at all times regardless of their official assignment. The only accommodation that Respondent could have provided Petitioner, upon proper request, would have been to find him a job other than as a correctional officer. Petitioner never made such a request. Respondent's written policies specifically require correctional officers to remain alert on duty. The written policies state that sleeping on the job is an offense that subjects the offender to discipline including termination. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner was aware of this policy. By letter dated September 23, 1996, Petitioner filed an appeal of Respondent's decision to terminate his employment with Respondent's personnel board. Respondent originally scheduled the appeal hearing for November 26, 1996. The hearing of Petitioner's appeal of his employment termination took place as rescheduled on December 30, 1996. Counsel represented Petitioner at the appeal hearing. During the appeal hearing, Petitioner thought he recognized a member of Respondent's personnel board as one of his former classmates. Petitioner did not bring this fact to the attention of anyone during the appeal hearing. There is no evidence that the former classmate was prejudiced against Petitioner. Respondent's employee health benefit plan administrator wrote Dr. Gaines a letter dated December 5, 1996. The letter states that Petitioner's case had been reviewed and that he was not eligible for coverage of osteotomy because the procedure did not meet the plan's definition of medical necessity. The letter advised Dr. Gaines that Petitioner needed documentation of intolerance to at least a one-month trial of optimally titrated CPAP before the medical necessity for surgery could be established. The letter states that according to Dr. Dinkla's letter dated June 14, 1996, the CPAP has not been tailored to the patient's exact pressure needs. The letter concludes that, if the CPAP is not tolerated, a hymoid myotomy suspension could then be considered. Only then, according to the letter, would an osteotomy be considered by the employee health benefit plan administrator. Petitioner never contested this determination in any forum. At some point in time, Dr. Gaines suggested that Petitioner undergo an outpatient surgical procedure to move his chin button forward with the attachment of his tongue to improve his airway posterior to his tongue. Dr. Gaines subsequently performed the outpatient procedure on Petitioner's chin but it was not particularly successful. Therefore, Dr. Gaines referred Petitioner back to Dr. Merrell to determine whether Dr. Merrell should perform surgery in the roof of Petitioner's mouth in the soft palate to reduce his uvula and his soft palate. December 30, 1996, Florida Department of Insurance wrote Petitioner a letter stating that it does not have jurisdiction over self-insured plans such as the Respondent's self-funded employee benefit plan. The letter refers to the following statements from Respondent's employee health plan administrator: (a) osteotomy does not meet Plan's definition of medical necessity and therefore is not eligible for coverage; without documentation of intolerance to at least a one-month trial of optimally titrated CPAP, the medical necessity for surgery could not be established; and (3) if CPAP is not tolerated, a hyoid myotomy suspension could be considered. On January 6, 1997, Respondent denied Petitioner's appeal. The termination of his employment became final at that time. Four of Respondent's current correctional officers testified at the hearing. Lieutenant William C. McGraft testified that he was 51 years of age. Officer Tim Rowand testified that he was 35 years old. Officer Joseph D'Esposito testified that he was 45 years old. Sgt. Noble Gaethers testified that he was 55 years old.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Mathias Gerhard Serwas 4615 Spruce Creek Road Port Orange, Florida 32127 Matthew G. Minter, Esquire 123 West Indiana Avenue Deland, Florida 32720 Azizi M. Coleman, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Since 1976, Horizon Hospital or its predecessor has been licensed by HRS as a special psychiatric hospital with 200 beds. Its most current license, License No. 1316, authorizes Horizon to operate a special psychiatric hospital with 200 beds, and bears an expiration date of June 30, 1985. Horizon has never applied for a Certificate of Need for substance abuse beds. The 1983 session of the Legislature amended the hospital licensure law and the Certificate of Need law. Section 395.003(4), Florida Statutes, was amended, in pertinent part, to require that the number of beds for the rehabilitation or psychiatric service category for which HRS has adopted by rule a specialty bed need methodology must be specified on the face of the hospital license. Section 381.494(8)(g), Florida Statutes, was also amended to require that Certificates of Need include a statement of the number of beds approved for the rehabilitation or psychiatric service category for which HRS has adopted by rule a specialty bed need methodology. In April of 1983, HRS adopted Rules 10-5.11(25), (26) and (7), Florida Administrative Code, setting forth methodologies for determining the need for proposed new hospital beds for short-term psychiatric services, long-term psychiatric services and short- and long-term substance abuse services. The methodologies set forth in the rules for short-term psychiatric (Rule 10- 5.11(25)) and substance abuse (Rule 10-5.11(27) beds require, first, the application of a bed to population ratio to arrive at the total number of beds needed in a District, and then a subtraction of the number of existing and approved beds in that District to arrive at the number of additional beds needed at any particular time. Thus, in order to apply the methodologies and determine the actual number of beds needed in a District at any given time, the number of existing and approved beds in that District must be determined. HRS's Office of Comprehensive Health Planning therefore established an inventory of existing and approved short-term psychiatric and substance abuse beds for each of the HRS Districts. At the time of establishing its inventory, HRS hospital licenses did not distinguish between psychiatric and substance abuse beds in specialty hospitals. In order to determine the number of existing psychiatric and substance abuse beds in each District, HRS reviewed the Hospital Cost Containment Board (HCCB) reports filed on behalf of existing facilities, and also consulted a publication of the Florida Alcohol and Drug Abuse Association entitled "Alcohol and Drug Abuse Treatment-Prevention Programs in Florida, 1983 Directory." When a hospital was included in the Directory or when it reported on the HCCB form that the facility had a separately organized and staffed substance abuse program, HRS personnel called that facility to ascertain the number of beds devoted to such a program. No inquiry was made regarding the method of treating the substance abuse patient or the manner in which the substance abuse unit was staffed. The telephone conversation was then followed up with a confirmation letter. Utilizing these sources of information, as well as the definitions contained in Rules 10-5.11(25) and (27), Florida Administrative Code, HRS completed and published the results of its inventory process. The published inventory includes Horizon Hospital and categorizes its beds as 178 short term psychiatric and 22 substance abuse. The HCCB reports filed by Horizon for the years 1981, 1982 and 1983 indicate in the section entitled "Services Inventory" that Horizon's substance abuse unit bears a "Code" of "1." Code "1" is defined on the form as a "separately organized, staffed and equipped unit of hospital (discrete)." Code "2" on the HCCB form means "services maintained in hospital but not in separate unit (nondiscrete)." In its 1980 HCCB report, Horizon listed its "drug abuse care" and its "alcoholism care" as a Code "1." The 1983 Directory for "Alcohol and Drug Abuse Treatment -- Prevention Programs in Florida," published by the Florida Alcohol and Drug Abuse Association, lists Horizon Hospital as having an "alcohol and chemical abuse program," a "medical non-hospital detoxification program treatment center," "intensive/intermediate residential treatment;" and "drug abuse treatment" for all ages. The source of the information provided in this Directory was not established. Horizon Hospital has published and has distributed a pamphlet entitled "Alcohol and Chemical Abuse -- The Family Disease." This pamphlet describes the nature of alcoholism, how to recognize the symptoms, the family involvement and how Horizon can treat the total problem of alcoholism. The pamphlet describes the treatment team at Horizon to include a medical director, a psychiatrist, a nurse, nursing staff, allied therapist and a social worker. Horizon also has published and distributes a booklet advertising itself as "a private psychiatric hospital" with 200 beds, and as containing six programs -- one of which is the "addictive disease program." The program, noted as the "Horizon Hospital's Alcohol and Chemical Abuse Program of Treatment" is described as being unique in that "unlike most alcoholic rehabilitation centers, it is capable of treating the alcoholic who not only is in need of alcoholism counseling, but also has severe emotional conflicts that require psycho-therapy." Horizon Hospital does provide specialized programs for, what it describes as, subpopulations in psychiatry. These programs include an adult general psychiatric program, a crisis and intensive care program, an adolescent treatment program, an older adult treatment or geriatric program, a pain management program and an addictive disease program. Horizon emphasizes the psychiatric aspect in each program. Patients at Horizon are admitted only by psychiatrists and the bylaws of Horizon require that a psychiatrist visit a patient at least once every three days. The physical layout of Horizon's three-story facility is that two of the units, Unit 31 and Unit 32, are located on the third floor of the building. Unit 31 is known as the adolescent substance abuse unit and Unit 32 is known as the adult substance abuse unit. Each of the units at Horizon has its own staff. The Program Medical Director of Unit 32 is Dr. Vijaya Rivindran, a psychiatrist. Dr. Rivindran holds this position on a part-time basis, and is responsible for the administration of and program philosophy for patient care. As of the time of the hearing, Unit 32 had 26 beds, with a capacity for 30 beds, and Unit 31 had a capacity for 12 beds. The Program Coordinator and the Assistant Program Coordinator for Unit 32 are both psychologists. They control the day-to-day clinical activities of Unit 32 and are directly responsible for the staff supervision. The staff of Unit 32 includes mental health counselors, psychiatric nurses, a social worker and mental health technicians. Most, if not all, of the staff members of Unit 32 have special training in the area of substance abuse. The criterion for admission to Unit 32 is that the patient need psychiatric hospitalization and have some involvement with substance abuse. The average length of stay for a Unit 32 patient is 20 or 21 days. A sample of records from patients discharged from Unit 32 over a three-year period revealed that only 4.8 percent of the patients had a single diagnosis of substance abuse, and some 17 percent of the patients sampled had a primary diagnosis of substance abuse, with another secondary or tertiary diagnosis. The remainder of the patient records sampled illustrates that substance abuse was a secondary or tertiary diagnosis for the patients assigned to Unit 32. In arriving at its inventory of existing and/or approved substance abuse beds, HRS did not base its determinations upon the treatment modality provided patients. Instead, HRS counted beds as substance abuse beds only if they were located in a separately organized and staffed unit of at least ten beds, had specially trained staff and the patients had an average length of stay not exceeding 28 days.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition challenging that portion of the HRS inventory of short-term psychiatric and substance abuse beds relating to Horizon Hospital be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 27th day of March, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: William B. Wiley McFarlain, Bobo, Sternstein, Wiley and Cassedy, P.A. P.O. Box 2174 Tallahassee, Florida 32316 Amy M. Jones Building 1 - Room 407 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Alan C. Sundberg and Cynthia S. Tunnicliff Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, and Cutler, P.A. P.O. Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 C. Gary Williams and Michael J. Glazer Ausley, McMullen, McGehee, Carothers and Proctor P.O. Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 David Pingree Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Harbour Shores Hospital is a 60-bed short-term psychiatric facility, with 36 adult beds and 24 adolescent beds. The facility opened in October 1985, and had an occupancy of 62 percent at the time of the final hearing in March 1986. T. 14, 20. The hospital is an integral part of Lawnwood Medical Center, Inc., located in Ft. Pierce, Florida, and Lawnwood is owned by Hospital Corporation of America. T. 13-14. Hospital Corporation of America now operates 5,000 psychiatric beds in the United States. T. 18. Lawnwood Medical Center, Inc. (Lawnwood), submitted an application for certificate of need number 3363 on June 14, 1984, for the conversion of 12 short-term psychiatric beds to 12 short-term inpatient hospital substance abuse beds. T. 15. No construction is needed to convert these 12 beds. T. 16. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) initially denied the application. T. 106. All references in this order to Harbour Shores Hospital shall include the Petitioner, Lawnwood, unless specifically stated otherwise. The parties stipulated that the only issue in this case is need and any ancillary issue which is based upon need. T. 4-5. HRS has a rule governing short and long-term hospital inpatient hospital substance abuse beds, which is rule 10-5.11(27), Florida Administrative Code. Subparagraph (f)1 of the rule contains what HRS calls bed allocations" and calculates need for a health service district as a whole. Harbour Shores Hospital is located in St. Lucie County in Health District IX. District IX is composed of St. Lucie, Indian River, Martin, Okeechobee, and Palm Beach Counties. HRS Ex. 2, p.7. The District IX Local Health Council has identified two subdistricts for purposes of allocating short term psychiatric and substance abuse beds. Subdistrict 1 is St. Lucie, Martin, Indian River, and Okeechobee Counties, and subdistrict 2 is Palm Beach County. HRS Exhibit 2, p. 7; T. 110. HRS proposes to determine need as of January 1989 using the date of the application as the starting point for the five year period specified in rule 10- 5.11(27)(f)1, Florida Administrative Code. T. 107-6. The basis of this decision is a new policy by HRS to implement the Gulf Court decision. There is a need for only 1 additional short-term substance abuse bed in District IX by January 1989 based upon Rule 10-5.11(27)(f)1, Florida Administrative Code. T. 109. HRS Exhibit 1. HRS proposes also to refer to such need for short term substance abuse beds as indicated by local health council plans, relying upon rule 10- 5.11(27)(h)3, Florida Administrative Code. T. 110. The local health plan for District IX allocates needed beds based upon the subdistricts described above. HRS Exhibit 2, p. 6. Further, the local health plan has adopted the method of HRS found in rule 10-5.11(27), supra, for calculating need, and calculates such need using the HRS rule factor of .06 substance 3. All references in this order to Harbour Shores Hospital shall include the Petitioner, Lawnwood, unless specifically stated otherwise. The parties stipulated that the only issue in this case is need and any ancillary issue which is based upon need. T. 4-5. HRS has a rule governing short and long term hospital inpatient hospital-substance abuse beds, which is Rule 10-5.11(27), Florida Administrative Code. Subparagraph (f)1 of the rule contains what HRS calls bed "allocations" and calculates need for a health service district as a whole. Harbour Shores Hospital is located in St. Lucie County in Health District IX. District IX is composed of St. Lucie, Indian River, Martin, Okeechobee, and Palm Beach Counties. HRS Ex. 2, p.7. The District IX Local Health Council has identified two subdistricts for purposes of allocating short-term psychiatric and substance abuse beds. Subdistrict 1 is St. Lucie, Martin, Indian River, and Okeechobee Counties, and subdistrict 2 is Palm Beach County. HRS Exhibit 2, p.7; T. 110. HRS proposes to determine need as of January 1989 using the date of the application as the starting point for the five-year period specified in Rule 10-5.11(27)(f)1, Florida Administrative Code. T. 107-8. The basis of this decision is a new policy by HRS to implement the Gulf Court decision. There is a need for only 1 additional short-term substance abuse bed in District IX by January 1989 based upon Rule 10-5.11(27)(f)1, Florida Administrative Code. T. 109. Exhibit 1. HRS proposes also to refer to such need for short term substance abuse beds as indicated by local health council plans, relying upon rule 10- 5.11(27)(h)3, Florida Administrative Code. T. 110. The local health plan for District IX allocates needed beds based upon the subdistricts described above. HRS Exhibit 2, p. 6. Further, the local health plan has adopted the method of HRS found in rule 10-5.11(27), supra, for calculating need, and calculates such need using the HRS rule factor of .06 substance abuse beds per 1,000 population in each of the two subdistricts. HRS Exhibit 2, pp. 5 and 8, paragraph II. Using current estimates of the populations of each subdistrict in January 1909, HRS projects that subdistrict 1 will have a surplus of 15 substance abuse beds in 1989, and all net need (16 beds) will be in subdistrict 2, which is Palm Beach County. T. 111; HRS Exhibit 1. HRS has not adopted these subdistricts by rule. T. 128-29. There was no evidence to substantiate the reasonableness of the subdistricts adopted in the local health plan. T. 131. The following is a summary of the existing and approved short-term substance abuse beds in District IX, showing county of location, and occupancy rates for 1985: Humana Hospital 16 Licensed Indian River 8509 Sebastian Lake Hospital 16 Licensed Palm Beach 3558 Palm Beaches Fair Oaks 17 Licensed Palm Beach 3807 Savannas 20 Approved St. Lucie Hospital Beds Status County Patient Days Occupancy 145.7% 60.7% 60.7% The number of patient days at Fair Oaks, however, is for four months, August, October, November, and December 1985. Thus, the actual number of patient days, 1269, has been multiplied by 3 to obtain an estimate for an entire year. T. 23- 24, 61-62. The occupancy rate is the number of patient days divided by the product of the number of days in the year (365) and the number of licensed beds. Using the statistics in paragraph 10, the average occupancy rate for the three existing facilities in District IX was 88.8 percent. If one assumes, as did Petitioner's expert, that the utilization rates for short-term substance abuse beds will at least remain the same as in 1935, with the addition of the 20 new beds at Savannas Hospital, District IX may have an occupancy rate of 63.8 percent and subdistrict 1 may have an occupancy rate of 64.8 percent . The 20 new beds at the Savannas Hospital are those granted to Indian River Community Mental Health Center, Inc., and are projected to open in November 1986. T. 83. As discussed above, Harbour Shores Hospital had been in operation about five months by the time of the March 1986 hearing, and its 60 short term psychiatric beds were averaging 62 percent occupancy, which is about 15 percent above the occupancy projected in its certificate of need application. T. 38. Harbour Shores serves patients from the four counties of subdistrict 1, St. Lucie, Martin, Indian River, and Okeechobee, and serves a significant number of patients from Palm Beach County as well; three to four percent of its patients also come from Brevard and Broward Counties. T. 19. About 80 percent of the patients at Harbour Shores in the first five months of its operation had a substance abuse problem secondary to the primary diagnosis of mental illness. T. 30, 50, 63. This is consistent with experience throughout Florida. T. 63. Most of these "dually diagnosed" patients have been through a detoxification program before entering Harbour Shores Hospital. T. 30. In its beginning months of operation, Harbour Shores has had patients referred from the courts, law enforcement agencies, community and social agencies, physicians, and from HRS. T. 21-22, 59. Harbour Shores can expect to obtain substance abuse referrals from these agencies. Staff at Harbour Shores works with the DWI Board, Students Against Drunk Driving, and school administrative personnel. T. 39-40. In October and November 1985, Harbour Shores received 38 requests from physicians, the courts, law enforcement agencies, and social agencies, for admission of patients for substance abuse treatment. T. 22, 49. There is no evidence that Harbour Shores had any such requests in December 1985 or January 1986. In February 1986, it had 14 such requests, and in March to the date of the hearing, it had 5 requests. T. 48. There is no evidence as to whether these requests were for short or long-term substance abuse services, or whether these were requests from different patients or multiple requests from the same patient. There is also no evidence that the persons requesting substance abuse treatment were not adequately treated at existing facilities. Thus, the data from these few months is not an adequate basis for determining future need for short term substance abuse beds. Ms. Peggy Cioffi is the coordinator for the Martin County Alcohol and Drug Abuse Program. Deposition, Ms. Peggy Cioffi, p. 2. Ms. Cioffi testified as to the need for substance abuse services in her area. She did not testify as an expert witness. Her program is primarily designed to assist the County Court in referrals of misdemeanants and others within the Court's jurisdiction who need substance abuse services. Id. Ms. Cioffi has difficulty placing persons needing inpatient or residential treatment. Id. at p. 3. She related an example of a county prisoner who asked to be detained in jail three months for lack of an alcohol program. Id. at p. 4. Ms. Cioffi did not state whether this person needed residential or inpatient hospital care. She also had recently reviewed a 14 page county court docket and determined that 67 percent of those charged represented alcohol or drug related offenses. Id. Ms. Cioffi did not clearly show how she was able to infer this fact. Further, Ms. Cioffi was unable to tell from this statistic how many of these defendants needed short term inpatient hospital substance abuse treatment. Id. at p. 6. She stated that a very high percentage of these could benefit from some kind of services, but did not separate the kinds of services, Id. at p.7. Ms. Cioffi stated that she often had to wait to find a place for a person in the following facilities: Dunklin, CARP, and Alcohope. Id. at p. 5. Ms. Cioffi stated that these were "residential" facilities, but she did not state whether these facilities were the equivalent of short-term inpatient hospital substance abuse facilities. These facilities are located in District IX, Id. at p. 7, but are not short-term in patient hospital substance abuse beds licensed as such. See paragraph 10 above. See also T. 96-99. In summary, although Ms. Cioffi identified a generalized need for residential or hospital substance abuse treatment, she did not draw any distinction between the two services. If there was a similarity, she did not provide evidence of the similarity. Lacking evidence in the record that need for residential treatment programs can be used to show need for inpatient hospital beds, Ms. Cioffi's testimony is insufficient to show need for the services sought by the Petitioner. The Honorable Marc Cianca is a County Judge in St. Lucie County. Deposition, Judge Marc Cianca, p. 2. Judge Cianca was of the opinion that his area attracted semi-young people with substance abuse problems in greater numbers than the retirement population. Id. at 17-18. He frequently was frustrated in his efforts to find substance abuse services for defendants in his Court. Id. at 3-5. Judge Cianca felt that most of the people he saw needed long-term therapy, beginning with inpatient services, followed by long-term follow-up programs. Id. at 12-14. Like the testimony of Ms. Cioffi (which concerned the same group of persons before the County Court), Judge Cianca did not clearly distinguish need for short-term inpatient hospital substance abuse services from need for all other forms of substance abuse treatment, and the record on this point is silent as well. For this reason, Judge Cianca's opinion that 100 short-term inpatient hospital substance abuse beds are needed must be rejected. The testimony of Ms. Cioffi and Judge Cianca is insufficient as a predicate for determining need for the inpatient hospital beds sought by the Petitioner for another reason, and that is the lack of evidence that the persons identified as needing substance abuse services will have the ability to pay for such services at Petitioner's facility, or that third party payment will be available for them. The people in need in Ms. Cioffi's testimony normally do not have funds to pay for treatment. Cioffi, p. 8. Similarly, a substantial number of the people in need seen by Judge Cianca do not have insurance coverage and would not be able to use Harbour Shores unless they qualified for Medicaid and unless Harbour Shores took all of those qualified for Medicaid. Id. at 7, 15-16. A substantial number of the persons needing substance abuse treatment do not have jobs or insurance and must rely upon "welfare" for services. Id. at 15, 17. These persons cannot afford certain programs, and must rely upon state aid through programs such as those provided by Indian River Community Mental Health Center, and for these programs there is always a waiting list. Id. at There is no evidence that any of these persons are eligible for Medicaid. Ms. Sharon Heinlen, Director of Planning and Development for Harbour Shores Hospital, who testified for the Petitioner as an expert in health planning and hospital administration, had not studied the Medicaid population in the area to determine need. T. 76. Although Harbour Shores had about 15 percent of its psychiatric patient days devoted to Medicaid patients, T. 33, the validity of this percentage for substance abuse patients, or for the reasonably near future, was not established by other evidence. Petitioner's formal application for this certificate of need projects 5 percent of its gross revenues from Medicaid and another 5 percent devoted to bad debt, indigents, and Baker Act cases. Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p. 5. But the application does not state whether this percentage will be evenly distributed among psychiatric and substance abuse patients. In any event, the percentages of indigent care and Medicaid care are too small to satisfy the need identified by Judge Cianca and Ms. Cioffi. Stated another way, the need identified by those two witnesses is not relevant to Petitioner's application except with respect to a small percentage. Harbour Shores plans to have after care for substance abuse patients. T. 40. The Savannas Hospital is the name of the hospital to be completed in November 1986 to provide, among other services, 20 short term inpatient hospital substance abuse beds under the certificate of need granted to Indian River Community Mental Health Center, Inc. T. 82-83. The primary service area of the Savannas Hospital will be the same four counties as now served by Harbour Shores Hospital, as well as Palm Beach County. T. 84. The Savannas Hospital intends to be licensed. T. 84. The Savannas Hospital is located in Port St. Lucie, in St. Lucie County. T. 95-96. The service proposed is a comprehensive substance abuse service. T. 87. Five of the twenty substance abuse beds will be devoted to detoxification. T. 92. The Savannas Hospital will be operated by the Mediplex Group in partnership with Indian River Community Mental Health Center, Inc. T. 82. The land will be owned by Mediplex. T. 95. The Savannas Hospital will be a private, for profit, hospital, while the Mental Health Center will be a not-for- profit facility. T. 86. The Savannas Hospital publicly states that it will take five percent indigent patients, which does not include Medicare. T. 87. There is no commitment to provide more indigent care. T. 89. All other patients acre expected to be fully paying. T. 93. The actual figure for free or nonpaying patients has not yet been calculated. T. 94. The Savannas Hospital will not serve Medicaid substance abuse patients because it is a freestanding facility. T. 36, 86. Humana Hospital Sebastian is the closest facility to Harbour Shores currently in operation providing inpatient short-term hospital substance abuse services, and Humana Sebastian can accept Medicaid patients. T. 59. Ms. Elizabeth Dudek testified for HRS as an expert in health planning and certificate of need review in Florida. Ms. Dudek has reviewed all of the applications made in District IX for substance abuse beds since November 1983, and as a supervisor, has reviewed all of the applications in the state for substance abuse beds. T. 104. She has been in contact with the District Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Program Office and has attended public hearings, as well as administrative hearings, concerning substance abuse beds in District IX. T. 104-05. She also listened to all of the evidence presented at the final hearing. It was Ms. Dudek's opinion that there was no need for the substance abuse beds sought by the Petitioner. T. 127-28. Ms. Sharon Heinlen was also qualified as an expert in health planning, as well as hospital administration. T. 13. Ms. Heinlen has only recently moved to Florida, T. 11, 66, and stated that she did not know Florida well enough to know what might be the best thing to advocate in Florida with respect to whether all hospitals should provide all services. T. 65-66. She had conducted studies of District IX, however. T. 66. The average occupancy rates for District IX testified to by Ms. Heinlen were mathematically incorrect, and the correct lower rates do not support her opinion that additional short term substance abuse beds are needed. See FF 11. The fact that about 80 percent of the psychiatric patients now are at Harbour Shores Hospital also have a substance abuse problem does not necessarily support Ms. Heinlen's opinion as to need. See FF 12. This statistic is consistent with experience in all of Florida, and therefore should be accommodated by the HRS numeric need methodology. Moreover, it must be inferred that hospitalization of these patients as psychiatric patients was proper, rather than as substance abuse patients, and that even if additional substance abuse beds were available, these patients still would need to be in a psychiatric bed for treatment of the primary diagnosis. As discussed in FF 14, the data concerning recent requests for substance abuse services at Harbour Shores Hospital is not sufficient to conclude that a need exists for additional beds. As discussed in FF 17, Ms. Heinlen did not have an adequate basis for any opinion as to the need for short-term substance abuse beds for Medicaid patients in District IX. Finally, Ms. Heinlen testified that there was a waiting list for patients to be admitted to licensed short-term substance abuse beds at Fair Oaks and Lake Hospital, but the testimony was hearsay. T. 28. Since this evidence conflicts with the relatively low occupancy rates at these same facilities, and has not otherwise been corroborated by non-hearsay evidence, it must be rejected as a basis for a finding of fact. Further, due to the conflict with the low occupancy rates, it is rejected as a basis for Ms. Heinlen's expert opinion. In summary, Ms. Heinlen's expert opinion that there is a need for short-term, inpatient hospital substance abuse beds in District IX must be rejected. It is the position of HRS that even if the rule showed a need, the occupancy factor would be a factor in showing no need. T. 134. Conversely, if the rule showed no need, the occupancy factor would be one factor among others which night show need. Id.
